< previous page page_199 next page >

Page 199
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
But in 1896 (1.422, 477) qualities "which are Firstnesses as well as icons" are general. In 1902 (2.310) only a Dicisign can be true or false, but in 1893 it is said (2.441) that two icons can form a proposition: The icon of a Chinese and the icon of a woman can be composed together to form a proposition and therefore function as general terms. In 1902 (2.275) an icon, even though being a mere image of the object, "produces an interpretant idea." In 2.278 icons can work as predicates of an assertion. In order to explain this apparent contradiction, it should be said that Peirce distinguishes icons as instances of Firstness (and thus as a component of the process which goes from perception to judgment) from iconic representamens, or hypoicons. Hypoicons being a representamen, they are already Thirdnesses and are therefore interpretable. However, the entire matter is not so clear: in 1906 (4.9) it is asserted that "I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as well as a logic of symbols."
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
2. Diagrams are interpretable (1.54). It is true that, whereas symbols include their consequences, icons exhibit them (2.282); this is 1893. But in 1901 (3.641) it is clearly said that there is not a substantial difference between reasoning by observing diagrams and reasoning by syllogisms. In 1905 (4.347) Peirce says that in graphs "the necessary consequences of these logical relations are at the same time signified, or can, at least, be made evident by transforming the diagram in certain ways." Apropos of section 7.2.5 of this chapter, a further remark is interesting (4.345): "I use the word 'signify' in such a sense that I say that a relative theme signifies its corresponding relation."
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
3. Since blackness is not considered in itself, but is known as referred to the stove, it can only be attributed as a general. "We cannot comprehend an agreement of two things" but only "an agreement in some respect" (1.551). The following remarks are suggested by Caprettini (1976).
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
4. This view is consistent with Peirce's cosmology. There is an ideal world (in which two contradictory propositions are possible) and there is an actual world (in which, given a possible proposition, its contradictory is impossible); the latter is a selection and an arbitrary determination of the former (6.192). The actual universe, in respect to that vast representamen (5.119) which is the entire universe perfused with signs (5.448 n.), is a "universe of discourse," so to speak, reducing all the possible characters to a manageable number.
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
5. The example Ground arms! is repeatedly cited (see, for instance, 8.315). As for a broad acceptation of interpretant, "we may take a sign in so broad a sense that the interpretant of it is not a thought, but an action or an experience, or we may even so enlarge the meaning of a sign that its interpretant is a mere quality of feeling" (8.332).
f0d057874ee5e31d4706f7033c0ae11d.gif
6. All this between 1901 and 1903. In 1891 (reviewing the Principles of Psychology by James) Peirce was more cautious: "In perception the conclusion is not thought but actually seen, so that it is not exactly a judgment, though it is tantamount to one" (8.65). "Perception attains a virtual judgment, it subsumes something under a class, and not only so, but virtually attaches to the proposition the seal of assent" (8.66).

 
< previous page page_199 next page >