|
|
|
|
|
|
Chapter Two
The Semantics of Metaphor |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If a code allowed us only to generate semiotic judgments, all linguistic systems would serve to enunciate exclusively that which has already been determined by the system's conventions: each and every utterance (énoncé) would beeven though through a series of mediationstautological. On the contrary, however, codes allow us to enunciate events that the code did not anticipate as well as metasemiotic judgments that call into question the legitimacy of the code itself. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If all codes were as simple and univocal as Morse code, there would be no problem. It is true that a great deal which the code cannot anticipate can be said with Morse code; it is equally true that one can transmit in Morse code instructions capable of modifying the code itself. This can occur because Morse code's signifiers take, as the signified, alphabetical signifiers which in turn refer us to that complex system of systems known as languageby language meaning, in this case, the total competence of a speaking subject and thus the system of semantic systems as well, that is, the total form of the content. Yet it is precisely this sort of competence, not entirely analyzable, which we have decided to call 'code' as well, not for the sake of simple analogy but in order to broaden the scope of the term.
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
How can it be, then, that this code, which in principle ought to have structured the speaking subject's entire cultural system, is able to generate both factual messages which refer to original experiences and, above all, messages which place in doubt the very structure of the code itself? |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The fact that the code, in referring to predictable cultural entities, nonetheless allows us to assign new semiotic marks to them, is singular |
|
|
|
 |
|
 |
|
|
"Semantica della metafora," in Le forme del contenuto (Milan: Bompiani, 1971). This chapter is a revised version of the Italian original. Translated by John Snyder |
|
|
|
|
|