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tion. This paper, therefore, is devoted to discussing the system of signification that allows both A and S to share the same assumptions or beliefs. Such a system of signification should have the format of an instructional semantics, conceived as a set of instructions for the proper textual insertion or for the reasonable interpretation of a given lexeme (see Schmidt 1976; Eco 1979b). In this sense it is concerned with an intensional approach as far as is possible, that is, insofar as presuppositions depend on a signification system, not on specific strategies implemented in actual processes of communication. |
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Moreover, another motivation of this paper is that we are not so much interested in what-is-the-case but, rather, in the textual strategies by which, considering the possibilities offered by a system of signification, someone succeeds in convincing someone else that something is the case. In pursuing such a task we shall try an approach aimed at eliminating, as far as possible, the impressive and disturbing number of examples and counterexamples occurring in current literature, which reminds us of the puzzle-solving games described by Kuhn (1962) as the last stage of a science waiting for (or trying to avoid) a radical change of its paradigms. |
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1.1. Background and Foreground |
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In order to distinguish the kind of phenomenon that could be reasonably labeled as presupposition, we have to make an introductory hypothesis. We assume that a very general feature of discourse is a hierarchical organization of information in its structure: elements of information cannot all have the same status and relevance in discourse. Necessarily they must be ranked according to some scale of relevance and organized at different levels. We always find, in a discourse, a textual perspective which obliges us to see events, characters, or concepts in a text from a given point of view. |
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This phenomenon can be described as a special kind of textual focalization: some elements of information are more focalized than others, which are played down. In other words, some information is set as the background of discourse, while other information, which is the focus, is the foreground. Generally speaking, the foreground is the most relevant part of discourse. In very general terms, this phenomenon depends on the fact that it is impossible not to impose an order of priority on discourse; we are forced to "put" our thoughts into the linear order of words and sentences. Moreover, the syntactic level of organization of language allows usand forces us at the same timeto structure what we want to communicate in an organized system of clauses: main |
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