Journal of East Asian Studies 14 (2014), 317–346
US POLITICAL ELITES IN BOTH PARTIES ARE INTERNALLY DIVIDED OVER
China. On the left, some Democrats argue for a pro-China policy of
engagement to better integrate China into the global economic, political,
and security orders. Other Democratic elites, concerned about
Chinese human rights abuses, advocate for tougher China policies.
“The plight of the people of Tibet is a challenge to the conscience of
the world,” Democratic Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi proclaimed
on March 12, 2008. “The United States must be prepared to
confront the Chinese government when they violate the human rights
of their people.” Yet other Democrats on Capitol Hill, many representing
heavily blue-collar districts, join Big Labor in condemning
unfair Chinese trade practices and advocating tougher US trade policies
toward China.
317
“Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”:
How Ideology Divides Americans
over China
Peter Hays Gries
Based on a 2011 national survey, I argue that while US conservatives
feel somewhat cooler toward the East Asian democracies than US liberals
do, they feel much cooler toward China. Greater average conservative
than liberal prejudice lingers, cooling attitudes toward the
“Yellow Peril” of all Asian countries, but communism is a larger source
of ideological differences over China. For cultural, social, economic,
and political reasons, conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals
toward both communist countries in general and “Red China” in
particular. I conclude by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing
ideological sorting, these ideological differences over China
on Main Street may come to play a greater role in the making of US
China policy. KEYWORDS: ideology, liberal, conservative, US-China relations,
“Red China,” “Yellow Peril,” communism, libertarianism, social
dominance
Republican elites are equally divided on China policy. Business
conservatives have historically promoted a friendlier China policy
conducive to increased trade, investment, and profits. For instance,
the US-China Business Council and AmCham China, which lobby on
behalf of US companies doing business with China, have worked
closely with many probusiness Republicans on Capitol Hill to support
pro-China and block anti-China legislation. Military hawks and
Christian conservatives, however, usually argue for tougher China
policies. Congressman Randy Forbes of Virginia serves on the House
Armed Services Committee and cochairs its China Caucus, frequently
promoting tougher positions on China. New Jersey Congressman
Christopher Smith, who has held dozens of hearings to
deplore China’s lack of religious freedoms, has also advocated a
tougher US China policy, but for very different reasons. “China’s
continued repression of religion is among the most despotic in the
world,” Smith (2006), a Christian conservative who founded the
House Pro-Life Caucus, argues. “Today, numerous underground
Roman Catholic priests and bishops and Protestant pastors languish
in the infamous concentration camps of China for simply proclaiming
the Gospel of Jesus Christ.”
Democratic and Republican Party elites thus appear internally
divided over China. Are Main Street Americans similarly conflicted,
so that there are no overall liberal-conservative differences over
China among the US public at large?
The predominant argument among US political scientists and
pollsters today is that neither partisanship nor ideology shapes US
public opinion toward China—or any other country (see Gries 2014).
In their Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the
Rise of China, Benjamin Page and Tao Xie (2010, 37, 57, 66, 103)
specifically and repeatedly claim, based upon their reading of existing
survey data, that ideology has “little impact” on the attitudes of
the American public toward China (for a critique, see Gries 2011).
This argument is consistent with Page’s earlier claims that partisanship
and ideology do not shape the international attitudes of the
American people in general (Page with Bouton 2006, 95–96), or their
attitudes toward Asia in particular (Page, Rabinovich, and Tully
2008, 45, 47).
The pollsters largely agree. Pew’s Andrew Kohut has argued that
among the US public, “partisan differences are slight.” Neither religion
nor nationalism, furthermore, shapes Americans’ views on foreign
affairs (Kohut and Stokes 2006, 218, 94, 70). More recently, the
Chicago Council on Global Affairs (CCGA 2012, 4, 44) has similarly
318 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
declared that the media’s focus on popular polarization is “exaggerated”:
among the general public, “Republicans and Democrats rarely
disagree on key foreign policy issues.”
In this article I argue that these political scientists and pollsters
have misinterpreted the public opinion data: Main Street liberals and
conservatives today are remarkably divided in their views of China
and East Asia. Greater average conservative than liberal prejudice
lingers, cooling attitudes toward the “Yellow Peril” of all Asian
countries. But communism is a larger source of ideological differences
over China. For cultural, social, economic, and political reasons,
conservatives feel substantially cooler than liberals toward both
communist countries in general, and “Red China” in particular. I conclude
by suggesting that with gerrymandering and ongoing ideological
sorting, these ideological differences over China on Main Street
may come to play a greater role in the making of US China policy.
We may, therefore, be poised for a significant change in the politics
of China policy on Capitol Hill.
Measurement Matters
We hired the Palo Alto, California, survey research company YouGov
to implement a national US Internet survey in spring 2011. It used a
“sample matching” methodology (see Rivers 2005; Ansolabehere and
Rivers 2013) to generate a representative national sample of 1,000
respondents, first matching them on gender, age, race, education,
party identification, ideology, and political interest, and then weighting
the final dataset to match the full US general population on age,
gender, race, education, and religion.
There are two major reasons why a new survey was needed.
First, to my knowledge, existing national surveys have largely
explored either ideology or international attitudes in general or China
attitudes in particular. The General Social Survey (GSS) and American
National Election Surveys (ANES) have measured US ideology
for decades, but rarely ask questions about international affairs. By
contrast, the CCGA, Pew, and the Program on International Policy
Attitudes (PIPA) have been asking questions about international
affairs for years, but rarely ask many questions about ideology. Similarly,
the Committee of 100 has been surveying US attitudes toward
China for years, but does not ask many questions about ideology. By
combining these two types of questions within a single survey, our
dataset provides new leverage to explore how ideology shapes Americans’
attitudes toward China and East Asia.
Peter Hays Gries 319
Second, improving both survey sampling and measurement is
necessary to allow the full extent of the relationships among our variables
to fully emerge. When psychologists limit themselves to university
student samples, range restriction can reduce the size of the
observed associations among variables. For example, because most
university students are about the same age and education level, it is
difficult to ascertain the true extent of any associations between age
or education and any other variable using a student sample.
Political science surveys, for their part, often suffer from high
measurement error, leading to type II errors, or false negatives—such
as the erroneous claim that Americans are united in their views of
China and the world (see Gries 2014, 18–21). Public opinion surveys
too often rely on single questions with limited response options.
While single, dichotomous questions are fine for some substantive
opinions—“Do you plan to vote for Barack Obama or Mitt Romney?”—they
are insufficient to capture more complex ideologies and
(international) attitudes. Single-item measures can decrease the
observed associations among variables as more error and less “true
score” variation are captured and correlated (see, e.g., Osterlind
2006; Thorndike and Thorndike-Christ 2009). Furthermore, binary
response categories, such as forcing a choice between “engaging”
and “containing” China, fail to capture the nuances of complex attitudes.
They also limit the variation necessary to ensure that the full
extent of the associations among variables can become apparent. In
short, measures of low internal reliability and insufficient variability
have often produced low or inconsistent associations between ideology
and international attitudes in existing public opinion surveys,
contributing to the many false negatives in existing public opinion
scholarship.
Poor question wording also plagues many public opinion surveys,
distorting our understanding of key concepts. For instance, for
decades the ANES and the GSS have measured ideology by asking
respondents to place themselves on a seven-point scale from
“extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” To be “extreme” is
not normatively desirable, however. This has pushed respondents
away from the edges of the distribution. In 2010 ANES substituted
“very” for “extreme,” while also reporting the results from Knowledge
Network’s public profile ideology question, which retained the
“extreme” wording.1
While only 7.4 percent of their respondents
were willing to describe themselves as “extremely” liberal or conser-
320 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
vative, 18.4 percent of the very same respondents were willing to
describe themselves as “very” liberal or conservative. “Extreme”
even swelled the numbers of respondents choosing the neutral (4)
position, from 30.9 percent to 38.1 percent, likely because of a negative
exemplar effect: some people may associate “extremely liberal”
and “extremely conservative” with people they find distasteful, like
Bill Maher or Rush Limbaugh, and so distance themselves from any
ideology. In short, a poor choice of diction—“extremely”—has contributed
to producing an artificially moderate picture of the US ideological
landscape for decades.2
Such poor measurement of ideology
has abetted scholars like Morris Fiorina in making the absurd claim
that the US public is not ideologically divided (see, e.g., Fiorina,
Abrams, and Pope 2011). Instead, Alan Abramowitz (2006, 2010) is
correct that the “culture wars” are no myth: Main Street America is
divided over issues like abortion—and, I add, China policy.
By combining the best of political science (sampling) and psychological
(measurement) survey methods, I hope to overcome
these problems of survey design, providing a more accurate picture
of the relationship between ideology and US views of China and
East Asia.
Liberals, Conservatives, and East Asia
In our 2011 YouGov survey, the average American felt cool (35°)
toward China, but the average conservative (22°) felt a full 18°
cooler toward China than the average liberal (40°) did, a large difference
statistically.3
By contrast, Americans felt substantially warmer
toward the East Asian democracies of Taiwan (49°), South Korea
(50°), and Japan (60°), with conservatives feeling just 6°, 6°, and 8°
cooler, respectively, than liberals did toward each.4
What’s more, the ideological cleavage over feelings toward
China shapes foreign policy preferences. In addition to the “China”
item in a 1–7 “much friendlier” to “much tougher” rating scale of
foreign policy preferences toward fifteen countries, we included two
additional 1–7 “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” items in our
2011 survey:
• The best way to deal with China is to build up our military to
counter Chinese power.
• The US government should pursue a tougher China policy.
Peter Hays Gries 321
The resulting three-item scale (α = .68) revealed that, on average, US
conservatives desired a great deal tougher China policy than liberals
did.5
Could these substantial ideological differences over China actually
be driven by ideological covariates like income or partisanship?
Is there a colinearity problem?
All analyses of covariance (ANCOVA), regressions, and mediation
analyses in this article covary or “control for” seven standard
demographic variables: age, gender, education, income, being black
(race), being Hispanic (ethnicity), and being from the US South
(region). In the case of warmth toward China analyzed above, only
gender was a statistically significant covariate, with men feeling
cooler toward China than women.6
So it cannot be said that income
(p = .17), for example, is the real driver of these ideological differences
over China.
Partisanship is a more complicated counterargument. How do we
know that ideology trumps partisanship in driving US attitudes
toward China?7
Following the publication of The American Voter in
1960, the “Michigan Model” of voting behavior, with its focus on
partisanship, has dominated the study of US elections (Campbell et
al. 1960). Ideology, by contrast, has been treated more skeptically, if
at all (see Federico 2012, 79; Jacoby 2011, 442). For instance, the
2010 edition of the authoritative and comprehensive Oxford Handbook
of American Elections and Political Behavior (Leighley 2010)
does not even include entries for “ideology,” “liberalism,” or “conservatism”
in its subject index, let alone chapters on them. The subject
index entry for “party identification,” by contrast, merits sixteen
subheadings. Political scientist Marc Hetherington (2012, 115) has
even declared partisanship to be the “most important” variable shaping
not just voting but “a person’s political behaviors, positions on
issues, or feelings about groups.”
Partisanship does not explain everything. Hetherington and other
students of US politics have elevated partisanship too high at ideology’s
expense. While partisanship may do a better job than ideology
in accounting for highly partisan attitude objects like Obama or
“Obamacare,” and overtly partisan behaviors like voting, the more
psychologically fundamental ideology is usually the more powerful
driver of our deeper sociopolitical attitudes and policy preferences.
Partisanship is rooted in ideology, which is the real source of many
seemingly partisan attitudes.
322 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
With the ongoing sorting of liberals into the Democratic Party
and conservatives into the Republican Party, partisanship and ideology
are increasingly intercorrelated. From 1972 to 2004, American
National Election Surveys revealed a fourfold increase in their overlap,
from 10 percent (r = .32) to 40 percent (r = .63) (Abramowitz
2006, 114; Bafumi and Shapiro 2009, 9–10). In our 2011 survey, they
overlapped a remarkable 53 percent (r = .73), perhaps reflecting further
sorting over time or, more likely, more accurate survey measurement,
as discussed above. Ideology and partisanship today, in short,
appear to share as much as half of their variance.
When ideology and partisanship are set against each other to predict
feelings toward China or China policy preferences, however, ideology
is consistently the stronger predictor. For instance, when pit
against each other in a regression explaining warmth toward China,
only ideology (standardized β = –.22, p < .001) and not partisanship
(β = –.04, p = .37) is a statistically significant predictor. The same is
true for our three-item China policy scale, introduced above: only
ideology (β = .30, p < .001) and not partisanship (β = .07, p = .12)
predicts desires for a tougher China policy. Indeed, where ideology
accounted for 11 percent of the unique variance in China policy preferences,
partisanship accounted for none. This article, therefore, differs
from more than fifty years of scholarship on US public opinion
by focusing on ideology rather than partisanship.
What are the sources of these substantial, consistent, and robust
ideological differences over China and East Asia? I begin with an
exploration of two distinct pathways to China policy preferences:
via the “Chinese people” and the “Chinese government.” Main
Street US conservatives desire a tougher China policy than liberals
do in small part because, on average, they maintain more prejudicial
attitudes toward Asians in general and the Chinese people in
particular. Conservatives also, however, desire a tougher China policy
than liberals do in larger part because, on average, they maintain
much more negative attitudes toward communist countries in
general and the Chinese government in particular. I then turn to a
closer examination of how four dimensions of US ideology—cultural,
socioracial, economic, and political—each contribute to ideological
polarization over communism and China. For instance, cultural
conservatives and libertarians may disagree over what they
most dislike about China, but they can agree that they dislike China
more than liberals do.
Peter Hays Gries 323
I then turn to a brief comparative exploration of how ideology
shapes Americans’ feelings toward the East Asian democracies of
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. As was the case with China, greater
prejudice against “Orientals” contributes to slightly greater average
conservative than liberal coolness toward these East Asian democracies.
But their greater libertarianism leads conservatives to feel
slightly warmer than liberals do toward these fellow democracies in
“Free Asia.” Social and political ideologies, in other words, counteract
each other, reducing overall liberal-conservative differences in
feelings toward East Asia’s democracies.
I conclude by returning to Capitol Hill from Main Street, speculating
on the policy implications of ideologically divided public
opinion over China. Since the global financial crisis, China has
become more assertive on both economic and security affairs and US
corporate elites are no longer as united in support of China. Greater
conservative coolness toward China on Main Street may, therefore,
begin to be more clearly expressed in the domestic politics of US
China policy.
“Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
Does the “Yellow Peril” continue to shape US views of Asia? Or
have the civil rights movement and racial integration since the
1960s eliminated race as an influence on US views of Asia? And
after thirty-five years of “reform and opening,” China today is
arguably communist in name only. Do liberal and conservative feelings
about “Red China” nonetheless continue to shape their China
policy preferences?
To best answer these questions, we decided to measure how
Americans feel about the Chinese people and government sepa-
rately.8
In addition to a 0°–100° cold to warm feeling thermometer
item on “China,” therefore, we included feeling thermometers for
“the Chinese people” and “the Chinese government.” And to reduce
measurement error and increase the internal reliability of these two
measures, we also added a pair of more cognitive items that were
evaluated on a seven-point “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree”
scale:
• The Chinese GOVERNMENT is trustworthy. (reverse coded)
• The Chinese GOVERNMENT is devious.
324 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
• The Chinese PEOPLE are trustworthy. (reverse coded)
• The Chinese PEOPLE are devious.
After reverse coding the feeling thermometer and “trustworthy”
items, we standardized and averaged them together to form threeitem
“prejudice against the Chinese people” and “negative attitudes
toward the Chinese government” scales, both of good internal
reliability.9
On average, Americans felt a whopping 34° cooler toward the
Chinese government (21°) than toward the Chinese people (55°), an
extremely large difference statistically.10
Just as conservatives felt
18° cooler than liberals toward “China,” they felt 11° cooler toward
“the Chinese people” and 15° cooler toward “the Chinese government,”
medium and large differences statistically.11
Our survey also
included thermometer items measuring feelings toward “Asians” and
“Communist countries.” On average, conservatives scored 5° and 19°
cooler than liberals on these two items, respectively, small and large
differences statistically.12
Would cooler conservative than liberal feelings toward the
Chinese people and their government and Asians and communist
countries more broadly help account for their preference for a
tougher China policy? The mediation model in Figure 1 reveals
that they did: the inclusion of these four mediators accounts for a
full three-quarters of the direct relationship between ideology and
China policy preferences.13
Mediation analyses are utilized to test whether one or more variables
“transmit” variation from a predictor to a criterion variable,
answering the how question of the mechanism(s) or pathway(s)
through which two variables relate to one another (see Hayes 2013).
Establishing causal mediation is extremely difficult. First, it is nearly
impossible to anticipate and measure all possible mediators of a relationship,
so one cannot be fully confident that the mediators tested
are the true drivers of an indirect relationship. Second, with correlational
data like ours, one can never be sure of the exact causal
sequence (see Green, Ha, and Bullock 2010). It may be best, therefore,
to think of the mediation models in this article as demonstrating
syndromes of variables that go together, rather than as strong claims
about which variables come first.
Figure 1 reveals that there are two largely distinct pathways to
China policy preferences. Liberals and conservatives can differ over
Peter Hays Gries 325
China policy because of differences in their average warmth toward
Asians in general and the Chinese people in particular (the top path
in the model). Traces of the “Yellow Peril” thus persist in the public
imagination. As the consistently thicker lines along the bottom path
in the model reveal, however, on average liberals and conservatives
differ on China policy in larger part because of their greater differences
in warmth toward communist countries in general and the Chinese
government in particular.14
Anticommunism continues to divide
Americans over “Red China” today.
Our 2011 data are consistent with work in social psychology
demonstrating that on average conservatives are slightly more prejudiced
against Asians (β = –.09; see the top left of Figure 1; when p
values are omitted in this article, it can be assumed that p < .001)
than liberals are (see e.g., Sidanius and Pratto 1999). But it is much
greater conservative (13°) than liberal (32°) coolness toward communist
countries (β = –.34; see the bottom left of Figure 1) that plays the
326 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
Figure 1 Racial Prejudice and Anti-Communism: Two Paths from
Ideology to China Policy Preferences
Source: University of Oklahoma Political Psychology of US-China Relations research lab.
Notes: A mediation model. Arrow thickness in this and all subsequent figures reflects the
weight of the standardized coefficients. In this and all subsequent figures p < .001. Coefficients
above the central horizontal line (here: β = .34) reflect the unmediated relationship; those below
the horizontal (here: β = .19) reflect what remains after the mediators are included. All indirect
paths displayed were statistically significant. See Appendix 1 for details. All three China measures
are three-item scales. Seven demographic covariates, none of which was statistically significant,
are not shown to reduce clutter.
larger role in accounting for overall liberal-conservative differences
over China policy. The ideological sources of Americans’ feelings
about communism therefore merit closer examination.
The Sources of Anticommunism on Main Street Today
Not all liberals and conservatives are alike. While the unidimensional
liberal-conservative self-placement scale used for decades is
extremely useful (see Jost 2006), political scientists have increasingly
recognized its limits. Stanley Feldman and Christopher Johnston
(2014, 353) argue that “parsimony is a desirable goal in science.
. . . However, this must be balanced against the need for an accurate
description of social phenomena. A unidimensional model of ideology
. . . does not do justice to the ways in which people actually
organize their political beliefs.” Shawn Treier and Sunshine Hillygus
(2009, 680) similarly argue that “the belief systems of the mass public
are multidimensional.” Both sets of scholars move from a unidimensional
conceptualization and operationalization of US ideology
to advocating a two-dimensional approach, tapping distinct economic
(e.g., taxation) and sociocultural (e.g., the culture wars) ideologies.
We decided to explore whether US ideology could be usefully
understood across not just two dimensions but four: cultural, socioracial,
economic, and political. This analytic approach is consistent
with commonsense understandings of the main issues that divide liberals
and conservatives in the United States today. For instance, in a
review of scholarship on conservatism, Kim Phillips-Fein (2011,
727) argues that most historians believe that “its central concerns
included anti-communism, a laissez-faire approach to economics,
opposition to the civil rights movement, and commitment to traditional
sexual norms.” In our terms, these refer precisely to the political,
economic, socioracial, and cultural dimensions of US ideology,
respectively.
Cultural ideology was measured using three items (α = .77) from
the “conventionalism” (Altemeyer 1996) or “traditionalism” (Duckitt
et al. 2010) facet of Bob Altemeyer’s right-wing authoritarianism
(RWA) scale:
1. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.
(reverse coded)
2. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting
with drugs, alcohol, and sex, and focus on family values.
Peter Hays Gries 327
3. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse.
(reverse coded)
Socioracial ideology was measured using three items (α = .61) from
the “group dominance” facet of Jim Sidanius and Felicia Platto’s
(1999) social dominance orientation (SDO) scale:
1. Inferior groups should stay in their place.
2. It’s probably a BAD thing that certain groups are at the top
and other groups are at the bottom. (reverse coded)
3. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.
Economic ideology was measured with three items (α = .81) we created
exploring attitudes toward income inequality:
1. Differences between high and low incomes should remain as
they are.
2. The government should decrease income differences.
(reverse coded)
3. Class differences should be smaller than they are today.
(reverse coded)
Finally, political ideology was measured with four items (α = .68) we
created assessing communitarian-libertarian beliefs:
1. American society has swung too far toward individual rights
at the expense of social responsibilities. (reverse coded)
2. Individual rights are more important than the good of the
group.
3. Individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in
their own ways, without interference from government.
4. Government must limit our individual freedoms so as to prevent
unchecked selfishness, greed, and immorality. (reverse
coded) (from Mehrabian 1996, 490)
Run together in an exploratory factor analysis, these thirteen survey
items produced a clear four-factor solution in which twelve of
the thirteen items fell cleanly on the correct factor.15
Factor analysis
is a statistical technique used to uncover the latent dimensions or
unobserved variables (called factors) that explain variation in a larger
number of measured (i.e., observed) variables, such as the thirteen
328 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
ideology items above. We therefore averaged them together into four
scales of fair to good internal reliability, as the Cronbach’s α reported
above reveal.
In a simultaneous multiple regression controlling for seven standard
demographic variables (age, gender, education, income, race,
ethnicity, and region) these four scales—cultural (β = .41), socioracial
(β = .12), economic (β = .37), and political (β = .12) ideologies—each
contributed statistically significant unique variance in the
correct direction to the standard unidimensional measure of liberalconservative
ideology, together accounting for a remarkable half of
its variation (R2
= .49). These two statistical analyses provide convergent
evidence for the internal and external validity of our four
dimensions of US ideology.
A multiple mediation analysis revealed that three of these four
dimensions of US ideology contributed to the 19° gap between liberal
and conservative feelings toward communist countries. As
shown in Figure 2, only social dominance orientation did not mediate
the relationship, which makes sense, as communism is not a racial
issue. Together, the mediators accounted for over 90 percent of the
direct relationship between liberal-conservative ideology and warmth
toward communist countries.16
Cultural traditionalism, the top path in Figure 2, was the most
powerful mediator of the relationship between broad liberalconservative
ideology and feelings toward communist countries.
Christian conservatives have long viewed communism as an atheistic
threat to God and Christian values. “Communism is not only
an economic interpretation of life,” Reverend Billy Graham declared
in 1949, “Communism is a religion that is inspired, directed and motivated
by the Devil himself who has declared war against Almighty
God.” In his famous 1983 “Evil Empire” speech given to the National
Association of Evangelicals, President Ronald Reagan similarly
equated the fight against communism with the fight against “evil.”
“Fighting communism was a religious duty, and the American government
was engaged in the work of the Lord when it opposed the Soviet
Union,” historian Daniel Williams (2010, 21, 23) writes in God’s Own
Party: The Making of the Christian Right. “The ‘American way of
life’ was therefore the Christian way of life, and a threat to one was
a threat to the other.”
Billy Graham is right that communism is primarily an “economic
interpretation of life.” Marx was an economic historian, and Marxism
is largely an economic theory. It is not surprising, therefore, that difPeter
Hays Gries 329
ferences between US liberals and conservatives over income redistribution
would also help account for their overall differences over
communism. “Fundamentally there are only two ways of coordinating
the economic activity of millions,” Milton Friedman (2002
[1962], 13) wrote in Capitalism and Freedom. “One is central direction
involving the use of coercion—the technique of the army and of
the modern totalitarian state. The other is voluntary co-operation of
individuals—the technique of the marketplace.” The same disagreements
that economic liberals and conservatives have about taxes,
social welfare spending, and income redistribution at home, our survey
data suggest, also influence Americans’ feelings toward “communist
countries” abroad.
The division between libertarians and communitarians at home
also shapes feelings toward communist countries abroad, as the bottom
path in Figure 2 reveals. In his The Broken Covenant, sociologist
330 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
Figure 2 Why Conservatives Dislike Communism More Than
Liberals Do
Source: University of Oklahoma Political Psychology of US-China Relations research lab.
Notes: A mediation model. * p < .05, **p < .01, all other p’s < .001. All three indirect paths
were statistically significant. See Appendix 1. Coefficients above the horizontal line (here: β =
–.31) reflect the unmediated relationship; those below the horizontal (here: β = –.14) reflect
what remains after the mediators are included. Seven standard demographic covariates not
shown. Older people felt cooler (β = –.09) and those with greater education (β = .11) felt warmer
toward communist countries.
Robert Bellah (1992 [1975], 124) argued that although many Americans
dislike communism for economic and religious reasons, it is
communism’s perceived threat to cherished American liberties that
stings the most. “Though ‘revolutionary’ and ‘atheistic’ would continue
to be negative terms used to characterize socialism, it was the
attribute of collectivism or statism, in contrast to allegedly American
individualism, that would be the central negative image.” Remarkably,
our 2011 survey data exactly confirm Bellah’s argument that
there are three (economic, religio-cultural, and libertarian) distinct
ideological ways that Americans think about communism. Historian
Andrew Preston (2012, 101) has more recently but similarly argued
that a libertarian ethic rooted in Protestantism “made Americans suspicious
about other nations that relied too heavily upon concentrations
of power, be they religious (the Catholic Church) or political
and economic (the Communist Party).” Libertarians don’t like democratic
governments, let alone centralized communist party-states.
Conservative US antipathy toward communist countries is thus
overdetermined. Whether seen as atheistic and a threat to Christian
values, redistributionist and a threat to property and the free market,
or authoritarian and a threat to individual liberty, different stripes of
Main Street conservatives can agree that they dislike communist
countries more than their liberal neighbors.
Liberal Panda-Huggers and
Conservative Dragon-Slayers
Broad feelings about “Asians” and “communist countries” thus help
account for more specific feelings toward the Chinese people and
their government, respectively, contributing to ideological differences
in China policy preferences (see Figure 1). When confronted
with difficult specific questions like “How much do you agree or disagree
with the statement, ‘The US government should pursue a
tougher China policy’?,” we frequently resort to “affect heuristics,”
substituting easier and broader questions about our gut feelings like,
“How do I feel about Asians?” or “How do I feel about communists?”
Such heuristic devices, social psychologist Daniel Kahneman
(2011, 97) has argued, help us “generate intuitive opinions on complex
matters.” This helps explain how Main Street Americans, in the
absence of much knowledge about China, can nonetheless form consistent—if
consistently different—opinions about it (see also Gries,
Crowson, and Cai 2011; Gries 2014, 129–131).
Peter Hays Gries 331
So why do US liberals and conservatives differ so systematically
in their intuitive opinions about China? The path model in Figure 3
reveals that all four of the dimensions of US ideology that we measured
shaped China policy preferences—and in the same direction. In
other words, conservatives of different stripes may disagree over why
they desire a tougher China policy than liberals do, but they can
agree on a tougher policy. Similarly, different kinds of liberals may
differ over why they want a friendlier China policy than conservatives
do, but they agree on a relatively friendly policy. The magnitude
of the US ideological divide over China policy is due in part to
this synergy of ideologies.
Figure 3 also reveals that negative attitudes toward the Chinese
people (prejudice) and government act as distinct pathways for our
four dimensions of US ideology to shape China policy preferences.
First, the top path in Figure 3 reveals that the same socioracial politics
that divide Americans today on domestic issues like affirmative
action also shape their feelings toward the Chinese people (β = .26),
and subsequent policy preferences toward China (β = .21). But social
dominance orientation—the belief that “inferior groups should
stay in their place”—has no impact on attitudes toward the Chinese
government.
This clash of socioracial ideologies was on display in a 2011
controversy over Rush Limbaugh’s derogatory parody of Chinese
President Hu Jintao speaking Chinese. On his January 19, 2011, radio
show, Limbaugh spoke of watching an Obama-Hu press conference:
“Hu Jintao, he was speaking, and they weren’t translating . . . Hu Jintao
was just going . . . ‘chin chang chin chan chong chang chi
bababba chi chike zhing zha zhe zhike rroooor ji kedi ba baba.’”
Limbaugh’s racist gibberish immediately produced a liberal outcry.
“Calling the Chinese names and imitating the Chinese language was
a childish and offensive tactic,” said Democratic Congresswoman
Judy Chu of California, the first Chinese American woman elected to
the US House of Representatives. “It is one thing to disagree with a
nation and criticize its policies, but it is another thing to demonize an
entire people. Over the last 150 years, Chinese in America have faced
severe racial discrimination. It wasn’t that long ago that the Chinese
in America were . . . called racial slurs, were spat upon in the streets,
derided in the halls of Congress and even brutally murdered” (Khan
2011). Our survey data suggest that Limbaugh and Chu were not
media and political elites divorced from Main Street: differing beliefs
about proper racial and social hierarchies continue to divide the aver-
332 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
age US liberal and conservative today in their gut feelings toward
Chinese people.
Second, Figure 3 reveals that cultural liberals and conservatives
also differ in their views of both the Chinese people and US China
policy. For cultural conservatives, Chinese immigrants may be
viewed as a threat to traditional WASP (white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant)
values, contributing to anti-Chinese prejudice (β = .15) and subsequent
desires for tougher China policies (β = .21). The stronger
direct path (β = .25) from cultural conservatism to preferences for
tougher China policies may reflect a fear-driven response to a rising
China seen as different and dangerous. Social psychologists have
demonstrated that when confronted by perceived threats to shared
cultural beliefs, values, or norms, cultural conservatives are more
likely than cultural liberals to respond with aggression (see Duckitt
and Sibley 2007; Jost 2006).
Many cultural conservatives advocate tougher China policies. As
noted earlier, Republican Congressman Christopher Smith deplores
Peter Hays Gries 333
Figure 3 Four Reasons Why Conservatives Desire Tougher China
Policies Than Liberals Do
Source: University of Oklahoma Political Psychology of US-China Relations research lab.
Notes: A path model. All p’s < .001. To reduce clutter, covariances and prediction error
terms are not displayed. All three China measures are three-item scales. Model fit was excellent
and all indirect paths displayed were statistically significant. See Appendixes 1 and 2 for
detailed statistics.
the persecution of Christians in China. Smith serves as cochair of the
House Pro-Life Caucus and as a member of its Taiwan Caucus,
which generally promotes tougher China policies. Smith is not
unusual in linking these seemingly disparate issues. Our 2011 survey
included the abortion question, “Are you more pro-life or prochoice?”
Answers to this intensely personal question were a substantial
predictor (β = .22) of China policy preferences, even after controlling
for the standard demographic variables.
Third, economic ideology, by contrast, has no influence on feelings
toward the Chinese people. Its effect on China policy preferences
is instead mediated through feelings toward the Chinese government
(β = .21; see Figure 3, near bottom left). Not surprisingly,
liberal-conservative disagreements over whether “the government
should decrease income differences” also shape their attitudes toward
the “communist” Chinese government. While business conservatives
often support pro-China policies out of a material self-interest in
profiting from trade and access to the China market, economic conservatism
as an ideology is marked by an antipathy toward governments—especially
socialist governments—that tax, spend, or redistribute
income, all seen as violations of free market principles and
threats to property.
Wall Street Journal editorials on China often serve as proxy battles
in domestic economic wars. “While it must be tempting to goose
GDP once more, Mr. Wen and his colleagues should think twice
about another round of stimulus,” the WSJ editorial board argued in
their May 23, 2012, article “China Is Stimulused Out.” “Now is not
the time to try to reinflate the economy with more wasteful spending
and investment.” Liberal economists, by contrast, were more inclined
to praise Chinese efforts at economic stimulus during the global
financial crisis in 2008–2009 (e.g., Krugman 2010). Our 2011 data
reveal that elite WSJ and New York Times editorialists were not out of
touch with the diverging economic views of the US public.
Fourth, like economic ideology, communitarian-libertarian political
ideology is not associated with prejudice against the Chinese
people; instead, it shapes feelings toward the Chinese government (β
= .16; see bottom left of Figure 3). Greater libertarian agreement that
“individuals should be free to follow their own dreams in their own
ways, without interference from government” is associated with suspicion
and hostility toward the US government, which is democratic.
It is not surprising, therefore, that Main Street libertarians would also
334 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
tend to feel cooler than communitarians toward the Chinese government,
which is authoritarian.
Communitarianism-libertarianism also appears to divide US
political elites over China. “Remember, there are reasons why Communist
China remains under an arms embargo,” Republican Congressman
Dana Rohrabacher (2009) of California said at a congressional
hearing on export controls. “The Tiananmen Square massacre,
where the tyrannical and brutal Chinese government murdered thousands
of peaceful reformers, changed the course of history.” Note
both the reference to “Communist China” and the clear distinction
drawn between the “tyrannical and brutal Chinese government” and
the Chinese people, described as “peaceful reformers.” Libertarians,
Figure 3 reveals, do not harbor prejudices against the Chinese people.
Their antipathy, instead, is directed against governments, especially
strong authoritarian governments like communist China’s.
“Free Asia” and the “Yellow Peril”
What influence does ideology have on Americans’ feelings toward
the East Asian democracies of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea? Statistical
analysis revealed that of the four dimensions of US ideology
that we measured in our survey, only social dominance orientation
and communitarian-libertarian political ideology mediated the relationship
between ideology and warmth toward these three East Asian
democracies (see Figure 4). But these two indirect effects, though
each statistically significant, canceled each other out at the aggregate
level. As we will see below, if it were not for the fact that conservatives
on average tend to be more libertarian than liberals, and libertarians
like democracies, conservatives would feel relatively cooler
toward East Asia’s democracies.
Higher average conservative than liberal social dominance orientation
(β = .36)— agreement that “inferior groups should stay in their
place”—contributed to greater conservative coolness (β = –.10)
toward Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (α = .80). Chinese are thus
not the only Asian objects of prejudice in the United States today.
“It’s because of you little motherfuckers that we’re out of work!”
Ronald Ebens yelled at Vincent Chin outside a nightclub in Detroit in
1982. Ebens, an autoworker, thought that Chin, a Chinese American,
was Japanese, and hence the source of Detroit’s economic woes.
Ebens and his stepson, Michael Nitz, tracked Chin down later that
Peter Hays Gries 335
night and bludgeoned him to death with a baseball bat. Shockingly,
Ebens and Nitz were not sentenced to prison time, provoking Asian
American outrage and greater Asian American involvement in the
civil rights movement (Wu 2010).
Thirty years later, Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez
(2012) of the US Department of Justice’s Civil Rights Division
marked Chin’s death by writing, “In a diverse, democratic nation like
ours, we all must be able to live and work in our communities without
fear of being attacked because of how we look, what we believe,
where we are from, or who we love.” Differences among Americans
today about proper race relations at home, our survey reveals, shape
their feelings not just toward China, but toward Asian democracies as
well.
Greater average conservative libertarianism (β = .26), however,
contributed to slightly greater conservative warmth toward these
Asian democracies (β = .11), suppressing the overall effect of a con-
336 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
Figure 4 Libertarian Warmth Counteracts Racial Coolness in
Conservative Feelings Toward Asian Democracies
Source: University of Oklahoma Political Psychology of US-China Relations research lab.
Notes: A mediation model involving a suppression effect. All p’s < .001. Both indirect effects
were statistically significant, but the total indirect effect was not. See Appendix 1. Coefficients
above the horizontal line (here: β = –.11) reflect the unmediated relationship; those below
the horizontal (here: β = –.10) reflect what remains after the mediators are included. Seven
demographic covariates not shown.
servative ideology on coolness toward Asian democracies. In mediation
analyses a “suppression effect” occurs when the inclusion of a
mediator (in Figure 4’s bottom path: libertarianism) increases rather
than decreases, or changes the direction of, the direct relationship
between two variables (normally, the inclusion of a statistically significant
mediator reduces the direct relationship, thus accounting for
part of it; see Rucker et al. 2011). For libertarians, the success of
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea may represent the triumph of freedom
in East Asia. When promoting the democratization of the Middle
East, President George W. Bush (2001, 2003) frequently extolled
Japan and Germany as “great democracies” capable of “sustaining
democratic values.” “Today the great powers are also increasingly
united by common values, instead of divided by conflicting ideologies.
The United States, Japan and our Pacific friends, and now all of
Europe, share a deep commitment to human freedom,” Bush (2002)
declared in a commencement address at West Point. “And the tide of
liberty is rising.”
Taiwan—“Free China”—has also long been held up by US libertarians
as a beacon of liberty in the Chinese world. “Taiwan is one
of the strongest democratic partners of the United States in the AsiaPacific
region and serves as a model of freedom and democracy,”
Republican Senator Jim Inhofe (2008) of Oklahoma wrote. Although
the state of Oklahoma has few commercial or other ties with Taiwan,
Inhofe has served on the Senate Taiwan Caucus from its founding in
2003. Supporting Taiwan appears to be a way for some US politicians
to express their antipathy toward communist China. “I want to
express my strong support for Taiwan,” Republican Congressman
Michael McCaul of Texas declared in 2009. “We like our independence
in Texas and I think that’s what we have in common. America
stands for freedom and democracy and the fight against oppression
and dictatorships. And so we stand with you” (Lowther 2009). The
2012 Republican Party Platform (GOP 2012, 48) similarly claims
that “America and Taiwan are united in our shared belief in fair elections,
personal liberty, and free enterprise.”
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea thus appear to receive a libertarian
boost for being democratic and/or capitalist that counteracts the
negative influence of lingering racism among some conservatives.
Turning to South Asia, India receives a similar democratic/capitalist
boost: greater libertarian warmth (β = .07) toward India partially
counteracts the negative influence of racism/social dominance (β =
–.14) on Americans’ feelings toward India. The suppression effect of
Peter Hays Gries 337
greater conservative libertarianism helps explain why the ideological
gap between liberals and conservatives on these Asian democracies is
much smaller than that between them over communist countries like
China. “It seems that by juxtaposing these two oriental peoples [Chinese
and Japanese] Americans had found a means of keeping their
hopes and anxieties in equilibrium,” historian Michael Hunt (2009
[1987], 77) surmised. “While oriental villains served as the lightning
rod of American racial fears, more worthy Orientals could be summoned
up to keep alive liberal dreams of a prosperous, stable, and
democratic East Asia.” Our survey data support Hunt’s historical
analysis: while a “Yellow Peril” inflects US views of all of Asia,
“Free Asia” is juxtaposed against “Red China” in the US imagination
today.
Main Street, Wall Street, and US China Policy
In this article I have argued that while conservatives feel somewhat
cooler toward the East Asian democracies than liberals do, they feel
much cooler toward China than liberals do. I further argued that the
sources of these ideological differences in attitudes toward Asian
countries can be found in many of the same issues that divide liberals
and conservatives over domestic politics.
One source of greater overall conservative coolness toward
Asian countries is their slightly greater average prejudice. “I think
one man is just as good as another so long as he’s honest and
decent and not a nigger or a Chinaman,” future president Harry
Truman wrote in 1911. “Negroes ought to be in Africa, yellow men
in Asia and white men in Europe and America” (cited in Leuchtenburg
1991). While such overt prejudice has clearly declined over
the last century, our survey reveals that it does persist, and that
slightly greater average conservative than liberal prejudice against
Asians has a small but significant influence on Americans’ attitudes
toward Asian countries.
But communism was a much larger source of ideological differences
over East Asia. For cultural, social, economic, and political
reasons, conservatives felt cooler than liberals toward both communist
countries in general and the Chinese government in particular.
By contrast, greater libertarianism counteracted greater conservative
prejudice toward the Asian democracies of Japan, Taiwan, and
South Korea, attenuating the overall liberal-conservative ideological
divide.
338 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
If ideology powerfully divides Main Street Americans over
China, why is that division not more clearly reflected among political
elites on Capitol Hill?
Public opinion is not the sole driver of US China policy. Campaign
contributors and special interest groups can exert an independent
influence on members of both the legislative and executive
branches. It may be that the pro-China advocacy of business groups
like the US-China Business Council and AmCham China has been
able to neutralize the anti-China leanings of congressional Republicans
and their conservative constituents. Similarly, the anti-China
advocacy of Big Labor has likely counteracted the greater liberal
warmth toward China within the rank and file of the Democratic
Party as a whole.
Will this delicate balance endure? While politicians from both
political parties have long sought to use China against their political
opponents in their campaigns, Republican politicians today appear to
have begun utilizing anti-China tactics against their Democratic
opponents more frequently. Republican campaign ads increasingly
invoke the “Red Menace” and “Yellow Horde” views of China,
appealing to the greater conservative antipathy toward both communism
and Asians that our survey data clearly reveal. For instance,
Michigan Republican Pete Hoekstra ran an ad during the 2012 Super
Bowl depicting an Asian actress speaking broken English: “Your
economy get very weak. Ours get very good.” Hoekstra sought to
depict his Democratic opponent as “Debbie spend it now” while he
was “Pete spend it not” (Weinger 2012). Hoekstra was appealing to
the anti-Chinese and anti–big government sentiments of conservative
Michigan voters.
Recent changes in the US electoral system suggest that polarized
public opinion over China could come to play a larger role in the
making of US China policy. The “electoral connection” ensures that
politicians who want to be reelected will pay careful attention to the
international attitudes of their core constituents (Aldrich et al. 2006).
For the most part, however, the views of the average voter no longer
matter to our elected politicians. The “median voter” (Downs 1957)
is less and less relevant today because the majority of House and
Senate districts have become hyperpartisan. The South’s partisan
realignment, begun during the civil rights movement, is now largely
complete (Valentino and Sears 2005). And Americans are increasingly
choosing to live in communities of the like-minded: liberals on
the coasts or in big cities, conservatives in the heartland or the subPeter
Hays Gries 339
urbs (Bishop with Cushing 2008). With this ideological self-sorting
and gerrymandering, the majority of congressional districts today
have become so deeply blue or red that the general election outcome
has become a foregone conclusion. Statistician Nate Silver (2012)
estimates that just 8 percent of House districts today are competitive,
while a remarkable 56 percent are “landslide districts.”
The action in US electoral politics today is therefore largely in
the primaries. And primary voters, Gary Jacobson (2012, 1625) has
shown, are more ideologically extreme than general election voters,
especially in the Republican Party. To avoid being “primaried,”
therefore, politicians today increasingly pander to the ideological
extremes of their parties. This exacerbates conflict and gridlock, not
just on domestic economic and cultural issues like the budget and
abortion but on foreign policy issues like China as well.
Meanwhile, pro-China business groups, so united in the 1990s as
apologists for China during the fight against President Clinton over
China’s most-favored nation status, may now be dividing over China.
During the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, the Chinese government
made the case to its people that the Chinese economic model
was superior to the West’s, contributing to greater Chinese assertiveness
and tougher policies toward the Western business world. “In my
more than two decades in China, I have seldom seen the foreign business
community more angry and disillusioned than it is today,” China
business expert James McGregor (2010) wrote for Time magazine.
“Anti-foreign attitudes and policies in China have been growing and
hardening since the global economic crisis.”
This recent development raises an important question. If business
Republicans become internally divided over China policy and stop
counterbalancing the anti-China leanings of Main Street conservatives
and their elected representatives, what is to keep the Republican
Party from moving toward a substantially tougher China policy? We
may be poised for a significant change in the politics of China policy
on Capitol Hill.
Peter Hays Gries is the Harold J. and Ruth Newman Chair and director of the
Institute for US-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma. He is author of The
Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology Divides Liberals and Conservatives
over Foreign Affairs and China’s New Nationalism; he is coeditor of
Chinese Politics and State and Society in 21st-Century China. His work focuses
on the political psychology of US-China relations.
340 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
Appendix 1 Indirect Effect Statistics for Mediation Analyses
95% Confidence
Point Intervalsa
Estimate Lower Upper
Figure 1. Ideology to China policy (mixed)
Total indirect effects .2119 .1655 .2625
Via Asians only –.0031ns
–.0140ns
.0037ns
Via Asians and prejudice against Chinese .0194 .0074 .0350
Via prejudice against Chinese only .0712 .0470 .1008
Via Asians and Chinese government .0015ns
–.0002ns
.0046ns
Via communism only .0741 .0422 .1076
Via communism and Chinese government .0531 .0392 .0713
Via Chinese government only .0516 .0263 .0867
Via communism and prejudice
against Chinese .0065 .0021 .0125
Figure 2. Ideology to communist countries (simultaneous)
Total indirect effects –4.6317 –6.1626 –3.0556
Via cultural traditionalism –2.3837 –3.3066 –1.3569
Via economic inequality –1.5769 –2.9611 –.3236
Via libertarian politics –.6711 –1.1692 –.2637
Figure 3. Four ideologies to China policy (path)
From social dominance via prejudice .0519 .0330 .0751
From cultural traditionalism via prejudice .0316 .0146 .0522
From economic inequality via negative:
government .0792 .0557 .1057
From libertarian politics via negative:
government .0586 .0299 .0857
Figure 4. Ideology to Asian democracies (simultaneous)
Total indirect effects –.0214ns
–.6601ns
.6768ns
Via social dominance –.7171 –1.1816 –.2521
Via libertarian politics .6957 .3119 1.1694
Notes: a. Bias corrected with 1,000 bootstrapped samples.
ns = nonsignificant.
341
Appendix 2 Model Fit Statistics for China Policy Path Model
Model χ2 p df χ2/df CFI TLI RMSEA
Figure 3 15.85 .026 7 2.27 .993 .978 .036
“Good fit”
conventionsa
> .05 < 2, 3 ≥ .95 ≥ .95 ≤ .06
Notes: χ2 = chi-square; p = significance level; df = degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative
fit index; TLI = Tucker-Lewis Index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation.
a. See Kline 2005.
Notes
1. ANES 2010 questions C1_V1A and C1_PP012. See ICPSR 32701
at icpsr.umich.edu.
2. While the means don’t change much in the 2010 ANES data, the
standard deviation for the “very” wording (M = 4.31, SD = 1.69) is larger
than with the “extremely” wording (M = 4.27, SD = 1.45), KolmogrovSmirnov
test for differences between distributions, goodness-of-fit = 1.90,
p < .001. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variance = 39.17, p < .001. In
other words, “extremely” has artificially reduced dispersion from the mean.
3. F(1, 419) = 64.97, p < .001, ηp
2
= .13, controlling for seven standard
demographic variables.
4. Feelings toward Taiwan: F(1, 420) = 6.94, p = .009, ηp
2
= .02; South
Korea: F(1, 420) = 6.00, p = .015, ηp
2
= .01; Japan: F(1, 420) = 10.75, p =
.001, ηp
2
= .03, controlling for the seven standard demographics.
5. F(1, 419) = 89.47, p < .001, ηp
2
= .18, controlling for the seven standard
demographics. Cronbach’s α range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating
greater internal consistency.
6. F(1, 419) = 14.07, p < .001, ηp
2
= .03.
7. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this question.
8. The Chicago Council’s feeling thermometer solicits feelings toward
a list of “countries and peoples,” conflating two distinct attitude objects.
9. Cronbach’s α = .78 and .79, respectively. Together with the threeitem
China policy scale introduced above, these two three-item scales were
used in all the mediation, path, and structural equation models in this
article.
10. t(999) = 34.29, p < .001. Cohen’s d = 1.05.
11. F(1, 419) = 24.02, p < .001, ηp
2
= .05 and F(1, 419) = 59.44, p < .001,
ηp
2
= .12, controlling for the seven standard demographics.
12. F(1, 419) = 6.40, p =.012, ηp
2
=.02 and F(1, 419) = 89.79, p < .001,
ηp
2
= .18, controlling for the seven standard demographics.
13. The direct effect was reduced from 10.9 percent (semipartial correlation
= .33) to 2.8 percent (semipartial correlation = .17) with the inclusion
of the four mediators.
14. The only crossover between the two paths was that warmth toward
communist countries had a small impact (β = –.12) on prejudice, although
it was overwhelmed by the impact of feelings toward Asians (β = –.56).
15. A principal axis factor analysis with Promax rotation and Kaiser
normalization. The scree plot revealed a clear break after the fourth factor,
and all four Eigenvalues were greater than one. The reverse coded SDO item
factored together with the three economic items, likely due to a method
effect: two of them were also reverse coded. The other twelve items loaded
cleanly (no cross loadings greater than .228) and strongly (all loads greater
than .504) onto the correct factor.
16. The direct effect was reduced from 8.8 percent (semipartial correlation
= –.296) to just 0.8 percent (semipartial correlation = –.09).
342 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”
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346 “Red China” and the “Yellow Peril”