

The Dangwai Setting

When the Chinese Nationalist Party or Kuomintang succeeded the Japanese colonial rulers (1895–1945), they in turn established a new colonial regime dominated by Chinese Mainlanders who systematically discriminated against the majority Taiwanese. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, this Chinese colonial regime massacred up to 28,000 Taiwanese following the February 28, 1947 Uprising. It then instituted “White Terror,” under which many thousands were imprisoned and executed during the 1950s and 1960s.¹

Chiang Kai-shek arranged for his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, to succeed him. This succession process began most clearly in 1969, when Chiang Kai-shek was already 81 years old. Partly as a result of such external pressures as the Diaoyutai Movement and Taiwan’s leaving the United Nations, pressure for reform also built up within Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo, already somewhat of a reformer though not a democrat, used “reform” to increase his own political support, especially after his father nominated him to become Premier on May 20, 1972. Chiang Ching-kuo doubled the small numbers of Taiwanese in his cabinet where he also appointed younger and better educated ministers. As part of his reform, Premier Chiang Ching-kuo clamped down on corruption and even publicly arrested and sentenced important officers of the Taiwan Garrison Command, one of Taiwan’s then most repressive security agencies, for corruption.

These reform efforts began a first phase of “liberalization” in Taiwan that lasted until the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979. Sometimes authoritarian regimes allow an increase in the scope of speech or the press. They may allow opposition politicians to win office in elections, but they do not relinquish ultimate control. It must be stated very clearly that such “liberalization” is not democratization.² Chiang Ching-kuo, right up to his death, never intended to relinquish control to any opposition.³ He maintained his power

1 For details, see Jacobs, *Democratizing Taiwan*.

2 The present writer began to draw this distinction in 1981, see J. Bruce Jacobs, “Political Opposition and Taiwan’s Political Future,” *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 6 (July 1981), p. 21.

3 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Chiang Ching-kuo Was No Democrat: The Difference between Liberalization and Democratization,” in *Zhonghua minguo liuwang Taiwan 60 nian ji Zhanhou Taiwan guoji chujing 中華民國流亡台灣 60 年暨戰後台灣國際處境 [The Republic of China’s Sixty Years of Exile in Taiwan and Taiwan’s Difficult Postwar International Situation]*, ed. Taiwan jiaoshou

through controlled elections as well as through his many security agencies and a controlled media.⁴

In order to maintain his colonial control in Taiwan following his forced retreat from the Mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek arranged that the central parliamentarians in the Legislative Branch, the Control Branch and the National Assembly retained their power. With the Communist takeover, Chiang Kai-shek's regime could no longer hold elections on the Mainland, so it arranged for the Council of Grand Justices to give Constitutional Interpretation No. 31 on January 29, 1954, which extended the terms of the central parliamentarians initially elected on the Mainland during 1947 and 1948 until they could "be elected and convene according to law..."⁵

By 1969, the numbers of central parliamentarians had declined. The KMT used the excuse of Taiwan's growing population to have limited supplementary elections in 1969. Taiwan (including Taipei) elected fifteen additional National Assemblymen and eleven additional legislators on December 20, and on December 29 the Taipei Municipality Council elected two members of the Control Branch.⁶ These additional central parliamentarians, like the original central parliamentarians elected on the Chinese Mainland, all had indefinite terms.

By 1972, only half of the original National Assemblymen and Legislators and only one-third of the Control Branch members remained and their average ages had gone up to 63 in the National Assembly, 67 in the Legislature and 73 in the Control Branch. The twenty-eight new central parliamentarians elected in 1969 only accounted for one-seventieth of the membership. Thus, in 1972, after considerable debate, the KMT agreed to have further supplementary elections for the central parliamentary organs. Most importantly, these new central parliamentarians would have the three and six year terms fixed in the Constitution.⁷ However, this reform did not end Mainlander control. When the system was

xiehui 台灣教授協會 [Taiwan Association of University Professors] (Taipei: Qianwei 前衛, 2010), pp. 435–480. See also Jacobs, *Democratizing Taiwan*, pp. 47–68.

4 For Taiwan's press at this time, see J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan's Press: Political Communications Link and Research Resource," *China Quarterly*, no. 68 (December 1976), pp. 778–788.

5 The text of Constitutional Interpretation No. 31 can be found in *Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報 (*Central Daily News*), January 30, 1954, p. 1 and *Lianhebao* 聯合報 (*United Daily News*), January 30, 1954, p. 1.

6 Taiwan Province was not given any new Control Branch members; see J. Bruce Jacobs, "Recent Leadership and Political Trends in Taiwan," *The China Quarterly*, no. 45 (January-March 1971), p. 133.

7 J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan 1972: Political Season," *Asian Survey* XIII, no. 1 (January 1973), pp. 106–107.

finally abolished in mid-1990, during Lee Teng-hui's presidency, the "old thieves" (*laozei* 老賊) still occupied 76 per cent of the central parliamentary seats.⁸

The death of Chiang Kai-shek on April 5, 1975 provided some further opportunities for liberalization. On April 20, Premier Chiang ordered the Minister of Justice to prepare to shorten the sentences of criminals in accord with the "will" of the late President Chiang to "humanely and virtuously love the people." On May 30 the legislature passed a law "To shorten the sentences of criminals," to be implemented on July 14, the hundredth day after the passing of President Chiang,⁹ and preliminary estimates suggested 9,000 criminals would benefit.¹⁰ According to a modern source, 7,000 criminals were released as a result of their shortened sentences, but less than 200 political prisoners received shorter sentences and less than half of these were released.¹¹

Later, in August 1975, Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介 and Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, two of the pioneers of the democracy movement, established a new magazine, *The Taiwan Political Review* (*Taiwan zhenglun* 台灣政論). Huang, born in 1917, had been elected a Taipei Municipality Councilman in 1961 and was re-elected in 1964. In 1969 he was elected as one of the new legislators with a permanent term. Kang, born in 1938, was elected a Taipei Municipality Councilman in 1969 after Taipei Municipality was raised to provincial status and in 1972 he won a three-year term to the legislature with the highest number of votes of any candidate in Taipei.¹²

Taiwan Political Review "was the first opposition magazine to raise the banner of 'Taiwan' since the Kuomintang had arrived in Taiwan."¹³ As an opposition magazine it followed *Free China Fortnightly* (*Ziyou Zhongguo* 自由中國), *Apollo*

8 The "old thieves" held 88% of the National Assembly seats, 52% of the Legislative Branch seats and 38% of the Control Branch seats. Statistics from table in *Zhongyang ribao guoji ban* 中央日報國際版 [*Central Daily News International Edition*], June 23, 1990, p. 1.

9 *Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報, May 31, 1975, p. 1.

10 *Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報, May 31, 1975, p. 3. This page also has the text of the provisions for shortening prison sentences.

11 *Renquan zhi lu: Taiwan minzhu renquan huiqu* 人權之路：臺灣民主人權回顧 [*The Road to Human Rights: Looking Back on Taiwan's Democracy and Human Rights*] (Taipei: Yushan, 2002), p. 29; *The Road to Freedom: Taiwan's Postwar Human Rights Movement* (Taipei: Dr Chen Wen-chen Memorial Foundation, 2004), p. 29.

12 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai: Taiwan minzhu yundong 25 nian, 1975-1987* 綠色年代：台灣民主運動 25 年，1975-1987 [*The Green Era: Twenty-Five Years of Taiwan's Democratic Movement, 1975-1987*], II vols., vol. I (Taipei: Caituan faren lüxing wenjiao jijinhui 財團法人綠色旅行文教基金會, 2005), p. 26.

13 Ibid.

(*Wenxing* 文星), and *The Intellectual* (*Daxue zazhi* 大學雜誌). With articles like “Can’t We Criticize the Constitution and National Policy?” by Yao Chia-wen and “Let’s Remove Martial Law As Soon as Possible” by Chen Ku-ying, the magazine clearly challenged the ruling party. The magazine published 50,000 copies for its fifth issue in December 1975. However, with the December 1975 legislative election looming, the authorities clearly felt the magazine had gone too far and they closed it.¹⁴

The excuse for closing the magazine was an article by Chiou Chui-liang, an academic at the University of Queensland in Australia.¹⁵ Chiou wrote about his discussions with two people from the People’s Republic of China. In fact, the content was mild. Probably the government used Chiou’s article as an excuse to close down *Taiwan Political Review* because Chiou was overseas and did not need to be arrested.

The movement that led to the Kaohsiung Incident developed further as a result of the December 20, 1975 Legislative election. Although the key non-partisans who had won in 1972—Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, Hsu Shih-hsien 許世賢 and Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興—all won re-election,¹⁶ another prominent non-partisan, Kuo Yu-hsin 郭雨新, lost. Kuo officially obtained over 80,000 votes, but in his home Ilan County an additional 80,000 of his votes were declared invalid and he was defeated.¹⁷

In early 1976, Kuo launched a case against the election results led by two young lawyers, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 also from Ilan County and Yao Chia-wen 姚嘉文, both of whom would lead the opposition movement.¹⁸ In addition, several other key people became deeply involved in the opposition movement at this time including Chen Chu 陳菊 (who was Kuo’s secretary) and Tien Chiu-chin 田秋堃, both also from Ilan, as well as Chiu I-jen 邱義仁, Fan Sun-lu 范巽綠, Wu Nai-jen 吳乃人, Wu Nai-te 吳乃德, Chou Hung-hsien 周弘憲 and Lin Cheng-chieh 林正杰 among many others.¹⁹ Kuo himself left Taiwan for the United States in 1977, where he died in exile in 1985, but he left a burgeoning

14 Ibid., pp. 26, 29.

15 Qiu Chuiliang 邱垂亮, “Liangzhong xinxiang 兩種心向 [Two Ways of Thinking],” *Taiwan zhenglun* 台灣政論 [*Taiwan Political Review*], no. 5 (1975), pp. 31–34.

16 *Zhongyang ribao* 中央日報, December 21, 1975, p. 3.

17 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai* 1, 1, p. 29.

18 Their book provides many details of these battles, see Lin Yixiong 林義雄 and Yao Jiawen 姚嘉文, *Huluo pingyang? Xuanzhan guansi Guo Yuxin* 虎落平陽? 選戰官司郭雨新 [*Has the Tiger Descended to Pingyang? Election Battles, Court Battles and Kuo Yu-hsin*] (Taipei: Gaoshan 高山, 1977).

19 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai* 1, 1, p. 30.

opposition movement that would come together in 1977. At this time, the Presbyterian Church re-entered politics declaring on August 16, 1977:

We insist that the future of Taiwan be determined by the 17 million people who live there ... In order to achieve our goal of independence and freedom for the people of Taiwan in this critical international situation, we urge our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.²⁰

The Election of November 19, 1977

The term *dangwai* 黨外, literally “outside the [Nationalist] Party,” gained new and ongoing currency as the name of the opposition during the campaign for the local elections of November 19, 1977.²¹ In fact, the term was first used in the “Fifteen Demands” of March 18, 1960 during the movement that led to the aborted rise of the China Democratic Party headed by the Mainlander democrat, Lei Chen 雷震, and several Taiwanese politicians including Li Wan-chu 李萬居, Wu San-lien 吳三連, Kuo Yu-hsin 郭雨新, Hsu Shih-hsien 許世賢, Kao Yu-shu (Henry Kao) 高玉樹 and Yu Teng-fa 余登發.²²

The elections of November 19, 1977 were “local” in that they chose sub-central level officials including provincial assemblymen and women, county executives and equivalent mayors, county assemblymen and women and township executives. In Taipei Municipality, city councilmen and women were elected.

These elections took place at the same time that the Kuomintang was making an important push for greater roles in local politics. Previously, under Chiang Kai-shek, the Kuomintang did not play a strong role in township-level

20 Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “A Declaration on Human Rights,” in *The Future of Taiwan: A Difference of Opinion*, ed. Victor H Li (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe), pp. 186–187. This is also available on the web, see Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, “A Declaration of Human Rights,” <<http://www.taiwandocuments.org/pcto4.htm>>.

21 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai 1*, 1, p. 38. This source incorrectly states that this was the first use of the term “*dangwai*.”

22 See Jacobs, *Democratizing Taiwan*, p. 39. For the text of the Fifteen Demands, see “Zaiye-dang ji wudang wupai renshi duiyu ben jie difang xuanju xiang Guomintang ji zhengfu tichu de shiwudian yaoqiu 在野黨及無黨無派人士對於本屆地方選舉向國民黨及政府提出的十五點要求 [Fifteen Demands from Opposition Parties and from Non-partisans Addressed to the Kuomintang and the government concerning the Current Local Elections]”, *Ziyou Zhongguo* 自由中國 22, no. 7 (April 1, 1960), p. 30.

elections. Higher levels controlled funds and, thus, the actual functioning of government, so the Kuomintang allowed local factions considerable electoral leeway in the township. However, about April 1975, the Kuomintang began to push for greater power at the local level and began to intervene in local elections and decision-making. Party membership also increased substantially during this period.²³

This pressure created dissension within the KMT and contributed to the Kuomintang's unparalleled "loss" in the November 19, 1977 election.²⁴ In the county executive and equivalent mayoral elections, non-partisans defeated KMT nominees in four of twenty elections. Non-partisans also defeated fourteen of sixty-nine KMT nominees for provincial assembly. In addition, they won an additional seven provincial assembly seats that the KMT had allocated to non-partisans.

During the campaign for these elections, Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, the two non-partisan legislators respectively elected in the supplementary elections of 1969 and 1972 (and again in 1975) and who also founded *Taiwan Political Review*, travelled up and down the island seeking support. The resulting *dangwai* movement proved to have considerable success. However, not all successful non-partisans belonged to the *dangwai*. Huang Hsin-chieh, who classified the non-partisans into "genuine" and "false" categories, claimed only thirteen of the twenty-one non-partisans elected to the provincial assembly were "genuine."²⁵ Interestingly, the right-wing opponents of the *dangwai* from *Gust (Jifeng) Magazine* claimed only eleven of the non-partisan provincial assemblymen belonged to the "Black Fist Gang."²⁶ In addition, interviews conducted in 1979 suggested that Huang Hsin-chieh's figures included a couple of non-political non-partisans.²⁷ So about half of the non-partisan provincial assemblymen and even fewer of the non-partisan county executives and Taipei Municipality Councilmen belonged to the *dangwai*.

23 Jacobs, *Local ... Democracy*, pp. 32–34, 37–39, 216–217, 222–246.

24 On the November 19, 1977 election, see Jacobs, "Political Opposition," esp. pp. 27–34. See also J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan 1978: Economic Successes, International Uncertainties," *Asian Survey* XIX, no. 1 (January 1979), pp. 20–23.

25 Zhen Boya 甄伯牙, "Linshi wuju, bumou wucheng 臨事無懼，不謀無成 [If One Does Not Plan, One Cannot Successfully Approach a Crisis without Fear]," *Da Shidai* 大時代 [*Great Epoch*] April 5, 1980, pp. 13–14.

26 Ziliaoshi 資料室 [Reference Office], "Baifen zhi sa xuanpiao de shuzi moshu 百分之卅選票的數字魔術 [The Wizardry of the Thirty Per Cent Vote Figure]," *Jifeng* 疾風 [*Gust*] April 4, 1980, p. 49.

27 Jacobs, "Political Opposition," p. 34.

As noted above, Huang Hsin-chieh only included thirteen of the twenty-one non-partisan provincial assemblymen as “genuine.” These were Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏 of Nantou County, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄 of Ilan County, Chiu Lien-hui 邱連輝 of Pingtung County, Tsai Chieh-hsiung 蔡介雄 of Tainan Municipality, Huang Yu-chiao 黃玉嬌 of Taoyuan County, Sung Hung Yueh-chiao 蘇洪月嬌 of Yunlin County, Chou Tsang-yuan 周滄淵 of Keelung Municipality, Chao Hsiu-wa 趙綉娃 of Kaohsiung Municipality, Fu Wen-cheng 傅文政 of Miaoli County, Lin Lo-shan 林樂善 of Chiayi County, Chen Chin-te 陳金德 of Taipei County, Ho Chun-mu 何春木 of Taichung Municipality and Yu Chen Yueh-ying 余陳月瑛 of Kaohsiung County.²⁸ Su Hung Yueh-chiao, the wife of long-term political prisoner Su Tung-chi, asked voters during her campaign, “Am I guilty?” (*wo you zui ma?* 我有罪嗎?)²⁹ Yu Chen Yueh-ying had married into the powerful Yu Teng-fa family. Many of these names will appear repeatedly throughout this book.

Among the four county executives, Huang Hsin-chieh only included Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良 of Taoyuan County. About Su Nan-cheng 蘇南成 of Tainan Municipality, Huang said, “He is very busy and we are also very busy, so we rarely see him.” With regard to Tseng Wen-po 曾文坡 of Taichung Municipality, Huang simply said, “He is not with us.” And with regard to Huang Yu-jen 黃友仁 of Kaohsiung County, Huang said, “We can communicate with him.” Huang only included two of the eight non-partisan Taipei Municipality Councilmen as “genuine” non-partisans, Kang Shui-mu 康水木 and Wang Kun-ho 王昆和.³⁰

The county executive election in Taoyuan County led to the famous Chungli Incident. Citizens feared that the government was stealing the election from Hsu Hsin-liang, leading to a series of demonstrations and the ultimate burning down of a major police station as well as six adjoining houses for police. According to an important book, “this was Taiwan’s largest [incident of] violence since the February 28, 1947 Uprising.”³¹ However, it was not true to say that Taiwan’s media did not cover the incident.³² In fact, short stories appeared in the three privately-owned newspapers that the writer received at the time.³³ In the end, the authorities conceded the election to Hsu Hsin-liang. Fortunately,

28 Zhen Boya 甄伯牙, “Linshi wuju,” p. 14. I have obtained locality from *Taiwan shibao* 臺灣時報 [*Taiwan Times*], November 20, 1977, p. 1.

29 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1978,” pp. 21–22.

30 Zhen Boya 甄伯牙, “Linshi wuju,” p. 14.

31 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai* 1, I, p. 46. For the whole incident, see *ibid.*, pp. 44–47.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 46.

33 See *Lianhebao* 聯合報 (*United Daily News*), November 20, 1977, p. 3; *Taiwan shibao* 臺灣時報 [*Taiwan Times*], November 20, 1977, p. 3; and *Taiwan ribao* 臺灣日報 [*Taiwan*

the Kuomintang under its then “liberal” leadership decided not to repress the violence at the time. However, on April 17 the next year, a court sentenced eight defendants to terms ranging from two years and four months to twelve years.³⁴

The Provincial Assembly election also had consequences. On December 20, 1977, during the election for Speaker and Deputy Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, Lin I-hsiung demanded the withdrawal of administrative officials in order to facilitate a secret ballot.³⁵ On March 30, 1978, Lin I-hsiung proposed a motion “allowing the use of Chinese languages including Mandarin, Manchu, Mongolian, Hui, Tibetan, Miao and this province’s aboriginal languages when the Provincial Assembly is in session.” Seven provincial assemblymen and women supported the resolution, while forty-three opposed it and five abstained.³⁶ Then, on April 18, 1978, Chang Chun-hung, Lin I-hsiung and Lin Lo-shan all fiercely attacked the police during interpellation.³⁷ On September 11, 1978, twelve non-partisan provincial assemblymen and women refused to participate in the six normal committees of the Provincial Assembly and instead established a “Seventh Committee” and elected Chen Chin-te as convenor and Chang Chun-hung as deputy convenor.³⁸ Clearly, the relatively large number of non-partisans in the Provincial Assembly was changing the dynamics of that institution.

The regime did not ignore these challenges. In the middle of the night on March 18, 1978, the authorities confiscated ten thousand copies of an important, but still unbound, book on the November 19, 1977 county executive election in Taoyuan County and the subsequent Chungli Incident.³⁹ On March

Daily], November 20, 1977, p. 3. A small additional item appeared in *Taiwan ribao* 臺灣日報 [*Taiwan Daily*], November 21, 1977, p. 3.

- 34 *Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1966–1978)* 台灣歷史年表 [*Chronology of Taiwan History*], vol. 11 (Taipei: Guojia zhengce yanjiusuo ziliao zhongxin, 1990), p. 342. Details can be found in the lead article, *Lianhebao (Guowai hangkongban)* 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News (Overseas Edition)*] April 18, 1978, p. 1.
- 35 *Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1966–1978)* 台灣歷史年表 [*Chronology of Taiwan History*], 11, p. 336.
- 36 *Lianhebao (Guowai hangkongban)* 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News (Overseas Edition)*], March 31, 1978, p. 2.
- 37 For two news articles and a commentary, see *Lianhebao (Guowai hangkongban)* 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News (Overseas Edition)*], April 19, 1978, p. 2.
- 38 *Lianhebao (Guowai hangkongban)* 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News (Overseas Edition)*], September 12, 1978, p. 3. The twelve included all of the thirteen mentioned by Huang Hsin-chieh as “genuine” non-partisans except for Chiu Lien-hui.
- 39 See Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai 1*, 1, p. 53–54. This book was *Xuanju wansui* 選舉萬歲 [*Long Live Elections*] by Lin Zhengjie 林正杰 and Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠.

25, 1978 the Ministry of the Interior wrote to the Taiwan Presbyterian Church to “warn it to correct” the Taiwan Independence attitudes of a small minority of members following the Church’s August 16, 1977 Declaration mentioned above.⁴⁰ The Ministry’s letter came ten days after a *United Daily* editorial calling for clarification of the Presbyterian Church’s political viewpoints.⁴¹ In June, the Director of the Bureau of Investigation told the legislature that supporters of “Taiwan Independence” were “domesticated lackeys” (*huanyang yingquan* 豢養鷹犬) of the Chinese Communists.⁴² In September, the government forced the owners of the *Taiwan Daily News* (*Taiwan ribao* 臺灣日報), an outspoken independent paper based in Taichung that had given excellent coverage of the Taiwan Provincial Government and the Taiwan Provincial Assembly, to sell to a new owner with close links to the Ministry of Defense.⁴³

The security agencies took even stronger action against Chen Chu, who did not hold an elected public office. Chen had been Kuo Yu-hsin’s secretary and still handled his affairs even after he left for the United States. She was also one of the key young *dangwai* leaders. In the early hours of June 16, 1978 police without a search warrant came to her residence, checked her identification card and confiscated some fifty items. That morning Chen left Taipei and stayed with an American Catholic priest in a Catholic Church in Changhua County. On June 23, the police surrounded this church and arrested Chen Chu. She was taken back to Taipei and subjected to four days of intensive interrogation and deprivation of sleep. Many people expressed concern as did the American embassy.

On July 5, 1978, the KMT Secretary-General Chang Pao-shu 張寶樹 called a meeting with the Director of the Security Bureau Wang Yung-shu 王永樹, the Commander of the Taiwan Garrison Command Wang Ching-hsi 汪敬煦, Minister of National Defense Kao Kuei-yuan 高魁元, and Minister of Foreign Affairs Shen Chang-huan 沈昌煥 to discuss how to deal with the situation. The meeting decided to release Chen Chu the next day.

On July 6 the Taiwan Garrison Command called a press conference and forced Chen Chu to “confess.” In fact, Chen Chu was not released but taken on

40 *Lianhebao* (*Guowai hangkongban*) 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News* (*Overseas Edition*), March 26, 1978, p. 1.

41 *Lianhebao* (*Guowai hangkongban*) 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News* (*Overseas Edition*), March 16, 1978, p. 1.

42 *Lianhebao* (*Guowai hangkongban*) 聯合報 (國外航空版) [*United Daily News* (*Overseas Edition*), June 27, 1978, p. 1.

43 Jacobs, “Taiwan 1978,” p. 29.

a tour of the “Ten Great Projects” and Kinmen Island. Only on July 24 did the Garrison Command call her father to come and get her.

In late October, Chen Chu met Harvey Feldman, a senior State Department official then visiting Taiwan, at the Taipei Hilton Hotel. Feldman told Chen Chu that she had been released in exchange for the United States selling weapons to Taiwan.⁴⁴

The Aborted December 23, 1978 Election

In preparation for the December 23, 1978 legislative election, on October 6 Huang Hsin-chieh established a “Taiwan *Dangwai* Personages Election Assistance Group. (*Taiwan dangwai renshi zhuxuantuan*), which released twelve common political viewpoints for *dangwai* candidates on October 31 including “respect the Constitution and re-elect all central parliamentarians, directly elect the provincial governor, nationalize the military [instead of having a military loyal to the party] ... end martial law ... oppose discrimination on the basis of provincial origin and language ... have a major amnesty for political prisoners.”⁴⁵ Huang Hsin-chieh was the liaison person, Shih Ming-teh, released in June 1977 after serving fifteen years in prison for “Taiwan Independence,” was the general manager, and Chen Chu was the secretary.⁴⁶

On December 5, more than forty candidates and seven hundred people met in the Chungshan Auditorium in Taipei for a campaign rally and press conference, the first organized meeting in over thirty years of opposition on the

44 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai 1*, 1, pp. 55, 57. For a useful English summary of the case, see International Committee for the Defense of Human Rights in Taiwan (ICDHRT), “An Account of Chen Chü’s June 23rd Arrest, Detention and Release,” in *A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980*, ed. Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles (Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance, 2008), pp. 317, 319. For an account by a foreigner involved in the case, see Rosemary Haddon, “The Sky-blue Backpack: My Experience with Taiwan’s Human Rights,” in *A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980*, ed. Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles (Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance, 2008), p. 295. For another foreign account, see Linda Gail Arrigo, “Three Years and a Lifetime: Swept Up in Taiwan’s Democratic Movement, 1977–79,” in *A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights through International Networks, 1960–1980*, ed. Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles (Taipei: Social Empowerment Alliance, 2008), pp. 314, 316.

45 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai 1*, 1, pp. 60–62.

46 *Ibid.*, p. 62. For Shih Ming-teh’s release, see *ibid.*, p. 54.

island.⁴⁷ In preparation for this meeting, Huang Hsin-chieh told Shih Ming-teh that in singing the national anthem, the word “party” (*dang* 黨) should be changed to “people” (*min* 民). As a result, everyone was happy and no one protested singing the national anthem.⁴⁸ After two hours, when the meeting was about to close, some “anti-Communists” created a disturbance and protested the amended word of the national anthem. Chairman Huang Hsin-chieh said, “This meeting is a meeting protected by the Constitution. These are bad people sent by the Communist Party to disrupt the meeting. If someone beats these bad people to death, I will not be responsible!” The disrupters fled.⁴⁹

During the campaign, various candidates raised issues relevant to Taiwan and to democratization. Annette Lu 呂秀蓮 in Taoyuan discussed “the Taiwan Question,” “The Community Concerned with Taiwan’s Fate,” and “Taiwan’s Past and Future.” In Changhua Yao Chia-wen talked about the constitution, martial law and the complete re-election of the legislature.⁵⁰

On November 1, 1978, two former members of the Kuomintang, Chen Ku-ying 陳鼓應, a Mainlander professor of philosophy at National Taiwan University running for National Assembly, and Chen Wan-chen 陳婉真, a former reporter for the *China Times* running for the legislature, issued a joint statement denouncing the Kuomintang’s thirty years of rule in Taiwan.⁵¹ In addition, they established a “Democracy Wall” near the gate of National Taiwan University, where conservatives also launched a “Patriotism Wall.”⁵² Their actions were colloquially summarized as “From within the Party, they hit their way out, joined with the *dangwai* and hit their way back in.”⁵³

At least twenty-seven candidates actively ran for the legislature and National Assembly with the support of the *Dangwai* Election Assistance Group.⁵⁴ On December 16, 1978 in Taiwan, the American government announced it was establishing formal diplomatic with China as of January 1. This naturally raised concern in Taiwan and led to the government postponing the central parliamentary elections scheduled for December 23. In response, twenty-seven *dangwai* personages issued a statement calling on the government to quickly

47 Ibid., pp. 62, 64, 66.

48 Ibid., p. 64.

49 Ibid., pp. 64, 66.

50 Ibid., pp. 66, 68.

51 Ibid., p. 68. This source reprints their joint statement.

52 Ibid., pp. 66–71.

53 Ibid., p. 68.

54 Ibid., p. 71.

restore the elections and to “bravely oppose the lures and oppression of military rule.”⁵⁵

Dangwai Political Activities in 1979

With the indefinite postponement of the December 23, 1978 election, the *dangwai* continued its activities in an effort to stay in the limelight for the forthcoming election. Because of a conflict between Huang Hsin-chieh and Kang Ning-hsiang, several *dangwai* leaders went to Kaohsiung County to ask Yu Teng-fa, a founding member of the “China Democratic Self-Government Research Association” in 1960, who won election as Kaohsiung County Executive that year, to become the national “spiritual” *dangwai* leader. Yu Teng-fa agreed, though the leader of the Black Faction in Kaohsiung County had never participated in *dangwai* activities in the 1970s. Under his chairmanship, a *Dangwai* National Affairs Meeting (*Dangwai guoshi huiyi* 黨外國是會議) met on December 25 at the Ambassador Hotel in Taipei with 73 people despite attempts of the security agencies to inhibit the meeting.⁵⁶

But divisions soon appeared in the *dangwai*. Some, like Yu Teng-fa, Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興 (who later went to China), Wang Tuoh 王拓, Chen Ku-ying and Su Ching-li 蘇慶黎,⁵⁷ the editor of *China Tide* (*Xia Chao* 夏朝), a leftist magazine that began publishing on February 28, 1976,⁵⁸ advocated unity with China. Others, including Shih Ming-teh, Lin I-hsiung, Hsu Hsin-liang, Yao Chia-wen, and Chang Chun-hung, favored a separate Taiwan.⁵⁹

On January 21, 1979, the authorities arrested Yu Teng-fa and his son and charged them with “knowing a Communist and not reporting it.” Yu Teng-fa was sentenced to eight years in prison on April 16. In a sense, the Yu Teng-fa case in itself is not important to Taiwan’s democratization and I have analyzed it elsewhere.⁶⁰ More importantly, on January 22, the day after the arrest, Taoyuan County Executive Hsu Hsin-liang and other prominent *dangwai* leaders⁶¹ went to Yu’s home village and to Kaohsiung City to protest. In April, in

55 For this quote and full text, see *ibid.*, p. 72.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 72–74.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 55.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 74.

60 J. Bruce Jacobs, “Taiwan 1979: ‘Normalcy’ After ‘Normalization,’” *Asian Survey* xx, no. 1 (January 1980), pp. 90–91.

61 A list of about twenty-five other leaders appears in Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai* 1, 1, p. 79.

order to impeach Hsu, the Control Branch announced an investigation into Hsu's "taking leave without permission," participating in an illegal demonstration and signing leaflets that libeled the government.⁶²

To support Hsu Hsin-liang as well as Yu Teng-fa, on May 26, 1979 the *dangwai* opposition organized a massive "birthday party" for Hsu Hsin-liang in his hometown of Chungli, the very location of the Chungli Incident eighteen months previously. Naturally, both the government and the opposition felt concern about the sensitive nature of the location. Between ten thousand and thirty thousand people attended to show support for the *dangwai* and to listen to the speeches, but the uniformed police and military stayed well away from the crowd. As the largest non-government sponsored, non-electoral peaceful political gathering in Taiwan's history, Hsu's birthday party was very important for the development of democracy in Taiwan. Unfortunately, the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries suspended Hsu from office for two years. Hsu left for "study" overseas and promised to return to finish the final six months of his term in June 1981.⁶³

On June 1, 1979, key members of the *dangwai* established *Formosa Magazine* (*Meilidao zazhi* 美麗島雜誌). As Shih Ming-teh told this writer in May, the opposition would establish a political party without using the term "political party." The magazine established county offices around the island, offices which they called "service centers" (*fuwu chu* 服務處). Ironically, this was exactly the same term used by the Kuomintang in its external nomenclature for its county party headquarters, though interviews several years later indicated the *dangwai* leaders did not realize this.⁶⁴ Naturally, this organization, as well as the language, scared the Kuomintang which had consistently prevented the establishment of any organization that could threaten Kuomintang rule.

In the meantime, as it could not gain publicity for the forthcoming elections in the Kuomintang-controlled media, the *dangwai* continued its public demonstrations throughout 1979. Two key demonstrations, the Taichung Incident of July 28 and the Chungtai Hotel Incident of September 8, deserve special analysis both for their importance in Taiwan's democratization movement and because they illustrate the difficulties that the *dangwai* faced in this struggle.

62 Jacobs, "Taiwan 1979," p. 91.

63 More details can be found in *ibid.*, pp. 91–92.

64 At the township level, the Kuomintang used the external nomenclature of "Service Station" (*fuwu fenshe* 服務分社) rather than the internal nomenclature of "District Party Office" (*quandangbu* 區黨部). However, at the county level, the KMT generally used the internal nomenclature of County Party Headquarters (*xian dangbu* 縣黨部) rather than the external nomenclature of Service Center (*fuwuchu* 服務處).

In comparative terms, the Taichung Incident was relatively small. The twenty-odd *dangwai* demonstrators did not even have a microphone. They were met by “a group of super-patriots” who banged on their cars and shouted two sets of slogans, “Communist Party! Communist Party! Kill the Communist Party!” and “Taichung’s citizens do not welcome you! Get out! Get out!”⁶⁵ The Fire Department also gave the demonstrators a “baptism” with fire hoses.⁶⁶ A picture of the event shows some twenty people in Taichung Park peacefully seated in a circle listening to Chiu Chui-chen 邱垂貞 play his guitar while singing Taiwan folksongs.⁶⁷

On September 8, the newly formed *Formosa Magazine* held a cocktail party to celebrate the magazine’s founding. The location was the Kowloon Room at the Chungtai Hotel (also known in English as the Mandarin Hotel) on Tunhua North Road in Taipei. In applying for permission to hold the cocktail party, the *Formosa Magazine* had met many obstructions. Originally, the *Formosa Magazine* had tried to book the Hilton Hotel, but had been rejected. They then were able to book the Chungtai Hotel and paid a deposit. The Chungtai Hotel also got cold feet and tried to return the deposit, but the *Formosa Magazine* refused. Finally, the *Formosa Magazine* told the authorities that if they did not receive permission to hold the cocktail party indoors, they would hold it outdoors either in a park near the presidential office or in front of the international airport in Taoyuan. The Deputy Secretary-General of the Kuomintang’s Policy Committee, Kuan Chung 關中, then came forward and the cocktail party went ahead at the Chungtai Hotel as planned.⁶⁸

When the five hundred guests for the cocktail party started to arrive in the afternoon, they were met by several hundred demonstrators organized by *Gust Magazine* (*Jifeng zazhi* 疾風雜誌) who had put up signs proclaiming such

65 Fan Zhengyou 范政祐, “Qi erba Taizhong naoju zhi wo guan: gei Taizhong shimin de gongkai xin 七二八台中鬧劇之我觀：給台中市民的公開信 [My Views on the Taichung Farce of July 28: An Open Letter to Taichung’s Citizens],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), p. 74.

66 On the Taichung Incident, see *ibid.*, pp. 74–76. See also He Wenzhen 何文振, “Qi erba Taizhong shijian zhenxiang 七二八台中事件真相 [The Truth about the Taichung Incident of July 28],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), p. 73. In their overseas editions, neither the *Lianhebao* nor the *Zhongyang ribao* reported on the Taichung Incident.

67 Zhang Fuzhong 張富忠 and Qiu Wanxing 邱萬興, *Lüse niandai 1*, 1, p. 88.

68 Wu Zhengshuo 吳正朔, “Zhongtai binguan shijian shimo 中泰賓館事件始末 [The Chungtai Hotel Incident from the Beginning to the End],” *Da shidai* 大時代 [*Great Epoch*], no. 4 (October 5, 1979), p. 9. This article is the classic account of the Chungtai Hotel Incident.

things as “Grand Meeting to Condemn the National Traitor Chen Wan-chen.” In addition, when guests went into the function, the demonstrators shouted such things as “Various compatriots are prepared to destroy you at any time,” “Kill him!” and “Destroy the Black Fist Gang!” Less violent shouted slogans included “Long Live the Republic of China!” and “Long Live President Chiang!”⁶⁹

About 3.20 PM the formal part of the cocktail party began with Annette Lu as master of ceremonies. Led by the publisher of the *Formosa Magazine*, Huang Hsin-chieh, several people spoke. Kuan Chung, the KMT Deputy-Secretary of the Policy Committee, came and shook hands with several people before departing. Shih Ming-teh went outside to have a look and was called “Linda Arrigo’s sex tool.” There were also shouts of “Taiwan Independence!,” “National Traitor!,” and “Get Out!”⁷⁰

The *Formosa Magazine* had booked the Kowloon Room until 5pm. At that time, Hsiao Yu-ching 蕭玉井, one of the *Gust* leaders, yelled: “Taiwan Independent elements, get out. It is already five o’clock. Please go out under police protection with your tail between your legs and get out!” Others in the crowd responded, “Get Out! Get Out! Get Out!”⁷¹

Clearly the *Gust* demonstrators posed a threat to the guests of the *Formosa Magazine*. The police sent three buses to the Chungtai Hotel and asked the *dangwai* guests to leave in the buses. The *dangwai* guests refused as they believed the demonstrators outside were those who were acting illegally. Around 7 PM it had already become dark and the police again sent buses and again the *dangwai* guests refused to board the police buses. The *Gust* demonstrators continued to hurl abuse. The riot police arrived and some used electric prods on some *Gust* demonstrators who fell down. Hsiao Yu-ching yelled, “Lie Down! Sit Down! Lie Down! Sit Down!” The demonstrators did as instructed. The riot police back off and surrounded the demonstrators.⁷²

Around 7.40 PM, Lao Cheng-wu 勞政武, another *Gust* leader, spoke to the demonstrators, “We have already won. Now we must respect the requests of the police and go home and have a happy weekend.” Finally, the crowd dispersed. About 8 PM, the *dangwai* organized about one hundred men into two lines who protected the elderly, women and children between the two lines. The *dangwai* participants proceeded to march out under police guard as well. Some yelled “Beautiful Island” and some yelled “One, two, one, two.” A taxi drove into the crowd, but no one was hurt. By the time the *dangwai* marchers

69 Ibid., p. 8.

70 Ibid., p. 11.

71 Ibid., p. 12.

72 Ibid., p. 13.

reached Changchun Road, they were no longer in order. Other incidents took place like the sound of an explosion and people throwing rocks breaking windows.⁷³

The Chungtai Hotel Incident was important for several reasons. First, it showed the *dangwai* could convene an orderly meeting. Second, it demonstrated that the threats to public order came from such right-wing “patriotic” groups as the *Gust Magazine*. According to the police, it was the *Gust* demonstrators, not the *dangwai*, who threatened public order.⁷⁴ The reports of the Chungtai Incident varied greatly among Taiwan’s daily newspapers.⁷⁵ For example, some newspapers did not report the numbers attending the Formosa Magazine cocktail party, while other reported from several hundred to even a thousand people participating.⁷⁶

The *Formosa Magazine* published four issues on August 16, September 25, October 25 and November 25, 1979. Many of those involved in the *dangwai* in 1979 were involved in the magazine according to the list published on the back cover of the first issue: Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介, Lin I-hsiung 林義雄, Yao Chia-wen 姚嘉文, Chang Te-ming 張德銘, Huang Tien-fu 黃天福, Lu Hsiu-lien (Annette Lu) 呂秀蓮, Hsu Hsin-liang 許信良, Chang Chun-hung 張俊宏, Shih Ming-teh 施明德, Wei Ting-chao 魏廷朝, Wang Tuoh 王拓, Su Ching-li 蘇慶黎, Hsieh San-sheng 謝三升, Hsieh Hsiu-hsiung 謝秀雄, and Huang Huang-hsiung 黃皇雄. Many others were also involved as committee members including such people as Kang Ning-hsiang 康寧祥, Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興 and Hsu Shih-hsien 許世賢. The first issue had 100 pages including the two covers and each issue expanded until the fourth issue had 132 pages. Circulation increased until it reached about 100,000 for the fourth issue,⁷⁷ about one per cent of Taiwan’s population.

The first issue of *Formosa Magazine* began with a statement launching the magazine by the publisher, Huang Hsin-chieh, entitled “All work together to push a political movement of the new generation!” Huang said that the break in relations with the United States “announced the bankruptcy of the KMT government’s foreign policy for the past thirty years” and created the greatest political crisis for the KMT since it began to rule Taiwan. One political response

73 Ibid., p. 14.

74 Ibid., pp. 8, 13, 18.

75 Wen Chaogong 文抄公, “Ni kan de shi shenme bao? ge bao dui Zhongtai shijian de bao-dao 你看的是什麼報？各報對中泰事件的報導 [What Newspaper Do You read? The Reports of Different Newspapers on the Chungtai Incident],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 83–87.

76 Ibid., p. 83.

77 Katherine Lee, “Taiwan’s dissidents,” *Index on Censorship* 9, no. 6 (December 1980), p. 54.

has been to stop the elections. But “democracy will not die. Long live elections.”⁷⁸ The statement also emphasized Taiwan: “This beautiful island (*meili zhi dao* 美麗之島) is our homeland where we have grown up. We deeply love this piece of land and its people, who have drunk its milk as they have grown. And we have concern about our future joint fate.”⁷⁹

In 1979 *Formosa* struck its readers as radical and new. Today, over thirty years later and after more than two decades of democracy, *Formosa* seems milder. The first issue had a six-page commentary entitled “Long Live Democracy,”⁸⁰ Two pages of legislative interpellation by Huang Shun-hsing⁸¹ and five pages of Cabinet response.⁸² With regard to the provincial level, the issue had a commentary on “What can the ‘provincial chairman’ do?”⁸³ and an article on the “ten best provincial assembly members” chosen by twenty-two relatively young observers of the provincial assembly. Of the fourteen finally chosen (five provincial assembly members tied for the tenth position), eight—including the first three place-getters—were non-partisans.⁸⁴ As previously discussed, the first issue also had two articles on the Taichung Incident of July 28.⁸⁵

78 Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介, “Fakan ci: gongtong lai tuidong xinshengdai zhengzhi yundong! 發刊詞：共同來推動新生代政治運動! [Words on Launching Magazine: All work together to push a political movement of the new generation!],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), inside front cover.

79 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

80 Ben she 本社 [*Formosa Magazine*], “Dangwai zhenglun: minzhu wansui 黨外政論：民主萬歲 [*Dangwai Commentary: Long Live Elections*],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 4–9.

81 Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興, “Xiang xingzhengyuan zhixun san ze 向行政院質詢三則 [Three Interpellations of the Cabinet],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 10–11.

82 Xingzhengyuan 行政院 [Cabinet], “Fulu: dui Huang weiyuan Shunxing zhixun zhi shumian dafu 附錄：對黃委員順興質詢書面答覆 [Appendix: Written Answers to the Interpellations of Legislator Huang Shun-hsing],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 12–16.

83 Huang Huang-hsiung 黃煌雄, “‘Sheng zhuxi’ neng zuo shenme? ‘省主席’能做什麼? [What can the ‘Provincial Chairman’ Do?],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 34–36.

84 Zhou Qingyuan 周清源, “Shi da shengyiyuan 十大省議員 [Ten Great Provincial Assembly Members],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 1 (August 16, 1979), pp. 37–39.

85 Fan Zhengyou 范政祐, “Qi erba”. He Wenzhen 何文振, “Qi erba.”

The second issue of *Formosa* had two articles on the Chungtai Hotel Incident of September 8 discussed above.⁸⁶ In addition, the second issue had the text of three *dangwai* legislators interpellating Premier Sun Yuan-suan,⁸⁷ two responses to the article in the first issue on “Ten Great Provincial Assembly Members”⁸⁸ and the transcript of a long forum on the draft election and recall law⁸⁹ among other items.

The third issue contained an extensive interpellation of Premier Sun by Legislator Huang Shun-hsing on behalf of Taiwan’s farmers.⁹⁰ Another extended article raised the very sensitive issue of Taiwanese/Mainlander relations.⁹¹ The article began by pointing out that Taiwanese account for 87.8 per cent of Taiwan’s population, while Mainlander account for 12.2 per cent. Of the Taiwanese, about two per cent are aborigines, Hokkien account for 83.1 per cent and Hakka account for 15.6 per cent. Among the Hokkien, those originating from Chuanchou account for 44.8 per cent while those from Changchou number 35.2 per cent.⁹² Publishing these figures right at the front of the article broke many taboos.

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- 86 Ben she 本社 [Formosa Magazine], “Dangwai zhenglun: Shaoshu pai yu baoli, ping Zhongtai binguan qian de naoju 黨外政論：少數派與暴力，評中泰賓館前的鬧劇 [Dangwai Commentary: The Minority Faction and Violence, A Critique of the Farce in Front of the Chungtai Hotel],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 4–5. Wen Chaogong 文抄公, “Ni kan.”
- 87 Fei Xiping 費希平, Huang Hsin-chieh 黃信介, and Kang Ning-xiang 康寧祥, “Jiu women suo mianlin de san xiang zhengzhi wenti xiang xingzhengyuan Sun yuanzhang tichu zhixun 就我們所面臨的三項政治問題向行政院孫院長提出質詢 [Interpellating Premier Sun about Three Political Questions which We Face],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 7–8.
- 88 Chen Qiude 陳秋德, “Feichang jumianxia, shengyiyuan suowei heshi? 非常局面下，省議員所謂何事？ [Under Unusual Circumstances, What are Provincial Assembly Members to do?],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 20–23. Ye Fengsheng 葉逢生, “‘Shida shengyiyuan’ xuanba yup’. 十大省議員’ 選拔餘波 [Trouble After Selecting the Best ‘Ten Great Provincial Assembly Members’]” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 24–25.
- 89 Ben she 本社 [Formosa Magazine], “Xuanju bamianfa cao’an zuotanhui jilu 選舉罷免法草案座談會紀錄 [Record of Forum on Draft Election and Recall Law],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 2 (September 25, 1979), pp. 34–41.
- 90 Huang Shun-hsing 黃順興, “Wei nongmin quanyi xiang xingzhengyuan Sun yuanzhang zhixun 為農民權益向行政院孫院長質詢 [Interpellation of Premier Sun on the Rights and Interests of Farmers],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 3 (October 25, 1979), pp. 35–42.
- 91 Liu Fengsong 劉峯松, “Yiqian babaiwan ren de Taiwan shi 一千八百萬人的台灣史 [The Taiwan History of Eighteen Million People],” *Meilidao* 美麗島 [Formosa], no. 3 (October 25, 1979), pp. 69–76.
- 92 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

Next, the article asked who is Taiwan's *zhuren* 主人, a term meaning "master" or "lord" in this context. These are the aborigines who came many centuries before the Hokkien, but the Hokkien, Hakkas and Mainlanders do not discuss this.⁹³ After discussing the reasons Hokkien and Hakka came to Taiwan 200–300 years previously, the article gives statistics on Mainlander males and females arriving from 1947–1951.⁹⁴ In terms of modern scholarship, the article declines a bit. It divides Taiwan's history into period of unity with the mainland (216 years) and separation (139 years),⁹⁵ periods of rule by Chinese (56 years) and by others (299 years), and then subdivides the rule by Chinese into 4 years of unity (with China) and 52 years of separation.⁹⁶ In the last paragraph, the article concludes, "Lastly, this article raises democracy, because only with democracy can we change our unclear destiny. Only with democracy can the people here stand on this land and genuinely protect themselves."⁹⁷

The fourth issue of *Formosa Magazine* covered a variety of areas including commentary of the 1979 coup against Park Chung-hee in Korea,⁹⁸ three discussions of matters relevant to provincial politics,⁹⁹ several articles on human rights and overseas human rights organizations such as Amnesty International,¹⁰⁰ and the transcript of a long forum on labor unions.¹⁰¹ Shih Ming-teh had a detailed account of the demonstrations in support of Yu Teng-fa in January 1979.¹⁰²

Formosa Magazine never published again. Three weeks later, on December 10, 1979, the *Formosa Magazine* sponsored a demonstration in Kaohsiung in celebration of Human Rights Day. Originally, this Kaohsiung demonstration was one of several planned until the legislative election. It was to be surpassed by a planned demonstration in Taipei on December 16, exactly one year after the United States broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid., p. 70.

95 Ibid., p. 73.

96 Ibid., p. 74.

97 Ibid., p. 76.

98 *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 4 (November 25, 1979), pp. 4–5, 6, 70–77, 77–78.

99 Ibid., pp. 7–11, 13–16, 30–34.

100 Ibid., pp. 40–44, 51.

101 Ibid., pp. 52–69.

102 Shi Mingde 施明德, "Taiwan minzhu yundong huashidai de yitian: dangwai renshi wei Yu Dengfa an youxing kangyi jishi 台灣民主運動劃時代的一天：黨外人士為兩余登發案遊行抗議記實 [An Epoch-Making Day in the Taiwan Democratic Movement: A True Account of the *Dangwai* Personnages Marching to Resist the Yu Teng-fa Case]," *Meilidao* 美麗島 [*Formosa*], no. 4 (November 25, 1979), pp. 82–88.