The conception of experience, tradition and human being in hermeneutics of H. –G. Gadamer and C. G.
Jung




      As far as the problem of experience, tradition and human being  is concerned, we can find
similar conceptions by Hans-Georg Gadamer and the founder of the analytic psychology and the theory
of archetypes, Carl Gustav Jung.

      On the basis of a structural investigation of inner opposites and contradictions, C. G. Jung
articulated, with the help of verifiable empirical procedures, the theory of the substantial
function of collective unconsciousness in creating mythological thought. This theory is also very
inspiring for an unspeculative philosophical anthropology, which operates with mythical-narrative
and deep-founded structures. In such a conception of a hermeneutically oriented philosophical
anthropology, the term collective unconsciousness  becomes the parallel category to the notion of
collective consciousness.

      In Jung´s view, there is a substantional binding link among the notions of tradition, myth,
collective consciousness and collective unconsciousness. Collective consciousness is from the point
of Jungian depth psychology comprehended as the "aggregate of the traditions, conventions, customs,
prejudices, rules, and norms of human collectivity which give the consciousness of the group as a
whole its direction, and by which the individuals of this group consciously but quite
unreflectingly live".12  In this context,  Jung is very close to Gadamer´s hermeneutics with its
emphasis on the great importance of tradition for the social and cultural continuity of the
humankind.  In Jung´s view tradition can compensate the inevitable one-sidedness and extravagances
of modern progress. "The retarding ideal is always more primitive, more natural (in the good sense
as in the bad), and more "moral" in that it keeps faith with law and tradition. The progressive
ideal is always more abstract, more unnatural, and less "moral" in that it demands disloyalty to
tradition."13 If we take into account the problem of relation of philosophical hermeneutics and the
depth hermeneutics, we can also argue that hermeneutical conceptions of   Heidegger,  Gadamer and
Jung have as their common feature the dialectical conception of experience. In the epistemological
tradition of depth psychology and psychoanalytical literary science (C. G. Jung, G. Condrau, J.
Hillman, P. von Matt, B. Urban, F. Gessing), modern philosophical hermeneutics (M. Heidegger, H.-G.
Gadamer), and American neopragmatism (R. Rorty, S. Cavell, H. Bloom), there is an emphasis on the
deep, imaginative and projecting character of human experience which helps to overcome the
theoretical foundation of experience on the processes of mere seeing, mirroring the world.14

        Gadamer´s basic conception of experience is, due to Heidegger´s influence, dialectical and
existential; he emphasizes those  forms of experience which cannot be verified by means of exact
sciences.15 According to Gadamer, the main paradigm of experience is drawn from philosophy,
history, art, and religion. In this context, Gadamer is interested in the deep philosophical
reflection of the religious experience, and examines the wide range of human experience and its
spiritual dimensions. Gadamer´s analysis of religious and life experience helps him to overcome a
limited scientific conception of knowledge and truth.16   A typical feature of experience is also
its openness and connection with the finitude of the human being, which means the experience of our
"painful failure".17 The subject of the hermeneutical process could only be  someone who has
learned  from the dialectical character of experience to such an extent that he is prepared for the
new experiences. The dialectical character of experience can  therefore only be realized through
the openness ("Offenheit") for new experiences. This kind of openness  "has the structure of
question," and is freely loosened up by means of  the experience itself.18

       Here Gadamer draws from Hegel´s conception of experience (in The Phenomenology of Spirit) as
a dialectical process. Our experience leads to the recognition that there is a contradiction
between our consciousness and the object itself. The fact that our consciousness does not accord
with its object must lead to a change in our consciousness. Gadamer calls this process a "reversal
in consciousness" and therefore, from his point of view, the essence of hermeneutical experience
gains the character of dialectical movement.19 Hermeneutical experience, as Georgia Warnke argues,
is in fact learning experience, an experience that in a sense cannot be repeated and serves to
"negate the error or partiality of our previous views". 20

       We can find a very similar conception of the dialectical character of our experience and
knowledge by C. G. Jung. He claims that  "the transition from morning to afternoon means
re-valuation of the earlier values. There comes the urgent need to appreciate the value of the
opposite of our former ideals, to perceive the error of our former convictions."21

       It is obvious that Jung´s account of experience, like Gadamer´s,  is dialectical,
emphasizing its negativity. However, Jung´s conception of experience is directly influenced not by
Hegel, but above all by Heraclitus. It was Heraclitus who discovered the very important principle
of depth hermeneutics, namely the regulative function of opposites. He called it enantiodromia, by
which he meant that everything must ultimately flow into its opposite. Jung follows this Heraclitan
principle and also formulates  his hermeneutically oriented dialectical conception of the world and
human being: "Everything human is relative, because everything rests on the inner polarity; for
everything is a phenomenon of energy. Energy necessarily depends on a pre-existing polarity,
without which there could be no energy. There must always be high and low, hot and cold, etc. so
that the equilibrating process -- which is energy -- can take place." 22  We can find a certain
analogy between  Jung´s view on the energetic character of the world reality and  Gadamer´s
conception of energetic, dialectical character of  sprachliches Geschehen as the medium of
hermeneutical ontology.

       Much like philosophical hermeneutics, the domain of Jung´s depth psychology is in the
borderland between cognition and experience. In this borderland, which by its very nature must
confront the conceptual and metaphorical language, Jung strives, with all his power of creative
expression, to draw the necessary and legitimate semantic distinctions adequate to the realm of the
life-experience ("Lebenserfahrung“). Heidegger´s and Gadamer´s philosophical hermeneutics on the
one hand and Jung´s hermeneutically oriented depth psychology on the other hand,  investigate the
problems of the destiny of man, the sense of human life that cannot be resolved by exact sciences,
but can only be experienced.23

        The hermeneutical theories of Heidegger, Gadamer and  Jung, concerning the problems of the
dialectical character of experience, are closely connected with the analogous conceptions of the
temporality and finitude of the human being. In a certain extent Gadamer accepts the basic features
of Heidegger´s philosophical theory of time, connected with Heidegger´s characteristics of  the
temporality of  Dasein as striving to the future, which  is, however, characterized as Vorlaufen -
zum - Tode.  In Gadamer´s view, „Heidegger derives the circular structure of understanding from the
temporality of Dasein.“ (Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2^nd rev. Edn, Joel Weinsheimer and
Donald G. Marshall (trans.) New York: Crossroad, 1991, p. 266)

       In accordance with Heidegger (but also Aristotle and Augustine) Gadamer proclaims the thesis
that "a sense for time is primarily a sense for what is future, not for what is present." 24 As
Gadamer points out, "Heidegger rather showed how  ´ knowledge´ of death lies at the base of our
experience of time and of our reckoning with time." 25

        However, in his study “Concerning Empty and Full-filled Time,” Gadamer strives to overcome
the tragic dimension of Heidegger´s   Sein-zum-Tode by means of  a cyclical conception of
temporality, which means that time is presented as  "a process which is rhythmically repeated" in a
circle.26  But it is remarkable that the form of a circle is typical for so-called mandalas or
"magic circles" which, according to C.G. Jung, represent a primordial image of psychic totality,
while their inner purpose is to transform chaos into cosmos. Mandalas express the view of the
cyclical character of natural life and they are, from the therapeutical point of view, helpful to
the self-reconstruction and regeneration of psychic life.

         Against the tragic dimension of Heidegger´s conception of temporality and human being´s
finitude, Gadamer  aplies the neo-Platonic notion of  Aion, which he interprets as the lifetime of
the world´s organism; the superior, unlimited duration of the world enlivened by its "soul."  He
seeks the resolution of this tragic experience of human finitude  in a conception of organic time
which might overcome the ´throwness´ of  the human into her subjectivity,  reconciling her with her
finitude,  but simultaneously  incorporating her in the "history of being. " As  mentioned above,
in his theory of organic time Gadamer seeks its basic sources in the neo-Platonic tradition, in its
notion of  Aion as "the temporal structure of that which endures as one and the same in every
alteration and articulation of life´s phases, namely liveliness  ("Lebendigkeit"). 27

      Gadamer´s conception of organic time is based on the cyclical process of life, perpetual
renewal of balance and a rhythmically recurrent return to the beginning, regeneration and rebirth.
The process of individualization of human being, although it leads to the gain of one´s own
temporality, has as its consequence the loss of identity with the life cycle and so it excludes the
possibility of return to the original state. In Gadamer´s view the problem of human finitude was
profoundly grasped by the following statement of the Greek doctor Alkmaion: "Human beings therefore
have to die because they have not learned to connect the end with the beginning." 28  From the
point of view of Gadamer´s hermeneutically oriented philosophical anthropology, the human being is
a fateful creature whose  certainty of his own of life consciously includes the certainty of death.

      Where is the solution to this tragic situation of the human being, suffering  the
consciousness of his finitude, the senselessness and aimlessness of his life? Where is the escape
from the universal neurosis of our time, in which a complete spiritual, social and cultural
disorientation has taken hold of mankind? It is interesting that Gadamer´s solution (as well as
Jung´s theory of individuation) is prospective, stressing the most profound forms of temporal
experience and therefore influenced by depth psychology. "Only he who can leave what lies behind
him or what is removed from him beyond his reach, who does not cling fast to what is past as
something which he cannot reliquish, is at úof neuroses in modern depth psychology, which teaches
us that when a person is bound to something, is not free from it, he is prohibited from becoming
free for his own possibilities." 29


     In Gadamer´s view we can find the way to the reconciliation with the tragic fact of man´s
finitude in an analogy to the so-called epoch experience.  In experiencing an epoch, wherever it
takes place, we also experience the necessity of leaving it aside, in the same way as we must
conceal in the process of our own maturation and aging, for instance with the necessity of a
transition from one half to the second half of our life. At the same time we can find
individual-psychological, personal correspondence to this epoch experience -- as Gadamer argues --
in the Christian hope which  only becomes significant when we do not insist upon what is  old and
subsiding. More over, the ability to bid farewell, just as much as the openness for the new, has
the character of transition and transformation.

     This hermeneutical conception of transition and transformation has its analogy in  Jung´s
theory of individuation, in which the very concept of personal transformation occupies a
fundamental place. We can say  first  that C.G. Jung is convinced (as is Gadamer) that transition
and transformation are strained positions between departure from the old and  openness toward the
new. Both in Jung´s theory of individuation and in Heidegger´s and Gadamer´s conception of
temporality, the problem of man´s finitude is solved in a transcendental, mythical and religious
dimension. However, if we closely compare Jung´s theory of individuation with the conception of
man´s finitude in  Gadamer´s philosophy, we can characterize Jung´s theory as more elaborate, based
upon  his deep psychological experience and erudite knowledge of  human character.

 In a certain analogy with the conception of hermeneutical understanding as "the dialogue of the
soul with itself" C. G. Jung strives to understand the crisis of modern man by activation of the
profoundest depths of his soul that means to counter his life disorientation by "activating the
creative forces of his unconscious and by consciously integrating them into the whole of the
psyche". By raising these forces to consciousness, which results in a "new creation" in our human
experience and in a deeper self-knowledge, the individual "achieves an inward and outword bond with
the world and cosmic order". 30 In this context we can find the obvious theoretical analogy with
this Jung´s conception in Gadamer°s interpretation of Aion as the complete identity of life with
itself, namely liveliness ("Lebendigkeit").31 The identity of man with himself is also the aim of
the process of individuation in which "the work on the psyche paves the way for a
spiritual-ethical-religious order" and this process  "must be chosen consciously and freely by the
individual". 32

 What is the contribution of Jung´ s depth psychology and the theory of archetypes for the
methodology of human sciences? It is obvious that archetypes have their specific place especially
in humanities: philosophy, history, religious studies, depth psychology, literary science, where is
used the hermeneutical methodology of understanding. From that point we ought to differentiate
between the function of archetypes and the function of the so-called motifs in social sciences.
These motifs do not enable to understand deeply the behavior and basic features of a certain
subject or personality. In fact they only "conform socially established opinion about a certain
type of people".33

    Therefore archetypes cannot be identified with the motifs of human action, because they
represent something deeper, which is bounded not only with social dimension and which cannot be
comprehended by the scientific category of explanation: "Not for a moment dare we succumb to the
illusion that an archetype can be finally explained and disposed of. Even the best attempts at
explanation are only more or less successful translations into another metaphorical language."
34 The archetypes are universally human manifestations of life, which represent or personify
"certain instinctive data of the dark, primitive psyche, the real but invisible roots of
consciousness".35 The paradox of archetype is that it is both universal (collective), and yet only
accessible through individual experience. Taking an example from the Old Testament, for instance
the personage of Job can be understood as the archetype of suffering, better to say the archetype
of  relation to suffering.

 It is also necessary to emphasize that in contradiction to the ordinary views which comprehend
archetypes as mere images and content entities that C. G. Jung claims the formal, structural and
collective character of archetypes. In his view the structure of archetype "might perhaps be
compared to the axial system of a crystal, which, as it were, preforms the crystalline structure in
the mother liquid, although it has no material existence of his own". [...] "The axial system
determines only the stereometric structure but not the concrete form of the individual crystal".
Analogically "the archetype [...] has an invariable nucleus of meaning - but only in principle,
never as regards its concrete manifestation".36 Archetypes, as well as the symbols from the
unconscious, "correspond to certain collective (and not personal) structural elements of human
psyche in general, and, like the morphological elements of the human body, are inherited". 37 From
the epistemological point view Jung´s conception of the relation between human being and object of
knowledge is very inspiring for contemporary hermeneutics. It is obvious more and more that the
epistemological process cannot be apprehended only from the view of affecting of the outer world to
the subject of knowledge, but also as "remembering from within", in such a way that the world
reveals and interprets itself from the archetypal core, and with the creative participation of
man.38 On the basis of Jung´s theory concerning the importance of archetypal structures for life
orientation of human being, the depth hermeneutics stresses these methodological procedures which
are based on investigating resemblances, differences, participations of the object of our knowledge
to appropriate archetype. Therefore it is often possible to infer from the meaning of an archetype
the meaning of an object of knowledge. 39


Notes

12 Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (Yale University Press, New Haven and London,
1973), p. 29-30.

13 C. G. Jung and C. Kerényi, Essays on a Science of Mythology. The Myth of the Divine Child and
the Mysteries of Eleusis. Translated by R.F.C. Hull. (Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.,
1971), p.82.

 14 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Oxford (UK) - Cambridge (USA): B. Blackwell
1994, p. 144.

 15 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. 2nd edition (J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1965), p. 496. XXVI,
XXVII.

 16 H.-G. Gadamer, "Gadamer on Gadamer", in: Gadamer and Hermeneutics, ed. with an introduction by
Hugh J. Silverman. Routledge: New York and London 1991, p. 15.

 17 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode. 2nd edition (J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1965), p. 496.

 18 Ebenda, p. 344.

 19 Ebenda, p. 103.

 20 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason. (Stanford university Press,
Stanford, California, 1987) p. 26.

 21Carl Gustav Jung, "The Psychology of the Unconscious" in The Collected Works of C. G. Jung,
Volume 7. Two Essays on Analytical Philosophy. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1953), p. 60.

 22 Ebenda, p. 74.

 23 Compare Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (Yale University Press, New Haven and
London, 1973), p. 65.

 24 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-filled Time", in Martin Heidegger: In Europe and
America. Ed E. G. Ballard, C. E. Scott (The Hague, 1973) p. 83.

 25 Ebenda, p. 80.

 26 Ebenda, p. 83.

 27 Ebenda, p. 85.

 28 Quoted according Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", in Martin
Heidegger: In Europe and America. Ed E. G. Ballard, C. E. Scott (The Hague, 1973) p. 83.

 29 Ebenda, p. 88.

 30 Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (Yale University Press, New Haven and London,
1973) p. 133, 109.

 31 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", in Martin Heidegger: In Europe and
America. Ed E. G. Ballard, C. E. Scott (The Hague, 1973), p. 85.

 32 Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (Yale University Press, New Haven and London,
1973), p. 142.

33 Gerlinda Šmausová, "Rozumění a morální hodnocení ve fenomenologické sociologii" [Understanding
and moral evaluation in phenomenological sociology], in V. Gluchman, Reflexie o humánnosti a etike.
[Reflections on humanity and ethics] (Prešov University Press, Prešov, 1999), p. 131.

 34 C.G. Jung, C. Kerényi, Essays on a Science of Mythology. Translated by R. F. C. Hull.
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971), p. 79.

 35 Ebenda, p. 79.

 36 C. G. Jung, "Psychological Aspects of the Mother Archetype" in The Collected Works of C. G.
Jung. Volume 9. The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London,
1959), pp.79-80.

37 C. G. Jung, C. Kerényi, Essays on a Science of Mythology. Translated by R. F. C. Hull.
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971), p. 74.

 38 Rudolf Starý, Filmová hermeneutika [Hermeneutics of Film Art]. (Saggitarius, Praha, 1999),
p.11.

 39 Ebenda, p. 44.