

College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

---

Political Opposition and Taiwan's Political Future

Author(s): J. Bruce Jacobs

Source: *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 6 (Jul., 1981), pp. 21-44

Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2159050>

Accessed: 17-10-2017 09:08 UTC

---

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <http://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

*College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, The University of Chicago Press* are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*

# POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE

J. Bruce Jacobs

About 8.30 pm on 10 December 1979, demonstrators commemorating World Human Rights Day clashed violently with members of Taiwan's security agencies in Gaoxiong (Kaohsiung), Taiwan's second largest city and its major industrial centre and chief port. About fifty hours later, at dawn on 13 December 1979, following extensive debates involving Taiwan's highest political authorities, Taiwan's security agencies arrested over sixty leaders of and participants in what has become known as the Gaoxiong Incident. Those arrested included most of Taiwan's non-partisan political opposition. A series of relatively open trials cast substantial doubts on the government's case, but these leaders are currently serving heavy prison sentences.

The Nationalist Party (*Guomindang*) leadership in Taiwan has never intended to implement democracy in the sense of permitting a loyal opposition to replace the Nationalist leadership and gain control of the reins of government through elections, though non-partisan candidates can and do defeat Nationalist Party nominees in relatively open elections. Democracy in the sense of increased civil liberties and reduced constraints on speech and publication – sometimes called 'liberalisation' – did, however, seem to be developing in Taiwan during the 1970s.<sup>1</sup> Has the government's harsh response to the Gaoxiong Incident irrevocably reversed this trend? The arrests and trials remain too recent to analyse for their long-term impact; but, as an advocate of democracy and a long-term observer of Taiwan, I feel an unprecedented pessimism about Taiwan's political future.

This article attempts to provide some preliminary perspectives for analysing the impact of the Gaoxiong Incident on Taiwan's political future.

THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS NO.6

## I. POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN TAIWAN

Political scientists have discovered that analysis of political opposition enhances their understanding of a wide variety of political systems.<sup>2</sup> Examination of political opposition in Taiwan, where the subject has often been high on the political agenda, helps elucidate both recent events and the nature of the political system itself. In Taiwan, two general categories of political opposition exist. First, there are the illegal, covert opposition organisations based primarily outside Taiwan. Secondly, a wide variety of individuals and groups within Taiwan engage in legitimate opposition activity. Some of this legitimate opposition activity approaches the border of illegality and, as the case of the Gaoxiong Incident illustrates, the government on occasion determines that it crosses that boundary.

**Illegal, Covert Political Opposition**

Despite wide variations in programmes and frequent mutual enmity, the illegal political organisations share a commitment to overthrow the Nationalist political system on Taiwan, which they consider illegitimate. The very nature of illegal, covert opposition minimises the information available to scholars for analysis, but two general groupings of illegal political opposition, the Chinese Communists and the Taiwanese Independence Movement, stand out as most important.

Before 1945, the Chinese Communists did not devote much attention to Taiwan. The Comintern made Taiwan the responsibility of the Japanese Communist Party during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945),<sup>3</sup> though some Taiwanese went to the mainland and joined the Communist Party of China<sup>4</sup> and a few Taiwanese members of the Communist Party of China worked in Taipei (Taipei).<sup>5</sup> The close historical links between the Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist parties on the mainland between 1921 and 1949, when they co-operated as well as fought, has assured substantial mutual infiltration. Such interpenetration exists in all divided nations (e.g. Germany, Korea, and pre-1975 Vietnam) and thus discovery over the years of communist agents in Taiwan's government and party organisations cannot be surprising. Communist agents certainly continue to exist in Taiwan (as do Nationalist agents on the mainland), though outsiders cannot determine their numbers, strength, or degree of commitment. Communist and communist-front organisations such as the Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League also exist in China and in overseas Taiwanese communities. But future Communist control of Taiwan would almost certainly require the co-operation of Taiwan's Nationalist leadership which does not seem probable at present.<sup>6</sup>

The avowed goal of the Taiwanese Independence Movement has been to create a political system in Taiwan which is neither Communist nor Nationalist. Since the Taiwanese Independence Movement would detach Taiwan from China, both the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists oppose the Taiwanese Independence Movement. In fact, the Chinese Communists oppose the Taiwanese Independence Movement so strongly, they appear to prefer continued Nationalist control of the island.

The Taiwanese Independence Movement has been based primarily overseas in Japan, the United States, and Europe,<sup>7</sup> though some Taiwanese Independence advocates like Peng Mingmin and Shi Mingde have emerged on Taiwan itself.<sup>8</sup> Until the early 1970s, the Taiwanese Independence Movement relied primarily upon hopes that the United States would maintain its enmity with the Chinese Communists, renounce its support of the Chinese Nationalists, and support the Taiwanese Independence Movement's democratic platform and claimed independent international legal status. The Shanghai Communique signed by Richard Nixon and Zhou Enlai on 27 February 1972 dashed these always slim hopes and many Taiwanese Independence Movement leaders returned to Taiwan later that year.<sup>9</sup> The Taiwanese Independence Movement overseas, however, now includes many younger highly educated scientists and engineers. The Movement has bombed Chinese Nationalist offices in the United States as well as houses in the United States belonging to kin of Chinese Nationalist officials and the dangers have caused several high Chinese Nationalist officials to bring their children from the United States back to Taiwan. The hysterical diatribes against the Taiwanese Independence Movement which appeared in Taiwan's press during the months following the Gaoxing Incident and the (generally unsuccessful) attempts to link the leaders of Taiwan's non-partisans to the Taiwanese Independence Movement during the trials may indicate growing Taiwanese Independence Movement strength overseas. Yet, even the most extreme rhetoric of Taiwan's non-partisan leaders prior to the Gaoxing Incident and during their trials suggests that they cannot be classified as advocates of the Taiwanese Independence Movement and that the Taiwanese Independence Movement remains weak within Taiwan. Thus, although the government frequently rails against the Chinese Communists and the Taiwanese Independence Movement, illegal, covert political opposition does not play an important role in Taiwan's political system.

### Legal Political Opposition in Taiwan

Taiwan's legal opposition has been extraordinarily variegated. By focussing on political parties, we can distinguish three broad categories of legal political opposition. These, in ascending order of importance, are

the two minor parties, the non-partisans, and groups within the ruling Nationalist Party.

The Taiwan authorities permit the existence of two 'friendly parties' (*youdang*), the Youth Party (*Qingniandang*) and the Democratic-Socialist Party (*Minshedang*), which most observers see simply as adjuncts of the Nationalist Party. A series of interviews conducted in the early 1970s with central and local leaders of both minor parties suggested, however, that despite substantial controls the minor parties do provide opposition to the Nationalist Party. In fact, rarely in Taiwan have I heard such pungent and detailed critiques of the Taiwan political system.

This political opposition originated during the Nationalist period on the mainland when both parties (or their antecedents) suffered repression necessitating periods underground or in exile overseas even though both parties consisted primarily of intellectuals and lacked mass bases. Many minor party leaders did not come to Taiwan out of love for the Nationalists, but only because they believed the Nationalists the 'lesser evil' for China. The programmes and ideologies of both parties differ from those of the Nationalist Party, a point which the minor party leaders (many of whom have since died) stressed in the early 1970s. Thus, in contrast to the Nationalist Party's ideology of the Three People's Principles, the Youth Party advocates 'Nationalism' while the Democratic-Socialist Party favours Fabian Socialism and an increased role for trade unions.

Several factors have weakened the opposition roles of the minor parties at the central level. First, factionalism has reduced the effectiveness of the parties and on occasion even rendered them immobile (e.g. unable to make an appointment allocated to them). The bases for these factions often seem personal, but leaders also pointed to pro-Nationalist Party and anti-Nationalist Party factions within the minor parties. The existence of these pro-Nationalist party groups within the minor parties as well as Nationalist Party control of the police, facilitates a second weakening factor, the Nationalist Party's thorough infiltration of the minor parties. Finally, in recent years the leadership of the minor parties has become aged and declined in numbers. At the central level, interpellation in the Central Parliamentary organs remains the most effective method of minor political party opposition but, as noted by even minor party leaders, the minor party parliamentarians interpellate as individuals rather than as representatives of their respective parties.

No finding about the minor parties surprised me more than the discovery that they have had some success in recruiting native Taiwanese members throughout the island. Membership statistics obtained in interviews varied widely, but estimating from data given for localities as well as island-wide figures, it seems probable each minor party had in excess of 10,000 members during the early 1970s and perhaps as many as 20,000-

30,000 members.<sup>10</sup> (The Nationalist Party's membership in late 1970 exceeded one million.) All sources agree the Youth Party has recruited more Taiwanese members than the Democratic-Socialist Party. These people have joined the minor parties in spite of obstacles inhibiting minor party recruitment and disabilities suffered by minor party members. The minor parties, for example, cannot recruit actively in institutions of higher learning and those who join the minor parties may find they cannot obtain permission to study abroad or that they are dismissed from their government or teaching jobs or from such institutions as banks. Thus, the self-employed constitute a good proportion of the minor party memberships.

Why have Taiwanese joined the minor parties? Some joined during the 1950s when it seemed the minor parties might have a greater role to play. One person explained he joined a minor party in order to end pressure to join the Nationalist Party. Several minor party members have won election to the Provincial Assembly, County Executiveships (and equivalent mayoralities), and to the various County and Municipal Assemblies, but most minor party members have run as non-partisans, not disclosing their minor party memberships publicly until after winning office. The Nationalist Party fears an opposition *organisation* more than an isolated non-partisan individual (a theme addressed in Sections III and IV below) and therefore makes greater efforts to defeat minor party candidates than non-partisan candidates. In fact, very little distinguishes a minor party candidate from a non-partisan candidate; the minor party candidate will obtain quiet support and some funds from fellow party members in his locality, but the weakness of the minor party organisations and their small memberships suggest this help has little significance. Because the differences are negligible, local-level members of the minor parties have been included as 'non-partisans' in the following analyses.

Non-partisans have provided the most visible as well as the most diverse political opposition in Taiwan. Although some non-partisans have proved trenchant critics of the political authorities, many simply use politics to gain prestige or 'face'.<sup>11</sup> During the early 1970s several young intellectuals privately expressed their disappointment at discovering how many non-partisans focussed their energies on obtaining office and lacked either the ability or the desire to use their office once elected. This absence of political programme and concern with 'face' has contributed to non-partisan weakness. The points of entry into the political system available to non-partisans also reduces their political power. Non-partisans can win county or township executive posts or legislative positions, but policy formulation occurs at Taiwan's higher levels leaving local levels the task of implementing higher-level policies,<sup>12</sup> while legislative bodies at all levels in Taiwan have little power *vis-a-vis* the executive. Finally, non-partisans have tended to remain isolated from each other making few

contracts across the boundaries of their local electorates. Concern for 'face' and re-election makes many non-partisans concentrate on their home districts, but non-partisan organisation can be dangerous. The two efforts to organise non-partisans around the island, the Democratic Party led by Lei Zhen in 1960 and the Formosa Magazine organisation which sponsored the Gaoxiong demonstration in December 1979 (both discussed below), have resulted in long prison terms for many of their leaders.

A special kind of non-partisan political organisation, which has also provided political opposition and resulted in prison sentences for its leaders, has been the Presbyterian Church. Several factors distinguish the Presbyterians from other religious groups in Taiwan. First, the Presbyterians became well established in Taiwan during the second half of the 19th century. In contrast, many other churches such as the Catholics basically arrived with the Nationalists from the mainland in the late 1940s. Thus, the Presbyterians have been a Taiwanese church rather than a mainlander church. Secondly, the foreign connections of the Presbyterians have provided political protection unavailable to 'native' heterodox religions, especially since the Nationalists have used 'freedom of religion' to press their claims overseas to be 'Free China'. Thirdly, the Presbyterians have proven extraordinarily idealistic; they cannot be bought and often seem to desire martyrdom. This makes government repression counterproductive. On 16 August 1977 the Presbyterians issued 'A Declaration on Human Rights' which approached advocacy of Taiwanese Independence:

We insist that the future of Taiwan shall be determined by the 17 million people who live there. . . In order to achieve our goal of independence and freedom for the people of Taiwan in this critical international situation, we urge our government to face reality and to take effective measures whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent country.<sup>13</sup>

However, the government did not crack down on key church leaders until April 1980 when they arrested, tried, and convicted several Presbyterian leaders for harbouring Shi Mingde, who escaped during the dawn roundup of 13 December 1979. Ironically, the indicted Presbyterians received much more foreign support than the other defendants in the post-Gaoxiong Incident trials, even though they were the only clearly guilty defendants.

Probably the most significant political opposition in Taiwan comes from within the ruling Nationalist Party, a situation paralleled in communist countries.<sup>14</sup> In fact, only the protection given by powerful persons and groups within the Nationalist Party enabled the non-partisans to speak out and publish opposition magazines in the past. Intra-party

opposition tends to be hidden from view, though policy debates do occasionally become public as, for example, in the aftermath of the 'normalisation' between Washington and Beijing.<sup>15</sup> The mutual antagonisms between the two pre-1949 factions, the CC Clique based in the party organisation and the Youth Corps Group which had been based in the Three People's Principles Youth Corps, provided another source of intra-party opposition, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The CC Clique possessed majorities in the central parliamentary organs while the Youth Corps Group controlled the executive branch creating conflict between the executive branch and the various parliamentary organs as well as within the parliamentary organs themselves. The ageing and deaths of many of these pre-1949 faction leaders along with the strengthening of the Nationalist Party organisation has, however, reduced the importance of these pre-1949 factions in contemporary Taiwan's politics.

## II. THE ELECTION OF 19 NOVEMBER 1977: REAPPRAISING A KEY EVENT

On 19 November 1977, between 7.00 am and 4.00 pm, over seventy percent of Taiwan's citizens went to the polls and cast their 'sacred ballots' for County Executive (and mayoral equivalent), Provincial Assembly, County Assembly, and Township Executive. The election results surprised most observers. Non-partisans won four of the twenty County Executive (and mayoral equivalent) posts defeating Nationalist Party nominees in all four cases. Non-partisans also defeated fourteen of the sixty-nine Nationalist Party nominees for Provincial Assembly and twenty-one non-partisans won seats in the seventy-seven member Provincial Assembly. During the vote counting that night, supporters of the non-partisan candidate for County Executive in Taoyuan County, worried the Nationalist Party would 'steal' the election, began a demonstration in Zhongli Municipality which resulted in the burning of a major police station. The security forces responded non-violently and the Zhongli Incident ended relatively peacefully with very few casualties. The non-partisan candidate for Taoyuan County Executive, Xu Xinliang, won office with 61.5 percent of the vote.

Observers including many non-partisans and Nationalist Party officials considered the 19 November 1977 elections, with the non-partisan defeat of so many Nationalist Party nominees and the occurrence of the Zhongli Incident, significant. Non-partisans, believing they had widespread support, organised for the 23 December 1978 central-level election, which the government ultimately postponed (until 6 December 1980) during the height of the electoral campaign in the tense period following the 16 December 1978 announcement of 'normalisation' between Beijing and Washington. In order to maintain momentum for the postponed election,



the non-partisans continued open and energetic political activity (discussed in Section III below) until the Gaoxiong Incident of 10 December 1979 and the subsequent arrests halted non-partisan activities.

The Nationalist Party, in its response to the 19 November 1977 election, attempted numerous reforms.<sup>16</sup> Interviews at the Central Party Headquarters in Taipei during mid-1979 indicated a realistic commitment on the part of some new appointees to implement these reforms. Unfortunately, several of these people had lost their positions within a year and interviews at the Central Party Headquarters during early 1980 revealed much less commitment to at least some of the reforms.

After observing the 19 November 1977 election in Taiwan's countryside, I agreed with the explicit claims of the non-partisans and the implicit admissions of the Nationalist Party that the 'Nationalist Party suffered an unprecedented "defeat"'.<sup>17</sup> However, I could not,<sup>18</sup> and still cannot, entirely agree with the electoral analysis given by many non-partisans and their intellectual supporters in Taipei which emphasised the anti-Party appeals of the non-partisan candidates and the anti-Party votes they received, especially from educated youth. This analysis seems valid for only a few areas of Taiwan where politically conscious and highly articulate young non-partisans ran issue-oriented campaigns, e.g. Nantou and Yilan counties where Zhang Junhong and Lin Yixiong respectively won the most votes for Provincial Assembly and Taoyuan County where Xu Xinliang became County Executive.<sup>19</sup>

If citizens in most areas of Taiwan did not consciously reject the Nationalist Party when casting their ballots, why did so many non-partisans defeat Nationalist Party nominees? During the 1970s the Nationalist Party gained strength throughout Taiwan as Party membership increased and the Party organisation penetrated deeper into local levels and played an increasingly important role in basic-level politics.<sup>20</sup> The increased strength of the Nationalist Party organisation infected many professional Party cadres with hubris, leading to two major errors in the 19 November 1977 election. First, professional Party cadres played favourites during the nomination process, alienating many long-term, loyal Party members. Many unhappy Party members ran for office 'against Party discipline' (*weiji*) while other local leaders belonging to the Party, who normally would have helped Party nominees, either sat on their hands or quietly helped the 'against Party discipline' campaigns of their friends. Most persons who supported the opponents of Nationalist Party nominees, therefore, did so out of anger with the local Party organisation and/or on the basis of particularistic ties (*guanxi*) with the opponents of the Nationalist Party nominees. They did not work against the Nationalist Party *per se* or desire to 'overthrow the system'. Secondly, the Nationalist Party organisation campaigned so vigorously in support of its nominees that it created

resentment (*fan'gan*) against the Party and enabled non-partisans (including those running 'against Party discipline') to seek 'sympathy votes' (*tongqing piao*). Several non-partisan candidates for Provincial Assembly, who won overwhelming victories, appealed to voters for sympathy without emphasising anti-Party themes in their campaign speeches.<sup>21</sup>

### The 19 November 1977 Election Results in Historical Perspective

As a 'key event' which ultimately led to the jailing of several non-partisans, the election of 19 November 1977 seemed to require a detailed re-analysis and an attempt to place it in historical perspective. To do this I have focussed on the contests for Taiwan's two most important elected offices, County Executive (and mayoral equivalent) and Provincial Assemblyman. Elections for these posts were held in 1950-1951, 1954, 1957, 1960, 1963 (Provincial Assembly), 1964 (County Executive), 1968, 1972, and 1977. For each of these elections I have examined the number of seats won by non-partisans as well as the proportion of votes cast for non-partisan candidates. I have excluded the 1950-1951 elections from the following analysis for three reasons: the Nationalist Party, in the midst of its 1950-1952 Reform, did not nominate candidates and in fact supported some non-partisans against Party members during the 1950-1951 elections;<sup>22</sup> the County Assemblies indirectly elected the 1951 Provincial Assembly in contrast to the popularly-elected 1954 and subsequent Provincial Assemblies; and the 1950-1951 County Executive elections were held on several dates and used run-off elections, procedures changed for the 1954 and subsequent County Executive elections. All the Provincial Assembly and County Executive elections from 1954 to 1977, excepting those held in 1963 and 1964 and with some minor exceptions in 1954, were conducted simultaneously.

The counties and equivalent municipalities serve as the electoral districts for both the County Executive (and equivalent mayoral) and Provincial Assembly elections. (The Provincial Assembly also has electorates for mountain aborigines and plains aborigines.) Since 1954, the County Executive candidate obtaining a plurality of votes wins the elections. Most counties elect more than one Provincial Assemblyman, but each voter may cast a ballot for only one candidate. The Provincial Assembly candidates with the most votes win, though a 'female guarantee' assures women occupy at least ten percent of the Provincial Assembly seats.<sup>23</sup>

The Nationalist Party, in its efforts to maximise its electoral victories while allowing non-partisans some legislative seats, can choose from several alternative strategies in each electorate. In County Executive elections, the Party usually nominates (*timing*) a candidate, which means no other Party member may run against the nominee; if a Party member runs against a

Party nominee, he runs 'against Party discipline' and is expelled from the Party. If two or more good Party members desire a nomination and one of these good candidates seems certain to win, or if no party member worthy of a Party nomination can win, or if a nomination will certainly result in an 'against Party discipline' candidacy, the Party organisation may declare a 'free election' (*ziyou jingxuan*) in an electorate in which any Party member may run, but in which no member receives official support from the Party organisation. The Party declares relatively few 'free elections' for County Executive. Theoretically, the party can also decide not to nominate a candidate for County Executive and leave the position to a non-partisan, though the one time this occurred (in the 1972 Yilan County Executive election), the desired non-partisan became 'ill' and the party finally nominated a candidate.

The Party organisation's strategies in the Provincial Assembly elections resemble those for County Executive, but the multi-member nature of most Provincial Assembly electorates gives the Party more options. The Party may nominate a full slate of candidates or it may nominate a partial slate leaving one or more Provincial Assembly seats in the electorate to non-partisans. Usually, the Party nominates a partial slate if a powerful non-partisan will win against a Party nominee and/or if the Party organisation does not find the probable non-partisan victor too distasteful. 'Free elections' are much more common for the Provincial Assembly than for County Executive. The strengths and quality of the various Party and non-Party candidates and attempts to balance geographic and occupational representation all help determine the strategy employed by the Party in each electorate. Non-partisans generally wait for the Party strategy to become clear before responding. The most important decision facing a non-partisan is whether or not to contest the election. Most elections for County Executive and Provincial Assembly have more candidates running than seats available, meaning some candidates must lose. Uncontested elections do occur, however, necessitating the distinction between contested and uncontested elections in any electoral analysis. Non-partisans generally do not co-ordinate their electoral strategies, but a non-partisan candidate may decide not to run, to withdraw, or to run for another office after determining another non-partisan candidate has greater strength.<sup>24</sup>

The foregoing analysis noted that both the non-partisans and the Nationalist Party responded to the 19 November 1977 electoral results as though the 'Nationalist Party suffered an unprecedented "defeat"'. Were, in fact, the 1977 electoral results 'unprecedented'? Examination of the 1954-1977 electoral data reveals the non-partisans did well in the 1977 election, especially in terms of seats, but they did not win unprecedented proportions of the vote. Table 1 shows the seats won by non-partisans in

the seven County Executive elections between 1954 and 1977.<sup>25</sup> Non-partisans did very well in the 1977 County Executive election; only the 1964 non-partisan candidates for County Executive equalled their performance.

TABLE 1: Non-partisan Seats Won in County Executive Elections, 1954–1977

| Year | Non-partisan<br>Seats<br>[A] | Contested<br>Seats<br>[B] | %<br>Non-partisan<br>[A/Bx100] | Total<br>Seats<br>[C] | %<br>Non-partisan<br>[A/Cx100] |
|------|------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|
| 1954 | 2                            | 13                        | 15.4                           | 21                    | 9.5                            |
| 1957 | 1                            | 18                        | 5.6                            | 21                    | 4.8                            |
| 1960 | 2                            | 13                        | 15.4                           | 21                    | 9.5                            |
| 1964 | 4                            | 12                        | 33.3                           | 21                    | 19.0                           |
| 1968 | 3                            | 15                        | 20.0                           | 20                    | 15.0                           |
| 1972 | 0                            | 11                        | 0.0                            | 20                    | 0.0                            |
| 1977 | 4                            | 13                        | 30.8                           | 20                    | 20.0                           |

Sources:

ZZZY, pp. 689-691

ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3

ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3

LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3

See note 25 for full citations.

The brightest aspect of the 19 November 1977 election for the non-partisans came in the seats won in the Provincial Assembly. Table 2 shows the number of Nationalist Party nominees (Column A) and the number of nominees defeated by non-partisans (B), the number of contested Provincial Assembly seats in which non-partisans ran against Nationalist Party candidates be they nominees or in a 'free election' (C) and the number of non-partisans who defeated Nationalist Party candidates (D), the number of seats deliberately allocated to non-partisans by the Nationalist Party's nomination of partial slates (E) and, finally, the total number of non-partisans elected (D+E) and the total number of Provincial Assembly seats (F) in the seven Provincial Assembly elections between 1954 and 1977. As Table 2 shows, non-partisans won more seats in all categories than ever before, though the 1977 proportion of non-partisans defeating Party nominees only marginally exceeded the performance of the 1957 non-partisans. The non-partisans won an unprecedented percentage of Provincial Assembly seats in 1977 because they did well in the contested elections *and* because the Nationalist Party allocated them a much greater proportion of seats than in 1957.

The significance of the 19 November 1977 elections in terms of seats lies primarily in the simultaneous non-partisan success in both the County Executive and Provincial Assembly elections. In previous years, non-partisans had performed poorly in the County Executive contests when they did well in the Provincial Assembly elections and *vice versa*. In 1977 they did well, in terms of seats, in both sets of elections. In terms of votes, however, the non-partisans did only moderately well.

TABLE 2: Non-partisan Seats Won in Provincial Assembly Elections, 1954-1977

| Year | Nationalist Party Nominees | Nominees Defeated | % Defeated | Contested Seats | Non-partisans Elected | % Non-partisan | Seats Allocated to Non-partisans | Total Non-partisan Seats | Total Provincial Assembly Seats | % Non-partisan |
|------|----------------------------|-------------------|------------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|----------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------|
|      | [A]                        | [B]               | [B/Ax100]  | [C]             | [D]                   | [D/Cx100]      | [E]                              | [D+E]                    | [F]                             | [(D+E)/Fx100]  |
| 1954 | 44                         | 5                 | 11.4       | 52              | 5                     | 9.6            | 5                                | 10                       | 57                              | 17.5           |
| 1957 | 54                         | 10                | 18.5       | 63              | 10                    | 15.9           | 3                                | 13                       | 66                              | 19.7           |
| 1960 | 58                         | 5                 | 8.6        | 64              | 6                     | 9.4            | 9                                | 15                       | 73                              | 20.5           |
| 1963 | 57                         | 5                 | 8.8        | 68              | 7                     | 10.3           | 6                                | 13                       | 74                              | 17.6           |
| 1968 | 60                         | 4                 | 6.7        | 66              | 5                     | 7.6            | 5                                | 10                       | 71                              | 14.1           |
| 1972 | 60                         | 6                 | 10.0       | 66              | 8                     | 12.1           | 7                                | 15                       | 73                              | 20.5           |
| 1977 | 69                         | 14                | 20.3       | 70              | 14                    | 20.0           | 7                                | 21                       | 77                              | 27.3           |

Data calculated from following sources:

ZZZY, pp. 684-689;  
 ZYRB, 2 March 1968, p. 3; ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3;  
 ZYRB, 23 September 1972, p. 1; ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3;  
 ZYRB, 11 August 1977, p. 1 (Int. Ed.); LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3.

See note 25 for full citations.

After the 19 November 1977 elections, non-partisan leaders claimed the non-partisans had obtained between thirty and forty percent of the vote. Analysis of the 1977 election results shows this claim to be true, but two qualifications must be noted. First, although the proportion of votes cast for non-partisans in 1977 increased over the 1968 and 1972 elections, non-partisans had obtained higher proportions of the votes in at least some of the pre-1968 elections. Secondly, the non-partisan vote included many ballots cast for 'false' non-partisans.

Table 3 gives the percentage of votes cast for non-partisan County Executive candidates in both contested electorates, where non-partisans competed against Nationalist Party candidates, and for the whole of Taiwan Province. In contested electorates, the 1977 non-partisans ranked only equal third in the seven elections as the 1977 non-partisans obtained a substantially smaller percentage of votes than did the 1954 and 1964 non-partisans and only equalled the 1960 non-partisans' performance.

Table 4 shows the percentage of votes received by non-partisans in Provincial Assembly electorates where the Nationalist Party nominated full slates (Column A), where the Nationalist Party allocated one or more seats to non-partisans by nominating partial slates (B), in electorates where non-partisans competed against Nationalist Party members be they nominees or running in a 'free election' (C), and for the whole of Taiwan

TABLE 3: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in County Executive Elections, 1954-1977

| Year | In Contested Electorates [A] | No. Electorates | In All Electorates [B] | No. Electorates |
|------|------------------------------|-----------------|------------------------|-----------------|
| 1954 | 45.4                         | 13              | 28.7                   | 21              |
| 1957 | 38.9                         | 18              | 33.6                   | 21              |
| 1960 | 40.9                         | 13              | 28.0                   | 21              |
| 1964 | 45.9                         | 12              | 24.8                   | 21              |
| 1968 | 35.6                         | 15              | 27.6                   | 20              |
| 1972 | 35.0                         | 11              | 21.9                   | 20              |
| 1977 | 40.9                         | 13              | 30.7                   | 20              |

Data calculated from following sources:

- ZZZY, pp. 413-425, 689-691
- DFZZ, pp. 136-146
- LHB, 19 April 1954, p. 1
- ZYRB, 3 May 1954, p. 1
- LHB, 19 July 1954, p. 4
- LHB, 20 December 1954, p. 1
- LHB, 22 April 1957, p. 1
- LHB, 25 April 1960, p. 2
- ZYRB, 27 April 1964, p. 3
- ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3
- ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3
- LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3

See note 25 for full citations.

TABLE 4: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in Provincial Assembly Elections, 1954-1977

| Year | Full Slates Nominated [A] | No. Electorates | Partial Slates Nominated [B] | No. Electorates | Contested Electorates [C] | No. Electorates | All Electorates [D] | No. Electorates  |
|------|---------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------------|------------------|
| 1954 | 28.7                      | 15              | 35.3                         | 3               | 31.2                      | 19              | 29.5                | 20 <sup>a/</sup> |
| 1957 | 29.7                      | 17              | 35.5                         | 2               | 31.2                      | 20              | 30.3                | 22 <sup>b/</sup> |
| 1960 | 29.5                      | 11              | 46.7                         | 8               | 36.4                      | 20              | 34.6                | 23               |
| 1963 | 26.9                      | 13              | 44.8                         | 6               | 32.4                      | 22              | 32.0                | 23               |
| 1968 | 17.4                      | 13              | 45.7                         | 5               | 26.1                      | 20              | 25.5                | 22               |
| 1972 | 22.9                      | 9               | 47.9                         | 6               | 33.5                      | 16              | 29.3                | 22               |
| 1977 | 32.2                      | 13              | 41.1                         | 5               | 34.9                      | 19              | 34.0                | 22               |

- Notes:
- a) Data cannot be calculated with available materials for three of the 23 electorates in 1954: Taidong (Taitung) County, mountain aborigines, and plains aborigines. These three electorates accounted for about 4% of the total 1954 Provincial Assembly vote.
  - b) No data are available for one of the 23 electorates in the 1957 election, the plains aborigines, who cast 1.1% of the total 1957 Provincial Assembly vote.

Data calculated from the following sources:

- ZZZY, pp. 253-257, 267-272, 295, 684-688;
- DFZZ, pp. 88-93;
- LHB, 19 April 1954, p. 1; TWXSB, 19 April 1954, p. 1; ZYRB, 3 May 1954, p. 1;
- LHB, 22 April 1957, p. 1; LHB, 25 April 1960, p. 2;
- TWXSB, 29 April 1963, p. 1;
- ZYRB, 2 March 1968, p. 3; ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3; TWXSB, 22 April 1968, p. 1;
- ZYRB, 23 September 1972, p. 1; ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3;
- ZYRB, 11 August 1977, p. 1. (Int. Ed.); LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3; TWXSB, 20 November 1977, p. 1.

See note 25 for full citations.

Province (D). Only in the electorates where the Nationalist Party nominated a full slate of candidates did the 1977 non-partisans win an unprecedented proportion of the vote; otherwise, non-partisans won a greater proportion of votes in 1960 and came reasonably close to the 1977 results in all of the other elections except 1968. As would be expected, non-partisans have won much larger percentages of the votes in electorates where the Nationalist Party has allocated at least one seat to the non-partisans (Column B) than in electorates where the Party has nominated a full slate (A). Non-partisan candidates in the 1977 County Executive and Provincial Assembly election did well, but they did not win an unprecedented proportion of the votes cast.<sup>26</sup>

The non-partisan vote totals, rather substantial for a political system frequently characterised as a one-party dictatorship, must be partially discounted since some votes went to 'false' non-partisans. The term 'non-partisan', as noted above, encompasses an extraordinarily diverse grouping of individuals. During an interview Huang Xinjie, a non-partisan elected to the Legislative Branch in 1969 and sentenced to fourteen years in prison on 18 April 1980 for his role in the Gaoxiong Incident, divided non-partisans into 'genuine' and 'false' categories. Of the twenty-one non-partisans elected to the Provincial Assembly in 1977, Huang classified only thirteen as 'genuine'.<sup>27</sup> Interestingly, the right-wing opponents of the 'genuine' non-partisans, the sponsors of the magazine *Gust (Jifeng)*, basically agreed with Huang's evaluation; the right-wingers claimed only eleven of the non-partisan Provincial Assemblymen belonged to the 'Black Fist Gang'.<sup>28</sup> (Interviews in mid-1979 with 'genuine' non-partisan Provincial Assemblymen confirmed my observation that Huang's list included a couple of non-political non-partisans.) Thus, according to both sides, a fairly substantial proportion of the votes cast for non-partisans in 1977 went to 'false' non-partisans.

### The Unimportance of Party Affiliation in Voting Behaviour

The focus on the distribution of seats and votes according to party affiliation in the preceding analysis suggests party affiliation plays an important role in determining voter behaviour. In fact, observation and statistical analysis both show party affiliation has little saliency in aggregate voting behaviour. Voters in Taiwan usually cast their ballots on the basis of particularistic ties called *guanxi*. Political leaders support the candidate with whom they have the closest *guanxi* and voters cast their ballots either for the candidate with whom they have the closest *guanxi* or for the candidate supported by the local leader with whom they have the closest *guanxi*. Party members find it difficult to work openly on behalf of non-partisans running against Party nominees, but otherwise party membership makes little difference in voting behaviour.

In the rural township where I observed the 19 November 1977 election, the local leader who basically ran the Party organisation's campaign had been a life-long non-partisan.<sup>29</sup>

Analysis of voting statistics verifies these observations about the low saliency of party affiliation. If voters cast ballots on the basis of party, then the support received by party candidates in the simultaneous County Executive and Provincial Assembly elections should correlate closely. In fact, calculations of Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the simultaneous County Executive and Provincial Assembly elections show extremely low correlations which are statistically insignificant even at the .1 level.<sup>30</sup> Statistical analysis also shows party affiliation remained unimportant in the 19 November 1977 election itself. In the thirteen counties and equivalent municipalities which had contested elections for both County Executive and Provincial Assembly (Table 5), voters clearly did not vote according to party affiliation.<sup>31</sup> This lack of correlation is especially pronounced in the counties where 'genuine' non-partisans ran. In Taoyuan County, Xu Xinliang won 61.5 percent of the votes for County Executive, but the five non-partisans competing against five Party nominees for Provincial Assembly obtained only 27.3 percent of the votes. In Yilan County, Lin Yixiong won 42.7 percent of the Provincial Assembly vote while the non-partisan candidate for County Executive obtained only 13.4 percent of the vote. (In Nantou County where Zhang Junhong won a Provincial Assembly seat, no non-partisan contested the County Executive election.) Thus, we can conclude that party affiliation has played a very small role in Taiwanese voting behaviour.

TABLE 5: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in Contested County Executive and Provincial Assembly Elections, 19 November 1977

| County/<br>Municipality | County<br>Executive | Provincial<br>Assembly |
|-------------------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Jilong Mun.             | 43.3                | 33.2                   |
| Taizhong Mun.           | 50.4                | 27.0                   |
| Tainan Mun.             | 53.6                | 35.7                   |
| Gaoxiong Mun.           | 44.7                | 51.2                   |
| Taibei Co.              | 34.7                | 29.1                   |
| Taoyuan Co.             | 61.5                | 27.3                   |
| Miaoli Co.              | 30.8                | 27.9                   |
| Taizhong Co.            | 35.7                | 41.1                   |
| Zhanghua Co.            | 34.8                | 28.0                   |
| Yunlin Co.              | 43.0                | 36.1                   |
| Jiayi Co.               | 32.0                | 26.3                   |
| Gaoxiong Co.            | 50.3                | 45.7                   |
| Yilan Co.               | 13.4                | 42.7                   |

Data calculated from *Lianhe bao* [United Daily News], 20 November 1977, p. 3.



### III. GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FROM THE ELECTION OF 19 NOVEMBER 1977 TO THE GAOXIONG INCIDENT

During the two years between the 19 November 1977 election and the Gaoxiong Incident of 10 December 1979, the 'genuine' non-partisans continuously expanded their activities and widened the parameters of acceptable political discourse. The government response to these pressures varied in a seemingly erratic manner. While the government banned some books and reorganised a forthright newspaper, it also licensed outspoken periodicals and allowed other newspapers to report and comment on an increasingly wide range of formerly forbidden topics. This seemingly uneven response to the growing opposition activities probably reflected wide disagreements within the ruling elite about the desirability of greater openness in the political arena. I believe that the pro-democratic elements in the ruling elite succeeded in convincing Nationalist Party Chairman Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) to continue the broad process of 'democratisation', but that the more conservative and security-oriented forces proved able to convince Jiang to take actions to deal with specific situations. Thus, for two years, Taiwan experienced ever more open political debate in public gatherings and publications. At the same time the government banned books and journals and conducted political trials.

Following the election of 19 November 1977, the non-partisans' activities centred on the Provincial Assembly where the 'genuine' non-partisans had sufficient numbers to interpellate effectively and to organise an unofficial 'Seventh Committee' after refusing to participate in the Provincial Assembly's six official Standing Committees. The focus of attention then turned to the central-level elections scheduled for 23 December 1978. Numerous young, articulate and politically conscious non-partisans registered for the Legislative Branch and National Assembly elections in electorates all around Taiwan. Debate during the campaign, according to all sides, substantially exceeded previous limitations. The number of 'genuine' non-partisans who would have won office cannot be ascertained because the authorities postponed the election in the tense period following the 16 December 1978 announcement of 'normalisation' between Beijing and Washington.

The ability of the non-partisans to organise a 'campaign organisation' (*zhuxuantuan*) to liaise and co-ordinate their campaigns around the island provided an advance even more significant than the broadened scope of political debate. For years non-partisans had attempted to co-ordinate their campaigns, but such attempts always seemed to fail after the organising banquet, partly because of the non-political orientation and concern for 'face' of many non-partisans, partly because the government clearly opposed attempts to establish an opposition organisation. The

authorities' apparent toleration of the non-partisan 'campaign organisation' in late 1978 encouraged the non-partisans to anticipate a fundamental change in the policy towards political opposition.

Since their removal from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, the Nationalist authorities had made clear they would not tolerate the organisation of another opposition political party in addition to the 'friendly' Youth and Democratic-Socialist parties. The classic political case testing this policy occurred in 1960 when Lei Zhen, a former Nationalist Party official who had held very high positions on the mainland before 1949, organised the Democratic Party (*Minzhudang*). Lei, the chief editor of the fortnightly journal *Free China (Ziyou Zhongguo)* during its 260 issue life from November 1949 to September 1960, angered leading Nationalist officials with his outspoken articles on democracy and freedom and was expelled from the Nationalist Party in 1954 for criticising educational policy. During the summer of 1960 the Democratic Party leaders made substantial progress, convening large meetings in several localities of Taiwan attended by numerous non-partisans, but on 4 September 1960 Lei and three others were arrested. After a one day military court trial on 3 October 1960, the court sentenced Lei to a ten year sentence. He was released on 4 September 1970 and died of brain cancer on 7 March 1979, aged 81.<sup>32</sup> Thus, until the apparent acceptance of the 'campaign organisation' in the aborted 23 December 1978 election, the prognosis for an opposition *organisation* appeared dim.

Following the postponement of the December 1978 election, the non-partisans felt the need to maintain campaign momentum. They decided to use the Chinese tradition of 'literary politics' and follow in the footsteps of earlier intellectuals in Taiwan by founding magazines. Several important political journals have been published, but the most important prior to 1979, in addition to *Free China*, were *Apollo (Wenxing)* published from 1957 until 1965, *The Intellectual (Daxue)* which had its greatest influence in the early 1970s,<sup>33</sup> and *Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan zhenglun)* which published five issues during August-December 1975.

Several journals appeared in 1979, but the two most important reflected a split in the non-partisans which had occurred during the December 1978 election campaign. Kang Ningxiang, an astute young Taiwanese elected to the Legislative Branch in 1972 and re-elected in 1975, organised *The Eighties (Bashi niandai)* which first appeared in June 1979 and lasted seven issues until December 1979, the month of the Gaoxiong Incident. Kang had split with the 'campaign organisation' in the December 1978 election since their policy of running as many non-partisans as possible threatened to divide the non-partisan vote and cost him re-election. While advocating many of the same ideas as those in the 'campaign organisation', Kang has possessed a clearer understanding of Taiwan's political realities

and acted accordingly. Thus, although he spoke at the Gaoxiong Incident, he has avoided arrest. Kang has worked tirelessly on behalf of the arrested despite their earlier conflict.<sup>34</sup>

The 'campaign organisation' founded the second important political magazine, *Formosa (Meilidao)*, which published four issues from August to November 1979. *Formosa* differed from the other political journals because it quite openly operated as an opposition political organisation, a 'political party in all but name'. Its leaders established 'Service Offices' (*fuwuchu*) in most of Taiwan's counties and municipalities which sponsored various meetings and forums on a wide variety of issues.<sup>35</sup> When the November 1979 issue of *Formosa* reached a self-proclaimed circulation of 100,000, the organisation clearly had become threatening.

Endeavouring to stay in the public eye in order to prepare for the postponed election, the non-partisans organised numerous rallies and demonstrations throughout 1979. Their success varied as local authorities responded differently. But, despite an occasional soaking from fire hoses and some political arrests, the non-partisans continued their activities. The Human Rights Day rally, sponsored by the Gaoxiong 'Service Office' of the *Formosa* Magazine, which became the Gaoxiong Incident, was only a prelude to a bigger rally scheduled for Taipei on 16 December 1979, the anniversary of the announcement of 'normalisation' between Beijing and Washington. But the violence, which after considerable investigation I believe resulted from errors on both sides, gave the conservatives and security forces their opportunity to end the 'dangerous' democratic trends.

The fifty hour delay between the Gaoxiong Incident and the arrests, during which the *Formosa* Magazine leaders conducted a lengthy press conference, clearly indicates a long debate about how to deal with the non-partisans occurred among the top levels of Taiwan's ruling elite. The conservatives and security forces argued that they had predicted the non-partisan activities would lead to violence. This argument has special strength in Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalists believe the Chinese Communists exploited social unrest on the mainland to defeat the Chinese Nationalists. Thus, the Nationalists have striven to maintain social stability on Taiwan, a factor which partially explains the implementation of policies leading to a comparatively egalitarian distribution of income on the island. Furthermore, the security authorities claimed they had the evidence to convict the *Formosa* Magazine leaders. The more liberal forces had to give the conservatives an opportunity to prove their point. In fact, the relatively open military court trial of the eight major defendants (virtual transcripts appeared in some major daily newspapers) showed the weakness of the prosecution case. Nevertheless, the judgment of 18 April 1980 sentenced the eight major defendants to long prison terms: one person received life imprisonment, a second person fourteen years, and the six

other defendants twelve years. The judgment virtually accepted the accusations in the indictment and ignored the courtroom debate; from a judicial perspective the trial need not have taken place, though it did provide the non-partisans with an opportunity to expose a large proportion of Taiwan's population to their ideas. Over forty other persons have received sentences in other trials related to the Gaoxiong Incident.<sup>36</sup>

#### IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS

Why did the authorities crack down on the non-partisans? What conclusions do recent events enable us to draw about the political system on Taiwan?

While the Nationalist authorities tolerate opposition both in and out of government, they will not permit the existence of any opposition which shows even the potential of attempting to replace them in government. Thus, opposition organisations such as the Democratic Party of Lei Zhen or the *Formosa Magazine* organisation must be destroyed before they have an opportunity to develop a mass base which could threaten the Nationalist leadership with an alternative government.

Additionally, any opposition activity must not threaten social stability. Until the Gaoxiong Incident, the authorities had gradually relaxed the restrictions on public gatherings both in election campaigns and in the various non-partisan rallies such as Xu Xinliang's 'Birthday Party' attended by 10,000-30,000 persons in Zhongli on 26 May 1979.<sup>37</sup> The violence which occurred during the Gaoxiong Incident and, retrospectively, during the Zhongli Incident of 19 November 1977, means that the authorities will not tolerate mass public demonstrations for a long time.

Further, the leaders of the non-partisans appeared especially threatening because, as home-grown products educated under the Nationalist system in Taiwan, they should have supported the system. Many of those now in jail had been the system's bright stars, ranking at the top of their classes in the best universities. They possessed unlimited opportunities for success, yet they turned to opposition and, as idealists, could not be bought off with money or prestige.

The termination of the Mutual Security Treaty between the United States and Taiwan as of 1 January 1980 also helps explain the crackdown on the non-partisans. Although 'normalisation' between Washington and Beijing became effective on 1 January 1979, the United States terminated the Mutual Security Treaty according to the Treaty's provisions, giving one year's notice. Thus, while the United States conducted normal diplomatic relations with Beijing, it also maintained the Mutual Security Treaty with Taiwan during 1979. The imminent absence of the treaty guarantee worried many people in Taiwan and the authorities labelled

1980 Self-Reliance Year (*zìqiángnián*). Determined to create solidarity within the island, Taiwan's leaders repeatedly emphasised, in xenophobic tones, the Republic of China's sovereignty and the impermissibility of foreign interference in the island's domestic affairs. The non-partisans, who appeared to threaten solidarity in this time of perceived crisis, received much less sympathy both in and out of government than they might have obtained in more secure times.

The *Formosa Magazine* case again revealed the widespread disagreements within Taiwan's top leadership over whether to stress 'democracy' or internal security. These divisions have been apparent ever since the Nationalist removal to Taiwan in 1949, but during the 1970s the 'democrats' seemed to be gaining influence. Unfortunately, recent events suggest 'democratisation' has not become an integral part of Taiwan's political system, but has developed or retreated upon the decision of one man, Jiang Jingguo, the eldest son and successor of President Chiang Kai-shek.<sup>38</sup> One finds it difficult to be optimistic about the future of democratisation if its existence depends upon the decision of one man.

On the other hand, Taiwan has a very highly educated population and Chinese in Taiwan seem able to organise groups (e.g. factions, interest groups, lineages, etc.) for political activities. According to 'liberal' democratic theorists, high educational levels and the ability to form groups for political activity have been two important factors in the establishment and maintenance of western democracies.<sup>39</sup> Taiwan has these attributes as well as many people in and out of government committed to democratisation and some experience with relatively open political discourse and activity. Have these assets established sufficiently strong roots able to provide a basis for the re-emergence of democratisation in the future?

Finally, the non-partisans suffered as a result of being caught up in the succession struggle. President Jiang Jingguo became seventy years old in March 1980 and, although in apparent good health despite diabetes, cannot remain in power indefinitely. Yet he has made no provisions for the succession and several persons in the security forces, who see themselves as protectors of the Republic of China, have tried to grasp as many levers of power as possible in order to be prepared when the fateful day arrives. Unfortunately for the people of Taiwan, the security forces have not demonstrated much capability. If they could not even stage a political trial competently, a task within their area of specialisation, how will they be able to manage the increasingly sophisticated and complex economy and society of Taiwan?

These various factors in Taiwan's present political system do not all necessarily lead to one pre-determined future for Taiwan. The situation in Taiwan, as in all complex political systems, contains many contradictory elements. It is the apparent preponderance of factors which has given me the feeling of pessimism noted at the beginning of this article. I hope I am wrong.

30 January 1981

---

## Notes

---

\* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Taiwan Political Economy Workshop, Columbia University, New York, 18-20 December 1980, sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Sciences Research Council (ACLS-SSRC) Mellon Program. Grants from the La Trobe University Travel Committee and the ACLS-SSRC Mellon Program enabled my participation in the Workshop. This article has also benefitted greatly from field research in Taiwan during 1977, 1978, 1979, and 1980, which grants from the Australian Research Grants Committee (ARGC) made possible. A more theoretical version of this article is scheduled to appear in Edwin A. Winckler (ed.), *Authoritarianism and Dependency on Taiwan*, forthcoming.

<sup>1</sup> See, *inter alia*, J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession', *Asian Survey*, XIV:1 (January, 1974), esp. 27-29; J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan: Background and Prospects', *World Review*, XVIII:2 (June, 1979), 65-66; and J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979: "Normalcy" after "Normalization"', *Asian Survey*, XX:1 (January, 1980), esp. 88-93. The last article was completed just two weeks before the Gaoxiong Incident.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, (New Haven and London, 1966); Barbara N. McLennan (ed.), *Political Opposition and Dissent*, (New York and London, 1973); Leonard Schapiro (ed.), *Political Opposition in One-Party States*, (London, 1972).

<sup>3</sup> Frank S.T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, 'The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943', *Pacific Affairs*, LII:3 (Fall, 1979), 455-456; Edgar Wickberg, 'The Taiwan Peasant Movement, 1923-1932: Chinese Rural Radicalism Under Japanese Development Programs', *Pacific Affairs*, XLVIII:4 (Winter, 1975-1976), 570-571.

<sup>4</sup> Cai Xiaoqian, *Jiangxi suqu: hongjun xicuan huiyi* [The Jiangxi Soviet Area: Memoirs of the Red Army's Escape Westwards], (Taipei, 1970).

<sup>5</sup> Hsiao and Sullivan, 'Chinese Communist', 456.

<sup>6</sup> Jacobs, 'Taiwan: Background and Prospects', 71-72.

<sup>7</sup> George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, (Boston, 1965), pp. 451-472; Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 146-170.

<sup>8</sup> Peng Mingmin had travelled overseas widely before his arrest; see Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader*, (New York et al., 1972). Shi Mingde, a Taiwanese graduate of Taiwan's Military Academy born in 1941, clearly participated in Taiwanese Independence activities and began serving a sentence of life imprisonment in 1962. Following the death of President Chiang Kai-shek in 1975, the authorities reduced his sentence to fifteen years and released him in June 1977. Shi actively participated in the non-partisan campaign for the aborted December 1978 elections and became General Manager of the *Formosa Magazine (Meilidao)* during 1979. A leader of the demonstrators during the Gaoxiong Incident, Shi received a sentence of life imprisonment on 18 April 1980, which he is currently serving in a prison on Green Island off the East Coast of Taiwan.

- <sup>9</sup> J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1972: Political Season', *Asian Survey*, XIII:1 (January, 1973), 110-111.
- <sup>10</sup> A recent journalistic report, apparently based on foreign diplomatic sources in Taiwan, states the two minor parties have a combined membership of less than 15,000 and that the Nationalist Party gives them a monthly subsidy of NT\$1 million (US\$27,750); see Paul Wilson, 'A moderately successful poll', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, CX:51 (12 December 1980), 9.
- <sup>11</sup> For an analysis of the politics of 'face' in Taiwan, see J. Bruce Jacobs, *Local Politics in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan*, (Canberra, 1980), pp. 60-68, 112-113 *et passim*.
- <sup>12</sup> Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 13-14, 31-39.
- <sup>13</sup> The text of the 'Declaration' may be found in Victor H. Li (ed.), *The Future of Taiwan*, (New York, 1980), pp. 186-187.
- <sup>14</sup> Schapiro, *Political Opposition*, pp. 9-10.
- <sup>15</sup> See Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', 88-89.
- <sup>16</sup> J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978: Economic Successes, International Uncertainties', *Asian Survey*, XIX:1 (January, 1979), 22-24.
- <sup>17</sup> Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 20.
- <sup>18</sup> Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 21-22.
- <sup>19</sup> Zhang and Lin received twelve-year sentences on 18 April 1980 in the aftermath of the Gaoxiong Incident, sentences they are now serving in a suburban Taipei prison. Xu most likely would also be in prison except that he was, and is, 'studying' overseas as a result of his mid-1979 impeachment and suspension from office. On the Xu case, see Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', 91-92.
- <sup>20</sup> Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 25-31, 176-199 *et passim*; J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Politics', *Politics*, XIII:2 (November, 1978), 241-243.
- <sup>21</sup> Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 21-22. See Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 182-202 for a detailed description of the 19 November 1977 election in a rural township.
- <sup>22</sup> *Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao* [Annals of Local Self-Government in Taiwan Province], (Taizhong, 1965), pp. 684, 689.
- <sup>23</sup> The only other country using this single-vote, multi-member district electoral system, to the best of my knowledge, is Japan. See Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 117-118 for a preliminary analysis of this electoral system and p. 123n for the operation of the 'female guarantee'.
- <sup>24</sup> For case studies of the Party nomination process and non-partisan responses, see Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 149-152, 160-164, 182-189.
- <sup>25</sup> The abbreviations and full citations of the sources used in preparing the tables follow:
- DFZZ: *Difang zizhi* [Local Self-Government], (Taizhong, 1971).
- LHB: *Lianhe bao* [United Daily News].
- TWSB: *Taiwan shibao* [Taiwan Times].
- TWXS: *Taiwan xinsheng bao* [Taiwan New Life News].
- ZYRB: *Zhongyang ribao* [Central Daily News].
- ZZZY: *Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao* [Annals of Local Self-Government in Taiwan Province], (Taizhong, 1965).

<sup>26</sup> Statistical calculations lend support to the analysis that the non-partisans did much better winning seats than votes in the 19 November 1977 elections. Calculations of Pearson Correlation Coefficients showed no significant correlations between percentage of votes received and percentage of seats won in the elections from 1954 to 1977. For example,  $R = 0.5825$  for correlations between Column A in Table 3 and the corresponding percentage column (A/Bx100) in Table 1 and  $R = 0.1699$  for correlations between Column B in Table 3 and the corresponding percentage column (A/Cx100) in Table 1; neither  $R$  value is significant even at the .1 level. The corresponding Provincial Assembly statistics for Columns A, B, C and D in Table 4 and the seats won in those electorates (data not presented) also showed statistically insignificant  $R$  values except for the  $R$  value between Column C and the corresponding non-partisan seats which was significant at the .05 level ( $R = 0.7593$ ). Considering that the data in Column C are integrally related to the data in Columns A, B, and D, one must assume this relatively high correlation occurred by chance.

<sup>27</sup> Zhen Boya, 'Lin shi wu ju, bu mou wu cheng' [If one does not plan, one cannot successfully approach a crisis without fear], *Da shidai* [Great Epoch], II:4 (April 1980), 13-14.

<sup>28</sup> Ziliao shi [Reference Office], 'Baifen zhi sa xuanpiao de shuzi moshu' [The wizardry of the thirty percent vote figure], *Jifeng* [Gust], I:9 (April, 1980), 49; this analysis contains several factual errors.

<sup>29</sup> Jacobs, *Local*, p. 190 *et passim*. For three electoral case studies, see Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 148-160, 160-172, 182-202. On the concept of *guanxi*, see Jacobs, *Local*, pp. 40-60 *et passim* or J. Bruce Jacobs, 'A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese Political Alliances: *Kan-ch'ing* and *Kuan-hsi* in a Rural Taiwanese Township', *The China Quarterly*, 78 (June, 1979), 237-273.

<sup>30</sup>  $R = 0.3184$  for electorates in which non-partisans competed against Nationalist Party members (Column A in Table 3 and Column C in Table 4 excluding the non-simultaneous 1963 and 1964 data) and  $R = 0.2582$  for all electorates in Taiwan Province (Column B in Table 3 and Column D in Table 4 excluding the 1963 and 1964 data).

<sup>31</sup> In fact, the correlation is marginally negative:  $R = -0.0671$ .

<sup>32</sup> In retrospect, the Lei Zhen case possesses great importance in the post-1949 political history of Taiwan and deserves a full scholarly analysis. The best article I have found is Wen De, 'Lei Zhen, Hu Shi, *Zhongguo minzhudang*' [Lei Zhen, Hu Shi and the China Democratic Party], *Bashi niandai* [The Eighties], I:3 (August, 1979), 87-91. Lei's own memoirs have been published: Lei Zhen, *Lei Zhen huiyi lu* [Memoirs of Lei Zhen], (Hong Kong, 1978). Short summaries of the Lei case in English may be found in Kerr, *Formosa*, pp. 446-448; Mendel, *Politics*, pp. 114-117; and three articles published in Mark Mancall (ed.), *Formosa Today*, (New York *et al.*, 1964): Mancall, 'Introduction: Taiwan, Island of Resignation and Despair', pp. 38-41; John Israel, 'Politics on Formosa', pp. 61-64; and Ong Jokitik, 'A Formosan's View of the Formosan Independence Movement', pp. 168-169.

<sup>33</sup> See Mab Huang, *Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 1971-1973*, (Ann Arbor, 1976).

<sup>34</sup> Before the closure of *The Eighties* in December 1979, Kang had announced a 'sister' journal, *The Asian* (*Yazhou ren*), which ran for two issues in January and February 1980 before being suspended. *The Current* (*Nuanliu*), a more recent attempt to found a successor to *The Eighties*, lasted one issue (August 1980) before being closed.



<sup>35</sup> The Nationalist Party's township-level offices are called Service Stations; see Jacobs, *Local*, p.28.

<sup>36</sup> This summary cannot do justice to the eventful and significant two years leading to the Gaoxiong Incident. A much more comprehensive account will appear in a book I am currently writing. Some details and the context of these events can be found in Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', esp. 26-27 and Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', esp. 89-93.

<sup>37</sup> For details of the 'Birthday Party' rally, see Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', 91-92.

<sup>38</sup> Jiang Jingguo effectively succeeded his father in the early 1970s becoming Premier in 1972 and President in 1978. Upon his father's death in 1975, he became Chairman of the Nationalist Party.

<sup>39</sup> For example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, (Princeton, 1963).