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THE KOYUKON BEAR PARTY AND THE "BARE FACTS" OF RITUAL

BENJAMIN C. RAY

Summary

Jonathan Smith's recent interpretation of the classic "bear festival" among northern hunters is examined, together with his more general theory of ritual. Smith's interpretation of the bear festival is shown to be unfounded. The paper also investigates the well-documented bear rituals of the Koyukon of Alaska in light of Smith's general theory of ritual. Viewed in the context of other theories of ritual as symbolic action (those of Geertz, Douglas, Valeri, Turner, Eliade), Smith's theory is found to be unsuited to the task of understanding the meaning and significance of Koyukon bear rituals. The paper argues that the interpretation of ritual requires the investigator to attend to the ritualist's notion of reality and to grasp how his beliefs and actions are fitted to it. The investigator should be concerned with questions of meaning not empirical validity, as the problem of understanding ritual is a semantic and semiotic one, analogous to understanding the cognitive and performative uses of a language. The magical or instrumental aspect of the Koyukon bear rituals is also dealt with as an instance of performative language.

In an important article titled "The Bare Facts of Ritual" Jonathan Smith brings to light what he believes to be a contradiction in the classic ethnography on bear hunting among northern hunting societies.¹ "There appears," says Smith, "to be a gap, an incongruity between the hunters' ideological statements of how they *ought* to hunt and their actual behavior while hunting."² After pointing out apparent discrepancies between what the hunters say and what they do, Smith proposes to find out how "*they* [the hunters] resolve this discrepancy" for, he asserts, "we must presume that *he* [the hunter] is aware of this discrepancy, that he works with it, that he has some means of overcoming this contradiction between word and deed."³

Smith finds the resolution to the contradiction to lie in the well-known bear festivals performed by some of these hunting groups. In these ceremonies a bear cub is captured, kept in captivity for a period of time, and then ritually killed. Acknowledging that

previous interpretations of the bear festival have been illuminating in some respects, Smith suggests another: “*The bear festival represents a perfect hunt.*”⁴ That is, under the controlled circumstances of the ritual context the bear festival enacts the kind of hunt that the hunters recognize can never happen in the bush:

The ritual displays a dimension of the hunt that can be thought about and remembered in the course of things. It provides a focusing lens on the ordinary hunt which allows its full significance to be perceived, a significance which the rules express but are powerless to effectuate. It is in ritual space that the hunter can relate himself properly to animals which are both “good to eat” and “good to think.”⁵

“It is conceivable,” says Smith, “that the northern hunter, while hunting, might hold the image of this perfect hunt in his mind.”⁶ Thus, the “contradiction” between word and deed is overcome.

Smith offers this interpretation of the bear festival as an example of an important understanding of ritual.

Ritual is a means of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are in such a way that this ritualized perfection is recollected in the ordinary, uncontrolled, course of things. Ritual relies for its power on the fact that it is concerned with quite ordinary activities, that what it describes and displays is, in principle, possible for every occurrence of these acts. But it relies, as well, for its power on the perceived fact that, in actuality, such possibilities cannot be realized.⁷

Despite careful articulation, however, Smith’s interpretation and the theory behind it raise several important questions: Why do the hunters deliberately say they hunt bear in ways they do not? Why should they cling to an “ideology” that contradicts their experience? What about the other more commonly performed bear rituals that accompany every kill? Are they also to be understood as obsessive attempts at “control,” as efforts to make “perfect” the otherwise flawed experience of the hunt?

At the outset, it is important to agree with Smith that the bear hunter or the “primitive” is not to be dismissed as a creature living in a “cuckoo-land” where our own commonplace, commonsense understanding of reality does not apply. Thus we are obliged to find out why, if Smith is correct, the hunters’ words and rituals “con-

tradict" their deeds. This he never explains, except to say that the hunters, like other ritualists, wish they could control a world that they recognize cannot be controlled.

Surprisingly, the sources on which Smith relies point, in fact, to *no* contradiction between the hunters' notions about the hunt and the methods the hunters use. The sources also suggest that the bear festival is not intended to be a "perfect hunt" but a celebration to which the bear is invited before being ritually dispatched. Moreover, since the bear festival is performed only among a few East Asiatic peoples, it can hardly be assumed that this rite influences the collective mind of the "northern hunter," as Smith suggests, for the vast majority of bear hunters on the Euroasian and North American continents know nothing of it.

It should be noted, however, that Smith's view of the bear festival is not offered as a fully developed interpretation. It treats only one aspect of the festival, the killing of the bear, and deals with only selected statements about bear hunting, not with thorough descriptions. Smith's view is therefore intentionally partial and hypothetical, an innovative suggestion about a certain tendency in the ethnography. By contrast, his theory of ritual is more developed, and receives additional treatment in his recent book *To Take Place* (1987). It therefore deserves to be examined on its own in relation to more detailed ethnography.

After reviewing the somewhat antiquated ethnography on which Smith relies, it will be useful to consider more recent accounts of bear rituals and to consider other theories that interpret ritual as symbolic action. Here I shall draw upon Richard K. Nelson's excellent study *Make Prayers to the Raven*,⁸ which describes the hunting practices of the Koyukon of the northwestern interior of Alaska, and the well-known theories of ritual offered by Clifford Geertz, Mary Douglas, and Valerio Valeri. My aim is to see whether and to what extent the views of ritual, including Smith's, make the bear ceremonies of the Koyukon intelligible as symbolic action.

I

The accounts on which Smith primarily relies are A.I. Hallowell's classic study, *Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern*

Hemisphere (1926), and Eveline Lot-Falck's more recent survey, *Les Rites de chasse chez les peuples sibériens* (1953).⁹ These are secondary sources based on ethnographic reports from different societies, and they offer a generalized picture of hunting practices and rituals. The ethnographies they use were written by outsiders, and the language and voices of native informants are virtually absent. In this respect, Smith's assertion that these sources present what the hunters "say" is somewhat misleading. Nevertheless, they do give a relatively clear picture of hunting techniques and ritual procedures.

Hallowell's survey, which was written in 1926, shows that most bear hunters employ three different methods: den hunting, hunting in the open, and trapping.¹⁰ Den hunting is the most widely practiced method on the North American and Euroasian continents. The main hunting season takes place in the late winter or early spring when bear are hibernating in their dens. The hunters generally force the sleeping bear out of its den and kill it face-to-face, with spears, knives, axes or clubs, or shoot it with the bow and arrow or guns. Many groups also hunt bear out in the open during the warmer months of the year, and attack them with spears or clubs. Hallowell points out that this method is practiced only by the northern groups on both continents. Finally, Hallowell's sources indicate that all groups make use of snares and traps, especially the deadfall.

Descriptions of den hunting reveal a general set of procedures. First, the hunters do not say openly that they are going to hunt bear. They speak of their intentions by circumlocution and metaphor in order not to insult the animal, which they assume can hear them. When they find an occupied den, they speak formally to the bear, using respectful names such as "grandfather" or "honey eater" or "cousin," and call it out of the den. They announce they are going to kill the bear; they beg its pardon, and they ask it not to hurt them or take revenge on them at some later time. Then they use sticks or smoke to provoke the sleeping bear into emerging from the den, attacking it when it appears. Some groups prefer to kill it with a blow of an axe or club to the head as it emerges. Others wait until it has come fully out of the den and attack it with long knives, spears, or arrows, aimed at the heart or

the mid-section, or else fire gun shots to the body. These attacks may be carried out by one of the hunters or by the group as a whole. In some instances the bear is allowed to rush forward toward one of the hunters who then steps back a few paces so the bear falls onto his spear, thus impaling itself. By contrast, Siberian groups do not attack face-to-face, but prefer to block up the entrance of the den with logs, and then break into the den roof and stab or shoot the trapped animal inside.¹¹ The same technique is found among the Koyukon of Alaska.¹²

Many groups also hunt bear in the open during the spring, summer, and fall. Some consider this to be the bravest and most heroic method, although Hallowell points out that it is practiced only by the northern hunters. Again, the hunters avoid saying they intend to hunt bear and speak only indirectly about it. When they encounter a bear they address it in the customary fashion telling it of its death and asking pardon. A single hunter or group of hunters searches out a bear and attacks it, using only knives, spears, or war clubs in a face-to-face engagement. Although guns and steel traps have long been available, Hallowell notes that traditional weapons such as the knife, spear, and club are often deemed more "sportsmanlike" and a more "manly" way of attacking the bear. The reports indicate that the preference among some groups for single-handed combat with a bear has as much to do with personal bravado and desire for prestige as with respect for the bear itself.

In the case of trapping, a technique used by all groups, the rules of the hunt do not fully apply. Nevertheless, Hallowell cites a few reports that say that when a bear is trapped alive, it is spoken to in a conciliatory manner before or after it is killed and that it is sometimes dispatched by the blow of a club to the head or a spear thrust to the body.

Afterwards, regardless of how the bear is killed, virtually all the societies treat the slain bear in a ceremonial fashion, in what Hallowell calls "post-mortem" rites. Some groups greet the returning hunters and the bear with songs and put the bear's skin with head attached on display during the feast. Sometimes the post-mortem conciliatory speeches and addresses of apology are given at this time. Some groups also deny any responsibility for killing the bear, saying it was an accident or that the "Russians" or

“Americans” did it. The bear is always butchered in a prescribed fashion and its flesh eaten according to gender rules that prohibit women from eating all or part of the meat. Virtually all groups return parts of the bear, usually the head, to the forest, and among some groups dogs are prevented from defiling the meat or bones of the bear. Hallowell says that the general motive for these post-mortem procedures is the desire to show respect to the spirit of the bear or to the spiritual powers that control it, so that the bear will continue to “give” itself to the hunters.¹³

In addition to these rites, several societies in the Amur River-Gulf of Tartay region (the Gilyak [or Nivkhi], Ainu, Orochi, and Olcha) perform a periodic bear festival in which a bear cub is captured, kept for several months or years, and ceremonially killed. The stated purpose of this rite is to convey a request for continued provision of game to the spiritual powers via the sacrificed bear “messenger.” In the view of Hallowell and others, this festival “clearly differentiates the peoples of this district from other tribes of Asia and America” who do not perform this rite.¹⁴

To sum up: Most bear hunters follow a general set of procedures, which seems to constitute a kind of bear-hunting etiquette. (1) The hunters avoid saying that they are going to hunt a bear in order not to insult the animal. (2) They address the bear in a conciliatory manner before or after killing it. (3) They kill it in den hunting or out in the open with thrusting weapons or guns in face-to-face encounters, sometimes in single-handed combat (although the same hunters use traps to catch bear as well). (4) Some groups also formally renounce (to the bear) any responsibility for killing it. (5) Most groups have rules about the butchering of the carcass, sharing the meat, and returning part of the bear to the forest, and all appear to have some sort of post-mortem feast. (6) Only the Gilyak, Ainu, and their immediate neighbors perform a periodic festival in which a bear cub is captured, kept for a few months, and then killed.

Having summarized Hallowell’s account and the relevant parts of Lot-Falck’s survey, I turn to Smith’s interpretation of them. He begins with a series of questions:

Can we believe that a group which depends on hunting for its food would kill an animal only if it is in a certain posture? Can we believe that any animal, once spotted, would stand still while the hunter

recited “dithyrambs” and ceremonial addresses? Or, according to one report, sang it love songs! Can we believe that, even if they wanted to, they could kill an animal bloodlessly and would abandon a corpse if blood was shed or the eye damaged? Can we believe that any group could or would promise that neither dogs nor women would eat the meat, and mean it? Is it humanly possible that a hunter who has killed by skill and stealth views his act solely as an unfortunate accident and will not boast about his prowess?¹⁵

These questions exhibit more rhetorical flourish than ethnographic accuracy. Since bear kills account for only a small percentage of the hunters’ activity, the bear is not an animal on which hunting societies “depend” for food. The hunters can therefore afford to give the bear special treatment, such as attempting to kill it in face-to-face, even hand-to-hand encounters. Nowhere do the reports say that the hunters expect the bear to “stand still” when they speak to it or assume a certain “posture” before killing it, an obviously absurd idea. One report says that the hunters speak to the animal when they first see it at a distance, another says they speak only upon attacking it. Singing “love songs” to the bear was reported only in the context of den hunting, when the hunters approached an occupied den.¹⁶ There is no mention of hunters trying to kill bear bloodlessly, although some try to minimize the show of blood on the ground in killing or butchering it. Many reports refer to prohibitions against dogs eating bear meat, and virtually all mention the existence of rules prohibiting women from eating some or all of the bear.

Despite Smith’s suspicions, the literature indicates that hunters do try to follow these rules and that there are powerful sanctions behind them. Hunters who formally deny responsibility for killing a bear do so in order to deceive the bear, not to express their own “view” of the matter; hence their disclaimers are not to be taken seriously. Although traditional hunters the world over refrain from boasting about their kills, this is not always the case among bear hunters. The Algonkians, the Lapps, the Gilyak of Sakalin, for example, regard bear killing as a brave and noble sport, and some men carve a notch into a stick carried in their belts for each bear killed.¹⁷ Nevertheless, as Smith notes, hunters typically deny that skill alone enables them to succeed. Instead, they attribute their

success to the bear's willingness to "give" itself to the hunters, a matter to which I shall return below.

One further point must be made. Smith asserts that "most of the groups from which this information was taken do not, in fact, hunt bears face-to-face but make extensive use of traps, pitfalls, self-triggering bows, and snares."¹⁸ This is incorrect. As already mentioned, Hallowell's study shows that most societies practice den hunting and open forest hunting in addition to trapping. Some groups appear to prefer den hunting and open forest hunting, and both may involve face-to-face engagements, even hand-to-hand combat.

Although Smith lacks grounds for his interpretation of bear hunting, he rightly draws attention to the fact that for the hunters the governing idea is that "the animal is not killed by the hunter's initiative, rather the animal freely gives itself to the hunter's weapon."¹⁹ Bear hunting is predicated upon the idea of reciprocity: Bears give themselves to the hunters who show respect for them. The sources show that the bear's appointed role does not consist in specific conduct during the hunt (for example, standing still or assuming a certain posture when engaged by the hunters), as Smith believes. Smith therefore misconstrues the sources in stating that "the hunter might attempt to play his part; the animal will not reciprocate, nor will it respond in the required manner. And the bear's failure to reciprocate will prevent the hunter from making his attempt if the hunt is to be successful *qua* hunt."²⁰

In fact, the sources show that the bear's appointed role is simply to "give" itself to the hunters. The hunters do not attempt to control its behavior in ways Smith suggests. By contrast, the hunters make every effort to control their own behavior before, during, and after the hunt. We may therefore conclude that the "perfect hunt," to use Smith's phrase, occurs every time the hunters find and kill a bear and dispose of it properly. Success in finding and killing a bear is, in fact, understood to be the bear's response to the hunters' having observed the etiquette of the hunt. There is no need, therefore, to perform a ritualized "perfect hunt" as symbolic compensation for a perceived failure of the hunters or the bear to follow the rules.

The same ideology obtains among the Ainu, Gilyak, Olocha,

Orochi who perform the periodic bear festival. As indicated above, the purpose of this ceremony is to kill a bear that has been held in captivity so that it will act as a spokesman to the spirits, asking them for a continued supply of game. A bear cub, conceived as a supernatural "visitor," is captured and raised with care so that it will be pleased with the human community and convey gifts to the spirit world on the people's behalf. A common theme is the parading of the bear around the village so people may show its affection and offer gifts. The officiants address the bear before killing it, asking it to think well of them and carry presents to the spirit world. Just before killing the bear, people tease it and provoke it until it is finally exhausted. It is held fast so that arrows may be shot accurately into the heart, and then it is immediately throttled to death. Officiants address the bear again during the post-mortem feast, asking it to carry gifts and requests for game to the powers that control the animals. The purpose of the ceremony is to give the bear a perfect "send off." Hence, the Ainu call this ritual *Iyomante*, "to see off" or "to send off" the bear. The Olocha of the lower Amur River call this festival "play with the bear," its purpose being to entertain the bear and send it away happily to its relatives in the forest with gifts to insure good hunting and fishing. On killing the bear, the Orochi say to it, "Go fast; go to your master; put a new fur on, and come again next year that I may look at you."²¹

II

Although Smith's interpretation of the bear festival is without foundation, his underlying theory of ritual as compensatory symbolic action is an important one and requires further consideration. For Smith, "ritual is a means of performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are."²² This theory poses a fundamental contrast between everyday, empirical reality ("the way things are") and ritual idealism ("the way things ought to be"), and invites the investigator to discover the gap. Although the ritualist supposedly knows the ritual image to be false, it nevertheless expresses his "ideology" and shapes how he understands the significance of what he is doing. Among hunters it is therefore the ideology of bear hunting, not the everyday reality of it, that the

hunter describes to outside investigators. Hence Smith admonishes the historian of religions not to “suspend his critical faculties, his capacity for disbelief,” lest he naively confuse religious ideology with everyday reality and cover up the ritualists’ knowledge of the difference.

For Smith, the motive for ritual is both “gnostic” and Freudian. It is gnostic because in performing the ritual the participants demonstrate that “we know what ought to have been done, what ought to have taken place,” thereby allowing the “full significance” of everyday, imperfect reality to be perceived. Ritual enacts an ideal, make-believe reality (the “perfect hunt”) in order to give greater significance to otherwise flawed experience. Ritual is also Freudian because it springs from a compulsion to make perfect order (a “controlled environment”) out of the less than orderly nature of everyday life. Smith states his agreement with Freud’s view of the similarity between ritual and neurotic behavior. Both, he says, “are equally ‘obsessed’ by the potentiality for significance in the commonplace.”²³ Smith notes elsewhere that for Freud the distinguishing characteristic of ritual is “conscientiousness [toward] details.” He quotes Freud:

The ceremonial appears to be only an exaggeration of an ordinary and justifiable orderliness, but the remarkable conscientiousness with which it is carried out ... gives the ceremonial the character of a sacred rite.²⁴

For Smith, then, the keys to ritual are its Freudian obsession with perfection and its “gnostic” insistence upon ideology in the face of the facts. Hence, the principal motive of the bear festival is supposedly the compulsion to get things right, to perform the perfect hunt that will make up for the lapses in actual hunting procedures, which, I have indicated, cannot be correct.

Nevertheless, an examination of Smith’s theory may help to shed light on the nature of ritual, especially among bear hunters, for what Smith did not do is apply it to the more commonly performed rites that accompany all bear kills. Are these rites also to be understood as symbolic compensation for perceived failures during the hunt? Just how do these rituals compare to the hunters’ words and deeds?

It is worth recognizing, first of all, that Smith intends to distinguish his understanding of ritual from other theories of ritual as symbolic action. He points out that “we should question theories which emphasize the ‘fit’ of ritual with some other human system.”²⁵ “Ritual,” he says elsewhere, “is not best understood as congruent with something else—a magical imitation of desired ends, a translation of emotions, a symbolic acting out of ideas, a dramatization of a text, or the like.”²⁶ This statement clearly dismisses Malinowski’s view of ritual magic as the expression of emotions as well as Eliade’s understanding of ritual as the enactment of myth, a point to which I shall return. In emphasizing the misfit between ritual and ordinary reality, Smith may also intend to challenge the widely accepted anthropological theory that rituals create a fundamental congruity between a society’s view of reality and its experience of everyday life.

The latter theory, at any rate, is the one I wish to examine here because of its general currency and because it differs radically from Smith’s view. For the symbolic anthropologists, ritual creates and expresses forms of meaning which give significance to life because they dictate the very norms by which reality is perceived and understood. Accordingly, ritual expresses not disjunction from the world and a lack of human control over it, but conjunction and a sense of engagement, a recognized “fit” between the paradigms of religious belief and the believer’s experience of the world. The task of the investigator is not to find the gap between ritual and everyday life but the bond that holds the two together.

Clifford Geertz puts it this way: “In a ritual, the world as lived and the world as imagined, fused together under the agency of a single set of symbolic forms, turns out to be the same world, producing [an] idiosyncratic transformation in one’s sense of reality....”²⁷ The result is that “the moods and motivations induced by religious practice seem themselves supremely practical, the only sensible ones to adopt given the way things ‘really’ are.”²⁸ Since this model is concerned primarily with meaning, it forces the inquirer to attend carefully to the ritualist’s notion of reality and to grasp how his beliefs and actions are fitted to it.

Proposing a similar view, Mary Douglas argues that “rituals both create and control experience.” Douglas refers to a ritual

among the Dinka of East Africa in which people bury alive an old or ailing Master of the Fishing Spear, which is done at the Spear Master's request. In this rite, Douglas points out, the Dinka do not deny the fact of death, instead they create a religious interpretation of it.²⁹ It is important to note that both Geertz and Douglas recognize that ritual involves the perception of difference, the difference between commonsense experience and the religious understanding of it. The point of their theory is that this difference becomes transformed through ritual and given a new meaning. Potential incongruity is resolved by the semantic power of ritual action; the more limited significance of everyday reality is transformed by the wider meanings of religious language. Thus the contrived death of the Dinka Masters of the Fishing Spear is modified by ritual and becomes a public celebration, "a social triumph over death," as Douglas puts it. For Geertz and Douglas, the purpose of ritual is to transform everyday experience not by denying the facts but by joining them to broader, more ultimate meanings.

Douglas, for her part, emphatically dismisses the Frazerian notion that the ritualist's primary motive is to control the natural world, "as if primitive tribes were populations of Ali Babas and Aladdins, uttering their magic words and rubbing their magic lamps,"³⁰ a notion that Smith partly shares. Indeed, it was Frazer who proposed that genuine religion, by which he meant the formal worship of spiritual beings, arose as a consequence of the perceived failure of magical rites to control the empirical world, a parallel to Smith's notion that the northern hunters created the bear festival out of the recognition that they could not control the bear during the actual hunt. For both Geertz and Douglas the primary aim of ritual is not the control of the everyday world but the control of how it is understood. Smith, too, holds that the purpose of ritual is to control the understanding of experience, but only as a make-believe substitute for the ritualist's admitted failure to control the real world.

Unlike Geertz, Douglas also tackles the question of ritual's instrumentality—the assumption that some rituals also seek to control the empirical world. First, she gives examples of the obvious power of ritual to resolve social and psychological problems. Then she argues that the belief in its ability to control the natural world

is less “automatic” than has been assumed. She suggests that the belief in ritual efficacy is more analogous to the belief in the miraculous than the magical. Rain-making rituals, she points out, are performed only during the rainy season, and they are not expected to produce results automatically. Even when such rituals fail, Douglas asserts that “instrumental efficacy is not the only kind of efficacy to be derived from their [rituals’] symbolic action. The other kind is achieved in the action itself, in the assertions it makes and the experience which bears its imprinting.”³¹ This latter statement is essentially Smith’s theory of ritual (its ability to “focus” and “clarify” everyday experience), shorn of its Frazerian motive and Freudian obsession with illusion.

In elaborating a theory of sacrifice, Valerio Valeri formulates a better integration than Douglas of the symbolic and instrumental aspects of ritual.³² He argues that ritual sacrifice may be understood as efficacious in ways similar to J.L. Austin’s analysis of illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances. A ritual, Valeri suggests, is effective in a symbolic or illocutionary sense when it communicates to the performer a particular understanding of the world such that he comprehends both the world and himself as an agent in it in the manner formulated in the ritual. A ritual is effective in an instrumental or perlocutionary sense when its performance is deemed to bring about certain objective results. These results are not viewed as occurring automatically but “performatively” as the result of certain ritual conditions, rather like a verbal command that succeeds in causing someone to do something. Valeri’s point is that any theory of ritual must have a way of interpreting both the symbolic function of ritual, the results of which are purely conventional and affect the performers’ understanding of the world, and the instrumental function of ritual, the results of which are non-conventional and are understood by the performer to affect the world itself. Here again we see that investigator’s concern is with questions of meaning not empirical validity. Like Geertz and Douglas, Valeri takes the task of understanding ritual to be primarily a semantic and semiotic one, analogous to understanding a language as a system of meanings.

Finally, it is well to keep in mind Victor Turner’s emphasis upon the fact that while ritual paradigms do indeed shape how religious

believers view the world, these paradigms are neither simple nor totally rigid but complex and open to change:

Ritual, in all its performative flow, is not only many-leveled, "laminated," but also capable, under conditions of societal change, of creative modification on all or many of its levels. Since it is tacitly held to communicate the deepest values of the group regularly performing it, it has a "*paradigmatic*" function, in both of the senses argued for by Clifford Geertz. As a "*model for*" ritual can anticipate, even generate change; as a "*model of*," it may inscribe order in the minds, hearts, and wills of participants.³³

The difference between this anthropological view and Smith's theory is clear, as is their common epistemological foundation. Behind each is the assumption that religion is an interpretive framework that gives meaning to an objective, common world.³⁴ Smith proposes that ritual provides an idealistic interpretation of the world to which the believer knowingly (or, perhaps, unknowingly) clings; the anthropological view proposes that ritual provides a rich and "deep" interpretation of the world that the believer accepts as true and acts upon.

As theories, of course, neither can be accepted as a description of how the world is but merely as a framework for focusing and interpreting the evidence. The pertinent issue is not a question of truth or falsity but of intellectual power, whether the anthropological model is unacceptably superficial and naive (because less insightful, less theoretically promising, and less in tune with the facts) compared to Smith's more critical, Freudian view.

III

The answer is that neither model can be evaluated apart from specific contexts of analysis. Thus I want to return to the subject of bear rituals and to Nelson's excellent account of them among the Koyukon.³⁵

The Koyukon relationship to animals is based upon their stories of the Distant Time. These stories explain how the world began, how the animals became their present selves, and how the Koyukon people should behave toward them. For the Koyukon the Distant

Time is the mythical age at the beginning of time, when human beings and animals were the same. After the Distant Time period ended, people and animals became completely separate, although the Koyukon believe that animals still possess certain "human" qualities. Most animals are understood to have distinct personalities, to communicate with each other, and to understand human behavior and language. Koyukon therefore think that animals are aware of what people say and do, and they believe that animal spirits are easily offended by disrespectful behavior. A variety of prohibitions (*hutlaani*) surrounds all animals. These taboos constitute an elaborate moral code. They govern how people speak about animals, how men hunt and care for their weapons, how hunters butcher animals, how they share the meat, and how they dispose of the bones and skins.

Although Koyukon sometimes hunt bears out in the open, the main hunting season begins in the middle of October when the bears have entered their dens. The Koyukon country is rich in bears, and den-killed bears are the fattest and best-tasting of all. The black bear is especially prized for its delicious meat and for the social prestige enjoyed by the hunters who kill it. When planning to hunt bear, men refrain from speaking directly about it, knowing that the bear will hear them and disappear. Hunters avoid using the literal term for the black bear (*sis*) and use the circumlocution "black place." This is the name that women must always use. Even in the course of everyday conversation, people choose their words carefully and speak cryptically when referring to den hunting.

Koyukon recognize the physical similarity between bear and human beings, although for them this does not imply kinship. A bear standing up at a distance, peering across an open field, shading its eyes with a raised forepaw, looks remarkably human, as does a skinned bear carcass lying in the grass. This special resemblance between bear and humans may be the reason why it alone is given a funeral-like potlatch feast, or "bear party," soon after it is killed. Apart from the bear party, the most valuable parts of the bear are saved for the community potlatch memorials for the dead.

Koyukon men are skillful and dedicated bear hunters. In the fall they travel widely through the land, searching for occupied bear

dens. These are ground-level openings formed by uprooted trees that bears make into their lairs, or openings in riverbanks or knolls dug out by the bears themselves. The hunters check known dens and look for new ones, and they examine the snow for signs of bear. The Koyukon usually consider each den a property "owned" by the man who discovered it.

Although the hunters know that great skill and years of experience are necessary for successful hunting, they say that "luck" is essential. Koyukon use the English term "luck" to denote a special, nearly tangible quality or essence that people possess. It is sustained or diminished by conduct toward animals and by adherence to the taboos described in the Distant Time stories. People lose their luck when they offend an animal and are punished by its spirit; they keep their luck when they obey the taboos and earn the favor of the animal spirits. Older men can pass on their luck to younger hunters in showing them how to hunt. Luck is also a contagious quality that inheres in a hunter's equipment and clothing. Some men have more luck than others with bear, either because they have shown respect for bear all their lives or the bear favor them. A hunter can lose his luck if he passes on his equipment to others, and his weapons can be made unusable if prohibitions against contact with women are not observed.

Since there is an avoidance relation between women and bear, hunters must limit their relations with women during the fall bear season. They must refrain from talking with women about bear hunting, they must keep their rifles from female contact, and they must not talk of women while hunting. There are stories about hunters who broke these rules and failed to kill any bear. There are also stories about bear attacks and severe illnesses that came as the result of breaking the rules and insulting the black bear.

One of the episodes in the television series *Make Prayers to the Raven*, which Nelson wrote and co-produced, is titled "Life in the Bear."³⁶ It shows Tony Sam, his brother Wilson, a nephew, and a friend hunting bear in dens. When Tony Sam finds a den and determines that it is occupied, he calls to the other hunters, who have dispersed into the forest, to join him. Instead of killing the bear by himself he wants to give the others a chance to share in his success, for this is more important than succeeding by itself. The

hunters clear the entrance of the den, removing the moss and grass that the bear used to block the opening. Tony Sam explains that before he shoots a bear he talks to it. "I always talk with the bear when they are in there [the den]. If I know he's in there, then I talk with the bear. But it's hard to explain; I ain't going to explain that. [It is] so he doesn't get rough with you. That's the reason I do that. My old man taught me to [do it]." Hunters also talk to bear when hunting in the open. Preparing to shoot a bear in the distance a man might say, "I am your friend—be easy with me—go slow—put up your head."³⁷ The video recording shows a bear peering out of the entrance of the opened den before Tony Sam shoots it at close range. At another den we see two of the hunters aiming their rifles at the entrance while another hunter pulls out moss from the entrance. We do not see the actual shooting of the bear. Afterwards, Tony Sam explains that he had to hold his flashlight next to the barrel of his rifle in order to see into the den as he shot the bear.

The hunters tie a rope around the bear's neck or leg and pull it out. The rope must be a "clean" one that has not been around dogs or anything that might offend the bear's spirit. Before butchering the carcass Wilson Sam carefully slits the bear's eyeballs. He does this so that the bear's spirit will not see if he violates one of the many rules of proper treatment. The first thing the men do after skinning the carcass is to cut up the intestines and roast them for the women and children at home. (It is "like candy" says Tony Sam.) After the meat is cut up and packed in the sled, the head and the skin are left at the site of the kill. These parts are potent and the consequences of violating them are strong, especially for women. Although women may eat certain parts of the bear, contact with other parts would offend the animal and cause other bears to avoid the hunter who killed it. A few days after the black bear has been killed, Tony Sam and his friend hold a "bear party." The feast is a modest affair, a dozen or so men and boys, gathered outdoors near the woods, cutting up and cooking bear meat (the neck and backbone parts) which have been put aside for this purpose. The men say that women are not allowed to eat the head or the neck parts of the bear ("The women would get mean from it"), so they gather outdoors at a clean forested place away from the village and

women to hold their party. The men say that it is good to get together in this way. They build a fire, saw up the neck bones, roast and boil the meat, talk with each other, and enjoy the feast.

Several of the men speak about what they are doing. They say that the bear party helps them “keep their luck,” so that they will continue to catch more bear. “From my perspective, you know, it’s hard to get bear,” says one of the hunters. “There’s a lot of luck involved. So this is kind of a way of [the hunters] getting their luck, you know. They keep their luck going all the time, whoever get bear.” The way to keep this luck is to have a bear party and to share the bear meat among the hunters, other men and boys, even babies. Another hunter says, “It keeps up the good luck for the people that’s catching bear. My father, he taught us how. We’re a big family, and we hunt all over. And he taught us how to do it. Some of us can catch it, and some of us can’t, you know.” One hunter says that the bear party “is a really important part of our culture. It’s a concept of sharing that’s in our culture. I think it’s good that the old people keep emphasizing that.”

At the bear party they tell stories about bear hunting, and they tell tales from the Distant Time when all the animals were human beings. Tony Sam tells a story about the Bear and the Lynx. “The Lynx asked the Bear, ‘How long would you last if you turned away from people?’ The Bear says, ‘Oh, maybe four years or five years, maybe then I’ll come back to the person again and try him out again.’ The Lynx says, ‘Not me. If I turn away, I stay away. I’ll never go back to a person again.’” The story explains why the hunters hold the bear party. It is a way of showing respect to the bear after it is killed. If this is not done, the bear will “turn away” and the hunters will not be able to find or kill any more for a long time. Speaking about his success, Tony Sam explains:

I always take care of my animal. I’m happy with it, and it always comes back to me. Every fall, summer, winter, you know. If I look for it, it comes. It takes time, sometimes. A lot of work. You got to do a lot of work on it to do any good. Some of us go out one or two days and don’t catch anything. We get disgusted. But not me. I don’t do that. I just keep right on going till I see something or somebody catches something with me. That’s the way my old man taught me. When I hunt bear, you know, we’ll get to it [kill a bear]. He’ll let

us find him. If we don't find him, we don't find him, you see. If we've got good luck with it, then we'll find him.

On the surface, the bear party does not seem to be a ritualistic occasion. The men speak about it pragmatically as a way of insuring successful hunting and of renewing traditional culture. But, as Nelson was told, the bear party is implicitly a funerary potlatch for the bear spirit.³⁸ A Koyukon potlatch is a ceremony that honors the deceased with food and gifts for relatives and friends. The soul of the deceased sees that many people have come to the potlatch in his or her name and that the food and gifts have made people happy. Satisfied and content, the soul will then depart and not bother his or her kinsmen. In the bear party the hunters honor the bear as one of the most powerful animal spirits; and, according to one of Nelson's informants, in eating the special parts of the bear reserved for the bear party they "eat the main part of the bear's *life*."³⁹

By performing a funeral potlatch, the hunters make the bear an honorary member of the human community, recalling the relation that obtained in the Distant Time. The bear party epitomizes the moral and spiritual relationship between human beings and the animal kingdom. The Koyukon believe that they can live only by the generosity of the animals which they earn by treating them with respect, as if they were human beings. The bear party expresses the moral message of the hunt: "We pay respect to you so that you will continue to give yourself to us that we may live." So it is with all the other animals. The bear party therefore performs the way things are understood from the Koyukon perspective, and it is a means of maintaining this understanding.

This view of the bear party can be made clearer if we contrast it with the interpretation Smith's theory suggests. Following Smith, we might say that the bear party springs from a perceived gap between the Koyukon experience of bear hunting and the "ideology" expressed in the ritual. For the Koyukon, we might say, bear hunting is recognized (implicitly or explicitly) as an exploitive and destructive action undertaken for purposes of acquiring meat and social prestige. They therefore see a contradiction between their ideology which says that bears "give" themselves to the hunters and their deliberate actions in finding and killing them. Realizing this, the hunters perform the bear party to express their

view of “the way things ought to be” in contrast to “the way things are,” so that they may justify their actions and “perfect” the otherwise cold-blooded and brutal experience of the hunt.

This interpretation, it may be noted, is similar to that proposed by Lot-Falck in her study of Siberian hunters. “Although driven by necessity,” she says, “the hunter is not convinced of the legitimacy of his act; his feeling of guilt is clearly evident in the care that he takes to justify himself, to disengage his responsibility, to reconcile himself with his victim.”⁴⁰ That is, the hunters’ rituals are merely elaborate ways of denying feelings of guilt about killing animals, and their purpose is simply to legitimate the killing.

The Norwegian scholar Carl-Martin Edsman expresses a similar view in writing about the bear-runers in the Finnish *Kalevala*. He suggests that the participants in the bear feast are “burdened with guilt.” Hence they console the bear in song while carrying the steaming pot of bear soup from the kitchen hut to the cabin: “Lo! the cook has died in the kitchen,” they sing, “and his boy in the porch has fallen.”⁴¹ However, the joyfulness of the hunters, as depicted in a seventeenth-century drawing of a Finnish bear feast reproduced in Edsman’s essay,⁴² hardly conveys feelings of guilt. Understood in this context, the purpose of the songs seems to be aimed at fooling the bear into believing that the hunters are sorry to have killed it so that the bear will not take offense. In the *Kalevala* hunters protest their innocence and try to reconcile themselves with the bear they have killed: “Let us take the paws in handclasp/... I it was not that o’erthrew you./... You yourself slipped from the brushwood,/you yourself from the fork tumbled down.”⁴³ The purpose of these songs is not to express guilt but to placate the bear so that it will give itself to the hunters again.

Smith, too, thinks that hunters need to legitimate their actions and rationalize their ideology in the face of contradictory experience. “Is it humanly plausible,” Smith asks, “that a hunter who has killed by skill and stealth view his act solely as an unfortunate accident?”⁴⁴ Here Smith requires the investigator to inject his or her own sense of plausibility into the interpretive process, which of course must be done. But context and evidence are all important, no matter whether one is in the “armchair” or the field. Smith asks the investigator to decide nothing less than whether the

bear hunters believe their own words. In the above example from the *Kalevala*, it seems clear that their words are not to be taken literally and the hunters know it.

Let us return to the Koyukon. We must agree with the symbolic anthropologists, I think, and assume that language determines how people understand and explain their experience. Does the hunter simply find and selfishly kill a hibernating bear or does he believe his success is a matter of the bear "giving" itself to him? It depends on the language he uses. Is the hunter's view of his success explainable in terms of his skill or in terms of Koyukon notions of "luck" and "respect" for animals? Again, it depends on the language the hunter uses. Even the deceitful use of language is linguistically determined, as good ethnography will show. For example, Nelson tells about a man who killed a starving bear and her cubs, after realizing that they had been driven from their den by ground water and were wandering hopelessly in the deep snow. When the hunter finished cutting up the bear carcasses, as a gesture of utilization and respect, he told his companion, "We'll come back for this later," a placating promise that he did not intend to keep.⁴⁵ The issue here is one of empirical fact: What do the hunters actually say and do? Is there evidence that they are somehow implicitly or explicitly hypocritical in performing the bear party?

If we were to apply Smith's theory to the bear party, we would have to say that the Koyukon hunters implicitly (if not explicitly) recognize that hunting is a cold-blooded act accomplished entirely by the hunters' stealth and skill. Since this contradicts their "ideology" of reciprocity between bears and men, the hunters must be said to perform the bear party in order to "focus" themselves upon this ideology despite their recognition that things are otherwise. The ritual may therefore be said to portray bear hunting as it "ought to be," a mutually respectful, moral, and reciprocal relationship, instead of the way the hunters actually know it "is," a unilateral, exploitive, and destructive one.

If this interpretation is to be evaluated (and not merely imposed upon the ethnography), there must be evidence for it; and it seems clear that there is none. There are, indeed, important references to Koyukon hunters who do not share the traditional view, although these individuals are not dealt with in Nelson's book or the televi-

sion series. Their absence is of course understandable, as they presumably no longer employ the special language and taboos of the bear hunt or accept the meaning of the bear party. For them to attend the party would obviously be hypocritical.

Nevertheless, one might still insist that Smith's theory represents the fundamental truth of the situation. But it is not cogent philosophically to try to assert such a God's-eye point of view, a sort of "transcultural rationality,"⁴⁶ nor would such an assertion address the question at issue. The issue here is one of intelligibility concerning the Koyukon understanding of the bear party, not the intrinsic nature of reality, against which to measure Koyukon ritual. The outsider's perspective of reality may of course contradict the Koyukon view, and it is the privilege of the outsider to insist upon his own criteria of plausibility and credibility. The problem lies in confusing the two, in giving priority to the outsider's view of reality, "the way things are," and in assuming that the natives must share this view so that their rituals become merely forced "ideological" statements about the way "things ought to be." No wonder Smith understands ritual to be a self-conscious rationalization of attempts to control a world that the natives believe they cannot compel. From this perspective we would have to say that the Koyukon view of bear hunting is an illusion, that they know it, and that they hold the bear party because of an obsessive need to believe it anyway. This, it appears, comes very close to saying that the Koyukon hunter lives in a Freudian cuckoo-land.

The way out of this problem is through careful representation of the Koyukon view of the world. This may differ from the outsider's view, and if so, the Koyukon can truly be said to live in a different world. For the Koyukon, this is a world that is ultimately defined by religious ideas and practices, by the Distant Time stories, and by ceremonies such as the bear party. "Religion," Geertz points out, "alters, often radically, the whole landscape presented to common sense, alters it in such a way that the moods and motivations induced by religious practice seem themselves supremely practical, the only sensible ones to adopt given the way things 'really' are."⁴⁷ Hence, the skeptic's and believer's ideas of what is plausible and credible may radically differ on some points, although of course not

on all.⁴⁸ The only problem with Geertz's model is that it presupposes that in the ritual context the believer "leaps" or "slips" (to use Geertz's metaphors) from a common-sense perspective to a religious one and back again when the ritual is finished, whereas for the believer there is in fact no perspectival jumping or sliding around, as is clear from the way the Koyukon hunters talk about the bear party.

For the Koyukon hunters, it seems, the world "is" the way it "ought to be," and ritual helps to keep the two fused together. Koyukon say they "talk" to the bear, show it "respect," and hold a "bear party" so that the bear will continue to "give" itself to them. There is therefore a profound correspondence between Koyukon words and deeds, between what they say and do in the bear party and what they say and do while hunting.

Despite this fundamental fusion between religious imagery and perceived reality, there appears to be no basis for interpreting the bear party as an Eliadian enactment of a myth.⁴⁹ Some northern hunters, to be sure, tell stories about a bear that was killed and received ceremonial attention from human beings in the primordial time, and this myth does seem to serve as an archetype for the post-mortem rites among these groups.⁵⁰ But no such myth has been recorded among the Koyukon. Nor is it possible to understand the bear party as a ritual return to a mythical time in the way Eliade's theory might suggest. For the Koyukon, the original identity that existed between animals and human beings was forever destroyed by the great flood. Thereafter, human beings and animals became entirely separate and different. Nevertheless, Eliade's theory, more broadly interpreted, does draw attention to the way in which ritual expresses mythic themes. The bear party is based upon the notion of a moral relationship between humans and animals which existed from the very beginning. This notion is central to the Distant Time stories, and the bear party both expresses this mythic idea and helps to maintain the hunters' belief in it.

In addition to being a symbolic expression that honors the bear, the bear party is also, for the hunters, an instrumental act. It is a means of controlling the bears' behavior and keeping the hunters' "luck." Given the premise of reciprocity, the hunters intend the bear party to have nonconventional results, that is, they expect it

will oblige the bear to give itself to them again. In this way it helps them keep their “luck” so they can kill more bears, a point that the hunters emphasize in explaining the purpose of the ceremony.

Luck, as indicated above, is a quality that can be increased or decreased by a hunter’s behavior, and the bear party is one of the ways of “keeping” it. The principle here is the sympathetic one of “like produces like,” of treating the bear like a human being by holding a funerary potlatch so that it will respond by giving itself to the hunters again. The bear party is therefore a kind of hunting magic or perlocutionary utterance performed with the intent of sustaining the hunters’ success, although of course the results are not automatic or guaranteed. Tony Sam admits that he often fails to find bear, and he attributes his relative success to both his persistence and his luck.

For Tony Sam, then, there is a fundamental congruence between the ritual of the bear party and his experience of the world. Contrary to Smith’s view that hunting rituals testify to the hunter’s belief that he is “not in control,” the bear party expresses the hunter’s conviction that he can actually influence his environment. Continued success confirms his view of the efficacy of the bear party and strengthens his attachment to it. Efficacious ritual is not, as Smith rightly notes, to be regarded as an “offensive against the objective world,”⁵¹ just as a perlocutionary utterance is not an offensive against the socio-linguistic world. Rather, such performances are expressions of the hunter’s claim that he is a recognized player in the wider universe, a universe in which his actions, both ritual and nonritual, have effect. Indeed, performing the bear party is one of the ways the Koyukon keep their experience of bear hunting consistent with their understanding of their moral relationship to the bear. It not only expresses and validates this relationship, it deepens the hunters’ commitment to it.

This, I think, is the way we should understand some of the “bare facts” of Koyukon bear rituals.

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¹ "The Bare Facts of Ritual," *Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 53-65. This is a revised version of "The Bare Facts of Ritual," *History of Religions* 20 (1980): 112-27.

² *Ibid.*, p. 62.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸ Richard K. Nelson, *Make Prayers to the Raven* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983).

⁹ A.I. Hallowell, "Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern Hemisphere," *American Anthropologist* 28 (1926): 1-175; Eveline Lot-Falck, *Les rites de chasse sur les peuples sibériens* (Paris: Gallimard, 1953).

¹⁰ For simplicity, I have retained the use of the ethnographic present tense, even though in many societies most of these hunting procedures and ceremonial customs are now obsolete.

¹¹ Waldemar Jochelson, *The Koryak*. Edited by Franz Boas. Memoir of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 6. The Jesup North Pacific Expedition (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1905-1908), p. 555.

¹² Richard K. Nelson, *Hunters of the Northern Forest* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 120.

¹³ Hallowell, pp. 144-45.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121.

¹⁵ "Bare Facts," pp. 60-61.

¹⁶ Hallowell, "Bear Ceremonialism," p. 54.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.

¹⁸ "Bare Facts," p. 61.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

²¹ John Batchelor, *The Ainu and Their Folk-Lore* (London: Religious Tract Society, 1901), Ch. 42; Joseph M. Kitagawa, "Ainu Bear Festival (Iyomante)," *History of Religions* 1, no. 1 (1961), pp. 95-151; Alexander M. Zolotarev, "The Bear Festival of the Olcha," *American Anthropologist* 39 (1937), pp. 113-130, 123.

²² "Bare Facts," p. 63.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 56.

²⁴ Jonathan Z. Smith, *To take Place: Toward Theory in Ritual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 111.

²⁵ "Bare Facts," p. 57.

²⁶ *To Take Place*, p. 109.

²⁷ Clifford Geertz, "Religion As a Cultural System," in: *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1973), p. 112.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 122.

²⁹ Mary Douglas, *Purity and Danger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 66.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

³² Valerio Valeri, *Kingship and Sacrifice*. Translated from the French by Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), especially pp. 62-74, 343. See also Benjamin C. Ray, "'Performative Utterances' in African Rituals," *History of Religions* 13, no. 1 (1973): 16-35.

³³ Victor Turner, *From Ritual to Theatre* (New York: Performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982), p. 82.

³⁴ On this important topic, see Terry F. Godlove Jr., *Religion, Interpretation and Diversity of Belief*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Godlove's devastating criticism of the Durkheimian notion of religion as a conceptual scheme does not, however, apply to the ritual theories of Geertz, Douglas, or Valeri.

³⁵ *Make Prayers to the Raven*, see especially pages 16-32, 172-84, 225-237; *Make Prayers to the Raven*, Parts 1-5. Produced by KUAC-TV. Richard K. Nelson, writer & associate producer. (Fairbanks: University of Alaska-Fairbanks, 1987).

³⁶ *Make Prayers to the Raven*, KUAC-TV. Part 5: "Life in the Bear."

³⁷ Nelson, *Make Prayers to the Raven*, p. 179.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 181. For further information on the Koyukon funerary potlatch, see *Make Prayers to the Raven*. KUAC-TV. Part 2.

³⁹ *Make Prayers to the Raven*, p. 182.

⁴⁰ *Les Rites de chasse*, p. 9.

⁴¹ Edsman, "The Hunter, the Game, and the Unseen Powers: Lappish and Finish Bear Rites," in: Harald Hvarfner, ed., *Hunting and Fishing* (Lulea, Sweden: Cliches Buchtropps, 1965), p. 185. See also, Carl-Martin Edsman, "Bears," in: Mircea Eliade, Editor-in-Chief, *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. Vol. 2 (New York: MacMillan, 1987), pp. 86-89.

⁴² Edsman, "The Hunter," p. 186.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴⁴ "The Bare Facts," p. 61.

⁴⁵ *Make Prayers to the Raven*, p. 24.

⁴⁶ I borrow this expression from Richard Rorty, *Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth*. Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 26.

⁴⁷ "Religion As a Cultural System," p. 122.

⁴⁸ On this point, see Godlove, *Religion, Interpretation and Diversity of Belief*, Ch. 4.

⁴⁹ "Any ritual whatever ... unfolds not only in consecrated space ... but also in a 'sacred time,' 'once upon a time' (*in illo tempore, ab origine*), that is, when the ritual was performed for the first time by a god, an ancestor, or a hero" (Mircea Eliade, *Cosmos and History*. Translated from the French by Willard R. Trask. New York: Harper & Row, 1959).

⁵⁰ For myths of this kind, see E.A. Alekseenko, "The Cult of Bear among the Ket (Yenisei Ostyaks)" in: *Popular Beliefs and Folklore Traditional in Siberia*. Edited by V. Dioszegi (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), pp. 178-81; Kitagawa, "Ainu Bear Festival," pp. 139-40; Edsman, "The Hunter, the Game, and the Unseen Powers," pp. 171-75.

⁵¹ "The Bare Facts," p. 65.