Fabian Bross (2012): German modal particles and the common ground. In:
Helikon. A Multidisciplinary Online Journal, 2. 182-209
www.helikon-online.de
mitmachen[YOUKNOWIT]helikon-online.de (Betref:„Helikon“)
182
German modal particles and the common ground
Fabian Bross
Abstract
The German language makes use of many so called modal particles, noninlected
words marking the speaker’s mood or attitude towards the proposition expressed
in the uttered sentence.1
Since there are just a few languages making use of similar
types of grammatical particles it is very dificult to understand their (very elusive)
meaning. This article provides a basic introduction to what German modal particles
are and what they mean and what their function is. A short review of two main approaches
to their meaning will be given and a new account based on Stalnaker’s
common ground will be outlined. Based on this account the function of German
modal particles is said to create a common basis for continuing a conversation by
the speaker’s appraisal of the mutual knowledge.
1
German: ‘Modalpartikel’ (f.), plural: ‘Modalpartikeln’ sometimes ‘Abtönungspartikeln’ (e.g. Weydt
1969) or discourse particles. Modal particles are a phenomenon of spoken German and are seldom
used in written language. The use of modal particles counts as a sign of high language competence in
L2 learners.
183
Introduction
Particles are a heterogeneous lexical category which lack the potential to inlect. In
English, particles are e.g. conjunctions like for or and or sentence connectors like
well or yet. Modal particles are metalingual expressions indicating to the hearer
the mood or attitude of the speaker towards a proposition. In the following I will
concentrate on particles in German. Sentences (1a) and (1b) give examples of a
sentence with and without use of the modal particle schon. Where (1a) can be read
as a neutral statement (1b) expresses the same proposition but contains an admonition
to the hearer to act. The abbreviation MP means modal particle.
(1) a. Gib mir den Regenschirm.
Hand me the umbrella.
b. Gib mir schon den Regenschirm.
Hand me MP the umbrella.
Describing modal particles by their properties is hard so they are mostly just listed.
König (1997:57) lists 17:
(2) German modal particles = {aber, auch, bloß, denn, doch, eigentlich, eben,
etwa, erst, halt, ja, nun (mal), nur, schon, vielleicht, ruhig, wohl}
But there are different views about the members of this class. E.g.Weydt (1969:68f.),
Weydt & Hentschel (1983:4f.), Helbig (1988:26) or Diewald (2007:118) seperate
between a core class of modal particles (aber, auch, bloß, denn, doch, eben,
eigentlich, etwa, halt, ja, mal, nur, schon, vielleicht and wohl) and a class of peripheral
modal particles (fein, ganz, gerade, gleich, einfach, erst and ruhig).2
This
opposition is made because the latter class is still under a process of grammaticalization.
There are two conspicious differences between this two groups. The
modal particles of the core class cannot be in a sentence initial position and do
have homophones in other lexical categories.3
This contrasts with the peripheral
class, whose members do not have any homophones but can be in a sentence initial
position.
Particles in German
Spoken German has—compared to many other languages of the world—a rich
system of particles. In a non-representative analysis of a German literary text
Weydt (1969:10f.) found that 13 of 100 counted words were (on average) particles.
Particles in general are uninlectable words which do not have a rich meaning by
themselves, so one could call them non-autosemantica. Particles are distinct from
2
See also Weydt (1969:69).
3
These homophones can be in a sentence initial position.
184
e.g. adverbs or prepositions in their syntactic behaviour. They share the following
features (for more details cf. Helbig 1988:21ff.):
1. Particles can be parts of immediate constituents (IC) but cannot form an
IC on their own. In contrast e.g. adverbs can.
2. Particles cannot be in a sentence initial position, i.e. they cannot precede
the inite verb alone in a declarative sentence.
3. One cannot ask about a particle, i.e. a particle cannot serve as an autonomous
answer.
4. Particles do not change the truth value of a sentence.
Diewald (2007:119) provides the follwing table (based on Zifonun et al. 1997:66f.)
which gives an overview of the particles used in spoken German:4
name (German name): characteristics: examples:
modal particles
(Modalpartikeln/
Abtönungspartikeln)
relating to knowledge/
anticipation
eben, vielleicht, ja
focus particles
(Fokuspartikeln/Gradpartikeln)
grades what was said ausgerechnet,
bereits, sogar, vor
allem
intensiiers (Intensitätspartikel/
Steigerungspartikel)
speciies characteristics recht, sehr,
ungemein, weitaus
connecting particles
(Konnektivpartikeln)
relate proposition to
preceding propositions
erstens, allerdings,
dennoch, indessen,
sonst, zwar
Table 1: Overview of particles in German (see Diewald 2007:119 and Zifonun et al. 1997:66f.)
König (1997:57) emphasizes that there are overlaps between the class of modal particles
and other lexical categories. So doch, etwa, vielleicht, wohl, einfach, ruhig,
mal, nun (mal), halt and eben overlap with adjectives and adverbs, erst, auch, nur,
bloß and schon with focus particles, aber and denn with conjunctions and ja und
eben with so called “Antwortpartikeln”, which are used to answer a question and
can be equated to a whole sentence. With the exception of halt the core class of
modal particles in German are derived from these other classes and their meanings
which are still in use (Burkhardt 1994:131). But let us turn to the modal particles.
One of the irst publications about German modal particles was Weydt (1969) who
deines them as:
noninlectable words which indicate the speaker’s attitude towards what was
said. In this meaning they cannot serve as an answer to a question and cannot
occur in a sentence initial position. They operate over whole sentences; they
are integrated in sentences. Put in other syntactic positions or stress differ-
4
The table was slightly modiied.
185
ently they all have one or more meanings. In the other meanings they belong
to different functional classes. (p. 68)5
Weydt’s deinition is a good point to start to understand what a modal particle is. In
the following section I will briely outline the characteristics of modal particles.
What modal particles are and what they are not
This section offers a list with criteria to identify modal particles which is mainly
based on Weydt (1969:68), Helbig (1988:32ff.), König (1997:58) and Diewald
(2007):
1. Modal particles are noninlectable.
2. They serve as an expression of the speaker’s mood or attitude towards the
proposition.
3. They cannot serve as an answer to a question (without changing their
meaning).
4. They cannot be in a sentence initial position.
5. They refer to the whole sentence.
6. They do not change the truth value of a sentence.
7. Their occurence is restricted to certain sentence types/moods.
8. They follow the inite verb.
9. Modal particles cannot be negated and therefore precede the negation.
10. Modal particles have homophones in other lexical categories.
11. They cannot be coordinated with and or or (German: und or oder).
A short comparison of this list and the feature list of particles in general reveals
that some points appear in both of them. Helbig (1988:34f.) provides a list of
features which are characteristic for modal particles and not for other particle
subclasses:
1. Modal particles do not refer to a special constituent of a sentence but to
the sentence as a whole.
2. They do not change the truth values of sentences but their function lies on
a communicative level.
3. Most modal particles are restricted to certain sentence types/moods.
4. One cannot negate modal particles.
5. The core class of modal particles cannot occur in sentence initial position.
Modal particles do not have a lexical meaning on their own so their meaning is
context dependent and very elusive. In the next sections I will briely sketch what
differentiates modal particles from other particle subclasses and present a short
5
My translation.
186
outline of what their special characteristics are before discussing what they mean
(or what their function is).
Differentiation to other particle subclasses
Based on Helbig (1988:37ff.) I will only briely introduce important features which
differentiate the other particle classes from the modal particles. Focus particles do
not refer to the whole sentence but to a certain constituent of the sentence and they
are not restricted to certain sentence types/moods. Focus particles do not change
the truth values of sentences either, but their contribution to the meaning of a sentence
is nevertheless semantic in nature, because they are used to quantify meanings.
In contrast to modal particles, intensiiers do not relate to the whole sentence
and are not restricted to certain sentence types or moods. Moreover, their meaning
is semantic in nature, although their meaning is also not autosemantic and they do
not change a sentence’s truth value but graduate certain properties expressed in a
sentence, see sentence (2).
(2) Die Tasse ist sehr schön.
‘The cup is very nice.’
A short note on history of research in German modal particles
Until the seminal works of Krivonosov (1977)6
and Weydt (1969), modal particles
were regarded just as ‘lavouring words’7
(Thiel 1962), ‘patch words’8
(von der
Gabelentz 1969 [1901]) or as ‘parasites of language’9
(Reiners 1943). Since particles
are non-autosemantica they are highly interesting for pragmatics. For Helbig
(1988:17f.) it is no coincidence that the interest of linguists arose at the beginning
of the 70s because at the same time more and more linguists all over the world
explored language not as a closed system but from a viewpoint of its function in
communication (see also Helbig 1986:13).
Excursus: the topological ield model
So far we said that German modal particles cannot be in a sentence inital position.
This restriction can be described in more detail with the topological ield model
(German: “topologisches Stellungsfeldermodell”). This is a model developed especially
for describing the structure of German sentences by Drach (1963 [1937]).
In this model the sentence is divided into three ields: the pre-ield (‘Vorfeld’),
6
A dissertation written in 1963.
7
German: “Würzwörter”.
8
German: “Flickwörter”.
9
German: “Läuse im Pelz der Sprache”. For more descriptions given to modal particles in the history
of German research see Vural (2000:13).
187
the middle ield (‘Mittelfeld’) and the post-ield (‘Nachfeld’). These ields arise
by the assumption that inite and ininite verb forms divide a sentence. The verb
forms build something like brackets which are called the left bracket (‘linke
Satzklammer’) and the right bracket (‘rechte Satzklammer’):
(3) Peter ist gestern gerannt wie der Teufel.
Peter is yesterday run like the devil.
Pre-ield left bracket middle ield right bracket post-ield
‘Peter ran like the devil yesterday.’
It is not necessary for all positions to be illed. So, in sentence (4), the pre-ield and
the post-ield are empty.
(4) ฀ Ist Peter gestern gerannt? ฀
Pre-ield left bracket middle ield right bracket post-ield
‘Did Peter run yesterday?’
With regard to German modal particles they can only occur in the middle ield.
Helbig (1988:36) illustrates this behavoiur with the following sentence:
(5) Peter hat ( ) gestern ( ) seiner Freundin ( ) die Uhr ( ) geliehen.
Peter has yesterday his girlfriend the watch lend.
‘Peter lent the watch to his girlfriend yesterday.’
The core class of the German modal particles can occur in the brackets, whereas
the peripheral class of modal particles can also occur in the pre-ield. In contrast to
Helbig’s (1988) analysis, Ickler (1994:379) believes that German modal particles
are not all in the same structural position. He argues that the only difference between
(6a) and (6b) are the different modal particles denn and eigentlich.10
It seems
as if they ill in the same slot.
(6) a. Wie spät ist es denn?
b. Wie spät ist es eigentlich?
c. Wie spät ist es denn eigentlich?
But—as shown in sentence (6c)—they are combinable so he argues for a structure
like the one in (7a) and (7b).
(7) a. Wie spät ist es denn x ?
b. Wie spät ist es y eigentlich ?
10
Wie spät ist es? means ‘What’s the time?’
188
I think we should assume that there is one big slot which can be illed with a different
number of elements rather that many different slots, because in general more
elements can appear in the in the middle-ield and we do not assume that there are
different slots for each of them.
Restrictions of German modal particles
There are several restrictions in the use of modal particles—in particular in respect
to sentence type or mood—which cannot all be described here. E.g. ruhig can only
be used in imperative and declarative sentences containing a modal verb, like in
Du kannst ruhig kommen ‘You can MP come’.11
It seems feasable that the further
left an particle appears in a sentence the more general its meaning is (cf. Ickler
1994:379).
We will differentiate between seven sentence types, on which I will refer to in Latin.
The following overview of these seven types is based on Thurmair (1989:44f.),
who assumes that each type has certain formal characteristics:
Declarative sentences: Sentences with the inite verb in second constituent position
(V2) which do not contain an interrogative word (w-element):
(8) Ich bin dein Vater.
‘I am your father.’
Polar interrogative sentences: Sentences with the inite verb in irst position
(V1):
(9) Kannst du das Fenster aufmachen?
‘Can you open the window?’
W-interrogative sentences: Finite verb form in second position; the irst position
is illed with a interrogative element (w-element):
(10) Wo ist das Auto?
‘Where is the car?’
Imperative sentences: Finite verb form in the irst position with imperative marking.
In some cases it may be hard to distinguish imperative from polar interrogative
sentences. Then it is necessary to watch for shifts in pitch. An example of an
imperative sentence is given in (10).
(11) Gib mir den Hut!
‘Give me the hat!’
11
Ruhig can be used in contexts in which there are rules or conventions against a hearer’s wish and is
used by a speaker to encourage her to do something (cf. König 1997:72).
189
Optative sentences: Sentences in which the Konjunktiv II form of the verb is in
the irst position:
(12) Wäre ich doch ein berühmter Schauspieler!
‘If only I were a famous actor!’
Exclamatory sentences: In exclamatory sentences the inite verb form (mainly
with indicative marking) can be in the irst or second position. This sentence type
is marked by a characteristic pitch shift:
(13) Hast du diese Schuhe gesehen!
‘Have you seen these shoes!’
W-exclamatory sentences: The indicative marked verb is in second position, in
the pre-ield there is a w-element (mostly wie or was für ein):
(14) Was für eine Verschwendung!
‘What a waste!’
There is no real one-to-one-correspondence between these seven form types and
functional types but prototypically a declarative sentence is used to make an assertion,
while polar and w-interrogative sentences are used to ask a question, imperative
sentences usually express a command, optative sentences are use to express
wishes and exclamatory and w-exclamatory sentences are used to make exclamations.
In summary, the following restrictions apply to German modal particles with
regard to the form types:
declarative polar interrogative w-interrogative imperative optative exclamatory w-exclamatory
aber +
auch + + + + +
bloß + + + +
denn + +
doch + + + + +
eben + +
eigentlich + +
einfach + + +
etwa +
halt + +
ja +
mal + + +
nur + + + +
190
ruhig + +
schon + + +
vielleicht + +
wohl + + +
Table 2: Restrictions of German modal particles concerning sentence types (taken from Thurmair
1989:49, slightly modiied)
The meaning of German modal particles
As mentioned above, modal particles have a weak lexical meaning. Instead of referring
to extralinguistic concepts they refer to relations between concepts/states
of affairs or to relations between concepts/states of affairs and the speaker and/or
hearer (cf. Hentschel 1986:120). Burkhardt (1994:133) explains:
In general these particles express the speaker’s subjective evaluation in regard
to certain elements of the communicative situation. Part of this situation
is the hearer’s knowledge and her wishes, the way to connect to previously
uttered sentences or executed acts, the speaker’s opinion or preferences.12
In general we can divide the hitherto existing approaches to the meaning of modal
particles in two opposing positions: semantic minimalism and semantic maximalism.
Posner (1979:361) outlines:
Semantic maximalists try to explain as much as possible by the meaning of
linguistic expressions and tend to assume that words have rich meanings and
that there are many ambiguous words. Semantic minimalists acknowledge
that there are pragmatic rules of reinterpretation of given lexical meanings
and tend to assume that words can only have minimal and clear-cut mean-
ings.13
That means that the question arises if the meaning of the several modal particles is
a primary (i.e. semantic) or secondary one, inferred by pragmatic rules (cf. Ickler
1994:377). It seems plausible to me to assume that there is a core meaning of each
modal particle from which the speaker can derive the special meaning from case
to case because of economic considerations. After reviewing modal particles as
operators of the illocutionary force and modal particles in a relevance-theoretic
account I will try to carve out the meaning or rather the function of some selected
modal particles in an approach based on an expanded model of Stalnaker’s (2002)
common ground. But irst I will present—based on the literature—a short overview
of what German modal particles mean one by one.
12
My translation.
13
My translation.
191
Aber:
The modal particle aber is restricted to exclamatory sentences as illustrated in
sentence (15).
(15) Hast du aber einen schönen Hut!
have you MP a nice hat!
‘You have such a nice hat!’
With aber the speaker indicates that what she is saying is unexpected for her (cf.
Coniglio 2011:18).
Auch:
The particle auch can be used in all sentence types and establishes a relationship
between old and new information. Therefore the utterance in which it appears is
often a reason or a cause:
(16) A: Du bist sehr betrunken. B: Ich habe auch 10 Bier getrunken.
A: Youare very drunk. B: I have MP 10 beers drunk.
‘A: You are very drunk. B: I drank 10 beers.’
With auch the speaker points out that she expected the proposition expressed in
a preceding utterance and the auch-sentence provides an explanation why it was
expected (Thurmair 1989:155).
Bloß:
Partially synonymous with nur; see nur.
Denn:
With the use of denn in interrogatives the speaker indicates that her question has
an actual reason which is motivated by the situation and that she is interested in an
answer (cf. Burkhardt 1994:143). Ickler (1994:381) writes that it is common sense
that the question in which it appears is “triggered by parts of the conversational
situation which are accessible for the hearer.”14
Doch:
Indicates a contradiction between the utterance and an act, knowledge, conventions
or something else. So it is used when the speaker thinks that the hearer has
not payed attention to something. It is often used to assure a premise that is needed
in the following conversation. Ickler (1994:402) shows with the following example
that doch is used to assure the premise that the interlocutor is able to speak French.
An answer is in this cases not expected, except for the case that the proposition is
false.
14
My translation.
192
(17) Du kannst doch Französisch. Was heißt denn bricolage?
You can MP French. What means MP bricolage?
‘You can speak French, can’t you. What’s the meaning of bricolage?’
So in short, the speaker indicates that the hearer is familiar with the proposition
expressed but that she now has to take it into account.
Eben:
See the partially synonymous halt.
Eigentlich:
Eigentlich is used to signal a change of topic in interrogatives. But the topic does
not change totally. The context and pretext won’t change in most cases just the aspect
under which the context is viewed changes (cf. Ickler 1994:384). So eigentlich
indicates how the question relates to the context.
Einfach:
This particle marks a proposition as an obvious explanation for something which is
only accesible to the speaker. In sentence (18), adopted from Thurmair (1989:131)
Iris uses einfach to indicate what the reason for her anger is.
(18) Eva: Wieso bist du denn so sauer?
‘Eva: Why are you so angry?’
Iris: Ich habe heute einfach keine Lust zu arbeiten.
‘Iris: I’m not in the mood for working.’
Etwa:
Etwa is used in polar questions when a negative answer is expected. These questions
relate to a previous utterance or action.
Halt:
With halt the speaker indicates that both the speaker and the hearer are familiar
with the facts expressed in the utterance, that these can not be altered, and therefore
have to be accepted (cf. Burkhardt 1994:144). Its meaning is very similar to eben
but they are not always interchangeable. With the use of these two particles the
speaker indicates that she can’t change the situation expressed in the proposition
and that she is not willing to discuss more about the topic.
Ja:
As commonly interpreted, unstressed ja is typically used when the speaker wants
to indicate that the proposition is, should be or can be evident for the hearer (cf.
Coniglio 2011:28). Used in imperatives ja reminds the hearer of responsibilities
193
or scold her for participating in banned activities. Ickler (1994:380) criticizes this
view using the following sentence from Helbig (1988:165):
(19) Sie wissen ja, dass er nächste Woche operiert wird.
You know MP that he next week operate will be.
‘As you know he will be operated on next week.’
The evidence for the hearer is already in the proposition. If we assume that ja indicates
that the proposition should be evident, the sentence’s meaning is that the
hearer knows that she knows that someone will be operated. This is not feasible.
The meaning of ja could better be described as ‘I want you to consider in this context
that’ or ‘In this context I want to call attention to’. Ickler (1994:399) argues
that this particle says that the proposition is not controversial for the speaker.
Mal:
In imperatives mal is used by the speaker to stress that the command conveyed
holds for now and not in general (cf. Ickler 1994:397f.):
(20) Hör mal!
Hear MP!
‘Listen!’
So in (19) the speaker wants the hearer’s attention, not in general but for a sec-
ond.
Nur:
Used in optatives, nur is used to indicate that there were contrary expectations or
hopes. In imperatives the speaker wants to signal—against the hearer’s expectations—that
there are no obstacles to act in a certain way. Used in interrogative constructions,
the speaker shows that she had not expected an event or that she cannot
identify the reason for the situation (cf. Bukhardt 1994:146f.).
Ruhig:
The utterance of sentences with ruhig indicate that an act can be performed without
obstacles (cf. Burkhardt 1994:146).
Schon:
Used in contexts in which something seemingly contradicts a prediction made in
the utterance and sometimes establishes a relationship between the actual utterance
and general premises (König 1991:66):
(21) Du wirst schon gesund (wie immer)
‘You will get well (as always)’
194
When used in imperatives it sounds reproachful because the speaker “admonishes
the hearer with a direct speech act to do something and suggests that the problems
are on the hearer’s side” (ibidem). In short, the meaning of schon is that the speaker
accepts parts of the meaning of a preceding utterance and refuses other parts,
i.e. the speaker wants to indicate that he knows that there are counter-arguments
(Thurmair 1989:148ff.).
Wohl:
Wohl is used to signal the uncertainty of the speaker towards the proposition:
(22) a. Werde ich wohl noch eine Karte bekommen?
‘Will I still get a ticket?’
b. Der Typ da drüben, der hat sie wohl nicht mehr alle!15
‘This guy over there, he’s crazy!’
With wohl the speaker can indicate that she is not sure about the truth of the proposition.
Therefore, questions with and without wohl differ in the expressed uncertainty
towards a proposition. With questions containing wohl the speaker adresses
herself but is awaiting a response (not a concrete answer) (Thurmair 1989:143).
This is because whether the proposition expressed in wohl-sentences is true or not
is not known to the speaker and at the same time she assumes that this is also not
known to the hearer.
Vielleicht:
Like auch, vielleicht is restricted to exclamative sentences and is also used to indicate
surprise. Ickler (1994:390) believes that the difference between auch and
vielleicht lies in the viewpoint: whereas with the use of auch the speaker expects
the hearer to explain something, with vielleicht the speaker is the one who knows
the reason for something surprising (or exciting).
Modal particles as operators of the illocutionary force
It seems plausible to interpret modal particles as sentence operators which add the
speakers attitude towards a proposition which is based on a common ground to the
propositional content. Since—as we have seen—the concepts ‘speaker’ and ‘hearer’
are needed in order to explain the meaning of modal particles, it seems that we
should start at an more abstract level: the illocutionary one (Coniglio 2011:19).
Every speech act can be divided in three parts: the locutionary act as the act of uttering
with an ostensible meaning, the illocutionary act with the intended meaning
and the perlocutionary act, i.e. the effect evoked by speaking. The function of a
sentence is what is meant by the illocutionary level. Every sentence can therefore
be divided into a proposition p and an illocutionary operator Φ. So an uttered sentence
should look like (22):
15
Example from Thurmair (1989:142).
195
(22) Φ(p)
As we have seen there is a difference between the formal sentence types (declarative,
imperative, interrogative, etc.) and the illocutionary force of a sentence which
prototypically coincide but do not have to. To simplify matters I will assume that
they coincide, i.e. the meaning of a declarative sentence is an assertion etc.
In a speech act theoretical framework modal particles can be interpreted as illocution
modiiers or indicators (cf. Helbig 1988:57f., Thurmair 1989:201, Coniglio
2011:20f.). That means that if we have a sentence with an illocutionary type X to
which we add a modal particle we get a sentence with an illocutionary type X’ with
a more speciic usage (Jacobs 1986:103).
Ickler (1994:375) criticizes that there is no inite set of illocutionary types so that
many authors have to invent new types ad hoc to classify a modal particle. So to
describe the illocutionary type of utterances containing ja the subtype JA-ASSERT
can be assumed. But it is doubtful whether this makes sense, because we have to
assume a very large set of special subtypes.
A relevance-theoretical approach
König & Requard (1991) and König (1997) propose an account to explain the
meanig of modal particles based on relevance theory. König (1997:59) and König
& Requard (1991:64f.) critizise the following points in the disscussion about modal
particles and the analysis of their meaning:
1. Aspects of the meaning of the context in which modal particles appear are
often ascribed to the meaning of the particles themselves
2. Instead of looking for a superordinate meaning of modal particles per se
many analyses assume polysemy
3. The analysis of modal particles often does not account for the difference
between sentence meaning and utterance meaning
4. The detailed study of the meaning of the individual modal particles often
hinders the adherence to the general properties of the whole class
The central claim of the relevance theory is that all interlocutors tend to maximize
their representations of the world. According to Sperber & Wilson (1986) this is
achieved in an economic way, i.e. all participants try to weigh the costs against
the beneits. They deine input as relevant when an individual can interrelate new
information with old information such that she can draw new conclusions. In addition,
the interlocutors aim to ind evidence for preexisting assumptions. König
(1991:62) lists three important roles which such an inference system can play and
should be considered regarding to an analysis of modal particles:
196
1. An inference system can detect inconsistencies in a set of assumptions and
can therefore guide the hearer to reject old assumptions and replace them
with new information
2. An inference system can guide the hearer to afirm old assumptions
3. Old and new information can be combined and therefore new conclusions
can be drawn
The problem with which an interlocutor is faced is how she should integrate new
informations into background knowledge. Equipped with these considerations
König inprets modal particles as meta-pragmatic instructors picking out an appropriate
context in which an utterance should be understood. Based on the roles identiication
of inconsistencies (i), strengthening of assumptions (ii) and guidance of
context selection (iii) (König 1991:65) sorts—note the overlappings—the modals
particles as follows:
Identiication of inconsistencies: doch, etwa
Strengthening assumptions: aber, vielleicht, erst, schon, ja, wohl, eben,
nun mal, halt, bloß
Guidance of context selection: auch, eben, nun mal, halt, schon, denn,
eigentlich, einfach, nur, bloß, wohl
And indeed: doch and etwa do serve as a signal for conlicting assumptions of the
interlocutors and the second group does refer to evidences of assumptions. But
let’s take a closer look at the third group. König (1991:66) distinguishes group
three into the following subgroups:
Context selection: Inference: Premisses: Base/Premise:
eigentlich wohl, schon, eben,
einfach, bloß
nun mal, eben, halt denn
Table 3: Context selection (taken from König 1991:66)
In König’s minimalistic analysis modal particles are not interpreted as modiiers or
indicators of illocution. For him the meaning of modal particles lies in their contribution
to the processing of an utterance in a context.16
Modal particles and the common ground
As we have seen there are different proposals of what the meaning and function
of modal particles in general are. At the beginning of her detailed work (Thurmair
16
Maximalistic approaches do not seem plausible because of the enormous amount of memory needed
for thousands and thousands of words. Helbig & Kötz (1981) for example, assume that there are seven
different modal particles doch alone.
197
1989:2) writes that modal particles operate in the illocutionary domain and characterizes
them as follows:
The main task of modal particles is to integrate utterances in the interaction
context. The interlocutor uses them to refer to the mutual knowledge and to
the speaker’s or hearer’s assumptions and expectations, to recent utterances or
the importance attached to the utterance.17
Thurmair is not alone in ascribing the function of modal particles to the context.
Ickler (1994:382) states that they “relate to a context”18
and that they are a “comment
on the speciic utterance in which they appear, a comment with regard to the
logical or rhetorical classiication into the communicative context” (p. 404). On
the other hand, modal particles were analyzed as indicators and modiiers of the illocutionary
force (Jacobs 1986), indicators for interpersonal relationships (Franck
1980), as speaker’s instructions on how to make use of shared knowledge (Lütten
1979), and as a means of expression of epistemic attitude (Doherty 1985) and
many more. All approaches have in common that they act on the assumption that
modal particles act on a meta-level and not on a propositional level.
I will attempt to explain what modal particles mean by expanding Stalnaker’s (e.g.
1978, 2002) common ground. His basic assumption is that utterances in natural
language usually engage a speaker or signer (S) who makes an utterance (U) which
is addressed to an attender (H). But to utter a sentence, S has to make some background
assumptions about H’s knowledge and beliefs. Or in other words: S and H
share some information and they need to know which information they share to
communicate properly. Stalnaker (2002:704) deines a common ground (or common
belief) in a simple way as follows:
[the mutual beliefs] of the parties to a conversation are the beliefs they share,
and that they recognize that they share: a proposition Φ is common belief of a
group of believers if and only if all in the group believe that Φ, all believe that
all believe it, all believe that all believe that all believe it, etc.19
The problem with this notion of common ground is that S cannot really know
what H knows or believes, a problem the sociolologist Niklas Luhmann (1984)
called ‘double contingency’: we can’t see into each other’s heads.20
S just knows
17
My translation.
18
My (loose) translation. He writes: “weil [...] alle Modalpartikeln einen [...] Kontextbezug
herstellen.”
19
Although Stalnaker (2002:705ff.) argues that common ground and common beliefs may diverge we
will keep it simple for the moment and identify the two.
20
Gripp-Hagelstange (1989:65) puts it the following way: “‘I don’t know what you are really thinking
and you don’t know what I’m really thinking, but I know that you could drive at something else than
you pretend; similarly you can’t really know what I want to do because we both know that what is
apparent of us is quasi the tip of the iceberg’—this situation is untenable; the constituting uncertainness
of this situation has to be counterbalanced if we want to interact.” (My translation, German original:
“‘Ich weiß nicht, was Du wirklich denkst, und Du weißt nicht, was ich wirklich denke, aber ich weiß,
198
(or better: has to believe) that what she hears (what H is saying). Put simply: S
only has introspective access to her own beliefs and her own knowledge. In some
languages there are grammatical markers for indicating that we can’t really know
what others think or feel. E.g. in Japanese you cannot simply say that someone has
a headache—you have to mark that the evidence for the headache is indirect:
(24) Ken wa atama ga ita- sô da.
Ken TOP head NOM pain-EVID KOP.PRES
‘Ken seems to have a headache.’21
Because the real common ground lies outside the heads of the interlocutors and is
not accessible to them it can’t explain their behaviour. The common ground is “an
abstraction, […] only observable by a god-like, omniscent outsider with privileged
access to the participants’ representational inventories” (Koschmann & LeBaron
2003:93). Therefore, I will assume that there are as many common grounds as there
are interlocutors in a conversation—an idea similar to what Stalnaker (2002:708)
calls “beliefs about common beliefs” and what Kecskes & Zhang (2009:344) call
an “assumed common ground”. If we look at the conversation between S and H, S
has a common ground CGS_1
which we can think of as a set of propositions which S
believes to be true and believes that H also believes to be true, and a ‘deeper’ common
ground CGS_2
which is the set of propositions S believes to be true, she believes
daß Du auch anderes wollen kannst, als Du zu wollen vorgibst, so wie Du ja auch nicht wissen kannst,
was ich wirklich will, weil wir beide wissen, daß das, was von uns ‘sichtbar’ ist, gleichsam nur die
Spitze des Eisberges ist’– diese Situation ist unhaltbar; die sie konstituierende Unsichterheit muß, soll
ein Sichverhalten zueinander möglich werden, kompensiert werden.” To overcome this uncertainty
we have language to express what we think—Zaefferer (2007), therefore, called language a “mind
sharing device” and humans “mind sharing animals”.
21
Example taken from Löbner (2003:240).
Figure 1: Set of propositions constituting all beliefs of S (outer circle), CGS_1
and CGS_2
199
Figure 2: Con_CGS_1 and Con_CGS_2
Figure 3: A mental common ground model of the speaker’s viewpoint. Doxastic, epistemic and expectational
common ground
200
that H believes and she believes that H believes that she also believes.22
Figure 1
shows CGS_1
as a subset of all beliefs of S (which I called G here) and CGS_2
as a
subset of CGS_1
. This takes into account the consideration that the speaker’s knowlegde
and beliefes “involve[...] constructing a model of the hearer’s knowledge
relevant to the given situational context” (Kecskes & Zhang 2009:335).
All three sets G, CGS_1
and CGS_2
are constantly changing in the interaction/conversation,
a process called grounding (see Clark & Brennan 1993). Note that in
this process S is not only uttering for example a proposition p which H is adding to
her common ground, but S’s utterance has the form Φ(p), so it is possible that her
utterance was a question and not an assertion. In this case H knows that S does not
know p and wants to know if p (in the simple case of a polar question). But even if
S is making an assertion, things are not that simple. What is accepted in most cases
is that by making an assertion, a proposition p is added to the common ground (and
adding means that this proposition is accepted for the purpose of communication).
But this is the best case scenario. If the hearer believes a contradicting proposition
q, she will not add p to her common ground. So in real grounding, she has to accept
a proposition (by commenting on it or by remaining silent) or to reject/correct/
modify it before it is added to the common ground (see Kecskes & Zhang 2009).
But what does this have to do with modal particles and their meaning or function?
As Thurmair (1989:94) puts it, their meaning lies in the fact that S can provide with
them indications of how to relate a proposition expressed in an utterance to a given
context. So not all propositions in CGS_1
and CGS_2
are relevant, and it is therefore
necessary to assume context-relevant subsets, to which I will refer as Con_CGS_1
and Con_CGS_2
, as shown in igure 2.23
For the role of these salient or relevant
meanings, see Giora (2003).
22
This is a bit oversimpliied because S does not really have to believe that the propositions are true
(they could talk about unicorns). So the propositions are taken to be true, i.e. they are accepted for the
purpose of the conversation.
23
You do not have to keep in mind these abbreviations.
Figure 4: Epistemic common ground of an assertion without and with using doch
201
It is important to note that the common ground must have some sort of mental
representation (we could call it a mental common ground) but the model I present
here is just this: an abstract model. To simplify matters I will refer to both (to this
model and to the mental state or mental processes it represents) with the notion of
mental common ground. Up to now this model does not distinguish between what
is believed and what is known. Furthermore, it does not represent all the things that
are expected (or wanted). Figure 3 shows a more elaborate model of a speaker’s
mental common ground which not only takes the speaker’s beliefs into account but
also her knowledge and beliefs.
What is believed by the speaker (the doxastic common ground) has already been
explained. In the epistemic common ground are all propositions the speaker knows
to be true or rather accepts for the purpose of a speciic communicative situation.
I have said that S cannot really know what H knows or believes, but let us assume
that she knows a proposition p which H knows or believes when H has made an assertion
(a proposition p) or when she has acted as if p. Note that it is not the whole
circles that are the (mental) common grounds, but just the grey ones. In what I have
called the expectational common ground there are the expectations of S and the
expectations of S of which S knows that H knows that she expects it. This is a part
of S’s knowledge, i.e. a subset of what she knows. What S believes that H expects
is in contrast to that part i.e. a subset of her beliefs. With this model I will try to
explain what happens in communicative situations when modal particles are used.
As examples, I will use the particles doch, ruhig, ja and halt.
Figure 5: Process of a directive with ruhig
202
Doch :
Let us assume that two friends, S and H, are having a conversation:
(25) H: Schau Dir mal diesen lustigen Hund an!
‘H: Look at this funny dog!’
S: Das ist doch eine Katze!
‘S: That is a cat!’
What is happening is that H is uttering a proposition p which is now in the epistemic
common ground as shown in igure 4. This does not mean that S thinks that p is
true but that S knows that H believes p to be true. The model on the left show what
would happen if S utters the sentence without using doch.24
The model on the right
shows that S knows that q and therefore ￢p should be evident for H but that he is
not considering this in the actual situation. So with uttering the sentence with doch,
S indicates that H should know that q and ￢p.
24
Something like: This is a cat (and no dog).
Figure 6: Common ground process in sentences with ja
203
Ruhig:
Imagine a situation where a student, H, is in the ofice of professor S to talk about
the thesis that H wants to write. S is sitting in his ofice chair behind his desk and
H is standing in front of it. Due to our culture it is normal to take a seat in such a
situation. So S assumes that H believes that there is some reason p for her not take
a seat so he says:
(25) S: Setzen Sie sich ruhig hin.
S: ‘Take a seat.’
With the use of ruhig S indicates that she believes that there is no such reason
(￢q). Sentences with ruhig are always directives, so the sentence (with or without
ruhig) says something like: do(q) because there is no reason p not to. See igure
5.
Ja:
In a conversation between two friends, S and H, the former says:
(26) S: Lena hat ja ein Stipendium bekommen.
‘S: Lena got a scholarship.’
Figure 7: Process of a assertion with halt
204
because she is not sure whether H has already heard this and wants to use the proposition
made in the utterance to continue the conversation. So the model should
look like the top one in igure 6. In some cases it could look like the model on the
bottom of the picture, but this is not relevant for the hearer to understand what was
meant.
Halt:
Halt (and the partial synonymous eben) is used to answer a preceding question,
like the dialog in (27):
(27) H: Warum arbeitest du nicht?
‘H: Why don’t you work?’
S: Ich hab halt keine Lust.
‘S: I’m not in the mood.’
S’s answer with halt signals H that S does not want to talk about his reasons further.
But the proposition expressed in his utterance is an answer to the question.
Questions can be modeled as a set of possible answers, i.e. a set of propositions
(Hamblin 1958), which we will refer to as α—shown in igure 6 as the dotted circle.
By uttering the answer the proposition p is added to the common ground but is
marked as not relevant for the future conversation (illustrated by the intermediate
stop of the arrow in igure 7).
In the presented view modal particles verbalize—similar to e.g. Japanese sentenceinal
particles—“relations between the speaker’s mind and his estimation about
the hearer’s mind regarding the proposition uttered” (Schanz 2009:31). For these
Japanese sentence-inal particles Schanz (2009:31) considers the following subtasks
to describe their function:
Matching of minds: This is information about whether the speaker expects the
hearer’s mind to agree with the proposition
Figure 8: Operations in the expectational common ground in Japanese sentence-inal particles
205
Interaction between proposition and hearer’s mind: This represents the speaker’s
expectation of how the hearer should deal with the proposition in regard to his
own knowledge and experience
Intensity of expectation: Combined with the expectation criterion above, there
is a certain degree of relevance pressure which is laid on the hearer regarding its
intended fulillment
Weight of relevance: This expresses how important it is to the actual topic that the
proposition is presented by the speaker
As we can see, the functions of these Japanese particles are very similar to German
modal particles. The irst three subtasks are operations in what I have called expectational
common ground. The fourth is an operation in the epistemic common
ground. Figure 8 shows the irst two subtasks: with the matching subtask the speaker
wants to indicate that her proposition is expected to be accepted by H too and
with the interaction subtask she wants to indicate that H should deal with the expressed
proposition, like the German modal particle ruhig (see the arrow in igure
8). The intensity and weight subtasks can be modeled by assuming that the sets of
relevant propositions contain a subset with propositions that are more relevant to
the context.
Conclusion and requirements for further models
The model presented above showed that the function of German modal particles
lies in the guidance of speaker-hearer relevant information based on the speaker’s
assumptions about their mutual knowledge. Or as Abraham (2012:76) aptly puts
it: “The speaker appraises what the hearer knows and what he is aware of, lets her
know of this act of appraisal, and invites her to comment on this appraisal of p (to
afirm, to correct, to modify).”25
Modal particles work against the general tendency
of speakers to “in general underestimate the ambiguity of their utterances” (Keysar
& Henly 2002:207) by a targeted process of evaluating the common ground.
The biggest problem of this model is that it can barely handle aspects of time. For
example the modal particle mal narrows the time a proposition is valid so a sentence
like Hast du mir mal ne Zigarette. (‘Do you have a cigarette.’) means that
the speaker wants a cigarette now and will not ask for another one later. This is not
to be modeled by the presented approach because of its limitation in time. Future
models of the (mental) common ground should include all aspects of real conversational
situations consisting of pairs <sentence, context>. According to Wunderlich
(1971:177f.), such a communicative situation consists of: 1. a speaker, 2. a hearer,
3. the time of the utterance, 4. place (what is perceived by the speaker), 5. pho-
25
My translation. The original quote says: “Der Sprecher schätzt den Stand des Hörerwissensbewusstseins
ab, lässt den Hörer von diesem Einschätzungsakt wissen und lädt ihn ein, zu dieser seiner (des
Sprechers) Einschätzung von p Stellung zu nehmen (zu bestätigen, zu korrigieren, zu modiizieren).”
206
nological-syntactic properties of the utterance, 6. cognitive content of the utterance,
7. several assumptions (a. speaker’s assumptions, knowledge, and skills; b.
hearer’s assumptions, knowledge, and skills; c. assumptions about what the hearer
perceives; d. social relationship between speaker and hearer; e. what the speaker
thinks about what the preceding utterances meant); 8. what was intended by the
speaker with her utterance, and 9. the interrelation between speaker and hearer
caused by the utterance.26
26
Further requirements to a common ground model could be how exactly questions operate in a
common ground and an integration of theories of theories of mind.
207
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Please cite this article as: Fabian Bross (2012): German modal particles and the common
ground. In: Helikon. A Multidisciplinary Online Journal, 2. 182-209.