France's rejection of British EEC Membership


Press statement by French president Charles de Gaulle

14 January 1963


When we talk about economic matters, and even more when we are dealing with them, it is essential
for what is said and what is done to conform to reality, for otherwise we end up in deadlocks and
sometimes even in ruin.

Concerning this very important question of the European Economic Community and also lhal of the
possible membership of Great Britain, it is the facts which must be considered first. Sentiments,
as favourable as they might be and as they are, cannot be put forward in disregard of the real
facts of the problem. What are these facts?

The Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States,

States which are, to put it briefly, economically of the same nature. Whether in terms of their
industrial or agricultural production, of their foreign trade, of their commercial practices and
clients, or of their living and working conditions, there are many more similarities than
differences between them. Moreover, they are adjacent, they interpenetrate, they are extensions of
each other through their communication links. The very fact of grouping them and linking them
together in such a way lhal what they produce, buy, sell, and consume by preference within their
own grouping thus conforms to reality.

It must be added, moreover, that from the standpoint of their economic development, their social
progress and their technological capability they are, in short, in stride with each other and they
are moving forward at more or less the same pace. Furthermore, it happens lhal there exists between
them no kind of political grievance, no border disputes, no rivalry for domination or power. To the
contrary, there is a feeling of solidarity between them, first owing to the awareness they have of
sharing an important part of the origins of their civilisation, and also with regard to their
security, because they are continental countries and they are confronted by the same single threat
from one end of their territorial grouping to the other. Finally they have a feeling of solidarity
because not one of them is linked externally by any special political or military agreement.

Thus it has been psychologically and materially possible to organise an economic community of the
Six. This was not without difficulty. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long
discussions, and once concluded - so lhal something could be accomplished - it was necessary for us
French to straighten ourselves out in the economic, financial, and monetary domain. And this was
done in 1959.

From that time on, the Community was workable in principle, but it was then necessary to implement
the Treaty. Now this Treaty, which was quite specific and complete on the subject of industry, was
not at all specific and complete on the subject of agriculture. And yet, it was essential for our
country lhal this be settled.

For it is indeed quite obvious lhal agriculture is an essential element of our national activity as
a whole. We cannot conceive of a Common Market in which French agriculture would not find outlets
commensurate with its production, and we agree lhal, among the Six, we are the country for which
this necessity is the most imperative.

That is why last January, when consideration was being given to implementing the second stage of
the Treaty, in other words, to a practical beginning of its application, we were led to insist on
the

introduction of agriculture into the Common Market as a formal condition. This was finally accepted
by our partners, but very complex and

difficult arrangements were needed. And some of these arrangements are still being worked out. I
will note in passing that, in this vast undertaking, all the decisions taken were taken by
Governments, for nowhere else is there any authority or responsibility. But I should say that, in
order to prepare and clarify matters, the Brussels Commission worked in a highly objective and
pertinent fashion.

Then Great Britain applied for membership of the Common Market. It did so after refusing earlier to
participate in the community that was being built, and after then having created a free trade area
with six other States,2 and finally - I can say this, the negotiations conducted for so long on
this subject can be recalled - after having put some pressure on the Six in order to prevent the
application of the Common Market from really getting started. Britain thus in its turn requested
membership, but on its own conditions.

This undoubtedly raises for each of the six States and for England problems of a very great
dimension.

England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets, and food supply to
very diverse and often very distant countries. Its activities are essentially industrial and
commercial, and only slightly agricultural. It has, throughout its work, very marked and original
customs and traditions. In short, the nature, structure, and economic context of England differ
profoundly from those of the other States of the Continent.

What is to be done so that Britain, in the way it lives, in the way it produces and in the way it
trades, can be incorporated into the Common Market such as it has been conceived and such as it
functions?

For example, the means by which the people of Great Britain nourish themselves is in fact by
importing foodstuffs purchased at low prices in the two Americas or in the former dominions, while
still granting large subsidies to British farmers. This method is obviously incompatible with the
system the Six have quite naturally established for themselves.

The system of the Six consists of making a pool of the agricultural products of the entire
Community, of strictly determining their prices, of forbidding subsidising, of organising their
consumption between all the members and of making it obligatory for each of these members to pay to
the Community any savings they might make by having foodstuffs brought in from outside instead of
consuming those offered by the Common Market.

Once again, what is to be done to make Britain, such as it is, enter that system?

One was sometimes led to believe that our British friends, in applying for membership in the Common
Market, agreed to change their own ways even to the point of applying all the conditions accepted
and practised by the Six, but it is necessary to know if Great Britain can at present position
itself, with the Continent and like it, within a tariff that is truly common, give up all
preference with regard to the Commonwealth; cease to claim that its agriculture be privileged and,
even more, consider as null and void the commitments it has made to the countries that are part of
its free trade area. That question is the one at issue.

One cannot say that it has now been resolved. Will it be so one day? Obviously Britain alone can
answer that.

The question is all the more relevant since, following Britain, other States which are, I repeat,
linked to it in the Free Trade Area, would or will want to enter the Common Market fór the same
reasons as Great Britain.

It must be agreed that first the entry of Great Britain and then that of those other States will
completely change the series of adjustments, agreements, compensations, and regulations already
established between the Six, because all these States, like Britain, have very important traits of
their own. We would then have to envisage the construction of another Common Market. But the
11-member, then 13-member, and then perhaps 18-member Common Market that would be built would,
without any doubt, hardly resemble the one the Six have built.

Moreover, this Community, growing in that way, would be confronted with all the problems of its
economic relations with a crowd of other States, and first of all with the United States.

It is foreseeable that the cohesion of all its members, who would be very numerous and very
diverse, would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic
Community dependent on the US and under American leadership which would soon completely swallow up
the European Community.

This is an assumption that can be perfectly justified in the eyes of some, but it is not at all
what France aspired to and what France still aspires to i.e. a strictly European construction.

Then, it is possible that Britain would one day come round to transforming itself enough to belong
to the European Community without restriction and without reservation, and placing it ahead of
anything else, and in that case the Six would open the door to it and France would place no
obstacle on its path, although obviously the mere membership of Britain in the Community would
completely change its nature and its size.

It is also possible that England is not yet prepared to do this, and that

indeed appears to be the outcome of the long, long Brussels talks. But if this is the case, we
should not rutake a drama out of it. . . .