15 Responding to cyberterror A failure to firewall freedoms? Rajash Rawal Responding to cybe.rtmor 258 »I\m-s the trends in government measures to attempt to control hyperspace, kins the nature of these measures and presents how these measures threaten ■mux-racy while at the same time highlighting the need for legitimate ptilily mechanisms to be created. Finally, the chapter endeavours to present it lusion as to whether (or not) cyberterrorism is a real and actual threat to >tn society. Summary While campaining for office of President of the United States in 2008, li.n described a 'net attack' as being as serious and grave a problem as any |i nuclear or biological threat. Obama's concerns echo long-standing criiii Internet and its capacity, such as its openness and the lack of a regit L Governments have readily highlighted that terrorists have been quick !■ potential that the cyberworld has to offer them to deliver their me. municate with each other and retain their anonymity. As a result, efforts • contain have often trampled over human rights, privacy and civil lil" chapter examines the developments by looking at the actual threats of < \ I k and what threats are posed by the use of the Internet by terrorists. ' I analyses the trends in government measures to attempt to control h question the nature of these measures and present how these measmc E-Democracy while at the same time highlighting the need for legitimati I mechanisms to be created. Introduction Barack Obama described a 'net attack' as being as serious and grave a prol >\< potential nuclear or biological threat when running for office of Presidt i United States in 2008. He suggested that the 'War on Terror' had to bead diverse in its range of action in order to cope with the diverse threats being by the modern terrorist. Obama followed up on his words by launchM cybersecurity review soon after being sworn into office in an attempt to sin I nation's efforts in this area.1 Obama's concerns echo long-standing criticisms of the Internet and its < (i.e. its openness and the lack of a regulatory power).2 Governments haw highlighted that terrorists have been quick to utilise the potential that the c \ I ■ has to offer them in delivering their messages, communicating widi each \ authorities and is one which limits our civil freedoms. The May Day riots of 2001 the anti-globalisation protests of 2001 were all partially organised online, with « sites being created to inform activists of their legal rights and give phone numb* sympathetic lawyers. However, Denning contests that 'Cyberterrorism exists only in theory'" w| cybercrime and cyberactivism are real. The following definition can be posited Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It rcfi I unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and i information stored therein when done to intimidate or coerce a governmeui its people in furtherance of political or social objectives. Further, to quaHl cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence against property or pci-.m or at least cause enough harm to generate fear.14 This definition implies a very involved element in contrast to the concept of cylx terrorism. Potential examples of cyberterror include spreading viruses, spammiiif 23-year-old was jailed in the UK for 'anarchic behaviour' after spreading abusive s\ i.un emails threatening to fire-bomb the headquarters of his county's trading stand.mk office and petrol-bomb his local police office13), digital jamming and hacking tlir Israelis and Palestinians were engaged in a cyberwar between 1999 and 2002, when each party attacked the other's Web resources16). Aggressive campaigns fought out r aftermath of the riots that swept French cities in the autumn of 2005, French authorities jailed two bloggers for inciting violence.18 It is questionable as to whether the latter can be considered to be an act of cyberterror or terrorist use of the Internet, as is illustrated later in this chapter. The authorities will often confuse protest and terror, allowing them to classify protest as terror to meet their own political needs. However, it can be argued that the standard definition of cyberterrorism as quoted above is not one to which the wider public would adhere. They view cyberterrorr i as the use of the Internet by terrorist groups to propagate their message. This view further endorsed by the popular media,19 which, as 'conduits for symbolism',20 h.i\ become enmeshed in the symbolic war against terror, where fear becomes the mai element. 'In newspapers and magazines, in film and on television, "cyberterrorism" is tl Zeitgeist.'21 Moreover, Lanzone22 adds a special new 'war on terror' element to cybe terrorism, which he phrases as 'cyberjihad'. In addition to this, Weimann23 identiti IV( ■t.ii terrorism on the Internet is a very dynamic phenomenon. I lowever, what exactly ■M-s this involve? What is cyberterrorism and how do terrorists use the Internet? It It y terrorists use the Internet ■'.< msidering Webster's assertion that ICTs have had a 'massive and ongoing'24 impact bii society, it is natural, as Knight and Ubayasiri suggest, that terrorist groups have IVuibraced the Internet'25 and have challenged the existing balances on information Iftnw and news coverage. This point is further emphasised by Scott and Street,26 who I Hgest that the Internet has shifted 'editorial' control to activists, allowing them | in present news and opinion as they like. As a result, terrorist use of the Internet is I Very vibrant; websites appear, change format and disappear or simply change their jildresses to avoid closure.27 This equates to normal progression in regard to the I development of protest politics, as noted by Dahlgren, as cyberspace has become a I 'vital link and meeting ground for the civically engaged and politically mobilized'.28 Weimann29 further expounds the idea that terrorists are drawn to the web to target I three main audience categories: Supporters: Terrorist websites keep supporters informed of their (recent) activities. Merchandise can be sold to help raise funds. Organisations localise their site in order to provide more detailed information; this often is done in minority languages. Al Qaeda is one such group which employs this tactic. > Public opinion: Even those who are not directly involved may be affected. Most sites offer information in a number of languages in order to draw as wide an audience as possible. The Basque Separatist Group (ETA), for example, has pages in Basque, Castilian, German, French and Italian. The main premise of this is perhaps to capture international journalists' attention and hence get the organisation into the traditional media. One of the Hezbollah's websites is aimed exclusively at journalists, inviting them to email the group's press office. • Enemy publics: This is one of the less obvious targets, but an equally important one. Sites will aim to promote the past activities of the terrorist group and threaten more, wider and dangerous campaigns. The idea is to try to demoralise the enemy. This is turn gathers media attention and begins debate and may weaken the governments' rule, which is the ultimate aim of most groups. An example of this is the 11 March 2003 bombings in Madrid. The ruling People's Party maintained through the state-run news agency EFE that ETA were behind the attacks; however, various wings of Al Qaeda began to spread news via the web that they were responsible. The commercial, non-state-run media began to publish this and the citizenry began to doubt the government. This contributed to the ruling party being ousted in favour of the Socialist Party in the 13 March election. Attractions of cyberspace Heralded as the integrator of cultures, the Internet30 has also been the 'instrument of a political power shift'.31 As one of the first many-to-many broadcasting systems, as opposed to the one-to-many systems, it has opened up numerous possibilities for groups of activists to lively air their views and opinions.11' ft lias become which businesses, consumers and governments communicate with each > >i such, unparalleled in its creation of a truly global forum which provides loi existence of McLuhan's much-cjuoted 'global village'.33 However, .is |mi development as the Internet has been, Utopian visions were quickly challi proliferation of sites such as those which contain (child) pornography, \ ■ extremist aims.34 That said, the Internet remains an exciting propo itlfl challenges existing regimes of power and presents information and opini..... hierarchical way than traditional media.35 The attractions that the Internet holds for terrorist are manifold. It is an id! for activity as it offers the advantages shown in Figure 15.1.36 In their approach to combat terrorist use of the Internet, governments tun j be imaginative and creative in their policy-making. An evaluation of the mei h introduced and their wider implications is put forward later in this chaptei How do terrorists use the Internet? There is a clear lack of an answer to the above question when considering 11 or rather post-September 11, terrorism, and the obvious difficulties the lulrff has presented in policing terrorism. How does one identify a terrorist n computer to further their aims, as distinct from an ordinary user? Tin identifying of a terrorist remains a perilously difficult thing to do and has In subject of many heated debates. Consequendy, a broad-brush approach is often t.ikn by authorities, who categorise all members of particular ethnic or religious gr< n the actions of a few. The dangers of 'risk-profiling' potential terrorist suspci highlighted by Kip Viscusi and Zechauser,37 as well as by Muhammcd Abdul I1.... head of the Muslim Council of Britain, who feels the current climate of'uneasi only 'help some people to recruit young [people] to terrorism'.38 This is Imiliff illustrated by the shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes, who was wrongly idem as a terrorist suspect partially due to his appearance after the 7 July 2005 boinlmip in London. \ Figure 15.1 Advantages of the Internet Source: Amended from Weimann (2004), Knight and Ubayasiri (2002). Easy access Little or no regulation/government control The potential for huge global audiences Anonymity (false identities are easy to create and u unsecure networks open to abuse and distortion Speed of information flow Inexpensive to develop and maintain Multimedia possibilities (websites can combine text, graphics, films and sound, which can be downloaded by users) Ability to gather attention (mass media increasingly use the Internet as source for news stories) 1 Terrorist website's are rife and appeal' in all shapes and forms. Almost all major prist organisations have websites; many have more than one and appear in several fcliHiiagcs. Terrorist organisations have embraced the Internet as a vital cog in their ■ *>,ii liincry, as shown in Figure 15.2.39 \li bough the use of the Internet as a tool may be new, terrorist groups have always Liu;lil to spread propaganda by whatever means possible. The appeal of the Internet ■ that it goes beyond the means of traditional media and 'allow[s] for completeness pt .storytelling'.40 It means that the terrorists can now bypass media controls and edit Arir own news agendas; one should consider the potential of social-networking sites Itiii h as Facebook and the group possibilities that exist here. ( >ne of the earliest known postings by terrorists was back in March 1996 when the |rl errorist's Handbook' was placed online. The handbook contained guidelines on I h< pw to make a bomb - the same type of bomb as was later used in the Oklahoma [ bombings.41 With today's advances in technology, the handbook has now been I in) iplemented by training videos which can be uploaded onto video-hosting sites. An fcbvious candidate here would be sites such as YouTube; however, these sites are I rrgularly monitiored. In an interview with a web analyst42 it was revealed to me that I Inrorists prefer to use 'unmonitored' porn sites such as Red Tube, where videos are | linlden away in the annals of the back catalogue. Another example of how terrorists use the Web aside from creating websites is by I nipisteringblogs. 'Blogging', as it is commonly referred to, offers terrorists the potential I to air their views and present information is an unedited way, while at the same time [ allowing others to voice their support by joining in discussions held in the forum. It I w i )uld appear that all viewpoints are available and given equal space and prominence; [ however, the owner of the blog can decide whose viewpoints he/she wishes to publish, I hence there is a form of editorial control in the hands of the terrorist blogger. The evamples of the French bloggers arrested on suspicion of inciting violence given earlier in this chapter43 and the proposed €70 million expenditure of the British government 'to undermine extremist influences' in 'ungoverned' online spaces illustrate how seriously the authorities take this potential threat.44 It is further argued by Weimann45 that terrorists seek to use the Internet to maintain iheir 'psychological warfare'. Their websites will not only re-enact past actions, but .ilso present more general threats aimed at illustrating to the public the potential of I heir reach (i.e. disabling air traffic, destroying networks, etc.). An example of this was i he airing of the murder of the American hostage Daniel Pearl in 2004, which was issued on several terrorist websites. Groups can also spread disinformation, which exaggerates the scope of their potential attacks and can generate cyberfear. Al Qaeda has been particularly successful at this, continually talking of the impending attack on Transmit propaganda on their aims and objectives Raise money by selling articles, merchandise or asking for donations Attract new members Communicate with existing activists Figure 15.2 Why terrorists use the Internet the United States, which has kepi the nation on high alert since ScpteuiUi I I /ill) Moreover, many terrorist organisations have created their own newsm, counter the power of traditional journalists.46 Al Qaeda has proven to be an excellent example of how a terrorist group <. the Internet. According to Knight and Ubaysiri,47 the structure of this orgai 11 in many ways parallel to the Internet, which affords limitless possibilities f< ir il I are listed in Figure 15.3. Consequendy, we can say that Al Qaeda is 'simultaneously everywh. nowhere' .4a National governments often complain of the lack of wherewithal i trol the Net due to its borderless, translucent world; the United States govenmi found it tough to eliminate and negate the threat Al Qaeda poses. Mechanisms of government control Thus far this chapter has only really examined the measures that terrorists i using the Internet. It has also looked at the weakness that governments feel (he\ lunf in their arsenal in being able to deal adequately with the potential threats. Howrm the picture of a meek, mild and limited executive does not really fit the mould 11-somewhat considerable powers that government have are considered in this si and I challenge the notion the Internet is a wilderness beyond control. Internet regulation and governance One of the greatest myths of the Internet age is that there is no control ovei Internet whatsoever. Sunstein argues that mechanisms exist to monitor and regular the Internet:1 [it] is hardly an anarchy or regulation free'.49 The Internet Corpoi-.nn* for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), based in California, has long since In,., the main body which has regulated how Internet domain names and addn ing systems function, as well as managing how email and Net browsers direct 11 traffic. It was established in 1998.50 ICANN has a direct link to the United Si, government.51 It is this very issue - the United States' relationship with ICANN - which fonnrtl the basis of heated debate during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Tunis in November 2005. Nations such as Brazil, China, France, It.hi and South Africa wanted a more neutral body to be created under UN auspices i.i oversee the Net,52 while others, such as the Internet think tank group the Intern. Governance Project (IGP), wanted greater reforms of ICANN's powers and , democratisation of its structure.53 • Is transitional • Lacks a geographic centre • Consists of disparate nodes or activist cells • Relies on software of ideas, rather than hardware of the military (e.g. aeroplanes as bombs) \ concept paper prepared by IGP identified the main criticisms of ICANN to be:M the unilateralism of the United States government in its control and supervision of ICANN; • dissatisfaction with ICANN's Government Advisory Committee (GAC), where governments have only advisory powers; • that ICANN does not reflect the needs and interests of developing countries in balance to those of developed countries; the general feeling that ICANN lacks legitimacy. I his concept paper was mooted during WSIS in attempt to create an agreement khich would see the development of an internationally and legally recognised body to replace supervision by the US government with a more multi-lateral body similar to I he International Telecommunications Union, which was founded in 1865.55 It was lurlher suggested that ICANN, while being central to Internet governance, does not tncet all of the challenges that are faced, and indeed lacks transparency, account-iliblity and legitimacy itself. These ideas were substantiated by the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which last met in June 2005, and presented four models for Internet governance.56 However, despite these pressures for reform of ICANN, the outcome of WSIS lesulted in little change to the current situation. ICANN remains in the hands of the I Inited States, although an agreement was reached to set up an Internet Governance forum (IGF) under the guidance of the United Nations Secretary General.57 Kawamoto argues that a body that satisfactorily regulates the Internet should be . reated. Kawamoto points to the role of the UN as being a key international body in the past when looking to form a global consensus; these experiences should not be Inst and the UN should have a major role in his opinion.58 The IGF has a tough task . i head of it. In addition to the ICANN provisions, however, there are other ways in which the Internet is regulated. The Security Intelligence Products and Systems (SIPS) framework has been in operation since 1995. It forms part of the British-based mi2g Intelligence unit and boasts 'the world's largest digital attack database'.59 SIPS contains information on all major hacking groups and Internet malware attackers (sabateurs) and has relationships with virtually all global actors in order to maintain a peerless status in holding confidential information with regard to digital risk.60 A secondary wing of the above-mentioned intelligence unit is the Asymmetric Threats Contingency Alliance (ATCA), which was initiated post-September 11. ATCA monitors activity throughout the world, focusing on terrorist and organised crime cartels. ATCA draws up a thorough database of potential threat by compiling monthly reports on posting of information gathered through monitoring of terrorist groups, websites and intercepted communications of terrorist organisations. However, a fundamental criticism of ATCA is that it continually infringes civil liberties and confuses protest with terrorist activity. Figure 15.3 Analogies between Al Qaeda and the Internet Control of Internet users As important as ii is that cyberspace is regulated, ii it is also of equal im monitor the users that surf the World Wide Web. A simple rcasm highlighted by the fact that the September 11 hijackers booked at least n airline tickets online a few weeks prior to the attacks.51 It is further sug;',i hijackers set up a number of'largely anonymous . . . temporary [email] . such as Hotmail accounts, and accessed the Web from public places such .i* IiIm Notably, these are all actions which are perfecdy legal. Had the tickets In • in the conventional way with a travel agency, would we now want to cm agencies' services more stringently? In order to combat this element of Web abuse, authorities are l»i.....■ introduce a number of new measures. One such example is in Italy, where ,1111 I laws affect how people can access the Internet in public places. Celeste'1'1 sui^riH these new laws are part of the most extensive anti-terror packages inti ■ >■ Europe. While encompassing more than Internet use, these laws now rcquin who wish to use the Internet in public places such as libraries or Internet submit a photocopy of their passport before being allowed to log on. M. Internet cafes have to obtain public communications business licences and expensive tracking software, or so-called 'eavesdropping technology',64 cosliir US$1,400.65 Additionally, the European Union introduced a directive which will allow authories to access users 'traffic data'.66 The directive, which was introduced in r\rf| member state of the European Union by the deadline of July 2007, compels • ■ n telephone company and Internet service provider (ISP) to save call and Ini records for up to two years. The ISP data is comprehensive and includes w< visited and header information of email correspondence detailing the sender, ret i| date, time and Internet address.67 Whereas law enforcement agencies welcome • new legislation, privacy advocates fear for the wider implications. The prospect < hM presents of our communication tools forming part of the largest surveillance s\ ever created in the near future surely is enough reason to worry.6" One could ask whether these restrictions are enough when we once more an.i the use of technology by terrorists in reality. As reported by Spanish media follow inn investigations into the 11 March 2003 train attacks by Al Qaeda in Madrid, ii \ found that in order to not have their messages intercepted on Hotmail, the terroi iitt merely amended their use of the free email service. Current legislation alio authorities to monitor inboxes and no more. The Madrid attackers simply used one email account which was accessed by all and stored messages in the 'drafts' foldei • the account. Once more, legislation seems to be one step behind. Do governments pose a threat to cyberfreedom? Government controls and their ensuing implications for society have left spectator, lamenting the abuses of privacy and freedoms that governments can now legitimate!) undertake under the guise of protecting their citizens. Indeed, as noted by the Geneva-based NGO International Commission of Jurists, many governments have ■d the anti-terror drive as an excuse to curb lieei loins and limit the use of domestic poncnts on the Internet a charge levelled most acutely at the US and UK r< titives.69 These initiatives, which have introduced surveillance and removed the election of privacy, may threaten the healthy existence of democracy.70 The nelils of E-Government in making society more open and democratic may be idone by E-Policing and E-Control. I he dynamics at play here bring together the divergent needs of government and i iety. On the one hand, as mentioned earlier, the Internet has enabled society to i ly express its opinions at a global level. Borders have been in some cases rendered •vant. On the other hand, as positive an element for society as this may have d for governments to adjust antiquated laws and ations, which the existence of the Internet has challenged. For example, it is rn, it has also triggered a need tor g le existence of the L„™.~. —;-----------0 of Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf'm Germany. In the pre-Internet vs of the to own a copy ,,,'kl this was a simple policy to implement and maintain, as the book was not ilable. However, in the new Amazon.com age it was easy to order a copy " kok online without the authorities ever knowing about it. A law change was needed. I'ost-September 11 the world seemed to legitimise the opportunity for governments make these changes due to the large-scale public fear that was generated by the 1 IIS I make these changes •dia for potential terrorist threats, although the actual desire to adjust laws predated September 11 — indeed, the British government has been interested in the idea bf data retention since 1998,71 as has the German government.72 However, as Loundy suggested before September 11 2001, the Internet must not be made a scapegoat .ihead of other methods of communications, despite concerns over its mis-use licing 'legitimate'.73 If there are concerns that terrorists communicate using email, I why are there no such concerns that they may communicate using regular mail? It is his question which guardians of Internet privacy ask in retort to the clampdown iiid ultra-secure era that is dawning in the cyberworld. Indeed, as noted by Loader, he Internet has presented a 'paradigmatic change in the constellation of power relations'74 between governments and individuals. This is perfectly illustrated by Williams, who argues that post-September 11, the Internet became an invaluable source for 'neutral' information as the traditional media was seen as the mouthpiece i if the US government.75 However, the opportunities to harness the new cyberworld were only fully grasped by governments post-September 11. The fear of terrorism, in all its forms, has heightened since September 11, becoming part of our daily political diet and thus becoming the 'raison d'etre for countless examples of political excess'.76 Cynics have argued that there has been an over-emphasis of the threats faced so that the public would accept a diminishing of rights without a public outcry - although, as Sunstein argues, free society has always known some form of regulation. Legislation passed in the United States, Britain, France, Gern.„, Denmark, tied in with policy from the European Union, the Council of Europe •'° TK» Airtrn'r- nf manv of these )ciety has always Known some lorm oi icguwuuu, passed in the United States, Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and Denmark, tied in with policy from the European Union, the Council of Europe and the G8, has limited cyber freedoms in some way.78 The danger of many of these law changes is that not only do they challenge personal freedoms, but they also risk turning ISPs and telecommunication companies into a potential arm of the police. The upshot is that governments seem to be willing to exact 'a high price in terms of liberties to the high toll of terrorism'.79 Many well-meaning initiatives have fallen 'far short'"" of promises made and have created new problems oľ limiting freedom .11 augmenting the unaeeountabilily of government and corporations. The risk is that society has accepted changes without much debate, wheirfl had changes been introduced to control more traditional media and method I communication, discussion would have been rife.81 The need for a legitimate folfl of developing E-Identities has never been greater. As presented by Fishendcn,"" \hd need for E-Identities to monitor online government services and online commcrri now encompasses online security. Can the ordinary citizen do more? As illustrated above, governments across the world have been keen to introdih restrictions in order to protect the citizenry from the terrorist potential. Howcvr these restrictions, though accepted without discussion at their inception, have bee rounded on as curbing our natural freedoms. Nevertheless, the threat exists an something needs to be done. However, perhaps there is something that we, 1 ordinary citizens, can do to limit the possibilities that terrorists have of using ll Internet to meet their needs. A first and very simple step is to limit the visibility of our own digital equipment. Many of us enjoy simple, easy access to the Internet through our domestic wi-lt environment; however, we extend this courtesy to all and sundry when we do not secure our networks. As mentioned earlier, the potential terrorist thrives or anonymity and an unsecured network allows them to have access to an ISP whirl cannot be traced back to them - better still, it can be traced to an unsuspectit^ innocent citizen caught in the crossfire. This is, incidentally, also true for tin-Bluetooth facility on mobile devices, which, as factory default, come as 'visible to all" and should be set to 'password protected'. We can also make sure our information is safe by making sure our access to the Internet is safe too. Increasingly, as illustrated by other chapters in this volume, we turn to the online world for our interaction with government (i.e. for taxes, health, education, etc.). By filling in an online form for a tax return, for example, we send out vital information about ourselves which can be adopted and used to criminal, and potentially terrorist, use. So-called 'blaggers' wait to prey on any lapse of security in order to gain personal information which they can sell on to the highest bidder. 1 The problem is so rife that the British Information Commissioner's Office published a 'Personal Information Tool-Kit' in January 2007. Unfortunately, two years after its publication the success of this leaflet was not as widespread as the leaking of personal information or indeed the 'cybercrime tool kits' which can be easily purchased.84 In short, the citizen can never safeguard everything; we will always need government protection too, but by being aware of our actions and their implications we can begin to remove some of the threat to our online security that we face. We must also apply common sense when we interact over the Internet. We would never post money in an unsealed envelope through regular post, so why transact over unsecure Internet sites? Public complacency sits oddly with public paranoia.85 < < inclusions |\\V have reached an important juncture in the so-called 'zeitgeist' of cyberterrorism. ( Mivernments have acted and their policy-making counteracts the growing prospective threats of cyberterror, but terrorists continue to seek a safe haven in the dark turners of cyberspace to advance their campaigns based on creating fear and panic. I lowever, as Matai notes, 'physical terrorism and digital attacks go hand in hand',"6 tin is the potential of cyberterror should not be overestimated and exaggerated, which li.is been the case with politicians 'using fear of terror'.87 Terrorists will continue to I use violence to overcome their 'invisibility'.88 However, the use of the Internet by terrorists is a far more alarming prospect and one which is tougher to combat. It 1 here that a delicate balance needs to be addressed. On the one hand, restrictions Bred to be tough enough to serve as an adequate deterrent, but on the other hand, I ihey need to maintain the existing freedoms and allow cyber society to develop. \ lechanisms to monitor public Internet access points, as in Italy, can work. However, they should not burden the host (i.e. Internet cafe) to the extent that the host is impeded by the requirement for financial capital needed to meet modern regulations, as this may only lead to closure of much-needed public access points, which help iildress the issue of the digital divide.89 In our fight against modern terrorism and its role in cyberspace, a few things must he noted. The War on Terror has not been a watershed, it has been an excuse. The 111 reat existed before September 11, and nothing since this date has heightened its potential as a threat. However, events since this date have legitimised government .ittempts to implement restrictive legislation which they have wanted to introduce for some time now (see the above-mentioned examples of the UK and Germany). The .imple fact remains that we (both government and citizen alike) need to better monitor how the Internet is used and limit its capacity to be abused by Internet-sawy terrorists. However, heavy-handed restrictions will only hand the initiative to authoritarian governments that may violate privacy, curb the free flow of information and hamper freedom of expression - ironically, the very core values of the society we are claiming to be trying to protect. Moreover, it will enable undemocratic regimes to refer to our own counter-terror mechanisms as examples to justify their own abusive practices. As noted by Moore,90 the relationship between democracy and cyberspace is a complex, multi-dimensional one, and we must all engage in nurturing it. Key points • Governments have readily highlighted that terrorists have been quick to utilise the potential that the cyberworld has to offer them to deliver their messages, communicate with each other and retain their anonymity. • Terrorist groups have embraced the Internet and have challenged the existing balances on information flow and news coverage. The Internet has shifted editorial control to activists. This allows them to present news and opinion as they like. Terrorist use of the Internet is very vibrant. Websites appear, i ■ format and disappear or simply change their addresses. Mechanisms do exist to monitor and regulate the Internet - is k an anarchy or regulation free'. Such mechanisms include ICAIW and ACTA. There are also numerous national surveillance tools 11 I world over. In order to combat this element of Web abuse, authorities arc begu to introduce a number of new measures. For example, eavesdroppin • nology is used in public access points and the European Union intrt»li a directive which will allow police authories to access users' traflu i which compels every telephone company and Internet service | >i 11 (ISP) to save call and Internet records for up to two years. Government controls and their ensuing implications for society haw spectators lamenting the abuses of privacy and freedoms that govenmi can now legitimately undertake under the guise of protecting their citij Citizens can limit the visibility of their own digital environment. Thel also make sure their information is safe by making sure their access b Internet is safe too. Common sense must be applied when interactiiii' the Internet. The simple fact remains that we (both government and citizen alike] i to better monitor how the Internet is used and limit its capacity I abused by Internet-sawy terrorists. Notes 1 BBC Newsonline (2009) 'Obama Begins Cybersecurity Review', BBC News, 10 l'rln. http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/technology/7880695.stm. 2 Buckler, S. and Dolowitz, D. (2005) Politics on the Internet. Abingdon: Roudedgc. 3 Knight, A. and Ubayasiri, K. (2002a) 'eTerror: Journalism and the Internet', Ejmn 2/1, http://www.ejournalism.au.com/ejournalist_v2nl.htm. 4 Scott, A. and Street, J. (2001) 'From Media Politics to E-Protest?', in Culture and /Vi/m the Information Age, Webster, F. (ed.) London: Routledge. pp. 32-51. 5 Bradbury, D. (2009) The Fog of Cyberwar', Guardian, 5 Februray. 6 Cukier, K. N. (2005) "Who Will Control the Internet? Washington Batdes the \\ Foreign Affairs 84/6 November/December: 7-13. 7 Segoviano Monterrubio, S. (2005) 'Al Qaeda en la Red', Papeles de Cuestiones Intern, 89, Primavera. 8 Matai, D. K. (2005) Cyberland Security: Organized Crime, Terrorism and the Internet. < > ■ i Internet Institute, University of Oxford, 10 February. 9 BBC Newsonline (2009) 'Obama Begins Cybersecurity Review', BBC News, 10 FcW http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/ technology/7880695, stm. 10 Bradbury, D. (2009) 'The Fog of Cyberwar', Guardian, 5 February. 11 Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality Bites: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist 'use' of the Internal Monday 7/11 (November), http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_l l/conway/mdex/li 12 Painter, A. (2001) 'The Contagious Campaign (part 2)', in Viral Politics, Painter, A. Wardle, B. (eds) London: Politicos Publishing, pp. 154-167. 13 Denning, D. quoted in Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality Bites'. 1 Inuring, I). quoted in Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality Biles', p. 6. BBC' Newsonline (2005) 'Spammer Convicted of /,1.6m Scam', BBC.News, 16 November, litlp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/l/hi/england/cambridgeshire/4442772.stm. Conway, M. (2002) Reality Bites; Wcimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net: How Modem Terrorism Uses the Internet, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 116, March 2004, vvww.usip.org. RosenkrandsJ. (2004) 'Politicizing Homo economicus' in Cyberprotest -NewMedia, Citizens and Social Movements, van de Donk, W., Loader, B.D., Nixon, P.G. and Rucht, D. (eds) Ixmdon: Routledge. pp. 57—76. Plunkett, J. (2005) 'French Bloggers Held after Paris Riots', Guardian Unlimited Special Reports, November, http://www.guardian.co.uk/story/0,l 1882,1638520,00html. Weimann, G. (2004) www.taror.net. Louw, E. (2005) The Media and Political Process. London: Sage Publications. Conway, M. (2002) Reality Bites. Lanzone, R. (2005) Cyberjihad. Indiana: AuthorHouse. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. Webster, F. (2001) 'A New Politics?', in Culture and Politics in the Information Age, Webster, F. (ed.) London: Routledge. pp. 1-13. Knight, A. and Ubayasiri, K. (2002b) 'Reporting On Line: The Internet and Terrorism', ON LINE opinion - Australia's e-joumal of social and political debate, http://onlineopinion. com.au/view.asp?article_ 1101. Scott, A. and Street, J. (2001) 'From Media Politics to E-Protest?' Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. Dahlgren, P. (2001) 'The Transformation of Democracy?', in New Media and Politics, Axford, B. and Huggins, R. (eds) London: Sage Publications, pp. 64—88. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. Ibid. Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality Bites'. Dahlgren, P. (2001) 'The Transformation of Democracy?' McLuhan, M. (1964, 2002) Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: Roudedge. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. Stevenson, N. (2001) 'The future of public media cultures', in Culture and Politics in the Information Age, Webster, F. (ed.) London: Routledge. pp. 63-80. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net; Knight, A. and Ubayasiri, K. (2002b) 'Reporting On Line: The Internet and Terrorism'. Kip Viscusi, W. and Zechauser, R. Z. (2003) Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce Terrorism Risks, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University Faculty Research Working Paper RWP03-017. BBC Newsonline (2007) 'UK Terror Tactics create unease', BBC News, 10 Novermber, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/uk/7088325.stm. I For an elaborative review of terrorist websites and their aims and objectives please refer to Conway 2002, Knight and Ubaysiri 2002a, Weimann 2004. i Kawamoto, K. (2003) Media and Society in the Digital Age. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. Sunstein, C. (2002) Republic.com. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ! The web analyst prefers to remain anonymous. 1 Plunkett, J. (2005) Trench Bloggers Held after Paris Riots'. : BBC Newsonline (2007) 'Internet Used to Target Extremism', BBC News, 31 October, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/uk/7070416.stm. i Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. i Knight, A. and Ubayasiri, K. (2002b) 'Reporting On Line: The Internet and Terrorism'. I Ibid, i Ibid. ) Sunstein, C. (2002) Republic.com. ) Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (2004) Fact Sheet, http://www.icann.org/general/fact-sheet.html. fftm, tl 52 53 BBC Nrwtonitne (2005) 'US Retain Hold of die Internet', BBC, http://newi.bbc.co.uk/g<)/pi/li/-/lii/ic(linol<))5y/ 111-11514.stm. Cukkr, K. N. (2005) 'Who Will Control the Internet? Washington Ifcittli I hi \ BBC Newsonline 'US Retains Hold ol the Internet', BBC News, 16 N<>\< i news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/technology/44441544.stm. Klein, H. and Müller, M. (2005) What to Do about ICANN: A Proposal fir Shu,: Concept Paper by the Internet Goverance Project, 5 April, http://* Governance.org; Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) (200. > i MM Bossey, June, http://www.wgig.org/; Drake, W.J. (2005) Reforming liilm Perspectivesfrom WGIG, ICT Task Force Series 12, Working Group on Intt-riu (WGIG). 54 Klein, H. and Müller, M. (2005) What to Do about ICANN: A Proposalfor Slim tu, 55 Cukier, K. N. (2005) 'Who Will Control the Internet? Washington Battles tti. ' Reporters Without Borders (2002) Anti-terrorism Drive Threatens Internet Freedom* Centre.org, 12 September, http://www.thinkcentre.org/article, cfm? Article 111 BBC Newsonline, 'US Retains Hold of the Internet'; World Summit on the I Society (WSIS) (2005) Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, Document 05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev.l)-E, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/ofi/lin Kawamoto, K. (2003) Media and Society in the Digital Age. Matai, D. K. Cyberland Security: Organised Crime, Terrorism and the Internet, p. 1. Ibid. p. 2. Conway, M. (2002) 'Reality Bites' p. 11. Ibid. Celeste, S. (2005) 'Want to Check Your E-Mail in Italy? Bring Your Passp Christian Science Monitor, October, 4 http://www.csimonitor.com/2005/1001/j woeu. html. GibbJ. (2005) Who's Watching You? New York: Conspiracy Books. Celeste, S. (2005) 'Want to Check Your E-Mail in Italy? Bring Your Passport'. Grossman, W. M. (2006) 'Will Logging Your Email Combat Terrorism in I c Guardian Unlimited Technology Section, January, http://tcchnology.guardian.co.Uk/v story/0,16376,1683944,00.html. Ibid. GibbJ. (2005) Who's Watching Tou? BBC Newsonline (2009) 'Anti-terror Tactics Weaken Law', BBC News, 16 hi http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/world/europe/7892387.stm. Raab, C. D. (1997) 'Privacy, Democracy, Information', in The Governance of Crl"'> Loader, B. D. (ed.) London: Routledge. pp. 1-19. Williams, B. A. (2003) 'The New Media Environment, Internet Chatrooms and PulJir Discourse after 9/11' in War and the Media, Thussu, D. T. and Freedman, D. (eds) L..... Sage Publications, pp. 176-189. GibbJ. (2005) Who's Watching You?-p. 20. Sunstcin, C. (2002) Republic.com. Reporters Without Borders (2002) Anti-terrorism Drive Threatens Internet Freedoms. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net. p. 12. Lyon, D. (2004) Surveillance after September 11. Cambridge: Polity Press. Loundy, D. (1995) 'Constitution Protects All Modes of Speech'; Celeste, S. (2005) 'Want! to Check Your E-Mail in Italy? Bring Your Passport'; Reporters Without Borders (20112) Anti-terrorism Drive Threatens Internet Freedoms. 56 j7 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 7 1 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 Kishcndcn, J. (2005) 'ell): Identity Management in an Online World', in I'mnrdiiigs of the >th European Conference on hl-Govcrnmint, Rcnicnyi, 1). (ed.) University of Antwerp, June I 2005. BBC Panorama (2008) 'You Can Run ... but Can You Hide?' BBC News, 24 October, li[tp://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/programmes/panorama/7685043.stm. it BBC Newsonline (2007) 'Cyber Crime Tool Kits Go on Sale', BBC News, 4 September, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/technology/6976308.stm. \'\ Economist (2008) 'Identity Parade', published in The Electronic Bureaucrat: A Special Report, 'I he Economist, 16 February. II»• Matai, D. K. Cyberland Security: Organised Crime, Terrorism and the Internet, p. 3. IIBC Newsonline (2009) '"Ministers 'Using Fear of Terror'", BBC News, 17 February, http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/hi/uk/7893890.stxn. IB 1 -ouw, E. (2005) 77« Media and Political Process. W* Nixon, P. G. and Rawal, R. (2005) 'From e-Gov to we-Gov: Social Inclusion, Government and ICTs', in Proceedings of the 5lh European Conference on E-Govemmenl, Remenyi, D. (ed.) University of Antwerp June 2005. jtt) Moore, R. K. (1999) 'Democracy and Cyberspace', in Digital Democracy, Hague, B. N. and Ixiader, B. D. (eds) London: Routledge. pp. 39-59. Further reading I l.ihlgren, P. (2001) 'The Transformation of Democracy?', in New Media and Politics, Axford, B. and Huggins, R. (eds) London: Sage Publications, pp. 64-88. (iibbj. (2005) Who's Watching low? New York: Conspiracy Books. Weimann, G. (2004) www.terror.net How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet, United States Institute of Peace Special Report 116, March, www.usip.org.