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proposition, an argument (Peirce, CP, 2.342344). Therefore, to speak of presuppositions in the cases above leads one to assume that everything in language is a presuppositional phenomenon. But this means that language is indefinitely interpretable. To say that every expression presupposes every other expression is to multiply entities unnecessarily. Many discussions on presuppositions risk this farfetched position (see Zuber 1972). |
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1.2. Presuppositional and Positional Power |
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Assuming that we are not so much interested in what-is-the-case as, rather, in what someone tries to make someone else believe to be the case means that we are interested in the presuppositional power of p-terms and sentences insofar as they acquire (as soon as they are uttered) a positional power. Given sentence (6), according to the current literature, (6a) is presupposed, and given (7), (7a) is presupposed: |
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(6) I accused Mary of having bought a new dress. |
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(6a) To buy a new dress is bad. |
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(7) The son of John is ill. |
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(7a) There is (somewhere) a son of John. |
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It can happen that when (6) is uttered there is no mutual agreement between S and A about the moral evaluation of the act of buying dresses. However, as soon as (6) is uttered (if S and A share the same system of signification and S knows it), by using a p-term such as accuse, endowed with a precise presuppositional power, S "frames" the following discourse and suggest to A that (6a) should be taken for granted. In other words, by saying (6) S constructs a background frame in which buying a new dress is considered bad. This presupposition establishes the textual point of view and, in doing so, frames the discourse locating part of the information (an unfavorable value) in the background and a different part of information (that Mary bought a new dress) in the foreground. From this point on, foreground information should be viewed from the point of view of the imposed background. In the same way, even though A has never heard about a son of John, the utterance of (7) frames the following discourse as if there were (somewhere) a son of John. Once A has accepted the utterance of the expression proposed by S, A must accept the framing of the further discourse as imposed by S. If A, on the grounds of some previous knowledge, does not accept the |
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