

Martial Law in Taiwan

by Richard C. Kagan

The following testimony was presented to the House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, chaired by Representative Steven Solarz from New York. He is conducting a series of hearings on the nature of political rule in Asia and its relationship to human rights and strategic security.

The hearings do not deal directly with human rights because of the Reagan administration's shift in policy. Under President Carter human rights became a significant prong of American foreign policy. Hearings were held each year on the scope and nature of human rights in Asia (I testified in 1980 and 1981 on this topic). Under Carter, human rights were construed as including not only the basic political and civil rights (fair trial, freedom from torture, etc.), but also economic and social rights (job security, right to strike, etc.).

The Reagan administration, after waiting for over a year to fill the post of Undersecretary for Human Rights (the Undersecretary has still not appointed personnel to some of the area desks), decided to drop any reference to economic and social rights. Furthermore, it has decided to ignore the previous administration's policy of linking human rights to the decision of whether or not to give military or police aid. In response to this change in policy, the Solarz Subcommittee has decided not to address the issue of human rights *per se* but to question whether the repressive regimes in Asia are justifiable at all, whether in their ability to govern and in their reliability as allies in the U.S. defense system.

Currently, the Subcommittee has asked Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to testify regarding the sale of mace and handcuffs to the Army of the Republic of China. After many months of debate between the State Department and the Commerce Department, the Reagan administration sided with Commerce and without any announcement made the sale. (The sale happened so suddenly that a Commerce official on the China desk was totally unaware of it and somewhat startled that it had occurred.) It is within this perspective that the following testimony should be read.

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Courtesy of the author.

The date of the hearing, May 20, was deliberately set to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the establishment of martial law in Taiwan. On that day, a press conference with Senators Kennedy and Pell and Representatives Leach and Solarz was held to call for the end of martial law. Prior to the hearings, Chairman Solarz wrote an open letter to his fellow Congressmen asking them to support his stand against Taiwan's martial law, presenting his case with a comparison of martial law in Taiwan and Poland. The Republicans answered with an attack on such an invidious comparison and privately many opposed any criticism of Taiwan.

At the hearings, which consumed four hours of heated debate and argument, Professor James Gregor (Berkeley) took the position that martial law should continue in Taiwan and Representative Hyde took a strong pro-Taiwan position. Thus, the hearings made clear once again that the "Taiwan lobby" was still intact and ready to leap to the defense of the Reagan administration's attempts to prop up the martial law regime. ★

Introduction*

It is in the interests of the United States and of the government and people of Taiwan to end martial law immediately and without hesitation or anxiety. I advocate this position for the following reasons. The abolition of martial law will terminate the conspiracy of terrorism which has been perpetrated by the Kuomintang (KMT), the Taiwan Garrison Command and other military and para-military institutions against the people of Taiwan. The end of martial law will allow for a true democratic system—one based on law and judicial principle and not upon ambiguous and capricious rules arbitrarily and secretly administered. The abandonment of martial law will also allow political parties free expression of public opinion in stark contrast to the single and tyrannical voice of the Taiwan Garrison Command. The end of martial law will release the repressed ideas of the people, allowing books, articles and communications to flourish. It will provide a sense of personal security now totally lacking. The network of Taiwanese spies both at home and abroad will be dissolved. Finally, the elimination of martial law will promote the national security interests of Taiwan. It would significantly ease the current distrust of one another due to the pervasive reporting system. It would reduce the hostilities between Taiwanese and Mainlanders. And it would remove the controls on thought which make people cynical and unbelieving. This can only result in strengthening the body politic.

1. The History and Purpose of Martial Law

In 1949 the Peace Preservation Command of the Chinese National Army proclaimed a state of siege. This became the authority for the martial law which is in effect today. Soon after this promulgation, the Taiwan Garrison Command assumed responsibility for implementing martial law. The declaration of martial law by the Chinese National Army was unconstitutional. In the Constitution of the Republic of China the Legislative Yuan or Congress has the right to declare or repeal martial law. This right was usurped by the military and the head of the Kuomintang—Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Originally, martial law was justified because the Nationalist Chinese government faced possible invasion from the Mainland and local uprisings from the Taiwanese. Indeed, Chinese Communist agents had been active in Taiwan. And in 1947 and in 1949 the local Taiwanese did stage two non-violent demonstrations against military rule. Gradually, however, the threat from Mainland China diminished. As it did so, the internal threat from the indigenous Taiwanese population who wanted full political representation and human rights took on greater significance. In any case, the Nationalist Chinese have consistently maintained that the Republic of China is seriously

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The [Taiwan] Garrison Command can usurp any civil law or procedure. It has a license for tyranny. . . .

It is not communism but democracy that is the real enemy and the target of attack.

threatened. They blame both communists and Taiwanese for this perennial "state of siege" and they hold up martial law as their only protection against open attack. General Wang Ching-hsi, Commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command, warned again in 1978 that application of martial law would intensify, if a

small minority of conspiratorial elements, used by the communist bandit or Taiwan independence elements, take advantage of the situation to develop splitist, destructive or subversive activities damaging to national security and the people's welfare. Illegal activities include the holding of illegal marches or assemblies.

2. The Control and Application of Martial Law

The Military Investigation Bureau, which was under the control of Chiang Ching-kuo, sought to gain dominance over the Central Bureau of Investigation. The ensuing struggle resulted in the arrest and incarceration of several of the bureau chiefs of the Central Bureau of Investigation. Li Shih-chieh, senior deputy commissioner of the First Bureau in charge of research and investigation, was arrested in February of 1966 and detained for 345 days before his case was transferred to the Taiwan Garrison Command. Although known as a vociferous anti-communist—over three-million words of published anti-communist articles, and a recipient of a 1951 commendation from President Chiang Kai-shek, Li was accused of being a member of the Communist Party since 1937 and of trying "to influence public opinion." He was charged with sedition. The Taiwan Garrison Command sentenced him to death on Feb. 13, 1970. This sentence was commuted in 1972 to a life term, forfeiture of property and disenfranchisement for life. In 1975 he was transferred to the political prison on Green Island. Since 1978 he has not been allowed to send for any documentation relative to his constitutionally protected appeal. Currently his health is failing (he is 64 years old). Attempts to publicize his case are met with indifference or threats of intimidation.

Many other Bureau chiefs met the same fate in 1966. Chiang Hai-jung was held incommunicado for 420 days. He was sentenced to death. This sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. His incarceration and torture in the Green Island prison have been recently told by a fellow prisoner. (For a translation see *SPEAHRhead*, #12/13. The report is from "On Ching-mei Prison" by Liang Shan.) The government reported that he committed suicide in prison in 1979. However, the cause of his death is in doubt.

The forceful reorganization of the Central Intelligence Bureau by means of a purge strengthened Chian Ching-

kuo's hold over all eleven of the government intelligence agencies. From that time on, it was clear that martial law could be used not only to protect against the Mainland and not only to suppress the Taiwanese, but also to build any one individual's power base in the KMT. Chiang Ching-kuo's acquisition of the Intelligence Bureau was critical because it authorized his control over the agency that directed the activities of the Garrison Command.

The Function of the Garrison Command

In the last thirty years the KMT has assembled a huge administrative apparatus and a large force of agents for the purpose of providing surveillance on the entire population including loyal KMT members, Taiwanese and alleged communists. The Garrison Command can usurp any civil law or procedure. It has a license for tyranny—i.e., for arbitrary or oppressive exercise of power. The military commander can arbitrarily suspend the Constitutional rights of freedom of speech, assembly, teaching, writing, publication, privacy, freedom of religious expression, and legal guarantees of a fair trial.

The Garrison Command has consistently expanded its jurisdiction over so-called political offenses. This includes areas not usually included in other countries. There is no statute of immunity for political crimes. Political crimes include: engaging in labor strikes, petitioning, demonstrating, attending public meetings, and spreading rumors. Supplementary regulations have increased punishments, have broadened the scope of offenses and have legitimized many deviations from constitutional procedures. Perhaps the most unique addition is the Statute of Denunciation (1954) which was written in a vague and ambiguous manner. If a relative or acquaintance does not denounce a political offender that person will receive one to seven years in jail and have his property confiscated. Even if the information is already known and published, failure to report a "crime" can result in a long jail sentence. Finally, once one is arrested, his or her sentence can be extended without review, and his or her prison conditions will be kept secret.

A year after the 1954 revisions of martial law, Chiang Ching-kuo declared: "Our principles commit us to democracy, but so long as we let communism exist we can never implement our principles and can never have democracy."

The claim that all martial law does is to prevent Communist subversion and citizen unrest is exposed as false when one views the scope of the law—it suspends all constitutional guarantees, denies political freedom, and suppresses any legitimate negative criticism of the regime and especially of the regime's right to maintain martial law. In fact it is a legal convenience for authoritarian rule. And because it legitimates authoritarianism, it is not communism but democracy that is the real enemy and the target of attack.

4. Martial Law and Daily Life

The atmosphere of Martial law is pervasive. It is imposed upon all the citizens, not just the seditious ones. Individuals accused of political crimes are placed into a totalitarian system of imprisonment legitimated by the Garrison Command.

Consider the following current examples of martial law:

a) The Garrison Command manages two taxicab companies in Taipei. The drivers are intelligence agents. They pick up information from their customers, and listen in on conversations. This occurs in other Taiwanese cities as well.

b) The post office carefully checks all air mail letters and packages against three lists of suspicious addresses and spot checks others. Lack of return address also requires inspection. A list of proscribed journals identifies journals that can be mailed within Taiwan but cannot be mailed abroad.

c) All international phone calls are monitored. Local phones are tapped whenever necessary. Some private phones are tapped permanently. The phones at Tainan Seminary and other "liberal" institutions are tapped 24 hours a day. In my own experience in the dormitories of Tainan Theological Seminary, suspicious phone calls were investigated by police agents within a few hours.

d) The Garrison Command deploys political officers in all schools to observe and report on the students.

e) In 1977, the former head of the Taiwan Police Academy became the new president of Tung-hai University. The regulations regarding student activities have since become so restrictive that, as one University professor put it: "There is nothing they [the students or faculty] are allowed to do but follow the line." This professor would only talk about such things outside of his University-provided house for fear of bugging devices.

f) In 1981 the government imposed sanctions against 453 publications. The rationale given by the Taiwan Garrison Command for banning issue #6 of *Deep Plough* (November, 1981) was that "the contents of this magazine confuse the public." No reason was given for banning the February 27, 1982 issue of *The Politician*. It may have been because it discussed Chiang Ching-kuo's deteriorating health.

g) Copies of every publication must be sent to the Garrison Command for approval. If the authorities do not approve, all copies will be confiscated and the authors will face proceedings.

h) The government gagged reporters from publishing details of President Chiang Ching-kuo's collapse at a meeting of the Standing Committee of the KMT in late March of 1982.

i) A vast system of Taiwan intelligence agents report on Taiwanese abroad. (see the Committee's Hearings on the Chen Wen-cheng case) In Minnesota they have been involved in gathering charges and information on Ye Dao-lei and intimidating critics of the regime.

j) Even the KMT party's newspaper, the *Chung-yang jih-pao*, is censored when it is distributed to prisoners. So many sections are cut out that it is called the "holy" paper.

k) Yao Chia-wen, a famous lawyer and political prisoner in Taiwan, was placed in greater penal confinement after his wife won an election in Taipei. During the campaign she was not allowed to mention her husband or his activities. Although no reason has been given, the link between her victory and his increased confinement is clear to all.

l) Torture, sensory invasion, manipulation of diet are perpetrated without right to appeal or protest. There is considerable evidence of torture at Green Island. Lu Xiulien, one of the Kaohsiung, is suffering from a diet that forces her to gain weight.

These eleven examples are merely the tip of the iceberg. To maintain the machinery of martial law requires vast expenditures of money and time, constant vigilance, appeals to patriotism and loyalty, and consistent accusations of communist invasion and subversion. The least openly discussed aspects of this system, yet the most frightening, are the vigilante groups who beat up, injure, falsely accuse and even kill. This group and its associates are handled in the next section.

5. The Vigilante Gangs and Agents Who Prosper Under Martial Law

Since the rise of a strong reform movement for democratic rule, there has been a growth in power of vigilante groups who attack and intimidate the leaders and followers of the democratic movement. Although these groups travel under various names, the most widely known label is the "anti-communist heroes."

The term "anti-communist heroes" (*fan-kong i-shih*) originally was used to identify former Chinese Prisoners of War who were brought to Taiwan in 1953. Some of these individuals spent the next decade in work-camps, prison, the army, or under other forms of heavy surveillance. Others became part of the anti-communist commando forces. Their energies were enlisted to engage in counter-insurgency on the Mainland.

Today, the "heroes" are often young men who have participated in undercover activities in Southeast Asia or Mainland China. Upon their return to Taiwan their services are used by the secret police to watch over and bully critics of the regime.

Based on a few written documents and many interviews, I have been able to put together the following description of this group's organization and activities. Since they have been immune from investigation, it is difficult to research their activities. Two ex-heroes agreed to interviews in secrecy and with my pledge of their anonymity. In general, people are afraid to discuss the organization.

The leaders of the group are Hsiao Yu-ching and Lao Tseng-wu. They have close ties with the Intelligence Office of the Ministry of Defense. (This office regularly sends spies to China.) Although Messrs. Hsiao and Lao were employed in a commercial firm (run by the family of Yeh Hsiang-tzu, the former head of the above-mentioned Intelligence Office) they spent a great deal of their time editing *Chi Feng*, the group's publishing organ, and organizing activities against the democratic movement.

Whereas the linkage between this group and the Ministry of Defense is clear, the linkage with Chiang Ching-kuo's second son Chiang Hsiao-wu is only speculative. It would be logical for there to be a connection because Mr. Chiang Hsiao-wu controls the Coordinating Commission on Intelligence Activities in Taiwan. These activities cover both internal and external operations. The Intelligence Office of the Ministry of Defense has close ties with this Commission.

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Over the last four years, *Fan-kung i-shih* "heroes" and other agents have been identifiably involved in the following incidents:

a) In early 1978 the "heroes" stormed a public meeting of the Democratic Movement and provoked a fight. The opposition leadership was arrested. No "heroes" were arrested. This is a consistent arrest pattern.

b) The anti-U.S. riots of December 1978 were organized and led by agents provocateurs from various intelligence groups. While I was photographing the scene, a military platoon came out of the shadows and at bayonet point, confiscated my film. The photographs would have been evidence for the charge that the "rioters" were not composed of the masses but were from the military intelligence. At another "demonstration" I was led through the crowd by an old Chinese friend who pointed out which units of the secret agents were involved. Later, all my notes and photographs were confiscated by government agents.

c) In the 1979 Kaoshiung Incident, "heroes" were observed and photographed attacking the police. Despite the fact that leaders of the opposition shouted at them to desist, the leaders were arrested and the "heroes" remained free and unscathed.

d) Two bizarre murders have become associated with the heroes' activities. The first is the murder of the family of Lin Yi-hsiung; the second equally mysterious murder of Chen Wen-cheng.

(1) Arrested for inciting the crowd in Kaoshiung, even though he had not spoken at the demonstration, Lin was held incommunicado for forty-two days. He was interrogated and severely beaten by the Garrison Command. They warned him that if he disclosed these beatings to his family, "unfavorable" events would occur. On February 27, 1980 Mr. Lin met with his wife. During this visit he indicated that he had been tortured and had not signed the customary confession "voluntarily." On the next day, Lin Yi-hsiung's grandmother and two daughters were murdered in his home. This occurred despite the fact that the house had been under a 24-hour-a-day police surveillance since mid-December. Officially the murderer or murderers have not been caught. The government has blamed the opposition movement for the murders. It has even implicated an American and a foreign clergyman. American government sources have confidentially provided a contrary opinion, that this terrorist act was committed by a member of the "heroes."

(2) The mysterious death of Chen Wen-cheng was reported in the July 30 and October 16 Hearings of this Committee. Information since then confirms the suspicion that the death not only was murder but also was carried out

by a vigilante group. Although any concrete evidence is not publicly available, it is widely assumed that the Taiwan Garrison Command did not in fact torture or harm Mr. Chen. In fact, they did release him on the evening of July 2. It is also assumed that a vigilante group, perhaps the "heroes," were not happy with the leniency displayed by the Command. They kidnapped, tortured and finally killed Mr. Chen. A 100 dollar bill in Taiwanese currency placed in his shoe exaggerated the curious and threatening nature of his death. In Taiwan, this "payment" means that a murder is a warning for others.

A critic of the Elections Commission who is also a professor at Taiwan University was criticized by the members of *Chi Feng*. During an interview he stated that a friend warned him to be careful, because "behind them [the *Chi Feng* Editors] stand the generals." On December 8 of 1980 he received another warning because of his recent attacks on martial law. He began to receive threatening phone calls. The intimidation took on a public aspect when "a group of ill-mannered folks swaggered in and hassled his students," and boldly inquired if "his blood was red or not." At first he did not openly discuss these incidents and their cause. But one night the government controlled TV criticized him directly.

The "heroes" and other vigilante groups' indulgence in macabre and grisly terrorism is protected by martial law. Even if martial law is only invoked in a small percentage of the legal cases, as argued by its proponents, it exercises an undeniable influence over the everyday lives of all the people of Taiwan. Martial law gives both governmental and extra-legal groups license to intimidate and be arbitrary. The vigilantes are a product of their system. The fear that is engendered in the local population and the overseas Taiwanese should not be underestimated.

Should this fear be taken seriously? Perhaps the best analogy can be drawn from the nuclear issue in America. On May 15, 1982 a federal appeals court ruled that the Three Mile Island nuclear power "plant may not be restarted without consideration of the psychological distress it could cause those living nearby." The *Minneapolis Tribune* report continued:

The unprecedented decision said that the 'anxiety, tension and fear involved in restarting Three Mile Island must be taken into account . . . ' Dissenting Judge Malcolm Wilkey predicted a 'court-imposed paralysis of nuclear power' if the decision is allowed to stand.

The psychological and emotional effects of martial law have never been queried. If they were, it would be safe to say that martial law would be considered cruel and unusual punishment.

The issue of martial law cannot even be discussed without great fear and trepidation. No one can forget Pai Ya-tsan's 1975 heroic critique of martial law:

Why isn't Mr. Chiang Ching-kuo willing to rescind Taiwan's State of Siege which, after 26 years, remains the world's oldest uninterrupted period of martial law; abolish the military rule of the Taiwan Garrison Command, which violates the people's rights by indiscriminately arresting and detaining the innocent; do away with the secret military trials which set Mainlander against Taiwanese; and rid us of the

poisonous control methods prevalent under this State of Siege which violates constitutional human rights guarantees —thus establishing an open Taiwan society in which Taiwanese and Mainlanders are integrated harmoniously?

He was arrested for committing sedition and sentenced to Green Island. In 1980 the warden of Green Island would not allow him to visit with friends nor allow release of any direct communication about his condition.

6. Predictions on the Consequences of Ending Martial Law.

There is no doubt that a viable multi-party system would result. The Kuomintang Party would indeed lose a lot of votes, but it would still exist as a useful force in Taiwan's politics. In fact many observers feel that the existence of martial law has in fact made the KMT sloppy and unresponsive to the needs of its constituency. Making it perform in an open political arena would weed out the good from the bad.

Chiang Ching-kuo would still be popular. Many Taiwanese disassociate him from the evils of his family's involvement in the security apparatus. Among many Taiwanese he is viewed as responsible for Taiwan's continued economic growth.

By ending martial law many taboo issues would be open for public debate. Currently one can never be sure when a topic is safe. Some people are arrested for discussing an issue while others are not arrested for discussing the same issue. Abrogation of martial law will result in wide ranging discussions. There is no evidence that the representative of Taiwan's citizenry would engage in seditious activity. Both the KMT and the democratic movement are committed to the economic welfare and security of the Island.

If martial law is not lifted soon severe consequences may occur. The leadership is faced with two explosive situations: naming a successor to President Chiang, and planning adequately for future problems.

Chiang Ching-kuo's current severe health problems have made the question of transference of power a critical issue. There is no one else in government leadership who is as popular as the current President. If martial law continues, the best scenario is that a collective leadership will take over. This will be based on an uneasy alliance among three groups: (1) General Wang Sheng and the military political office. General Wang's popularity is extremely low. His support stems from the Chiang family and his growing control over the Taiwan Garrison Command. His writings on political ideology express a great resentment toward both Taiwan and the Taiwanese. (2) The old military and KMT factions which have their base in Chiang Kai-shek's entourage. These are rather old men who still yearn to return to the Mainland. (3) The new technocrats who are recognizing that Taiwan the island, and not Taiwan the government of China, is their main base and concern. They are pushing for democratization, for liberalization of the system, and for political and intellectual freedoms. This last group, however, does not have a large popular constituency and does not have military or security forces to protect or back it up.

The most likely scenario for the future is the most pessimistic: rule by an economic-military oligarchy legitimated by controlled elections and secured by a network of spies and secret police. Intimidation and outright terror will be finely tuned to keep the citizens in line.

Not so clear is the reaction of the populace to an economic-military oligarchy. This is further complicated by the unknown effects of a possible economic depression and the effects of pressures, mainly economic, from Beijing. For the former, the anticipation is that the Taiwanese may just rise up in violent protest against the aging and socially isolated rulers. For the latter, it is clear that martial law created disaffection and factions within the State. Some might want to join with the Communists—both the old guard and the young radicals—but most will probably grudgingly accept the necessity to defend Taiwan. In case of either economic or international pressures, the reaction will be more mixed under a repressive regime than under a democratic one.

In planning for the future, the most significant issue today is the controversy over nuclear power and ecology. Professor Lin Jun-yi, chairman of the Biology Department at Tunghai University and President of the Asian Ecological Society, has publicly called for criticism and open discussion of the proposal to build twenty nuclear power plants in Taiwan. Irrespective of the merit of the arguments of this scientist, he has been attacked for questioning government policy. A recent attack came from the “anti-communist heroes.” They charged that his proposal to use bicycles rather than motorized vehicles “proved” that Professor Lin was “under communist influence.” Professor Lin has been under surveillance, his phone is tapped, agents check his mail, and his movements are watched.

The pressure is not confined to Professor Lin. Other colleagues have been arrested and their articles censored. Unsubstantiated stories exist about how workers in nuclear plants have disappeared after criticizing the quality of the work or design.

Needless to say, the future of the world, not just Taiwan, depends upon open and full discussion of nuclear power issues. Currently, imposition of martial law prevents such discussion.

7. U.S. Government and Martial Law

When one by force subdues men, they do not submit to him in their hearts. They submit because their strength is not adequate to resist.

The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are next; the sovereign is the lightest.
(Mencius 372–289 B.C.)

The principles of a free constitution are irrevocably lost, when the legislative power is nominated by the executive.
(Edward Gibbon 1737–1794)

In both the Chinese and European tradition, the value of democracy has long been recognized. A democracy which freely represents the will of an educated and economically satisfied populace possessed a more stable political and economic system than one run by a secretive minority which maintains itself through threats, fear, ideological discipline, arbitrary rules, and outmoded ideologies. There

is no doubt that the level of the intimidation, the amount of harassment, and the corruption of government agencies would be drastically reduced by lifting the cover of martial law. The spectre of being charged with endangering security and the threat of a military investigation inhibits criticism that could lead to more rational economic policies and a more just political system.

The *Wall Street Journal* (November 13, 1980) accurately reported that

The price of Taiwanese stock is entirely controlled by professional manipulators. There is so much fraud and hanky-panky going around that it is more dangerous than a gambling joint. A well-placed source at the SEC (Securities and Exchange Commission), who did not want to be identified, said that most of the staff members are either retired servicemen or relatives of influential people.

U.S. foreign policy and economic interests can only be aided by a more open political and economic system.

8. Relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC)

Martial law prevents any open and rational discussion of relations with the PRC. Anyone who talks about relations with the PRC is left conscious about the danger he places himself in. Nonetheless it is clear that those in authority who are “safe” have many dealings with the PRC. Trade, travel, and private contact are maintained by government officials, selected businessmen, and protected individuals. The contradiction between punishing some and encouraging others to trade or meet with the Communist regime exposes the martial law authorities as hypocrites. It is clear some individuals or groups in Taiwan do have dealings with China. Only by ending martial law can a unified, publicly discussed, and participative approach be worked out. Currently, only the influential benefit from the trade and the visits.

9. Beijing's Reactions to an End to Martial Law

I believe that Beijing would oppose the end of martial law. Beijing's great fear is the weakening of the Nationalist Party. China has made it very clear that they favor working with the KMT and not with the people of Taiwan. During CCP Vice-chairman Deng Xiaoping's trip to the United States he refused to meet with several non-KMT Taiwanese delegations. Recently, the PRC has even increased its attempts to curry favor with the KMT. If the end of martial law meant that the Taiwanese obtained more control and that this control meant a gain for views of a “Two Chinas” or Taiwanese Independence, Beijing would definitely take a hostile approach to Taiwan.

The issue for Beijing would be how they could express their displeasure. They have no military force or equipment capable of an amphibious landing. Taiwan would not be in danger.

One could take a more optimistic view and hold that the moderates in China would welcome a stable Taiwan that could engage in trade and communications without the threat of provoking a “rebellion” or being constantly vigilant about “selling-out” to the Communists. A democratic Taiwan could form a constructive relationship with China.

10. Effect of Democratization in Taiwan on Asia

The policies we support in one area of Asia or even the world effect other areas. During President Carter's Administration, a strong Asian Human Rights movement developed. The Taiwanese copied Democracy Wall in Beijing with their own Democracy Wall in Taipei. Popular support for human rights surfaced in South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines and other countries. Based upon the historical record, one can conclude that the end of martial law in Taiwan would be seen with hope and admiration by citizens in other countries in Asia.

11. Regarding the Sale of Police Equipment

Until the people in Taiwan are fully represented by a freely elected legislature, until the judiciary is independent from the military, and until civil law and the constitution are equally available and applied to all citizens in all circumstances, the U.S. government should disassociate itself from all police and military instruments which are used to overpower the will of the people.

Conclusion

On July 3, 1981, Professor Chen Wen-cheng of Carnegie-Mellon University was found dead on the campus of Taiwan University. He had been visiting his family in Taipei. He had applied for an exit visa but it was not approved. On July 2 he was summoned to the Taiwan Garrison Command. The next day he was dead. An investigation after this curious death revealed a man of great learning, of professional accomplishments, and of minor involvement in the Taiwan reform movement. This involvement was discovered by the Nationalist government through illegal tape recordings of Professor Chen's conver-

sations while he was in the United States and by government spies on American University campuses. No evidence was ever gathered that he had committed a crime and the autopsy by an American forensic expert ruled out suicide or accidental death, leaving murder as the only option.

Even if one accepts the government's argument that Chen's death was accidental, the gloating tone of the obituary notice delivered on the occasion of his funeral by the government-controlled press cannot help but make one think the government was involved in, or at least pleased by, the death. While reading the following article recall that the self-confident accusations made here are without any evidence:

Dr. Chen Wen-cheng's body will be buried on Wednesday in Chunchiu Cemetery in Chungho.


While Chen's peers were confidently advancing toward higher scholastic achievements and living a happy life, Chen died mysteriously on the campus of his alma mater, National Taiwan University. Maybe Chen is not free from remorse and confusion even while resting in Hades.

If Chen is able to think after death, he must regret having taken part in political activities overseas that were contrary to national interests.

His unfortunate death has been used by some malcontents overseas to defame the government's policy toward the Republic of China and stop Washington's supply of arms to the ROC. If he could speak, Chen would probably express his hatred for the despicable behavior of the malcontents.

Taiwan Daily News
September 15, 1981

It is clear from this article that a warning has been given to all "malcontents." Under martial law, a "warning" means harassment, arrest, torture, or murder. Is this a situation we want the U.S. government to support? ★



A political cartoon by CoCo, dated 1974. Note that all one does is "sigh" to be categorized as being political. CoCo's cartoons are carefully subtle.

Other cartoonists and satirists have been jailed for making fun of government goals and politics. R.C. Kagan

