Slavonica, Vol. 10, No. 2, November 2004

A PIVOTAL TURN: PRAGUE SPRING 1948 AND THE SOVIET CONSTRUCTION OF A CULTURAL SPHERE[1]

KIRIL TOMOFF

University of California, Riverside

This article begins to describe the Soviet Union's attempt to create a cultural sphere in the emerging Eastern bloc through the lens of musical ties, exchanges, and competitions. Focusing on a pivotal international festival, Prague Spring 1948, it strives to reveal Soviet aspirations, strategies, and expectations for its cultural sphere during one of the Cold War's most formative periods. It argues that the festival marked the moment at which two cultural spheres in Europe became operationally distinct. Within the Soviet sphere, it also argues that Soviet confusion and insecurity, prevailing attitudes among East Central European musicians, and Soviet efforts to placate them created a baseline of internal diversity and an emphasis on competition with the West from which Soviet discipline later could be imposed more aggressively. By characterizing Soviet decision makers' overarching visions in early 1948, it provides a descriptive starting point for study of the construction of a Soviet cultural sphere and the transformation of the Soviet cultural 'system' that resulted from its contact with an East Central Europe that it sought to dominate politically, economically, and militarily. It thus initiates a study of how the Soviet Union's imperial presence in East Central Europe changed Soviet society and culture.

At the end of the Second World War, Europe was divided and much of it was occupied by the military forces of the victorious Allies — primarily the Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain. Even long before the war had ended, Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill had begun to meet to discuss the post-war order. Within two years of the war's end, the strains between the Allies about that order, which had never completely disappeared through years of co-operation, burst into outright competition and finally developed into a Cold War confrontation between two nuclear superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States. The two superpowers sought to carve out and demarcate spheres of control within Europe, and what began as strategic and political confrontation soon became competing projects for global influence that had significant cultural overtones. In order to understand the nature and extent of these efforts and Cold War competition in Europe, the superpowers' cultural activities must be investigated. This article begins to describe the Soviet Union's attempt to create a cultural sphere in the emerging Eastern bloc through the lens of musical ties, exchanges, and competitions. It focuses on one specific, pivotal international festival, Prague

Spring 1948. By examining the Prague Spring festival, this article reveals Soviet aspirations, strategies, and expectations for its cultural sphere during one of the Cold War's most formative periods. It argues that the festival marked the moment at which the two cultural spheres in Europe became operationally distinct. Within the Soviet sphere, it also argues that Soviet confusion and insecurity, prevailing attitudes among musicians in the peoples' democracies, and Soviet efforts to placate them created a baseline of internal diversity and an overriding emphasis on competition with the West from which a later, more aggressive imposition of Soviet discipline in East Central Europe could begin.

Scholarly writing about the Cold War has been overwhelmingly dominated by concern with high politics and, especially, superpower diplomacy. The few exceptions to this focus have revealed American cultural strategy in Europe or analysed the role of Western-style popular culture (especially rock music) in the Soviet sphere.[2] But Soviet cultural policy goals, cultural competition strategies, and the practices that helped create a Soviet cultural sphere after the war have been comparatively ignored.[3] This article strives to begin addressing this lacuna by analysing Moscow's intentions at a pivotal moment near the start of the Cold War.

Throughout this article, repeated reference is made to a 'Soviet music system' or a 'Soviet cultural system,' the components of which can be described as 'Soviet-style.' These convenient if imprecise appellations require some explanation and qualification to avoid the appearance that they represent an immutable ideal type, pre-formed in the Soviet Union and ready for transplantation abroad.[4] I follow the lead of György Péteri and Michael David-Fox in eschewing such an understanding for one that acknowledges the dynamic nature of the 'system' and its capacity for continual transformation inspired by contact with East Central Europe.

Still, 'Soviet cultural system' and its related phrases remain useful shorthand. For the remainder of this article, they are meant to refer to an interlocking set of institutions and discursive practices which produced, oversaw, and disseminated the artistic products created in the Soviet Union and organized, financed, and disciplined Soviet cultural practitioners. Institutionally, this 'system' was comprised of three primary branches: 1) a set of creative unions (the Composers' Union, the Writers' Union, the Artists' Union, etc.) nominally independent of both governmental and party bureaucracies; 2) a governmental bureaucracy comprised of performance ensembles, theatres, museums, and so forth, which was crowned by a co-ordinating oversight body (the Committee on Artistic Affairs); and 3) a party bureaucracy capped by a changing committee in the Central Committee apparatus (usually short-handed as Agitprop).

Discursively, the 'system' was characterized by efforts to establish and police the boundaries of appropriate musical creativity. Appropriate music was theoretically labelled 'socialist realist,' but socialist realism was never precisely defined, either positively or by exemplar. Instead, the Soviet 'system' was characterized by vague and often nonsensical instructions from governmental and party oversight institutions that were interpreted, often creatively and broadly, by musicians, especially members of the Composers' Union. The primary restriction on these interpretations was that they had to stay within relatively broad boundaries that excluded the radical experimentation with musical form, atonality, serialism, and other features characteristic of high musical modernism in the West. Political authorities reserved the right to intervene into musical politics, which they did rarely, but dramatically and to traumatic effect. Aside from these distressing interventions, however, Soviet composers and musicologists generally used their privileged access to musical expertise to distribute the

comparatively generous resources allocated to the music sphere as their leadership saw fit, to establish their own hierarchies of prestige and privilege (subject to state intervention), to educate their successors, to minimize the lasting effects of party intervention, and most generally to produce the Soviet Union's musical culture. It was this system that the Soviets eventually sought to replicate in East Central Europe.

Efforts to do so depended on Soviet-sponsored musical exchanges that typically fell into one of three categories: cultural delegations, adjudicated international competitions, and expert consultations. These three types of musical exchange served distinct but mutually supporting purposes. The most common type of exchange immediately following the war was the cultural delegation, the primary purpose of which was the *exhibition* of exemplary Soviet music.[5] But the Soviets sought more than just to exhibit their musical culture. They also wanted to *demonstrate its superiority* over any other music production system, a goal which they pursued vigorously through the participation of Soviet musicians in adjudicated international competitions.[6] Finally, in the expert consultation, prominent individual artistic experts were sent to cities in the emerging Soviet bloc on extended business trips during which they usually directed the creative efforts of an artistic institution in the host country and thereby helped *constitute* the Sovietized system there. For example, a prominent opera director from Moscow might visit Hungary and direct a production of a Soviet opera or ballet at the opera and ballet theatre in Budapest.[7]

Examining all three types of exchange during the Prague festival provides a sense of Moscow-based decision makers' goals for international musical exchanges, their perceptions of the effectiveness of those exchanges, and the measures that they sought to enact in order to achieve those goals. Before discussing the festival in detail, however, an important caveat is in order. This examination of a single festival is not a substitute for a detailed investigation of the dynamics of each type of exchange over the entire period. It cannot provide an understanding of the real diversity of expectations and experience that pertained to different countries within the emerging cultural sphere. Further, it does not seek to provide a realistic sense of the reception of Moscow's policies in those countries or the transformation of musical culture prompted by the Soviet presence in each.[8] Instead, it seeks to characterize Soviet decision makers' overarching visions for the entire cultural sphere at one distinct, pivotal point in time. It can at best hope to provide a descriptive baseline from which further developments in the construction of a Soviet cultural sphere can be traced. To the extent that it almost exclusively focuses on Soviet perceptions and actions, it also provides the baseline for a study of the transformation of the Soviet 'system' described above that resulted from its contact with the cultural sphere it sought to dominate politically, economically, and militarily. It thus initiates a study of how the Soviet Union's imperial presence in East Central Europe changed Soviet society and culture.

Planning Prague Spring in an uneasy Europe

Prague began to host an annual music festival each spring as early after the war as 1946. Each year, delegations from around the world would descend on Prague to take part in a festival of concerts, competitions, and exhibitions. But the 1948 festival in particular took place at a moment of tremendous flux, both within Czechoslovakia and in Europe as a whole. Since the 1947 festival, a number of things had happened to solidify existing divisions within Europe and push the superpowers toward their Cold War. In June 1947, the United States had offered

all devastated European countries participation in the enormous economic relief package known as the Marshall Plan, an offer that countries in the emerging Soviet bloc were forced to reject. In September 1947, East Central European Communist parties, most still part of nominally co-operative ruling coalitions, were invited to join a new political coordinating body dreamed up in Moscow — the Cominform. And in March 1948, the Soviet Union walked out of the Allied Control Commission, abandoning the co-operative decision-making structures established as the war was coming to a close. Within two weeks of the festival's conclusion, the Berlin Blockade would begin and the emerging Soviet bloc would receive its first decisive split when Tito and the Yugoslavs were expelled from Cominform.

These European-wide developments precipitated or took place amidst domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well. In July 1947, the Kliueva–Roskin Affair in the Soviet Union triggered a new ideological offensive against international collaboration and foreign contacts, especially cultural, scientific, or artistic contacts with the West.[9] And in February 1948, the Central Committee announced the most thoroughgoing intervention into the music realm it would ever take, disciplining the Soviet Union's most accomplished and internationally recognized composers and culminating in the First All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers in April 1948.[10] In Czechoslovakia, events were even more explosive. In February, the prime minister accepted the resignations of all non-communist ministers in the Czechoslovak government, precipitating a crisis that would only be resolved coincidentally during the Prague Spring festival with the ratification of a communist-based constitution and the final consolidation of communists in power.

It was in the midst of these tumultuous events that the 1948 Prague Spring festival was planned and took place. According to Soviet sources, the planning of the music festival was entirely in the hands of local cultural leaders, especially the Czech Composers' Union and the Czech Philharmonic.[11] Invitations to prospective Soviet participants in both the Smetana Piano Competition and the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics that were taking place during the festival were sent in time to get the approval of the Soviet Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in mid-January 1948.[12] Unfortunately, the Soviet music world had just started down the slippery slope to Central Committee intervention. The participants and the agencies that represented them to the party leadership did not get approval to participate before the beginning of the public party intervention of early February and the brouhaha surrounding it. The issue of Soviet participation in the Prague Festival was only revisited in March.

By then, the festival was only two months away, and time was running short. At the beginning of March, the Committee on Artistic Affairs consulted with the organizers from the Czech Philharmonic, discussed the financial ramifications of the trip with the Second Secretary of the Soviet embassy in Prague, and received clearance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The head of the Committee, P. Lebedev, assembled a comprehensive recommendation for the Soviet delegation.[13] Possibly after further prompting by the Soviet embassy in Prague,[14] the Central Committee apparatus only took up the issue at the very end of March when Lebedev submitted a new, very short report that just addressed the issue of composers' and musicologists' participation in the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics.[15] After checking with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Composers' Union, bureaucrats in the Central Committee apparatus essentially endorsed Lebedev's two proposals, introducing only three minor changes designed to strengthen the Soviet presence on the piano jury, shore up the ideological credentials of the delegation's musicologists, and

maintain the new domestic leadership of the Composers' Union at home for the duration of the proposed trip to Prague.[16]

The final delegation as recommended by the Committee on Artistic Affairs, the Composers' Union, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Central Committee apparatus was thus comprised of four performance musicians, including an accompanist (E. L. Gilel's, K. K. Ivanov, M. P. Maksakova, and B. M. Iurtaikin), three piano jurists (A. B. Gol'denveizer, L. N. Oborin, and P. A. Serebriakov), three composers (T. N. Khrennikov, Iu. A. Shaporin, and V. P. Solov'ev-Sedoi), and two musicologists (T. N. Livanova and B. M. Iarustovskii). The creative proclivities of these twelve musicians demonstrate the musical face that the Soviet decision-makers in Moscow sought to present to the world. That face was one of excellence in instrumental and vocal performance and accessibility in symphonic, choral, and music theatrical composition.

When this proposal finally reached the upper levels of the party leadership, however, the whole project received a peremptory dismissal. In the post-war Stalin period, any international travel had to be approved by the Politburo, and complicated proposals like the Prague Spring delegation were often routed through the Secretariat on their way to the top. In most cases, both the Secretariat and the Politburo merely rubber-stamped what were thoroughly investigated, carefully considered, and well-documented recommendations. In this case, however, the Secretariat did not approve. In a short, terse decision, it noted that Soviet composers were busy with organizational and explanatory work connected with the barely completed All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers, and the most outstanding concertizing musicians could not be spared for a trip to Prague. So, the entire proposal was rejected.[17]

This episode demonstrates first and foremost how preoccupied the most powerful Soviet leaders were with *domestic* cultural developments in early 1948. This is not to say that Stalin and his innermost circle were ignoring international affairs. Such a claim would be patently absurd in the face of the Frankfurt Charter (9 February), the Czechoslovak crisis (20–25 February), and the decision to abandon the Allied Control Commission (20 March). Rather, international deliberations at the highest level in early 1948 were entirely political and strategic. Artistic and musical life was worthy of attention even in this highly charged international atmosphere, but only domestic Soviet artistic and musical life.

The bureaucrats within the party's cultural oversight apparatus were not so preoccupied, and sometime in the first eleven days after the Secretariat decision of 8 May, the top party leaders were persuaded that the Soviets would miss an important cultural opportunity if they did not participate in the festival. When the Politburo heard the issue on 19 May, it overturned the earlier decision and agreed to send a delegation to Prague, only slightly changing its membership from the proposals of late March by replacing Maksakova with another soprano (N. D. Shpiller) and the accompanist with an operatic baritone (A. P. Ivanov).[18]

But all was not well. By the time the Politburo finally voted to send the Soviet delegation, the festival had already begun, and its organizers had been told on the eve of the first day that no Soviet delegation would participate.[19] Programmes were set, and the Soviets were not on them. Soviet indecision and inefficiency thus created a huge organizational headache for the festival's leadership and ensured that the delegation's greeting would be other than ecstatic,[20] a response undoubtedly amplified by the recent communist coup. But the last-minute Soviet decision to participate was only one component of a nearly disastrous chain of events started by the Czechoslovak political crisis that began just months earlier. Entire delegations from the United States, England, and France decided to boycott the event, as a result of which the only

internationally recognized artists from the original participant list who remained were Eva Bandrovskaia-Turskaia from Poland and Erich Kleiber from Austria.[21] When the Soviet delegation, too, announced that it would not participate, the festival was devastated. All of that changed when the Soviet artists finally arrived on 27 May, and the festival was even extended nine days to 12 June to accommodate the changes.[22]

Performing to a new sphere: Soviet participation and impressions, part I

One of the most active proponents of Soviet participation in the festival was I. Lazarev, Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Prague. Immediately after the conclusion of the festivities, Lazarev sent a glowing report about Soviet participation that reveals how non-musical decision-makers thought about the sorts of cultural exchanges embodied in the Prague Spring 1948 festival. Lazarev's report exhibits the combination of pride, condescension, and arrogance characteristic of the Soviet Union's self-presentation and self-image on the international musical stage.

Lazarev described the arrival of the Soviet delegation as though the Soviets were the festival's saviors. He noted that 'the program of the festival was constructed with an overt preponderance of compositions by Czech composers, and also with complete preponderance of Czech performance musicians. Undoubtedly, this did not facilitate the festival's success.'[23] In the eyes of the Soviet functionary, the entire first week of the festival had gone by with barely any mention, and the concerts were quite poorly attended. Even the internationally renowned Eva Bandrovskaia only managed to draw a half auditorium. The arrival of the Soviet delegation, on the other hand, completely changed the character of the festival, and immediately after Shpiller's first concert, the organizers decided to cover up the festival's poor first week by extending its dates nine days and allowing much more time for performances by Soviet musicians. In the end, the Soviets' contribution to the performance aspect of the festival was quite significant, by any measure. Lazarev itemized eight different solo concerts, reported that Soviet performers made multiple additional recordings for radio broadcasts, and noted that the two operatic singers also sang the lead roles in three separate operas. Besides these concert performances, Lazarev described visits that the delegation took to provincial cities across Czechoslovakia and their presentations at major factories in and around Prague. He also noted with obvious pleasure that Oborin's evaluation of the piano competition suggested that any second-flight Soviet pianist could easily have walked away with first prize.[24] Despite some positive remarks about individual artists from other countries, Lazarev concluded with heavy self-congratulatory praise:

> Evaluating the meaning of the participation of the Soviet pianists L. N. Oborin, E. Gilel's and singers A. P. Ivanov and N. D. Shpiller, one can remark that their performances demonstrated to the entire world the fact that the Soviet Union occupies the leading position in musical and vocal culture among all other countries of the world. [. . .] One can also note that only thanks to the participation of the Soviet artists was the Prague festival a success.[25]

Lazarev did not depend exclusively on his own subjective observations to support his proud recitation of Soviet success. Rather, he devoted a good deal of attention to articles published in the Czechoslovak press, quoting substantial segments of glowing reviews.[26] Even these accounts, however, were coloured by the shadows cast by the recent political upheaval, for Lazarev also noted with satisfaction how many of the concerts were attended by members of

the Czechoslovak leadership and diplomatic corps. In fact, he considered the presence of a Soviet artistic delegation during this period of political upheaval to be especially important:

> One can also note that the participation of Soviet artists in the festival during this political moment that is so tense for Czechoslovakia (the elections and sacking of the president), to a certain degree exerted a beneficial influence on the development of the political situation, for the participation of Soviet musicians showed that the Soviet government is responsive to the requests of the Czechoslovak government and the Czechoslovak communists.[27]

Lazarev's report thus suggests that Soviet political operatives on the ground in the countries of the emerging Soviet bloc recognized probably better than their superiors in Moscow how musical exchanges could serve political ends, theoretically exhibiting Soviet good intentions and the successes of the Soviet system. The *actual* reception of these 'good intentions,' however, is a question beyond the bounds of this article.

One of the actual Soviet participants in the Prague Spring 1948 festival drew much more detailed and far ranging conclusions from his own experiences and observations. B. M. Iarustovskii attended the festival as the Soviet Union's representative musicologist, a role he acquired because of his administrative position in the Central Committee apparatus. Iarustovskii was the only musician to hold a full-time post in the party's main cultural oversight department, a post that was regularized in the aftermath of the party intervention into musical affairs that took place in February 1948. Iarustovskii was thus ideally situated to articulate Soviet positions at the festival and to view the proceedings that took place there with an eye to evaluating them for higher ranking decision makers in Moscow.

When he returned from the festival, Iarustovskii compiled a report for his superiors that included a five-point program for musical exchanges with the new peoples' democracies. He argued that the overriding purpose of Soviet performance delegations should be to compete with their Western counterparts. He thus noted that the summer of 1948 was the ideal time to expand musical and even theatrical tours of the emerging Soviet bloc because of the recent and ongoing Western boycott.[28]

In order to compete successfully, Iarustovskii suggested that Soviet delegations should be modelled more closely on those of their competitors. Considering that any cultural delegation was intended to demonstrate the superiority of the Soviet production system, this suggestion may seem unwise or even dangerous, especially in the growing tide of anti-cosmopolitanism in the Soviet Union. However, Iarustovskii's exact recommendations demonstrate that he thought that Soviet performance musicians could compete successfully with their Western counterparts on whatever terms were most familiar to the intended audience. Thus he noted that the primary problem with Soviet tours up to the summer of 1948 was their haphazard and chaotic planning, especially compared to tours by artists from Western Europe and the United States. The lack of preparation *in planning* — not the artists' musical preparation — caused confusion that alienated concert and theatre audiences. The distribution of Soviet touring artists was also extremely problematic, 'for until now, these trips have had an episodic character, as a result of which for months there will have been no touring artists, and then at exactly the same time a large number of our ensembles and soloists will be concentrated all at once.' Compared with Western tours, planned 'well ahead of time and precisely', the Soviet tours were not making the desired impression on audiences, especially in Czechoslovakia and Poland.[29]

Iarustovskii also suggested emulating Western practice in a more surprising area — material compensation for the touring artists. Iarustovskii summarized the prevailing system as follows:

> Now, thanks to the fact that tours of our artists and collectives are looked on as visits from guests, the artists receive daily (from the Soviet Union), free food and hotel rooms, full honorariums for all of their concerts, and very often, they retain their salaries from their workplaces in the Soviet Union. As a result of this, our touring artists' trips turn out in the majority of cases to be materially unprofitable, and sometimes simply burdensome for the budget of the Ministry.

In other words, the Soviet government was subsidizing concert tours, and the touring artists were allegedly profiting too extravagantly, causing resentment among the leaders of concertizing and theatre organizations at home, putting off target audiences in the peoples' democracies, and generally creating an unhealthy atmosphere. The solution: limit performers' pay to a concert honorarium similar to those provided 'for any touring artist from the West'.[30]

This suggestion again implies adjusting Soviet practices to models familiar to audiences in the peoples' democracies, though it also served the purpose of saving scarce resources. If it partially reduced one of the prime incentives for Soviet artists to participate in international tours, that was a price Iarustovskii was willing to pay. Modelling the economics of international concert tours on Western practice, however, could potentially create problems later when the economic system on which Western practice was predicated was replaced by Soviet-style, planned economies across the bloc. The removal of the Soviet food and housing payments put the entire financial burden of visiting tours on the host government, and by the early 1950s, Politburo decisions approving international tours and exchanges typically noted that the host country would subsidize the trips.[31]

If the ramifications of Iarustovskii's proposal to model Soviet tours on Western practices was fraught with potential long-term problems, he also suggested measures that could help alleviate some of those problems. He suggested making musical exchanges reciprocal and inviting artists from East Central Europe to tour the Soviet Union. This suggestion stemmed from the clearly uncomfortable personal position in which Iarustovskii found himself when the Soviet delegation arrived at the Prague festival. As Lazarev noted earlier, the director of the Czech Philharmonic, Kubelik, greeted the Soviet contingent 'coldly'. While Lazarev explained the cold reception by referring to the scheduling nightmares caused by bungled Soviet decision making, Iarustovskii thought that Kubelik resented the fact that initial invitations to tour the Soviet Union had gone unmentioned for well over a year.[32]

This incident also suggests an important characteristic of musical exchanges that is difficult to assess from sources produced by the party and government apparatus in Moscow: the distinction between the strident, arrogant assumption of cultural superiority issuing from the Kremlin and the insecurity of even the proud and loyal Soviet musicians who were approved to embody those exchanges when they were still a relative novelty. For both Lazarev and Iarustovskii to mention Kubelik's coldness but neither blame him for it nor even suggest a link between it and the recent political developments in Czechoslovakia is striking indeed, especially considering that Kubelik would defect within the year.[33] The embarrassment of the Soviet delegation about their belated arrival and their inability even to discuss reciprocity with their colleagues is as palpable as it could be in dry reports written by operatives within the Central Committee bureaucracy and diplomatic corps.

Though Iarustovskii's policy recommendation concentrated primarily on the structural aspects of prospective concert tours, he also touched briefly on the musical content of these tours. He suggested paying closer attention to programming choices and playing more pieces by the late nineteenth-century romantic composers that the Soviets affectionately dubbed the 'Russian classics' and by 'Slavic, contemporary composers.'[34] In other words, Iarustovskii

sought to cultivate a sense of historical cultural similarity and contemporary artistic linkage between the increasingly Russocentric Soviet Union and the predominantly Slavic countries of the emerging Soviet sphere. How Hungary, Romania, and Albania figured in Iarustovskii's scenario is not clear.

It would not take long for Iarustovskii's suggestions to bear fruit, especially those that called for taking advantage of the Western boycott to strengthen the Soviet cultural presence in East Central Europe and for extending more frequent and significant reciprocal invitations to musical colleagues in the emerging Soviet sphere. By the early 1950s, there was a dramatic increase in the flow of musical and other artistic delegations from East Central Europe into the Soviet Union, as just a cursory examination of the Politburo approvals of international musical exchanges in 1947 and 1950 demonstrates. Between October 1946 and November 1947, the Politburo approved twelve decisions allowing fifteen different musical exchanges between the USSR and other countries. Only one of those permitted artists from the Soviet sphere of influence to visit the Soviet Union.[35] In 1950, the Politburo made twenty-nine such decisions about thirty-two exchanges, and eleven — just over a third — of those decisions entailed visits from artists from East Central Europe or North Korea.[36] Musical exchange in the Soviet cultural sphere thus increasingly became a two-way affair.

The Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics: Soviet participation and impressions, part II

Prague Spring 1948 was thus the moment at which the cultural spheres of the West and the Soviet bloc became operationally distinct, through both Western boycott and rising Soviet attention to cultural exchanges, which became increasingly systematized and increasingly based on the Western models with which East Central European audiences were presumably more familiar. But in May and June 1948, the musical content of the Soviet sphere was still undefined. In this light, another main component of the Prague Spring 1948 festival is worthy of detailed attention. The discussions at the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics and the Soviet delegation's reactions to those discussions provide insights into the disparate views of musical analysis and evaluation that adhered across the bloc and into how the Soviets proposed to deal with that heterogeneity.

The Congress took place 20–29 May 1948 as part of the Prague Spring festival. Like the festival's performance components, it was significantly marked by unpredictable ramifications of the dramatic political events of the year. Most notably, a bit of drama was lent by the presence of the leftist German composer Hanns Eisler. Eisler had just been deported from the United States, Czechoslovakia issued him a transit visa, and his stopover coincided with the dates of the Congress.[37] His shabby treatment by the Americans played directly into the hands of the Soviets, who could make (disingenuous) hay about the unpredictable vicissitudes of musical production in the postwar United States. The benefits of Eisler's participation were partially offset when many, but not all, composers and musicologists from North America, England, and France boycotted. Unlike the performance components of the festival, the Congress was not extended to accommodate the Soviet delegation, so their arrival late on the 23 May meant that the Soviets missed almost half of the meeting, including Eisler's presentation.[38]

Nevertheless, the Soviets began to participate as soon as they arrived, immediately joining the Congress's three working groups for the meetings of 24 May. For the next six days, the

assembled composers, musicologists, and music critics continued discussing such issues as the role of tradition in contemporary composition, the social function of music and of composers, the state of music performance in the West, and a number of issues relating to national musical particularity and the applicability of the general issues to each national case.[39] At the end of these discussions, the Congress's governing board passed a series of resolutions that provide an extremely useful view of the diverse but directed consensus about the state of contemporary music in the emerging Soviet sphere and in the world as a whole.[40]

The most concise statement of the Congress's findings was the 'address' drafted at the initiative of the Soviet delegation and approved in the second resolution.[41] In the address, the Congress's leadership pointed to a crisis in contemporary music caused by a polarization of 'so-called "serious" and "light" music.' Both types of music reached their own state of crisis, 'serious' music because of its increasingly individualistic, subjective content and complicated, constructive form, and 'light' music because of its banality, standardization, and, in many countries, monopolization by cultural 'industries.' The delegates unanimously agreed that such a crisis was particularly unacceptable 'in our epoch, when new social forms are being born and when all human culture is entering a new era and placing new and unavoidable tasks in front of the artist.' Before listing the general outlines of a solution to this crisis, the address paused to make an extremely significant statement intended to preserve national particularity and diversity across the emerging bloc:

> The Congress does not want to give any concrete recipes or instructions to musical creativity; the Congress understands that each country and each people should find its own path and its own methods. However, common [to all of these paths] should be a deep understanding of the causes and essence of the musical crisis, and common [to all] should be our striving and our will to overcome it.[42]

Finally, the Congress noted that the crisis should be surmounted if all composers considered 'progressive' ideas and the feelings of the masses, if all artists turned to national culture and avoided the cosmopolitan tendencies of modern life, if composers paid more attention to concrete musical forms (operas, oratorios, cantatas, romances, mass songs, and so forth), and if composers and music critics tried harder to educate the populace.[43]

This resolution reveals the outstanding characteristics of the consensus about music during the pivotal year of 1948. Most importantly, the Congress agreed to ensure that national particularity would be preserved in culture, if not in politics or economic organization. Of course, this sort of language had been used to describe the postwar phenomenon of peoples' democracy in general, but the pretence to 'separate national paths' in politics had been dropped with the advent of the Cominform nine months earlier and the increasing co-ordination of the activities of national communist parties throughout the emerging bloc ever since. The same was not to occur in music for at least another year.[44]

This potentially surprising concession to local national culture actually makes sense in the light of contemporary domestic developments in Soviet cultural policy. Throughout the late 1940s, even during the peak of the anti-cosmopolitan campaigns hinted at in the Congress' address, Soviet cultural policy makers sought to preserve national forms that they thought should appeal to mass audiences. That is not to say that these policy makers evaluated music based on its *actual* popularity with mass audiences.[45] Indeed, they did not, as the Congress' diatribe against 'American entertainment' music clearly suggested. In fact, the list of 'more concrete genres' suggests that the Soviets intended to insist on some specific guidelines reminiscent of those recently sketched out at home.[46] Nevertheless, the repeated calls to

develop contemporary music on the shoulders of national traditions could give musicians throughout the Soviet sphere hope to pursue their own musical developments. Soviet efforts to construct a cultural bloc on which and from which to launch their globalization efforts should be evaluated with this in mind. To be a bloc did not necessarily mean to be monolithic.

In a much more secretive realm, however, the creative proclivities that the Soviet delegation observed in Prague were cause for concern back in Moscow. In his report to the Central Committee, Iarustovskii enumerated and analysed the causes of that concern, and in so doing further demonstrated Moscow's global ambitions in the music realm. No doubt unintentionally, he also sketched out the contours of disagreement and diversity that would prevail throughout the Soviet cultural sphere for years to come.

Iarustovskii's analysis was based on more than twenty-five presentations at the Congress, informal discussions with other delegates, and additional impressions gathered during the Soviet delegation's trip to Poland following the festival.[47] He was pleased to report that some of the creative and theoretical positions expressed in the presentations corresponded with or supported Soviet priorities for international culture. For example, Hanns Eisler described the 'dependency' of composers and musicologists working in the 'Anglo-Saxon Bloc' on 'customer-entrepreneurs.' Others complained about the 'assault of the American "cultural" industry on France, the Netherlands, and elsewhere.' Yet others raised more theoretical questions about Marxist musical aesthetics. And Iarustovskii thought that almost everyone received the Soviet delegation's presentations with a sincere desire to understand the recent developments in the musical life of the Soviet Union. Only a few outriders from the United States and the Netherlands proved visibly hostile, confrontational, and provocative.[48]

The Czechoslovak delegation was so favourably disposed to their Soviet counterparts that they surprised Iarustovskii, Khrennikov, and Shaporin with a proposal to form an 'International Communist Musical Organization,' and other speakers at the Congress repeatedly suggested forming an international 'Association of Progressive Musicians.' Creating some sort of international association seemed indispensable because of developments at a parallel congress that took place in Amsterdam immediately after the Prague festival.[49] At the Amsterdam congress of the Association of Contemporary Music, one of the American delegates announced that American financiers had put together a 'dollar fund' dedicated to supporting contemporary music by paying for performances and publication of new music. Despite this offer, Iarustovskii claimed, many delegates even at the Amsterdam congress were reportedly eager to participate in the sort of progressive association suggested by the Czechs.[50] Much as they may have liked the idea, Iarustovskii and his Soviet colleagues were hamstrung by the overly centralized nature of decision-making about international matters in Moscow. Without receiving instructions from the Central Committee, the Soviet delegation could not commit to anything except hypothetical future discussions about an international association based on the Soviet model. When he returned to Moscow, however, Iarustovskii pushed for Central Committee authorization to allow the Composers' Union to play an active role in the formation of such an association in the near future.[51]

This incident demonstrates how unprepared the Soviet domestic cultural apparatus and its representatives abroad were for systematic competition with the West even in 1948. Isolated from the international music scene for years, they did not find out about the ACM congress in Amsterdam until they encountered friendly delegates in Prague. Still reeling from party intervention into musical life at home just months earlier, they seemed insecure and

unprepared to lead any sort of collaborative association abroad. In fact, their colleagues in Czechoslovakia seemed to have had far more initiative, not to mention experience, organizing activities on this front. Still, the Soviet delegates also found sympathetic colleagues, seemingly interested in the Soviet music system and eager to co-operate in the construction of an integrated sphere.

In the highly charged atmosphere of early 1948, it should perhaps come as no surprise that the delegates from Czechoslovakia would approach the Soviet delegation with offers of cooperation. At the almost contemporaneous celebration of Charles University's 600th anniversary in Prague, a number of highly placed Czech officials plied the Soviet delegation with requests for information and closer ties. Apprehension during the on-going political crisis and careerist opportunism may have combined in varying degrees to render Czechoslovak delegates in both cultural fields eager to convey their enthusiasm to their Soviet counterparts.[52] Over the next several years, the Sovietization of East Central European cultural life would proceed with the participation of Soviet cultural experts like the delegates to the Charles University celebration and to Prague Spring 1948. John Connelly has recently shown the extent to which Sovietization of higher education depended on local elites who sought to adapt to their national contexts a Soviet system about which they sought information from Soviet experts. Though these experts played important roles, they were not decisive in the Sovietization of higher education, which was driven more by national dynamics in each country.[53] Though conclusions about the motivations of non-Soviet delegates to the Prague Spring festival who appear in Soviet sources are necessarily speculative, it is very likely that the presence of the Soviet delegates encouraged musicians who were sympathetic to the communists to seek information about the Soviet system and to solidify their own professional positions by displaying interest in it and a willingness to direct future Sovietization efforts in their own countries.

Whatever motivated his Czech colleagues to suggest co-operation, Iarustovskii found other causes for concern in identifying sympathetic figures. As he had earlier with regard to performance tours, he presented a series of observations that focused on these concerns. First, he and his colleagues had discovered that the creative proclivities of their counterparts were far closer to the oft-pilloried Western modernists than to their own:

> The process of deep and wide democratization characteristic of modern Czechoslovakia and Poland has still only weakly touched the artistic intelligentsia, the majority of whom occupy incorrect, undemocratic creative positions. Formalist, modernist tendencies in the work of artists, composers, [and] theater directors presented themselves extremely broadly and variously.[54]

The situation was so troublesome that Soviet singers slated to perform in operas during the Prague festival were even forced to withdraw rather than participate in such 'extreme formalism.' The most prominent opera theatres in Prague and Poznan — and the paintings on exhibition throughout Poland and Czechoslovakia — all confirmed the suspicion that modernism was well-entrenched.[55]

Iarustovskii's discovery of such modernist proclivities would not have startled any observers familiar with the music scene of his Czechoslovak hosts, which the Soviet delegation clearly was not. Between the two world wars, Czech composers formed two separate avant-garde groups. The first centred around Alois Hába, his students, and a group of communist composers who were attracted to Hába's social criticism. Hába is best known for his experimentation with quarter-tone and sixth-tone music, which he taught to a circle of students after founding a department of microtonal music at the Prague Conservatory in 1934. He directed the

department until it was closed in 1949. Having emerged from the avant-garde tradition of the Second Viennese School, Hába used microtonal techniques to adapt Moravian folk music to avant-garde music composition.[56] The other intra-war avant-garde group was typified by Bohuslav Martinů, a nationalist, modernist composer who was much closer in artistic temperament during the seminal 1930s to jazz and the constructivist and neo-classical tendencies of Stravinskii and the French Les Six. Though Martinů fled to the West to avoid Nazi persecution during the war and never returned, composers sympathetic to his compositional approach were still active in post-war Czech musical life.[57] Despite the constrictions imposed during the war, this modernist terrain was not very hospitable to Soviet socialist realism, whatever the political proclivities or career interests of the Czech musicians whom the Soviets encountered in 1948.

Iarustovskii was bound to be disapproving. Still, his observation about the creative proclivities of his counterparts highlights an extremely important feature of future musical relations throughout the Soviet cultural sphere. Namely, contacts with East Central European colleagues could continually provide artistic alternatives to Soviet musicians. Though Iarustovskii was not at all receptive to those alternatives, others surely were.[58]

Iarustovskii did not merely make note of the prevalent place of modernist music in Poland and Czechoslovakia, he also sought to explain it. His explanation reveals the global aspirations of the Soviet cultural system and some of the potential obstacles to achieving global goals. Iarustovskii argued that the success of modernism could be explained by two general tendencies. First, the incredible prestige of Paris as an 'aristocratic 'Mecca' of art' drew considerable attention in East Central Europe, so the 'schools of Picasso, Stravinskii, and more minor but "fashionable" composer-aesthetes' had become the ideal for composers throughout the sphere. The pull to Paris was so strong that the Polish government continued to send aspiring Polish artists to Paris while repeatedly turning down Soviet offers to open their own conservatory doors to Polish students.[59]

Second and perhaps even more disturbing, leftist musicians, including many communists, maintained a strong sense of correlation between leftist political views and a so-called leftist artistic orientation:

> They were genuinely surprised by the 'events' in the USSR because they consider our political convictions incompatible with the pursuit of classical traditions in art. They are sure that revolutionary views should coincide with 'revolutionistness' [sic] in creativity. It is from this [that they are] drawn to quarter-tone music which is calculated for a refined ear, to searching for a 'revolutionary,' 'unusual' language, and so forth.[60]

The conviction that revolutionary political and social views should coincide with abandoning musical traditions and searching for new, experimental musical forms had powerful political supporters even in local communist parties and the communist press. Consequently, the proponents of 'realistic, democratic' music were few, especially among the most talented composers. Perhaps worst of all, some of the most highly touted Soviet cultural figures were thus dismissed with indifference. An exhibit by the Soviet socialist–realist painter Aleksandr Gerasimov in Czechoslovakia received a terrible critical reception, and the songs of Solov'ev-Sedoi, a huge popular success in the Soviet Union, failed completely to impress the progressive Czech composers of Prague.[61]

The problem was so pervasive that Iarustovskii could think of nothing but a political solution: 'it would be extremely useful to present these questions in the newspaper *Za prochnyi mir, za narodnuiu demokratiiu* and to explain their mistakes to workers in the propaganda

departments of these countries' Central Committees.' [62] Though this report only envisions a political solution, a hint of future solutions dependent upon loyal musicians in each country already has a very faint presence in this early report. Namely, each of the figures that Iarustovskii named in his report would assume leading roles in the adaptation of their musical life to the Soviet system. In Czechoslovakia, chief among these figures was Zdeněk Nejedlý, to whom Iarustovskii referred as a prominent politician in attendance at the festivities. Nejedlý was educated as a musicologist, but he was already well established by 1948 as a top-level communist functionary, the head of the Ministry of Education from 1948 on. A wartime inhabitant of Moscow, Nejedly would become the single most dominant personality in Czech cultural life by the early 1950s.[63] But Iarustovskii also singled out Antonín Sychra (Czechoslovakia), Zofia Lissa (Poland), and Oskar Danon (Yugoslavia) for their attempts to pose questions of Marxist musical aesthetics in official presentations to the Congress and noted that Soviet delegates used their presentations to call attention to the work of Czech composer Josef Stanislav, who had been 'snubbed' earlier.[64] Sychra had been a member of the communist underground during the war, he completed his doctoral dissertation in Prague in 1946, and has been considered one of the most enterprising of organizers of Czech musical life in the 1940s. He undoubtedly saw in the increasing Soviet presence in Czechoslovakia an opportunity to increase his influence in that process and he did indeed become one of the most influential members of the Czechoslovak Composers' Union.[65] Similarly, Lissa capitalized on her interest in Marxist musical aesthetics and her connections with Soviet authorities forged during her wartime residence in Tashkent and Moscow to establish a dominant career in Polish music institutions (like the Polish Composers' Union and the musicology institute at Warsaw University).[66] Stanislav was one of those communist composers who had been attracted to Hába's circle before the war. A visitor to Moscow as early as 1933, he wrote music for leftist theatre before the war and mass songs in the late 1940s and 1950s.[67] Alone among the composers mentioned in Iarustovskii's report, his creative proclivities were aligned well with those of the Soviet delegation. The positive, if passing, attention paid by Iarustovskii to these individuals suggests that he had begun to identify a sympathetic cohort among the attendees at the congress and suggest some of the agents of the imposition of discipline across the cultural sphere that would begin later.

Iarustovskii thus pointed out a sharp contradiction in the reception of the Soviet delegation and the ideas about music that it presented. Many composers received them well, but few agreed with their creative positions. Iarustovskii also made it clear that a number of his colleagues — not mentioned by name — also resented what they considered a Soviet intrusion. Afraid that the Soviet delegation had arrived to 'install order', many composers at the congress either completely skipped the Soviets' presentations or just sat and listened passively. Just as Soviet composers had done months earlier at the First All-USSR Congress of Soviet Composers, the delegates to the Second International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in Prague saved their most critical remarks for the corridors. Undoubtedly used to disgruntled murmuring at large ceremonial events, Iarustovskii suggested that the Soviet presentations were nevertheless useful, especially because they raised issues that young composers in the audience could consider when embarking on their own creative endeavors.[68]

After his lengthy analysis of the causes of the creative disjuncture between the Soviet delegation and those of the other peoples' democracies, Iarustovskii completed his report with two extremely short structural recommendations. First, he noted that non-experts in the bureaucracies of VOKS (the All-USSR Society for Cultural Exchanges) and the Slavic

Committee were doing the lion's share of propagandizing Soviet musical ideas abroad. Since they clearly had not been doing an effective job, he suggested turning over such efforts to the Composers' Union. Second, as noted above, he suggested having the Composers' Union take an active role in organizing an international association of progressive musicians.[69]

Iarustovskii's report thus demonstrates that Soviet cultural decision-makers in Moscow sought a dominant role for Soviet music on an international level. The comparisons with Paris, the concern about the Association of Contemporary Music congress in Amsterdam, and the interest in some sort of international association of 'progressive' composers all point in the same direction. However, the report also demonstrates that Iarustovskii foresaw serious obstacles to these ambitions. Even sympathetic composers and musicologists in the Soviet bloc held strong views dissonant with those expressed in the recent party intervention at home, and the Soviet delegates themselves seemed insecure about some aspects of their global claims and were even more clearly embarrassed by overly centralized decision making which prevented them from joining initiatives suggested by their like-minded international colleagues. Their grand pretensions guaranteed that the Soviet music system would continue to propel itself into competition with the West and commence more systematic efforts to forge an integrated cultural sphere in East Central Europe. On the other hand, the thinly veiled insecurity and ideological commitment to building on national traditions kept open the possibility that the cultural sphere would not be monolithic.

In the press, lessons learned in Prague were given a much more brazen tone than the somewhat ambivalent findings communicated in the more secret realm of the Central Committee. The confident and aggressive interpretation of the global music scene published in *Sovetskaia muzyka* at the beginning of its special report on Prague demonstrates that, first and foremost, to be a cultural bloc meant to engage in co-ordinated musical competition with the West. *Sovetskaia muzyka*'s lead editorial in the July issue began with an unequivocally worded proclamation of Soviet superiority, claiming that the Congress in Prague had demonstrated that 'contemporary bourgeois music' characteristic of Western Europe and the Americas was hastening down a 'path to complete degeneration, into a dead end.' The Congress had also 'given spectacular confirmation of the correctness and timeliness of the Central Committee resolution of 10 February'. The degeneration of 'bourgeois' music was said to have a number of causes: anti-humanistic individualism and soulless formalism, the collapse of national musical culture in a majority of the countries of Europe and America, the sharp division between the artistic demands of audiences and the antisocial striving of modernist composers, and the extremely poor material conditions in which most musicians in bourgeois countries lived.[70]

This unequivocal attack created two rhetorical poles between which there was very little ground. Individualism, international standardization, formal experimentation, and little state support for the arts were conflated into one pole, implicitly leaving collectivism, national diversity, audience accessibility, and generous state subsidies in the other. Carefully crafted for a domestic Soviet audience, the editorial sought to vindicate what was still an unpopular ideological intervention into musical life just months earlier by translating international competition into domestic terms. Thus, the editorial continued by giving a much fuller characterization of the internal contradictions of 'bourgeois' musical life, a characterization that leaned heavily on the distinction between 'serious' music written for an ever-shrinking, increasingly elite audience on the one hand, and 'light music' that was dominated by the jazz-based American entertainment industry which filled radio waves, records, and movie

screens with 'neurotic' jazz intonations in 'New York and Vienna, Paris and Rome, Shanghai and Singapore.'[71]

Most of the rest of the editorial was spent giving a brief history of twentieth-century music in the West through the foggy lens of typical vulgar Marxist theory, but one passage in particular stands out because of what it shows about the Soviet digestion of the Prague Spring 1948 festival:

> The upsurge of the social movement and political consciousness of the people, especially strong in the countries of the new democracies, exerts a strong influence on the ideological-creative demarcations in the ranks of the artistic intelligentsia *of the West*. Everything best, everything healthy and life-affirming in music is entering the camp of democracy. But this does not mean that these musicians have already fully freed themselves from the weight of formalist delusions. Thus the necessity to reevaluate all of one's creative positions now stands at its full height before artists who are really interested in the path of their art.
>
> Evidence of this ideological-creative watershed appeared at the International Congress of Composers and Music Critics in Prague, which laid the foundation of a new era in the development of contemporary *Western* music. . . .[72]

The public lesson learned from Soviet participation in Prague Spring 1948 was that the battle with the West was set to intensify. The Cold War had gained its cultural dimension.

Ramifications and conclusions

Soviet participation in the Prague Spring Festival of 1948 reveals many things about evolving Soviet efforts to create a cultural sphere within its emerging political and strategic bloc. In the shadow of the Marshall Plan and Cominform abroad and near the end of the ideological discipline of the *Zhdanovshchina* in the Soviet Union itself, the music festival in Prague was a pivotal point in Soviet cultural strategy. The Western boycott of the festival and of concert tours in the Soviet sphere following it provided the Soviet Union with the opportunity to make Soviet touring artists an overwhelming international musical presence in that sphere. It was at the festival that the Central Committee apparatus's resident musician realized this opportunity, and it was not long before that opportunity would be exploited. A cursory examination of Politburo confirmations of international touring plans throughout the post-war Stalin period reveals a sharp increase in the number and extent of such tours. The Politburo approved just six delegations abroad in 1947. In 1950, they approved at least twenty, and in 1951, no fewer than thirty-seven.[73]

It will be recalled that Iarustovskii also called for greater co-ordination of these cultural exchanges by music professionals and their professional organization, the Composers' Union. Though the Composers' Union did not build the administrative apparatus necessary to provide that sort of coordination during the Stalin period, its leadership was consulted much more regularly in an effort to improve the information foreign representatives received about Soviet musical life.[74] However, a later institutional reorganization did mark a second shift in Soviet priorities and the structural treatment of its cultural sphere. In 1951, the Committee on Artistic Affairs took control of musical exchanges with East Central Europe, leaving VOKS to deal with the West, thus signalling a greater degree of integration within the bloc.[75]

On the other hand, Soviet experience at the Prague Spring 1948 festival also demonstrated that musical exchange throughout the Soviet cultural sphere could always be a two-way street. This particular delegation in mid-1948 may not have been particularly receptive to the

'formalist' musical ideas held by many of their colleagues, even politically sympathetic ones. But the exposure that they received would be an extremely important continuing feature of all musical exchanges.

For example, coverage of international issues in *Sovetskaia muzyka*, the only professional music journal in the Soviet Union, also expanded after the festival, though less dramatically than the musical delegations. In 1946 and 1947, *Sovetskaia muzyka* carried a total of 104 pages of international coverage, just over six per cent of its entire print space. At its high points in 1949 and 1951, coverage had expanded to 159 and 173 pages respectively, or 12 per cent of the total for each year.[76] This marked expansion in international coverage is surprising considering the intense anti-cosmopolitan campaign that began in earnest in the arts in January 1949, but it suggests that coverage of the Soviet cultural sphere outweighed concern about international contacts.

Perhaps even more significant than a quantitative measure of print space devoted to international topics is the impressionistic sense that coverage became substantially more *systematic* after 1948. Rather than just devoting a large special section to an international event like the Prague Spring 1948 festival, the journal began to print short, regular reports from around the emerging bloc. The overall impression is one of steadily increasing attention to international topics and especially to information about developments in the musical life of countries in East Central Europe.

Though a quantitative measure of this impressionistic sense is necessarily problematic, there is one that illustrates the point. From 1946 to 1949, nine of the forty issues of *Sovetskaia muzyka* contained absolutely no coverage of international topics. From 1950 to 1952, every single one of the thirty-six issues carried at least some international coverage. In fact, that trend seems to have started with the Prague Spring 1948 festival itself. Beginning with the issue that covered the festival, there were only three more issues to the end of 1952 that published no international reports. One of those was the issue immediately following the Prague 1948 issue, and another was the issue in which the anti-cosmopolitanism campaign in the arts first broke.[77]

Diversity within the Soviet cultural sphere ensured that this two-way exchange of musicians, music, and musical ideas would become increasingly important to musical life within the Soviet Union as well. Even after the sphere had become more tightly integrated, multiply layered connections between the countries that comprised it and the musicians who embodied those ties could have decisive effects. In fact, a very different Prague Spring almost exactly twenty-years later would prove for many Soviet musicians a decisive push toward an open dissidence nearly inconceivable in the postwar Stalin period.

[1] For their insightful comments and helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank the participants of the series of conferences in Budapest, Hungary (14–17 December 2000 and 31 January–1 February 2003) and Trondheim, Norway (8 September 2001), associated with the Across and Beyond the East–West Divide project tirelessly organized by György Péteri and of the meeting of the University of California Multi-Campus Research Unit on World History, 8–9 February 2003, University of California, Irvine. Research and writing support was generously provided by Fulbright-Hays and by the Faculty Senate of the University of California, Riverside.

[2] For one example of United States policy, see Reinhold Wagnleitner, *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994). For the role of rock in the Soviet Union, see especially Timothy W. Ryback, *Rock around the Bloc: A History of Rock Music in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[3] The Soviet Union's earlier international music policy and goals have received scholarly attention recently in Caroline Brooke, 'Soviet Music in the International Arena, 1932–41', *European History Quarterly*, 31.2 (2001), 231–64.

[4] The complexities of the transplantation and transformation of Soviet academic institutions and practices in East Central Europe is productively addressed directly in Michael David-Fox and György Péteri, 'On the Origins and Demise of the Communist Academic Regime', in *Academia in Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe*, ed. by David-Fox and Péteri (Westport, Connecticut, and London: Bergin and Garvey, 2000), pp. 3–38.

[5] For two examples of performance ensemble delegations, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1062, l. 92 (Protokol #55 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 308 (17 December 1946), to Bulgaria and Hungary) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 64 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 301 (17 October 1947), to Poland). For two examples of smaller delegations to international meetings, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 67 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 315 (24 October 1947), to Poland) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1090, l. 104 (Protokol #83 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 555 (19 September 1951), to Romania). The Soviets also hosted delegations; for one example see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1089, l. 86 (Protokol #82 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 409 (5 July 1951), from Hungary).

[6] For one example of this enforced rigor, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1087, l. 55 (Protokol #80 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 279 (16 February 1951)) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 133, d. 239, ll. 16–20, especially l. 20 (OKhLI to Malenkov, 30 April 1951).

[7] For this example, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1087, l. 13 (Protokol #80 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 62 (19 January 1951)), which sent N. S. Dombrovskii and V. I. Ponomarev to Hungary for three months to work on opera and ballet.

[8] The other articles in this volume, in one way or another, turn attention to these questions.

[9] On the K-R Affair, see Nikolai Krementsov, *The Cure: A Story of Cancer and Politics from the Annals of the Cold War* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[10] On the brouhaha of 1948 and its aftermath, see Kiril Tomoff, 'Creative Union: The Professional Organization of Soviet Composers, 1939–1953' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Chicago, 2001), chapter four.

[11] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 120–120ob (Czech Composers' Union to VOKS); RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 122–220b (Czech Philharmonic to VOKS).

[12] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 118 (secret memo from P. Lebedev (VKI) to A. A. Kuznetsov (UPA TsK VKP(b)), 4 March 1948). Lebedev cited the decision by V. N. Zorin (zam.ministra ID) of 15 January 1948.

[13] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 118.

[14] Evidence of the embassy's prompting can be deduced from RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 283–87 (a packet of materials pertaining to the original invitation sent from the embassy in Prague to the Central Committee on 25 March 1948), but it is not conclusive.

[15] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 124 (Secret memo, P. Lebedev to A. A. Kuznetsov, 30 March 1948).

[16] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 289–90 (undated report, Shepilov to Suslov). Shepilov had received Lebedev's memos in a report from Kuznetsov on March 31 (RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 124, marginal notation), so his report was probably written at the beginning of April. The personnel changes were the following: P. A. Serebriakov was added to the Smetana piano competition jury, B. M. Iarustovskii, the resident musician in the Central Committee apparatus, replaced K. K. Sakva, and songwriter V. P. Solov'ev-Sedoi replaced V. G. Zakharov. The replacement of the folkish Zakharov with the more contemporary Solov'ev-Sedoi may also have sought to soften for international audiences the emerging Russocentric bias in popular music that was asserting itself by mid-1948.

[17] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, l. 116 (Protokol #348 Sekretariata TsK VKP(b), pt 285g. (8 May 1948)). This file is actually materials to the Secretariat decisions, which are listed separately. For the complete set of materials to this decision, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 118, d. 45, ll. 116–24. For just the protocol, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 348, pt 285g.

[18] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1070, l. 38 (Protokol #63 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 143 (19 May 1948)).

[19] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312 (I. Lazarev to VOKS, 17 June 1948).

[20] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312. Lazarev noted that the main organizer from the Czech Philharmonic, the conductor R. Kubelik, greeted the delegation 'coldly' because he had completely reworked the festival's program twice — once when the Soviets announced they were not coming and again when they changed their minds.

[21] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 320 (Iarustovskii to Shepilov [July 1948]).
[22] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312.
[23] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 312.
[24] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 312–15.
[25] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 315.
[26] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 313–14.
[27] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 315.
[28] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 320–26 (Iarustovskii to Shepilov, undated), here l. 321. For the dating, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 316 (Riurikov to Tekhsekretariat, 2 July 1948).
[29] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 321.
[30] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 321–22.
[31] For a couple representative decisions from 1950, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1079, l. 91 (Protokol #72 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), 6 February 1950) and RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1081, l. 7 (Protokol #74 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 24 (25 April 1950)).
[32] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322.
[33] For Kubelik's defection, see Arthur Jacobs, 'Kubelik, Rafael (Jeronym),' in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. by Stanley Sadie, x, 288–89.
[34] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322.
[35] This conclusion is based on perusal of the Politburo protocols from 1947: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, dd. 1062–67. For the one decision approving the visit of a delegation of Polish musicians and writers, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 1066, l. 64 (Protokol #59 Politbiuro TsK VKP(b), pt 301.2 (17 October 1947)).
[36] These data have been compiled from the Politburo protocols for 1951: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, dd. 1079–86.
[37] B. Iarustovskii, 'Na Mezhdunarodnom s"ezde kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage,' *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 11–20, here pp. 11–12.
[38] Ibid., p. 12.
[39] Ibid., pp. 12–20.
[40] The resolutions were published in *Sovetskaia muzyka* as 'Rezoliutsiia 2-go Mezhdunarodnogo s"ezda kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage', *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 9–10.
[41] For evidence that the Soviet delegation proposed the 'address' and its contents, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 323.
[42] 'Obrashchenie 2-go Mezhdunarodnogo s"ezda kompozitorov i muzykal'nykh kritikov v Prage', *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 7–8.
[43] Ibid., p. 8.
[44] For an excellent exploration of the Sovietization of Hungarian musical culture through the lens of Bartók reception, see Danielle Fosler-Lussier, 'The Transition to Communism and the Legacy of Béla Bartók in Hungary, 19451956' (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1999), especially chapters 1 and 3. For an investigation of an intriguingly peculiar cultural example of Sovietization in Hungary in 1950, see Lóránt Péteri, 'A "Szovjet Zene" Magyarországon: Ilja Golovin Budapestre érkezik', *Magyar Zene*, XL.2 (May 2002), 201–12. For a study of the Sovietization of Polish and East German musical culture, see David Tompkins, 'Composing the Party Line: Music and Politics in Poland and East Germany, 1948–1957 (unpublished doctoral thesis, Columbia University, 2004).
[45] For an extended discussion of the various meanings of 'cosmopolitanism' in the Soviet Union and the ramifications of those meanings on music policy from the centre in Moscow to the periphery in Central Asia, see Tomoff, 'Creative Union', chapter five.
[46] For a description of the scandals surrounding the Party's efforts to intervene in Soviet musical life, see Alexander Werth, *Musical Uproar in Moscow* (London: Turnstile Press, 1949). For an analysis of those events using archival data, see Tomoff, 'Creative Union,' chapter four.
[47] For Iarustovskii's description of the trip to Poland, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.
[48] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 322–23.
[49] For discussion about whether the Soviet Union should participate, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 636, l. 307 (Riurikov to Tekhsekretariat, 14 June 1948).
[50] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 323–24.
[51] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 324, 326.
[52] For the Charles University example, similar requests from a number of Czech and other national groups, and analysis of their possible motivations, see John Connelly, 'The Sovietization of Higher Education in the

Czech Lands, East Germany, and Poland during the Stalinist Period, 1948–1954', in *Academia in Upheaval: Origins, Transfers, and Transformations of the Communist Academic Regime in Russia and East Central Europe*, ed. by Michael David-Fox and György Péteri (Westport, Connecticut and London: Bergin and Garvey, 2000), pp. 141–79, especially, pp. 153–54.

[53] John Connelly, *Captive University: The Sovietization of East German, Czech, and Polish Higher Education, 1945–1956* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). See especially pp. 50–55 for the discussion of Soviet experts.

[54] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.

[55] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 324–25.

[56] Miroslaw Perz, 'Czechoslovakia,' in *The New Grove*, v, 122–23. Jiří Vysloužil, 'Hába, Alois', *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004), <http://www.grovemusic.com>.

[57] Perz, 122-23. Brian Large, 'Martinů, Bohuslav (Jan)', in *The New Grove*, xi, 731–35.

[58] For brief discussion of Central Committee complaints about the lively interest in formal experimentation and music composed in the West at the Moscow Conservatory in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see Tomoff, 'Creative Union', chapter five.

[59] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 325. Iarustovskii was undoubtedly referring to Hába, though the reference is not direct.

[60] Ibid.

[61] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, ll. 325–26. Solov'ev-Sedoi's songs apparently made a much more positive impression on working-class audiences during the Soviet delegation's visits to local factories.

[62] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

[63] John Tyrrell: 'Nejedlý, Zdeněk', *Grove Music Online*, ed. L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <http://www.grovemusic.com>. For Iarustovskii's reference to Nejedlý, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 324.

[64] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 322. I have assumed the Danon to whom Iarustovskii referred was Oskar Danon, though he did not use first names in any case. The identity of Sychra and Lissa are clear.

[65] Josef Bek: 'Sychra, Antonín', *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <http://www.grovemusic.com>.

[66] Zygmunt M. Szweykowski, 'Lissa, Zofia', *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <http://www.grovemusic.com>.

[67] Jiří Macek, 'Stanislav, Josef', *Grove Music Online*, ed. by L. Macy (Accessed 14 January 2004) <http://www.grovemusic.com>.

[68] For an analysis of the grumbling overheard during the All-Union Congress in Moscow, see Tomoff, 'Creative Union', chapter four. For the corridor talk in Prague, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

[69] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 125, d. 636, l. 326.

[70] 'Progressivnye muzykanty mira v bor'be za demokraticheskoe muzykal'noe iskusstvo,' *Sovetskaia muzyka* 1948, no. 5 (July 1948), 3–6; here, p. 3.

[71] Ibid., pp. 3–4. Indeed, the success of American-style popular music was spreading rapidly among youth audiences even in the Soviet Union, a development of great concern to Central Committee bureaucrats just over a year later. See, for example, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 234, ll. 102–10 (Kruzhkov and Tarasov to Suslov, 2 November 1949). For analysis of one component of this youth culture, see Mark Edele, 'Strange Young Men in Stalin's Moscow: The Birth and Life of the Stiliagi, 1945–1953', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 50.1 (2002), 37–61.

[72] 'Progressivnye muzykanty', p. 5. Emphasis added.

[73] These data are compiled from Politburo protocols from 1947, 1950–51: RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3. The number of musicians in each delegation ranged from as few as one well into the hundreds.

[74] For example, see RGASPI, f. 17, op. 132, d. 419, ll. 50–154.

[75] RGASPI, f. 17, op. 119, d. 257, ll. 157–58 (Protokol #550 Sekretariata TsK VKP(b), pt 125-s (February 1951). Perusal of Politburo protocols before and after this decision seems to confirm this division of labour in practice, but firm conclusions require more detailed research.

[76] These data are compiled from the contents of all *Sovetskaia muzyka* issues, 1946–1952. Of the 122 pages (nine per cent) devoted to international coverage in 1948, forty-eight of them reported on or analysed the Prague Spring festival, more than any other single international event in the post-war Stalin period. In 1950, international coverage dropped to 123 pages (nine per cent), and in 1952, to 129 pages (nine per cent).

[77] *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1946–1952. The three issues with no international coverage were *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1948, no. 6; *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1949, no. 1; and *Sovetskaia muzyka*, 1949, no. 9.