Lessons on the Japanese Constitution
Lynn Parisi
Japan’s current constitution was written in 1946 and adopted in 1947,
while Japan was under Allied occupation following World War II. On
the occasion of its adoption, one Japanese politician called the document
an “ill-fitting suit of clothes,” totally inappropriate as a governmental
blueprint for Japan. Observers predicted that the constitution would be
replaced as soon as the Occupation ended. Debate over the workability of
Japan’s constitution has been a political constant; yet, the document has
not been amended since its inception. Much of the ongoing controversy
stems from the context in which the document was brought into being.
Following a brief exploration of the history of Japan’s 1947
Constitution, this digest introduces recent scholarship and offers
examples of how that scholarship deepens the story of Japan’s postwar
constitutional process. In its final section, the digest provides ways in
which study of the postwar constitution can enrich social studies
instruction.
Historical Overview. When the constitution was presented to the
Japanese people in 1946, official commentary explained that the Japanese
government, with significant input from the emperor and feedback from
Occupation authorities, had written the document. Quickly, however, the
explanation of Japanese authorship was replaced with a version
acknowledging the strong hand of Supreme Commander of the Allied
Powers (SCAP) General Douglas MacArthur and Occupation personnel
in the constitution-making process. Early in the Occupation, Americans
charged with overseeing the democratization of Japan identified the Meiji
Constitution of 1887 as a flawed document that had enabled militarists to
take control and lead Japan into war. The Potsdam Declaration, which
had set the terms for Japan’s surrender and reconstruction at the end of
WWII, provided the rationale for modifying the Meiji Constitution by
requiring that Japan remove all obstacles to democracy and ensure basic
freedoms and rights. SCAP called upon Japan’s leaders to revise the
constitution in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration. When Japanese
government leaders made only cosmetic changes, MacArthur concluded
that it was within SCAP’s authority to draft a completely new
government charter for Japan. During one week in February 1946, a
committee of 24 Americans, both military and civilian, drafted a
democratic constitution for Japan. MacArthur approved it and SCAP
presented it to Japan’s foreign minister as a fait accompli.
This account of the making of Japan’s postwar constitution has been
the accepted history until recent years. The account credits the making of
Japan’s postwar constitution as an essentially American story. In it, U.S.
government and Occupation forces are the key actors and authors. Japan,
represented by its government, is a minor and, in fact, reluctant player.
Although this account casts the United States in the role of bearer of
democracy, it has led to the more negative but common sentiment that the
United States imposed a constitution on Japan. This raises the crucial
question of how an alien political document survived in a reluctant
nation. If Japan was resistant to the document and to the democracy it put
in place, how did this foreign constitution stay in place? Why did this
exercise in democracy building succeed when many others have failed?
Japan’s 1947 Constitution: A New Narrative. Recent scholarship
has led to more complex understandings of Japan’s postwar constitutional
story. Over the past two decades, American and Japanese historians and
political scientist have re-examined the birth of Japan’s 1947
Constitution. Looking beyond the initial drafting convention of February
1946 and taking advantage of documents that were classified until the
1970s, researchers have uncovered a story of democracy building in
Japan that involved intricate debate and collaboration within and across
national lines. Their research has brought into focus diverse Japanese as
well as American roles in the constitution-making process, integrating
Japanese chapters into what had been an American-centered story.
Japanese Involvement. Current research reinforces the narrative
that Japan’s postwar leaders resisted changes to the Meiji Constitution.
However, such scholars as John Dower argue that focusing on the role of
Japan’s political leaders obscures the supportive role played by common
Japanese people. While Japanese government response to SCAP’s call
for constitutional revision did stall, Japanese people responded to the
opportunity. Between late 1945 and spring 1946, SCAP received 12
proposals for constitutional revisions from outside the Japanese
government. Proposals came from liberal and conservative sources,
including the Communist, Liberal, Progressive, and Socialist parties, the
grassroots Constitutional Research Association, and individuals.
Suggestions included the abolition of the emperor; retention of the
emperor with limits on authority or exclusively symbolic duties;
economic rights; gender equity; and the right to education. A number of
these popularly generated suggestions correlated with SCAP interests and
with provisions SCAP ultimately included in its own draft.
Not Simply an American Replica. American writers from SCAP’s
government section, charged by MacArthur with writing a draft
constitution, took note of suggestions for the document contributed by
Japanese people and groups. They also chose not to limit themselves to
creating an American replica for Japan. They looked within but also
beyond the U.S. Constitution. Many on the American writing committee
embraced the expansive human rights of the New Deal. These ideals were
not reflected in the U.S. Constitution, nor necessarily embraced by
conservatives within American occupation personnel. Beate Sirota
Gordon, a young and idealistic member of the committee, has recorded
her search through Japanese libraries for sample constitutions from other
nations that might provide models for a progressive Japanese document.
In its original form, Gordon’s human rights section for the Japanese
constitution articulated rights far more progressive than anything in the
U.S. Constitution. In the constitution’s final version, articles on women’s
rights significantly surpassed U.S. guarantees. Other features in the
American draft clearly reflected compromise with Japanese tradition.
Notable, of course, was the maintenance of the emperor. While the 1947
Constitution demotes the emperor from his earlier position as sacred and
inviolable, it maintains a hereditary throne as a symbol of the state,
making the Japanese governmental system comparable to the British.
The Adoption Process. Japanese input in the constitutional process
became more pronounced after SCAP presented the American draft to the
Japanese government in February 1946. Adoption was an arduous
process that entailed months of intergovernmental, parliamentary, and
popular discussion. As the document moved through multiple drafts, it
was translated from the original English into Japanese, then back into
English for SCAP review. Some scholars argue that, in this process, the
original American draft underwent “Japanization,” becoming more
representative of Japanese thought. The following example illustrates the
process by which Japanese writers influenced conceptual issues through
translation.
American political philosophy rests on the concept of popular
sovereignty: ultimate power resides in the people. This principle was
fundamental to Occupation efforts to rebuild the Japanese government.
The preamble in SCAP’s draft constitution established popular
sovereignty within Japan; sections on human rights underscored it.
But for their part, Japan’s postwar governmental elite had not swayed
from the position in the Meiji Constitution that the Emperor commanded
ultimate and inviolable power. When Japanese leaders received the
American draft, their first task was to translate it into Japanese.
Translators dropped the American-authored preamble altogether, thus
circumventing the troubling issue of popular vs. imperial sovereignty.
Required by SCAP to reinsert the concept of popular sovereignty,
Japanese translators used the archaic word shiko, meaning “supreme
National Clearinghouse for United States-Japan Studies
Indiana University
Memorial West #211
Bloomington, IN 47405-7005
(800) 441-3272 (812) 855-3765 http://www.indiana.edu/~japan/Digests/const.html
JAPAN
DIGEST
November 2002
height.” A term out of use in 1940s Japan, shiko was meaningless in
conveying the concept to Japanese readers. Through this word choice, the
Japanese government obscured the meaning of a political concept they
did not endorse (Dower: 379-382). SCAP, in turn, re-translated the
Japanese version into English and succeeded in catching most of the
conceptual changes that the Japanese had introduced. Translation
continued to be an issue through six revised drafts in the Japanese Diet.
Opportunity for Revision. MacArthur invited Japanese review and
revision of the constitution between 1948 and 1949 to insure that it
reflected the free will of the Japanese people. Constitutional scholar
Shoichi Koseki has noted that there was little response, despite vocalized
concern over foreign authorship. The Japanese government established a
review committee, but received only a few proposals for minor revisions.
Although it could have done so, the government did not invite public
response to the constitution through a national referendum. According to
Koseki, the fact that the Japanese government and people disregarded the
opportunity to change the constitution when invited to do so, indicates an
early level of support that renders the claim of foreign imposition moot
(249-254).
Article Nine. Early in the occupation, MacArthur identified the
abolition of war as a critical principle to be included in any revision of
Japan’s constitution. MacArthur drew on the idea of a world without war
expressed in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. However, the no-war
provision as it appears in the final constitution is very much a negotiated
principle, going beyond American mandate or authorship. MacArthur
stipulated that Japan would abolish war as a sovereign right of the nation.
War would be renounced as a means to settle disputes and as a means to
preserve security. Japan would not have the right to build or maintain a
Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force, and would relinquish the right of
belligerency (Gordon: 104). This wording would have denied Japan the
right to use military force for any reason, including defense. In the
February 1946 draft constitution, Charles Kades, chair of SCAP’s
constitutional committee, deleted the reference to national defense, but
broadened the prohibition against military forces and supplies.
Once in their court, Japanese Diet members debated the clause,
particularly its implications for national defense. Many within the Diet
argued that this meant Japan could not defend itself from attack. Others
countered that the right of national defense was irrevocable and so Article
Nine could not prohibit it. Still others cautioned that the Pacific War had
been waged in the name of national defense. Some argued that Article
Nine would keep Japan out of the United Nations by precluding Japan
from contributing to international peacekeeping and thus, be ultimately
self-defeating. While politicians argued, the Japanese people embraced
the no-war provision. John Dower suggests that they did so because
Article Nine offered this devastated, defeated people a positive national
result from the war. While they might be proud of little in their recent
national past, Japanese could be proud to lead the world in outlawing war
(398).
Following months of debate, the final version of the “no-war” clause
came from Japan’s House of Representatives:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign
right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of
settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land,
sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized.
Most analysts agree that the failure to clearly define national defense
left the meaning of Article Nine open to debate for all time. Article
Nine’s ambiguity came into play almost immediately with the communist
victory in the Chinese Civil War, and then again with the Korean War. In
the Cold War context of a regional communist threat, U.S. and Japanese
governments interpreted Article Nine to support rearmament for national
defense.
The Japanese Constitution in American Classrooms. What are the
lessons worth teaching in Japan’s constitutional story? Why is changing
historiography on this topic relevant in the classroom? Where can Japan’s
constitution be taught in the social studies curriculum and to what
purpose?
On one level, multiple narratives of Japan’s postwar constitution over
half a century offer students a living case study in how history is
constructed, modified, and enriched by ongoing research and new access
to previously unavailable historical sources. Japan’s constitution also
provides a case for examining national perspectives in the intersection of
two nations’ histories. The conventional narrative that Americans
authored Japan’s postwar constitution claims the story as an American
story. Newer research makes it a binational and negotiated story.
In civics classes, students can examine what has been seen as an
example of successfully transplanting American democracy. In
considering the complex story that has emerged, students can better
appreciate the multiplicity of factors in that success. Study of Japan’s
constitution should take students beyond the story of the American
“constitutional convention” and engage them in an analysis of the players
and conditions in Japan that enabled constitutional democracy to take
root. In looking at Japan’s governmental blueprint, students should be
encouraged to look for American influences as well as examine
provisions of the document that tie it to other national models and
recognize elements that make Japan’s 1947 Constitution unique.
For students in government, history, or international relations classes,
Article Nine offers a case study of an enduring constitutional issue
affecting Japan in the world. The meaning of Article Nine, and the larger
question of whether to amend the constitution regarding this provision,
has been brought to the fore repeatedly: during the Korean War, in a
1954 constitutional assembly, during the 1960 U.S.-Japan security treaty
protests, and during military build-up in conjunction with the Vietnam
War. In the 1990s, the U.S. criticized Japan for limiting its Mideast
peacekeeping contributions to financial and humanitarian aid under
Article Nine.
Most recently, Article Nine underlies the controversy over Japanese
response to the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Factions
within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party argue that new global realities
call for Japan to sever the reins of Article Nine and revise the
constitution. Critics across the political spectrum argue that Article Nine
has been bent to the breaking point in 2002 as Japan has redefined its
“defensive” role to include sending Self-Defense Forces to aid U.S.
forces in the Pacific, carrying munitions, and refueling war equipment.
In April 2002, the Koizumi government proposed a set of “emergencycontingency”
bills designed to give the national government power in
case of foreign military attacks. Critics noted that the bills, initiated in the
name of self-defense, would legalize national preparation for war, an
arguably offensive measure. While the “emergency-contingency” bills
were defeated, controversy over constitutional reform related to Article
Nine grows. Students can track this ongoing constitutional issue though
online access to English-language Japanese newspapers such as The
Japan Times http://www.japantimes.com, The Mainichi Daily News
http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/, and The Asahi Shimbun
http://www.asahi.com/english/english.htm.
References
Beer, Lawrence W. and John M. Maki. From Imperial Myth to Democracy:
Japan’s Two Constitutions, 1889-2002. Boulder: University of Colorado Press,
2002.
Dower, John. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New York:
Norton, 1998.
Gordon, Beate Sirota. The Only Woman in the Room: A Memoir. New York:
Kodansha International, 1997.
Inoue, Kyoko. MacArthur’s Japanese Constitution: A Linguistic and Cultural
Study of its Making. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Koseki, Shoichi. The Birth of Japan’s Postwar Constitution. Trans. Ray Moore.
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998.
Miller, Barbara, Lynn Parisi and Others. The Bill of Rights around the World.
Boulder, CO: Social Science Education Consortium, 1992.
Lynn Parisi is the Director of the Program for Teaching East Asia,
Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at the University
of Colorado.
The National Clearinghouse for U.S.-Japan Studies is made possible
through the generous support of the Japan Foundation Center for Global
Partnership.