< previous page page_261 next page >

Page 261
Notes
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
1. The bibliography on presuppositions is extensive. The most complete compilations are those of Sag and Prince (1979) and Oh and Dinneen (1979).
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
2. For similar approaches see Dinsmore (1981a and 1981b), Soames (1979), and Schiebe (1979).
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
3. There are, however, more complex cases. Let us consider, for example, an act of saying a word such as "accuse." We can accuse someone by saying "I accuse you" or, in a given context, by saying "You did it." In the latter case, at the level of the lexical item, there is nothing which can be described as an accusation. Nevertheless, if, in a given context, that sentence has the illocutionary force of an accusation, the speaker using it would make the same presupposition as he did with the sentence "I accuse you." In other words, the description of the p-term "to accuse'' is a description of the speech act as well. Of course, when an accusation is conveyed by the sentence "You did it," the presupposition of this sentence is only contextually definable, because the same sentence, in a different context, could be an act of praise.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
4. The character of a negative sentence, in a natural language, as always following a prior sentence in order to correct it, is recognized by various authors (for further references, see Gazdar 1979:67) even if they do not seem to draw all necessary conclusions from this point.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
5. Take, for instance, some curious counterexamples proposed by Gazdar (1979:31) in order to challenge Lakoff's proposal (1975:268) to represent the felicity conditions of request by the format of meaning postulates, according to the following representation:
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
REQUEST (x,y,P) 23167-0232a.gif ATTEMPT (x CAUSE [y,P])
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
Gazdar says that by virtue of Lakoff's representation, (1) should presuppose (2)
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
(1) Henry requested of Jill that she take her clothes off.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
(2) Henry attempted to get Jill to take her clothes off.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
      but he objects that, at this point, it would be impossible to cope with (3) and (4):
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
(3) Henry requested of Jill to take her clothes off because it was the only way he knew of preventing her from doing so.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
(4) Henry requested of Jill that she take her clothes off but he was only attempting to shock her.
15a618ec9e7a226e83a3ec91f2bb0396.gif
      It is interesting to notice that while (1) and (2) are plain sentences, (3) and (4) are sequences of sentences, that is, texts. The result of these textual operations is to tell a deviation from the normal and conventional presuppositional power of the expression request, which was conventionally used in (1) in order conventionally to presuppose (2). Texts (3) and (4) are microdramas introducing epistemic pictures (what Henry wants and thinks, what Jill should think according to Henry's forecasts, and so on). A text is a mechanism which reduces, magnifies, or rebuilds the conventional meanings of a term or standard sentence. The

 
< previous page page_261 next page >