< previous page page_256 next page >

Page 256
olent addressee" will not discuss the existence of the object that S refers to, but he will try, to activate a reference schema which allows the interpretation of the sentence, even if he does not have, at the time of sentence utterance, the knowledge related to the existence of the object in question. This process is activated by, and depends on, the use of referring expressions (proper names and definite descriptions). From our perspective, the important point is the description of the kind of textual effects that an utterance produces on the context, rather than the system of knowledge and beliefs of S and A, since we consider the latter to be an effect of the former. As we have said, when in a context there is a definite description or a proper name, it produces for A a sort of"suspension of judgment" or a "disposition" to accept the existence of the individual to whom the reference is made. This disposition prepares A for any new information provided by S. Such a disposition is created by what we called "positional power." Existential presuppositions have the power to pose their objects of reference as existing, whether or not they are known beforehand to exist. The very act of mentioning them creates the existential disposition.
This positional power of existential presuppositions, however, is not tied to a semantic description or meaning convention, as was the case for p-terms, but rather to pragmatic and discursive rules, to the use of a definite description or a proper name in discourse. One objection that might be raised here is that the existential presuppositions of definite descriptions might be tied to the semantic description of the English definite article the (Russell 1905). Although existential presupposition is often associated with the, it cannot be accounted for entirely by the: first, because various kinds of expressions in English carry it, such as proper names, demonstratives, and pronouns; second, because the does not itself always carry existential presuppositionsfor example, in opaque contexts, existential sentences, or certain cases where "reference" is uncertain,
(43) John wants to marry the girl of his dreams.
(44) The Magic Mountain doesn't exist.
(45) The proof of Fermat's last theorem is still undiscovered.
and, finally, in the attributive interpretation of definite descriptions (Donnellan 1966).
The desirability of a discourse account is also suggested by the fact that many languages lack any device remotely resembling the English

 
< previous page page_256 next page >