|
|
|
|
|
|
a semiotic theory and all together they depend on a "satisfactory" semiotic definition of Truth and Falsity. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
It seems, however, rather difficult to look for a definition of Truth and Falsity in order to reach (after some thousand pages of a complete revisitation of the whole course of Western and Eastern philosophy) a "satisfactory" account of fakes. The only solution is thus to try a provisional and commonsensical definition of /forgery/ and /fake/in order to cast in doubt some of our definitions of Truth and Falsity. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In order to outline a provisional definition of forgery and fake, we must take as primitives such concepts as similarity, resemblance, and iconism. (These concepts are discussed and defined in Eco 1976:3.5, 3.6.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Another concept we shall take as a primitive is that of identity (as a criterion of identity of things, not of terms, concepts, or names). Let us assume as a starting point Leibniz's law of the identity of indiscernibles: if, given two objects A and B, everything that is true of A is also true of B, and vice versa, and if there is no discernible difference between A and B, then A is identical with B. Since many "things" can be true of any A and B, that is, innumerable "properties" can be predicated of the same object, let us assume that, rather than in the predication of those substantial properties advocated by Aristotle (Met. v. 9.1018a: "things whose matter is formally or numerically one, and things whose substance is one, are said to be the same"), we are interested in the predication of a crucial "accidental" property: two supposedly different things are discovered to be the same if they succeed in occupying at the same moment the same portion of space. (For space-temporal identity, see Barbieri 1987, 2. For transworld-identity, see Hintikka 1969; Rescher 1973; and Eco 1979:8.6.3.) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Such a test is, however, insufficient for forgeries because we normally speak of forgeries when something present is displayed as if it were the original while the original (if any) is elsewhere. One is thus unable to prove that there are two different objects occupying at the same time two different spaces. If by chance one is in the position of perceiving at the same time two different though similar objects, then one is certainly able to detect that each of them is identical with itself and that they are not indiscernibly identical, but no criterion of identity can help to identify the original one. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Thus, even if we start from the primitive concepts above, we shall be obliged to outline additional criteria for distinguishing authentic from fake objects. The many problems elicited by such an attempt will arouse |
|
|
|
|
|