Immigration and the
Transformation of Europe
Edited by
Craig A. Parsons
University of Oregon
Timothy M. Smeeding
Maxwell School ofSyracuse University
.CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS
12 The new migratory Europe: Towards a
proactive immigration policy?
Marco Martiniello
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the migration issue has returned to the top ofthe political
agenda in various regions of the world, as we see in the evident return to
1920s nativism now taking place in the United States. This politicization
of migration and its consequences has led to an over-dramatization, and
sometimes an over-mediatization, of the human migration issue. Both
migratory flows and the presence of immigrant populations are largely
perceived as a cause of insecurity and even as a real threat (Martiniello
2001).
Two significant features mark public debate concerning international
migratory movements. Firstly, the emphasis is on real or potential migratory
flow and on political and police measures to be brought into force
for supranational regulation, in practice to keep the flow at a minimum
level. The refugee issue is also on the way to becoming the major preoccupation
of politicians and, to a certain extent, of certain sections of
public opinion who are particularly aware of the migratory situation.
Secondly, a certain "social alarmism" often predominates in these discussions
where an essentially negative view of migration is presented and
even seen as legitimate. There are many Europeans who accept the "invasion
of Europe" doctrine and are ready to fight it. Immigration is thus
presented as a fearful plague that must be swiftly vanquished, before it is
too late.
In other words, current migratory flows are often supposed to have
a harmful effect on international security insofar as they may compromise
relations between immigrant supplying states and immigrant host
states. This is only a short step from claiming, as is often done in the
popular press and by politicians, that migratory flows hinder the emergence
of a new world order. This alarmist approach to migration is
then logically followed by attempts to control, limit, or prevent it from
doing harm by means of increasingly international political and police
cooperation.
298
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 299
Migration is also perceived as a cause of insecurity inside states. The
presence of immigrant populations is often presented as a threat to
"native" economic well-being. Immigrants and their offspring are often
accused of taking jobs from nationals or of taking unfair or fraudulent
advantage of rich countries' social security systems. Immigrant populations
are also presented as a threat to law and order, so that immigration
is associated with the rise in trans-frontier organized crime (drugs,
prostitution, arms-dealing, and human-trafficking, mafias, etc.). Immigrants,
particularly of the second generation, are associated with the rise
in urban criminality affecting many towns and suburban areas ofEurope.
Consequently, since the presence of migrants is presumed to encourage
feelings of insecurity in the native population, it is sometimes used
simplistically as the main reason for the rise of extreme-right parties.
In this way, immigration finally appears as a threat to democracy and
immigrants as "internal enemies" who put in jeopardy our social benefits,
our relative economic well-being, and even our cultural and national
identity. Islam and Muslims thus become our bogey men. According
to this view, Europe is suffering from galloping Islamization, threatening
European cultures and values, including democracy and human
rights.
Stressing only the negative economic, democratic or security aspects
of immigration is unsatisfactory from the academic point of view. Being
too simplistic, it leads to manifest ambiguity and paradox. The growing
economic exploitation, especially of illegal immigrants in certain sectors
(for instance, in Spanish agriculture), coincides with declarations about
the supposed costs for receiving countries. In cruder terms, the more we
get out of immigrants the more they are accused of getting out of "us"
(Adam et al. 2002).
It is more realistic to recognize that migrations may have positive as well
as negative effects both for the country of origin and the host country.
There are no absolutes in the matter. It all depends on the general context
of these migrations.
We must also remember that migration is nothing new in human history.
On the contrary, history is simply the long story ofsuccessive migratory
flows across the planet. Humans have always moved over the face
of the earth and nothing suggests they are likely to stop, whatever sort
ofrestrictive migratory policies are brought into force. Modern means of
communication and transport developments have, in fact, made it easier
for people to travel to the four corners of the globe. Is it not a paradox,
in the present state of the world, to make migration easier and cheaper
for the many while trying at the same time to draw up more and more
restrictive immigration policies?
300 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
Migration is an inescapable feature of tbe start of tbis century, and
is very likely to continue throughout it (Castles and Miller 2003). How
could it be otherwise considering tbe number ofexisting and even increasing
migratory pressures on a world-wide scale (demographic and economic
inequalities, environmental and political causes, desire for better
living conditions), and the technical possibilities for human mobility? In
spite of restrictive immigration policies, frontiers between states remain
more or less easy to cross. This is even more the case for tbe frontiers
of democratic states which, in principle, are not willing to use
force in order to deport human beings or to prevent tbeir arrival or
departure.
This chapter shows in what way Europe can be considered as an
immigration continent. It briefly follows migratory flows to Europe since
1945 and considers tbe outlook for tbe future. It also presents European
immigration policies adopted since tbe postwar period, finally stressing
tbe need to go furtber towards a common immigration approach in tbe
European Union.
Immigration in Europe since 1945
Like otber regions of tbe world, Europe has always been, from prehistoric
times and all tbrough tbe countless population movements up to
tbe present day, a continent ofimmigration (Enzenberger 1994). During
tbe prehistoric period, migrations took place all over tbe world, including
Europe. The classical period was a time of great population movements
known as tbe "great migrations." Towns and cities like Atbens and Rome
were largely formed by drift from tbe land when peasants left for a more
prosperous life in tbe urban centers. The Middle Ages saw tbe Germanic
and Ottoman invasions as well as the Crusades. Learned men of tbe time
traveled everywhere in spite of the difficulties to be faced. When Pope
Alexander VI divided tbe New World between the Spanish and the Portuguese,
he set offtransoceanic migratory movements on a gigantic scale.
Such movements were to mark tbe history ofEuropean populations' right
up to World War I. Millions ofEuropeans left their continent to take part
in tbe conquest of tbe Americas. Between tbe wars, population shifts
witbin Europe also gained considerable momenturg.for tb.e following
reasons: tbedepression, tbe closing of tbe United States to emigrants,
and.tbe~appearance•·of dictatorships in certain European countries like
Spain,:Italy, and~Germany. Belgium, at tbis time, was already recruiting
foreign workers and accepting refugees from eastern and soutbern
Europe (Caestecker 2000).
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 301
From 1945 to 1973-74
Just after World War II, demographic and economic indicators were
announcing a new period of intercontinental emigration from Europe.
The heady rise in fertility rates looked likely to lead to over-population
in certain parts of the continent. In the economy, poverty was rife and
restarting production was an enormous challenge. In such conditions, it
was no wonder large numbers of Europeans went offto seek their fortune
elsewhere, like in Canada or Australia. It was, however, mainly within
Europe that migratory flows reached record levels in the period up to
1973-74 (Castles and Kosack 1985). During the industrial and economic
reconstruction period of 1947-60, northern European economies suffered
from a persistent manpower shortage in mining and heavy industry,
whereas unemployment reigned in southern European countries such as
Italy and Spain. These countries became immigrant labor pools for countries
such as Belgium or Germany to draw on, and they recruited intensively.
During the "Golden Sixties" (1961 to 1973-74), with industry
constantly in search offresh manpower, the demand for unskilled, cheap
labor often outran supply. Immigration towards northern Europe continued,
mainly on account of short-term economic requirements. At the
time, the:migration equatiorrwas generally-perceived as relatively simple.
When a manpower shortage appears, the immigration tap is turned on.
When the vacancies have been filled, the tap is turned offagain (Martens
1976).
At a finer-grained level, the-1945 to 1973....,74 .period featured five
migratory scenarios. In the first, northern· European countries invited
manual workers from southern Europe, then the Balkans, North Africa,
and Turkey. This is the origin of the large numbers ofTurks present in
Germany. and of the Italian and Moroccan communities in Belgium. In
the second, colonial powers such as France and Great Britain encouraged
immigration.from .their colonies and later from their ex.,-colonies.
Algerian workers thus arrived in France (Sayad 1991); Caribbean or
Indo-Pakistani workers settled in the British metropolis. In the third, the
decolonization process led to the.. return of ex-colonials~to the mothercountry.
When Algeria became· an independent· state, numbers of excolonists
came·back to France. Some, called "Pieds Noirs", met with
serious problems of re-insertion. Similarly, the new dictatorships in exBritish
East Africa turned out large numbers ofresident migrants from the
Indian sub-continent who, instead of returning to the mother-country,
made for Great Britain; In the fourth, Europe was already facing the
aJ.'rivalofpoliticaLasylum.,-seekers mainly from the communist bloc and
later from Latin America where authoritarian regimes were in power.
302 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
Finally, there was considerable movementofhighly qualified elites thanks
to industrialtrans-nationalizations and the development ofEuropean and
non-European international organizations.
To different degrees and according to each European Union (EU)
country's specific timetable, most countries saw at least one of these five
scenarios between 1945 and 1973-74 (Martiniello 2001). In Belgium, for
example, the organization ofsouthern Mediterranean immigration began
very soon after the war, in 1946. With the independence of the Congo,
Belgian colonists returned home. Belgium also accepted political refugees
from eastern Europe and Latin America. As Brussels gradually became
the European capital, a business and administrative elite moved there.
In contrast, unlike France, Great Britain, and Holland, Belgium never
encouraged immigrants from her colonies to come and work there. Two
reasons are often quoted to explain the absence of colonial worker immigration
in Belgium. Firstly, industrial exploitation of the Congo necessitated
an abundant manpower supply which sometimes fell short locally.
Secondly, on account ofBelgian colonial racist attitudes, the government
did not want to risk black workers settling in Belgium.
At the European level, this period's most significant migration scenarios
were those of~unskilledworker and colonial and post-colonial immigration.
This led to considerable change in the ethnic and national composition
of many European urban and industrial zones. The fact that
Leicester is fast becoming the first non-white majority British town, that
in Marseilles the northern area has a high proportion of French citizens
ofNorth African origin, that there is a significant Turkish presence in the
Ruhr, that in Brussels, Charleroi, and Mons, an Italian accent is often
heard, is largely due to migratory shifts that took place after the World
War II and before 1973-74.
Since 1973-74
The early 1970s marked the end of the "Golden Sixties" and the beginning
of a global economic restructuring period. The first oil crisis, which
struck in 1973-74, was of both economic and political importance,
highlighting a fundamental transformation of the global economy and
labor markets. There were several contributing elements: firstly, investment
strategies underwent profound modifications; capital and jobs were
increasingly being transferred to parts ofthe world where workers enjoyed
less social~ security. Secondly, the micro-electronic revolution made for
lower unskilled worker demand in certain industrial sectors. Thirdly,
industrial· decline took shape and.~gathe:te<:t:pi:fCe: Formerly prosperous
mining and heavy industry areas faced a situation of almost unstoppable
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 303
job losses. Economic desertification (which actually began during the
"Golden Sixties") became rampant in Wallonia, Yorkshire, and the north
of France. Fourthly, the service sector exploded. One of the main features
of the workforce was flexibility, the essential element for operational
efficiency. Fifthly, as from this period, we see the development
of the "black" economy, with large numbers of illegal workers. Lastly,
under-employment as a whole progressed, as well as job instability. All
these developments took root during the following decades. Theybrought
about a widening ofthe North-South divide and accentuated the poverty
gap in the rich countries. They were also paralleled by global geopolitical
transformations which took concrete form after 1989 with the fall of the
Berlin Wall.
These upheavals caused changes not only in the perception of European
immigration but also in world-wide migratory scenarios. Until then,
immigration had been seen largely as an essentially economic resource to
be mobilized according to precise labor requirements. Generally speaking,
the presence ofimmigrants was supposed to be temporary. In the case
ofunfavorable economic conditions, they were expected to go home. But
in 1973-74, the expected departures did not take place, in spite of the
recession and rising unemployment. Most European governments seem
to have lost their bearings at this point. Several governments decided to
end all further labor immigration.
Yet despite its official termination, labor immigrationinto Europe continued.
Certain previous migratory scenarios proceeded at a slower rate.
Other older scenarios took a firmer hold. In addition, there were new
immigration mechanisms appearing and developing both in Europe and
on a global scale. Two distinct"sub,-,phases can be seen in immigration
within. andinto Europe after 1974- the first.up to 1989, and the second
from the fall of the Berlin Wall up to the present day (Martiniello
2001).
In the first sub-phase, European governments somehow never seemed
able or inclined to see that their own decision to halt immigration was
strictly respected. Foreign workers continued to obtain work permits in
Belgium, France, Germany, and Holland after 1974. In Belgium, 30,000
new work permits were delivered to foreigners arriving directly from
another country between 1974 and 1984 (Groenendijk and Hampsink
1994). Admittedly, these migrants did not have exactly the same profile
as before. The proportion of highly-qualified workers tended to be
higher. Als9, familY members continued to arrive. Not only did most
migrant workers fail to leave the country after the 1970s oil crisis, but
they increasingly brought in their family and gradually settled into less
temporary situations in northern European countries. Refugees of more
304 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
and more varied origins continued to arrive in relatively moderate numbers.
In general, refugees ,from the communisebloc also continued to be
welcomed- for reasons of international politics, among others. To some
extent they were considered as desirable symbols of the failure of the
communist egalitarian ideal.
But the most striking development of this period conc:erned the
Mediterranean countries. Historically speaking,.Italy; Spain, and Greece
had always been countries of emigration; now they became countries of
immigration. Italy, for example, was historically the outstanding country
of emigration. From 1876. to 1942 alone, over 18 million Italians
left the country (Assante 1978). After the war and until the 1960s, the
average annual number of emigrants stood at 300,000. It later fell to
about 125,000. With industrialization in the north, however, the trend
was gradually reversed. Fewer and fewer'Italians emigrated and more
and more foreigners entered Italy. Today the country has over 2.6 million
legal immigrants, not counting "illegals" whose numbers are difficult to
estimate with any accuracy (Caritas/Migrantes 2004).
Thesecond:sub,-phase camewith the thawing ofthe cold war in the late
1980s, which brought a new sense of the potential for immigration. The
nearer we got to the watershed of 1989, the more there was the feeling
that political changes in the East might cause an unmanageable influx
of migrants. There were alarmist forecasts. According to some sources,
several million Russians were ready to leave as soon as they could. The
fear·of invasion graduallytookroot in·Western Europe. In the summer of
1991, a boat carrying hundreds ofAlbanian emigrants, like bees in a hive,
berthed in Italy. It was the media event of the summer, and aggravated
the vague fear ofa migratory flood. And yet we can but note that although
immigrants continued to arrive in Europe after 1989, the feared invasion
never took place.
It is true that political crises in eastern Europe, Africa, or Asia have led
to a global asylum crisis. There are indeed a growing number ofrefugees
in the world Goly, Kelly, and Nettleton 1997). In spite of the correct
impression of a major rise in numbers :of asylum seekers in the 1990s,
Europe.does not take in all the world's refugees. Far from it. In fact, the
vast majority ofthem take refuge in another poor country. Nonetheless, in
the 1990s, European populations and their governments turned a colder
and colder face to these immigrants. They were increasingly seen as "false
refugees" or "disguised economic immigrants."
East-West migration after 1989 also included other new streams.
Hundreds of thousands of ethnic Germans, who had lived for generations
in the East, went back to re-unified Germany, the eternal mothercountry.
Meanwhile, the German government tried to encourageJewish
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 305
immigration into Germany. Lastly, migrant workers from the east came
to do seasonal work in the west.
The increasing politicization and mediazation ofimmigration was particularly
striking in the 1990s and early 2000s, especially around the
theme of illegal immigration and people-trafficking. Whether we consider
the tragedy ofthe fifty or so young Chinese who perished in a crosschannel
refrigerator truck going to England, the hundreds ofAfricans who
disappeared.while trying to cross the straits of Gibraltar in unseaworthy
craft, or the hundreds of girls from eastern Europe forced into prostitution
in western cities, these highly publicized dramas tend to produce
a simplified impression of present migratory flows, which become connected
with human tragedy, illegality and delinquency. This contributes
stron:gly::to the-definition of immigration as essentially a security issue.
However, different forms of non-legal immigration were partly the consequence
of immigration and the hardening of asylum policy in Europe
over the previous twenty years. The drastic restriction of legal immigration
routes meant candidates were willing to try their luck by other
means, either alone or with recourse to the services ofillegal immigration
professionals. It is also important to underscore the vague nature of the
"illegal immigration" category. It covers, in fact, very different migratory
trajectories. Some ofthese people enter the European territory legally, for
example, with a tourist visa or as students, and then stay in the country
after expiration of their visa. Others make a clandestine frontier-crossing
and immediately become "illegal." And some reside legally in Europe,
but work illegally (Adam et al. 2002).
This is not to deny the existence of illegal immigration and humantrafficking
organizations. But neither can illegal immigration or immigration
as a whole be reduced to the sordid activities of international
organized crime. The many and complex causes of migratory flows in
our globalized world are so compelling that, with or without illegal organizations,
would-be immigrants will try their luck until they succeed or
even die in the attempt.
Complexification and multiplication of migratory scenarios
It is sometimes claimed that economic globalization is the root cause of
new migratory scenarios, making them fundamentally different from traditional
immigration scenarios. In the globalized economy, it is said, it
is becoming more and more difficult to identify and distinguish between
emigrant countries and host countries (Martiniello 2001). Most countries
may have somehow become both at once, as we see in those African
states where large numbers oftheir population emigrate while immigrants
306 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
from neighboring countries pour in. In Europe, Mediterranean countries,
which have always known large-scale emigration have now become immigration
countries.
Moreover, it may be becoming more and more difficult to retrace the
complex routes and trajectories followed by today's migrants and thus
give shape to multidirectional migratory flows. To simplify, it .could be
said.thatctn:rent~migrations are increasingly less likely to feature a departure
point·A:and an arrival point B with, in a certain number of cases, a
final.return:ofmigrants to point A,. or, for. the majority, permanent residence
at point'R In the age of globalization, migratory scenarios may
actually involve points A, B, C, D, and E, between which some ofthe new
migrants travel, making it impossible to identify their departure point
(especially for those without identification papers) or their final point of
arrival. The following anecdote illustrates this new migratory reality (as
does Jacqueline Andall's chapterin this volume). A young Senegalese man
I met in autumn 1998 in the New York area ofBattery Park, where he was
selling T -shirts to tourists going to see the Statue of Liberty, explained
in perfect French that he had worked for about a year in Italy, selling
African statuettes in the streets. He also told me he was preparing to go
for the third or fourth time to Belgium where he would stay a few months
in order to buy second-hand cars and export them to the Ivory Coast.
He thought he would stay a while in Belgium and then go back for a rest
in Senegal before setting out again either for Europe or for the United
States. Of course, there is no proof that this "global migrant" was telling
the truth, but the migratory scenarios he describes, that of a young man
ready to go where there are the best opportunities and stay as long as
necessary, may at least seem more plausible and widespread today than
was the case thirty years ago.
It is, in any case, undeniable that.migratory movements today correspond
to more,and mme numerous, complex, global scenarios; Traditional
migratory customs are disappearing before our eyes and new ones
are appearing which will continue to develop. Thus, the patterns of postwar
European migration ebb and flow across at least six major types of
migration:
(1) Unskilled labor migrations were crucial to industrial development
after the war. Today, they remain important in certain economic
sectors such as agriculture, building construction or catering.
(2) Migration ofhighly qualified workers has steadily increased as technology
has become more complex. This migration type is likely to
spread in the future in Europe.
(3) Armed conflicts and ecological disasters all over the world have
caused, and will continue to cause, more or less forced population
shifts towards Europe.
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 307
(4) Inasmuch as human beings aspire to family life, family regrouping is
an important scenario.
(5) Return migration has always existed, though of varying importance
according to time and country.
(6) Migratory movement is developing on a global scale, as shown above.
This type of migration is not the most widespread, but it already
affects our continent (Castles and Miller 2003).
Serious observers no longer doubt that migration will be an inescapable
feature of the twenty-first century. Migratory pressures continue to exist
in the "global village" and are growing at the global level due to demographic
and economic inequalities, environmental and political concerns,
and the desire for better living conditions. Material possibilities for travel
have multiplied and made for easier access. On the other hand, there is no
prospect of anything that could be called a migrant invasion of Europe.
The United Nations estimated total migrant numbers in the world in
1990 at 120 million (Castles 2002). Despite an increase in the 1990s,
migrants still represent no more than 4 percent of world population.
Moreover, only a small minority reaches Europe. The idea ofa European
invasion, therefore, in no way corresponds to current migratory reality.
That said, European migratory prospects are hard to foresee with any
accuracy. But it seems clear that the immigration policies brought into
force may have an impact. Admitting that mobility has always existed
and will always exist should not lead to an attitude of political fatalism
or passivity. A clear, fair and proactive immigration policy is not only
possible,J:>l1t~])solutely essential ifmigratory flows are to be to the benefit
of all, here and elsewhere. Up to now, however, European policies have
not always fully fulfilled these criteria. This takes another look across
postwar European history to trace these policy choices.
European immigration policies from 1945 to
the present day
Before starting to examine immigration policies some definitions are in
order. Following the work of the Swedish political scientist, Thomas
Hammar, a distinction is generally made between a state's immigration
policy and its immigrant policy (Hammar 1985). Immigration policy
concerns migratory flow regulation, border-controls and admission of
foreign nationals. It consists of all legal measures and procedures as well
as administrative practices governing the selection, admission and entry
offoreign nationals to state territory. Refusal ofentry, removal, and expulsion
measures are also included in immigration policy.
Immigrantpolicy combines all legal measures and administrative practices
governing the immigrant's life in the new country. It covers work
308 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
practices, social security, accommodation, education, social, and political
participation as well as the immigrants' cultural life. Immigrant policies
plainly concern integration, incorporation, insertion or assimilation of
newcomers to society.
Immigration policy and immigrant policy are really two distinct,
although linked, branches of what can be called migratory policy. They
are distinct because the one aims to manage human movement while
the other is concerned with aspects of migrants' new living conditions.
They are linked because, in certain countries (particularly the traditionally
immigrant countries like Canada, the United States, or Australia),
immigration policy is the initial phase of immigrant policy. The final
objective of these countries is, in fact, to transform migrants into full citizens.
These two branches of migratory policy are also frequently associated
in political discourse. A much-used argument for a very strict immigration
policy is that it represents an essential condition for ensuring the
success ofimmigrant policies put in place. In Great Britain, for instance,
politicians often attribute the success of race relations measures, which
many would like to copy in continental Europe, to the strict frontier controls
brought into force in 1962 (Favelll998). Along the same lines, those
who wish to follow a closed frontier policy today are ready to declare that
higher immigration into Great Britain would harm the country's ethnic
and racial cohesion. British researchers, however, express open criticism
of this simplistic linking of immigration to immigrant policy.
This section is almost exclusively devoted to immigration policies in
Europe. There are two other fundamental preliminary remarks to be
made before delving into this sensitive issue. First, until recently, the
EU states as well as outside states have had sovereign control over their
immigration and immigrant policies. Each state is responsible for deciding,
freely, but within international legal regulations, who may or may not
enter the country, stay or reside and under what conditions. The state also
has exclusive power of decision as to who may acquire citizenship. These
issues are, in fact, at the heart of national sovereignty, which explains the
difficulty and slow-going in drawing up a supranational European immigrant
and immigration policy partly outside each state's control. This
point will be dealt with later in this chapter.
Secondly,~HWestern European and traditionally immigrant countries
have widely different histories both in their approach to immigration
and the type ofimmigrationpolicy applied. The United States, Canada,
and Australia consider themselves as nations of immigrants. Nationbuilding
in these ''NewWorld" countries relies on the immigration myth.
Of course, in the interest of historical objectivity, we can hardly accept
the idea of virgin territory conquered by immigrants from all over the
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 309
world to form new nations. In the United States, genocidal treatment of
Indians and slavery played an equally important part in the formation of
the American nation. Immigration remains, however, a critical element
in social imagery of the country's history. The Ellis Island immigration
museum in New York is one of the most popular in North America.
There everyone can commemorate the immigration story, the startingpoint
of United States history, as well as their pride in being American
descendents of immigrants. In these circumstances, the idea of bringing
in migrants to settle, exploit available resources, and contribute to
development is historically rooted. They have admittedly often adopted
restrictive immigration policies, but the idea of a proactive immigration
policy is not seen as preposterous in immigrant nations.
In Western Europe, on the other hand, the predominant notion is of
age.,.oldnations eventually achieving their own state (Smith 1986, 1995).
What is the German nation? What is the French nation? There can be
fierce debate on the subject, but rarely does anyone question the existence
ofthese nations previous to immigration. In other words, European societies
consider themselves as already populated and constituted entities,
which needed the help of~foreign labor atparticular times in their economic
development. They are much less likely to see immigration as
a constituentparrofthe nation than are traditionally immigrant states.
Immigration is considered as a tempmary aid to national economic development
and an essentially short-term factor, which does not necessarily
lead to the granting of citizenship. Consequently, the idea of a reactive
immigration policy adapts well to this perception of migratory events.
According to the state of the economy, immigrants are invited with the
idea that they can be got rid of when no longer needed.
Yet European history shows that migration has also made a large contribution
to the formation ofEuropean nations. France is a very good example.
Though the French sense ofa pre-existing nation is highly developed,
it is also a long-standing immigrant state like the United States (Noiriel
1988). The difference between the two countries is that one of them has
incorporated the migratory phenomenon into the romance of its national
history, but not the other. To varying degrees, this would be true of all
European countries. They have all experienced migratory flows, but this
migratory history is more often ignored than integrated into national history.
This is the case in Belgium. By reason of its geographical position,
the country has always been criss-crossed by diverse populations. Yet the
subject of immigration remains strikingly absent from Belgian history
books. Even if immigration practically always leads part of the migrants
in permanent residence, Europeans still broadly conceive of it as provisional
and temporary. The French-Algerian sociologist, Abdelmalek
310 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
Sayad, already pointed out, twenty years ago, that the distinction between
labor migrations and population shifts correspond only approximately to
reality (Sayad 1991, 1999). Human beings cannot be moved around like
merchandise. Germany, for example, may well claim that it is not an
immigrant country, but 2 to 3 million Turks are now a permanent part
of its population. In the long term, many of them will become German
citizens.
Whatever the reality ofpermanent immigration, these differing perceptions
of the importance of migratory facts for nation- and state-building
are reflected in political attitudes to immigration and affect immigration
policies put into practice on either side of the Atlantic. The trend in
the western world towards strict frontier and immigration control- some
would say the tendency to pretend we control the frontiers- has gathered
force during the 1980s and 1990s. On the one hand, the United States
has actually set up a wall that is several thousand kilometers long along
the Mexican border, creating one of the most highly militarized frontiers
in the democratic world. In Europe, very strict rules apply at checkpoints
for entry into the EU. But in countries where immigration is traditional,
there is still the possibility of legal immigration through various procedures
(annual quotas, points system, lottery, family regrouping, etc.).
Some regions such as Quebec even foresee increasing the number ofvisas
to be issued to would-be immigrants in the next few years. In contrast,
there is still no proactive immigration policy in most European countries.
Legal immigration possibilities are at a minimum. The zero immigration
doctrine is certainly running out of steam, and yet it has held out since
1973-74, when the European frontier was essentially closed to all new
labor immigration.
From the end of World War II to the first oil-crisis
Between the end of World War II and the first oil-crisis, several types of
immigration policy were set up in Europe. The reasons for these policies
were chiefly economic. In a certain number of cases, they were also
demographic and political.
As Albert Martens writes, immigration was mainly seen as supplementary
manpower to be mobilized according to the industrial system's special
requirements (Martens 1976). When labor demand outran supply
in certain sectors, governments imported poorly-skilled migrant workers
who were satisfied with low pay and accepted very hard workingconditions.
In certain cases, recruitment took place in the country of
origin, organized by the importing country's government at the request
of employers and with unwilling trade union consent. The unions feared
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 311
possible downward pressure on pay-packets due to the arrival of migrant
workers. But rather than stand by passively during these manpower
importations, they often decided to take part and try to limit the potentially
harmful effects on local workers.
The basic instruments of this immigration policy, which was no more
than an appendage to employment policy, were bilateral ,agreements
between countries. In,June 1946, for example, Belgium signed an agreement,with*Italy
providing for tens of thousands of Italian workers to be
sent to the Belgian collieries. In exchange, Belgium would export coal
to Italy on favorable terms (Martiniello and Rea 2001). As part of the
so-called "contingent" system, the agreements provided for the workers
to be brought to Belgium in special rail convoys. Belgium would also
sign bilateral immigration contracts with other countries such as Spain,
Morocco, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Get;many also had recourse
to bilateral agreements to set up its system of Gastarbe£ters ("guest workers")
through which foreigners were invited to come and work for a limited
period (often five years). SwitzeFlanainvented arotatingimmigration
system in order to prevent foreigners settling in its territory. After !heir
stinrin Switzerland,,,immigrant workers had to go home and leave room
for otherforeignworkerswho would be subject to the same regime.
In spite of these different immigrant worker recruitment and management
methods, certainccommonfeatures.are present in the bilateral agreements
signed by labor importing and exporting governments. Firstly,
immigrant workers were given work and residence permits for. a limited
stay. Secondly, labor market access was initially restricted to certain
industrial,sectors, generally mining or iron and steel industries. Thirdly,
the agreements concerned at fust the recruitmentofjustthe male workerhe
could not bring his family. But from the early fifties, things began to
change in certain countries. Fourthly, priority was given to strong, healthy
young men who could be immediately productive.
Whatever the immigration system chosen, the legal distinction between
citizen status and foreign status was the central criterion for the migrant's
right to work, residence and social security. The immigrant was a foreign
worker whose presence was seen as temporary. His only social existence
was as a worker. In these circumstances, unemployment was an intolerable
anomaly in the migrant's trajectory. Either he worked or he had no
place in the host country.
In the.' 1960s, labor demand reached such a high level that certain
governments adopted a la£ssez-faire policy. Foreigners, some of
whom had already migrated under the bilateral agreements, arrived
in Belgium or Germany simply on a tourist visa (Martens 1976).
They found jobs in industry, without any trouble. Later they could
312 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
regularize their situation as to residence and working rights. The granting
oftourist visas thus plainly appeared as a part ofreactive immigration
policy.
Certain colonial powers set up other immigrant labor recruitment
methods. Prior to decolonization, colonial labor migration to the home
country was in fact assimilated to internal migration. France and Great
Britain had, in most cases, no need for collective labor recruitment in
their colonies. On account of poverty and the demographic explosion,
many colonial subjects were attracted by the opportunities they thought
they would find in the metropolis. Leaving was easy thanks to their citizen
or subject status, which gave them entry into France or Great Britain. In
thS!9t:Y, coloniaL.immigra!l~S,,enjoyed the same rights as other citizens.~In
practice,·however,·they faced.hostility from thdocal population and var:
ious types of discrimination in their.social and working life. They essentially
played the same economic role as immigrant workers in countries
like Belgium or Germany. But in terms ofstatus, they had the immediate
advantage of a secure residence permit. Decolonization put an end to
freedom of movement between colonies and home country. Both France
and Great Britain would endeavor to control immigration from former
colonies, which is the object ofthe British 1961 Immigration Act (LaytonHenry
1992).
Immigration policies are also often put in place for internal demographic
and political reasons. In the 1960s, Walloon demographic decline
was seen as a danger for the region's political equilibrium with Flanders.
The French demographer, Alfred Sauvy, recommended the immigration
of young families to compensate for the demographic shortfall. Without
the Belgian population being really aware of it, this concern was
partly responsible for the Belgian authorities' comprehensive attitude
to family regrouping, which had, in fact, already taken place since the
1950s.
In short, it is obvious that European immigration policies from 1945 to
1973-74 were largely reactive. According to particular economic requirements
and sometimes the demographic situation, governments called on
labor immigration that they generally considered as temporary. In most
cases, permanent residence, and the formation of new ethnic minorities
resulting from these migratory processes were neither anticipated,
desired, nor organized. Generally speaking, European migratory policy
during this period was no more than an element in employment
policy and a reaction by governments to market forces and the sometimes
contradictory, sometimes converging, interests of migrants' countries
of origin and host countries. It was also very nationally oriented.
Each state drew up its immigration policies on its own, according to its
sovereign rights, without consulting European Community partner states
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 313
or taking account of special links with each of the European or other
countries.
Unfinished Europeanization (from 1973-74 to the year
2000)
With the development ofthe European integration process since the 1957
Rome Treaty, immigration policy was to become an issue for discussion,
and eventually decision at the supranational level. Insofar as European
integration is based on four fundamental freedoms - free movement of
capital, goods, and services as well as of persons - migratory policy was
bound to appear sooner or later on the European political scene. Chapter
16 in this volume discusses these developments in greater depth, but a
rapid summary of them is a crucial part of my overview.
The baseline ofthe story is that the realization ofthe four freedoms has
been extremely.hesitant and complex. On the one hand, many European
states have been very reluctant to give up their sovereignty on migration
issues, especially as they have become .more politicized. On the other
hand, within fifty years, we have progressed from essentially national
immigration policies to European-scale intergovernmental cooperation,
with a growing tendency to common discussion and, to a lesser extent, a
common immigration policy. This process has been hampered by running
disagreements over the appropriate institutional format for cooperation,
notably with several states objecting to the federal-style centralization
of migration issues in truly common policies. Also crucial is the fact
that this slow, laborious process of migratory policy Europeanization has
taken place in a spirit of respect for the zero immigration doctrine. An
important result is that the Europeanization of immigration policies whether
tending towards relative harmonization, convergence or more
closely concerted national policies- has led to a considerable heightening
of the restrictive nature of immigration policy and border controls at
Europe's external frontiers. In becoming more European, immigration
policies have become even more security-based.
Most ofthe developments in the Europeanization ofimmigration policy
took place after 1973, occasionally taking giant steps. Two important
periods stand out: the first from 1973-74 to 1989, the second from 1989
to the present day (with an important sub-phase of more accelerated
activity since 1996). During the first period, migration was discussed
at the European level mainly as a by-product of discussions about the
construction of a common European market. During the second period,
migration became a European issue in its own right.
Two earlier dates provide the background to the former period: 1957
and 1968. The Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the European
314 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
Economic Community (EEC) provided a legal basis for a European intracommunity
migration policy. The principle offree labor force movement,
one of the founding principles of the Common Market, implied abolition
of all discrimination based on Member-State workers' nationality
with regard to employment, pay or other working conditions. The EEC's
Council of Ministers was to be responsible for adopting Directives and
Regulations in this respect. In 1968 the EEC took its first actions in
this sphere, adopting legal norms concerning freedom of movement for
European workers. EEC Regulation 1612/68 established a legal difference
between European and non-European workers. From this date, a
line was drawn between the issue ofintra-European mobility and that of
extra-Community immigration. In other words, the difference of status
between those who become European citizens and those from outside
countries is fixed by a European legal norm. In the same year, Directive
68/130 widened the scope of freedom of movement for workers
to certain members of their family, of whatever nationality. The aim of
this Directive was above all to facilitate European worker mobility with
the Common Market. And yet, in some ways, it laid the foundations
for the future development of an extra-European immigration policy
(Martiniello and Govaere 1989).
The first steps toward elaborating such a policy in the 1973-74 to 1989
period began with an EEC summit in Paris in 1974, where the question
of"non-Community foreign nationals" status was seriously examined for
the first time. This was the logical consequence of the recently-affirmed
idea ofa "Citizens' Europe." How was this to be managed without considering
similar treatment of non-European foreign nationals? Abandoning
intra-European border controls while leaving each state free to adopt its
own immigration policy did not seem feasible in the long term. In 1976
the Council therefore decided in favor of intergovernmental cooperation
on the matter- if only in principle.
The growing importance ofthe immigration issue led the Commission
to present, in March 1985, a document on "Orientations for Common
Migration Policy." This text pleaded in favor of more elaborate European
personal mobility legislation. The Commission also defended the
idea ofintergovernmental consultation on Member States' non-European
immigration policies. Already at this time, the Commission was playing a
leading role in sensitizing European authorities to the importance of the
migratory issue and in cautiously trying to plead for a European immigration
policy. A few months later, the Commission presented the idea of
European coordination of entry, residence and work-permit regulations
for non-European citizens. It also considered the creation of a common
visa policy.
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 315
In June of the same year, the Commission took a further step in this
direction by deciding to set up a procedure for previous notification
and concerted action on migratory policies with regard to third countries
(Martiniello and Govaere 1989). Its aim was to encourage Member
States to inform their Community partners and the Commission of any
changes planned in existing non-European immigration legislation. This
decision made it possible for the Commission and the Member States to
coordinate their action without any binding constraints. Member States
were reluctant to accept this decision, however, which many saw as an
attack on national sovereignty. The Council thus adopted a resolution
again stating that non-European immigration policy remained a national
responsibility. Even this was not enough for France, Germany, Denmark,
The Netherlands, and Great Britain, who asked the European Court
of Justice to annul the Commission's decision since (they argued) the
Commission was not competent to deal with the matter. They thus indirectly
contested the very idea of a common, coordinated non-European
immigration policy. After extensive debates in which the European Parliament
participated, and often spoke in defense of the Commission, the
Court rescinded the Commission's decision, while upholding the idea
that a European migration policy is feasible. The parties met halfway.
The Commission re-attacked in 1988 with a second decision setting up
a previous notification and coordination procedure for non-European
immigration. This amended version of the initial text caused less
trouble.
The Member States seemed divided between the wish to set up an
internal market and saving their freedom of action on migration issues.
This ambiguity is clear in the Single European Act of 1987, which revised
the EEC treaty and launched the "Single Market 1992" program. On
the one hand, governments promised to cooperate over non-Community
foreign nationals, rights ofentry, movement, and residence. On the other,
they reasserted their right to take national measures for controlling nonEuropean
immigration.
This ambiguity endured. In 1989, during finalization ofthe Single Market
program, the Palma Document (prepared for the June 1989 European
Council summit in Madrid) drew up a list of problems to be solved for
achieving personal freedom of movement in the EEC. It included border
control on internal and external frontiers as well as visas and expulsions.
Priority was given to the drawing-up ofa list ofcountries whose nationals
would need a visa for entering any Community country. Another priority
was common external border control and surveillance measures.
The document also attacked the question of improved cooperation and
information exchange between customs and national police, as well as
316 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
prevention of illegal immigration. But if immigration policy harmonization
was now presented as desirable, in-depth discussion of the content
and development of a future common immigration policy did not take
place.
Meanwhile, in the middle of the 1980s, senior officials in the Benelux
countries, France and Germany were working, in secret and outside European
institutions, on an agreement for gradually eliminating border controls
on these five countries' common frontiers. The final objective was
to completely abolish internal frontiers in this group of states and place
all border controls at their external frontiers. The Schengen Agreement
signed in June 1985 raised a number ofquestions not only among migrant
defense associations but also among parliamentarians from these states,
who were left out of the negotiations. There was a regrettable lack of
information. The agreement admittedly provided for visa and entry policy
harmonization, but it heavily emphasized police and judicial cooperation-
clearly associating immigration with criminality and terrorism. The
Schengen Agreement application clause was signed in 1990. It stresses
interior or exterior frontier crossing, visas, mobility conditions, residence
permits, and state responsibility for dealing with asylum applications.
This agreement also provides for the setting-up ofthe Schengen Information
System (SIS). This huge data bank, mainly concerned with wanted
persons, is more a tool for improved police cooperation than a means of
ensuring personal freedom of movement (Collinson 1993).
Some see Schengen as a practical method of work. Rather than proceeding
through the usual intergovernmental channels, or accepting the
leading role of the Commission, is it not better for a small group to
make some progress towards an immigration policy, even if it is securityoriented,
and later try to rally other European states to the same idea? And
in fact Schengen did gradually attract most EU members, and even some
from outside the EU. Among the EU Member States, only Great Britain
and Ireland have not yet signed up to the Schengen Agreement. Moreover,
although they cannot formally join, Iceland and Norway adopted
the entire content of Schengen in March 2001. The Schengen method
may be efficient. However, the fact that the basic agreement was negotiated
in secret, hidden from the public gaze and from its representatives,
poses a major problem for European democracy.
Thus, until 1989, it cannot be said that a common non-European
migration policy existed. Each state tried to regulate migratory flows and
check out foreigners on its own. Cooperation between states was difficult
and took place within the negotiations for setting up the Internal Market
by 1992 (or in parallel to them, in the Schengen format). The maximum
attempted was to coordinate national border-control policies at the
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 317
European level. In the absence of a more coherent collective discussion
of migration, these national immigration policies practically all became
more restrictive and security-oriented while remaining as reactive as ever
(Martiniello 2001).
As mentioned above, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the following collapse
of nearly all communist regimes aroused the fear of a massive,
uncontrollable migratory influx from the east. Illegal migrant and refugee
flows from the south were also a cause ofanxiety. It was increasingly recognized
that an urgent political response to these migratory "threats"
must be found. In a troubled geopolitical environment, external bordercontrol
became a priority for the EU, ifonly in European political rhetoric.
Migration became a major issue in the European and even non-European
political context. Intergovernmental and multilateral cooperation gained
increasing momentum from the end ofthe 1980s. In the early 1980s, five
multilateral forums were dealing with migratory issues. A few years later,
there were fifteen, including the Schengen group, the Rhodes group, the
Trevi group, the "ad hoc immigration group", the "mutual assistance"
group, the European anti-drug committee, the Berlin group, the "horizontal
group," the European Security and Cooperation Conference, and
others (Collinson 1993).
This intense intergovernmental and multilateral activity is a main feature
of the new migration policy regime set up during this period. The
states increasingly realized that it was in their interest to cooperate in finding
solutions to migratory dilemmas. Migration is in itself transnational.
It may therefore be no use trying to regulate it simply between countries
of origin and host countries. The Maastricht Treaty setting up the European
Union came into force in 1993 and confirmed this trend towards an
intergovernmental and multilateral approach to immigration policy. But,
although visa policy was included in the supranational "first pillar" of
core "Community competence," all other features ofimmigration policy
were relegated to Title IV of the Treaty, concerning Justice and Home
Affairs cooperation. This is the famous "third pillar" of the Maastricht
Treaty, the creation of which sought to limit centralized, supranational
policy harmonization, and which pointedly did not provide for a common
migratory policy as a whole.
A particularly significant area in the post-1989 expansion of activity
was political asylum. Cooperation on asylum dates from 1986 with the
adoption of the Single Act. At this time, one of the aims pursued by
the "ad hoc immigration group" was to put an early end to abuse of the
asylum process in Europe. With the enormous increase in asylum cases
after 1989, however, pressure for development of a European asylum
regime accelerated. Considerable progress has since been made, though
318 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
Member States have continued to disagree over how much their cooperation
should operate through hortatory resolutions and declarations
or through more centralized and legally binding common agreements
and actions. Even given extensive coordination on asylum, certain states
remain anxious to retain a degree of national sovereignty.
There has been no shortage of resolutions and declarations on asylum
since 1986. The 1989 Palma Document presented several asylum policy
proposals. It called for a common Geneva Convention-based policy
involving Member State acceptance of identical international commitments,
simplification of screening procedures for "plainly unfounded"
asylum applications, determining the state in charge of asylum application
screening and the creation ofa data bank to record the date and place
of asylum applications. In 1991, the Commission presented to Member
States an asylum policy communication that prioritized the harmonization
of expulsion policy. The Maastricht Treaty of 1991 defined asylum
policy as a matter of common interest to be dealt with through intergovernmental
cooperation. A year later, the Edinburgh European Council
again stated Europe's intention ofkeeping to the asylum tradition but also
ofcountering the potentially harmful effects ofuncontrolled immigration.
Among the principles inspiring European action was the recommendation
to try to maintain displaced persons in the secure regions nearest to
their home country. The idea of temporary protection appeared in these
discussions, but did not lead concretely to a clearly defined status.
In terms oflegally binding agreements and measures, two major instruments
are directly pertinent to the asylum issue. The Dublin Convention
1990 was mainly aimed at determining the country responsible for asylum
application screening. To avoid the "orbiting refugee" phenomenon,
it lays down that one Member State alone shall be in charge of screening
each asylum application. Asylum seekers thus have only one chance of
obtaining refugee status. The state responsible is that of the applicant's
first entry into EU territory. The Convention also considers the question
of information exchange on asylum rights between different states. As to
the Convention on European external frontier crossing of 1990, it deals
with the policy to be adopted with regard to asylum-seeker conveyers. In
1995, it was still at a standstill because of disagreement between Spain
and the United Kingdom about the Straits of Gibraltar. The debate continued
for some time within the Schengen framework.
With the opening of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference that led
to the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European policy regime for international
migration underwent four main developments that marked a
new, more ambitious phase. Firstly, the political agenda widened considerably
in comparison with previous periods. The Treaty assigned the EU
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 319
five major tasks: admission policy harmonization, development of a common
illegal immigration approach, drawing-up of a labor immigration
policy, solving of problems raised by non-EU foreign nationals' presence
within EU territory, and action to stem outside migratory pressure.
Secondly, the emphasis was laid on joint international action. The basic
notion was to set up a political regime stretching beyond the Schengen
frontiers, and even beyond those of the EU and of the European Free
Trade Association, stressing the importance of dialogue with the fiftyfive-member
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, the
forty-one member Council of Europe, and the thirty-member Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development. The eastern enlargement
of the EU was already on everyone's mind, leading to an emphasis
on coordination with the accession countries as well. Thirdly, the prevailing
state of mind remained largely defensive. The EU and its Member
States wished, above all, to protect EU frontiers by putting border controls
on its external frontiers and creating buffer zones. Finally, this new
regime was marked by a new level ofconfusion. It became even more difficult
to discover exactly who does what in European immigration policy.
During the Intergovernmental Conference preparing the Amsterdam
summit, it was obvious that opposition from Great Britain, Denmark, and
Ireland would block any sort ofimmediate immigration policy revolution.
The other Member States claim to support the idea of a common immigration
policy, leading to a compromise of sorts that has been decried by
some political observers on both sides.
Of all the difficult texts in EU history, the Amsterdam Treaty is one of
the most complex and least readable, with fourteen protocols and fortysix
appended declarations. Its migration-related provisions were particularly
Byzantine. It provided for the incorporation of Schengen principles
in the "first pillar," except with respect to the three above-mentioned
states. The Community thus adopted the Schengen restrictive, securityoriented
approach. The Maastricht Treaty's Title IV on freedom ofmovement,
immigration and asylum was moved to the first pillar. In other
words, most ofthe migration and asylum issues left the third intergovernmental
pillar and became subject to the more supranational procedures
of core "community competences." The Amsterdam Treaty also foresaw
the possibility, within five years of its ratification, of creating a common
immigration policy, which would have to be unanimously adopted by the
Council. But discussion ofthe content ofthis supposed future policy was
avoided.
Nonetheless, migration issues remained high on the agenda. At the
1999 European Council summit in Tampere, the Member States stressed
the need to reach a common immigration and asylum policy within the
320 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
five-year time frame in the Amsterdam Treaty- by 2004. Border-control
and anti-illegal immigration measures were again emphasized.
Two years after the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999, nobody
denied the slow progress made on common immigration and asylum policy.
The Commission played its part with no less than eleven proposals.
Only two of them have so far been adopted by the Council. In a speech
delivered in Rome in July 2000, Commissioner Vittorino, in charge ofthe
dossier, wrote offzero immigration. In November 2000, the Commission
presented a communication on Community immigration policy. In one
way, things began to change. More and more political actors recognize
the limits of zero immigration doctrine as well as the security-oriented,
restrictive approach to immigration. Otherwise, things remain the same.
Firstly, Member States are still suffering from a sort of schizophrenia.
On the one hand, they declare they want to set up a common immigration
policy. On the other, national bureaucracies cling to their national
sovereignty. Secondly, the restrictive, security-oriented approach is widely
accepted by most Member States. A generous, proactive European immigration
policy is still to come. We shall now look at some arguments for
and against such a policy.
Conclusion: For a proactive immigration policy in the
European Union
In the last few years, demands have been voiced all over Europe for official
re-opening offrontiers to certain forms oflabor immigration. Several
European governments have already seriously studied this hypothesis,
often under strong pressure from industry, in order to counter the highly
skilled manpower shortage in certain sectors, or unskilled in others. Others
see immigration as a solution to our demographic ageing and decline
as well as a means of safeguarding our social security system, particularly
our pensions. In this view, we would import large numbers ofyoung
immigrants, who would have a lot of children and contribute, through
taxation, to the costs of our welfare state. Lastly, there are those who
advance our commitment to human rights in support ofa more generous
immigration and asylum policy.
Nevertheless, zero immigration is still considered the reference. Official
re-opening offrontiers to new immigration is generally regarded with
suspicion, ifnot hostility. Trade unions, for example, are reluctant to consider
it. As to governments, some ministerial departments are afraid this
new immigration will prove to be at the expense oflabor market integration
for the immigrant-origin youth. Most demographers are opposed to
the idea of using immigration as a remedy for population ageing.
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 321
After September 11 had stopped any attempt to seriously move beyond
the zero immigration doctrine at the EU level, the European Commission
has tried hard to stimulate a debate on the necessity to have a global
approach to immigration, asylum, and integration. In June 2003, the
Commission presented a Communication on immigration, integration,
and employment (COM [2003]: 336) advocating a holistic approach targeting
all dimensions of immigration and integration (economic, social,
and political rights, cultural and religious diversity, citizenship and participation).
Referring to a 2000 Communication (COM [2000]: 757),
the text determined the targeted population as essentially composed by
migrant workers, their reunited family members, refugees, and persons
under international protection. In November 2004, the Common Basic
Principles (CBP) on Integration were adopted under the Dutch presidency.
They are aimed at designing a common European integration
policy. They suggest a framework to serve as a reference for the implementation
and evaluation of current and future integration policies. Finally,
the Commission released a Green Paper on an EU approach to managing
economic migration in early 2005 (COM [2004]: 82 final). The paper
raised numerous issues and discusses various scenarios relating to an EU
approach to economic migration. It has led to a consultation of all the
stakeholders throughout the Union. At the time of writing, the position
of the Member States still look difficult to reconcile on this matter.
Analysis of immigration policy and declarations on the subject reveal,
as the American researcher James Hollifield has been stressing for some
years, a flagrant contradiction between market logic and political logic
(Hollifield 1997; Entzinger et al. 2004). On the one hand, liberal states
are obliged to support frontier opening as a part of their foreign policy
in a free-trade economy, which presupposes freedom of movement for
highly-skilled labor. On the other, they are afraid a migratory influx will
bring into question the social security system, national identity and social
cohesion, which is why they sometimes support very restrictive immigration
and border-control policies. This tension, or, as Hollifield writes,
this paradox ofliberalism, is at the heart ofpublic debate on immigration
in Europe and one of the major causes of the slow progress towards a
more generous proactive common immigration policy in the EU.
Furthermore, anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment is
widespread among the population and the idea of re-opening frontiers
is far from meeting with unanimous approval. These contradictory pressures
sometimes cause divisions within governments. Some ministerial
departments seem willing to discuss an end to zero immigration, while
others seem mentally stuck in a timid, restrictive and security-oriented
attitude to migratory flows.
322 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
The realistic argument in favor ofa more generous, proactive common
immigration policy in the EU rests, on the one hand, on the findings
of migration theories and analysis of the main immigration trends in
the last fifty years and, on the other, on an assessment of the restrictive
policies in force since 1973-74 in Europe. Several important points must
be stressed.
First, as stressed in the first two chapters ofthis volume (by a demographer
and economists), migration is a complex phenomenon that cannot
be reduced to its economic, demographic or political aspects. Economists
often explain migratory flows by a juxtaposition of individual rational
decisions taken by migrants on a cost-benefit basis. According to this,
they leave their homes when they think they will get an economic advantage
from migration. This is largely a simplification, as can also be said
of certain demographic analyses explaining migration by the existence of
demographic inequalities between different regions of the world. There
would be emigration from overpopulated to less populated regions. Yet
we observe that it is often heavily overpopulated urban zones that attract
most migrants. Migration can only be explained within a transdisciplinary
approach, alone capable ofexpressing its complexity. For the present, the
most efficient theories are migratory system theories. In their attempt to
explain migratory movements, they take into account both the role of
the state and that of individual decision. In this way, they combine the
"macro" and "micro" approaches. On the "macro" level, they recognize
the importance of institutional and structural factors such as the
state of the market as well as the legislation and policies adopted by different
states. On the "micro" level, they take notice of the role played
by migrants' beliefs and practices as well as by social networks. Many
studies highlight the importance of networks to explain the formation
of same-origin migrant communities, for example, those from China or
Italy, in certain European or North American towns. They also stress
international comparisons as well as historical links existing between the
migrant's home country and the host country, for instance, their cultural
proximity, political influences or remaining traces ofcolonization (Castles
and Miller 2003; Verdusco 2004). Second, and as a consequence, migration
can only be understood in a global context. It means little to explain
immigration in Belgium, for example, while isolating this country from its
European partners. Immigration can only be understood and explained
if we also understand and explain emigration. This means taking note
of what is happening all over the world, not imagining that immigration
begins when foreigners cross the frontier.
Third, North-South inequalities, whether economic, social, demographic
or environmental are the context in which migratory movements
Towards a proactive immigration policy? 323
are formed rather than their fundamental causes. Even if such inequalities
were to disappear overnight, migration would not stop. It would
simply take place in another context and take on another form. Fourth,
international migrations are, in reality, the expression ofgrowing interdependence
between different regions of the world in the globalized economy.
Different parts of the world are all, at the same time and to various
extents, both emigrant countries and immigrant countries. Fifth, migration
is certainly a feature ofthe economic and labor market restructuring
process in the wealthy, developed parts of the world. This is as true for
legal migration as it is for the illegal kind. In this latter case, if hundreds
of thousands of clandestine immigrants are doing agricultural work in
southern Europe and California, it is because the demands of competition
impose cost reductions, which, in turn, keep prices down for the
consumer and increase profits for the producer. In other words, illegal
immigration plays an important economic role. This is perhaps why it is
flourishing despite all the policies designed to combat it and which hypocritically
denounce it as a calamity. Sixth, we must not omit to mention
the cultural aspect of emigration. In certain parts of the world, emigration
is a compulsory phase of life for an individual or a family. It represents
a sort of rite of passage or an obligatory service rendered to the
community.
In front of so complex a phenomenon, it will be easily understood
that restrictive, security-inspired policies relying on the zero immigration
doctrine are plainly inadequate. Policies applied in Europe since
1973-74 have definitely not achieved the objectives set. Moreover, these
policies have produced perverse and apparently unexpected results. In
the first place, as mentioned above, they have not put a stop to immigration
into Europe. Declaring an end to labor immigration does not
mean that it will actually stop. Furthermore, ambiguities can be found in
working visa policy. On the one hand, a total ban on labor immigration is
announced and on the other, visas are still delivered to certain categories
offoreign workers. Secondly, while claiming to have closed the front door
on immigration, that is, legal labor immigration, European governments
have, in a way, encouraged entry through the side door, the one used
by asylum seekers, and the back door, which lets in illegal and clandestine
immigration. So immigrants who might in other circumstances
have tried to enter Europe legally have chosen to seek asylum or enter
by illegal means. Growing illegal immigration and people-trafficking can
be largely explained by the extremely limited legal means of access to
European territory. As to asylum seekers, many of these people fall into
the legitimate Geneva Convention categories but may also be potential
economic migrants as well. This is in no way contradictory. Thirdly, it
324 Immigration and the Transformation of Europe
is particularly inappropriate to privilege, as European governments have
long been doing, a strictly national approach to a transnational and, as
already noted, global phenomenon. This is all the more true for the fact
that, through the European integration process, a group of European
states was becoming more and more interdependent. In the international
migration sphere, each state's policy has an impact on its partners' situation.
For example, when Germany decided to abolish visas for Polish
nationals, there was a potential risk of migratory flows for neighboring
countries whose borders with Germany are now much easier to cross. In
other words, by opening its frontiers, Germany was also opening those of
its partners in the EU. In these circumstances, the absence of common
tools for European immigration management raises serious problems.
Chapters 11, 16, and 17 all stress this theme as well.
Three options are in fact offered ifwe recognize the fact that European
immigration policies have been, for several decades, poorly adapted and
inefficient. The first consists of a general opening of frontiers. Morally
speaking, it is possible to dream of a totally open world, as mentioned
above. However, in present circumstances, with such an array of economic,
social, political, and environmental inequalities, only the well-off
would benefit from a general opening of frontiers. As to the poor, they
would run the risk of becoming a new proletariat, even a lumpenproletariat,
globalized like the globalized economy. The second possibility is
to make immigration policies even more restrictive by increasingly militarizing
immigration control, by further detaining asylum seekers and
increasing the expulsion offoreigners. We then risk the systematic undermining
ofthe human rights we claim to defend. This choice would mean
a great loss for democracy. Between the naive total open borders hypothesis
and the hypocritical reassertion of the zero immigration hypothesis,
there is maybe room for a third option: a proactive EU approach to immigration
which could take into account the interests ofsending and receiving
countries and regions but also the interests of migrants themselves.
The construction of such an approach will be one of the most important
challenges of the next decade.
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