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      comes the signifier of the other, but, because of a sort of identification between things and words, one can act upon the other, so that the principle of universal resemblance becomes at the same time the principle of universal sympathy and of mutual interaction.
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3. Vagueness depends on synechism: "Since no object in the universe can ever be fully determinate with respect to its having or not having every known property, it follows that any proposition about the universe is vague in the sense that it cannot hope to fully specify a determinate set of properties" (Almeder 1983:331). See also Nadin (1983:163): "Vagueness hence represents a sort of relationship between absolute, final determination, which in fact is not attained (the condition of an ideal, therefore) and actual determination of meaning (again as sense, meaning, signification) in concrete semioses."
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4. "The current attempts at a theory of reality are to a great extent characterized by the insight that the problem of reality is now freed from the controversy between idealism and realism which had long been unfruitful, and must be treated on another level. The first and decisive step in the new direction was taken by Peirce. . . . This misleading phenomenon explains why, in his writings, he sometimes calls his own position 'idealistic' and sometimes 'realistic,' without essentially changing it" (Oehler I979:70).
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5. As for a discussion of Derrida's critique of "presence," only after having written this paper did I read the important remarks of Scholes (1989) about "pragmatic presence": see pp. 7174 on "occasional" expressions such as this and now.
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6. The problem of the Habit involves the pragmatic maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Thus our conception of these effects is the whole of our conceptions of the object" (5.402). "The meaning of any proposition is itself given in another proposition which is simply a general description of all the conceivable experimental phenomena which the assertion of the original proposition predicts" (Almeder 1983:329; C.P., 5.427).

 
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