European Sociological Review VOLUME 20 NUMBER 1 FEBRUARY 2004 47–61 47
European Sociological Review vol. 20 no. 1 © Oxford University Press 2004; all rights reserved
Enforced Secularization –
Spontaneous Revival?
Religious Belief, Unbelief, Uncertainty and
Indifference in East and West European
Countries 1991–1998
Heiner Meulemann
The religious question of men’s origin and destination can be answered by belief, unbelief,
uncertainty and indifference. The degree of secularization should increase belief against
the three remaining options, unbelief against uncertainty and indifference, and uncertainty
against indifference. The paper asks if the enforced form of secularization of East European
countries has the same effects even if the degree of secularization is controlled, and
if these developments are reversed after the demise of communism. Furthermore, it examines
if the developments of countries and their reversal remain significant if the education,
the age and the religious practice of individuals are controlled. Dependent variables are
the belief in God and the Bible as surveyed in the ISSP 1991 and 1998. In 1991, the degree
and the form of secularization affect the answers to the religious question as expected. Up
to 1998, the effects of the degree and the form of secularization persist. Furthermore, the
effects of the degree and the form of secularization do not shrink if education and age
of individuals are controlled, and do shrink but remain significant if additionally religious
practice is controlled.
Question: Effects of the
Form of Secularization
Responses to the Religious Question
Secularization means that the ‘other world’ loses relevance
in human life in favour of ‘this world’ (Yamane, 1997). It
is the common denominator for a series of processes in
which transcendent viewpoints lose impact in favour of
immanent ones: historically, the Christian churches have
handed over their domains to the state; in recent decades,
they have lost believers (Jagodzinski and Dobbelaere,
1995: 91–95). Secularization, then, proceeds from the
institutional framework of churches to the personal core
of religion, which is to the religious question.
The religious question grows out of the human condition
itself: as people are aware of being mortal they seek to
know where they come from and where they will go.
This question cannot be answered immanently, neither
by experience nor reasoning, nor by science or philosophy;
it must be answered by a belief, that is, by the assumption
of truth where truth cannot be proven. If belief in
the Christian dogma is abandoned, a series of responses
is conceivable. First, unbelief may give a negative answer
where belief used to give a positive one. But if one is
unable to answer the religious question deﬁnitely either
48 MEULEMANN
by belief or unbelief, one may relate to it in the form of
attitudes. One may, second, stick to the religious question,
yet be uncertain as to its answer. And one may,
third, become indiﬀerent to the religious question: as it
cannot be answered either by belief nor unbelief, it is not
worth being concerned with, since certainty (of belief or
unbelief) and uncertainty are equally meaningless.
Rather than being subjectively uncertain as to the
answer, one is convinced that the question cannot be
objectively answered. For that reason, the third is also
the ﬁnal answer to the religious question: one can be less
certain than the believer or unbeliever, but one cannot
do more than ignore the transcendental nature of the
question and discard it as immanently unanswerable.
In brief, the religious question can be split up into a
sequence of three. Do I believe or not? If I do not believe,
am I really a convinced unbeliever or am I not so sure at
all about belief or unbelief ? If I am not so sure, am I
uncertain as to the answer or indiﬀerent to the question?
In this manner, a hierarchy of three questions and
answers is built up, which leads from the positive belief
of religious dogma to a positive attitude to the religious
question and thus allows a distinction between surface and
deep eﬀects of secularization. This hierarchy is presented
in Figure 1.
As the ﬁgure makes clear, the questions pertain to
increasingly smaller groups such that the answers written
in italics are represented by three independent variables:
the percentage of belief among everybody, of unbelief
among non-believers, and of uncertainty among those
holding only an attitude towards the religious question.
Using this hierarchy, the paper asks two questions.
Did the enforced secularization in Eastern European
countries suppress belief and positive attitudes to the
religious question over and beyond the spontaneous
secularization which would have taken place without
political coercion? And did the end of enforcement accordingly
allow a spontaneous revival of belief and of positive
attitudes to the religious question? To answer both questions,
the eﬀect of the enforced form of secularization on
belief in Eastern countries is examined by a comparison
with Western countries of a similar degree of secularization
in 1991 and 1998.
Hypotheses: Secularization of
Countries
The degree of secularization refers to the opportunities
of religious freedom provided by the legal and social
constitution of a country. It is reﬂected, and can be indirectly
measured, by the percentage of the population who have
left the churches and who do not attend church services,
that is, by indicators of religious practice. If religious
practice has lost its binding force, religious belief will
become weaker as well. The higher the secularization of a
country, the less common will be belief over non-belief –
as deﬁned in question I of Figure 1. But someone who
has abandoned belief has to choose between unbelief
and an attitude to the religious question. Unbelief
negates the (Christian) answer to the religious question.
The higher the secularization of a country, therefore, the
more common will be unbelief over attitudes to the religious
question – as deﬁned in question II of Figure 1.
Finally, someone who subscribes to neither belief nor
unbelief has to choose between uncertainty and indiﬀerence.
Uncertainty combines a positive attitude to the
religious question with ambivalence to the answer.
Indiﬀerence, however, ignores not only positive as well
as negative answers, but the religious question altogether.
The higher the secularization of a country, therefore, the
Figure 1 Responses to the religious question, split up into three sub-questions
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 49
less common will be uncertainty over indiﬀerence – as
deﬁned in question III of Figure 1. This ﬁrst pattern of
predictions will be called the degree of secularization
hypothesis.
The form of secularization reﬂects whether constitutionally
granted freedoms are respected by the political
system. In the capitalist West European countries, the
freedoms granted to individuals and the limits set to the
power of the state over society by the democratic constitution
have become social and political realities. In these
countries, therefore, people were free to leave churches
and to abandon Christian faith if they no longer needed
them. Secularization was a socially autonomous, spontaneous
process.
The constitutions of former socialist Eastern European
countries, however, granted individual freedom only
nominally. The ‘leading role’ of the communist party
gave the state the means to directly govern society. The
supremacy of politics over society provided the means
to suppress the churches and Christian belief and to put
the ideology of ‘scientiﬁc materialism’ in their place: in
the long run, political practice can, by means of science
and technology, build up paradise in this world. This
ideology can paradoxically be called a secular belief,
namely that the religious question has found an immanent
answer. It was at the heart of the communist ideology
and has, through political coercion and educational
indoctrination, become a common world-view. People
did not leave churches, but were expelled from them
(Pollack, 2001: 138); they did not abandon Christian
belief, but were willy-nilly taught a secular surrogate.
Secularization became a politically enforced process.
Enforced secularization worked against belief – as
deﬁned in question I of Figure 1. Furthermore, the doctrine
of ‘scientiﬁc materialism’ transformed unbelief into a
secular belief allegedly proven by science. What has
remained nonconformist in Western countries became
conformist in Eastern countries. Enforced secularization
worked in favour of unbelief – as deﬁned in question II
of Figure 1. Finally, the pressure in favour of unbelief
aﬀected the balance of the two remaining options as
well. In secular matters, uncertainty is an inferior
response – it is unwise to be uncertain where proof is
seemingly available and, moreover, majorities and propaganda
testify to the truth. Beyond unbelief, therefore,
indiﬀerence is preferable to uncertainty. Indiﬀerence
escapes the conﬂict between the delining old and the
imposed new belief by neglecting the religious question
altogether. In this manner, intentional propaganda in
favour of unbelief also favoured indiﬀerence unintentionally.
Enforced secularization worked against
uncertainty—as deﬁned in question III of Figure 1. This
second pattern of predictions will be called the form of
secularization hypothesis.
Yet political enforcement will attain its aims the better
the weaker the countervailing societal powers are. Conversely,
social acceptance of the churches and a religious
foundation of national identity may stall the enforced
secularization. Therefore, the degree and the form of
secularization may interact: the expected eﬀects of the
enforced secularization should be stronger in highly secularized
than in less secularized Eastern countries; this
third pattern of predictions will be called the enforcement
without resistance hypothesis.
In principle, the eﬀect of enforced secularization on
belief must be gauged by comparing countries before
and after this ‘treatment’, which is not possible. Nevertheless,
if the eﬀect of enforcement is thought to be
super-added to the degree of secularization spontaneously
arrived at, it can be gauged indirectly by comparing
countries with and without enforcement for a given
degree of secularization immediately after the end of
communism. Weaker belief in Eastern than in Western
countries with a similar degree of secularization can be
attributed to the enforced form of secularization.
Yet as time goes by, the eﬀects of the degree and the
form of secularization should develop diﬀerently, for
spontaneous and enforced secularization are diﬀerently
rooted in the long-term development of modern societies.
Spontaneous secularization results from the diﬀerentiation
of social spheres, which in turn allows for
personal freedom and civil rights, religious tolerance
and moral pluralism. It has continually widened the
range of personal options – and should continue to do
so if not disturbed by politics. Enforced secularization,
however, is a late branch grafted onto the stem of spontaneous
secularization. It did not rest on social diﬀerentiation,
but on social de-diﬀerentiation: Society had
been subjugated under the ‘leading role’ of the communist
party, and religion under the monopoly of ‘scientiﬁc
materialism’. The range of personal options had been
restricted – and should widen again once the old diﬀerentiations
are re-established.
In brief, just as enforced secularization was superadded
to the spontaneous one, there should be a spontaneous
revival of religion once the enforcing powers have
resigned. Where secularization was spontaneous, that is in
the Western countries, ﬁrst, answers to the religious question
should remain constant or continue to follow the
path of spontaneous secularization (Jagodzinski and
Dobbelaere, 1995: 93); in any case, there should be no
reversal. Yet where political power has enforced the
50 MEULEMANN
spontaneous process, that is in the Eastern countries,
second, a spontaneous revival should compensate for the
enforcement: belief should increase, unbelief decrease,
and uncertainty increase. Third, the spontaneous revival
should be stronger where the enforcement has been
stronger, that is in the highly secularized Eastern countries.
This fourth pattern of predictions will be called the
revival hypothesis.
Hypotheses: Education, Age and Religious
Practice of Individuals
Yet diﬀerences between countries in belief can only be
understood as consequences of diﬀerent aspects of the
secularization process if individual level variables which
foster belief are controlled for.
First, education fosters a rational, scientiﬁc attitude to
immanent questions of ‘this world’ which can be transferred
to transcendental questions of ‘the other world’
(Felling et al., 1987: 87; Tomka and Zulehner, 2000: 71;
Pollack, 2001: 140). The higher, therefore, a person’s
education, the less should he or she be inclined to belief,
the more to unbelief and the less to uncertainty – as
deﬁned in Figure 1. Second, with increasing age men
become increasingly aware of their mortality (Ester et al.,
1994: 63; Kelley and de Graaf, 1997: 653, 658; Felling
et al., 1987: 79; Tomka, 1998: 303). The greater a person’s
age, the more should he or she be inclined to
belief, the less to unbelief and the more to uncertainty –
as deﬁned in Figure 1.
While education and age aﬀect belief only indirectly
by producing attitudes favourable or unfavourable to
religion, the religious practice is directly geared to foster
belief (Felling et al., 1987: 64–65). The more frequently
someone follows religious practices, therefore, the
more should he or she be inclined to belief, the less to
unbelief and the more to uncertainty – as deﬁned in
Figure 1.
Data and Steps of Analysis
The following article builds up on an earlier one
(Meulemann, 2000). It uses the classiﬁcation of countries
justiﬁed there and extends the analysis in two ways:
by following the development and by controlling for
individual level variables. Data are drawn from the
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) 1991 and
1998.2
It comprises 18 countries. All non-European
countries except the USA were excluded such that nine
‘Western’ and ﬁve ‘Eastern’ countries remained. As all
indicators of religious practice collected in the above
mentioned article show, Eastern and Western countries
can be consistently classiﬁed into lowly and highly secularized
ones and countries within these four groups can
again be ordered from highest to lowest degree of secularization:
Ireland, Northern Ireland, USA and Italy versus
Austria, West Germany, The Netherlands, Great
Britain and Norway; Poland, Slovenia, Hungary versus
East Germany and Russia. These four groups can, therefore,
be considered as a sort of experimental ‘treatment’
on religious belief.
The ISSP contains only two questions on belief with
response options indicating uncertainty and indiﬀerence.
The ﬁrst asked ‘Which statement comes closest to
expressing what you believe about God’: ‘I know God
exists and I have no doubts about it’ and ‘I don’t believe
in a personal God, but I do believe in a higher power of
some kind’ – both coded as belief. ‘I don’t believe in
God’ – coded as unbelief. ‘I ﬁnd myself believing some of
the time, but not at others’, ‘While I have doubts, I feel
that I do believe in God’ and ‘Can’t choose, don’t know’
– all three coded as uncertainty. ‘I don’t know whether
there is a God and I don’t believe there is any way to ﬁnd
out’ – coded as indiﬀerence.3
The second question asked ‘Which statement comes
closest to describing your feeling about the Bible’: ‘The
Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally,
word for word’ and ‘The Bible is the inspired word of
God, but not everything should be taken literally, word for
word’ – both coded as belief. ‘The Bible is an ancient
book of fables, legends and moral teachings recorded by
man’ – coded as unbelief. ‘Can’t choose, don’t know’ –
coded as uncertainty. ‘This does not apply to me’ –
coded as indiﬀerence.
Responses to both questions will be analysed in two
steps. First, the hypotheses regarding the secularization
of countries will be examined by percentage
point diﬀerences in tables and by logistic regression
with dummy variables. Second, the hypotheses
regarding the secularization that have been conﬁrmed
on the level of countries in the logistic regressions will
be examined by controlling for individual level variables.
Results: Belief in God
Secularization of Countries: Percentage
Point Differences
As to the belief in God, the responses according to
Figure 1 in Western and Eastern countries with a low
and high degree of secularization in 1991 and 1998 are
presented in Figure 2.
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 51
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
Belief
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Unbelief
IRL NIRL USA I AU WG NL GB N PL SL H R EG
50
60
70
80
90
100
50
60
70
80
90
100
West: Low West: High East: Low
Uncertainty
East: High
Figure 2 Belief in God in Western and Eastern countries with low and high degrees of secularization, in 1991 and 1998
(dotted lines) in per cent
52 MEULEMANN
The Degree of Secularization Hypothesis
Looking at the Western countries, belief decreases with
the degree of secularization at both time points. Within
the lowly secularized countries and at both time points,
belief oscillates in the narrow range between 72.5 per
cent in the USA in 1998 and 55.0 per cent in Italy in
1998; and within the highly secularized countries between
57.3 per cent in Austria in 1998 and 36.3 per cent in
Great Britain in 1991. But the ranges of the percentage
values of both groups do not overlap in 1991 and only
once in 1998 (55.0 per cent for Italy below 57.3 per cent
for Austria). Unbelief roughly increases with the degree
of secularization at both time points. The ranges of the
percentage values of lowly and highly secularized countries
do not overlap in 1991 and 1998. Uncertainty
roughly decreases with the degree of secularization at
both time points. Again, the ranges of percentage values
of lowly and highly secularized countries do no overlap.
Looking at the Eastern countries, belief consistently
decreases with the degree of secularization at both time
points. But it varies much more within groups than in
the Western countries. Within the lowly secularized
countries, Poland exceeds Slovenia and Hungary by at
least 20 percentage points, and attains the highest values
of Eastern and Western countries. Within the highly secularized
group, East Germany has at least 10 percentage
points fewer believers than Russia; but the ranges of the
percentages of lowly and highly secularized countries do
not overlap. Unbelief roughly increases with the degree
of secularization at both time points. Yet it varies much
more within both groups than in Western countries.
The ranges of the percentage values of lowly and highly
secularized groups overlap quite a bit in 1991, but not in
1998. Uncertainty roughly decreases with the degree of
secularization. Within the lowly and the highly secularized
group, there is no more variation than in Western countries.
Between the lowly and the highly secularized group,
ranges of percentages do not overlap.
In sum, the degree of secularization hypotheses is conﬁrmed.
But it fares less well in the Eastern than in the
Western countries. In the West all three responses are
very similar among the lowly secularized, and fairly similar
among the highly secularized countries. In the East,
however, belief and unbelief vary greatly within lowly as
well as within highly secularized countries, and only
uncertainty remains in a more narrow range within both
degrees of secularization. Among the Eastern (as well as
among all) countries, Poland and East Germany take the
extreme positions. Poland is the least secularized Eastern
country; its belief overbids even the least secularized
Western countries, its unbelief is as low and its uncertainty
as high as in many lowly secularized Western
countries. Obviously, Catholicism as a pledge of national
identity has not only resisted the Communist attack on
religion, but held the position of religion against secularism
in general (Pollack, 2001: 141–143, 154–155).
East Germany is the only country where belief has
become marginal and unbelief dominant and where
indiﬀerence is almost as common as uncertainty. Here,
Protestantism may have paved the way for unbelief. On
the one hand, it has accepted unbelief as a legitimate
branch of theological thinking long before the advent of
communism; on the other hand, it has willy-nilly cooperated
with communism under the heading of a ‘Church
in Socialism’.
The Form of Secularization Hypothesis
Looking at the lowly secularized countries, belief has
been lowered by Eastern state suppression below the
Western level at both time points, with the exception of
Poland. In Slovenia and Hungary, however, belief is
lower than in the lowly secularized Western countries
(Prudky and Arcis, 2001: 294). Unbelief has been heightened
in Eastern countries consistently above the Western level
at both time points. The ranges of the values of Western
and Eastern countries do not overlap in 1991 and only
once in 1998 (10.6 for Poland below 11.8 for USA).
Uncertainty has been lowered consistently in the Eastern
countries below the Western level at both time points;
the ranges do not overlap.
Looking at the highly secularized countries, belief has
been lowered und unbelief heightened by state repression
in Eastern countries at both time points so that the
ranges of the percentages overlap only once (unbelief
1991: 28.9 per cent in the Netherlands higher than the
26.6 per cent in Russia). Similarly, uncertainty has been
lowered almost consistently with only one overlap of
ranges (1991: 59.4 per cent in the Netherlands below
61.8 per cent in Russia).
In sum, the form of secularization hypotheses is conﬁrmed
among lowly and highly secularized countries –
with one exception: the high level of belief in Poland.
The Enforcement Without Resistance Hypothesis
If one compares summarily the diﬀerence between
Eastern and Western countries for lowly secularized
countries, with the same diﬀerence for highly secularized
countries, the enforcement without resistance
hypothesis is conﬁrmed for belief and unbelief. The
negative eﬀect of enforcement on belief and its positive
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 53
eﬀect on unbelief are stronger in the highly secularized
than in the lowly secularized Eastern countries at both
time points.
The Revival Hypothesis
Looking at the lowly secularized Western countries, belief
decreases in all countries by 5 percentage points or more,
except in the USA where it increases by 3 percentage
points. Unbelief increases in all countries, and uncertainty
decreases in Ireland and the USA, but increases in
Northern Ireland and Italy. In sum, there are far more
cases of a continuing secularization than of revival.
Looking at the highly secularized Western countries,
belief remains deﬁnitely constant in the Netherlands, Great
Britain and Norway; it increases by 3 percentage points in
Austria and decreases by 2 percentage points in West
Germany. Unbelief remains more or less constant in all
countries except Austria, where it gains 6 percentage
points. Uncertainty remains constant in Norway, increases
by 8 percentage points in the Netherlands and by 4 percentage
points in Austria, West Germany and Great Britain.
The best summary of a patchwork such as this is: no change.
Taking lowly and highly secularized countries
together, then, there is – as expected – no revival of
belief in the West, in any case not in Western Europe.
On the contrary, where the spontaneous secularization
has not yet gone very far, in the lowly secularized countries,
it is – except for the USA – still on its way.
Looking at the lowly and highly secularized Eastern countries,
belief increases by 7–8 percentage points in Slovenia
and Russia, but remains constant in Poland, Hungary and
East Germany. Unbelief decreases in Slovenia by 5 percentage
points, but remains constant in Poland and Hungary
and increases by 6–7 percentage points in East
Germany and Russia. Uncertainty increases by about 10
percentage points in Hungary and Russia, but remains
constant in Poland, Slovenia and East Germany. Even if
one again takes Poland out of consideration, belief and
uncertainty increase neither consistently nor impressively,
and unbelief more often increases than decreases. Taking
the three responses together, there is – as expected – some
revival; but how much has still to be ascertained. To do this,
the eﬀects of the enforced secularization have to be compared
with the eﬀects of the revival; such a comparison can
only be furnished by a regression analysis.
Secularization of Countries: Regression
Analysis
As the dependent variable is a hierarchy of three percentages,
diﬀerences between countries and time points must
be examined by three nested logistic regressions. For
country groups, dummy predictor variables are constructed
in the same manner for 1991 and 1998; yet for
1998, a speciﬁc dummy predictor variable must be added,
together with its interaction with the country variables.
For 1991, the lowly secularized Western countries are
taken as the base category represented by the regression
intercept to prove the three eﬀects of the secularization
of countries by three dummy variables. ‘Secular’ has
value 1 for the highly secularized and value 0 for the less
secularized countries and examines the degree of secularization
hypothesis in Western countries. ‘East’ has value 1
for Eastern and 0 for Western countries and examines
the form of secularization hypothesis in Eastern countries.
‘Secular*East’ has value 1 for the highly secularized Eastern
countries and 0 for the three remaining groups of
countries; it examines the enforcement without resistance
hypothesis in highly secularized Eastern countries.
For 1998, a dummy variable ‘1998’ which has value 1
for 1998 and 0 for 1991 and its three interactions with
the secularization dummies are constructed to examine
the three predictions of the revival hypothesis. The ﬁrst prediction
of no change in Western countries is examined by
‘1998’ in the lowly secularized Western countries, and by
‘1998*Secular’ in the highly secularized Western countries.
The second and third prediction of a revival of belief in
lowly secularized, and a particularly strong revival in
highly secularized, Eastern countries are examined similarly:
by ‘1998*East’ for lowly secularized Eastern countries, and
by ‘1998*Secular*East’ for highly secularized Eastern
countries.
To measure the revival, ‘East’ must be compared with
‘1998*East’ for the lowly secularized Eastern countries,
and the sum of ‘East’ and ‘Secular*East’ with the sum of
‘1998*East’ and ‘1998*Secular*East’ for the highly secularized
Eastern countries. More speciﬁcally, if belief or
uncertainty is considered, the ﬁrst, negative, eﬀect should
be more or less compensated for by the second, positive,
eﬀect in both comparisons. If there is a particularly
strong enforced secularization, and if there is a particularly
strong revival in the highly secularized countries,
‘Secular*East’ should have a signiﬁcantly negative, and
‘1998*Secular*East’ a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect. If
unbelief is considered, the same reasoning applies with
reversed signs.
Furthermore, as the dependent variable is nested
within groups of the independent variables, the eﬀects of
the degree and form of secularization on the three aspects
of belief would be estimated too easily as signiﬁcant by a
conventional regression, which considers each individual
within a country as an independent measurement,
54 MEULEMANN
although all individuals of a given country may have
been inﬂuenced in the same way by their country membership.
Therefore, hierarchical regressions have to be
applied which test country variables on the higher level
of samples, and person variables on the lower level of
individuals sampled (Snijders and Bosker, 1999). To this
purpose, the HLM program (Raudenbush et al., 2000)
has been used.
The regressions of the three steps of the belief in God
on these predictors are presented in Table 1. As the variable
‘Secular’ shows, the degree of secularization hypothesis is
conﬁrmed in 1991: in the highly secularized Western
countries people less often believe in God. If they do not,
they more often subscribe to unbelief. If they subscribe
neither to belief nor unbelief, they are less often uncertain
than indiﬀerent. As the variable ‘East’ shows, the
form of secularization hypothesis is conﬁrmed in 1991
without signiﬁcance for belief, but signiﬁcantly for
unbelief and uncertainty. As the variable ‘Secular*East’
shows, the enforcement without resistance hypothesis is
conﬁrmed in 1991 without signiﬁcance, but not for
unbelief and uncertainty.
As for 1998, no change was expected in the West, but
a revival was expected in the East. As the variables ‘1998’
and ‘1998*Secular’ show, there are only small and insigniﬁcant
changes in the West, as expected. However, as
the variable ‘1998*East’ shows, there is the expected
revival in the lowly secularized Eastern countries, but it
does not reach signiﬁcance. Furthermore, as the variable
‘1998*Secular*East’ shows, not even the signs come
consistently out as expected.
In sum, only the degree of secularization hypothesis
is conﬁrmed unequivocally in 1991 and 1998; the form
of secularization hypothesis is conﬁrmed only partly
and only in 1991. Yet the eﬀect of the degree of secularization
was primarily ascertained in order to measure
the eﬀects of the form of secularization and their possible
reversal. Controlling for the degree, then, the
enforced form has reduced belief only insigniﬁcantly,
and the end of force restores belief only insigniﬁcantly.
The enforced form has, however, increased unbelief
and decreased uncertainty, but the end of force leads
neither to a retreat of unbelief nor to a recovery of
uncertainty.
In conclusion, the eﬀects of the enforced form of secularization
are at once less and more disturbing than
expected. On the ﬁrst level of the religious question,
belief has only minimally been pushed backwards and
forwards. But on the second and third level, unbelief has
been persistently strengthened, and uncertainty persistently
weakened (and correspondingly indiﬀerence
strengthened). The deeper eﬀects of the enforced secularization
seem to remain: it did not so much aﬀect religious
belief as the concern with the religious question.
Yet this conclusion may be due to the fact, visible
already in Figure 2, that the lowly secularized Eastern
countries are not very similar as to the belief in God
because of Poland’s extreme position. Therefore, Eastern
countries will no longer be divided according to the
degree of secularization, and the variable for the
enforcement without resistance hypotheses will be
dropped together with the variables for the corresponding
revival. Instead, Poland will be compared to all other
Eastern countries by a dummy variable; because of the
extraordinarily high belief in Poland no revival is
expected and a variable ‘1998*Poland’ need not be
Table 1 Belief in God: logistic regression on the secularization of countries
B, belief; UB, unbelief; UC, uncertainty.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Predictions Regression coefficients
B UB UC B UB UC
Intercept 0.591 −2.705 1.942
Secular - + - −0.761* 1.164** −0.933***
East - + - −0.431 1.284** −0.891**
Secular*East - + - −0.492 −0.038 0.249
1998 0 0 0 −0.164 0.345 −0.001
1998*Secular 0 0 0 0.167 −0.126 −0.057
1998*East + - + 0.312 −0.317 0.223
1998*Secular*East + - + 0.148 0.399 0.024
Log-likelihood 50,122 26,027 19,414
Valid n of 35,840 35,290 18,333 13,681
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 55
constructed. In this way, the enforcement without
resistance (in all highly secularized Eastern countries)
hypothesis is reformulated as the resistance to enforcement
hypothesis (in a single lowly secularized Eastern
country) and the sign of the prediction switches accordingly.
Finally, as ‘1998*Secular’ had no eﬀect, which
means that the development does not diﬀer between
lowly and highly secularized Western countries, this
variable will be dropped as well.
The results of the revised regression models are
presented in Table 2. As the log-likelihoods show, the
revised model fares better with less predictors than the
original one. The degree of secularization hypothesis is now
examined by the variable ‘Secular’ for both time points
and for Eastern and Western countries; it is again
conﬁrmed. The form of secularization hypothesis is now
examined by the variable ‘East’ which compares all Eastern
countries except Poland against all Western countries in
1991; it is now clearly conﬁrmed for each response. The
resistance to enforcement hypothesis is examined by ‘Poland’
for both time points; it is conﬁrmed strongly for belief
and unbelief and without signiﬁcance for uncertainty.
For 1998, the prediction of no change in the West
now is examined by ‘1998’, and the prediction of a
revival in the East is examined by ‘1998*East’. The
ﬁrst prediction is conﬁrmed, but not the second:
There is no signiﬁcant change in the West, but also no
signiﬁcant revival in the East. In Eastern countries,
belief and uncertainty regain only about a quarter
of the lost ground (−0.912 + 0.226; −0.826 + 0.240),
and unbelief increases contrary to expectation (1.447 +
0.125).
In sum, taking Poland as a singular case and eliminating
the eﬀect for diﬀerent developments between
lowly and highly secularized Western countries, clears
the picture. The degree of secularization retains its
eﬀects, while the form of secularization and the resistance
to enforcement now show their eﬀects as
expected. The enforced form decreases belief,
increases unbelief, and decreases uncertainty – except
in Poland. However, the expected revival of belief and
uncertainty in Eastern countries does not show up
signiﬁcantly and is only weak as measured by the
coeﬃcients, while unbelief increases contrary to
expectation.
In conclusion, the results are, at the same time,
more and less disturbing than expected. On the one
hand, all levels of the religious question are now
aﬀected by the enforced secularization and remain so
until 1998. On the other hand, this pessimistic view
results from taking out of consideration a fact disposing
for optimism: Poland with its national-Catholic tradition
was able to resist the enforced secularization. In general,
however, the enforced secularization had its genuine
and – in spite of signs of revival – persistent eﬀects.
Secularization of Countries and Education,
Age and Religious Practice of
Individuals
The regressions of the last section merely summarize
and test the results of Figure 2. Is there still an eﬀect of
the form of secularization if individual level variables are
controlled for? Two regression models of the belief in
God on the secularization of countries as in Table 2 and
on individual level variables are presented in Table 3.
The ﬁrst model contains only demographic predictors
which indirectly aﬀect religion. Indeed, education and
age aﬀect the three aspects of belief in God as predicted.
Yet they do not reduce the eﬀects of the two secularization
variables – ‘Secular’ and ‘East’ – as expected; also, the
eﬀects of the two time variables – ‘1998’ and ‘1998*East’ –
Table 2 Belief in God: logistic regression on the secularization of countries, revised model (valid n as in Table 1)
B, belief; UB, unbelief; UC, uncertainty.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Predictions Raw regression coefficients
B UB UC B UB UC
Intercept 0.558 −2.623 1.877
Secular − + − −0.702*** 1.031*** −0.827***
East − + − −0.912*** 1.447*** −0.826***
Poland + − + 1.485*** −1.138*** 0.341
1998 0 0 0 −0.070 0.250 −0.033
1998*East + − + 0.225 0.125 0.240
Log-likelihood 50,110 26,021 19,407
56 MEULEMANN
remain insigniﬁcant. In sum, demographic diﬀerences
between countries cannot account for the diﬀerences in
the belief in God. If secularization eﬀects can be at all
traced back to qualities of persons, they must rest on a
behaviour directly aﬀecting religious belief, namely on
religious practice.
The second model additionally includes frequency of
prayer, which was the only variable of religious practice
measured in every country at both time points, and
refers to the public as well as the private practice.4
Indeed,
frequency of prayer strongly aﬀects the three aspects of
belief as expected. Moreover, its inclusion in the model
reduces the eﬀects of age and education. Furthermore, it
considerably reduces the eﬀects of the two secularization
variables as expected, but the pattern of their eﬀects is
retained. In particular, the enforced form still signiﬁcantly
reduces belief and increases unbelief independently
of the degree of secularization. Finally, the revival
eﬀect remains as small and insigniﬁcant as in the earlier
models. In sum, diﬀerences of religious practice between
countries account for quite a bit, but not all, of the
diﬀerences of religious belief. In particular, the suppression
of belief in the East is only partly due to the suppression
of religious practice; some of the suppression of belief
remains even when religious practice has regained its
freedom.
Instead of the frequency of prayer, the frequency of
church attendance, which refers to the public practice of
religion, has only been additionally introduced into a
third model. As the state can suppress the public practice
of religion only, church attendance is preferable to
prayer as an indicator of religious practice.5
Yet, unfortunately,
it was not surveyed in Slovenia in 1991. In spite
of this, this third model led to the same conclusions as
the second so that the results need not be presented.
Looking back on the development of the belief in God
between 1991 and 1998 under the control of individual
level variables, the conclusion remains more and less
disturbing than expected. On the one hand, if demographic
predictors of religious belief are controlled for,
the eﬀects of the enforced secularization remain as
strong and as persistent as without these controls. If, in
addition, religious practice is controlled for, these eﬀects
are reduced, but remain signiﬁcant. In brief, the liberation
of religious practice does not show up as a signiﬁcant
increase of the belief in God in Eastern countries between
1991 and 1998. On the other hand, this conclusion takes
Poland out of consideration, where belief was already
stronger in 1991 than even in the lowly secularized
Western countries and remained so until 1998.
In Poland, as in the remaining Eastern European
countries, therefore, there is more persistence than
change between 1991 and 1998, yet on diﬀerent levels.
Where the enforced secularization did not meet resistance
it not only reduced belief, but also uncertainty,
and furthered unbelief and indiﬀerence. It aﬀected not
only religion, but the concern for the religious question.
Yet where the enforced secularization met resistance, it
left belief and uncertainty, unbelief and indiﬀerence
similarly unaﬀected – it might even have strengthened
Table 3 Belief in God: logistic regression on the secularization of countries, education, age and frequency of prayer (fixed
slopes models)
Number of levels of individual variables in parentheses.
B, belief; UB, unbelief; UC, uncertainty.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Predictions Age and education Age, education, religious practice
B UB UC B UB UC B UB UC
Intercept 0.064 −2.853 2.197 −1.370 −1.109 0.619
Secular − + − −0.711*** 1.068*** −0.871*** −0.201 0.525** −0.366*
East − + − −0.918*** 1.471*** −0.875*** −0.395* 0.900** −0.341
Poland + − + 0.272*** −1.148* 0.372 0.949** −0.256 −0.538
1998 0 0 0 −0.099 0.258 −0.044 −0.018 0.263 −0.058
1998*East + − + 0.190 −0.110 0.234 0.104 −0.110 0.271
Education (7) − + − −0.047*** 0.110*** −0.137*** −0.010 0.084*** −0.136***
Age (years*10) + − + 0.160*** −0.072*** 0.080*** 0.070*** 0.011 0.016
Prayer (11) + − + 0.228*** −0.561*** 0.482***
Log-likelihood 49,853 25,935 19,318 48,590 41,249 22,288
Valid n 35,105 18,228 13,609 34,343 17,823 13,247
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 57
the former and weakened the latter. Altogether, however,
the end of political suppression of the societies is at best
partly reﬂected in a religious revival.
Results: Belief in Bible
Percentage Point Differences
As to the belief in the Bible, responses in Western and
Eastern countries with a low and high degree of secularization
in 1991 and 1998 are presented in Figure 3.
The degree of secularization hypothesis
Looking at Western countries, the degree of secularization
lowers belief so that there is no overlap; yet unbelief
and uncertainty are roughly equally common. Looking
at Eastern countries, the degree of secularization again
lowers belief so that there is no overlap; for unbelief and
uncertainty no clear tendencies are visible. In brief: the
degree of secularization hypothesis is conﬁrmed for
belief only.
That the degree of secularization hypothesis is not
conﬁrmed for unbelief and uncertainty may be
explained by the generally high level of unbelief in the
Bible. Unbelief in the Bible is shared by two thirds in
most of the samples; and it is much more common than
unbelief in God – as a look back at Figure 2 reveals.
Many of those who do not believe in the Bible express
unbelief straight away – but only a few of those who do
not believe in God confess to be unbelievers. For nonbelievers
in God, unbelief is a minority response so that
the last decision between uncertainty and indiﬀerence
becomes highly signiﬁcant for the remaining majority.
For non-believers in the Bible, unbelief is a majority
response so that the decision over attitudes to the Bible
loses signiﬁcance. To believe in God or not is a permanent
challenge in a person’s life, diﬃcult to respond to once
and forever. Yet if the Bible ‘really tells the truth’ is an
almost secular and scientiﬁc question that can be
answered by ‘yes’ or ‘no’.
The form of secularization and the enforcement
without resistance hypothesis
Looking at lowly as well as at highly secularized countries,
belief is consistently and with no overlap higher
in the West than in the East at both time points; yet
again no clear tendencies appear for unbelief and
uncertainty. The form of secularization hypothesis is
conﬁrmed for belief only. Furthermore, the negative
eﬀects of the enforced secularization on belief are not
stronger in the highly than in the lowly secularized
Eastern countries. The enforcement of secularization
hypothesis is not conﬁrmed for belief – let alone for
unbelief or uncertainty.
The revival hypothesis
Looking at the Western countries, belief decreases in
every country (except the Netherlands). But so does
unbelief (with the exception of West Germany). Uncertainty
decreases in most countries; it remains constant in
the Netherlands, Great Britain and Norway and
increases in Italy. Looking at the Eastern countries, belief
increases only in Russia (by 16 percentage points) and
remains more or less constant in the remaining countries.
Unbelief, decreases by 34 percentage points in Russia and
by 20 percentage points in Hungary; it remains constant
in Poland and Slovenia and it increases by 11 percentage
points in East Germany. Uncertainty remains constant
except in Slovenia where it increases by 5 percentage
points and Hungary where it decreases by 28 percentage
points.
If one considers only belief, there is some evidence of
a revival in the East. How strong it is must again be
gauged by a comparison of its eﬀect with the eﬀect of the
enforced secularization in a regression analysis.
Regression Analyses
The regression of belief in the Bible, that is the ﬁrst
response of Figure 1 only, on the dummy variables representing
the secularization of countries are represented
in column 1 of Table 4. As the enforcement to resistance
hypotheses was not conﬁrmed in the table analysis, the
diﬀerentiation between lowly and highly secularized
Eastern countries is not held up so that – otherwise as in
Table 1 – ‘1998*secular’ refers to Eastern and Western
secularized countries and ‘1998*East’ refers to highly
and lowly secularized Eastern countries.
In 1991, the degree and the form of secularization
hypothesis (‘Secular’ and ‘East’) are conﬁrmed: in comparison
to lowly secularized Western countries, less people
believe in the Bible in highly secularized as well as in
Eastern countries. Up to 1998, belief signiﬁcantly
decreases in the lowly secularized Western countries
(‘1998’), and insigniﬁcantly increases in the highly secularized
countries (‘1998*Secular’). In the Eastern countries
(‘1998*East’), belief increases, as expected by the
revival hypothesis, but narrowly fails to reach signiﬁcance.
In brief, the belief in the Bible has been reduced
not only with the degree but also with the form of secularization.
But it recovers somewhat, yet insigniﬁcantly
between 1991 and 1998.
58 MEULEMANN
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Belief
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Unbelief
IRL NIRL USA I AU WG NL GB N PL SL H R EG
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
West: Low West: High East: High
Uncertainty
East: Low
Figure 3 Belief in Bible in Western and Eastern countries with low and high degrees of secularization, in 1991 and 1998
(dotted lines) in per cent
ENFORCED SECULARIZATION – SPONTANEOUS REVIVAL 59
Does the enforced form still reduce belief in Eastern
countries when education and age are controlled for? As
the regression in column 2 of Table 4 shows, education
decreases and age increases the belief in the Bible. However,
controlling for education and age does not reduce
the eﬀects of the degree and form of secularization.
Additionally controlling for the frequency of prayer,
however, strongly reduces these eﬀects, as the regression
in column 3 of Table 4 shows. Moreover, it reduces the
eﬀects of education and age – in the latter case even the
sign is reversed, which is diﬃcult to explain. In sum, not
only the degree, but also the form of secularization retains
a strong eﬀect on belief even under the control of practice.
Conclusion: Genuine and
Persistent Effects of the
Form of Secularization
As the regressions on the secularization of countries only
showed, the degree of the secularization in 1991 had the
expected eﬀects on all three responses as to the belief in
God, and on belief as to the belief in the Bible. Up to
1998, this eﬀect has been reduced slightly or not at all for
belief in God as well as in the Bible.
Even when these eﬀects of the degree of secularization
had been taken account of, the enforced form of
secularization had the expected eﬀects on all three decisions
on the belief in God, and on belief and uncertainty
as to the belief in the Bible. That is, the state suppression
of religion in the former communist countries reduced
not only positive beliefs in religious dogma but also
positive attitudes to the religious question; it had manifest
and subtle eﬀects on religious belief. And these
eﬀects of the form of secularization could be ascertained
independently of the eﬀects of the degree of secularization.
The enforced form decreased religious belief over and
beyond what a merely spontaneous process of plausibility
loss would have produced. One cannot contend – as
some do (Höllinger, 1995: 114) – that the communist
regimes just attained with political force what would
have happened as an autonomous social process anyway.
They did more.
And what they did more survived their demise up to
1998 to an astonishingly high degree. While the enforced
secularization in Eastern countries had its genuine eﬀect
on belief, only slight traces of a spontaneous revival of
belief after the demise of the Communist regime show
up by 1998. As to the belief in God, belief and uncertainty
recover only by a quarter while unbelief increases.
However, this holds only for Slovenia, Hungary,
Russia and East Germany, while in Poland belief was the
strongest of Eastern and Western countries and did not
decline. In Poland as well as in the remaining Eastern
states, then, there is more stability than change. As to
belief in the Bible, belief – the only decision worth a
closer examination here – recovers somewhat but
insigniﬁcantly.
As the regressions on the secularization of countries
and individual level variables showed, neither the degree
nor the form of secularization loses impact on the belief
in God or the belief in the Bible if education and age are
controlled for. However, both lose impact but retain
signiﬁcance if religious practice – either frequency of
prayer or frequency of church attendance – is additionally
Table 4 Belief in Bible, belief only: regression on the secularization of countries, education, age, and religious practice
(fixed slope models)
For notes see Table 3.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
Prediction (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 1.229 1.190 −0.575
Secular − −1.312*** −1.332*** −0.568**
East − −1.072*** −1.079*** −0.600**
1998 0 −0.393* −0.410* −0.299
1998*Secular 0 0.279 0.290 0.215
1998*East + 0.412 0.394 0.323
Education (7) − −0.081*** −0.037***
Age (years*10) + 0.092*** −0.055***
Prayer (11) + 0.323***
Log-likelihood 50,301 50,058 49,035
Valid n 35,426 35,243 34,460
60 MEULEMANN
controlled for. If secularization diﬀerences between
countries are mediated by individual level variables at
all, then they are mediated by religious practice – but
only in part. In particular, considerable eﬀects of the
enforced form of secularization persist even when religious
practice is controlled for.
Whichever kind of analysis is considered, the answer
to the two questions posed in the beginning is: there are
genuine eﬀects of the enforced form of secularization,
and they persist up to 1998. The political suppression of
religion under communism reduced Christian belief
and concern with the religious question over and
beyond what would have arisen from a spontaneous loss
of faith; but the end of suppression does not automatically
mean the revival of faith or of concern with the
religious question.
The persistence of the eﬀects must stem from other
sources than political coercion. One such source may
have been the comparatively low trust of Eastern
European people in the churches (Pollack, 2001: 151).
People prefer to remain without belief than reacknowledge
the teaching of the churches. Institutions
can be changed instantly. But people must
forget and re-learn; they may instantly do the former,
but hesitate to do the latter. In any case, people seem
to change less quickly than institutions.
Notes
1. For Eastern European countries and one time point
only, a similar question has been treated by Need
and Evans (2001) with reference to religious practice.
2. The data utilized were documented and made available
by the ‘Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung,
Köln’ (ZA). The data were collected by independent
institutions in each country; the ZA kindly provided
an integrated data set of the questions concerning
religion for 1991 and 1998 (Study codebook 3390).
Neither the original collectors nor the ZA bear any
responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented
here.
3. This statement does not express a subjective state of
uncertainty, but a conviction that the religious question
cannot be answered objectively (or scientiﬁcally)
and, therefore, is meaningless. It expresses
indiﬀerence as deﬁned above: negating not only the
answers, but abandoning the question. The distribution
of the original codes in Britain, as well as the
development of an index constructed from this and
two similar questions in the ISSP-countries in 1991
and 1998 are shown in de Graaf and Need (2000,
125, 129).
4. The question wording: ‘About how often do you
pray?’ lacked a reference to the home and
allowed prayer in the church to be included. In
Ireland in 1998, the two highest responses ‘once
a day’ and ‘several times a day’ were not in the
data, but the two next highest categories have
been chosen more often. There was no way to
correct this.
5. Frequency of church attendance was measured on
six levels. It correlates strongly in each country at
both time points with frequency of prayer (about
r≈0.60). It does not increase between 1991 and 1998
in the Eastern European countries.
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Author’s Address
Prof. Dr Heiner Meulemann, Universität zu Köln,
Institut für Angewandte Sozialforschung, Greinstr. 2,
D-50939 Köln, Germany. E-mail: meulemann@
wiso.uni-koeln.de
Manuscript received: September 2002