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Visuality and pictoriality

WHITNEY DAVIS

> Beside and above the world of perception all the spheres [of spiritual activity] produce freely their own image-world [*Bildwelt*] which is the true vehicle of their immanent development—a world whose inner quality is still wholly sensory, but already discloses a formal sensibility, that is to say, a sensibility governed by the spirit.
>
> *Ernst Cassirer*[1]

> The explicit idea of the world in general is required by the ordering of world-views [*Weltbildern*]. And if "world" is itself a constitutive element of Dasein, then the conceptual working out of the phenomenon of "world" requires an insight into the fundamental structures of Dasein.
>
> *Martin Heidegger*[2]

Visuality is the symbolic form of visual experience—and simply another word for the "imaging habit of thought" described in Erwin Panofsky's iconology, pursuing Immanuel Kant's contention that human thought needs images.[3] "Visuality," then, refers to the "constitutive character of symbolic renderings in the making of 'experience'"—in this case, our experiences of seeing, imaging, and picturing.[4] Panofsky proposed that mundane visual experience must be grounded in successively deeper strata of meaning rooted in "symbolical values" incarnated in the traditions of a historical culture. When we speak of "visuality" rather than vision, we address the difference introduced into seeing by cultural meaning consolidated in and as images. In visuality, seeing becomes "viewing." In visuality, one does not see the world; rather, one sees an image of the world. Paradoxically, this image can only be experienced visually as an *extra-pictorial* world-recognition. It cannot be recognized simply as the picture it is. If it were, visuality would not be *world*-recognition. It would simply be a recognition of a particular *depicted* world. And there's the rub. Visuality constitutes a picture of the world as world-seeing. But if the depictiveness of this picture is to be recognized in the first place, it *requires* the pictorially mediated seeing it supposedly *produces*. And this picture-seeing, this recognition of a world being depicted, cannot be entirely subsumed by the cultural visuality—the world-seeing *tout court*—it supposedly relays.

Is this a vicious circle? No—for we have identified a fundamental feature of the *historical* character of visuality: visuality both projects and presumes a picture of the world as a "way of seeing," or world-recognition, including its way of seeing pictures. This projection-presumption has a peculiar history, which we need to track. And here we must notice a methodological circle. Visuality is not a pure seeing. It must be mediated in activities of image making that cannot be entirely reduced to the visuality they constitute. In this sense visuality (or "viewing") is not a historical *object*. Rather, it is one analytic pole of historical *method* when it addresses its actual historical object—human vision both projecting and presuming pictures.

These days, visual-culture studies often reify a pure visuality.[5] Indeed, visuality often seems to be taken to be a historical object—namely, "visual culture" as such. But this approach violates the underlying theory of an original phenomenal *succession* to cultural meaning—a succession putatively identical in the end to an original noumenal succession to visual apperception. When visual-culture studies take visuality to be the very ground rather than one moment of the history of image making, it has no coherent way to relate the effects of the image itself—its supposedly constitutive ordering *of*

1. E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, vol. 1, *Language* [1923], trans. R. Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), p. 87 (translation modified).

2. M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* [1927], §11, p. 52 = *Being and Time*, trans. J. Stambaugh (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), p. 48.

3. The quoted phrase is from A. H. Gilbert, *Review of Panofsky, Studies in Iconology* [1939], *The Art Bulletin* 22 (1940):172. Gilbert refers "specifically to [the] 'emblematic and personifying' art of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries," but his description could be fully general—as it was for Panofsky.

4. The quoted phrase is from S. K. Langer, "On Cassirer's Theory of Language and Myth," in *The Philosophy of Ernst Cassirer*, ed. P. A. Schilpp, The Library of Living Philosophers 6 (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1949), p. 393.

5. It would be tedious to unravel the definitions of visuality assumed by historians working on visual cultures; see, for example, C. Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); *Visuality Before and Beyond the Renaissance*, ed. R. S. Nelson (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and *Images and Empires: Visuality in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa*, eds. P. S. Landau and D. D. Kaspin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002). Here I pursue essential elements of the concept of visuality as it appears in its various inflections. For a lively recent discussion, see J. Elkins, *Visual Studies: A Skeptical Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003).

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vision—to the causes of its pictorial vehicle *in* vision. It has no coherent way to relate them, that is, beyond identifying them wholly with one another. A reified pure visuality is just another question-begging dogma of visual *Weltanschauung* or "period eye."

Visuality and what I will call *pictoriality* though always inter-converting are at no point identical. Indeed, at every moment in their noetic succession they must be disjunct. A picture cannot entirely express the essential "symbolical values" of a visuality, just as a visuality cannot entirely conceive the essential "formal values" of a picture. This basic disjunction creates disruptions that provoke visual imagination and pictorial configuration—constituting the very mechanism of the cycle of form to symbol, of image to "discourse," of the sensible to the intelligible, and round again. It will be helpful to consider all this in a concrete instance—a paradigm case in the development of iconology.

The splitting of the art-historical eye

The art-historical method developed by Panofsky in the 1920s and 1930s distinguished the "pre-iconographical," the "iconographical," and the "iconological" levels of analysis. For the moment they can be regarded as requiring the historian to identify forms, motifs, and cultural meaning, respectively. Panofsky's most succinct statements of his method can be found in two well-known essays. The first, written in German, was published in 1932 in the journal *Logos*.[6] The second, written in English, was published in 1939 as the first part of the "Introductory" section in *Studies in Iconology*; Panofsky republished it with a two-paragraph addition in 1955 in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* under the rubric "Iconography and Iconology," the title I use here.[7] I will return to differences between the claims of 1932, 1939, and 1955. At this point I want to recall a third text, which has been overlooked in subsequent discussions of Panofsky's program. In 1951, Panofsky published "Meaning in the Visual Arts," a brief essay presaging the title he gave to the collection published in 1955.[8] To some extent "Meaning in the Visual Arts" repeats and summarizes "Iconography and Iconology." In the final paragraphs, however, Panofsky turned to an issue directly addressed neither in the German essay of 1932 nor in the English essay of 1939/1955—even though the matter had occupied him ever since his doctoral research dating from 1911 to 1914.

In "Meaning in the Visual Arts," Panofsky tried "to illustrate what may be called the gradual revelation of content" in a work of pictorial art (48). He addressed a familiar print by Albrecht Dürer—the large engraving or *Meisterstich* usually known as *Knight, Death, and the Devil,* bearing Dürer's monogram and the date 1513 (fig. 1).[9] Above all Panofsky hoped to discover "the *indissoluble unity* of forms, motives and narrative subject matter" in the print (*MVA,* 48; my emphasis). That they *should* constitute an "indissoluble unity" cannot be taken for granted in iconographic terms. As Panofsky noted, the magnificent trotting horse and the stern, sanguine rider in Dürer's picture "come from two

6. E. Panofsky, "Zum Problem der Beschreibung und Inhaltsdeutung von Werken der bildenden Kunst," *Logos* 21 (1932):103–119 = E. Panofsky, *Aufsätze zu Grundfragen der Kunstwissenschaft,* eds. H. Oberer and E. Verheyen (Berlin: B. Hessling, 1964), pp. 85–97. This essay will be cited in the main body of the text as *PB*.

7. E. Panofsky, "Introductory, §1," *Studies in Iconology: Humanistic Themes in the Art of the Renaissance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 3–17; *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers In and On Art History* (New York: Anchor Books, 1955), pp. 26–41. The 1939 version of the essay will be cited in the main body of the text as *I & I*. In the large literature on these writings, I wish to single out David Summers, "Meaning in the Visual Arts as a Humanistic Discipline," in *Meaning in the Visual Arts: Views from the Outside—A Centennial Commemoration of Erwin Panofsky (1892–1968),* ed. I. Lavin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 9–24.

8. "Meaning in the Visual Arts," *Magazine of Art* 44, no. 1 (February, 1951):45–50. This essay will be cited in the main body of the text as *MVA*. It introduced Panofsky's iconology to the nonacademic American artworld.

9. The engraving measures 246 x 190 cm. For an early, a later, and a very late impression, see *Albrecht Dürer: Master Printmaker,* ed. E. A. Sayre (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1971), nos. 179–181. Subtle spatializing effects are more visible in earlier impressions than in later ones, which can be quite lifeless (e.g., ibid., no. 181), and connoisseurs rightly assert that the print should be viewed "in fresh, early impressions" (ibid., p. xvii). I will return to the importance of this point. For the bibliography available to Panofsky, see E. Panofsky, *The Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer,* 1st ed. This book will be cited in the main body of the text as *LAAD*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), vol. 2, Handlist No. 205. For recent exhibition history and bibliography, see R. Schoch, M. Mende, and A. Scherbaum, *Albrecht Dürer: Druckgraphische Werk,* vol. 1, *Kupferstiche, Eisenradierungen und Kaltnadelblätter* (Munich: Prestel, 2001), no. 69, G. Bertram, *Albrecht Dürer and His Legacy* (London: British Museum, 2002), no. 126, and *Albrecht Dürer,* eds. K. A. Schröder and M. L. Sternath (Vienna: Albertina, 2003), nos. 137–139. For valuable historiographical surveys, see H. Schwerte, "Dürers 'Ritter, Tod und Teufel': Eine Ideologische Parallele zum 'Faustischen'," in *Faust und das Faustischen: Ein Kapitel deutscher Ideologie* (Stuttgart: E. Klett, 1962), pp. 243–278, and J. Bialostocki, *Dürer and His Critics, 1500–1971: Chapters in the History of Ideas,* Saecula Spiritalia 7 (Baden-Baden: V. Koerner, 1986), pp. 211–242. It is not part of my purpose to consider post-Panofskyan scholarship on the print; it has substantially revised Panofsky's interpretation (see below, note 21).

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Figure 1. Albrecht Dürer, *Knight, Death, and the Devil* (1513), engraving. Photograph © 2004 Museum of Fine Arts, Boston, Harvey D. Parker Fund 68.261.

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different sources" in the artist's production (ibid.). Dürer based the principal rider, an armed knight, on a life study of an armed and mounted groom painted in watercolor in 1498 (fig. 2); as the artist's inscription tells us, this study was intended to illustrate "the armor in Germany at the time."[10] By contrast, the rider's *horse* precipitated from Dürer's "theoretical studies" of equine proportions, especially a sheet of studies now in Nuremberg (fig. 3), in turn derived from drawings by Leonardo da Vinci in which the "exquisite rhythm" of equine movement had been grasped by the Italian artist (*MVA,* 48).[11] But despite the disparate pictorial materials, which flowed into the image created in the print of 1513, Dürer achieved an "indissoluble unity" of forms and motifs because he was able to "display this perfect posture of a horseman for its own sake" (ibid.)—a complete pictorial image and a self-sufficient work of art. In this, as Panofsky and his collaborators later wrote, the artist created one of his "great symbolical forms."[12]

Whence, however, the "gradual revelation of content"—the symbolic charge of the picture, the iconologist's "intrinsic meaning or content" (*I & I,* 7–8)? Panofsky aimed to describe a wholesale continuity *from* formal and strictly iconographic *to* iconological identifications of the significance of the print. Thus he was compelled to suppose that Dürer was "not satisfied" with the picture of a horseman's posture displayed "for its own sake" (*MVA,* 48)—even though that self-sufficient image constituted the unity of the disparate forms and motifs already observed. In the engraving of 1513, Dürer "added" other elements—the figures of Death and the Devil on their horses, the running hound, the landscape setting. In this way he "invested [the image of the horseman] with an intelligible idea, and even transformed it into an allegory" (ibid.). Specifically, in its intrinsic meaning—the ultimate object of iconology in the identification of a visual culture—the print depicts "the Christian Knight [who] finds himself in the dense, pathless wilderness of the World, haunted by reptiles and the remains of those who died on the road, . . . waylaid by Death, who threateningly holds up his hourglass, and by the Devil who sneaks up from behind" (ibid.). These elements were added to the print insofar as they were generated in its production rather than inherited from its formal and iconographic sources. But they also translated the self-sufficient pictorial display of the horse and rider into the "intelligible idea" of a Christian Knight on his dread journey. In turn this idea subsisted in "indissoluble unity" with the form and

Figure 2. Albrecht Dürer, *Man on Horseback* (1498), watercolor. Courtesy of The Albertina, Vienna.

10. For the watercolor, see Panofsky (see note 9), vol. 2, Handlist No. 1227 (Albertina). The rider is said to be Philipp Link, groom to the family of one of the artist's patrons. In scouring the Dürer canon, the Tietzes rejected the drawing, taking it to be a workshop copy after his original (H. Tietze and E. Tietze-Conrat, *Kritisches Verzeichnis der Werke Albrecht Dürers* [Augsburg: B. Filser, 1928], vol. 1, p. 90). Panofsky did not accept this reattribution and it does not appear to have been taken up; see Albrecht Dürer, eds. Schröder and Sternath (see note 10), no. 137.

11. For the Nuremberg sheet (its "horses are constructed according to the system employed for the engraving"), see Panofsky (see note 9), vol. 2, Handlist No. 1674. For a two-sided "preparatory drawing" for the engraving, see ibid., vol. 2, Handlist Nos. 1675–1676 (Ambrosiana). (Both sides are illustrated in *Albrecht Dürer,* eds. Schröder and Sternath [see note 9], no. 138.) The verso of the sheet is the "fair copy," and insofar as it reversed the drawing on the recto, it could have served as a working drawing for the engraving (which would, of course, reverse it in turn). For a further copy of it (not always accepted to be Dürer's), see ibid., vol. 2, Handlist No. 1677 (Uffizi). None of these three studies includes the figures of Death and the Devil.

12. R. Klibansky, E. Panofsky, and F. Saxl, *Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion, and Art* (London: Nelson, 1964), p. 373. This text was prepared in the 1930s but finished and published long afterward.

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

Figure 3. Albrecht Dürer, *Study of a Horse,* pen drawing. Detail of MS. Nuremberg, fol. 162r. (Georg Reimer Verlag, 1915).

motif of the horse and rider: there was no reason for Dürer to depict the horse and rider except in order to depict the Christian Knight. In sum, in Dürer's print pictoriality, including the formal and iconographic constitution of the picture over time, smoothly gives onto visuality, the cultural meaning of the image—even as that visuality determines pictoriality.

Now Panofsky knew very well the purported unity of the sensible form and the intelligible idea of Dürer's print had been questioned by Heinrich Wölfflin, "the greatest advocate of purely formal analysis" (*MVA,* 48–49). Panofsky's doctoral thesis on Dürer's art theory, submitted in 1914 at Freiburg, had begun life in an essay awarded a prize in 1911, on Wölfflin's recommendation, by the University of Berlin. Six years earlier, in 1905, Wölfflin had published the first edition of *Die Kunst Albrecht Dürers.*[13] In his treatment of the print (in a lecture of 1921 he called it the "best known picture in all German art"), Wölfflin insisted that Dürer was "originally"—and as it were *throughout the entire process* of making the image—"merely concerned with the simple subject of a horse and rider" (*KAD,* 242).[14] Dürer presented the beast "in pure side view, and there has been no playing down of the intention to reveal the

13. H. Wölfflin, *Die Kunst Albrecht Dürers* [1905], 6th ed., ed. K. Gerstenberg (Munich: F. Bruckmann, 1943). This edition will be cited in the main body of the text as *KAD.* For Panofsky's dissertation, see E. Panofsky, *Die theoretische Kunst-Lehre Albrecht Dürers (Dürers Ästhetik)* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1914). The 60-page dissertation did not present the technical details of Panofsky's researches on Dürer's theoretical studies. These appeared a year later in Panofsky's first (and a 200-page) book: *Dürers Kunsttheorie; vornehmlich in ihrem Verhältnis zur Kunsttheorie der Italiener* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1915). For Wölfflin's review of Panofsky's book, which reminded readers of Wölfflin's role in its genesis, see *Monatshefte für Kunstwissenschaft* 8 (1915):254–255; though complimenting Panofsky's scholarship, Wölfflin did not wholly endorse the younger scholar's account of the "synonymity" of Art and Beauty in Dürer's thinking.

14. In this he followed the pioneering commentary of Moritz Thausing, who had written that "Dürer wanted, above all, to do as perfect a picture as possible of a knight on horseback" (*Albert Dürer: His Life and Works* [1876], trans. F. A. Eaton [London: J. Murray, 1882], vol. 2, p. 227). According to Thausing (followed by other nineteenth-century commentators), the Knight represents the Sanguine Temperament. Both Wölfflin and Panofsky rejected this interpretation. For Wölfflin's 1921 lecture, see his *Albrecht Dürer* (Darmstadt: O. Reichl, 1922); the text became the chapter "Zur Einleitung" in the later editions of *KAD* (quotation from p. 11).

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actual shape in its utmost distinctness" (*KAD,* 241); the artist did his best to preserve the strictly formal unity of this initial, his primary, pictorial image.

According to Wölfflin, this replication subsisted in tension—even in clear contrast—with the "intelligible idea" imported in its wake. Most striking, the artist's additions were an obvious failure—evidence, for Wölfflin, that the persisting primary pictorial determination continued to overwhelm a secondary symbolic reformatting. To be sure, Dürer gave a "new sense" to the horse and rider "by going back to the type of the *eques christianus,* bringing in Death and the Devil and changing the figure into a symbolic one" (*KAD,* 242). But Wölfflin insisted that this change was "not to the advantage of the picture." As he put it—and in "Meaning and the Visual Arts" Panofsky quoted this remark—"it cannot be denied for a moment that the accompanying figures [of Death and the Devil] are merely tacked on and that the whole scene represents a compromise" (ibid.). The subsidiary figures interfered with the horse at the noetic center of the image. To recall Panofsky's phrasing, we can gradually identify what Death and the Devil might be doing; we can construct a narrative. But in seeing the horse and rider, as Wölfflin asserted, "the eye immediately feels the order on which the principal outlines and their rhythm are based, even though the mind is incapable of penetrating the secret" (*KAD,* 244–245). At the Wölfflinian origin of the picture, then, there was no intelligible idea even if and indeed precisely *because* the formal unity of an original image—and its occlusion in a secondary symbolism—remains palpable.

This is not to say that Wölfflin saw no significance in Dürer's horse and its rider. The very presence of a secret—the image of the horse and rider—implies a deep and perhaps surprising or even disruptive significance. It is only to say that for Wölfflin this significance cannot be (or cannot be limited to) the cultural-traditional significance of the Christian Knight later identified by Panofsky (following scholarship already cited by Wölfflin) as the "gradual revelation" of the secret—that is, the "intrinsic content" which, Panofsky would say, expresses a "cultural philosophy condensed by a single personality and determining even the form of a work of art" (*I & I,* 8). In Wölfflin's treatment of the print, the secret of the image, as it were, simply *is* its primal formal unity persisting in—and overwhelming—a symbolic reconstruction. This inner image harbors a significance that must be radically outside—and noetically prior to—wholly cultural intelligibility in part because it is Dürer's own expression, *his* image rendered in or as a picture. And, in part, it must be outside merely cultural intelligibility because its unity can be grasped immediately by *us,* observers belonging to a later and a different cultural universe who *nonetheless* visually understand the noetic history of Dürer's print. We immediately grasp its "principal outlines and their rhythm" and the primordial and persisting extra-symbolic meaningfulness they betoken—an artistic imagination in direct engagement with its pictorial means. To dramatize his conclusion, in the fifth edition of *Die Kunst Albrecht Dürers,* issued in 1926, Wölfflin included an illustration of Dürer's engraving with everything but Dürer's primary pictorial image—the horse and rider—which was completely blacked out (*KAD,* 244) (fig. 4).[15]

According to Wölfflin, his illustration enables us to see how Dürer "secured the entire rhythmic action" of the horse (*KAD,* 245, n. 1). And the illustration suggests why that unity could not be fully extended to the rest of the image. Because the rider "fills the whole breadth" of the picture plane, which appears in the illustration when the landscape depth is excluded, Death and the Devil must be squeezed behind him. In particular, the "mere size" of Death looks "insignificant." Dürer managed to mitigate this by making Death's white shirt stand out strongly against the horse's mane in front of him; Death looks bigger than he is. "The disastrous muddle of the legs," however, "was irreparable; nothing could undo the impression of incoherence" (*KAD,* 247). The four acutely foreshortened legs of Death's horse and the one barely visible leg of the Devil's horse—not to speak of the running dog's legs—create a formal as well as a narrative tangle. Still, Wölfflin conceded a certain logic to the mess. "Just because the subsidiary figures seem so dismembered, the main figure gains its flat, structurally clear and concise appearance, which goes well with the print's meaning" (ibid.)—namely, the Knight's faith and resolve in the face of mortality and temptation. But for Wölfflin this suggestion of a conventional meaning was built around an original pictorial unity to which it remained a symbolic complement, a formal accessory.

In 1943, Panofsky published his *Life and Art of Albrecht Dürer*; it criticized Wölfflin's interpretation

15. The blacked-out engraving was illustrated in the fifth (1926) and sixth (1943) editions of *KAD.* The latter edition was prepared by Wölfflin's student Kurt Gerstenberg. Gerstenberg also prepared the 7th edition, published in 1963; this edition was translated into English (*The Art of Albrecht Dürer,* trans. A. and H. Grieve [London: Phaidon, 1971]). Here Gerstenberg eliminated the illustration; thus the controversy has not been apparent to English-speaking readers.

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Figure 4. Illustration of *Knight, Death, and the Devil* with background removed, from Heinrich Wölfflin, *Die Kunst Albrecht Dürers,* 5th and 6th eds. only (F. Bruckmann Verlag, Munich, 1926 and 1943).

without mentioning him by name. According to Panofsky, Wölfflin's illustration of Dürer's print eliminating everything but the horse and rider "defeats its own purpose," for it really shows, against Wölfflin, that "the 'many odds and ends' are indispensable" (*LAAD,* 153):

> In my opinion [Panofsky wrote in 1951], this attempt to teach a great master his business defeats its own ends. The blacked-out composition appears less meaningful, not only from the point of view of subject matter but also from that of form. With the background eliminated, the group simply *looks* wrong. It looks like an equestrian monument deprived of its pedestal and taken out of its architectural context: overmodeled, yet unstable, expressionlessly moving no one knows whence, no one knows whither (*MVA,* 49).

Nevertheless, Panofsky recognized that his objection—it is itself avowedly formalistic—cannot dispose of Wölfflin's illustration. For Wölfflin, it was the very *contrast* between the primal image of a mysterious horse and rider and the secondary symbolic significance that constituted the noetic history of the engraving. Panofsky realized he needed to preserve the tension identified by Wölfflin even as he had to convert its chief index—the formal disunity and aesthetic disorder of the print—into an "indissoluble unity" between all the forms and motifs and their cultural meanings. As he went on to say in 1943:

> It is quite true that Dürer was anxious to find a subject matter which would permit him to demonstrate the final results of his studies in the anatomy, movements, and proportions of the horse. But he would not have been a great artist had he conceived of this problem in terms of detachable accessories. Once he had discovered his theme in the idea of the Christian Knight the visual image of the perfect horseman merged with the mental image of the perfect *miles Christianus* into an artistic concept, that is to say, an integral unity. The iconography of the Christian Knight took shape according to the formal pattern of a carefully balanced equestrian group while, conversely, this formal pattern assumed, as such, an expressive or even symbolic significance (*LAAD,* 153–154).

To my mind, we could hardly find a more succinct application of iconological method—and its methodological circularity—in the entire literature of art history and visual-culture studies. It needs careful unpacking. As Panofsky insisted, in order to unify images—"visual" and "mental"—as an intelligible artistic concept Dürer had to have "discovered his theme in the idea of the Christian Knight." In itself, of course, the "idea of the Christian Knight" could only foreshadow the "intelligible idea" of the final image relayed in the engraving. But putting first things first, whence did Dürer derive the idea of the Christian Knight?

In 1521, in his diary of his journey to the Netherlands the artist responded to rumors of the assassination of Martin Luther by appealing to Erasmus—"ride forth, you Knight of Christ!" (*du Ritter Christi*).[16] Panofsky wants to associate Dürer's exclamation of 1521 with his print of 1513—though in the same diary Dürer himself, as Panofsky noted, referred to the engraving not as *der*

16. "Hör, du Ritter Christi, reit hervor neben den Herrn Christum, beschütz die Wahrheit, erlang der Märtyrer Kron!": *Dürers schriftlicher Nachlass auf Grund der Originalhandschriften,* eds. K. Lange and F. Fuhse (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1893), p. 164 (27). Scholars had embraced this connection as soon as it had been proposed by Wölfflin's predecessor Herman Grimm, a "documentary" art historian ("Dürers Ritter, Tod und Teufel," *Preussische Jahrbücher* 36 [1875]:543–549).

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Ritter (the Knight) but as *der Reuter* (the Rider).[17] According to Panofsky, the phrase "du Ritter Christi" alludes to Erasmus's *Enchiridion militis Christiani* or *Handbook of the Christian Soldier.* Erasmus's *Enchiridion* was first published, Panofsky reminds us, in 1504—implying that the book influenced Dürer's outlook in 1513.[18] In particular, Erasmus's imagery must have colored the artist's identification of his own achieved knight on horseback—the watercolor study he had already painted in 1498—with an Erasmian Christian Soldier, at least when the study of 1498 came to be "adapted to the new purpose" of the engraving in 1513 (*LAAD,* 152). But Panofsky neglects to mention that Erasmus's *Enchiridion* was not translated into German until 1520 and 1521, well after the engraving had been made. Instead, he suggests that the supposed fact that Dürer "promoted the Erasmian 'soldier' (*miles,* not *eques*) to a 'knight' riding forth on horseback shows that his mind involuntarily associated him with the hero of his own engraving" (*LAAD,* 151–152). As the chronology of the iconography suggests, however, Dürer's awareness of the Erasmian applications of the Christian Soldier—and hence any link he made to his own *Reuter* as a Christian *Ritter*—could well have postdated his pictorial visualization of his knightly rider, whether *Reuter* or *Ritter.* If these involuntary associations were made at all they were quite as likely to have been made after—and perhaps responding to—the engraving rather than before it and as its founding idea. Panofsky produced the crucial linking of an Armed Rider and a Christian Knight out of nowhere: a link made only in the print itself, it cannot be discovered in a preceding iconography even if Dürer might have partly ratified it in his own later discourse. In the engraving, then, Dürer's pictorial association *had* to be "involuntary"—just like slipping in speech from *Reuter* to *Ritter.* To be sure, this association of *Ritter* and *Reuter* should take us to the heart of Dürer's "artistic concept"—an indissoluble unity achieved in an involuntary association when Erasmus's Christian Soldier of 1504 somehow coupled in 1513 with the image of the knight based on the costume study of 1498. But the only evidence for this can be the engraving itself, in particular its supposed wholesale formal unification of the central image and the subsidiary figures. And it was precisely this unification that had been directly questioned by Wölfflin.

Panofsky's inquiry, then, was displaced yet again. Rather than showing how the Rider became a Knight, the process at the center of the image of horse and rider identified by Wölfflin, Panofsky tried to show how the Knight became a Christian, a process vested in the elaboration of the figures of Death and the Devil. Panofsky recalled that Dürer's tradition provided him with a type of the Christian soldier girding himself for battle or even mounted for war (fig. 5)—though he is always depicted as a single figure—as well as a type of the Pilgrim beset by Death, the Devil, or other fiendish adversaries.[19] According to Panofsky, "the two ideas intermingled . . . and a complete fusion of Soldier's March and Pilgrim's Progress . . . is seen in woodcuts and etchings of the sixteenth century where the *miles Christianus* climbs the ladder which leads to God, hampered but not discouraged by the strings of Death, Luxury, Disease, and Poverty" (*LAAD,* 152) (fig. 6).[20] But the fusion in these pictures does not equate with the fusion achieved in Dürer's engraving. Neither the fully armed knight nor the rider appears in them; the protagonist is always an ordinary foot soldier or a humble pilgrim. And where the knight does appear in a symbolism of death and the devil—for instance, in the title page of the German translation of Erasmus's *Enchiridion* printed in Basel in 1520 (fig. 7)—he is not a rider. Of course, adding these available types to the image of a mounted knight could convert him into the Christian *Reuter/Ritter* of Dürer's image. For Panofsky, this fusion occurred as a unitary artistic

17. Lange and Fuhse (see note 16), pp. 140 (5) (*der Reuther*), 150 (20) (*der Reuter*). The artist referred to sales of his print. For a more recent edition of the Diary, see *Dürers schriftlicher Nachlass,* ed. H. Rupprich, vol. 1, *Autobiographische Schriften . . .* (Berlin: Deutscher Verein für Kunstwissenschaft, 1956), pp. 146–202 (*der Reuter* named on pp. 162 and 166; *du Ritter Christi* on p. 171).

18. In the scholarship available to Panofsky, the date of first publication varied from 1502 to 1504; it is now agreed to have been 1502. A second publication occurred in 1509. Panofsky did not mention that all following editions—the most widely circulated—appeared after 1515; it was in this later year that "the great dissemination and real popularity of the book first took hold" (P. Weber, *Beiträge zu Dürers Weltanschauung; eine Studie über die drei Stiche Ritter Tod und Teufel, Melancholie und Hieronymous im Gehäus,* Studien zur deutschen Kunstgeschichte 23 [Strassburg: J. H. E. Heitz, 1900], p. 16).

19. Weber (see note 18), p. 31, reproduced an illustration in a pamphlet published in 1494.

20. Weber (see note 18), p. 32, pls. 4–5, reproduced a painted woodcut issued in 1488. For the iconography, Panofsky himself (see note 9, vol. 2, Handlist No. 205) cited R. Muther, *Die deutsche Bucherillustration der Gothik und Renaissance* (Munich and Leipzig: George Hirth, 1884), vol. 2, pl. 169 (right) (Hans Wieditz's illustrations to Petrarch), reproduced here (fig. 6), and G. Pauli, *Inkunabeln der deutschen und niederländischen Radierung* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1908), pl. 18 (top left) (a poor replication of the same?).

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Figure 5. A Spiritual Knight (*ein geystlich Ritter*) from *Der Fusspfadt tzuo der ewigen seyligkeyt* (booklet of 1494), woodcut (from Weber, *Dürers Weltanschauung* [1900], 31).

Figure 6. A Pilgrim with Death and other adversaries (ca. 1490), woodcut (from Muther, *Die deutsche Bücherillustration der Gothik und Renaissance* [1884], II, pl. 169 [right]).

conceptualization: "the visual image of the perfect horseman merged with the mental image of the perfect *miles Christianus* into an artistic concept, an integral unity" (*LAAD,* 153). Panofsky takes care to say, touching bottom, and the essence of our problem, that the "visual image" of the horseman merged with the requisite "mental image" because Dürer had produced no such image *qua* picture, even if his imaginative world or cultural visuality may have allowed for it. But the evidence for all of the required association and merging of these images is simply the "integral unity" of the print, even though the fusion must constitute its formal-pictorial unity in the first place. To dispute that unity must be to question the communication between expressive and symbolic significance or—to recall Panofsky's effort to bind the *visual* image and the *mental* image in an integral unity—to question the very possibility of a wholesale interconversion of pictoriality and visuality.[21]

21. Panofsky's interpretation has suffered considerably in recent years. According to Edgar Wind, Dürer depicted the Knight, a "cold, brutal, efficient warrior," in the "final vanity of [his] martial prowess": the Knight has no iconographically Christian identity whatsoever (*Giorgione's Tempesta with Comments on Giorgione's Poetic Allegories* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969], p. 27, n. 31). On the basis of alternate iconographies (considering, for example, the skull on the ground, the salamander, and the fox-brush on the knight's lance), E. H. Gombrich has taken the Knight to be a soldier "in need of contrition" ("The Evidence of Images," in *Interpretation: Theory and Practice,* ed. C. Singleton [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1969], pp. 35–104, quotation from p. 103)—in historical context, possibly Dürer's "protest against the brutal and unscrupulous ravagings of the robber-knights" who still plagued his country (S. Karling, "Ritter, Tod und Teufel: Ein Beitrag zur Deutung von Dürers Stich," in *Évolution générale et développements régionaux en histoire de l'art: Actes du 22e Congrès international d'Histoire de l'Art,* vol. 1 [Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1972], pp. 731–738; cf. U. Meyer, "Politische Bezüge in Dürers 'Ritter, Tod und Teufel'," *Kritische Berichte* 6, no. 6 [1978]:27–41). This interpretation had already appeared in the nineteenth century before Grimm's insistence on the *miles Christianus* had fully taken hold. In an elegant analysis of pictoriality (*Bildsinn*) and visuality (*Sinnbild*) in the print, Heinrich Theissing (*Dürer's Ritter, Tod und Teufel: Sinnbild und Bildsinn* [Berlin: Gebr. Mann, 1978]) has offered a compelling interpretation of the engraving; according to him, its symbolism of the overcoming of death can be seen to mesh—to be synonymous—with the presentation of the formal devices of art itself. Theissing's account does not depend on identifying the Rider as a Christian Knight in *iconographic* terms. Instead, according to Theissing the Knight relays Dürer's concept of Beauty (the artistic *locus* of Culture) overcoming Nature and in particular the natural necessity of Death—a visualization which can be taken to reflect the artist's Christian spirituality.

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Figure 7. Urs Graf, A Christian Knight (1520), title page of Erasmus, *Handbüchlein des christlichen Ritters* (Basel, 1520), woodcut (from Weber, *Dürers Weltanschauung,* 28).

Recognitions in the iconographic succession

In methodological remarks published in 1939, Panofsky asserted that our study of the primary expressive value of a motif, including form "in Wölfflin's sense," must be a pre-iconographical investigation of "what we see" (*I & I,* 9). What we see is simply a "change of details within a configuration . . . in [our] world of vision" (*I & I,* 3). We automatically recognize objects and events; visual intuition gives us the "primary expressional meaning" of perceived states of affairs. Such realizations need not be conscious and intentional, but they are always sensible: they are constituted in visual perception. As Wölfflin had put it in considering Dürer's print, they must be immediate. In one sense, Panofsky excluded such reflexive visual experience from his iconology, leaving it to natural history, psychology, or ethnology—to speculative anthropology. Still, in a deeper sense "what we see" ultimately must be a visual world which has been constituted symbolically—a visuality. To be sure, much of this *iconological* anthropology—especially the closing of the circle in the discovery of visuality or the symbolic form of visual experience—remained implicit in Panofskyan iconology and visual-culture studies. It has typically been relayed in innumerable wishful art and cultural histories in which "visual" and "mental" images have been magically interconverted. Thus we need to remind ourselves why visual image and mental image, picture and symbol or the "intrinsic content" of a picture, though interrelated, cannot be conflated. Better, we need to recall why visual culture, if it is a historical object at all, is not simply visuality but also pictoriality—and at the limit, the pure form of depiction as resistance to symbolic or discursive cultural intelligibility.

Our recognition of the expressional meaning of objects and events in pictures must be included in "what we see" because pictures are furnishings of the world fully open to our vision. Indeed, they are produced specifically for our vision—our "viewing." Panofsky acknowledged, however, that "what we see" in pictures—and precisely because they are pictures—must be grasped in a "*fraction* of a second and *almost* automatically" (*I & I,* 11; my emphasis). In other words, he noticed, against himself, that our seeing of pictures includes a not-quite-immediate recursion, which occupies psychological duration and requires psychological work—duration and work *not* to be found in extra-pictorial seeing. In the case of seeing pictures, visual perception must "identify pure forms . . . as *representations* of objects, events, [and] expressions" (*I & I,* 5; my emphasis)—as motifs. In part, Panofsky used

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the word "representation" (*Darstellung* [*PB*, 95, see note 6]) in a Kantian sense to refer to the schematic constitution of visual intuition: objects and events in perception are representations or what Ernst Cassirer called "representative meanings" created by the intrinsic *Darstellungsfunktion* of human cognition.[22] But Panofsky introduced *Darstellung* specifically in his effort, as he put it, to "transfer the results" of a psychological analysis of extra-pictorial situations in everyday life "to a work of art" (*I & I*, 5)—that is, when he moved, as the art historian must, from seeing the *world* to seeing *pictures* or from visuality to pictoriality.

As Panofsky's iconography proclaimed, the study of the secondary conventional meaning of motifs explicitly needs a cultural history; it considers both traditional types and their historically specific thematization. In their perceptual near-immediacy motifs are inherently representational; "what we see" in pictures is not the world but representation. This constitutive recursion of representation—the "fraction of a second" it takes us to see a picture—marks the passage through which the method of iconology (in its theory of an ultimate visuality) needs to move. But it is also the moment of possible disjunction, resistance, or blockage. It might be much more difficult to recognize a pictorial motif than it is for us to see the very same objects and events in our non-pictorial world. Moreover, the recognition that gives us the picture (this particular object or event) and the recognition that gives us its motifs (the objects or events *depicted by* this particular object-event) are not the same. The recognizability of pictorial form occurs in a recursion quite distinct from the constitution of the significance of anything that might be represented *by* pictorial form. In theory, an anthropology of visuality wants to say that these realizations are one and the same: one and the same visuality grounds both recognitions as an integrated and unified (if not-quite-immediate) perceptual and cognitive succession. But this ultimate and yet determining visuality must somehow have been bootstrapped into being through the very synthesis of proximate recognitions—somehow determined *by* visuality—which would make it possible in the first place. The anthropology practiced here seems more like astrology.[23]

Supposedly our ordinary recognitional abilities in the mundane context explain our recognitional abilities in the *depicted* context. But the transfer between these environments requires the primary recognition of *the formal integrity of a picture as such*—the point Panofsky partially obfuscated when he assumed a complete and unperturbed transfer from the recognitions that support the picture to the recognitions that the picture supports. In this magical succession, initially it is as if the seeing of pictures must have become almost (though not quite) identical with extra-pictorial seeing: our abilities in world-*recognition* enable us to recognize pictures as such. Vision enables pictoriality. In the end, however, it becomes clear that extra-pictorial seeing must have become entirely identical with a seeing of pictures: our abilities in world-*representation* enable us to recognize pictorial motifs. Visuality enables pictoriality. *But the pictoriality enabled by world-recognition itself enables this recognition of world-representation.* We have moved in a great loop from vision to pictures to the pictoriality of vision to the visuality of pictures . . . and presumably round and round again. Throughout, moments of nonidentity—any cleavage between seeing the world and seeing pictures of the world—must be converted into identity. And this translation continually requires us to forego a critical history that might examine how the integrity (or nonintegrity) of a picture does (or does not) entirely cohere with the integrity (or nonintegrity) of the world it putatively depicts. This is a question neither of visuality nor of pictoriality alone, and thus a task neither for an anthropology of visual culture nor for pictorial formalism on their own. It is a task for their mutual critical negation—a method of confronting a visuality with its pictoriality and vice versa.

We grasp forms and motifs in a picture partly because we understand its depictive style. Therefore Panofsky took the history of styles to be the foundation of iconography and iconology.[24] Pre-iconographical

22. See E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit,* vol. 2 [1907], 3rd ed. (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1922), p. 699, and *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff: Untersuchungen über die Grundfragen der Erkenntniskritik* (Berlin: Bruno Cassirer, 1910) = *Substance and Function,* trans. W. C. and M. T. Swabey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1923). Throughout I have depended on the superb discussion by Michael Friedman, *A Parting of the Ways: Carnap, Cassirer, and Heidegger* (Chicago and LaSalle: Open Court, 2000), pp. 87–110.

23. Panofsky cautioned as much in a comment he added to *I & I* of 1939 on its republication in *Meaning in the Visual Arts* in 1955 (see note 7, p. 32): "There is, however, admittedly some danger that iconology will behave, not like ethnology as opposed to ethnography, but like astrology as opposed to astrography."

24. See E. Panofsky, "Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden Kunst," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 10 (1915): 460–467 = *Aufsätze* (see note 6), pp. 23–31. This article responded to Wölfflin's essay, "Das Problem des Stils in der bildenden

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picture-viewing is separated from pre-iconographical world-seeing by the fact of style—our awareness that the world looks natural, "objective," while pictures look constructed, "subjective." Nevertheless, when the full loop of visuality has been traversed, when symbolic understanding or cultural discursivity constitutes vision as such, then, of course, we must say that seeing itself has a style. In its most radical statement, this thesis—seeing itself is stylized according to prevailing canons of depiction—would seem to be the logical consequence of art-historical theories of visuality. But it has rarely been defended by art historians.[25] Indeed, Panofsky could not bring himself to suppose that the art historian can actually see the world as an artist in the past saw it, even if art history can specify the original cultural meaning of that artist's depiction. Thus he waved away the phenomenon of style precisely when it should have taken center stage.

To be fair, and as I have already implied, Panofsky's method incorporated the resistance of depiction. Panofsky urged that in examining *historical* pictures—pictures made by people in the past, subjects of a visuality different from our own—we must correct *our* seeing: we must reconstruct the original expressive, traditional, and symptomatic meanings of pictorial configurations produced in the past. This so-called contextual knowledge derives from the history of style (*Gestaltungsgeschichte*), the history of types (*Typengeschichte*), and the history of cultural or spiritual significance (*Geistesgeschichte*). In the end we should be able to identify the past *world-representations* that constitute the ground of the primary *picture-recognitions* with which we ourselves began. Panofsky's three correctives acknowledge the layered mediations of this connection. But he intended them to overcome the resistance of the picture—and the historical alterity of the world-representations it has formalized—admitted at each and every step of the way. For him, what can only begin as a hermeneutic of our own visual recognition of pictures should be wholly converted into the contextualist anthropology of a historical visuality.

Panofsky's program for *Kunstwissenschaft* closely resembles the conception of the progress of science promoted by neo-Kantian philosophers in the preceding generation, notably by Panofsky's mentor Ernst Cassirer. Their doctrine has been well described by Michael Friedman:

> [M]ore and more layers of "form" are successively injected by the application of our scientific methods so as gradually to constitute the object of empirical natural science. In this methodological progression we find . . . only an infinite series of levels in which any two succeeding stages relate to one another relatively as matter and form. The object of knowledge itself, as "reality" standing over and against pure thought, is simply the ideal limit point—the never completed "X"—towards which the methodological progress of science is converging. There is thus no "pre-conceptual" manifold of sensations existing independently of pure thought at all.[26]

Panofsky himself did not quite assert that *his* historical object, the symptomatic cultural meaning of a picture, subsists in our historical method in the same fashion as the object of science (i.e., "reality"), namely, as a "never completed 'X'." Nonetheless the methodological correctives of *Kunstwissenschaft,* like the method of science, should progress toward the reality of culture—the identity of form and symbol or better, of apperception and discursivity described by Cassirer in his philosophy of symbolic forms, developed in the early 1920s in close interaction with Panofsky.[27] In the same years, and overlapping Cassirer's phenomenology of knowledge and Panofsky's history of culture, Rudolf Carnap tried to construct empirical world-knowledge as a series of steps leading from the "autopsychological" realm (the subjective world of sense data) through the "physical"

Kunst," *Sitzungsberichte der königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 31 (1912):572–578.

25. In philosophy, the thesis has been associated with the arguments of Marx Wartofsky: see his "Perception, Representation, and the Forms of Action: Towards a Historical Epistemology," in *Models: Representation and the Scientific Understanding* (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 188–210; "Sight, Symbol, and Society: Towards a History of Visual Perception," *Philosophical Exchange* 3 (1981):23–38; and "The Paradox of Painting: Pictorial Representationality and the Dimensionality of Visual Space," *Social Research* 51 (1984):863–884. For comments, see A. C. Danto, "Seeing and Showing," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59 (2001):1–9, and W. Davis, "When Pictures Are Present," *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 59 (2001):29–38.

26. Friedman (see note 22), p. 31. Friedman refers in particular to Cassirer's *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* of 1910 (see note 22). For background, see K. C. Köhnke, *The Rise of Neo-Kantianism: German Academic Philosophy Between Idealism and Positivism,* trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

27. Cassirer's involvement with the Warburg Library and with Panofsky's project was taken at the time to have created a new center of art-historical and art-theoretical research in Hamburg, where Cassirer had been appointed the first professor of philosophy at the new university: see E. Utitz, "Ästhetik und Philosophie der Kunst," *Jahrbücher der Philosophie* 3 (1927):306–332. In another essay, Utitz marked his critical understanding of the aims of this Hamburg School when he complained that nothing can be gained by combining the problems of form with the problem of the symbol; see "Über Grundbegriffen der Kunstwissenschaft," *Kant-Studien* 34 (1929):6–69.

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realm (the public world of external objects) to the "heteropsychological" realm (a transpersonal cultural world).[28] To be sure, Carnap's logical positivism—it should be distinguished from the cognitive idealism of Cassirer and Panofsky—treated each of the steps of world-construction (*die Aufbau der Welt*) not as phenomenal experiences, as Cassirer and Panofsky supposed, but as logical types, derivative or dependent classes of and relations between objects derived from the objects constructed at the preceding level. For this reason, as Carnap tried to show, the "never completed 'X'" of a real object nonetheless can be effectively attained by the subject "in finitely many determinations . . . [which provide] its univocal description among the objects in general."[29] In other words, the putative noncompletion of "X" is metaphysical; human beings effectively know *this* from *that* precisely because they have constructed both of them. This brilliant insight spelled the end of Cassirer's and Panofsky's brand of idealism; if for them the Idea had been hunted back to a "never completed X," for Carnap it had reappeared as a perfectly definite and discriminable logical construct. Regardless, for Carnap, as for Cassirer and Panofsky, the catch was not so much the *incompleteability* of the progress of knowledge as its seeming *tautology*. The world-reports of other people become available to a percipient only at an advanced stage in the construction of its world. Nonetheless they would seem also to constitute a basis, if not the only basis, for that very construction. Somehow this substantive circularity—the tautology of history itself, and certainly of anything that could be called "social" or "cultural" history—must be grasped in the methodological tautology of its analysis.[30]

In this regard Panofsky explicitly conceived his method of art-historical recognition-correction as a *circulus methodicus*, a methodological circle. In formulating it, he relied on the work of his friend Edgar Wind, Cassirer's first doctoral student in Hamburg; though fully acquainted with neo-Kantianism and its discontents, Panofsky cited only Wind (*PB*, 93; *I & I*, 11). Wind attempted to compare—even to identify—the methods of natural science and cultural history. But he did not urge a scientization of cultural history. Instead he argued that in science and history alike "the investigator intrudes into the process he is investigating" and "every [scientific] instrument and every [historical] document participates in the structure which it is meant to reveal."[31] Specifically, we must "preconceive the universal, physical, or historical constellation" of which the instruments and documents form a part and then correct our assumptions about it through experiment. For Wind, then, "what first appeared as a logical circle, and, therefore, as self-contradictory, thus turns out to be a methodical cycle, and, therefore, self-regulating."[32] Panofsky repeated this point for his own purposes in relation to the correction secured through *Gestaltungsgeschichte:* "to control the interpretation of an individual work of art by a 'history of style' which in turn can only be built up by interpreting individual works may look like a vicious circle. It is, indeed, a

28. R. Carnap, *Die logische Aufbau der Welt: Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie* [1929], 2nd ed. (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1961) = *The Logical Structure of the World* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967).

29. Carnap (see note 28), §179. Carnap goes on, "Once such a description is set up the object is no longer an X, but rather something univocally determined—whose complete description then certainly still remains an incompleteable task."

30. In describing the heteropsychological level of world-construction, Carnap acknowledged a further problem obscured in Cassirer's and Panofsky's culturalist cognitive idealism (and in its attendant theory of visuality): although we can build an individual subject's world-knowledge from his or her elementary visual experiences, in order to construct an *intersubjective* world we must seemingly effect an "abstraction (via an equivalence relation) from the resulting diversity in 'points of view'" (Friedman [see note 22], pp. 84–85)—a point fully appreciated at this time, I believe, by Ludwig Wittgenstein. To be sure, Panofsky's work on the history of perspective prepared him to grasp the logical necessity and perhaps even the cultural-symbolic mechanism of this "abstraction" as it might function in the visual field (E. Panofsky, "Die perspektive als 'symbolische Form'," *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg* 1924–1925 [Leipzig and Berlin: B. G. Teubner, 1927], pp. 258–330 = *Aufsätze* [see note 6], pp. 99–167 = *Perspective as Symbolic Form,* trans. C. S. Wood [New York: Zone Books, 1997]). But in his theoretical work he simply assumed—rather than explicated—the necessary convergence of "viewpoints" which must constitute transpersonal meaning in or as human culture. In the early 1930s, Jacques Lacan's theories about the "mirror stage" of human subjectivity—they built on work conducted in the 1920s by Paul Schilder and others—conceived the convergence in terms of perspective optics; Lacan's "schema of the subject" places "I" and "Other" on a line of coincidence connecting two perfectly opposed optical pyramids—constituting the "equivalence relation" of intersubjectivity by optical-geometric fiat. On these and related problems, see H. Damisch, *The Origin of Perspective* [1987], trans. J. Goodman (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1994), and W. Davis, "Virtually Straight," *Art History* 19 (1996):434–444.

31. E. Wind, "Some Points of Contact Between History and Natural Science," in *Philosophy and History,* eds. R. Klibansky and H. J. Paton (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), pp. 255–264 (quotations from pp. 257–258).

32. E. Wind, "Experiment and Metaphysics," *Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, Harvard University, September 1926* [1927], ed. E. S. Brightman (Liechtenstein: Klaus Reprint, 1968), pp. 217–224 (quotations from p. 222).

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circle, though not a vicious, but a methodical one" (*I & I,* 11).[33]

Panofsky hoped that the *circulus methodicus* of iconology can be distinguished from its analytic *Doppelgänger,* the vicious circle, because—and only insofar as—the expressive forms identified in our ultimate anthropology of visuality are not the same as the expressive forms recognized in our initial hermeneutic of vision *even though they might look identical at the level of form.* In the initial moment of the loop, expressive form must be located in the picture recognized in our spatio-temporal and causal world-order (*I & I,* 16). In the ultimate moment of the loop, however, expressive form must be located in the picture understood to derive from a *historical* spatio-temporal and causal world-order. Nonetheless, as I have already noted, the methods of Panofskyan *Kunstwissenschaft* can never actually reach this visual-cultural reality—the "never completed 'X'" of a historical visuality—in the sense that the art historian can never actually come to see the world through the same eyes as the "viewers" of the past.[34] We can correct our world-seeing as we apply it to historical pictures. But this only gives us the ability to enter the great loop of visuality at the opposite end from historical viewers. At best we can "think" the picture "seen" by them. This "thinking"—the project of *Kunstwissenschaft*—claims to identify the syntheses effected by the human visual imagination in a concrete depictive practice historically removed from us. To put the matter another way, the primordial analytic difficulty of iconology lies in the fact that our *method* must assume a passage—a conversion between our world of seeing and a historical world—precisely where our *theory* must assert an essential nonidentity, a historical difference. We must preserve the difference between seeing the world and seeing pictures; it enables us to pass from apperceptive recognitions to symbolic and symptomatic interpretations. But in the historical context, this difference had been entirely sublated; in any historical visual culture, apperception *is* interpretation, and both functions would be wholly disabled by their distinction. In this sense our analytic method shelters an essential cleavage of form and content—their lack of unity—which in theory could never be discovered in the original historical situation of "viewing."

This doesn't mean that nothing at all can be said about partly unintelligible pictorial objects in our vision. It means that our analysis consists in observing the irreducible *tension* between a formal expressivity, which might be open to us, and depictive significances "whose secret remains impenetrable to the mind." Although visuality is historically relative, it remains historical relative *to us.* If it were historically "other" in a more radical sense—the sense Wölfflin had indicated in pointing to the "impenetrable secret" of Dürer's engraving—the iconological program of visual-culture studies could not identify it.

From *Sein und Zeit* to "Zeit und Ort"

Here at last we reach the deepest dispute between iconology and its opposite or negation—namely, the existential ontology of radical alterity in, or the "otherness" of, historically located formal expression. In the German publication of his iconological method in 1932, Panofsky said that the art historian approaches the intrinsic cultural meaning of a picture (the so-called *Dokumentsinn*) at the level of (his or her) visual apperception of (its) formal expressivity—an expressive significance apprehended in what Panofsky called our *vitale Daseinserfahrung,* our "living experience of existence," or Dasein (*PB,* 95). In part Panofsky's terminology in this essay implicitly invoked the philological and documentary procedures of pre-

33. Unlike Panofsky, Wind urged his readers to jettison the neo-Kantian grounding of the *circulus methodicus.* In particular, Wind wished to avoid the Kantian antinomies by deploying what he called "the method of 'implicit determination' which defines the relation of 'part' to 'whole' in such a way that any proposition concerning the structure of the 'whole' can be tested in terms of the behaviour of the 'parts' " ("Can the Antinomies Be Restated?," *Psyche* 14 [1934]:177–178 [quotation from p. 177]; see *Das Experiment und die Metaphysik; Zur Auflösung der kosmologischen Antinomien,* Beiträge zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte 3 [Tübingen: J. C. Mohr, 1934] = *Experiment and Metaphysics: Towards a Resolution of the Cosmological Antinomies,* trans. C. Edwards, introd. by M. Rampley [Oxford: European Humanities Research Center, 2001]). This method enables the work of experimental hypothesis to proceed because we do need not to address the *entire* constellation—in which our instrumentation and our documentation are embedded—in order to investigate the conditions of its coherence. Wind associated his proposals with the pragmatism of Charles Sanders Peirce, citing such essays as "What Pragmatism Is" (*The Monist* 15, no. 2 [April, 1905]:161–181). In turn these were cited by Panofsky in *PB* (p. 94) and again in "The History of Art as a Humanistic Discipline" (*Meaning in the Visual Arts: Papers In and On Art History* [New York: Anchor Books, 1955], p. 14). But Panofskyan iconology cannot be regarded as pragmatist.

34. Panofsky did write in 1940 that when an art historian has made the objective corrections of the history of style, types, and cultural meanings, "his aesthetic perception as such will change accordingly, and will more and more adapt itself to the original 'intention' of the works" (ibid., p. 17). But this statement does not go all the way; it does not state that the "adaptation" of our perception is the assumption of another's perception.

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Wölfflinian German art historians, such as Herman Grimm, who had been eclipsed by the rise of formalism. Still, the "documentary" meanings pursued by these positivist philologists and the "intrinsic" meanings pursued by neo-Kantian critics in the Hamburg School were antithetical: the positivists' specification of the historical meanings of pictorial motifs typically had not shown them to be *visualities* intrinsic to—and constitutive of—primary formal expression. Moreover, and as Panofsky's terminology suggests, in deriving the *Dokumentsinn* of the picture from our *Daseinserfahrung* iconology has not only been a dispute between Wölfflin and Panofsky or between "form" on the one hand and "content" on the other hand. It has also—and more profoundly—been a confrontation between the documents of *Idee* and the identifications of Dasein in enabling us to reconstruct and to experience the primordial historicity and expressivity of human artistic culture. This was a confrontation between Cassirer and Panofsky on the one hand and Martin Heidegger on the other hand.

Heidegger was well aware of the art- and culture-historical research which had framed Cassirer's emerging philosophy of symbolic forms. In 1923, he lectured on "Aufgaben und Wege der phänomenologischen Forschung" at Hamburg. On this occasion, as he later wrote, he came to "an agreement [with Cassirer] as to the necessity of an existential analytic which was sketched out in the lecture."[35] Later he reviewed the second (1925) volume of Cassirer's *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen,* which treated "mythical thought"; for his part, in the third (1929) volume Cassirer included several brief responses to Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* of 1928.[36] At Davos in 1929, Cassirer and Heidegger publicly discussed—and disputed—the grounds, aims, and results of the Kantian critical system.[37] For my purposes here, Cassirer and Panofsky wished to uphold (or in light of Heidegger's challenges to restore) the sense in which representations of the world—even those images achieved in a nontheoretical symbolism—could construct and relay transpersonal cultural meaning.

In *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (*KPM*), published in 1929, Heidegger asked whether Kant's conclusions in the *Critique of Pure Reason* imply that things-in-themselves "dissolve in a playing of representings."[38] Kant believed (Heidegger contended) that "being occurs for a finite creature in a representing whose pure representations of objectivity as such have played up to one another"—a Heideggerean phrasing for Kant's "play of representations." And the play of representations—their "playing up to one another"—occurs, Heidegger continued, in a *Spiel-Raum* formed through pure determinations of the inner sense. Phenomenological analysis of our play-space of representings—it is both Heidegger's starting point and his object—discovers it to be "pure self-affection, i.e., original time" (*KPM,* 138–139). The play of our representations transpires in the play-space of our temporalized finitude. Thus Heidegger took the pure Kantian schemata, the transcendental determinations of time, to be identical with the temporalities of Dasein or the concrete being-in-the-world of the human individual. In this way, Heidegger thought, Kant's system supposedly presaged his own existential ontology in *Sein und Zeit,* published in 1928; Heidegger took himself to enunciate what Kant really meant to say.

35. *Sein und Zeit,* 51, n. 1 = *Being and Time,* trans. Stambaugh (see note 2), p. 401, n. 11.

36. For Heidegger's review of Cassirer, see *Deutsche Literaturzeitung* 21 (1928):1000–1012 = M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe,* Abt. I, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1991), pp. 255-270 = "Review of Ernst Cassirer's *Mythical Thought,*" in *The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger,* trans. with notes and commentary by J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp. 32–45. Indirectly Heidegger also addressed Cassirer's influential article, a virtual *summa* of Hamburg School *Kunstwissenschaft,* on cultural symbolism: E. Cassirer, "Das Symbolproblem und seine Stellung im System der Philosophie," *Zeitschrift für Ästhetik und allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft* 21 (1927):191–208 = "The Problem of the Symbol and Its Place in the System of Philosophy," trans. J. M. Krois, *Man and World* 11 (1978):411–422.

37. "Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger," in M. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,* 4th ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1973), pp. 246–268 = *Gesamtausgabe* (see note 36), Abt. I, vol. 3, pp. 274–296 = *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* 5th ed., trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), Appendix IV, pp. 193–207. I will not rehearse the substance of all these exchanges here. For commentaries, see *Heidegger, German Idealism, and Neo-Kantianism,* ed. T. Rockmore (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 2000); *Cassirer—Heidegger: 70 Jahre Davoser Disputation,* eds. D. Kaegi and E. Rudolph, Cassirer-Forschungen 9 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2002); and especially Friedman (see note 22).

38. Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,* 1st ed. (Bonn: F. Cohen, 1929); this edition will be cited in the main body of the text as *KPM* (quotation from p. 138). The text was written a few weeks after the famous "disputation" at Davos. Cassirer's hard-hitting review of Heidegger's book—one of the older philosopher's most powerful summations—was published in 1931: "Kant und die Problem der Metaphysik: Bemerkungen zu Martin Heideggers Kantinterpretation," *Kant-Studien* 36 (1931):1–26 = "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics: Remarks on Martin Heidegger's Interpretation of Kant," trans. M. S. Gram, in *Kant: Disputed Questions,* ed. M. S. Gram (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), pp. 131–157.

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Contemporary neo-Kantians like Cassirer and Panofsky regarded Heidegger's assertion as thoroughly tendentious. Kant had asserted, for example, "the transcendental function of *space*"—that "space *also* enters into the pure schematism" (*KPM,* 139; my emphases). World-recognition must devolve in part from our original spatialization of the world as much as our temporalization in it. "That Kant himself has hereby opened up a new insight is unmistakable," Heidegger allowed. Nonetheless, to save his own analysis of Being and Time, Heidegger deflected any suggestion that "time alone is not what originally forms transcendence" (*KPM,* 139). For our purposes, the equal status of space and time in the schematism suggests that the deduction of "pure space" must be rooted in an original space in just the same way that the deduction of "pure time" must be rooted in an original time. If so, Heidegger's existential ontology of a primordial temporalizing finitude of Dasein would turn out to be partial. It might, for instance, overlook the possibility of the transcendental deduction of world-objectivity from the finitude of spatiality. The direction of this deduction, I admit, remains to be fully specified, an outstanding task of the anthropology of visual culture. But we might recall that objects are not only "here" with us (Heidegger's *zuhanden* or ready-to-hand) but also "there" at a *distance* and at a particular horizon of their (dis)appearance. A spatializing or world-distancing "then" and "there," we might say, shows that the "then and there" of Dasein's coming-to-an-end *in* the world cannot be the same as the coming-to-the-end *of* the world. Partly in space or as spatializing creatures, we discover that we will never experience all the world which we can see to be beyond us. In this original spatiality and its finitude, we discover that we are in or that we have a time. In this sense, my temporalized finitude can be said to be my awareness of my nonpersistence in what I know remains pervasive—the world at its distance or in its beyondness.

In 1930, Cassirer published a critique of Heidegger in considerations on "mythic, aesthetic, and theoretical space."[39] With Kant, he urged that space and time together provide the "two basic pillars" of human knowledge (*MATS,* 3). Thus we have every need for an account of "original space" which would complement Heidegger's "original time" in a phenomenology of knowledge; it would explore ways in which our spatiality can reveal "the horizon of objectivity." From this vantage point, space, beginning as schematism, issues in symbolic form: it can represent the "distance" between determinate beings in the manifold or, equally important, between beings and our standpoints in apprehending them. Panofsky's essay "Perspective as Symbolic Form," published in 1925, provided a powerful historical demonstration, and probably a provocation, for Cassirer's statements. These could summarize Panofsky's history of perspective too: in the symbolic form relayed in perspectival depiction, to quote Cassirer, "the object shifts to a new distance, to a remoteness from the 'I'; only in this does it gain its own independent existence and create a new form of objectivity" (*MATS,* 13).[40] In sum, if Heidegger's existential ontology addressed a temporalized being-*in*-the world, Panofsky's phenomenology of knowledge addressed a spatialized being-*of*-the-world. Imagining the world-space constructs the world's objectivity for us as "perspective."

Cassirer respected Heidegger's "perceptive and profound" inquiry into the historicality—the essential or original temporality—of Dasein.[41] He insisted, however, that if we wish to understand the full historicity of human thought we must effect a "change in [the] subject of temporality" from Dasein to human culture as such (*HPD,* 205, see note 41): culture possesses a primordial temporality, a transpersonal and intersubjective history made possible by the symbolic function itself. For Cassirer, "not only Dasein but also meaning—the idea—is primordially historical" (*HPD,* 204). From the futural-finitude of Dasein given by the prospect of its death, Heidegger derives the world-orientation of Dasein as care (*die Sorge*)—i.e., the thrownness of its being-in-the-world as a field of anxiety

39. "Mythischer, ästhetischer und theoretischer Raum," *Vierter Congress für Ästhetik und Kunstwissenschaft,* Hamburg, 1930, ed. H. Noack (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1931), pp. 21–36 = E. Cassirer, *Symbol, Technik, Sprache: Aufsätze aus den Jahren 1927–1933,* eds. E. W. Orth and J. M. Krois, Philosophische Bibliothek 372 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985), pp. 93–117. Cassirer's essay has been translated as "Mythic, Aesthetic and Theoretical Space," trans. D. P. Verene and L. H. Foster, *Man and World* 2, no. 1 (1969):3–17 (this essay will be cited in the main body of the text as *MATS*); regrettably, the translation does not include the commentaries, including Panofsky's.

40. On this problem, see further Damisch (see note 30) and Davis (see note 30).

41. "Symbolic Forms: For Volume Four" [MS. ca. 1928], sect. II, "'Geist' and 'Life'," no. 1, "'Geist' and 'Life' in Heidegger," no. 2, "Heidegger and the Problem of Death," and no. 3, "Time in Bergson and Heidegger," in E. Cassirer, *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms,* vol. 4, *The Metaphysics of Symbolic Forms,* eds. J. M. Krois and D. P. Verene (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); this posthumously published manuscript will be cited in the main body of the text as *HPD* (quotation from p. 209). Apparently the text was drafted in 1928 before the disputation at Davos in 1929.

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(*die Angst*). And he derives the meaninglessness of transpersonal truths: as Cassirer puts it, "for an entity that is in time and which passes away in time, there can be no eternal truths; the stigma of death is impressed upon everything human" (*HPD,* 206). By contrast, Cassirer would uphold "the broader, more universal, idealistic meaning of religion" not limited to the strand of dolefulness in Reformation Protestantism. In history—in culture and even in its representations of death—we "behold liberation and deliverance from the 'anxiety' which is the signature, the basic 'state-of-mind,' of finite Dasein" according to Heidegger (*HPD,* 203). From this perspective, the possibility of *logos*—transpersonal meaning and even eternal truth—might be said to be a project of "learning how to die." A Stoic outlook and a Spinozist ethics should be able to confront and to refute Heidegger's existential anxiety point for point and at every turn: "whoever has learned to see things *sub specie aeterni* is elevated above the fear of death."[42] In particular, every human being "develops a concept of nature and of thinking of natural necessity and within this he gives the phenomenon of death its place" (*HPD,* 208).

All this is well and good; it's as if Panofsky and his school of neo-Kantian philosophy, led by Cassirer, had refuted Heidegger's *Sein und Zeit* before its publication. But Heidegger's existential ontology generated an overwhelming problem specifically in the case of artistic representations of space—Panofsky's pictorial evidence for that visuality within which perspective constitutes world-knowledge. Modern science might well constitute a "theoretical space" in the medium of "pure thought." But artistic representation—such as the paintings in perspective considered by Panofsky—must constitute space in imaging and in the "medium of pure form" (*MATS,* 7). Any putatively objective knowledge secured in the imaging habit of consciousness and the medium of pure form must remain tethered to the temporal finiteness of human consciousness *whenever and wherever it has not been mediated by pure thought.* For this reason, artistic representations would seem peculiarly, perhaps even uniquely, to require a Heideggerean existential-ontological analysis even if our world-representations mediated in other ways might partly or wholly escape absolute reduction to the temporality of Dasein.[43]

Naturally this uncomfortable consideration did not attract direct comment from Cassirer or Panofsky. As we have seen, Panofsky insisted that artistic representation

42. Benedictus de Spinoza, *Ethics,* ed. and trans. G. H. R. Parkinson, Oxford Philosophical Texts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Pt. 5, prop. 30 (pp. 306–307).

43. Although it cannot be my topic here, the directions of this analysis were indicated by Heidegger's comment in his lectures at Freiburg in 1935 on the "rough peasant shoes" supposedly depicted in a painting by Vincent Van Gogh (one of his *Shoes,* painted in the late 1880s): "But as to what *is* in that picture, you are immediately alone with it as though you yourself were making your way wearily homeward with your hoe on an evening in late fall after the last potato fires have died down" (*Einführung in die Metaphysik* [Tübingen: Max Niemeyer, 1953] = *Gesamtausgabe,* Abt. II, vol. 40 [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1983], p. 38 = *An Introduction to Metaphysics,* trans. Ralph Manheim [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959], p. 35). Here we should remark the observer's *own* identification with the painted shoes and the historical existence(s) they seem to disclose—namely, one's own existence "as though you yourself . . ." were there, then (as well as here, now). For Heidegger, there can be no meaningful question of the "visuality" of the painting, the sense in which it derives from and gives onto another—or another's—world: as he claims, "Actually the painting represents nothing. . . . What *is* here? The canvas? The brushstrokes? The spots of color?" The "distance" of another world—of an other's world—from which Cassirer and Panofsky would begin has here been categorically foreclosed; we begin—and remain in—the original and the absolute time of our existential identifications. In more developed comments on the same painting in "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes"—they also originated in Freiburg lectures at this time—Heidegger transferred the identification to a "peasant woman"; supposedly it is *she* who is alone with and owns the shoes (*Holzwege* [Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1950], pp. 7–68). This interpretation has attracted considerable attention, including Meyer Schapiro's claim (based on his painstaking iconology) that we should instead regard the painting as relaying *the artist's* identification with *his own* shoes—shoes which have little to do with a peasant Dasein ("The Still Life as a Personal Object—A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh" [1968] and "Further Notes on Heidegger and van Gogh" [1994], in *Theory and Philosophy of Art: Style, Artist, and Society* [New York: George Braziller, 1994], pp. 135–152). In a footnote, Schapiro (ibid., p. 142, n. 2) did quote Heidegger's shorter—and original?—remark without comment. To my knowledge, however, Heidegger's shorter comment—it states that the pictorial representation becomes meaningful as a projection of *our* Dasein—has been overlooked in the debate about the degree to which the Dasein of a person (or class of persons) imagined *in* a depicted world or the Dasein of the maker *of* the depicted world can be (re)constructed from the picture. To be sure, Schapiro showed effectively (though not definitively) that the "peasant woman" was Heidegger's pure projection, as Heidegger intended and fully acknowledged. For a trenchant commentary on Schapiro's dispute with Heidegger, see Michael Kelly, *Iconoclasm in Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 20–54; Kelly considers Heidegger's claims to manifest his philosophic "disinterest" in van Gogh's painting(s) or at least in their historicity in van Gogh's context—in van Gogh's painterly culture and social consciousness. According to Jacques Derrida, another participant in the controversy about van Gogh's *Shoes,* the deepest difficulty of Heidegger's "epochal thinking" is the way in which it "locks up, neutralizes, and finally cancels historicity" (J. Derrida, *Specters of Marx: the State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International,* trans. P. Kamuf [London and New York: Routledge, 1984), p. 74 (quoted and discussed by Kelly, *Iconoclasm in Aesthetics,* p. 41).

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emerges in the determinations exerted by a culturally specific world-picture—a visuality—upon formal expression and upon imaging or visualizing itself. For Panofsky, in fact, there is essentially no such thing as the "medium of pure form." Form must be a wholly determined—not an originary or primordial—moment in the imagistic mediation of pure thought. As Cassirer put it, "by virtue of the basic content of artistic representation [*Darstellung*] the true content [*Vorstellung*] of the imagination is realized" (*MATS*, 13). At the same time, as we have seen, according to Cassirer and Panofsky the true content of the imagination must constitute the basic content of artistic representation—the "form of its spatial and temporal perception" (*MATS*, 16). To revert to my organizing terms, while pictoriality constitutes visuality, visuality at the same time constitutes pictoriality—but (we can now say) only if pure form never emerges as the true or the basic content along the way. As I have urged, this wished-for wholesale self-transcending of pictoriality is impossible. Our basic tautology recurs: an objective recognition of *the pure form of depiction*—a recognition of Being *being-depicted*—always enters artistic space-representation even if imagistic space-presentation must be subjectively experienced as the true and the basic content of experience, of Being *being-seen*.

In responding to Cassirer's essay, Panofsky noted that art historians must begin with their assumptions about the "aesthetic space" (*Vorstellung*) within which a style was generated in order to effect a formal description of pictures produced in that style (*Darstellung*).[44] In other words, he acknowledged the iconological cycle—the mutual determination of pictorial expression and cultural imagination. He pursued the methodological implications in a lecture presented to the Kiel section of the Kant Society, the initial statement of the ideas (i.e., *PB*) which became "Iconography and Iconology" in 1939 and "Meaning in the Visual Arts" in 1951. According to Panofsky, the "seemingly unproblematic exhibition of a mere phenomenal meaning"—the primary formal and expressive meaning that he placed at the beginning of his method—will be grounded in an "unsaid [set out] before the eyes" (*Ungesagtes vor Augen*), here quoting Heidegger's description of Kant's supposedly unspoken but implicit recognition of original time. But, Panofsky asked, and mindful that Heidegger would reduce spatialized world-objectivity to temporalized Dasein, *wer oder was setz dieser Gewalt eine Grenze* (*PB*, 92)—"who or what sets a limit on this violence"—which our interpretations seem constrained to inflict on historical pictures, and which Heidegger had explicitly acknowledged and justified in his own reading of Kant?

In interpreting a picture, the art historian applies his or her "living experience of existence." As we have seen, Panofsky would apply a series of correctives to this *Daseinserfahrung*. In general, the history of cultural tradition should limit our subjective arbitrariness. As Panofsky put it, from within the finitude of our own *vitale Daseinserfahrung* we sometimes cannot say what things in a picture might be. But the history of cultural tradition reveals their "time and place" to us—their *Zeit und Ort*. In other words, the "original time" or the *Sein und Zeit* of Heidegger's Dasein—it must enter into the *Daseinserfahrung* with which we begin looking at pictures—can be converted into the *Zeit und Ort* of objective historical context. Panofsky shifted Heidegger's emphasis on a uniquely determining original time, essentially subjective, to the determinations of a historical temporal-spatial locatedness which is at least provisionally objective. The conversion devolves from putting the object not simply in its past *time* but in particular from putting in its *place* objectively over and against us or, as we say in the metaphor of history, "distant" from us. If and when the loop closes, to have this visuality as my own ordinary *Daseinserfahrung*—my own being-in-the-world—must be to move Dasein from its inaugural relation to its own original time toward the cultural-symbolic form of *another's* spatialized world-perspective, a "view." In promoting the self-distancing of Dasein, then, Panofskyan iconology or the anthropology of visuality in the end constitutes a recognition of the Other as essentially like oneself (if contextually or contingently different and distant) and thus a recognition of transpersonal meaning—a cultural history meant to expand our objective horizons and to reduce our subjective involvements.

Maybe the project is laudable; as in the 1920s and 1930s, today it serves a fitfully progressive humanistic antiauthoritarian liberalism. Its problem is not that our historical interpretation of images must be secured in an analytic circle, bootstrapping out and away from original temporal self-involutions of Dasein. That is basic hermeneutics. Rather, the disjunction of recognitions—and the resistance of the picture—means that the existential time of the picture as a world-object (what I have called pictoriality) remains essentially divided from

44. E. Panofsky, "Aussprach," *Vierter Kongress für Ästhetik und Kunstwissenschaft*, ed. H. Noack (Stuttgart: F. Enke, 1931), pp. 53–54 = E. Cassirer, *Symbol, Technik, und Sprache* (see note 39), pp. 115–117.

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the significant spatiality of its object-world (or visuality). Panofsky hoped that their passage occurs immediately and imperceptibly—the merging and binding I have considered in the paradigmatic case of Dürer's engraving of 1513. But he had to invent the binding and merging of what he called Dürer's "visual" and "mental" images: Dürer's supposed Erasmian visual culture appeared out of nowhere in Panofsky's method. In itself, of course, this does not mean that there is no determinate relation between pictoriality and visuality. I have suggested that we must critically investigate the mutual resistance of pictoriality and visuality rather than their mythic synthesis and identity—and I want to pursue that thought further in the case of our paradigmatic example. It is not obvious what a "visual culture" could be if it is the material cohabitation—and the potential mutual negation—of disjunct recognitions rather than their mythic synthesis.

Dürer's correction

We can guess Panofsky's motivation for supposing that his iconology could think—if it could not see—the Erasmian culture of Dürer's visuality. Scholars before Wölfflin and Panofsky had often identified the Knight as a protagonist of a Northern or specifically German *Rittertum.* He could be a legendary hero of Teutonic saga or he could be a late-medieval warrior; he could be strong and pure ("spiritual" or *geistlich*) or he could be evil and doomed, a horror (equally *geistlich*), a phantom like his companions—"a German, national hero incorporating all the conflicts, desires, tragedies, and *malaises* of the German soul."[45] By far the most influential version of this construction of the print was propagated by Friedrich Nietzsche and his followers, especially Ernst Bertram, whose immensely popular 1918 book on Nietzsche contained a chapter on the print. In the 1870s Nietzsche took the Knight to be an emblem of Schopenhauerian pessimism—a man "isolated and totally without hope who goes on his dread journey in a longing for truth."[46] Writing during the Great War, Bertram connected the Knight's Nietzschean "will-to-pessimism" with a "fateful 'protestant' isolation of the individual," especially solitude in the face of Death.[47] (As already noted, Cassirer identified the same attitude in Heidegger's philosophy.) Thus Bertram provided the Lutheran symbol with a Nietzschean gloss. Panofsky, however, made no mention of this general interpretive possibility, if only to refute it. In his doctoral thesis on Dürer's art theory, he went only so far as to remark on the German Late Gothic aspect of the engraving. By this he chiefly meant its naturalism, "stylized in accordance with a 'classic' canon of pose and proportions" (*LAAD,* 152). Dürer's relation to Italy and the Antique occupied studies of the artist that Panofsky published in the 1920s and 1930s. But in 1943, when he dealt with the engraving in his artistic biography of Dürer, the Northern *Rittertum* proposed as a tradition for the print had been reconstituted in terms of the mystic German nationalism of the 1930s; an emblem deployed in National Socialist propaganda, Dürer's Knight had become a "forefather of the Prussian officer."[48] Ignoring Panofsky's subtle researches on Dürer's Italian affiliations, several German writers in the 1930s reduced all aspects of Dürer's pictorial investigations to "German Form," as Theodor Hertze put it in *Die Rasse,* the new periodical of racial anthropology.[49] Against this portrayal of the artist, in the early 1940s Panofsky, at this point a refugee, tried to construct Dürer in the "universal image of a cosmopolitan humanist."[50] If the Knight was not to be an *Ur*-Nazi, he almost *had* to be an Erasmian Christian.

Panofsky's and Cassirer's earlier tangle with Heidegger blended with this ideology: Panofsky wanted Dürer's print to be a transpersonal symbol—it had to lead into the universal *Ideenwelt.* For a Heideggerean phenomenology, Dürer's *Reuter* would be constituted in Being partly unintelligible to the art historian even though its "secret," to use Wölfflin's word, seems to be visible to us in the medium of pure form in Dürer's

45. Bialostocki (see note 9), p. 217. The medievalist scholarship supporting this interpretation was summarized in Weber (see note 18), pp. 18–36—the principal documentary source for Wölfflin and Panofsky if Panofsky, in particular, followed it selectively.

46. Nietzsche, *Die Geburt der Tragödie, oder: Griechentum und Pessimismus* [1870–1871], in *Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe,* eds. G. Colli and M. Montinari, vol. 3, pt. 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1972), §20, p. 127.

47. Bertram, *Nietzsche: Versuch einer Mythologie* (Berlin: G. Bondi, 1919), p. 69. For Bertram, see Schwerte (see note 9), pp. 269–271, and for parallel reflections in early writings by Thomas Mann, see Bialostocki (see note 9), pp. 236–239.

48. Wilhelm Waetzoldt, *Dürer und seine Zeit* (Vienna: Phaidon, 1935), pp. 232–233, and see his *Dürers Ritter, Tod und Teufel,* Schriftenreihe der Preussischen Jahrbücher 33 (Berlin: Georg Stilke, 1936), where he reminded readers (pp. 22–23) that Adolf Hitler loved the print as Nietzsche did. The principal portrait of Hitler at the Nazi art exhibition at Munich in 1938, Hubert Lanzinger's *Bannerträger,* depicted Hitler carrying the Nazi flag and posed and equipped like the Knight.

49. "Dürers deutsche Form," *Die Rasse* 2 (1934):134–138; see further Bialostocki (see note 9), pp. 313–314, cf. pp. 353–344.

50. Bialostocki (see note 9), p. 378.

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picturing of the mysterious horseman—the image singled out in Wölfflin's illustration. If we follow Panofsky, in apprehending this form the art historian enters the visual world of Dürer's engraving by recognizing the *binding* of the formal expressivity and the symbolic content to be *both* the existential *and* the cultural meaning—history of the engraving itself—the merging of the form of the original persisting image with the traditional allegory. As we have seen, however, these representations must be recognized in diverging registers of their supposed interabsorption. In turn, then, somehow the print must leap through its disjunction. In the end, the image subsists not so much in the formal and symbolic recognitions—for they are always disjunct—as in their *mutual correction.* For Wölfflin, Dürer worked *within* the disjunction: he could not overcome it. But for Panofsky, Dürer proceeded *through* the disjunction: *he corrected it.* If you like, for Panofsky the print negates and transcends the disjunction of pictoriality and visuality; it is itself essentially the objective correction of subjective existential-temporal meaning-involution.

Oddly enough, Wölfflin nowhere mentioned that in making his engraving Dürer corrected the hind off leg of the Knight's horse—lifting it further from the ground and bending it more acutely. The change remains clearly visible in the print even though Dürer did his best to disguise it as a tuft of grass crushed below the horse's hoof. For Panofsky, this "last minute" correction intensified the movement of the horse (*LAAD,* 253).[51] Perhaps this befits Dürer's supposed narrative of the Knight's progress on his Path—that is, Panofsky's reconstruction of the symbol. But the correction would seem equally to encourage Wölfflin's emphasis on the image of horse and rider. Indeed, in his dissertation Panofsky himself had shown that the right hind foot of the horse (as corrected) helped to render the animal visible according to an overall proportional canon worked out in theoretical studies (fig. 8).[52] Specifically, when Dürer raised the hoof on the horse's right hind foot he ensured that it touched a crucial construction line of this canon—a line, labeled E in Panofsky's diagram, drawn through the upper limit of the hooves on the right forefoot and the left hind foot of the horse. The *lower* limit of the hoof on the left hind foot rests on the so-called standline itself (Panofsky's line F), which is almost identical with the bottom edge of the print. The vertical distance EF, then, is the *height* of the horse's hoof; it is also precisely one-quarter the height and width of the basic constructional quadrant used *throughout* the canon. Indeed, one wonders if it was the actual module of the canon. (So far as I can see Panofsky did not recognize this, probably because he did not explore the pictoriality of the correction.) That possibility aside, Dürer's correction clearly helped the proportional construction of the entire image to be made visible as its "true content," confirming his persistent and pervasive interest in this aspect of his image throughout its construction in the engraving, just as Wölfflin had suggested.[53] If we permit ourselves

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51. The correction in the engraving should be compared to the "correction" or reworking visible in the right hind leg of the horse in the Ambrosiana drawing (recto), a study for the engraving (see above, note 11). According to Josef Kurthen ("Zum Problem der Dürerschen Pferdekonstruktion," *Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft* 44 [1929]:82–86), when the drawing was finished Dürer changed the right hind leg to create a sharper bend, as in the engraving. It is not clear, however, why he did not trace the entire revision onto the *verso* of the sheet, although he did trace a few lines of the correction—proving that he had already made it on the recto, that is, at the very beginning of the construction of the figure. Alternatively, as Henry Rox suggests, on the recto Dürer initially planned the sharply bent leg and revised *it* in the drawing which was traced on the verso for the engraving ("On Dürer's *Knight, Death, and Devil,*" *The Art Bulletin* 30 [1948]:68). Although I have not been able to inspect the two-sided sheet, reproductions suggest that Kurthen's interpretation is more likely than Rox's: the sharply bent leg in the drawing on the recto is lightly sketched and seems to be laid over the straighter leg. Either way, when the artist came to make the engraving he began with the pose relayed in the *tracing* (verso)—with the right hind leg on or at least closer to the ground—and then "corrected" it on the plate itself, in a sense returning him to the alternate (untraced) pose in the drawing. This history did not affect Panofsky's observations (though it might imply that Dürer's investigations and changes were not really "last minute") and need not be pursued further here. But in principle an archaeology of depiction—distinguished from an anthropology of visuality—must attend closely to these stratigraphies; they attest to the noetic emergence of pictoriality in the visual image(s). For this approach, see further W. Davis, *Replications: Archaeology, Art History, Psychoanalysis* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996).

52. Panofsky, *Dürers Kunsttheorie* (see note 13), pp. 200–204 and figs. 21–22. Panofsky corrected an earlier reconstruction of the artist's proportional canon: H. David, "Zum Problem der Dürerschen Pferdekonstruktion," *Repertorium für Kunstwissenschaft* 33 (1910):310–317; and compare G. Pauli, "Dürers früheste Proportionstudie eines Pferdes," *Zeitschrift für bildenden Kunst* NF 25 (= 49) (1914):205–208.

53. In a beautiful pictorial demonstration, in the engraving Dürer showed that the *breadth* of the horse's hoof is equal to its height: in the lefthand lowermost quadrant of the implied proportional grid, the hoof of the raised left forefoot of the horse—it is placed at the upper terminus of a diagonal running from the left hind hoof on the ground through the right hind hoof raised from the ground (in the correction)—is equal to one-quarter the height/width of the quadrant itself (and specifically EF). (Of course, while the left hind hoof is

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

Figure 8. Erwin Panofsky, Proposed reconstruction of Dürer's canon of proportions for *Knight, Death, and the Devil, Dürers Kunsttheorie,* 203, pl. 22. (Georg Reimer Verlag, 1915).

Heidegger's terminology, the artist's anxiety to effect this demonstration drives the care that he expended on the correction of the horse's hoof—the very "secret" of the image in Wölfflin's terms. But whence, then, the crucial objectification of the artist's anxiety and care—the *Aufhebung* Cassirer demanded of a Heideggerean existentiality? Whence the Panofskyan *distancing* of Dasein from itself? For Panofsky, Dürer's correction could not serve exclusively to preserve the Wölfflinian image. It must also mediate the cultural-symbolic significance of the form. But how exactly?

For one thing, the *uncorrected* hoof cannot be included in Wölfflin's own illustration of the putatively original image. And for another thing, the visible *correction* of the horse's hind foot—an element of the

placed just outside its quadrant, the left fore hoof is placed just inside its quadrant.) In other words, as just suggested Dürer seems to be showing that the hoof in both its breadth and its height is the measure—the module—for the proportions of the whole figure of horse and rider. By contrast, in the proportional study for the horse in Nuremberg (fig. 3), the right hind hoof "cuts over" line E (Panofsky, *Dürers Kunsttheorie* [see note 13], p. 202, n. 2). I would suppose that in this version of the image Dürer was trying to discover whether the hoof should touch against line J (in Panofsky's reconstruction)—an attempt the artist abandoned in both the uncorrected and the corrected hooves in the engraving.

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putatively original image of perfect horse and rider—partly belongs to the supposedly secondary background: it has become the crushed grass beneath the horse's hoof. As a pure form of depiction, then, the correction subsists *between* the Wölfflinian form relaying Dürer's artistic Dasein and the Panofskyan background constituting the cultural symbol; the stitching is carried out by the correction itself. We might even say that the merging of the form and the symbol occurred because of the correction of the engraving. Here I go beyond anything claimed by Wölfflin or Panofsky. When Dürer modified the horse's hoof in order better to display the primary pictorial construction of the horse and rider, he was forced to transform the residue, which could not be wholly erased, into a "background"—perhaps the *whole* background we can now see.[54] By the same token, however, we might imagine that the correction occurred because of the merging of the pictorial form into "symbolical form." When Dürer began to surround the proportional construction with a "background" and to build the allegory, in order to retain the primal construction—to keep it visible—he was forced to transform the horse's hoof. The correction subsists in both domains and it pulls in both directions. It seems to consolidate a visuality—the correction intensifies the fearless forward progress of the Christian Knight required by the emergent narrative symbol—at the same time as it displays the work of pictoriality, the artist's efforts to realize an existentially significant image, the perfect horse and rider. Pictoriality and visuality, then, *occur at the same time*: they are simultaneously within our sight. *But they do not occur in exactly the same place.* Our visual inspection of the engraving can immediately tell the difference between the activity of pictoriality, which is at least partly retained in the uncorrected matter, however transformed, and the activity of visuality—at least partly displayed in the transformation, however corrected.

To be sure, in the history of making the engraving, Dürer's correction would seem to have moved the original image and its existential "secret," embodied in its pictoriality, toward allegorical world-construction and cultural world-recognition. The correction seems to effect a translation from a specifically *pictorial* artistic problem to a specifically *visualizing* artistic problem—a translation from what we can actually "see" to what we should "view," from Experience to Idea or from "Is" to "Ought." To use Panofsky's terms for Dürer's activity in engraving the print, the correction submitted itself "before the tribunal of reason" (*MVA*, 48). In this it could have provided Panofsky's best evidence for the real conversion of the self-affectionate existential significance of the image into the rational transpersonal symbolism of the picture. Notice that when Dürer placed the right hind hoof on line E in his correction, he also visualized EF, the height of the hoof on the picture plane, as *equal* to the distance between the forward and rear planes of the horse in depth—that is, as the measure of the fictive three-dimensional space occupied by the knight's horse in the very same (and spatially pervasive) foreshortening in which the figures of Death and the Devil likewise appear in the picture. In terms of pictorial construction, the vertical distance on the picture plane between the horse's hind hooves *equals* the vertical distance on the picture plane from the rear hooves to the dog's left foreleg *equals* the vertical distance on the picture plane from the dog's left foreleg to the bottom of the left hind hoof of Death's horse; this diagonal of fictive visual depth, and thus of narrative space and the visuality of the allegory, is identical to the proportional quadrant on the pictorial plane. If we endorse the Panofskyan logic of visuality, Dürer's correction subjected the image-form constituted in his artistic expression to the very same spatialization recognized in the image-symbol constituted in his cultural tradition—images measured out and hence pictorially depicted and visually recognized both by the spatial construction of the picture and by the spatial relations imagined in the world it visualized.

But the problem I have traced in the case of Dürer's supposed "Erasmian" visual culture appears here too. In the absence of a visual culture of "reason" which surveyed them, these conjunctions could be seen as purely pictorial creations subsisting exclusively in the disjunction of a correction—habits and choices requiring no culture-historical image-symbolic interpretation. When Panofsky supposed that the sixteenth-century artist intended to justify his formal inventions "before the tribunal of reason," effectively he asserted that the most recalcitrant and self-reflexive recursions in representation tend ineluctably toward consolidating a world-recognition. What is this tribunal, however, but the art historian's iconology itself? In order to identify the constitutive cultural symbolism of

54. In order to absorb the correction, the artist might have had to rework the whole plate so that the blackness created around the correction would not leap into view. According to Thausing (see note 14), p. 228, this intensive reworking created the "unusual blackness" of the entire finished engraving as it was first published by the artist. This point is not strictly necessary for Panofsky's or for my own observations. But it reinforces the sense in which the correction consumes and in a crucial sense actually constitutes the engraving.

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the image, the visuality of the picture, Panofsky systematically had to overlook what we can actually see at the places of the correction—Dürer's picture making as such and its visible resistance to the pure visualization of that very world, that virtual space of narrative and allegory. The visibility *of* the correction as a historical event on the picture plane does not disappear in our vision because a virtual space of narrative and allegory has been constituted *in* the correction—because a visuality has been constructed in the pictoriality.

Both visuality and pictoriality are metaphysical ideals, the never-completed "X"s, of seeing and picturing—of a disjunctive material co-presence which can never be eliminated. Being *being-depicted* and Being *being-seen* require and resist one another as the history of an image—the pictorial correction of seeing and the visual correction of picturing spatially distributed on the plane of the image in the temporal emergence of its virtual world.

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