

Mao was comparing himself with the most successful emperors in Chinese history, and felt that all these emperors had shortcomings and only he was a truly great man. This ambition only gained momentum as the Chinese revolution was coming to fruition. In his opening remark to the first session of the Chinese National People's Congress, he spoke with great assurance: "We are fully confident that we can overcome all difficulties and hardships and make our country a great socialist republic. ... We are now engaged in a great and most glorious cause, never undertaken by our forefathers. Our goal must be attained. Our goal can unquestionably be attained."⁵⁰ His achievement-driven personality influenced and was demonstrated in China's policy as a staunch anti-imperialist warrior in the 1950s. After the death of Stalin, Mao, who felt secure and confident, considered himself more qualified than Khrushchev to be the leader of the Communist movement and believed that the Chinese Communists were in a better position to interpret Marxism. The two sides engaged in a great debate, which finally led to Sino-Soviet split.

4.2 Deng Xiaoping's Personality

Deng Xiaoping differed from Mao in his openness to new information, the way he related to the policymaking environment, the way he processed information, as well as his fundamental motivations.

Often referred to as the general architect of China's "reform and opening", Deng was crucial to China's opening to the outside world. This policy was to a large extent a result of Deng's openness and receptiveness to new information. During his investigation tour to Jilin Province in September 1978, he said, "The world is changing every day; new things are constantly emerging and new problems continually arising. We can't afford to lock our doors, refuse to use our brains and remain forever backward."⁵¹ Three months later, the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Party Committee of the CCP, which formally reinstated Deng leading position within the CCP, adopted the opening up policy.

China's foreign policy adjustment in the early 1980s also resulted from Deng's changing perceptions. Deng admitted that China had made mistakes in the 1970s. He said that from the late 1970s "we have made two important changes in our assessment of the international situation and in our foreign policy... The first change is in our understanding of the question of war and peace. We used to believe that war was inevitable and imminent and many of our policy decisions were based on this belief... after a careful analysis of the situation, we have come to... conclude that it is possible that there will be no large-scale war for a fairly long time to come and that

Song, Zhao Kuangyin (927-976), built out of the political and military chaos of Five Dynasties and Ten States period a united central power in China. The second king of Tang, Li Shimin (599-649), is well known for his political and military talents of helping his father to overthrow the Sui Dynasty and founded the Tang Dynasty, the strongest in Chinese history. Genghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror and emperor (1162-1227), gained control of Mongolia (1206) and conquered northern China (1211-1215), then vast territories in central and south Asia as well as Asia Minor. This poem was criticized by the Nationalist Government as revealing Mao's ambition of assuming emperorship.
⁵⁰ Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong zhuzhuo xuanqu* (Selected readings of Mao Zedong's works), Vol. 2, (Beijing: renmin chubanshe, 1986), p. 715.
⁵¹ Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 2, 1994, p. 128.

there is hope of maintaining world peace...we have changed our view that the danger of war is imminent." Deng continued: "The second change is in our foreign policy. In view of the threat of Soviet hegemonism, over the years we formed a strategic line of defense... Now we have altered our strategy and this represents a major change."⁵² With these sweeping changes, Chinese foreign policy entered the era of Deng Xiaoping.

Two kinds of decision-making processes The Chinese foreign policy-making process in Deng's time retained many similarities with that of Mao's time, and important decisions were made through a top-down process. But as Chinese foreign policy agendas expanded, many organizations, whose responsibility had previously been domestically bounded, began to get involved in foreign affairs. No leader was able to initiate and control every foreign affairs issue. Because many foreign policy decisions were initiated by lower level agencies, decision making quite often went through a bottom-to-top process.⁵³ For instance, as the military saw its budget decline and began to cut back on procurement from domestic weapon manufacturers in the 1980s, both the PLA and arms manufacturers were incentivized to increase arms sales abroad. As this occurred, the U. S. became increasingly concerned about the character of regimes that were purchasing Chinese arms. With increased pressure from the U.S., the Foreign Ministry began to question the wisdom of some arms sales. China's sale of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM) to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s is a case in point. When the PLA negotiated with the Saudis about the sale of DF-3 IRBMs to Saudi Arabia, neither the Foreign Ministry nor China's top leadership knew about the deal until it became an issue of international concern. It was finally brought to Deng's attention, who then asked the military trading corporations how much money it would make in the sale. When he was told the deal would earn 2 billion RMB, Deng apparently responded, "bu shao" (literally: not a little), and approved the deal, greatly facilitating the diplomatic normalization process between China and Saudi Arabia.⁵⁴ Several cases in Lu's book, including Zhao Ziyang's visit to the U.S. in 1984, the U.S. navy's visit to Qingdao, and the extradition of a Russian pilot who hijacked a Russian plane to northeast China in 1985 all show the marked pluralistic and horizontal nature of Chinese foreign policy in Deng's time.⁵⁵

Adapting to the policymaking environment Deng's belief system was not different from Mao's, but Deng tried to accomplish his goals through a gradual process, during which he adjusted his objective to the situation at hand. China's policy during Deng's time is one of adjusting and readjusting to adapt to domestic and international constraints, as demonstrated by his oft-quoted statement, "groping one's way across the river by feeling the stone." China's policy of reform started in the countryside before

⁵² *Ibid.* p. 127-28.

⁵³ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, pp. 87-95, 156-161; Xu, *A Study of Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Policy Decision-making Model*, pp. 267-332.

⁵⁴ John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Lihai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-export Dilemma," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 4 (1991), p. 96; Xu, *A Study of Chinese Communist Party's Foreign Policy Decision-making Model*, pp. 113-17.

⁵⁵ Lu, *The Dynamics of Foreign-Policy Decision-making in China*, pp. 87-94, 156-66.

moving to the cities and his open door policy took shape with the opening process extending gradually from special economic zones to open coastal regions, and then to inland areas. He said in his southern tour speech which added momentum to Chinese reform in 1992 after the end of the Cold War, "We should be bolder than before in conducting reform and opening to the outside and have the courage to experiment. Every year leaders should review what they have done...continuing those measures that have proved correct and tackling new problems as soon as they are identified."⁵⁶

Relationship focused motivations Mao sought rapprochement with the U.S. to oppose the Soviet Union, while Deng sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union soon after Sino-U.S. diplomatic normalization. Deng personally orchestrated the process and major decisions were made at his home; and he demonstrated great flexibility and pragmatism in this process.⁵⁷ At the beginning China insisted that the Soviet Union remove three obstacles to bilateral relations: the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet deployment of a large number of military forces along the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian borders; and Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The most important obstacle, Deng insisted, was the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia since the Soviets supported the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, while China supported the Cambodians' opposition, making Cambodian issue a sensitive issue in Sino-Soviet relations. To achieve this goal, Deng passed a message to Gorbachev first in October 1985 through Ceausescu, President of Romania, that if the Soviets could urge the Vietnamese to withdraw from Cambodia and the agreement could be implemented, he would be willing to meet with Gorbachev. He reiterated such a desire in his interview with Mike Wallace, a correspondent for the program "60 Minutes" on CBS TV based in the United States: "As I have said, if the Soviet Union can contribute to the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia, that will remove the main obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations...Once this problem is solved, I will be ready to meet Gorbachev. To be frank, I am over 82, already advanced in years. I have long since accomplished my historical task of making overseas visits, and I am determined not to take any more trips abroad. However, if this obstacle in Sino-Soviet relations is removed, I shall be ready to break the rule and go to any place in the Soviet Union to meet with Gorbachev. I believe a meeting like that will be of much significance to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations between the two states."⁵⁸ At first the Soviets refused to negotiate the three conditions saying they were not in a position to negotiate on behalf of any third party. China, however, insisted. When the summit finally happened in 1989 after China's three conditions were met, Deng proposed to Gorbachev "to put the past behind", and "open a new era" in Sino-Soviet relations.⁵⁹ The normalization of China's relations with the Soviet Union also removed the primary obstacle for China to develop good relations with Mongolia,

⁵⁶ Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, p. 372.
⁵⁷ Qian Qichen, *Wajiao shiji (Ten Stories of A Diplomat)* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2003), pp. 1-40; Huang Hua, *Jingli yu jianwen: huang hua huoyin (Personal Experience and Knowledge: Memoir of Huang Hua)* (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), pp. 358-68.
⁵⁸ Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, pp. 167-68.
⁵⁹ *Ibid.* p. 291-95.

Vietnam, and Laos.

Deng's relationship-focused motivation was also manifested in his way of handling China's relations with the other super power. In his meeting with former U.S. President Nixon in December 1989, when bilateral relations were locked in a stalemate following the Tiananmen Incident, Deng also proposed that "China and the United States should put behind them the strained relations of the past few months and open up a new era."⁶⁰ Discussing western sanctions against China, Deng instructed the Chinese leaders that "we should maintain friendly exchanges with them. We should keep them as friends but also have clear understanding of what they are doing."⁶¹ As to China's relations with developing countries, he said: "Some developing countries would like China to become the leader of the Third World. We absolutely cannot do that—this is one of our basic state policies... China will always side with the Third World countries, but we should never seek hegemony over them or serve as their leader."⁶² With Deng's emphasis on relationships, China not only survived the demise of the Soviet Union but kept its relations with big powers on a normal track.

5. Personality Type and its Impact on Foreign Policy Change

The examples discussed above reveal Mao and Deng's different personalities: Mao was closed to information, challenged constraints, made foreign policy through a top-down process, and was achievement-focused in his motivation. In contrast, Deng differed from Mao in almost every respect. These differences locate them at different positions in Hermann's personality type matrix and make them different kinds of leaders (table 2). Mao was a typical "crusader" and an "expansionist" while Deng was an "opportunistic" and "accommodative" leader.

TABLE 2. Comparison of Mao's and Deng's Personality

	Pred-ominant leader	Belief system	Interests	Information / experience	Training	Sensitivity to Environment	Relation to constraints	leader type	motivation
Mao	yes	Marxist	yes	no	Up-down	closed	Challenges	Crusader/strategist	power expansionist/st/incrementalist
Deng	yes	Marxist	yes	no	Bottom-up	open	respects	opportunistic/pragmatist	Relationship expansionist

⁶⁰ *Ibid.* p. 331.

⁶¹ *Ibid.* p. 322-23.

⁶² Deng, *Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping*, Vol. 3, p. 363.

that China was still in the preliminary stage of socialism and he borrowed everything but a political system from the West and reversed everything that Mao had stood for in foreign policy: joined the World Bank and the IMF; opened the country to private foreign investment; turned his back on Third World revolutionaries; sent hundreds and then thousands of China's best and brightest overseas for higher education; but then later renewed his open policy after using force to suppress the Tiananmen movement. China under Deng gradually integrated itself into the extant international system, forming a benign relationship with the outside world. In doing so, China has found export-oriented road of development, which later was referred to as China Model or China way of development.

Thirdly, the ways China handled its relations with major powers under the two leaders were also different. China always had a target of opposition during Mao's time: opposing the U.S. in the 1950s, the two superpowers simultaneously in the 1960s, and the Soviet Union in the 1970s. Whoever China opposed was consistently the strongest power of that time, making it the most evident feature of China's revolutionary diplomacy. To oppose one superpower necessitated China to form a formal alliance (with the Soviet Union in 1950s) or an informal alliance (with the U.S. in the 1970s) to oppose the other. Though many of these changes were reactions to international pressure, Mao would find ideological ground for such an antagonistic policy. China under Deng realized diplomatic normalization with the U.S. and the Soviet Union consecutively. Deng's China declared in explicit terms that it would not enter into an alliance or strategic relationship with any superpower to oppose the other and maintained sound relationships with all major powers. During the process of Sino-Soviet normalization in the 1980s, Deng cautioned his colleagues not to do so at the cost of China's relations with the U.S. Even when the U.S. and other countries were imposing sanctions on China after the Tiananmen Incident, China still emphasized the principle of "reducing trouble, increasing trust, developing cooperation, not seeking confrontation" in developing relations with the U.S.⁶⁵

Finally, China's regional policy and relations with small powers were also different. China under Mao always had an arch enemy, usually the strongest power, to oppose. It had to rely on poor and weak countries to form a united front to oppose the richest and strongest country. While China supported the national liberation movements in third world countries, it also expected them to support China's diplomatic cause—opposing the superpower. China under Mao decided its policy to and relations with non-superpowers according to their relations with the superpowers. Since Deng's was relationship motivated, China under Deng abandoned the policy of "drawing lines" and reiterated that China was willing to develop omni-directional relations with all countries on the basis of the "five principles of peaceful co-existence."⁶⁶ Deng strongly advocated not letting differences in ideology or political system impacting Chinese foreign policy. Since the early 1980s, China has reiterated again and again that it respects the special relationship that developing countries have historically formed with superpowers and that China will decide its position on international affairs according

⁶⁵ Tian, *gaige kaifang yilai de zhongguo waijiao*, p. 429.
⁶⁶ Han, *dangdai zhongguo waijiao*, p. 340.

the merits of the issue itself. It is these differences that make Chinese foreign policy in Mao and Deng's times distinct.

6. Conclusion

This paper sheds light on two potential directions for the future study of Chinese foreign policy. One is the necessity, benefits, limits, and directions of bridging theory on personality types and Chinese foreign policy studies. The other is that a more systemic and integrated theory of Chinese foreign policy is needed that puts decision-makers at the center while taking into consideration both external variables and domestic variables.

Scholars studying Chinese foreign policy both in the United States and China have emphasized the necessity "to integrate the field of comparative foreign policy more fully into the study of Chinese foreign policy."⁶⁷ This paper shows how this can be achieved and the benefits to be gained from it. Theories of personality types provide road maps for analyzing Chinese foreign policy. The framework of personality types not only provides a basis upon which the different personalities of Chinese leaders can be compared, but equips scholars with operationalized tools to make the comparison. Furthermore, the accumulated case studies which led to such a framework have also offered a backdrop for comparison with Chinese foreign policy studies. Such a comparison will bring about a more comprehensive understanding of Chinese foreign policy. From the perspective for foreign policy analysis, it more imperative than necessary to incorporate Chinese foreign policy studies into developing foreign policy analysis theories that go beyond the Western. Considering China's rising status and its proactive diplomacy today, any theory of foreign policy that disregards the Chinese situation or fails to explain Chinese cases is incomplete.

This paper tells both the feasibility and limit of Hermann's personality type theory in Chinese foreign policy study. Hermann's theory explains Deng's policy better than Mao's. Deng's reaction to the policymaking environment made him an opportunistic leader in Hermann's matrix, however this does not support the conventional view that he was a pragmatist. This disparity could be reconciled by the fact that Deng might have demonstrated different personalities before and after he became a paramount leader. He was an opportunist when he was a subordinate working under Mao and his own personality could not be given full play. He was criticized as a leading "capitalist roader" by Mao during the Cultural Revolution, and he yielded to Mao's criticism and admitted his mistakes. But he became a pragmatist as soon as he consolidated his power and became the predominant leader following Mao's death. Contrary to Mao, who would engage in direct political struggle when encountered with political opponents, Deng chose to respect the political constraints and yielded to more powerful leaders until the political constraints ceased to exist. Deng's experience demonstrates that the extent that leadership personality impacts foreign policy outcome depends on whether his/her power is strongly consolidated, or whether he/she is predominant enough. Hermann's theory not only helps explain the revolutionary theme of Mao's foreign

⁶⁷ Thomas J. Christensen, Alastair Iain Johnston, and Robert S. Ross, "Conclusions and Future Directions," in *New Directions in the Study of China's Foreign Policy*, p. 391; Wang Jisi, *guoji zhengzhi de lixing sikao (Rational Reflections on International Politics)* (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2006), pp. 28-29.

policy but his domestic policies, including Mao's determination to continue with the Great Leap even after he was informed of its immense costs, his decision to begin the mass movement of the Cultural Revolution in domestic politics. However, Hermann's framework fails to explain Mao's abruptly changing course and successful opening to the United States by welcoming his ideological enemy Nixon in the early 1970s. Hermann's model would not expect Mao, "closed" to his environment and a "crusader" focused on power and expansionism, to have done that. This disjuncture reveals the limit of Hermann's theory in studying Mao's foreign policy.

The limitation indicates that a more nuanced approach is needed when western born theory is to be applied to none western situation like China. The formation of leaders' personality is an evolving social process and politics is always dynamic, while the framework of leadership types, like any other theories of foreign policy analysis, is always static. The dynamic nature of politics and personality should be taken into full consideration in bridging the two. On the other hand, the failure to explain Mao's foreign policy changes does pose challenges to Hermann's framework. Finding the problem means that there are rooms for the framework to improve, and making up the hole is the very way to develop a more general and universally applicable theory.

From the perspective of Chinese foreign policy studies, this paper does not intend to invalidate the theories of other levels of analysis; neither does it make the case for future negligence of them. The influence of the world on China today is unprecedented. The balance of power has been an important shaping factor on Chinese foreign policy and will continue to exert its influence, as the ongoing power shift in East Asia shows.⁶⁸ As China joins the international system and claims to play a responsible and constructive role in the world, other international variables are also becoming important. One is international norms, which define the terms of international discourse, and another is the hundreds of international regimes China has joined. They will become equally, if not more salient factors, in shaping China's foreign policy as the distribution of balance of power.

The external influences on China are unprecedented, so are China's domestic changes. As Marxist ideology loses ground in China, the Chinese turned toward its traditional culture as an ideological replacement, and rising nationalism is gaining strength in Chinese politics.⁶⁹ As China joins the world, more and more agencies of Chinese government began to get involved in foreign affairs. New developments, such as "corporate pluralization", "professionalization", "decentralization" and other fragmentation tendencies against the background of globalization within the Chinese foreign policy structure are making Chinese foreign policy more often than not reacts to issues and challenges imposed on it by society and government.⁷⁰ Multiple and diverse

⁶⁸ Chenghong Li, "Limited Defensive Strategic Partnership: Sino-Russian Rapprochement and the Driving Force," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 16, No. 52, (Aug.) 2007, pp. 477-497; June Teufel Dreyer, "The Shifting Triangle: Sino-Japanese-American Relations in stressful times," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 75, (May) 2012, pp. 409-426.
⁶⁹ Suisheg Zhao, "Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: the strident turn," Vol. 22, No. 82, (Mar.) 2013, pp. 535-553; Suisheg Zhao, *A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism*, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2004); Peter Hay Gries, *China's New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy*, (Stanford, CA: University of California Press, 2004).
⁷⁰ Lampton, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the era of Reform*, pp. 10-27; Linda Jakobson and Dean Knox, *New Foreign Policy Actors in China*, SIPRI Policy Paper (2010), 26.

domestic factors are competing to shape China's external behaviors. An enlarging zone of routine decisions, especially those concerning the interest of certain domestic or bureaucratic interests, would go through a long process of domestic coordination and bureaucratic consultation, making bureaucratic and domestic political models better tools to understand such decisions.

Starting with Jiang Zemin, China's leaders onward will no longer enjoy the same level of political capital and charisma as their predecessors. So long as the Chinese hierarchical decision-making structure remains along with its authoritarian political system, the role of the core leader will continue to be the central to understand the major features of Chinese foreign policy. For instance, Jiang's rich experience and interest in foreign affairs made him closely involved in foreign affairs. His strong incentive to learn and show off his foreign languages ability and his frequent travels abroad—he paid 107 foreign visits to more than 70 countries as China's top leader—led to a constitutional revision in 2002 to legalize top leaders' foreign travel, leaving a stark Jiang's personal imprint on Chinese foreign policy.⁷¹ While Hu Jintao's influence on China's foreign policy was also impacted by his personality. For instance, years of working experience in China's poorest areas of Gansu, Guizhou, and Tibet led to Hu to emphasizing the notion of governing for the people while in power, which led to the principle of "diplomacy for the people" in foreign affairs. Though Hu travelled no less than Jiang, his disinterest in foreign affairs was the major reason for the Chinese Foreign Ministry to become the weakest it has ever been since the founding of the PRC. With a world view formed when China was isolated in radical Cultural Revolution and a personality of insensitiveness to the policymaking environment, Hu did not make any substantial political reform during the ten years of his tenure. Moreover, increased players vying for different policy outcomes make it more imperative for the central leadership to reconcile divergent interests and better supervise subordinate agencies, giving the paramount leaders different opportunities and means from those available during Mao and Deng's time to influence Chinese foreign policy. Foreign policy-making during international crisis and on important strategic issues, especially issues that concern the central leadership's domestic image and legitimacy will remain a woefully sensitive domain. Leaders will be more likely to participate in these decisions making and their personality will come into play.

It should also be noted as in conclusion that neither external systemic nor domestic societal factors with their various constraints or opportunities can have any significant influence on Chinese foreign policy unless or until they are perceived and acted upon by Chinese decision makers through their own decision-making system. A more nuanced and integrated model is needed that brings leadership personality back into the center of analysis, while taking into consideration both external and domestic factors into consideration. In such an integrated framework, the study of leadership will remain to be a core, if not the core. Whoever will be the core of next general of Chinese leadership, his personality should not be neglected in analyzing his foreign policy, and experiences in the past may offer some useful clue.

⁷¹ Zoung Zhicheng, *weilie shijie gengmeihao: Jiang Zemin chufang jishi*, [Fore a Better World: True Story of Jiang Zemin's Foreign Visit], (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2006), pp.2-3.