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definite article, yet surely the notion of presupposed existence plays some role in their conversation. Our claim is that the positional power of existential presuppositions is based on the pragmatic interactional structure of the communicative act. We can explain this structure with the notion of either "cooperative principle" (Grice 1968) or fiduciary contract (Greimas and Courtés 1979).
6 The fiduciary contract establishes between participants a relation which can be defined as a relation of trusting the truth of what is said in discourse. On the basis of such a convention, S's assertions are accepted as true by A unless there is some strong evidence to the contrary. But even in this case, the ways of denying another's words are subject to constraints by special discourse strategies. In case of existential presuppositions, the presence of proper names or definite descriptions sets for the Addressee a constraint to accept the existence of the referent as posed, not on the basis of linguistic rules or extensional verifications, but on the basis of discourse cooperation rules, as a result of a fiduciary contract between Speaker and Addressee. |
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Since the fiduciary contract can be viewed as the very basis of communication, that is, as a condition which makes the communicative exchange possible, it is not far from the notion of "cooperative principle" and, in particular, the maxim of "quality" ("be sincere"). To presuppose the sincerity of another means to accept his words as true; but the 'truth' of a definite description or a proper name resides precisely in the fact that, as a description, it can be satisfied by some object in the real world. We can therefore hypothesize two pragmatic rules: |
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1. If we put a definite description or a proper name in a sentence, it is because we want to refer to a given individual, belonging to a given world. |
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2. Generally the reference world is the real world. If it is not, particular textual hints must be provided. |
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These pragmatic rules can describe the positional power of existential presuppositions, and can also explain the particular "cooperative work" which is in certain cases necessary to identify the object. |
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Our description is applicable in both negated and non-negated sentences, such as |
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(46) The King of France is bald. |
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(47) The King of France is not bald. |
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