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The Culture War and the Sacred/Secular Divide: The Problem of Pluralism and Weak Hegemony

ON THE FACE OF IT, THE CULTURE WAR THAT HAS UNFOLDED OVER the last several decades has been a proxy for the conflict between the sacred and the secular. At its rhetorical extreme, one could hear accusations and counteraccusations among activists about the opposing threats of equally exclusive theocratic and secular social orders. Though this kind of hyperbole always strained credulity, there were also some good reasons to take seriously the more tempered view that the culture war really was at least partially predicated upon a division between religious and secular sensibilities.

One witnessed it play out within the symbolism on a range of issues, from abortion (where the fetus is either made in God's image or is merely potentially human) to sexuality (where homosexuality is characterized either as natural and beautiful or a perversion of sacred order); from avant-garde art (that is regarded as either innovative or sacrilegious) to church-state issues (where faith has either a privileged status or no status in the shaping of law and public policy); from gender (where roles and authority within the family either model a sacred order or are human constructions for which we are free to negotiate) to education (where schools cultivate values that either reflect the Judeo-Christian tradition or that are pragmatic and subjectivist).

One also saw it in the demography of popular support for different positions on contested issues. For example, the strongest supporters of restrictions on abortion and gay rights have long been disproportionately from the ranks of the most religiously observant and the strongest supporters of abortion rights are disproportionately less observant and even secular in their self-described preferences.

One could see it play out further in the historical narrative that has animated competing visions of American history and purpose. The discourse surrounding America's origin and meaning has been at odds, where one hears, on the one hand, a story about America whose destiny is framed by providence or else a story of America as a noble but thoroughly secular experiment.

Even well-known commentators reinforced this perception. As Simon Schama said of the election of 2004, "not since the Civil War has the fault lines between its two halves been so glaringly clear. . . . It is time we called those two Americas something other than Republican and Democrat, for their mutual alienation and unforgiving contempt is closer to Sunni and Shia, or (in Indian terms) Muslim and Hindu. How about, then, Godly America and Worldly America."[1]

Again, on the face of it, the conflict within American public culture over the last decades appeared to be a proxy for a conflict between two hegemonic tendencies—one based in religion and the other based in secularity. As such, each in its own way, engaged in a denial of pluralism.

The reality, of course, has been and remains more complicated than this. The simple duality between the sacred and the secular was always clearest from a distance and in the abstract. One problem is that in lived experience, neither the sacred nor the secular exists as generic realities. They are, by nature, particular and thus plural. What is more, except among the most extreme, neither side ever rejected pluralism either as a principle or as a reality. Activists and organizations on both sides of the cultural divide embraced the symbolic identity of America as *e pluribus unum*. The central questions were and are, What is the nature of the *unum*? And what are the limits of the *pluribus*? Though far from welcoming, the defenders of traditional order never

denied a place for secularists and the advocates of progressive change never denied a place for people of faith, even people of orthodox faith. Whatever else it may have been, cultural conflict in America has been a conflict over the range and limits of acceptable pluralism; over where and how and on what terms the boundaries of tolerable diversity would be drawn.

PLURALISM IS, NEEDLESS TO SAY, A DEFINING AND PERMANENT feature of the modern world order. We late moderns are constituted by our differences and its resulting—even if perhaps unintended—syncretisms.

In this context, there has been a strong tendency to view pluralism and, especially, the pluralism of belief, as an endless and random patchwork quilt of beliefs. The leading accounts in sociology have certainly depicted pluralism this way. Wade Clark Roof, for example, has described it as "a brilliantly colored kaleidoscope ever taking on new configurations of blended hues" (Roof 2001: 4). Faith in America, he argued, is a broad and eclectic marketplace of faiths and spiritualities that includes everyone from religious dogmatists and born-again Christians to mainstream believers, from metaphysical seekers to secularists, all of whom are distinctive in their lifestyles, family patterns, and moral values.

This sense of modern pluralism as a near-infinite yet random number of spiritual and religious positions is reinforced in phenomenological descriptions in which we all experience "an ever-widening variety of moral/spiritual options, across the thinkable and perhaps even beyond." Modern conditions of belief have created, in Charles Taylor's terms, a spiritual supernova that creates in between exclusive theism and an exclusive self-sufficient materialism "a space in which people can wander between and around all these options without having to land clearly and definitively in any one" (Taylor 2007: 351). The expressivism of the Romantic period has only validated this "wandering" in subjective consciousness as a quest for authenticity.

Not least, this idea of pluralism as a rich and mostly arbitrary tapestry of belief has long been validated as a normative ideal. This

finds expression in one of the leading traditions of political theory, in which the state remains "independent of controversial philosophical and religious doctrines" (Rawls 1985) precisely because of the impossibility of finding consensus among the range of religious and moral options. This is validated in legal theory in the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. It also finds expression in education, where multicultural curricula celebrates the range of diverse cultures, each with its own relatively distinctive way of life and identity; none better or worse that any other. Paeans to a wide, indiscriminate diversity can be found in popular culture as well.[2]

There is validity and virtue to this picture of pluralism and yet, on its own, it is misleading as a description of the full range of pluralism's nature and dynamics. In particular, these accounts leave out a range of institutional factors—structures of power—that make pluralism in public life anything but indiscriminate or random.

CONSIDER THE MATTER HISTORICALLY. WHERE PLURALISM HAS existed throughout most of human history, it has tended to operate within the framework of a strong dominant culture. This has always and everywhere been the experience of the Jewish community, but it has been true for others as well: Christians in pagan antiquity, Muslims in the Venetian republic of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, Latin Christians in Byzantium through the High Middle Ages, and Baha'is in Persia. If one were a part of a minority religious or philosophical community, one understood the governing assumptions, conventions, and practices of social life and learned how to operate within them the best one could. Because of the relatively insular nature of social life, whether in the majority or the minority, one could be convinced of the superiority of one's own beliefs and ways of life and not necessarily have to ever seriously face up to the claims of another. Even through the modern period, religious and philosophical diversity existed within a dominant public culture. In nineteenth-century America, for example, Catholics and Jews had to learn how to survive in a public culture that was overpoweringly Protestant and through most of the twentieth century, Jews, secularists, Buddhists, Hindus, and

Muslims have had to learn how to survive in a public culture that was predominantly Christian.

This, it seems to me, is no longer the case. Religious and philosophical pluralism—at least in late modern America—exists without a dominant culture, at least not one of overwhelming credibility or one that is beyond challenge. This does not mean that in some important quarters of social life, a particular cultural orientation will not have an advantage over others. In elite realms of cultural production, for example, the world of academia, the news media, high art and fashion, a certain kind of narrow secularity prevails. In other quarters, such as the military, an orthodox Christian theism seems ubiquitous and has, accordingly, enormous sway. There are, of course, important regional differences as well—say, in the Bible Belt, the Bay Area, the Northeast, for example. The playing field in which contemporary pluralism exists, then, is far from even.

There is another factor to consider. In our time, what does exist of a dominant culture is attenuated. Indeed, if there is a center in American culture and politics today, it is certainly not "the vital center" that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. described and hoped for at mid-century (Schlesinger 1949). In fact, it is probably fair to say that Schlesinger's "vital center" and the WASP consensus that underwrote it may have begun to erode the moment he declared its triumph. What "center" exists today seems to be mostly passive and of the thinnest content. This "center" is certainly not dense in its normative foundations, clear and purposeful in its vision for the future, or coherent in its political ideals. This is not to say that there aren't civic-minded people or organizations that aspire to such vitality on behalf of the common good. There are many. Rather, it is only to say that it such vitality is not shared in ways that transcend political party or partisan interest or in ways that provide thick and unifying normative affirmations. One can identify hypernorms, agreements in public opinion, but those agreements tend to be minimal at best. To imagine any unanimity beyond these minimal agreements, one that would give expression to extensive and multilayered understandings of the world and our purpose in it, is doubtful. For the foreseeable future, the likelihood that any one culture could

become dominant in the ways that Protestantism and Christianity did in the past is not great.

What this means is that a fragile and unstable pluralism has become a fundamental feature of the contemporary social order, both here in America and, perhaps, the world.

But this does not mean that such instability is permanent or that there aren't other factors in play that could effect the interrelation within this pluralistic mix. In short, there are strong motivational factors that bear on the mobilization of resources as well as institutional pressures, most notably in the requirement of law and public policy that press us to a greater articulacy in public culture; an articulacy that forces agreements where, in an intensely pluralistic society, agreements are neither natural nor consensual.

There are, for one, pressures created by the practical need for a universal system of law and justice. Law, we know, is not just a formal system of rules telling us what we can and cannot do, must and must not do. Laws, if only implicitly, also contain a moral story that proclaim the ideals and principles of the people who live by them, and as such give particular legal prescriptions their meaning and purpose.[3] They speak of a society's understanding of the common good. Universal public education exerts other pressures toward finding and maintaining some thicker agreements in public culture. It is not so much the particular skills children acquire in school as it is what they learn about the national heritage and culture; and the duties of civic life necessary to sustain that heritage. Questions concerning the common culture are implicit here too. And then there is the need for policies to guide a nation's interaction with other nations. In matters of trade, immigration, and, most prominently, war, standards of justice and prudence are inescapably at play.

Not least are the motivational factors that effect the mobilization of resources in populist social movements. Minimally, individuals, associations, and communities are motivated to survive. This means, at the least, protecting their rights to believe, associate, and practice their religious or moral commitments without interference or prejudice. This is not a given in a context where the very existence of a group or set of

beliefs or practices may seem to threaten the existence or flourishing of another. It is important not to underestimate the passions involved here. People in these moral communities feel genuinely threatened. They perceive that what makes them authentic as human beings—whether their deepest convictions, their closest relationships, or their most cherished ideals or capacities—are endangered. It is not only their own interests that they see as endangered but their deepest convictions about what is in the interests of society as a whole. It is no wonder that political passions are enflamed. The good that is in the world depends upon their engagement and the influence they can wield.

All of these factors combine in ways that require greater specification in law, social policy, ethics, and the like, of the terms by which common life is ordered and regulated. For all of these reasons, neither the state nor any other institution can be strictly neutral in matters pertaining to the public good. All institutions make binding decisions affecting the whole of society, in the name of society itself. To formulate law and policy, then, is, as Robert Cover put it, to create and sustain a particular *nomos*, a normative universe that draws distinctions, discriminates, judges, excludes as well as includes. It is, in short, to weigh in and even take sides on the matter of the public good.

In the case of the state, its decisions are reinforced by its claims to the sole legitimate use of violence (Weber 1946: 78) Those who fundamentally disagree with the principles contained in law, refuse to submit to them, and work outside of established channels for changing them are, therefore, vulnerable to the exigencies of state-imposed violence. It matters a great deal, then, how the government formulates law and public policy in response to the various cultural controversies.

This creates a double-bind. On the one hand, a strong consensual culture (at least in any explicit sense) is difficult to establish precisely because belief is so fragmented.[4] On the other hand, a social order marked by a fragile and unstable pluralism is difficult to sustain over time because there are built-in institutional pressures to resolve differences among rival factional interests and opposing moral ideals.[5]

In some respects, the culture war can be seen as an attempt to resolve this double-bind through the effort of competing sides of the

cultural divide to establish a "weak hegemony." By weak hegemony I do not mean anything as robust as a dominant ideology in the Marxist formulation of the phrase. Rather, I refer to a minimal and flexible framework of epistemic propensities,[6] normative assumptions, dispositions, myths, and symbols that loosely order public life; that allows room for a certain range of acceptable diversity.

It is this effort to establish a weak hegemony that explains why so many *cultural* issues have been contested *politically*—through litigation, lobbying, and electoral politics. When factions employ these tools, they use the instrumentalities of the state in order to secure the patronage of the state, its resources and, finally, its coercive power. Needless to say, all of these instrumentalities run roughshod over the actual far-ranging plurality of religious and cultural commitment, typically reducing them to crude simplifications, often based upon the narrow interests of activists.

The effort to establish a weak hegemony also helps to explain the lopsided influence of cultural elites, the wide-ranging institutions they lead, and their use of the instrumentalities of public discourse. By virtue of having a disproportionate access to the means of public communication, they provide the concepts, supply the grammar, and explicate the logic of public discussion. In so doing, they have been and are in a position to define and redefine the meaning of public symbols as well as provide the legitimating or delegitimating narratives of public life. In all of these ways, they, along with the institutions they serve, come to frame the terms of public discussion.[7] In their net effect, the special interests and the constraints built into the technologies of mass communication mean that public discourse is truncated, eliminating much of the complexity of public discourse.

The actual diversity of attitude, opinion, and belief in the general population, then, was never reflected in the kind of artificially polarized rhetoric of the special purpose groups, nor was it reflected in the platforms or agendas of political parties, para-church groups, denominations, and the like. Public discourse always tended to be more polarized than its citizens' beliefs and moral commitments.

But that is just the point. The discursive and the political often overlap but, in their net effect, they always reinforced each other.

Complexity, subtlety, reflectiveness, nuance—all of the things that make for serious and substantive democratic engagement get forced into a grid of rhetorical extremes. In the end, plurality is reduced to duality; polyphony is very quickly reduced to a crude, hackneyed and discordant diaphony.

In sum, while the picture of a random and indiscriminate plurality provides a useful description of much experience in the private sphere and in individual life, it is less useful when considering what takes place in the public sphere. To rework Taylor's terms, how pluralism is "spun" within the imminent frame, particularly through the structure of powerful institutions and symbols in the public sphere, has significant consequences for both public and private life.

TO REFLECT ON WHAT THIS MEANS FOR PLURALISM, LET'S STEP BACK for a moment.

In a context of fragile and unstable pluralism, boundary work is a sociological necessity. Collective identities become crystallized most sharply in relation to others who are different. The various means of social control (for example, through punishment, litigation, ostracism, opprobrium, name-calling, and the like) highlight these differences and are, in fact, ways in which social groups assert their own collective identity, establish and reestablish their moral authority, reinforce the group's solidarity, and maintain boundaries between insiders and outsiders. This dynamic is a fundamental feature of social life at all levels of complexity or simplicity. Without such boundary work, a social group, a community, or a whole society faces what may be an even greater danger—its own internal moral disintegration (Douglas 1966). It is especially important in a time of fragility and instability.

Clearly boundaries have been redrawn and protected. But how?

The premise of my own work on the normative conflicts of the last half-century was that a realignment was taking place in American public culture that was playing out not just on the surface of social life but at the deepest and most profound levels; not just at the level of ideology but in its public symbols, its myths, its discourse, and the institutional structures that generate and sustain public culture. This

realignment cut across age-old divisions between Protestants and Catholics and Jews. It also cut through the Enlightenment, dividing secularists operating out of early Enlightenment epistemologies from those operating out of high and post-Enlightenment epistemologies. The orthodox in these religio-cultural traditions now had much more in common with each other than they did with progressives in their own faith or philosophical tradition and vice versa.

In other words, the conflict has changed all of the players involved. So too it has changed the dynamics of pluralism. In particular, the tactical nature of the ongoing cultural conflict and the issues themselves forced pragmatic alliances among communities and confessions that had been at daggers for centuries. Anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism are both deep and virulent and their histories are a critical chapter of American history. Evangelicals in alliance with Catholics? Christians in alliance with Jews? Theists of different stripes in alliance with secularists? The boundaries of tolerable diversity have been redrawn through this conflict. But at the same time this realignment also created new lines of division and exclusion.

In effect, the main actors on opposing sides have come to operate with an implicit two-tier model of pluralism or tolerable diversity. On one tier, there are those with whom they share complementary epistemologies, moral visions, and social interests. Among these, there is a general disposition to let a thousand flowers bloom. On the other tier are those who do not share the compatible epistemological and normative assumptions. On this tier, each side regards the others' beliefs and ways of life with a mixture of derision and indifference. The general disposition is to tolerate the other so long as they keep to themselves. But indifference turns to opposition (and often open hostility) the moment the other seeks to widen their boundaries of legitimacy and social influence. It is the aspiration to influence in the public sphere—asserting a power oriented toward maintaining or expanding the boundaries of social space—that constitutes the fundamental breach.

What I think all of this suggests is that there are certain *structural* preconditions for tolerance. Tolerance, in short, may not be so much a function of "enlightenment" (though I do not want to sell "enlight-

enment" short), as it is a function of the relative sharpness of moral boundaries separating groups, where those boundaries are drawn, and on what side you stand. With the restructuring of pluralism, the boundaries separating groups has shifted. As the lines dividing Protestant, Catholic, and Jew have become more indistinct, toleration and acceptance have increased but as the lines dividing orthodox from progressive have become clearer and sharper, new bigotries have begun to take shape. The contemporary conflict, then, is not so much between one alliance that is tolerant (because it is cosmopolitan and highly educated) and another that is intolerant (because it is religiously conservative and less well educated). Neither is it between those who would guide people toward truth and those who would indoctrinate. Each side asserts its own parochialisms. Here again we see that the cultural conflict emerges over how pluralism is constituted; over what range of beliefs and moral practices are tolerable or intolerable.

But things continue to be in flux. Actors are changed by the encounter.

There is something more going on here. Longer-standing boundaries between the sacred and secular are being renegotiated as well. Let's step back even further.

ONE WAY THAT THE HISTORY OF AMERICA CAN BE TOLD IS THROUGH THE story of expanding pluralism and, not least, religious pluralism. With each wave of expansion in religious and cultural pluralism, not to mention racial and ethnic pluralism, came a challenge to inherited understandings of America's collective identity and civic culture. This expansion has been anything but linear, gradual, and harmonious. With every surge of expansion, the stability of public culture was challenged. Tension, conflict, and, at times, violence ensued as rising groups have challenged an existing social, religious, and political establishment that excluded them from public life and from membership and participation in collective life. It is arguable that some of the nation's greatest sufferings have occurred at precisely these points of expansion and, in turn, the struggle for assimilation. This is perhaps most obviously true as it bears on race and ethnicity but it is no less true as it bears on religious and moral community.

The story is told repeatedly. Thus, as the number of Catholics increased, their marginality was reinforced through institutional, physical and symbolic coercion. It was not only innumerable groups such as the Know-Nothing Society that were bent on purging the country of "foreign influence, Popery, Jesuitism, and Catholicism," it was a sentiment deeply embedded within the economic, educational, and status structures of the entire society. It was only after more than a century of hostility and the realization that Catholics were not going away that the position of Catholics changed to one of grudging inclusion. The experience of the Mormons partially overlaps that of Catholics and their reception too was anything but warm and hospitable. Rejection, denunciation, exclusion, and even murder forced their Westward migration. The same can be said for the Jewish immigration: anti-Semitism was part and parcel of the Jewish experience in America from the beginning. There are elements of this beginning with the Muslim community. In sum, tension, conflict, and violence are inherent within pluralism and particularly at the points of expansion. Hostility, prejudice, exclusion, and violence are not so much religious debates carried too far, but rather tensions inherent to the contest over social space and collective identity.[8]

Eventually space has opened up and new boundaries are normalized around them. They achieve some acceptance within the public imagination and their inclusion is reinforced within public institutions.[9] In short, assimilation occurs—but over a long period of time (sometimes multiple generations) and never without social tensions and conflict.

But normalization is never stasis. Configurations of authority are never without challenge, never without conflicting pressures. The boundaries continue to shift. The last decades of the twentieth century were a time of incredible flux in which the terms of older establishments have destabilized and what will replace them remain contested and thus undecided. The culture war can be read as a negotiation over what will come next.

Alliances notwithstanding, the two most prominent actors in this conflict have been cultural elites from Evangelicalism and secularism (such as it is). I am going to paint with a broad brush—there is a lot of nuance I will leave out—but bear with me.

Since the nineteenth century, small "e" evangelicalism—which became large "E" evangelicalism—has been on a long trajectory from the center of cultural formation to the periphery. It has continued to do well as a populist movement but its influence in the centers of intellectual, scientific, and aesthetic production has been in demonstrable decline. In this respect evangelicals have moved to the margins. In the process, it endured a century-long schism from its liberal/progressive wing and a combination of withdrawal and eviction from its leading role in mass education, higher learning, and social services, among other realms of life.

Now consider secularism—though not as a movement or an ideology but simply as a demographic. We know that secularists are diverse within themselves, just as Catholics and Evangelicals are. Allowing for this complexity, if one thinks of secularists as a broad demographic, one can see that they are, in a manner of speaking, the fastest growing religio-cultural group in America. In 1960, self-identified secularists comprised less than 2 percent of the population; That grew to 5 percent in the early 1970s and 12 percent by the late 1990s. It is now in the range of 15 to 17 percent. Most significantly, they are disproportionately represented in upper middle classes and in the high-prestige centers of cultural production.

I want to argue that the natural tensions of assimilation among secularists are not appreciably different from any other religious group wanting to be assimilated into the mainstream. The difference is that this is happening at the same time that Evangelicalism is being de-assimilated. The prestige and authority in the centers of social influence of one have been rising over the last half-century, while the prestige and authority of the other have been in weakening.

It is a contest over social space and voice. Cultural conservatives generally, but Evangelicals in particular, chose a political strategy to maintain their place of privilege in the shaping of the moral order. The strategy was largely successful for a quarter century. But the moment of its greatest triumph, the 2004 presidential election, seemed also the moment that marked the beginning of what may be its final move to the periphery of social influence. The 2004 election may have generated more hostility toward Evangelicalism than any time before in its past. The

culmination of this descent seemed to be symbolized in the 2008 election, when vice presidential nominee Sarah Palin performed on *Saturday Night Live.* Imagine William Jennings Bryan coauthoring an editorial with H. L. Mencken that made fun of himself (Bryan) at the Scopes trial. If you can picture this, then you can understand the symbolic significance of Sarah Palin participating with Tina Fey in her own self-parody.

Over the same quarter century, secularists overall were not nearly as successful in a strategy of electoral politics but they have been able to secure a place within the centers of cultural formation, such as universities, publishing, advertising, and entertainment.

These long-term historical trends are not over. Secularists have not triumphed once and for all, nor is the so-called Christian Right dead. Conflict will continue. No one really has claim to a weak hegemony.

But at the same time, it is important to note that cultural conservatives and cultural progressives have been changed by the encounter. Cultural conservatives, and evangelicals in particular, are accommodating to many of the cognitive and normative assumptions of secular modernity. Polls show that they are dramatically more tolerant of atheists and homosexuality than they were 40 years ago and, in spite of themselves, it is clear that they participate fully in a normative ethos of therapeutic individualism. At the same time, and against their fondest wishes, secularists are coming to terms with the fact that people of faith, and people of orthodox faith not least, are not going away and that many of the concerns about character and virtue may be legitimate and might need to be addressed.

I WILL CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT GREAT NORMATIVE CONFLICTS of the last half-century are part and parcel of longer term historical changes that include demographic shifts (the growth of some actors and the reduction of others) but more significantly, they involve a shifting in the boundaries that define the space of public culture and who occupies the places of privilege and influence—of assimilation and de-assimilation. The conflict enflames passions, challenges democratic civility, and generates many unintended consequences but it is an inev-

itable part of the changes that are unfolding. But there is no inevitable outcome. Among the many things at stake in this conflict is pluralism itself; of where and how and on what terms the boundaries of tolerable diversity will be drawn. This question too remains unresolved.

NOTES

1. In a 2004 column, humorist Dave Barry added more descriptive color when he depicted it as a conflict between "ignorant, racist, fascist knuckle-dragging NASCAR-obsessed cousin-marrying, road-kill eating, tobacco-juice-dribbling, gun-fondling religious fanatic rednecks . . . " and "godless, unpatriotic, pierced-nose, Volvo-driving, France-loving, left-wing communist, latte-sucking, tofu-chomping, holistic-wacko neurotic vegan weenie perverts."
2. Again, these are both secular (as in the popular song, "Imagine," by John Lennon) and religious sentiments ("red and yellow, black and white, they are precious in His sight," from the song, "Jesus Love the Little Children").
3. As Robert Cover of Yale University once put it, "For every constitution there is an epic, for each decalogue a scripture" (Cover 1983: 4).
4. This leaves aside, for the moment, the ways in which a dominant culture could be constituted implicitly. More on this later in the essay.
5. This double-bind creates the conditions for a semi-permanent legitimation crisis in which the legitimacy of one side depends upon the delegitimation of the other side. It is both in terms of the appeal to legitimacy made by those in authority and the popular consent given—what is self-evidently credible and acceptable for one is utterly counterfeit for the other. Eight years of Clinton hatred balanced by eight years of Bush hatred is one poignant manifestation of this tendency.
6. By which I mean orientations in the way knowledge and understanding are grounded; these are manifested as habits of thinking and practices of moral reasoning.
7. See Snow and Benford (1988, 1992). This is the first reason the vast majority of Americans who are somewhere in the middle of these

debates are not heard. They have no access to the tools of public culture in the way elites do.

8. Much of this argument in taken from Hunter and Franz (2006).
9. The Protestant and Judeo-Christian establishments were both coercive cultural establishments of a kind; they were hard-won and continually contested, but eventually normalized. In this regard it is important to note that the terms of "establishment" will vary considerably, largely due to conditions intrinsic to the religious community itself.

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