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      counterexamples above represent (in the sense of "staging") a vivid contrast between conventional and intended meaning (Grice 1968) and show us (in action) two examples of witty, persuasive strategies. It is clear that in (3) Henry only pretends to make a request: he wants Jill to believe that he is requesting, while in fact he is making a false request (his speech act is a fictive one). In (4) Henry wants Jill to believe that he is attempting to get her to do something, and is in fact trying to get a different effect, but he can only succeed in getting it because he believes that Jill will take his pseudorequest as presupposing his good will. Henry, in both cases, lies, as if he were to say he was a doctor to convince Jill to take her clothes off. This last kind of lie would have been more brutal (more condemnable according to current moral standards), whereas the rhetorical lie Henry built up is undoubtedly more subtle, and it will be difficult for Jill to say that she has been deceived. This means that there is a difference between lying by asserting crudely what is not the case and lying by using strategically the presuppositional power of expressions. Nevertheless, the communicative strategy of Henry does not affect the alleged meaning-structure of request and does not challenge Lakoff's representation; on the contrary, it reinforces it.
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      Notice that, if Lakoff's proposal is to be considered valid, the felicity conditions inserted within the meaning postulate (namely, that requesting someone to do something means to attempt to get the requested result) do not survive the negation test. To say that somebody did not request something leaves unanswered whether somebody attempted to get that something (one can avoid requesting because one does not want something or because one thinks that one can obtain someattemptedresult by other means). This means that there is a difference between presuppositions and other coded meaning postulates and that request is not a p-term.
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6. The fiduciary contract is defined thus by Greimas: "Le contrat fiduciare met en jeu un faire persuasif de la part du destinateur et, en contrepartie, l'adhésion du destinataire: de la sorte, si l'objet du faire persuasif est la véridiction (le dire vrai) de l'énonciateur, le contreobjet, dont l'obtention est escomptée, consiste dans un croire-vrai que l'énonciataire accorde au statut du discourse énoncé: dans ce cas, le contrat fiduciare est un contrat énonciatif (ou contrat de véridiction) qui garantit le discours-énoncé" (Greimas and Courtés 1979).

 
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