

contrast, the Stoics were more explicitly interested in rule-like moral commands, just as they were interested in the actual procedures of moral choice. We can, therefore, despite the fragmentary state of our sources, hope for a more complete account.

One more similarity should be noted. Just as Aristotle needs to distinguish between the reasoning of a fully virtuous agent and that of someone who is in the process of moral development,<sup>11</sup> the Stoics also have two markedly different kinds of agents to account for. Far more sharply than Aristotle, the Stoics distinguish the wise man, or sage, from the ordinary moral agent (even one who has made considerable progress); the moral capacities of these two kinds of agent are crucially different, and so the Stoics eventually came to use two distinct terms for moral deliberation: 'selection' and 'choice' in the narrow sense (*eklogē, hairesis*).<sup>12</sup> This explicit duality in their formal account of moral deliberation reflects a sort of dualism of moral agents. The gap between the wise and the rest of us looks very sharp indeed.

There is a conventional understanding of this dualism which is quite misleading.<sup>13</sup> It has often been held that the gap between the wise and the non-wise reflects a basic ethical dualism, that the Stoics offered *two* moralities, one for the wise and one for the rest.<sup>14</sup> That this is not so is indicated by the basic Stoic claim

<sup>11</sup> Annas, *The Morality of Happiness*, 89–90.

<sup>12</sup> I have given an account of this difference in ch. 6 of *Ethics and Human Action*, esp. 206–15.

<sup>13</sup> See 'Stoic Ethics I', in K. Algra et al. (eds.), *Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1999), 675–6; *Ethics and Human Action*, Ch. 6.

<sup>14</sup> This interpretation of the history of Stoicism was advanced forcefully by A. Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin, 1892). This interpretation was encouraged, possibly even suggested, by what Seneca says about Panaetius at *Ep.* 116.4–5. But the distinction between the wise man and the fool there is limited to the issue of practical advice about self-control. See my discussion in 'Why do Fools fall in Love?', in R. Sorabji (ed.), *Aristotle and After* (Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies, Supp. 68; London, 1997), 55–69. On the influence of this idea, see the summary survey by I. Hadot, *Seneca und die griechisch-römische Tradition der Seelenleitung* (Berlin, 1969), 71–8. Hadot's own view (78) still takes the notion of a middle Stoa (which is not attested by any ancient sources) rather too seriously, though it is a great step forward over most of the tradition.

that the characteristic act of the wise man, a *katorthōma*, is itself a kind of *kathēkon* or appropriate action.<sup>15</sup> Yet there are important differences between wise men and other kinds of moral agents, and the most important of these lies in their different relationship to moral rules or to laws. Whatever the role of rules or other prescriptions in the moral life of ordinary men, it is clear that ideally wise moral agents (however rare they may be) are reported to have a different relation to them.<sup>16</sup> The wise man is said to have a special kind of authority with regard to normally binding moral rules.<sup>17</sup> It is presumably in connection with such special authority that both Zeno and Chrysippus allowed that in some circumstances such taboo activities as cannibalism and incest would be permissible.<sup>18</sup> Wise men and the rest of us seem to have different relationships to moral rules.

The Stoic analysis of moral choice needs to be situated in the framework of two distinctively Stoic theories. First, their articulation of the different kinds of values of things or states of affairs (roughly, the sorts of things which can be the central objects of moral choice) needs to be taken into account; second, the sharp distinction drawn between appropriate actions (*kathēkonta*) and morally right actions (*katorthōmata*) is relevant, as are some distinctions among different kinds of appropriate acts. As far as the theory of value is concerned, a summary account should suffice. For the relevant range, everything can be classified as either good, bad, or indifferent.<sup>19</sup> The only goods are

<sup>15</sup> *Ethics and Human Action*, 208 and n. 120; see also Cicero, *Fin.* 3.59 and below, n. 53.

<sup>16</sup> The nature of this difference is, however, controversial. See the exchange between myself and Mitsis in *Journal of Philosophy*, 83 (1986), 547–58.

<sup>17</sup> DL 7.121 juxtaposes the acknowledgement that the most sacred taboos can be broken in some circumstances with a key definition of the sage's freedom: it consists in his 'authority to act autonomously' (*exousian autopraxias*). In 7.125 it is noted that such complete authority is granted to sages by 'the law'. Similarly at *Ecl.* ii. 102. 8–9 the wise man is said to be law-abiding just because he is the only proper interpreter of the law. Cf. *Ecl.* ii. 108.28, where the wise man is said to be king because only kingship entails the highest authority, one not subject to accountability (*anhupēthunon archēn*).

<sup>18</sup> For the evidence on this, see Vander Waerdt, 'Zeno's Republic', 300–1, with notes.

<sup>19</sup> The classification of things into good, bad, and indifferent is important enough that it is used by Stobaeus (or his source) as the opening theme of his Stoic