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lowing: suppose I am a man and I point my finger toward a real cat and say It eats meat. Would you admit that in this case the use of it is determined by the referent of the expression? |
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CSP: Not at all. If you indicate a given cat you intend to mean that cat. You simply point your finger instead of uttering I want to speak about the cat standing in front of meor on my left. At least, I interpret your gesture this way: He means that cat. Thus I implement an interpretative process: I start processing your nonverbal utterance. When I receive It eats meat, I interpret the sentence as He is using "it " anaphorically to mean the cat he previously mentioned. Obviously, people on this planet frequently use sentences in order to say that something is the case. However, in order to use a sentence referentially, you must grasp its meaning, and, in the process of grasping the meaning of It eats meat, the use of it depends on a previous interpretation, not necessarily on a referent. Suppose that a child, let us say, Jane, indicates a toy and utters He eats meat. By inference, I interpret that Jane thinks that toys are living creatures. Thus I refer he to what I suppose is meant by Jane. |
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Smith: Wouldn't you speak of reference in a possible world, namely, the world of the speaker's beliefs? |
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CSP: Jane is using an idiosyncratic encyclopedia which describes the world of her beliefs, and my job is to figure it out in order to interpret her sentence meaningfully. |
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Smith: But you (or your master) see that there is a toy! You need to know that it is true that there is a toy in order to interpret what Jane, albeit erroneously, means. |
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CSP: Correct. I told you that my masters are able to compare perceptions with utterances to decide whether a given statement says what is the case or not. If Jane pointed to the toy and uttered This is a pet, my masters could ascertain that Jane was wrong. But in our example, Jane did not say this. My masters know very well that a toy is not a living creature. Then they knew by Jane's gesture that she was speaking of a toy. They also knew that the content of he foresees such interpretants as the human male (or the male pet) of which somebody spoke before. At this point, they inferred that for Jane a toy is a living creature. But as soon as they realizedby interpreting their inputsthat their communicative interaction concerned a toy, they started processing words, not referents. By the way, this is precisely what we are doing now. For the last five minutes we have been discussing the referent of he and it and cats, toys, and children without seeing any external referent. However, we have perfectly understood what we are talking about. |
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Smith: But this is subjective solipsism! |
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