18 The National Interest Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics
T
....he United States and the People’s
Republic of China are locked in a
quiet but increasingly intense struggle
for power and influence, not only in
Asia, but around the world. And in spite
of what many earnest and well-intentioned
commentators seem to believe, the nascent
Sino-American rivalry is not merely the
result of misperceptions or mistaken policies;
it is driven instead by forces that are
deeply rooted in the shifting structure of
the international system and in the very
different domestic political regimes of the
two Pacific powers.
Throughout history, relations between
dominant and rising states have been uneasy—and
often violent. Established powers
tend to regard themselves as the defenders
of an international order that they helped
to create and from which they continue
to benefit; rising powers feel constrained,
even cheated, by the status quo and struggle
against it to take what they think is rightfully
theirs. Indeed, this story line, with
its Shakespearean overtones of youth and
age, vigor and decline, is among the oldest
in recorded history. As far back as the fifth
century bc the great Greek historian Thucydides
began his study of the Peloponnesian
War with the deceptively simple observation
that the war’s deepest, truest cause was
“the growth of Athenian power and the fear
which this caused in Sparta.”
The fact that the U.S.-China relationship
is competitive, then, is simply no surprise.
But these countries are not just any two
great powers: Since the end of the Cold War
the United States has been the richest and
most powerful nation in the world; China
is, by contrast, the state whose capabilities
have been growing most rapidly. America is
still “number one,” but China is fast gaining
ground. The stakes are about as high as they
can get, and the potential for conflict particularly
fraught.
At least insofar as the dominant powers
are concerned, rising states tend to be troublemakers.
As a nation’s capabilities grow,
its leaders generally define their interests
more expansively and seek a greater degree
of influence over what is going on around
them. This means that those in ascendance
typically attempt not only to secure their
borders but also to reach out beyond them,
taking steps to ensure access to markets,
materials and transportation routes; to protect
their citizens far from home; to defend
their foreign friends and allies; to promulgate
their religious or ideological beliefs;
and, in general, to have what they consider
to be their rightful say in the affairs of their
region and of the wider world.
As they begin to assert themselves, ascendant
states typically feel impelled to challenge
territorial boundaries, international
Aaron L. Friedberg is a professor of politics and
international affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School
at Princeton University. His book, A Contest for
Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for
Mastery in Asia, will be published in August by W.
W. Norton & Company.
Hegemony with
Chinese Characteristics
By Aaron L. Friedberg
Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics 19July/August 2011
institutions and hierarchies of prestige that
were put in place when they were still relatively
weak. Like Japan in the late nineteenth
century, or Germany at the turn
of the twentieth, rising powers want their
place in the sun. This, of course, is what
brings them into conflict with the established
great powers—the so-called status
quo states—who are the architects, principal
beneficiaries and main defenders of any
existing international system.
The resulting clash of interests between
the two sides has seldom been resolved
peacefully. Recognizing the growing threat
to their position, dominant powers (or a
coalition of status quo states) have occasionally
tried to attack and destroy a competitor
before it can grow strong enough
to become a threat. Others—hoping to
avoid war—have taken the opposite approach:
attempting to appease potential
challengers, they look for ways to satisfy
their demands and ambitions and seek to
incorporate them peacefully into the existing
international order.
But however sincere, these efforts have
almost always ended in failure. Sometimes
the reason clearly lies in the demands of the
rising state. As was true of Adolf Hitler’s
Germany, an aggressor may have ambitions
that are so extensive as to be impossible for
the status quo powers to satisfy without effectively
consigning themselves to servitude
or committing national suicide. Even when
the demands being made of them are less
onerous, the dominant states are often either
reluctant to make concessions, thereby
fueling the frustrations and resentments of
the rising power, or too eager to do so, feeding
its ambitions and triggering a spiral of
escalating demands. Successful policies of
appeasement are conceivable in theory but
in practice have proven devilishly difficult
to implement. This is why periods of transition,
when a new, ascending power begins
to overtake the previously dominant state,
have so often been marked by war.
While they are careful not to say so
directly, China’s current rulers seem
intent on establishing their country as the
preponderant power in East Asia, and perhaps
in Asia writ large. The goal is to make
China the strongest and most influential
nation in its neighborhood: a country capable
of deterring attacks and threats; resolving
disputes over territory and resources
according to its preferences; coercing or
The National Interest20 Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics
persuading others to accede to its wishes on
issues ranging from trade and investment
to alliance and third-party basing arrangements
to the treatment of ethnic Chinese
populations; and, at least in some cases,
affecting the character and composition of
their governments. Beijing may not seek
conquest or direct physical control over its
surroundings, but, despite repeated claims
to the contrary, it does seek a form of regional
hegemony.
Such ambitions hardly make China
unique. Throughout history, there has
been a strong correlation between the rapid
growth of a state’s wealth and potential
power, the geographic scope of its interests,
the intensity and variety of the perceived
threats to those interests, and the
desire to expand military capabilities and
exert greater influence in order to defend
them. Growth tends to encourage expansion,
which leads to insecurity, which feeds
the desire for more power. This pattern is
well established in the modern age. Looking
back over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
Samuel Huntington finds that
every other major power, Britain and France,
Germany and Japan, the United States and the
Soviet Union, has engaged in outward expansion,
assertion, and imperialism coincidental
with or immediately following the years in
which it went through rapid industrialization
and economic growth.
As for China, Huntington concludes, “no
reason exists to think that the acquisition of
economic and military power will not have
comparable effects” on its policies.
Of course the past behavior of other
states is suggestive, but it is hardly a definitive
guide to the future. Just because other
powers have acted in certain ways does not
necessarily mean that China will do the
same. Perhaps, in a world of global markets
and nuclear weapons, the fears and ambitions
that motivated previous rising powers
are no longer as potent. Perhaps China’s
leaders have learned from history that overly
assertive rising powers typically stir resentment
and opposition.
But China is not just any rising power,
and its history provides an additional reason
for believing that it will seek some form of
regional preponderance. It is a nation with
a long and proud past as the leading center
of East Asian civilization and a more recent
and less glorious experience of domination
and humiliation at the hands of foreign
invaders. As a number of historians have
recently pointed out, China is not so much
“rising” as it is returning to the position of
regional preeminence that it once held and
which its leaders and many of its people
still regard as natural and appropriate. The
desire to reestablish a Sino-centric system
would be consistent with what journalist
Martin Jacques describes as
an overwhelming assumption on the part of the
Chinese that their natural position lies at the
epicentre of East Asia, that their civilization has
no equals in the region, and that their rightful
position, as bestowed by history, will at some
point be restored in the future.
Conservative scholar Yan Xuetong puts the
matter succinctly: the Chinese people are
Seen from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous,
crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power that will not
rest until it imposes its views on the entire planet.
Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics 21July/August 2011
proud of their country’s glorious past and
believe its fall from preeminence to be “a
historical mistake which they should correct.”
If anything, the “century of humiliation”
during which China was weak and
vulnerable adds urgency to its pursuit of
power. For a nation with China’s history,
regaining a position of unchallengeable
strength is not seen as simply a matter of
pride but rather as an essential precondition
for continued growth, security and, quite
possibly, survival.
Deep-seated patterns of power politics
are thus driving the United States and
China toward mistrust and competition, if
not necessarily toward open conflict. But
this is not all there is to the story. In contrast
to what some realists claim, ideology
matters at least as much as power in determining
the course of relations among
nations. The fact that America is a liberal
democracy while China remains under authoritarian
rule is a significant additional
impetus for rivalry, an obstacle to stable, cooperative
relations, and a source of mutual
hostility and mistrust in its own right.
Relations between democracies and nondemocracies
are always conducted in what
political theorist Michael Doyle describes
as an “atmosphere of suspicion,” in part
because of “the perception by liberal states
that nonliberal states are in a permanent
state of aggression against their own people.”
Democracies, in short, regard nondemocracies
as less than legitimate because
they do not enjoy the freely given consent
of their own people. In their heart of hearts,
most self-governing citizens simply do not
believe that all states are created equal or
that they are entitled to the same degree of
respect regardless of how they are ruled.
Seen in this light, disputes between the
United States and China over such issues
as censorship and religious freedom are not
just superficial irritants that can be dissolved
or wished away. They are instead
symptomatic of much deeper difficulties. To
most Americans, China’s human-rights violations
are not only intrinsically wrong, they
are also powerful indicators of the morally
distasteful nature of the Beijing regime.
While the United States may be able to do
business with such a government on at least
some issues, the possibility of a warm, trusting
and stable relationship is remote to say
the least.
Democracies also tend to regard nondemocracies
as inherently untrustworthy
and dangerously prone to external aggression.
Because of the secrecy in which their
operations are cloaked, the intentions, and
often the full extent of the military capabilities
of nondemocratic states, are difficult
to discern. In recent years, U.S. officials
have pressed their Chinese counterparts to
be more “transparent” about defense programs,
but there is little expectation that
these pleas will be answered in any meaningful
way. And even if Beijing were to suddenly
unleash a flood of facts and figures,
American analysts would regard them with
profound skepticism, scrutinizing the data
for signs of deception and disinformation.
And they would be right to do so; the centralized,
tightly controlled Chinese government
is far better situated to carry off such
schemes than its open, divided and leaky
American counterpart.
Their capacity for secrecy also makes it
easier for nondemocracies to use force without
warning. Since 1949, China’s rulers
have shown a particular penchant for deception
and surprise attacks. (Think of Beijing’s
entry into the Korean War in December
1950, or its attack on India in October
1962.) This tendency may have deep roots
in Chinese strategic culture extending back
to Sun Tzu, but it is also entirely consistent
with the character of its current domestic
regime. Indeed, for most American analysts,
the authoritarian nature of China’s govern-
The National Interest22 Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics
ment is a far greater concern than its culture.
If China were a democracy, the deep
social and cultural foundations of its strategic
and political behavior might be little
changed, but American military planners
would be much less worried that it might
someday attempt a lightning strike on U.S.
forces and bases in the western Pacific.
Such fears of aggression are heightened
by an awareness that anxiety over a lack of
legitimacy at home can cause nondemocratic
governments to try to deflect popular
frustration and discontent toward external
enemies. Some Western observers worry,
for example, that if China’s economy falters
its rulers will try to blame foreigners
and even manufacture crises with Taiwan,
Japan or the United States in order to rally
their people and redirect the population’s
anger. Whatever Beijing’s intent, such confrontations
could easily spiral out of control.
Democratic leaders are hardly immune
to the temptation of foreign adventures.
However, because the stakes for them are
so much lower (being voted out of office
rather than being overthrown and imprisoned,
or worse), they are less likely to take
extreme risks to retain their hold on power.
But the mistrust between Washington
and Beijing is not a one-way street—and
with good reason. China’s current rulers do
not see themselves as they once did, as the
leaders of a global revolutionary movement,
yet they do believe that they are engaged in
an ideological struggle, albeit one in which,
until very recently, they have been almost
entirely on the defensive. While they regard
Washington’s professions of concern for
human rights and individual liberties as
cynical and opportunistic, China’s leaders
do not doubt that the United States is motivated
by genuine ideological fervor. As seen
from Beijing, Washington is a dangerous,
crusading, liberal, quasi-imperialist power
that will not rest until it imposes its views
and its way of life on the entire planet. Anyone
who does not grasp this need only read
the speeches of U.S. officials, with their
promises to enlarge the sphere of democracy
and rid the world of tyranny.
In fact, because ideology inclines the
United States to be more suspicious and
hostile toward China than it would be for
strategic reasons alone, it also tends to reinforce
Washington’s willingness to help
other democracies that feel threatened by
Chinese power, even if this is not what a
pure realpolitik calculation of its interests
might seem to demand. Thus the persistence—indeed
the deepening—of American
support for Taiwan during the 1990s cannot
be explained without reference to the
fact that the island was evolving from an
authoritarian bastion of anti-Communism
to a liberal democracy. Severing the last
U.S. ties to Taipei would remove a major
source of friction with China and a potential
cause of war. Such a move might even
be conceivable if Taiwan still appeared to
many Americans as it did in the 1970s, as
an oppressive, corrupt dictatorship. But the
fact that Taiwan is now seen as a genuine (if
flawed) democracy will make it extremely
difficult for Washington to ever willingly
cut it adrift.
Having watched America topple the Soviet
Union through a combination of confrontation
and subversion, since the end
of the Cold War China’s strategists have
feared that Washington intends to do the
same to them. This belief colors Beijing’s
perceptions of virtually every aspect of U.S.
policy toward it, from enthusiasm for economic
engagement to efforts to encourage
the development of China’s legal system. It
also shapes the leadership’s assessments of
America’s activities across Asia, which Beijing
believes are aimed at encircling it with
pro-U.S. democracies, and informs China’s
own policies to counter that influence.
As China emerges onto the world stage it
is becoming a source of inspiration and ma-
Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics 23July/August 2011
terial support for embattled authoritarians
in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America
as well as Asia—antidemocratic holdouts
who looked to be headed for the garbage
heap of history after the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Americans may have long believed
that growth requires freedom of choice in
the economic realm (which is presumed to
lead ineluctably to the expansion of political
liberties), but, at least for now, the mainland
has successfully blended authoritarian rule
with market-driven economics. If it comes
to be seen as offering an alternative model
for development, China’s continued growth
under authoritarian rule could complicate
and slow America’s long-standing efforts to
promote the spread of liberal political institutions
around the world.
Fear that the United States has regime
change on the brain is also playing an increasing
role in the crafting of China’s policies
toward countries in other parts of the
world. If the United States can pressure
and perhaps depose the current leaders of
Venezuela, Zimbabwe and Iran, it may be
emboldened in its efforts to do something
similar to China. By helping those regimes
survive, Beijing wins friends and allies for
future struggles, weakens the perception
that democracy is on the march and deflects
some of America’s prodigious energies away
from itself. Washington’s efforts to isolate,
coerce and possibly undermine dictatorial
“rogue” states (such as Iran and North
Korea) have already been complicated, if
not defeated, by Beijing’s willingness to
engage with them. At the same time, of
course, China’s actions also heighten concern
in Washington about its motivations
and intentions, thereby adding more fuel to
the competitive fire.
It may well be that any rising power in
Beijing’s geopolitical position would seek
substantial influence in its own immediate
neighborhood. It may also be true that, in
light of its history, and regardless
of how it is ruled,
China will be especially
concerned with asserting
itself and being acknowledged
by its neighbors as
the first among equals. But
it is the character of the nation’s
domestic political system
that will ultimately be
decisive in determining precisely
how it defines its external
objectives and how it
goes about pursuing them.
As Ross Terrill of Harvard’s
Fairbank Center
points out, when we speak
of “China’s” intentions or
strategy, we are really talking
about the aims and
plans of today’s top leaders or, as he describes
them, “the nine male engineers
who make up the Standing Committee of
the Politburo of the Chinese Communist
Party.” Everything we know of these men
suggests that they are motivated above all
The National Interest24 Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics
else by their belief in the necessity of preserving
ccp rule. This is, in one sense, a
matter of unadulterated self-interest. Today’s
leaders and their families enjoy privileges
and opportunities that are denied
others in Chinese society and which flow
directly from their proximity to the sources
of political power. The end of the Communist
Party’s decades-long reign would
have immediate, painful and perhaps even
fatal consequences for those at the top of
the system. Rising stars who hope one day
to occupy these positions and even junior
officials with more modest ambitions will
presumably make similar calculations. This
convergence of personal interests and a
sense of shared destiny give the party-state a
cohesion that it would otherwise lack. Party
members know that if they do not hang together
they may very well hang separately—
and this knowledge informs their thinking
on every issue they face.
But the motivation to continue ccp rule
is not rooted solely in self-interest. The
leadership is deeply sincere in its belief in
the party’s past achievements and future
indispensability. It was the ccp, after all,
that rescued China from foreign invaders,
delivered it from a century of oppression
and humiliation, and lifted it back into the
ranks of the world’s great powers. In the
eyes of its leaders, and some portion of the
Chinese people, these accomplishments in
themselves give the ccp unique moral authority
and legitimize its rule.
Looking forward, party officials believe
that they are all that stands between continued
stability, prosperity, progress and
an unstoppable ascent to greatness on the
one hand and a return to chaos and weakness
on the other. An analysis of the leaked
secret personnel files of the current “fourth
generation” of Chinese leaders (with Mao
Tse-tung, Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin
leading the first three) by Sinologists Andrew
Nathan and Bruce Gilley concludes
that, on this question, there is no evidence
of dissension or doubt. President Hu Jintao,
his colleagues and their likely successors are
aware of the numerous internal and external
challenges they face, but they are confident
that they, and they alone, can find the solutions
that will be needed to keep their
country moving forward and enable it to
achieve its destiny. Indeed, they believe that
it is precisely the magnitude and complexity
of the problems confronting China that
makes their continued rule essential.
The party’s desire to retain power shapes
every aspect of national policy. When it
comes to external affairs, it means that Beijing’s
ultimate aim is to “make the world
safe for authoritarianism,” or at least for
continued one-party rule in China. Over
the last several decades this focus on regime
security has led, first of all, to an emphasis
on preserving the international conditions
necessary for continued economic growth.
The party’s ability to orchestrate rapid improvements
in incomes and personal welfare
is its most tangible accomplishment of
the past thirty years and the source of its
strongest claim to the gratitude and loyalty
of the Chinese people. Economic growth,
my Princeton colleague Thomas Christensen
argues, “provides satisfaction and
distraction to the population, and, therefore
garners domestic support for the Party
(or at least reduces active opposition to the
Party).” Growth also generates revenues
that the regime can use to “buy off opposition
and to channel funds to poorer regions
and ethnic minority areas to try to prevent
violent uprisings.”
As China has grown richer and stronger,
the regime’s pursuit of security has also led
it to seek an increasing measure of control
over the world outside its borders. This
outward push has both offensive and defensive
motivations. As the steward of national
greatness, the party has the responsibility
of returning China to its rightful place at
Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics 25July/August 2011
the center of Asia. The visible deference of
others will provide evidence of the regime’s
success in this regard and will help to reinforce
its legitimacy at home. Especially if
economic growth should falter, “standing
up” to traditional enemies and resolving the
Taiwan issue and other disputes on Beijing’s
terms are likely to become increasingly important
parts of the ccp’s strategy for retaining
its hold on power. China’s leaders
believe that the stronger their country appears
abroad, the stronger their regime will
be at home.
Conversely, the appearance of weakness
or the widespread perception that the nation
has been defeated or humiliated could
be extremely dangerous to the party’s prospects
for continued rule. Underlying concerns
about its legitimacy make the regime
more sensitive to slights and setbacks, and
even more determined to deter challenges
and to avoid defeat, than it might otherwise
be. The best insurance against such
risks is for China to accumulate an overwhelming
preponderance of power in its
neighborhood.
Moreover, the ccp’s hypersensitivity to
what it sees as “separatism” is a direct result
of its belief that it must retain tight central
control in all places and at all times. Pleas
for greater autonomy from Tibet or Xinjiang
are thus seen as deadly threats to national
unity and hence to continued Communist
Party rule. The regime believes that
if it loosens its grip, even a little, the entire
country will spring apart. China’s leaders see
the need to develop sufficient strength to
deter its neighbors from providing aid and
comfort to separatist groups and will build
the capabilities to intervene directly to stop
them, should that become necessary.
Even as it grows stronger and, in certain
respects, more self-confident, the ccp continues
to dread ideological contamination.
Pliant, like-minded states along its borders
are far more likely to help Beijing deal with
this danger than flourishing liberal democracies
with strong ties to the West. The desire
to forestall “peaceful evolution” at home
gives the regime another compelling reason
to want to shape the political development
of its neighbors.
To sum up: China’s current rulers do not
seek preponderance solely because they are
the leaders of a rising great power or simply
because they are Chinese. Their desire for
dominance and control is in large measure
a by-product of the type of political system
over which they preside. A strong liberaldemocratic
China would certainly seek a
leading role in its region and perhaps an
effective veto over developments that it saw
as inimical to its interests. But it would also
be less fearful of internal instability, less
threatened by the presence of democratic
neighbors, and less prone to seek validation
at home through the domination and subordination
of others.
Though not everyone is convinced, it is
likely that a more democratic China
would ultimately create a more peaceful,
less war-prone environment in Asia. In the
view of some realists, domestic reforms
will only make Beijing richer, stronger and
hence a more potent competitor without
deflecting it from its desire to dominate
East Asia and settle scores with some of its
The United States and the People’s Republic of China are
locked in a quiet but increasingly intense struggle for
power and influence, not only in Asia, but around the world.
The National Interest26 Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics
neighbors. It is undoubtedly true that even
if, in the long run, China becomes a stable,
peaceful democracy, its passage will prove
rocky. The opening of the nation’s political
system to dissent and debate is likely to
introduce an element of instability into its
foreign policy as new voices are heard and
aspiring leaders vie for popular support. As
one observer, economist David Hale, ruefully
points out: “An authoritarian China
has been highly predictable. A more open
and democratic China could produce new
uncertainties about both domestic policy
and international relations.”
Nationalism, perhaps in its most virulent
and aggressive form, is one factor likely to
play a prominent role in shaping the foreign
policy of a liberalizing Middle Kingdom.
Thanks to the spread of the Internet and
the relaxation of restraints on at least some
forms of “patriotic” political expression, the
current regime already finds itself subject to
criticism whenever it takes what some “netizens”
regard as an overly accommodating
stance toward Japan, Taiwan or the United
States. Beijing has sought at times to stir up
patriotic sentiment, but, fearful that anger
at foreigners could all too easily be turned
against the party, the regime has also gone
to great lengths to keep popular passions
in check. A democratically elected government
might be far less inhibited. U.S.-based
political scientist Fei-Ling Wang argues that
a post-Communist regime would actually
be more forceful in asserting its sovereignty
over Taiwan, Tibet and the South China
Sea. As he explains:
A “democratic” regime in Beijing, free from
the debilitating concerns for its own survival
but likely driven by popular emotions, could
make the rising Chinese power a much more
assertive, impatient, belligerent, even aggressive
force, at least during the unstable period of fast
ascendance to the ranks of a world-class power.
The last proviso is key. Even those who
are most confident of the long-term pacifying
effects of democratization recognize the
possibility of a turbulent transition. In his
book China’s Democratic Future, Bruce Gilley
acknowledges that democratic revolutions
in other countries have often led to
bursts of external aggression and he notes
that, since the start of the twentieth century,
pro-democracy movements in China have
also been highly nationalistic. Despite these
precedents, Gilley predicts that, after an
Hegemony with Chinese Characteristics 27July/August 2011
interval of perhaps a decade, a transformed
nation will settle into more stable and cooperative
relationships with the United States
as well as with its democratic neighbors.
Such an outcome is by no means certain,
of course, and would be contingent
upon events and interactions that are difficult
to anticipate and even harder to control.
If initial frictions between a fledgling
democracy and its better established
counterparts are mishandled, resulting in
actual armed conflict, history could spin
off in very different and far less promising
directions than if they are successfully
resolved. Assuming the transition can be
navigated without disaster, however, there
are good reasons to believe that relations
will improve with the passage of time. One
Chinese advocate of political reform, Liu
Junning, summarizes the prospects well.
Whereas a “nationalistic and authoritarian
China will be an emerging threat,” a liberal,
democratic China will ultimately prove “a
constructive partner.”
This expectation is rooted in more than
mere wishful thinking. As the values and
institutions of liberal democracy become
more firmly entrenched, there will begin to
be open and politically meaningful debate
and real competition over national goals
and the allocation of national resources. Aspiring
leaders and opinion makers preoccupied
with prestige, honor, power and score
settling will have to compete with others
who emphasize the virtues of international
stability, cooperation, reconciliation and the
promotion of social welfare. The demands
of the military and its industrial allies will
be counterbalanced, at least to some degree,
by groups who favor spending more on
education, health care and the elderly. The
assertive, hypernationalist version of China’s
history and its grievances will be challenged
by accounts that acknowledge the culpability
of the Communist regime in repressing
minorities and refusing to seek compromise
on questions of sovereignty. A leadership
obsessed with its own survival and with
countering perceived threats from foreign
powers will be replaced by a government
secure in its legitimacy and with no cause to
fear that the world’s democracies are seeking
to encircle and overthrow it.
A democratic China would find it easier
to get along with Japan, India and South
Korea, among others. The trust and mutual
respect that eventually grows up between
democracies, and the diminished fear that
one will use force against another, should
increase the odds of attaining negotiated
settlements of outstanding disputes over
borders, offshore islands and resources. A
democratic government in Beijing would
also stand a better chance of achieving a
mutually acceptable resolution to its sixtyyear
standoff with Taiwan. In contrast to
today’s ccp rulers, a popularly elected mainland
regime would have less to gain from
keeping this conflict alive, it would be more
likely to show respect for the preferences
of another democratic government, and it
would be more attractive to the Taiwanese
people as a partner in some kind of federated
arrangement that would satisfy the
desires and ease the fears of both sides.
For as long as China continues to be governed
as it is today, its growing strength will
pose a deepening challenge to American interests.
If they want to deter aggression, discourage
coercion and preserve a plural, open
order, Washington and its friends and allies
are going to have to work harder, and to
cooperate more closely, in order to maintain
a favorable balance of regional power. In the
long run, the United States can learn to live
with a democratic China as the dominant
power in East Asia, much as Great Britain
came to accept America as the preponderant
power in the Western Hemisphere. Until
that day, Washington and Beijing are going
to remain locked in an increasingly intense
struggle for mastery in Asia. n
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