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On the contrary, if S uttered (26), the contradictory representation of the relation background-foreground would be |
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Naturally, this solution does not consider cases (which are rather frequent in natural language as well as in human psychology) in which S does not believe p and nevertheless takes it for granted in order to salvage the conversational intercourse. But in such cases S is rhetorically or pragmatically lying. He is performing complicated strategies and comedies of errors, and he can do this exactly because there is a minimal agreement on standard conditions of use of certain p-terms. |
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2.4. Positional Power of P-Terms |
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We said before that the use of certain terms "makes A understand" something. This power to induce beliefs is what we call positional power of presuppositional sentences. The use of p-terms obliges A to accept certain contents and, in so doing, imposes a certain perspective on the discourse which A cannot challenge. This perspective is precisely what we defined as background frame. |
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It is not necessary that the presupposition be already known to A; when a p-term is introduced into discourse, the presupposition carried by the p-term is settled in an incontestable way. Presupposed information becomes, in this way, part of the context that A must take into consideration. |
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For example, in a dialogue such as (29), |
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(29) S: I stopped smoking. |
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A: I didn't know that you smoked. |
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Speaker A must assume the presuppositions carried by S's sentence as clements of discursive context, even if he did not know anything before about the smoking habits of S. |
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The semantic encyclopedic description accounts for presuppositions in terms of"instructions" for the co-textual insertion of a certain lexical item. When the lexical item is inserted in a given context, presupposi- |
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