Barbarians and Romans in North-West Europe

from the later Republic to late Antiquity

edited by
John C. Barrett, Andrew P.
Fitzpatrick and Lesley Macinnes

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INTRODUCTION

John C Barrett and A P Fitzpatrick

The archaeology of 'culture contact' has been the general theme of a number of recent studies of the late Iron Age in northern and central Europe. These have isolated the organisational properties of indigenous pre-contact societies, demonstrating the way these properties partly determined the historical trajectory of the contact process. Obviously the other determining factor was the organisational demands of Roman military (and economic) activity. It is the mix of these two, relatively autonomous processes which seemingly gave rise to the history of a particular frontier region.

Whilst this line of reasoning has analytical strengths, for it clearly helps to organise our thinking, problems do remain. It is too easily assumed that Roman authority was the dominant force; whilst this may be true elsewhere it is an assumption which surely needs much closer examination in But a major problem in archaeology is also the way frontier regions. native studies have traditionally lain within the scope of 'prehistory' whilst Roman military history remains the preserve of Roman archaeology. As Burnham and Johnson have noted (1979, 2) this divide between specialisations occurs at the very point where the processes of integration need to be most carefully analysed. A further problem which also subverts the demand for holistic study is the different conception of history which both specialisations tend to imply. The difference is best expressed in terms elaborated upon by Braudel (1980, 25 ff); between long cycles of historical movement, the longue durée, and the shorter surface ripples of historical events. For some time now prehistorians have been concerned to understand long-term processes of social and economic change, just as by contrast Roman frontier studies often remain wedded to the precise chronologies of events. This distinction is not just a matter of different chronological scales of analysis, nor of different qualities of data, but concerns profound differences in the perception of historical processes, differences which are not directly compatible.

A unified history must recognise, as social historians have always done, that the events of invasion, campaigning and imperial policy were formulated within longer term and deeper seated historical processes. Others have begun to establish the way this kind of history may be written from the archaeology of this period (cf Burnham and Johnson 1979; and Sloftra 1983) and the studies contained in this volume contribute to that enquiry. They spring from two conferences held in 1984 and 1985. The Scottish Archaeological Forum meeting, Native Space and Roman Invaders held in Edinburgh, and The Barbarians held in Glasgow, examined the relationship between Iron Age indigenous communities and Roman Imperial authority on the north-western limits of the empire. Each conference was slightly different in its aim. The Forum meeting was specifically concerned with Roman/Native relations, the Glasgow conference looked at the long-term history of those societies which lay at and beyond the margins of the However, both meetings ultimately explored a considerable amount of common ground and this volume has arisen from that shared experience. Published here are contributions deriving from both conferences along with

some additional material.

Four main themes emerge. The first concerns the kinds of value systems sustained within the Roman and native worlds which guided the way each dealt with the other. Fitzpatrick isolates kinship and warfare not only as organising principles for particular societies but as principles upon which they might interact. And Braund's study of Roman attitudes to 'barbarian' peoples allows him to explain the particular form imperial policy, which he interprets as 'economic' imperialism, took towards natives beyond the northern frontiers.

The establishment of these frontier zones around the north-west of the empire forms the second theme, for these zones with their military installations imposed something of their own logic upon the historical Hanson outlines the development of Roman frontiers and the military requirements which we might envisage for these frontier zones and how these changing requirements were serviced by the military installations themselves. But it is the supply of the frontier, particularly in its material requirements, which dominates a number of the papers which consider the degree of control the Roman authorities may have been able to exercise within and beyond the frontier zone. Whittaker reasserts the importance of understanding that mechanisms existed to supply the military needs of the frontier from deep within the empire. He suggests these mechanisms may have played a dominant role in the movement of materials to both military and non-military sites, leading to the creation of a homogenous frontier zone with those territories within the frontier having greater similarities to those territories without than to the rest of the province. But it is the local rather than long distance supply of resources which most other contributors consider. In his paper Fulford disputes the degree of integration and interdependence on both sides of the Frontier envisaged by Whittaker, arguing instead that the frontier was largely supplied from within the provinces. Groemman-van Waateringe considers the fluctuating sources of grain available to the Roman army in north-western continental Europe and suggests that they oscillated between long-distance and local supply. Bloemers also considers this changing relationship and pays particular attention to the previously neglected demographic impact of a standing army, first as a form of colonialism and subsequently through its demand for local recruits.

Higham looks at one region immediately behind what has usually been considered to be the frontier zone in north-west England. He examines the sorts of economic changes which might be recognised resulting from the supply demands of the Roman army, setting his analysis in the context of long-term ecological change. He suggests that the demands of the military precluded large-scale 'romanisation'. Macinnes, in her study of Scotland, reviews the extent to which Roman products may have been circulating and being deposited beyond the frontier. Whatever the nature of the exchange of the subsistence requirements for the army, Macinnes argues that although the quantity of Roman material beyond the frontier may be small in comparison with other areas, its significance should not be underestimated and that it was probably directed to specific groups amongst the native elites.

The third theme is the independent development of areas beyond the frontiers throughout the pre-Roman Iron Ages. Parker Pearson considers southern Scandinavia and northern Germany. He gives a critical appraisal of recent ideas concerning culture contact which explain social changes in regions beyond the 'core area' of empire in terms of prestige gift exchange

by demonstrating the importance of other, internal factors, such as warfare and long-term changes in the control of agricultural production. Raftery, for Ireland, synthesises his own recent monographs and considers fully the range of archaeological data which define an Irish Iron Age whose ultimate transformation was to create the kingdoms of the early historic period.

The final theme is one of reflection on the difficulties which are raised by the approaches and questions put forward in this volume. Breeze considers the shortcomings of the archaeological record of northern Britain against these demands and finds it wanting in environmental analyses, problem-orientated excavations and integrated artefact studies. He concludes by emphasising that a better understanding of 'romanisation' is required. In contrast, Barrett challenges the value of this concept, arguing that it is a self-fulfilling concept which has reached the end of its usefulness. He proposes an alternative attempt at an understanding of the interaction, based not on the cultural diffusionism of 'romanisation' or 'acculturation', but on the ways in which new cultural values were achieved and sustained, emphasising the ideological rather than the material.

Perhaps the most encouraging feature of the volume is the way that all the authors consider barbarian and Roman alike and attempt to integrate archaeological and written sources. Most are also willing to consider varying geographical and chronological scales of analysis and draw on evidence from elsewhere in Europe, as well as comparative studies, albeit to a Ideally this should not occasion comment as these are lesser extent. approaches which many scholars would sympathise with, but it is fair to say that such catholicism has been rare in this field of study in recent years. The divide between Roman and barbarian is still sharp in, for example, the latest Limeskongress acta (1986). As many contributors comment, further progress will depend on integrated research. At present, studies such as those on Roman coins inside and outside the frontier in Germany, by Davies (1983), or on samian in barbaricum between Pannonia and Dacia, by Gabler and Vaday (1986), are notable for their rarity as well as their content. The ideas outlined by Bloemers in his paper are intended to further develop the archaeology of the Netherlands which, as Willems has elegantly demonstrated, is already outstanding in the quality of its information and interpretation (1984).This is the standard which this hoped for research must match and surpass.

While the papers collected here are certainly neither the first nor the last step, it appears to be a sure one in what we believe to be the right direction. None the less, difficulties still remain. While it is generally agreed that progress is still required in the collection and interpretation of archaeological data, the interpretation of literary sources is often thought to be exempt from this. But there is a tendency amongst those papers which approach the barbarians primarily from written sources to characterise them as an ideal ahistorical type. In part this reflects the timeless world which the ancient barbarians were thought to occupy on the fringes of the known world by the classical world, but it also reflects one facet of modern historical study. In contrast, the chronological depth available in archaeological sources prompts a rather different approach. This is brought out most clearly in Groenman-van Waateringe's paper, where she distinguishes a series of changes which might have been missed if she had adopted an historical characterisation.

Some areas are also not covered satisfactorily. While the present volume substantially reflects an increasingly fruitful debate across the

subject boundaries of prehistoric and Roman studies, it also reflects as clearly the gap between Roman and early Medieval studies which was apparent at the conferences. Lastly, impressive though much of the analyses outlined here are, discussion of the societies and actors involved, both barbarian and Roman, still has far to go. We hope that these papers give ground for optimism and debate in these fields.

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Chapter 1

THE NORTHERN FRONTIER REVISITED

David Braund

In my recent book, <u>Rome and the Friendly King</u> (Braund 1984) I have tried to explore the politics and diplomacy of the relationships between Rome and friendly rulers. In this paper I now want to pay more attention to the social and economic dimensions of these relations, with special reference to the north, Conventionally the peoples of the north are termed 'barbarians'; I use that term as convenient short—hand, implying neither value—judgment nor ignorance of local variations between peoples. I wish to establish three basic propositions, as follows:

- 1. That the notion of a moral barrier on the Rhine and Danube needs considerable modification, but, once modified, helps us to understand the ideology behind the payment of subsidies and Ruman restrictions on trade.
- 2. That the functions of subsidies can only be understood in the context of barbarian society.
- 3. That trade with Rome is important, and possibly vital, to the position of the friendly king.

As I observed in my book, the continuity from Republican through early imperial into late imperial practice seems greater than normally imagined.

In his classic paper at the first congress on Roman frontiers, Alföldi argued that 'the frontier line was at the same time the line of demarcation between two fundamentally different realms of thought, whose moral codes did not extend beyond that boundary'.(1) Essentially, he argued that the Romans thought that to deceive, mistreat or murder those beyond the Rhine-Danube frontier was simply not a moral issue.

Frontier studies have come far since the first congress. And, as Whittaker has recently observed, they now sit rather uneasily with Alföldi's model of a moral barrier.(2) At the same time, Alföldi's model tends to conflict with what we may call "the rules of ideology", that is, 'the' Roman view or attitude tends to vary greatly to the point of self-contradiction depending upon which Roman is in question and upon the circumstances obtaining at any given time and place. For example, subsidies may be viewed as subtle, diplomatic gifts when given by a 'good' emperor like Trajan, but as the pits of degradation when given by a 'bad' emperor like Domitian.(3) We should therefore expect the Roman view of northern barbarians to be a kaleidoscope of colours, not simply black or white.

We should bear in mind that many of these barbarians were men who had served with the Roman army and held citizenship. Much more important, there is also the theme of the 'noble savage'. A classic text is Tacitus'

Germania, where the author finds much to recommend in German society. In several respects Germans display the best features of traditional Roman morality - a morality which, on Tacitus' view, has now been largely corrupted in Rome itself. In Germany, says Tacitus, adultery is rare, secret love-letters are not exchanged and the corruption caused by public shows is absent. In Germany, he says, there is freedom of speech in political debate. There is simple food; freedmen are kept in their place. There is no usury: funerals are not occasions for ostentation and conspicuous expenditure. And hairdressing is practised only for the best of motives. Such ideas recur much later with regard to the Red Indians of the American Wild West. Of course, there are also negative myths of the 'ignoble savage' - not least in the Germania itself - but these should not blind us to the existence and prominence of the positive attitudes to be found in Tacitus and elsewhere. It is perhaps worth noting that, unlike some modern scholars Thomas More was well aware of the positive features of the Germania and built them into his Utopia.(4)

Alföldi stresses the fact that Roman forces are often said to devastate and slaughter north of the Rhine and Danube with the author's evident approval. Of course this was nothing new; particular brutality had characterised Roman imperialism from the first.(5) Yet it must be stressed that some of Alföldi's examples actually tell against his argument. A case in point is Dio's account of Caracalla's deceitful and murderous violence towards the Alamanni. Alföldi fails to observe that Dio roundly condemns Caracalla for this behaviour. This is not a gleeful account of Romans slaughtering barbarians - quite the reverse. Dio states: 'The Germanic nations however afforded him neither pleasure nor any specious claim to wisdom or courage, but proved him to be a downright cheat, a simpleton and an arrant coward.' (Dio 77.13.3, Loeb translation). Indeed this case apart, Alföldi very reasonably admits that many of his examples are more or less equivocal.(6) In fact there was even some tradition at Rome of fair play against enemies, including northerners. A well-attested story in Tacitus slots into long-standing Republican tradition. This tradition meets with understandable derision among some scholars and is easily dismissed as mere lip-service. But even if we reduce it to that level (and I find the reduction simplistic), such lip-service is itself surely incomprehensible if, as Alföldi holds, dealings with foreigners/northerners had no moral dimension. Tacitus states:

'I find from contemporary authors, who were members of the Senate, that a letter was read in the Senate from the Chattan chief Adgandestrius, promising the death of Arminius if poison were sent for the purpose. The Senate replied that 'it was not by treason nor in the dark but openly and in arms that the Roman people took vengeance on their foes', a high saying intending to place Tiberius on a level with the old commanders who prohibited and disclosed the offer to poison King Pyrrhus'

(Tac Ann 2.88, adapted from Loeb version).

On this text Alföldi claims 'If the deceit and trickery were too transparent, he (Tiberius) would shrink from them. (Alföldi 1952, 7) but that hardly meets the point: the passage indicates a certain tradition of fair play and shows that such matters could indeed have a moral dimension. And why should Tiberius shrink from open deceit if morality did not count where barbarians were concerned? I find Alföldi's dismissal of Cato's prosecution of Caesar for his ruthless attack upon the Usipetes and Tencteri

no more cogent.(7) Of course this was a political manoeuvre but it was only conceivable as such because dealings with barbarians could have a moral and legal dimension. We may also compare Ann. 11.19 where Tacitus feels the need to justify Corbulo's action against Gannascus. In Roman thought the morality of actions 'beyond the frontier' was, pace Alföldi, an issue. It was enmeshed with the morality of actions 'inside' the frontier area — not least because the same individuals were involved in both. The emperor who, like Caracalla, behaved immorally abroad was likely to do the same at home.

Finally, it must also be stressed that many peoples within the empire as conceived by Alföldi are regularly viewed in terms as negative as those applied to northerners — savage Sardinians, slimy Greeks, cannibalistic, animal-worshipping Egyptians, etc.(8) In other words there is no clear-cut divide between 'us' within the frontiers and 'them' outside. Occasional rhetoric apart, the frontiers are simply not regarded as critical lines of division in that sense. Much more important in fact, are the lines of division operating within Roman society and within the empire as conceived by Alföldi. And these lines have much more to do with ideology than with simple geography. This fact perhaps helps to account for the settlement of northerners within provincial territory. Difficult and dangerous though it may be, culturally and morally as well as militarily, barbarians could be civilised into 'better' ways.(9)

But I do not wish to deny the importance of a residual truth, which stands a little at odds with my last point. Alföldi must be right to the extent that northern barbarians are indeed often regarded in negative terms and it may readily be agreed that this negative view is in fact the dominant view. Central to this view is the notion that barbarians approximate to animals and in particular that, like animals, they are irrational. In their irrationality they fluctuate wildly between abject submission and the most violent aggression. Frézouls has recently demonstrated the point very well for Ammianus, who regards barbarians in precisely these terms. And Alföldi rightly draws attention to Velleius' view that the Germans are animals who have nothing in common with human beings except their limbs and voices.(10)

Frézouls stresses and Alföldi rightly assumes that such a stereotype must have had a powerful influence upon decision-making at Rome, contending with and usually defeating more positive attitudes. We cannot hope to detail or quantify this influence, but I would argue that subsidies and trade controls are very appropriate to the stereotype of the irrational and dangerous barbarian beast — that negative Roman conceptions of barbarians help to explain and provide a context for Roman treatment of them.

A surprising help is Plato's <u>Republic</u>. In it Plato compares the Athenian popular assembly to a great beast and tells us that to control that beast, politicians act in the manner of beast-trainers, pandering to its likes and dislikes. The key point is that for Plato, the irrational beast can only be controlled in material and emotional ways and not by reason. And Plato is no exception. Beast-training was still a metaphor for political government in Tacitus' day; his contemporary, Statius, compares a tyrannical emperor to a cruel beast-trainer: again, the trainer controls the beast by material means - in particular, its food.(11)

If, as seems to be the case, the Roman government was indeed disposed to conceive of barbarians as irrational animals, and if it was held that irrational animals were to be controlled by material means, especially food,

then we should $\underline{\text{expect}}$ Rome to control barbarians by such means — or at least to try to do so.

This, I suggest, is an important part of the ideology behind the payment of subsidies and trade control where barbarians are concerned. It was obvious and appropriate for Rome to seek to control barbarians by material means for that is how one controls animals and that is essentially what they are. I stress 'obvious and appropriate': we need not suppose that it was ever entirely thought out. It was simply understood, although we should note that both Velleius and Tacitus come very close to making my point explicitly.(12)

My second proposition is that the functions of subsidies can only be understood in the context of barbarian society. Our information on barbarian society is not all that we might wish but we can put together a fairly reliable general picture.

I want to draw attention to some central features of that picture. Wealth is obviously crucial to anyone with social and political aspirations in barbarian society. The power of religion may perhaps be allowed as exceptional. Wealth was the cornerstone of patronage, which was vital: the wealthy man attracted and maintained a following by distributing his wealth. He gave his followers food and entertainment in the form of feasts, together with gifts of other goods, not least weapons. His followers responded with services and perhaps also goods. The wealthier the patron, the bigger the following and thus the greater the power and influence of that patron. The greatest patron was the ruler. The centrality of this sort of patronage to barbarian society is affirmed and re-affirmed by our sources from classical antiquity well into the Middle Ages.(13)

Another recurrent feature is that this following was especially a $\underline{\text{war}}$ -following. At the same time, warfare or bandit-raids might constitute a rite of passage in barbarian society from boyhood to manhood.(14) Warfare was thus endemic to barbarian society in general and to these followings in particular, though we must remember that our Roman sources inevitably concentrate on the military aspect of barbarian society.

Let us consider the functions of subsidies in the context of this picture of barbarian society. By so doing we can help to make up for the shortage of explicit evidence on these functions. The patron needed wealth and the greatest patron, the king, needed the greatest wealth. Who received subsidies paid by Rome? One imagines that the king usually received them in the first instance, though the evidence is sparse and rather equivocal. It should now be obvious that such a ruler could easily use such subsidies within the context of barbarian society to bolster his own position as ruler. In other words, a primary function of Roman subsidies to the ruler was to keep that ruler in power. Paid elsewhere, they could obviously be subversive by the same mechanism. A secondary function will have therefore been to recommend Roman friendship to others.

At the same time, Rome was especially concerned that the friendly ruler should prevent raids on Roman or friendly territory. But this could be difficult in a society in which raids were part of the social fabric and to try to stop raids would be to break social norms. If the ruler were to achieve that, he would need all the reinforcement subsidies could bring him. In particular, he might use subsidies to compensate those in his tribe who would otherwise have taken part in raids, part of whose function was the

acquisition of wealth. Yet this could only mitigate the problem. Perhaps the most satisfactory solution was to direct the social need for warfare away from Rome and her friends towards peoples hostile to Rome.

All this, I stress, is easier said than done. We should not seek to minimize the king's problem, though Rome might not be so understanding.(15) And of course the problem will only have increased under the Principate as the frontier zone flourished through the influx of resources from wealthier provinces and as Rome and her friends thus offered ever more attractive targets.(16)

At the same time, in so far as subsidies strengthened a tribe (especially by promoting the stability of its government), they helped it to perform its function as a buffer for Rome against other tribes. In particular, those in receipt of Roman subsidies might pass them on to other hostile peoples. Zosimus regards subsidies paid to the Bosporan kingdom as a principal factor in obstructing potential Scythian raids upon the province of Asia and it is interesting that he speaks of trade in the same breath. Dio tells us that the young Battarius and his followers received money from Marcus Aurelius and then held back a hostile neighbour who demanded money from them with menaces. They presumably held him back by paying with Marcus' money.

Moreover, Tacitus tells us that the payment of subsidies was traditional practice in German inter-tribal relations and, interestingly enough, Tacitus relates the subsidies paid by Rome to that very tradition.(17) Once more we find that Roman subsidies were easily used within the pre-existing structures of barbarian society. Subsidies are often conceived in quasi-moral terms as 'bribes' or as 'tribute'. I hope that they can now be seen as very useful, if not necessary, for king and Rome alike. By paying subsidies Rome helped the king do what she wanted him to do, to their mutual benefit.

Finally on this topic, we should note that 'subsidies' are often called 'gifts' by our sources. As such, they suit both king and Roman emperor in another way. The conferral of gifts by a beneficent emperor was central to the ideology of the Principate, and the barbarian king — as Tacitus states — expected to receive gifts as a mark of honour. Subsidies could thus satisfy not only harsh social and economic realities but also the value—system of both donor and recipient.(18) But of course, for all that, the negative view of subsidies tends to predominate, both in antiquity and today.

My third proposition is that trade is important to and possibly vital to the position of the friendly king.

There is plenty of evidence for problems of food supply among the barbarians. The most obvious symptom is barbarian land-hunger, generated by warfare and agro-climatological problems.(19) It is becoming ever more apparent that even the best grain-producing areas might suffer recurrent shortages.(20) Faced by such problems, the tribe might either move, starve or import through trade or seizure, and of course there was also trade in non-essential goods.(21) The early history of the Lombards as told at the beginning of Paul the Deacon's <u>Historia Langobardorum</u> is one of many available illustrations of the impact of food shortage in the north, whatever its precise historicity. Barbarians both wanted and needed to trade with Rome.

Yet Rome was also concerned to limit and control trade. Two reasons are repeated:

- 1. The wish not to strengthen enemies by supplying their deficiencies (cf my first proposition).
 - 2. The fear that trade might allow espionage.(22)

Both reasons relate to those hostile to Rome. The implication, prima facie, must be that friendly barbarians $\underline{\text{can}}$ supply their needs and trade with Rome. Examples are easy to find.

In the second century BC a Norican king sought and was granted permission to export horses from Italy. Maroboduus seems to have enjoyed a special trading relationship by virtue of his friendship with Rome. Hermunduri are most often cited. The jurist Paulus, as quoted by the Digest, puts it in these terms: 'As with iron, grain or salt, it is not permitted, on pain of death, to sell the flints needed for striking fire to enemies (hostibus)'.(23) On one level, this may be seen as the extension of a prohibition on aiding a hostis which seems as old as Rome itself. That prohibition relates especially to Romans who have transgressed the law so seriously as to be punished by degradation to the status of hostis. quotation from Paulus, I suggest, embodies the application of this old prohibition to the case of trade with hostile peoples. That application accords with the ancient Roman practice of regulating inter-state trade by law, the ius commercii, whereby trading rights are conceived as privileges bestowed on friends. In other words, Paulus' statement has firm roots reaching deep down into Roman history. It is part of a morality which as a general principle held it right to help friends and harm enemies, whether in economic matters or otherwise.

Trading privileges can only have reinforced the position of the friendly king and because of this friendship his people ate - or, less dramatically, prospered. Herod's well-documented reign provides a graphic illustration which mutatis mutandis might easily be transferred to the We should note Ammianus' statement that among the Burgundians, when the crop failed, the king was deposed. This is the institutionalization of the social unrest to be expected in the face of famine. Compare Ammianus' statement that most of the Alamanni deserted Athanaric because they were 'worn out by the lack of the necessities of life'. It is an anthropological cliche that the worth of the ruler may be conceived in terms of natural fertility. As Homer's Odysseus puts it, for the good king 'the black earth bears wheat and barley and the trees are laden with fruit, the sheep bring forth unfailingly and the sea provides an abundance of fish, all out of his good guidance, and the people prosper When agriculture, stock-raising and/or fishing fail, the under him'.(25) king is deemed a bad king who must be deposed so that prosperity may be regained.

In such circumstances the ability to trade with Rome for food (and to receive food subsidies from Rome) will have been invaluable. With Roman help the king could mitigate the problem by supplying the deficiences of nature and thereby perhaps establish himself as a good king after all, rather as Herod did. Rome would wish to help her friend, if only to keep him in power, though other considerations could always pull her in the other direction, of course. For food we may substitute land, which is a long-term food supply. The dynamic is much the same (26)

Conclusion

In the context of the Batavian revolt of AD 70, Tacitus makes the rebel Tutor argue as follows: 'As for the Germans, they do not know what orders of obedience mean. They invariably act as the fancy takes them. Money and gifts are the only means of seducing them and these are available in greater quantity on the Roman side'.(27) Like Tacitus' Tutor, we must appreciate that Roman imperialism operated not only through military force and powerpolitics, but also through Roman economic strength vis-à-vis the barbarians. I hope to have established three propositions which help to illuminate both the Roman ideology behind this economic imperialism and the practical operation and application of that economic imperialism in the context of barbarian society, particularly with regard to the barbarian king.

NOTES.

- 1. Alföldi 1952, 1.
- 2. Whittaker 1983, 121 with astute remarks on Appian and Aelius Aristides.
- 3. See Braund 1984, 62-3; cf the debate at Procopius <u>Bell Pers</u> 2,10. 19-24.
- 4. Miller and Savage 1978 is very useful on myths about Red Indians. See esp Tac Germ 19 (sexual morality), 22 (free speech), 23 (simple food), 25 (freedmen), 26 (no usury), 27 (moderate funerals), 38 (hairdressing for the best motives; cf Braund 1983). Earl 1967 gives a good outline of the Roman mos majorum. Sherwin-White 1970, esp 40, who tends to underestimate the positive features of the Germania; contrast Surtz and Hexter, 1965, clxii.
- 5. Alföldi 1952, 8; cf Harris 1979.
- 6. Alföldi 1952, 7-8,
- 7. See Alföldi 7 and 4 respectively.
- 8. Balsdon 1979 collects a great deal of the evidence.
- 9. Ste Croix 1981 App 3 lists much of the evidence. Note for example, the proud language of ILS 985; cf Claudian De cons Stil 3,150-3. The settlement of barbarians within provincial territory is seldom considered in its historical context. An inscription records a letter of Philip V of Macedon to the city of Larissa recommending Roman openness' as a source of strength (Syll 3 . 543 with Walbank 1981, 150; cf Hammond and Griffith 1979, ch 20 on Philip II's practice). Cicero (pro Balbo 51; cf 31) and Claudius (ILS 212) make much the same point as Philip V: the tradition of 'openness' was traced back to the very foundation of the city of Rome: see Mayor on Juv 8,273 and Ogilvie on Livy 1,8.5-6. Cf Braund 1984 Part I, section 3 and throughout, where it is repeatedly observed that kingdoms and provinces were interwoven and to a large extent interchangeable, ie in crude terms there were always foreign/barbarian enclaves within provincial territory - eg the Cottii in the Maritime Alps, Cilicia Tracheia, the Thracian kingdom(s) etc, not to mention the free cities. Provinces were sometimes de-annexed though still within the framework of the empire - the fluctuating status of Commagene in the first century AD is a case in point (Braund 1984, 187). We can therefore trace a certain tradition behind the settlement of barbarians 'within' the empire. Compare too the old and effective practice of stopping piracy by giving lands to the pirates (<u>ibid</u>, 92 and 1985). Were barbarian raiders so very different?

On the 'civilising' of barbarians, see Sherwin-White 1970, 12-13; Braund 1984, Part I, section 1.

- 10. Frézouls 1983. Alföldi 1952, 6, citing Vell Pat 2,117.2 (the Loeb translation completely inverts the sense). The most devilish animals even have human voices: Braund 1980.
- 11. Plato Rep 493; Stat Silvae 3,3.71-5. Cf Plut Moralia 12,968 with Scullard 1974, 218-19.

- 12. Vell Pat 2,117.2; Tac Hist 4,76.
- 13. For example Tac Germ esp 13-14. On Germ 14,3 Anderson well observes that in Anglo-Saxon poetry the throne of a leader is called a 'gift-chair' and his residence a 'gift-hall'. Compare also the very explicit testimony of the Nibelungenlied (1969). 20-1; cf 72. For a similar mechanism on an inter-tribal scale see Amm Amarc 18,2.13 with Braund 1984, 98. Africa offers alluring parallels: Mair 1964 esp 166-72. On patronage in the Greco-Roman world, see Veyne 1976; Millar 1977; Saller 1982. In general, Mauss 1974; Gellner and Waterbury 1977; Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984.

Athenaeus, citing Posidonius as his source (4.137d-e; cf Str 4.191), provides a very graphic example of the distribution of wealth by a Gallic leader in the form of money and feasting (cf Anderson on Tac Germ 13.2 with sources on the similarity of Gallic patronage to that of the Germans). Ebel 1976, 65 is tempted, with reason, to set Athenaeus' example in the context of empire-building, cf Wallace-Hadrill 1971. For the numismatic and social context: Nash 1981, 13-16.

- 14. Caes <u>BG</u> 6. 23; cf 21; Tac <u>Germ</u> 14; 31. I pass over local variations, but cf <u>contra</u> Tac <u>Germ</u> 35-6. Shaw 1984 is very helpful, though only indirectly relevant.
- 15. In the late third century BC Teuta of Illyria had been in a very similar situation: see Dell 1967. For Roman pleasure in fighting between different barbarian tribes, see for example, Tac Germ 33, a common theme.
- 16. See Birley 1981; Whittaker 1983. The findings of Dent 1983 remind us to pay attention to on-going local development: Rome did not of course move into a vacuum.
- 17. Zos 1,31 with Braund 1984, 91-104 on the buffer model. Dio 71,11.1 (Battarius); Tac Germ 15. Cf Gordon 1948 186 for possible uses of subsidies paid to Persia.
- 18. As by Zos 1 31; Gordon 1948 collects much of the available evidence. Tac Germ 13.
- 19. See Whittaker 1983 with n 9 above.
- 20. See Garnsey <u>et al</u> 1984 on Thessaly. On Gaul and Cyrenaica, cf Braund 1985.
- 21. Whittaker 1983 observes the flow of food in the frontier zone. The emperor Maximillus Thrax had once had a farm in Thrace whence he traded with Goths north of the Danube in the context of personal relationships of friendship with them (cemented, it should be noted, by gifts): SHA Max Thrax 4. There is no suggestion that such activity was unusual (except perhaps for an emperor-to-be). The barbarian appetite for 'southern' grain is further indicated by the payment of subsidies in the form of food; Thompson 1966, 38 collects sources. Cf also Brogan 1936, 218 (including legal evidence) and Glodariu 1976 on the Danubian frontier.

- 22. Tac Germ 41 and Dio 71,11.3 (still more explicit) are echoed by the later legal evidence: Cod Just 4,41.2 and 4,63.4 (though the latter refers to the eastern frontier only). Cf, though not in a context of trade, Xen Anab 7,4.13. On the whole issue of trade and security see Crawford 1980, 212 and the work of Andreotti there cited.
- 23. Livy 43,59; Tac Ann 2,62 (though the meaning of Tacitus' ius commercii is not certain): Germ 41(Hermunduri). Cf Dio 71.15; Whittaker 1983. Cf Dig 39,4.11 (Paulus).
- 24. Braund 1984, 83.
- 25. Amm Marc 28,5.14; 31,2.8. Hom Od 19.111-14.
- 26. Of course, Rome might always choose to refuse requests made by friends: an obvious case is that of the <u>agri decumates</u> in Tac <u>Ann</u> 13,54-5, on which see now Hind 1984.
- 27. Tac Hist 4,76 (after Penguin translation) cf 4,64.

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