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pens in a chain of family resemblances (see Bambrough 1961). Consider a series of things A, B, C, D, E, analyzable in terms of component properties a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, so that each thing can possess some of the properties of the other, but not all of them. It is clear that, even with a short series, we can find a parenthood between two things that have nothing in common, provided they belong to a universal chain of uninterrupted relationships of similarity (figure 2.3). |
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At the end, no common property will unite A with E but one: they belong to the same network of family resemblances. Only this way can one know, according to the Paracelsian dictum, one thing within the other.
2 But in such a chain, at the moment we know E, any notion about A has vanished. Connotations proliferate like a cancer and at every step the previous sign is forgotten, obliterated, since the pleasure of the drift is given by the shifting from sign to sign and there is no purpose outside the enjoyment of travel through the labyrinth of signs or of things. |
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Provided one is able to go on playing such a game ad infinitum, one |
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