Wittgenstein gives another example of such a projection: ‘In order to understand the essential nature of a proposition, we should consider hieroglyphic script, which depicts the facts that it describes.’ (TLP 4.016) This explanation suggests that the projection is something natural. From the visual characteristics of a hieroglyphic sign for, e.g., a house, we could determine that the sign represents a house without any prior knowledge. This is, however, not how Egyptian hieroglyphs represent. Most hieroglyphic signs are (like English letters) phonetic in nature, meaning that the sign is read independently of its visual characteristics. The phonological value of a sign is derived from the name of the represented thing by means of the so-called *rebus principle* according to which the representation of, for example, a duck  ‘son’ *\*ziɜ* can stand for ‘hard ground’ *\*sɜt.w* due to their similar phonetic structures (analogously, the numeral ‘2’ can stand for the preposition ‘to’ in English). Cf. Loprieno, 1995, pp. 12f. We can, thus, take the rebus principle as a peculiar method of projection.

Loprieno, A. (1995). *Ancient Egyptian. A Linguistic Introductiuon*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.