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This is an example of the contextualizing process which takes place in a conversational interaction when a new element is introduced in discourse via a definite description, and A does not know anything about the referring element. |
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Consider now a conversation in which S utters sentence (37): |
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(37) John told me that X's last book is interesting. |
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It seems unlikely that the sequence would continue with (38): |
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(38) A: Is there an individual named John? |
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If A does not know the John to whom S is referring, he will not doubt his existence, but he will try to obtain more information to enable him to identify the entity named John. Only then will "reference" be secured. Therefore, a normal reply to (37) would be (39) or (40): |
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(39) Who is John? I don't think I know him. |
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(40) Have you already told me about John? |
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With (40) A is asking the Speaker to tell him where and when, in the preceding context, the individual in question has been named and described. In a text, the Reader would go back to see if this individual has been introduced earlier in the narrative. If in the previous context no reference can be found, A will expect, in the subsequent exchanges of conversation, to obtain the information necessary to identify the object of reference, as in (41) or (42): |
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(42) John is the student in Linguistics with the beard, glasses, and sharp, guttural laugh. |
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Sentences (41) and (42) represent an appropriate answer to (39) because they enable A to connect some known information with the new information (in this case the proper name). In any case, the utterance of a sentence containing a referring term disposes A to accept more information to clarify the reference of the sentence. |
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As Manor (1976) suggests, a "benevolent" addressee will wait until the end of the speech to give the Speaker a chance to clarify his views and initial statement. In the case of existential presuppositions, the "benev- |
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