



European Immigration

A Sourcebook

ASHGATE

Chapter 1

Introduction

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This chapter discusses the sociopolitical context of contemporary European migration. More specifically, we look at the impact that the end of the Cold War has had on migration in Europe, notably in terms of East to West population flows that involve not only the current EU25 member states but also countries of Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). We also discuss the emergence and diversification of migration forms including undocumented and shuttle migration, populations displaced for political reasons that are not, however, eligible for refugee status, as well as gendered migration. Through this, we aim at raising awareness of the universal usage of the terms 'immigrant' and 'immigration' that frequently suggests comparability where it does not, in fact, exist. Thus we point out major differences in the understanding of those terms in official statistics and current debates, while also discussing the divergence that may exist between official statistics and definitions of immigrant categories and the social reality on the ground. Last, we discuss the emergence of a common EU migration policy, and the challenges that lie ahead for European countries as regards the sustainable management of international migration.

General overview of migration patterns in Europe since the Second World War

The period immediately after the Second World War in Europe was characterized by large south-to-north flows originating from the northern Mediterranean countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). Western and Northern European countries such as Belgium, Britain, France, Germany and Sweden received migration from the south of Europe and the Mediterranean, but also experienced incoming flows from African, Caribbean and Asian countries. The post-war years were a period of reconstruction and industrial growth in a Europe that was short of labour after the disastrous Second World War. Thus, foreign workers came to meet domestic labour market needs and were often seen as temporary sojourners. The flows originating from outside Europe had largely to do with the colonial legacy of the receiving countries, especially Britain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Immigrants from former colonies were able to take advantage of an open policy towards labour migration and special rights (including in some cases full citizenship rights). These migrations were inscribed in the Fordist system of industrial production, and were often channelled through active recruitment policies of companies in the receiving societies and bilateral agreements between sending and receiving countries. While many of these immigrant workers indeed returned to their country of origin after some years, a considerable fraction eventually settled in the receiving societies and brought their families over, thereby raising important social and political challenges for integration that EU Member States continue to face today.

The migration dynamics in Europe changed in the early 1970s after the oil price shocks. Economic growth had been slowing down in Western Europe, structural change in labour markets was evident, and unemployment was growing, especially in the older industrial economies of

Britain and Belgium. As the European Communities pursued policies of economic integration, migration between Southern and Northern Europe gradually declined. By the time that Greece, Portugal and Spain joined the EEC, there were few migrants from these countries travelling for work to the northern Member States. At the same time, a certain level of industrial development accompanied by a wide expansion of the services sector in Southern Europe created employment opportunities, thereby restricting the 'push' factors to emigration. On the 'pull' side, Western and Northern European countries had put a stop to labour migration from the early 1970s onwards, aiming at 'zero immigration'. This equally reduced the flows from Asian and African countries to continental Europe and to Britain. Restrictive immigration policies were characteristic of many countries, including Britain and France, as a prerequisite for the successful integration of those already admitted. In other cases, such as Belgium, Denmark or Germany, admissions were restricted in line with domestic labour market needs, while integration remained a non-issue until the 1980s.

Population movements in Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) were severely restricted during the post-war period and until 1989. Labour migration took place at a very limited scale and always through central planning and control. There was some exchange of workers between countries of the Warsaw Pact as well as small scale incoming migration (for labour or study purposes) from Communist countries in other continents (for example, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam or Cuba) to CEEC countries (for example East Germany or Poland). As regards outgoing migration from the CEEC to Western Europe or North America, for instance, this never stopped completely in spite of the heavy control measures implemented by communist states. Those who left CEEC for political reasons quickly found refuge in Western Europe. However, their numbers amount to several thousands over the entire period and cannot be compared in terms of magnitude with the large flows from Southern to Northern Europe or from countries in the developing world to Western and Northern Europe.

Since the 1980s, the situation has been changing yet again. The integration of the world economy through world trade and service agreements (GATT and GATS), the globalization of capital and labour and the rapid development of transport and communication networks have contributed to new types of population movements. At the same time, the geopolitical restructuring of Europe after 1989 has opened new opportunities for temporary or long-term migration within Europe as well as from third countries to CEEC and not just to Western Europe. The migration patterns of the last couple of decades are characterized by their fragmented nature: they include new forms of flexible labour, insecure legal status (often undocumented), variable duration, new gender roles and multiple destinations, all of which we explore in the sections below.

Migration in post-1989 Europe

The implosion of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) in 1989 has made the new context more volatile and dynamic. The closed borders between Eastern and Western European countries were suddenly opened and many CEE citizens, faced with the dismantling of the production system and welfare state in their countries of origin, started seeking better life chances and work opportunities in Western and Southern Europe. Similar to citizens from countries in the developing world, people from CEE were integrated into specific niches of domestic labour markets in the European Union. Moreover, the opening of the borders has led to diverse forms of population mobility that involve *Eastern, Central and Western/Southern* European countries in complex patterns (Wallace and Stola, 2001; Favell and Hansen, 2002).

These changes have subverted, if not openly at least tacitly, the proclaimed policy of zero migration in most European countries. Large numbers of migrants have arrived, worked and stayed – in various guises. They have entered either clandestinely or as asylum-seekers; but most commonly they have simply come via the pathways of globalization itself – with tourist or student visas which they then overstayed or abused, and at times even as business people (Jordan and Düvell, 2003). Both the more ‘flexible’, pro-globalization regimes of the UK and Ireland, and the more social protectionist regimes such as those in Germany and the Netherlands introduced new options for temporary legal migration, and built control facilities. These efforts contributed to shaping the country-specific forms of migration and the living conditions of migrants, with rather debatable effects on migration levels.

The line between economic migrants and persons moving for reasons ranging from political instability or oppression to ethnic strife in their countries of origin is increasingly blurred. Thus, people fleeing from political persecution sometimes opt for economic migration channels, both legal and undocumented, while some economically motivated migrants who leave their country in reaction to unemployment or poverty present their applications as asylum seekers (Wallace, 2002).

The governments of Southern Europe have been quite unprepared for the influx of migrants, and indeed when those migrants arrive in these states they usually come into societies that perceive themselves as largely monocultural and monoreligious. Important and unexpected challenges in Southern Europe have thus been raised. Southern European societies have slowly reacted to the presence of immigrants, firstly through repeated regularization programmes of undocumented workers and, secondly, with a view to integrating them both economically and culturally. Incidents of social unrest, highly visible cases of racism and ethnic prejudice have triggered a public debate on the cultural and political rights of immigrants. The former set of rights has been largely recognized even if institutionalized only to a limited extent, while the latter set still looms far behind, almost a taboo topic for Southern European societies.

The beginning of the new century has been characterized by further developments, either endogenous to the EU or exogenous and having to do with developments in the international arena.

Notably, both the European Commission and a number of the EU Member states announced a major shift in policy regarding the recruitment of skilled and unskilled workers from outside the Union. This came at a time when unemployment among EU citizens was still high – some 15.7 million (or 9.2 per cent of the labour force) in 2001 (Eurostat, 2001) – and social policies have focused on retraining and inclusion. This shift reflects growing concerns about bottlenecks and shortages, and the overall flexibility of the European social model (see Jordan and Düvell, 2003). Although the emphasis has been different among the various Member States, there is no doubt that an important change has been taking place regarding recruitment from outside the EU. For example, both Italy and Greece had unemployment rates of around 11 per cent in 1999, whereas Spain’s unemployment rate exceeded 15 per cent in the same year. Nevertheless, Italy has admitted over 2.5 million, Spain about 2.5 million and Greece nearly 1.5 million immigrant workers in the last 15 to 20 years. This workforce is predominantly employed in agriculture, tourism, private care, catering and construction. In Italy, it also extends to small and medium-sized productive enterprises. Although initially admitted mainly through illegal channels, these workers have since been regularized through successive ‘amnesty’ programmes.

The second change followed the attack on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the USA on 11 September 2001. As a direct result, security concerns closely related to migration became an urgent priority. The concern, or the perception, that irregular migration was becoming uncontrollable was already being voiced by politicians and the media; but the policy implications

of the events of 9/11 complicated the migration debate further by bringing in additional dimensions. Simplified and even simplistic discourse signalled that migration, and even globalization itself, concealed a potential for terror attack and thus constituted a threat to security. As far as it is possible to ascertain, given the current information at hand, the perpetrators of these attacks were legal migrants and indeed their profiles – computer experts, technicians, diligent students – may be considered stereotypical of the skilled types of immigrant that the USA and the EU Member States are seeking (even competing) to attract. Further terrorist bombings in Madrid in March 2003 and in London in July 2005 have, however, indirectly confirmed the idea that migrants may constitute a ‘threat’ to western societies’ well-being and cohesion, also leading to the interchangeable use of the words Muslims and immigrants as nearly synonymous. Needless to say, such a categorization ignores the rich variety of migrant groups and migration situations across the 25 European Member States.

New features of migration

While the chapters in this book mainly present the variety of migration experiences in EU countries, here we point to some specific features of contemporary migration flows – mainly those of the last 15 years – that tend to be referred to as new (King, 2002). While there is hardly any form of migration that has no historical precedent with some similar features (Bade, 2002), when we speak of new features of contemporary migration, we refer to the relevance, dominance and specific combinations of migration patterns that are largely shaped by economic conditions in a globalized world. Let us sketch some of these conditions that are related to labour supply and demand needs and that form a number of core workforce categories.

In the post-war era, the world was divided into a highly industrialized ‘first’ world with a growing services sector and a welfare state built up under the influence of organized labour. The ‘second’ world of communist states was characterized by state-driven industrialization and state-supplied services, complemented by a flexible barter economy that mitigated the harsh effects of failures in state planning. The so called ‘third’ world was characterized by a high dependence on the primary sector. This allowed for enormous wealth in the case of some oil-exporting countries and for disastrous poverty in the case of agrarian countries that tried to balance production for self-sufficiency with that for the world market, often failing in both. In some countries, some sectors and regions developed quickly to match the standards of the ‘first’ world, while others stagnated, leading to considerable tensions within the country.

High labour costs in ‘first’ world countries have promoted an unprecedented technological development that has spilled over to almost all other regions and countries of the world. Computers have become smaller, cheaper and more powerful, satellites are able to distribute TV programmes to the remotest regions of the world, public and private transport has multiplied with faster and relatively cheaper cars, trains and planes, as well as better airports and streets. These developments lead to ever closer connections of all those regions of the world with access to a reliable electricity supply and it has influenced the type of workforce required. In effect, production in these sectors is highly specialized, requiring a small elite of highly educated, highly organized and creative developers, engineers and managers (Type A), and a highly disciplined, well-educated production workforce (Type B). This workforce is mainly situated in Western Europe, North America and Japan, but it is coming under increasing pressure from industrializing and democratizing regions, mainly in Asia and Eastern Europe. European and North American countries are increasingly seeking to attract highly skilled immigrants in an effort to stabilize locations and maintain work opportunities for their skilled labour force.

At a time when the movement of financial capital is largely liberalized, the wealth of a region depends largely on its capacity to supply a competitive combination of highly skilled Type A professionals with skilled and highly disciplined Type B workers in a stable, worldwide connected environment. These may form the core workforce of the internationally tradable services of global cities (Sassen, 1991), but also of prospering industrial regions in the old industrialized economies or newly industrializing states.

Such highly productive technology sectors are able to generate taxes for state services and welfare benefits. The state sector, with its spending on education, welfare and infrastructure is a necessary input for high-tech production insofar as it maintains a highly educated workforce, a stable political environment and a modern infrastructure. But it is also a cost factor for that production, as public employees, investments and welfare services have to be financed by taxes. Thus, the wage level in public employment and publicly organized employment is a crucial factor for the competitiveness of the high-tech sector. Employment with the state requires a certain degree of language capacities and country-specific knowledge and offers secure employment opportunities for native citizens of high- and low-skilled educational backgrounds (Type C and D respectively), but it is also often explicitly or implicitly reserved for citizens. This is most obvious in Luxembourg, where most citizens work for public authorities, but it is also present in all EU countries.

In addition, the sector providing services and other goods that are not internationally tradable is also an input and a cost factor for the high-tech sector. While some non-tradable goods and services also require high skills (Type E, for example, doctors, construction engineers), a considerable part of these activities can be performed with hardly any educational qualifications. Cleaning, gardening, looking after small children, caring for the physical needs of elderly and disabled persons, kitchen work in restaurants, delivering simple goods, hairdressing, simple renovating and construction work, can be done well by immigrants without qualifications and language capacity, but with the motivation to cope with low wages and endure unfavourable working conditions (Type F). The demand for Type F employment differs between states, and is most prominent in states where we find low levels of public services for children and the elderly and where highly qualified breadwinner couples have to resort to the private market to obtain labourers for these services (Sciortino, 2004). In this context, Type F workers are able to fill this need because of the low cost of their employment; that is, it is a cost item that can be relatively easily covered by the more qualified workforce.

At the same time, it is pertinent to note that the flexible and cheap labour provided by immigrants mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa, has been contributing to growth in an increasingly deregulated economic environment of global cities. Recent studies (Reyneri et al., 1999) have shown that undocumented immigrant labour has had a positive economic impact, at least in the short term, on Southern European countries (Greece and Italy, in particular). Indeed, immigrants are likely to take Type F jobs for which the local unemployed do not compete. If they want to spend part of their earnings in their country of origin and consider their stay temporary, they find it easier to be content with lower wage levels than locals and endure more restricted housing arrangements. While native unemployed persons – among them many sons and daughters of post-war immigrants – would experience a declining standard of living by taking up a low-wage job in a prospering high-rent region, immigrants may perceive this change as a step forward when compared to their previous situation in their country of origin, or in any case a temporary ‘sacrifice’ that they are willing to accept in order to send a steady income back home. This is of course only the case if illegal arrangements do not lead them into a work relationship which involves dependency and deception.

In combination with low transport costs, these demand structures favour all sorts of temporary labour arrangements, whether legal or illegal. In addition, they contribute to a changed gender

distribution of immigration. Many of these jobs are in private households and in fields that are traditionally associated with women. Women have become migration subjects in their own right, rather than being considered the accompanying 'luggage' of male 'breadwinners' who have migrated for work and have then brought over their spouse and children (Anderson, 2000; Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000; Kofman et al., 2000; Salih, 2001; Tastsoglou and Alipranti, 2003; Zontini, 2004).

There are also other forms of temporary migration, especially in Central and Eastern Europe and in areas of the Mediterranean. These may be categorized as new forms of mobility rather than migration proper, according to length of stay and/or repetition of travel for employment reasons (Peraldi, 2001, 2002; Wallace, 2002). They involve *shuttle migration* (repeated stays of a few months each, usually for informal work), *suitcase migration* (repeated trips of a few days or weeks each, mainly for trade and small business activities), and other petty trade and business activities related to the flourishing of 'bazaar economies' in Central and Eastern Europe and the wider Mediterranean basin. Such forms of migration have their origins in pre-existing state and economy structures such as the 'black market' during communist times, and the traditional open air markets in the Mediterranean. Moreover, they are further reinforced by the current economic and political transition processes in these regions that often lead people to invent new types of mobility and economic activity even if legal migration in the more 'traditional' sense of the term is impossible (because of migration policy restrictions) or undesirable (because of secondary jobs or welfare benefits in the home country).

This sketch of labour market trends in the global economy implies increasingly segmented labour markets. Polarized immigration in the lowest and the highest labour market segments is a general trend (see also, for example Jordan and Düvell, 2003). Immigration barriers for Type A professionals in tradable goods production are already low, and European states increasingly allow or consider allowing highly educated professionals in the production of non-tradables, for instance in the health services. However, absolute numbers are still low in the highly educated labour market segments. Professionals in state employment are still overwhelmingly recruited from the native population, while the middle class of production workers in high-tech fields is still very much protected from international labour competition by paperwork control and social control. At the other end of the spectrum, there exist numerous arrangements to allow, tolerate or accommodate immigration and temporary labour migration into the lowest strata of the labour market.

This constitutes a first overview of the different forms of migration that are present today, seen from a labour market perspective. This perspective alone is insufficient to understand the full range of migration push and pull factors; nor is it able to offer a complete understanding of who Europe's immigrants are today. Who comes as an immigrant – and under what employment conditions – is largely shaped by the migration histories and government policies of the individual EU Member States, or sometimes even of neighbouring Member States. Furthermore, there are many who arrive for reasons other than employment. This volume will, therefore, attempt to unfold the variety of paths and the diversity of migrant profiles that exist and to present the wide range of measures that have been taken by the EU Member States to deal with migration and its challenges.

Official definitions and social realities: who is an immigrant?

In order to proceed with this task, it is perhaps necessary to take a step back and tackle the obvious question of who is an immigrant according to official data and definitions. In doing this, we are confronted with the confusing reality that exists not only in terms of data and statistics, but also according to the gap that often exists between the formal status of an individual and his or her real

situation in the host economy or society. Therefore, to address the question of who are Europe's immigrants, it is first necessary to turn to the richness of existing definitions in order to clarify the lack of common definitions and means of measurement.

Immigration is framed in quite different ways in each Member State, and statistical accounting follows national prerogatives rather than international standards. While standardized and well annotated tables – as presented by the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) – are of major use for the scientific community, they also suggest a comparability that does not in fact exist. This creates the temptation to interpret the available data without fully understanding the country's national background. Almost every Member State has different models of citizenship (and hence naturalization practices) and different 'national philosophies' of integration (Favell, 1998), which are reflected in migration statistics by default (Grieco, 2002). Indeed, each receiving country has its own system of national statistics as regards migration. Some countries monitor all the foreign-born, others monitor non-citizens; but as soon as migrants naturalize, they automatically disappear from migration statistics (for example, Germany or the UK) and still others keep more 'complete' records of native-born citizens, citizens of immigrant origin and non-citizens (for example, France or the Netherlands).

In the following sections, we briefly discuss how migrants are defined in different contexts ranging from official statistics, to political discussions and scholarly literature. It should be noted, however, that in an effort to achieve a comprehensive picture of migration in Europe today, we adopt an inclusive definition of immigrants. Basically, we define immigrants as foreign-born people and their immediate offspring, namely, first and second generation immigrants. Nonetheless, given various limitations of information, we would like to draw the reader's attention to the problems of this concept and discuss its overlaps with and differences from other concepts.

Foreign-born and natives

The distinction between 'foreign-born' and 'natives' is the most widely used differentiation in immigration. It defines immigrants as persons who have changed residence across borders. Indeed, personal migration experience is the decisive criterion.

In many sociological studies, the foreign-born are called 'first generation immigrants', while their offspring – born in the receiving country or immigrated with the parents at a young age – are called 'second generation immigrants.' The terms *allochthones* and *autochthones* are used by the Dutch state to define in a more precise manner the ethnic/national origin of a citizen or resident. This pair of concepts is a refinement of the country-of-birth criterion. It differentiates between *allochthones* as the foreign-born and their immediate offspring, taking the country of birth of the parents into account, and *autochthones* – native-born with two native-born parents. This criterion has been used in the Netherlands since the 1980s for official statistical purposes, allowing social scientists and migration experts to have a more inclusive approach to the Dutch population of immigrant origin, including the second generation (Centraal Bureau voor Statistiek, 2002).

Although 'foreign-born' seems to be an easy and straightforward concept, there are still some complications in the contemporary European situation. While people usually move across borders, in some areas of Europe borders have moved over people repeatedly during the last century. This has been the case in the aftermath of the Second World War and after 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe. Two examples are worth mentioning here to illustrate this complexity.

After the Second World War, Germany received some 12 million co-ethnic refugees of German origin, most of whom were expelled from regions that formerly belonged to Germany and became part of the independent Central and Eastern European countries. These people were born inside Germany's former borders but outside its subsequent borders. Given that Germany does not use

the country-of-birth criterion in official statistics, it thereby renders this mass influx statistically invisible.¹ This is also true for contemporary ethnic German immigration from states that never had any affiliation with Germany.

Before 1989, the Baltic states were part of the Soviet Union. During this time, many Russians and citizens from other Republics of the Soviet Union (mainly Ukraine and Byelorussia) settled in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. These people moved to the Baltic states either of their own will or through forced migration as part of the dominant occupying majority. They were thus born inside the borders of the Soviet Union but at the same time outside the borders of the current Baltic states. However, after these countries gained independence in 1991, the Russian-speaking populations who chose to remain in these countries were assigned the peculiar status of *stateless permanent residents* of Latvia or Estonia. Although this category of persons did not undergo an international migration experience, but rather an internal domestic experience under particular circumstances, nonetheless, we have decided to include them in our definition of migrants.

Aliens and citizens under the influence of naturalization policies

Differentiating between foreign nationals and own nationals is still the most widespread criterion to measure foreign migration. It usually works well for new migration streams, but loses significance with increasing numbers of naturalizations and citizenship acquisition by birth. As policies regarding citizenship acquisition differ largely between EU Member States, the citizenship criterion measures completely different aspects with regard to migration.

People acquire their citizenship depending on their country of birth (*jus soli*) or by reference to their genealogical origin (*jus sanguinis*). Models of ethnic citizenship give preference to ancestry and, hence, to parents' and grandparents' nationality. Models of civic citizenship privilege the place-of-birth criterion, conferring citizenship to children born in their territory regardless of the nationality of their parents. In general, most citizenship regimes involve a combination of the two elements. Thus, in some cases, the *jus soli* principle is applied only if the parents of the child have lived for a certain time in the country, or, if the child herself/himself continues to live in that country. In other cases, a pure *jus sanguinis* regime is mitigated by a territorial element: children of foreign parents or foreigners born in a different country who are long-term legal residents are given the opportunity to naturalize if they wish to do so.

Generally speaking, the distinction between citizens and non-citizens (foreigners, be they temporary or long-term legal residents) is the main dividing line not only in the official statistics, but also in the public discourse in most countries. Data on the population by citizenship status are often used to frame migration-related issues. Let us, however, explore some concrete empirical examples with a view to highlighting the fuzzy edges of the distinction between citizens and aliens.

Most immigrants are foreign nationals at the time of migration. Exceptions include people of the same ethnic background who are granted citizenship upon arrival in the destination country through preferential channels. This is the case, for instance, of ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern European countries, from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Münz and Ulrich, 1998), or of the Pontic Greeks from the former Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Russia (Triandafyllidou and Veikou, 2002). Similar, albeit not identical, is the case of residents from former colonies in a transition period, such as the Surinamese in the Netherlands, Commonwealth citizens in the U.K. or Algerians in France. Such cases are usually linked to particular historical circumstances.

¹ They are included in the most recent microcensus which has yet not been analysed.

Different sets of exceptions are also made for the children or even grandchildren of former emigrants who may have inherited or re-acquired the citizenship of the country of origin. The case of Argentine citizens of Italian ancestry who are able to recover Italian citizenship if they prove that at least one of their grandparents had been an Italian citizen provides a good example (Pastore, 2001). The 'retornados' in Portugal are a similar case. These are former emigrants from Portugal and their offspring who settled in the Portuguese colonies in Africa, and who returned to Portugal after these countries gained their independence in the second half of the twentieth century.

Irrespective of some of the exceptions outlined above and to which we will return in the individual country chapters, it is standard practice that immigrants have the right to naturalize after a given period of time. This period tends to vary from one country to another and is usually between five and ten years of residence in the host country, and under specific conditions. In some countries these conditions refer mainly to the socio-economic realm, such as having a job and a stable residence and not having been convicted for certain crimes. In others, they also include cultural requisites such as language competence, familiarity with the customs and traditions of the country of settlement, and/or a feeling of belonging to that country. Applicants may or may not keep the citizenship of their country of origin. The conditions and procedures involved in the naturalization process influence the naturalization rate and, hence, the percentage of immigrants who become citizens.

Naturalization policies and practices blur the sociological distinction between immigrants and foreigners. While first-generation immigrants may naturalize, not all immigrants are considered foreigners. At the same time, while some non-citizens may have not experienced migration themselves, as they may have been born in their parents' country of settlement (that is, host country), they may still not be entitled to the citizenship of their country of birth. The obvious example of such a case was the German citizenship and migration policy until the year 2000. Today, more than one million out of its seven million foreign residents are native-born; that is, they are the offspring of immigrant parents or grandparents commonly referred to as second- or third-generation migrants.

In summary, naturalization policies greatly affect definitions and statistics about the immigrant population in a given country. In some countries, a considerable percentage of all first-generation immigrants are naturalized citizens, while the percentage in others is negligible. In some countries virtually all foreign nationals are foreign-born, while in others there is a considerable percentage of people born in the country who are foreign nationals. In yet other countries, naturalized citizens are considered migrants by the state and their (new) fellow nationals, while in other countries naturalized citizens become largely integrated in the host society and disappear from official statistics and, to a certain extent at least, from public opinion and media definitions of migrant populations.

Status and staying perspectives

When European states consider immigration policies, they often orientate themselves towards the classical immigration countries USA, Canada and Australia, with their sharp distinction between immigrants (with a permanent residence right) and non-immigrants (with a temporary residence right). The differentiation suggests that non-immigrants leave after a specified period of time, while immigrants come for permanent residence and stay permanently. Nonetheless, even in classical immigration countries, this categorization leads to problems, as it is built on rather simplistic assumptions about the immigration process. In the USA, there have been periods during which a large percentage of people who came with immigrant status left after some time. Today, many

people who have (permanent) immigrant status in the USA were previously temporary migrants or even illegal entrants (Santel, 1998).

In most European states, there are few migrants who came with permanent-residence status from the outset. Also, national policies vary not only in terms of citizenship acquisition rules but also with reference to migration status. Some countries, such as Ireland and Greece (Kassimis and Kassimi, 2004; Ruhs, 2004), have very recently developed a long-term immigrant category, as the need for such a category and for related policy provisions has emerged only during the last decade.

Most immigrants to Europe migrated with a temporary and/or uncertain staying perspective. They later decided to stay or were granted long-term residence status after several years of life and work in the receiving country. Here again the distinction between the different categories of seasonal, temporary and long-term migrants reflects the sociocultural norms and historical experiences of the receiving societies. Thus, the main 'hosts' of post-war Europe – Germany, France and the UK – had different expectations regarding the time perspective of their foreign workers. Germany saw immigration as a rotating guest worker scheme at the end of which migrants would return to their country of origin. This did not, however, eventually happen. Rather, a substantial portion of the migrants settled and brought their families in, considering Germany their new home. In France and the UK, expectations were more relaxed, not least because migrants came from former colonies and were thus perceived as sharing important cultural and historical links with the receiving society. However, indefinite stay permits were gradually restricted to those with French or British ancestry, respectively, and citizenship regimes became more restrictive. These changes emphasized the largely temporary perspective of international migration. Most receiving societies have difficulties in coming to terms with the idea that newcomers are there to stay permanently.

In reality, the distinction between temporary migrants and long-term or permanent immigrants is a criterion that differentiates migrants according to the host society's self-perception and policy objectives, and has little to do with actual migration processes. Migration policies often change, adapting to the migration trends and realities as well as to the perceived interests of the host society. Thus, people who came under rotation agreements were given indefinite stay rights and undocumented migrants received legal status. From this perspective, when we distinguish migrants according to their status, we do not imply a hypothesis about their future migration behaviour but, rather, relate to the legal ascription by the receiving state. In the analysis of issues such as integration and participation, researchers should not restrict their analysis to certain types of immigrants, since – from a historical and internationally comparative perspective – entry status is a very weak predictor of later settlement.

National majorities and ethnic minorities/diasporas

In certain cases, immigrants and their offspring from specific nationalities (these differ between Member States) are often seen as an ethnic minority in the receiving country. Ethnicity is not as objective a criterion as foreign-born or foreign national, but depends on self-perception and perception by others (Heckmann, 1992). In effect, ethnicity may be linked to culture, language or religion signalling the perceived belonging to a certain minority. This implies that boundaries of minority-majority perception may evolve and dissolve during migration processes. It is relevant to note here that, for immigrants from a certain country to be perceived as an ethnic minority within the receiving society, a substantial volume of immigration tends to be necessary.

Nonetheless, visibility is not only a matter of size of the population in question. Visibility may be higher if the minority is of a different phenotype (skin colour, face characteristics, overall complexion) making it easily distinguishable from the majority. Visibility may also depend on

cultural factors such as dress codes and overall appearance of immigrant individuals that make them stand out from the majority 'crowd' (for example headscarf, Sikh turban and so on). Some groups are stigmatized by the political and public discourse as 'problematic', 'dangerous' or 'undesirable' aliens. Such negative stereotyping is often directed against Albanians in Greece, Algerians in France, Turks in Germany and Pakistanis in Britain.²

Although these populations are not part of our target group, it is worth considering whether countries with important historical minorities have a different way of dealing with immigration-related ethnic minorities. In addition, new migration may blend into traditional ethnic minorities. In Poland, for instance, recent Ukrainian economic migrants have settled in historical minority Ukrainian communities, a pattern echoed by recent Bangladeshi migrants in the UK. They thus both challenge and revitalize the minority institutions and may provide a test case as to whether institutional channels aimed at catering for the civic and political needs of historical minorities can be used by and for immigrant minorities.

Ethnicity perceptions in immigrant minorities do not necessarily overlap with country boundaries, nor do they necessarily coincide with migrants' self-perception. Kurds, for example, come from Turkey or Iraq and organize in Kurdish associations in the receiving countries. People from South America may see themselves and be perceived as *Latinos* in the receiving countries, while they would not have been aware of such a categorization before leaving their country of origin. Similarly, people from Sub-Saharan Africa are categorized generally as Africans, while they may internally differentiate not only in relation to their country of origin but also in relation to their ethnic or clan affiliation.

This brief overview of different dimensions that may be used to define who is an immigrant and what type of immigrant one is, shows on one hand the complexity of national realities in different Member States and, on the other, the divergence between countries and official definitions, public perceptions and sociological (research) understandings of migrants. The country chapters included in this book further highlight these differences and explain how they came about. In other words, they explore the historical processes and the policy developments behind these differences. In the concluding chapter, we take this issue further by comparing countries and seeking to identify not only mobility trends, but also 'migrant definition' trends across Europe.

European migration policy

The complex and dynamic picture of old and new migrations in Europe has also to be seen in the context of European integration. A unique feature of the European Union as a socio-political entity is the expansion of its boundaries. The entry of 10 new member states in May 2004 has made its dynamic character ever more salient while also changing the legal definition of who is an international migrant in EU territory. However, public perceptions of who is an '*extracomunitario*' (non-EU citizen) take more time to change. In the meantime, the EU continues to expand, welcoming Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and with the expectation to include the Balkans and Turkey in the next decade or so.

2 In this book we are concerned with immigrant minorities only, not historical ones. Historical minorities are native populations of a different ethnicity or nationality that were nevertheless part of the country from its very moment of state formation or pre-modern migration movements. Well known cases of national minorities are the Basques in Spain and France, the Irish in the UK, Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia. However, most – if not all – European countries have one or several historical ethnic/national minorities living in their territory.

The inclusive nature of the Union, however, raises a number of identity questions which relate to both the notion of 'European-ness' or a European identity, and to the national identities of Member States or of minorities within them. The process of constituting the European Union opens up a tri-polar identity space in which existing forms of collective identification have to be re-negotiated and re-defined. This space is characterized by the simultaneous existence of three levels of identity and governance: the transnational or European level, the national or Member State sphere, and the local-regional context, which includes minorities and immigrant communities. Within this context, the dominance of the nation-state as a political agent and of national identity as the primary form of collective identification are put into question (Zapata-Barrero, 2001).

The process of Europeanization affects immigrant communities and minorities living in Europe both directly and through the channels of national states. First and foremost, the Amsterdam Treaty (AT) has incorporated migration policies into the Treaty of the European Communities as Title IV on 'Visas, Asylum, Immigration and Other Policies related to the Free Movement of Persons' (Hailbronner, 1998). Following the AT, the Treaty for a European Union (TEU) states (Article 2) that it is the EU's objective

to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum [and] immigration.

Thus, what was previously characterized as an area of common interest among Member States, has become a policy objective of the EU. Nonetheless, the AT has guaranteed a balance between national control and supranational governance by introducing a limit to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on migration policies, a limit that does not exist in other areas (Article 68 TEC; also Stetter, 2000, p. 95). Discussing the legal and institutional details of the AT provisions concerning migration goes beyond the scope of this volume. It is, however, worth noting that the AT shifted the focus from inter-governmental cooperation to protect a common interest to supranational governance.

The Directorate General for Freedom, Security and Justice (DG FSJ) has been actively engaged in preparing the ground for the development of a common EU immigration policy, issuing a series of relevant Communications and Council Directive proposals in recent years (http://europa.eu.int/pol/justice/index_en.htm). Negotiations among the Member States have been intense. Among recent developments, we note the Council Directives on family reunification and on the status of long term resident,³ on common asylum procedures⁴ and on the common efforts to combat illegal migration.⁵ After lengthy negotiations and failure to reach an agreement, the proposal for

3 25/11/2003, Council Directive, 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents. Official Journal L 016, 23/01/2004, p. 0044–0053, and 22/09/2003. Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family reunification, Official Journal L.251, 03/10/2003 p. 0012–0018.

4 25/02/03. Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national.

Official Journal L 050, 06/02/03 p. 0001–0010. And 06/02/03. Council Directive of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers

Official Journal L 031, 06/02/03 p. 0018–0025.

5 11/02/2002, COM 2002 071 final.52002PC0071. Proposal for a Council Directive on the short-term residence permit issued to victims of action to facilitate illegal immigration or trafficking in human beings who cooperate with the competent authorities. Decision follow-up; 10/07/2001. Council Directive 2001/51/EC of 28 June 2001 supplementing the provisions of Article 26 of the Convention implementing the

a common policy on managing labour migration (both for employed persons and for independent professionals) is again open for discussion.⁶ In sum, there has been progress in the building of a common EU migration policy, but such progress is slow and is characterized by the lowest common denominator approach. Directive proposals are systematically watered down through the negotiations between Member States who seek to protect their national interests and national immigration policies. Defining who is an immigrant, why, how and for how long they come and stay in a member state, remains largely tied to national government decision-making and national migration policy traditions.

Informal discussions with DG FSJ officials (notes from seminar at the College of Europe, Bruges, 15 March 2005) confirm that border control is the most successful sector of migration policy at the EU level. Co-operation and transfer of knowledge in this area has been intense in the past few years during the pre-accession negotiations of the 10 new Member States. Such co-operation systematically continues with both the remaining accession countries and in the context of the EU neighbourhood policy in the Mediterranean and Eurasian region. However, border control is only one area of migration policy which is indispensable, although it cannot obscure the pressing problems and challenges of the overall management of economic migration and immigrant integration that European societies face.

The contents of this book

The concurrence of these migration categories and migration patterns outlined above has led to the present situation of a profoundly diverse immigrant population in the EU 25 host countries. Thus, each EU Member State is looked at in detail in the 25 subsequent country chapters.

Each country chapter follows a similar structure. In the first instance, each chapter clarifies the categories of persons who are considered as migrants in the member state and includes an explanation of the national statistical data provided. This is followed by an overview of the recent migration history (that is the last 10 to 15 years) and the individual migration policies of each EU country, along with an analysis of how these have influenced the categories of migrants that exist across the 25 states.

The common traits and comparative dimensions are brought out in the concluding chapter. The final chapter not only brings forward the various categories of immigrants in the EU today, it also provides a schematic grouping of the EU Member States based on their characteristics. Without over-simplifying the distinctive features particular to each country, the 25 Member States are grouped in five subsets based on their experiences of migration: a) old host countries; b) recent host countries, c) countries in transition, d) small island countries and e) non-immigration countries.

Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985. OJ L 187 of 10/07/01, p. 45 (carriers liability); 02/06/01. 301L0040. Council Directive 2001/40/EC of 28 May 2001 on the mutual recognition of decisions on the expulsion of third country nationals. Official Journal L 149, 02/06/01 p. 0034–0036; 25/11/03. COM (2003) 727 final. Proposal for a Council Decision Establishing a secure web-based Information and Coordination Network for Member States' Migration Management Services (ICONET) of 25/11/03. And 29/01/02. COM 2001 567 final. 52001PC0567. Proposal for a Council decision adopting an action programme for administrative co-operation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration (ARGO), Official Journal C 025 E, 29/01/02 p. 0526–0530.

⁶ 11/01/2005, Com/2004/0811 Final, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration 11/07/2001, Com (2001), 386. Proposal for a Council directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed economic activities. Official Journal C 332 E, 27/11/01 p. 0248–0256. Decision follow-up.

The first group refers to Northern and Western EU Member States, or what we can also refer to as the traditional host migration countries. Their migration history is very different and the migrant population much more varied. France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the UK have a long migration history principally because of their colonial history, and this is similarly in Denmark and Sweden, which have a longer experience with immigrants. These countries are generally faced with the challenge of combating the social exclusion and marginalization of second- or third-generation immigrants. Associated with this is the fact that economic crises and social frustration are exacerbating xenophobic reactions of the majority populations, while the religious factor is becoming increasingly visible and present within the immigrant population. Nevertheless, these countries have the most far-reaching multi-cultural policies and, in many cases, immigrant populations have been granted the right to vote in local elections, thereby enhancing their political participation in the host country. In these countries the focus of attention has shifted from issues of regularization to issues of participation and integration.

The second subset includes the Southern European countries (that is, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal) that in the course of less than two decades have become host countries. Their emigration patterns of the past have been reversed in spite of high rates of unemployment among native workers. This shift in European migration patterns partly reflects a gradual improvement in the economic situation and the living conditions in Europe's southern countries, but in part it is also an unintended side effect of the restrictive measures taken by the UK, France, Germany, and Switzerland. The immigration experience in these countries has been characterized by the absence of a consistent migration policy with a long-term approach on issues of regularization and integration. This has led to an increase of illegal immigration and of migrants remaining in these countries unofficially, with their papers not always in order. This irregular or illegal status has implications not only for their employment security, but also for the extent of their integration into the host society. The large inflow of undocumented immigrants that has been common to these Member States has led to repeated regularization programmes. For example, the country chapters look into the five such programmes that have taken place in Italy since 1986, involving more than two million immigrants; the two such programmes in Greece, with the third currently under way; the four regularization initiatives in Portugal since 1992; and the three such programmes undertaken by Spain, with its third and most far-reaching regularization scheme in 2005. These regularization programmes confirm that such strategies do not solve in the long term the challenge of dealing with undocumented migration, if they are not part of a wider scheme of immigration management and integration policies.

The third subset is made up of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE). Along with the political, social and economic transition which occurred in this region after the 'Autumn of Nations' in 1989, the mechanisms and patterns of migration have changed with regard to these countries as well. Central European countries appear to be in the preliminary stage of an immigrant flow not only from the former Soviet Union countries, or from neighbouring nations with which there was a formal relation (for example Czechoslovakia and former Yugoslavia) but also from the Far East and from the West. During more recent years, CEE countries have become an attractive destination for entrepreneurs from Western Europe and the USA. They mostly carry out economic activities in the tertiary and quaternary sectors as highly-skilled managers, experts, consultants, scientists and so on. Immigrants from Asian countries mostly use CEE countries for temporary stay in transit towards Western Europe. The most visible group among these have been the Vietnamese in the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia, and the Chinese in Hungary and Slovenia. There have existed so-called 'international co-operation schemes' in educational and employment sectors between some of these countries, but since 1989 other forms of inflow have developed, from

illegal entry, to temporary stay and arranged marriages through to the setting-up of business and permanent settlement through formal means.

Cyprus and Malta form a different category combining a small population, a growing influx of immigration over the past decade and continued emigration. Being at the geographic periphery of the EU they are also called to manage increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and asylum seekers.

The Baltic states, Slovenia and Slovakia are identified as non-immigration countries, given that the former steady migration flows from the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia have, overall, ceased since the 1990s and 2000s. At the same time, the emigration flows that were characteristic of the first years after their independence also appear to be levelling out. The issue of stateless persons is of particular interest in this set of EU Member States and is looked at particularly in the Latvian and Estonian chapters.

Moreover, the concluding chapter puts forward a typology of the main migration pathways that can be traced within the European Union. Eight old and new migration pathways are thus identified: the pathway of co-ethnics and returnees, the colonial and post-colonial pathway, the pre-1989 internal migration pathway, the labour migration pathway, the asylum-seeking pathway, the pathway of temporary and seasonal migration, the 'gold-collar' pathway, and the pathway of irregular migration.

To conclude, the final chapter offers a comparative overview of immigrant integration practices regarding naturalization regimes, the granting of local voting rights and the extent of immigrant participation in the civic and political life of the host countries.

Thus, this book is a synthesis of existing data and provides a concise overview of recent migration history throughout the European Union. It is based on secondary sources in English and in the national language of each Member State, as well as on international and European migration statistics. It aims to serve as a useful and comprehensive reference volume for students, practitioners and scholars working on migration in Europe.

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