College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University
Political Opposition and Taiwan's Political Future
Author(s): J. Bruce Jacobs
Source: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 6 (Jul., 1981), pp. 21-44
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the College of Asia and the
Pacific, The Australian National University
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POLITICAL OPPOSITION AND TAIWAN'S
POLITICAL FUTURE
J. Bruce Jacobs
About 8.30 pm on 10 December 1979, demonstrators commemorating
World Human Rights Day clashed violently with members of Taiwan's
security agencies in Gaoxiong (Kaohsiung), Taiwan's second largest city
and its major industrial centre and chief port. About fifty hours later, at
dawn on 13 December 1979, following extensive debates involving
Taiwan's highest political authorities, Taiwan's security agencies arrested
over sixty leaders of and participants in what has become known as the
Gaoxiong Incident. Those arrested included most of Taiwan's non-partisan
political opposition. A series of relatively open trials cast substantial doubts
on the government's case, but these leaders are currently serving heavy
prison sentences.
The Nationalist Party (Guomindang) leadership in Taiwan has never
intended to implement democracy in the sense of permitting a loyal
opposition to replace the Nationalist leadership and gain control of the
reins of government through elections, though non-partisan candidates
can and do defeat Nationalist Party nominees in relatively open elections.
Democracy in the sense of increased civil liberties and reduced constraints
on speech and publication - sometimes called 'liberalisation' - did,
however, seem to be developing in Taiwan during the 1970s.1 Has the
government's harsh response to the Gaoxiong Incident irrevocably reversed
this trend? The arrests and trials remain too recent to analyse for their
long-term impact; but, as an advocate of democracy and a long-term
observer of Taiwan, I feel an unprecedented pessimism about Taiwan's
political future.
This article attempts to provide some preliminary perspectives for
analysing the impact of the Gaoxiong Incident on Taiwan's political future.
THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS NO.6
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22 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
I. POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN TAIWAN
Political scientists have discovered that analysis of political opposi
enhances their understanding of a wide variety of political systems.2
Examination of political opposition in Taiwan, where the subject has
often been high on the political agenda, helps elucidate both recent events
and the nature of the political system itself. In Taiwan, two general
categories of political opposition exist. First, there are the illegal, covert
opposition organisations based primarily outside Taiwan. Secondly, a wide
variety of individuals and groups within Taiwan engage in legitimate
opposition activity. Some of this legitimate opposition activity approaches
the border of illegality and, as the case of the Gaoxiong Incident illustrates,
the government on occasion determines that it crosses that boundary.
Illegal, Covert Political Opposition
Despite wide variations in programmes and frequent mutual enmity,
the illegal political organisations share a commitment to overthrow the
Nationalist political system on Taiwan, which they consider illegitimate.
The very nature of illegal, covert opposition minimises the information
available to scholars for analysis, but two general groupings of illegal
political opposition, the Chinese Communists and the Taiwanese
Independence Movement, stand out as most important.
Before 1945, the Chinese Communists did not devote much attention
to Taiwan. The Comintern made Taiwan the responsibility of the Japanese
Communist Party during the Japanese colonial period (1895-1945),3
though some Taiwanese went to the mainland and joined the Communist
Party of China4 and a few Taiwanese members of the Communist Party of
China worked in Taibei (Taipei).s The close historical links between the
Chinese Nationalist and Chinese Communist parties on the mainland
between 1921 and 1949, when they co-operated as well as fought, has
assured substantial mutual infiltration. Such interpenetration exists in all
divided nations (e.g. Germany, Korea, and pre-1975 Vietnam) and thus
discovery over the years of communist agents in Taiwan's government and
party organisations cannot be surprising. Communist agents certainly
continue to exist in Taiwan (as do Nationalist agents on the mainland),
though outsiders cannot determine their numbers, strength, or degree of
commitment. Communist and communist-front organisations such as the
Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League also exist in China and in
overseas Taiwanese communities. But future Communist control of Taiwan
would almost certainly require the co-operation of Taiwan's Nationalist
leadership which does not seem probable at present.6
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 23
The avowed goal of the Taiwanese Independence Movement has been
to create a political system in Taiwan which is neither Communist nor
Nationalist. Since the Taiwanese Independence Movement would detach
Taiwan from China, both the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese
Communists oppose the Taiwanese Independence Movement. In fact,
the Chinese Communists oppose the Taiwanese Independence Movement
so strongly, they appear to prefer continued Nationalist control of the
island.
The Taiwanese Independence Movement has been based primarily
overseas in Japan, the United States, and Europe,7 though some Taiwanese
Independence advocates like Peng Mingmin and Shi Mingde have emerged
on Taiwan itself.8 Until the early 1970s, the Taiwanese Independence
Movement relied primarily upon hopes that the United States would
maintain its enmity with the Chinese Communists, renounce its support
of the Chinese Nationalists, and support the Taiwanese Independence
Movement's democratic platform and claimed independent international
legal status. The Shanghai Communique signed by Richard Nixon and Zhou
Enlai on 27 February 1972 dashed these always slim hopes and many
Taiwanese Independence Movement leaders returned to Taiwan later that
year.9 The Taiwanese Independence Movement overseas, however, now
includes many younger highly educated scientists and engineers. The
Movement has bombed Chinese Nationalist offices in the United States
as well as houses in the United States belonging to kin of Chinese
Nationalist officials and the dangers have caused several high Chinese
Nationalist officials to bring their children from the United States back to
Taiwan. The hysterical diatribes against the Taiwanese Independence Movement
which appeared in Taiwan's press during the months following the
Gaoxiong Incident and the (generally unsuccessful) attempts to link the
leaders of Taiwan's non-partisans to the Taiwanese Independence Movement
during the trials may indicate growing Taiwanese Independence
Movement strength overseas. Yet, even the most extreme rhetoric of
Taiwan's non-partisan leaders prior to the Gaoxing Incident and during
their trials suggests that they cannot be classified as advocates of the
Taiwanese Independence Movement and that the Taiwanese Independence
Movement remains weak within Taiwan. Thus, although the government
frequently rails against the Chinese Communists and the Taiwanese
Independence Movement, illegal, covert political opposition does not play
an important role in Taiwan's political system.
Legal Political Opposition in Taiwan
Taiwan's legal opposition has been extraordinarily variegated. By
focussing on political parties, we can distinguish three broad categories
of legal political opposition. These, in ascending order of importance, are
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24 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
the two minor parties, the non-partisans, and groups within
Nationalist Party.
The Taiwan authorities permit the existence of two 'friend
(youdang), the Youth Party (Qingniandang) and the Democrati
Party (Minshedang), which most observers see simply as adjun
Nationalist Party. A series of interviews conducted in the early
central and local leaders of both minor parties suggested, how
despite substantial controls the minor parties do provide o
the Nationalist Party. In fact, rarely in Taiwan have I heard su
and detailed critiques of the Taiwan political system.
This political opposition originated during the Nationalis
the mainland when both parties (or their antecedents) suffered
necessitating periods underground or in exile overseas even th
parties consisted primarily of intellectuals and lacked mass ba
minor party leaders did not come to Taiwan out of love for the
but only because they believed the Nationalists the 'lesser evil
The programmes and ideologies of both parties differ from t
Nationalist Party, a point which the minor party leaders (man
have since died) stressed in the early 1970s. Thus, in contr
Nationalist Party's ideology of the Three People's Principles
Party advocates 'Nationalism' while the Democratic-Socialist Pa
Fabian Socialism and an increased role for trade unions.
Several factors have weakened the opposition roles of the mi
at the central level. First, factionalism has reduced the effect
the parties and on occasion even rendered them immobile (e.g
make an appointment allocated to them). The bases for these fa
seem personal, but leaders also pointed to pro-Nationalist Part
Nationalist Party factions within the minor parties. The existe
pro-Nationalist party groups within the minor parties as well a
Party control of the police, facilitates a second weakening
Nationalist Party's thorough infiltration of the minor parties
recent years the leadership of the minor parties has becom
declined in numbers. At the central level, interpellation in
Parliamentary organs remains the most effective method
political party opposition but, as noted by even minor party
minor party parliamentarians interpellate as individuals rat
representatives of their respective parties.
No finding about the minor parties surprised me more
discovery that they have had some success in recruiting nativ
members throughout the island. Membership statistics obtain
views varied widely, but estimating from data given for localit
island-wide figures, it seems probable each minor party had i
10,000 members during the early 1970s and perhaps as many
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 25
30,000 members.10 (The Nationalist Party's membership in late 1970
exceeded one million.) All sources agree the Youth Party has recruited
more Taiwanese members than the Democratic-Socialist Party. These
people have joined the minor parties in spite of obstacles inhibiting minor
party recruitment and disabilities suffered by minor party members. The
minor parties, for example, cannot recruit actively in institutions of higher
learning and those who join the minor parties may find they cannot obtain
permission to study abroad or that they are dismissed from their government
or teaching jobs or from such institutions as banks. Thus, the selfemployed
constitute a good proportion of the minor party memberships.
Why have Taiwanese joined the minor parties? Some joined during the
1950s when it seemed the minor parties might have a greater role to play.
One person explained he joined a minor party in order to end pressure
to join the Nationalist Party. Several minor party members have won
election to the Provincial Assembly, County Executiveships (and
equivalent mayoralties), and to the various County and Municipal
Assemblies, but most minor party members have run as non-partisans,
not disclosing their minor party memberships publicly until after winning
office. The Nationalist Party fears an opposition organisation more than
an isolated non-partisan individual (a theme addressed in Sections III and
IV below) and therefore makes greater efforts to defeat minor party
candidates than non-partisan candidates. In fact, very little distinguishes
a minor party candidate from a non-partisan cadidate; the minor party
candidate will obtain quiet support and some funds from fellow party
members in his locality, but the weakness of the minor party organisations
and their small memberships suggest this help has little significance.
Because the differences are negligible, local-level members of the minor
parties have been included as 'non-partisans' in the following analyses.
Non-partisans have provided the most visible as well as the most diverse
political opposition in Taiwan. Although some non-partisans have proved
trenchant critics of the political authorities, many simply use politics to
gain prestige or 'face'." During the early 1970s several young intellectuals
privately expressed their disappointment at discovering how many nonpartisans
focussed their energies on obtaining office and lacked either
the ability or the desire to use their office once elected. This absence of
political programme and concern with 'face' has contributed to nonpartisan
weakness. The points of entry into the political system available
to non-partisans also reduces their political power. Non-partisans can win
county or township executive posts or legislative positions, but policy
formulation occurs at Taiwan's higher levels leaving local levels the task
of implementing higher-level policies,l2 while legislative bodies at all
levels in Taiwan have little power v'is-a-vis the executive. Finally, nonpartisans
have tended to remain isolated from each other making few
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26 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
contracts across the boundaries of their local electorates. Concern for
'face' and re-election makes many non-partisans concentrate on their home
districts, but non-partisan organisation can be dangerous. The two efforts
to organise non-partisans around the island, the Democratic Party led by
Lei Zhen in 1960 and the Formosa Magazine organisation which sponsored
the Gaoxiong demonstration in December 1979 (both discussed below),
have resulted in long prison terms for many of their leaders.
A special kind of non-partisan political organisation, which has also
provided political opposition and resulted in prison sentences for its
leaders, has been the Presbyterian Church. Several factors distinguish the
Presbyterians from other religious groups in Taiwan. First, the Presbyterians
became well established in Taiwan during the second half of the 19th
century. In contrast, many other churches such as the Catholics basically
arrived with the Nationalists from the mainland in the late 1940s. Thus,
the Presbyterians have been a Taiwanese church rather than a mainlander
church. Secondly, the foreign connections of the Presbyterians have
provided political protection unavailable to 'native' heterodox religions,
especially since the Nationalists have used 'freedom of religion' to press
their claims overseas to be 'Free China'. Thirdly, the Presbyterians have
proven extraordinarily idealistic; they cannot be bought and often seem to
desire martyrdom. This makes government repression counterproductive.
On 16 August 1977 the Presbyterians issued 'A Declaration on Human
Rights' which approached advocacy of Taiwanese Independence:
We insist that the future of Taiwan shall be determined by
the 17 million people who live there... In order to achieve
our goal of independence and freedom for the people of
Taiwan in this critical international situation, we urge our
government to face reality and to take effective measures
whereby Taiwan may become a new and independent
country.13
However, the government did not crack down on key church leaders until
April 1980 when they arrested, tried, and convicted several Presbyterian
leaders for harbouring Shi Mingde, who escaped during the dawn roundup
of 13 December 1979. Ironically, the indicted Presbyterians received
much more foreign support than the other defendants in the post-Gaoxiong
Incident trials, even though they were the only clearly guilty defendants.
Probably the most significant political opposition in Taiwan comes
from within the ruling Nationalist Party, a situation paralleled in
communist countries.14 In fact, only the protection given by powerful
persons and groups within the Nationalist Party enabled the non-partisans
to speak out and publish opposition magazines in the past. Intra-party
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 27
opposition tends to be hidden from view, though policy debates do
occasionally become public as, for example, in the aftermath of the
'normalisation' between Washington and Beijing.1S The mutual antagonisms
between the two pre-1949 factions, the CC Clique based in the party
organisation and the Youth Corps Group which had been based in the
Three People's Principles Youth Corps, provided another source of intraparty
opposition, especially during the 1950s and 1960s. The CC Clique
possessed majorities in the central parliamentary organs while the Youth
Corps Group controlled the executive branch creating conflict between
the executive branch and the various parliamentary organs as well as
within the parliamentary organs themselves. The ageing and deaths of many
of these pre-1949 faction leaders along with the strengthening of the
Nationalist Party organisation has, however, reduced the importance of
these pre-1949 factions in contemporary Taiwan's politics.
II. THE ELECTION OF 19 NOVEMBER 1977: REAPPRAISING A KEY EVENT
On 19 November 1977, between 7.00 am and 4.00 pm, over seventy
percent of Taiwan's citizens went to the polls and cast their 'sacred ballots'
for County Executive (and mayoral equivalent), Provincial Assembly,
County Assembly, and Township Executive. The election results surprised
most observers. Non-partisans won four of the twenty County Executive
(and mayoral equivalent) posts defeating Nationalist Party nominees in
all four cases. Non-partisans also defeated fourteen of the sixty-nine
Nationalist Party nominees for Provincial Assembly and twenty-one nonpartisans
won seats in the seventy-seven member Provincial Assembly.
During the vote counting that night, supporters of the non-partisan
candidate for County Executive in Taoyuan County, worried the
Nationalist Party would 'steal' the election, began a demonstration in
Zhongli Municipality which resulted in the burning of a major police
station. The security forces responded non-violently and the Zhongli
Incident ended relatively peacefully with very few casualties. The nonpartisan
candidate for Taoyuan County Executive, Xu Xinliang, won
office with 61.5 percent of the vote.
Observers including many non-partisans and Nationalist Party officials
considered the 19 November 1977 elections, with the non-partisan defeat
of so many Nationalist Party nominees and the occurrence of the Zhongli
Incident, significant. Non-partisans, believing they had widespread support,
organised for the 23 December 1978 central-level election, which the
government ultimately postponed (until 6 December 1980) during the
height of the electoral campaign in the tense period following the 16
December 1978 announcement of 'normalisation' between Beijing and
Washington. In order to maintain momentum for the postponed election,
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28 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
the non-partisans continued open and energetic political activity (discussed
in Section III below) until the Gaoxiong Incident of 10 December 1979
and the subsequent arrests halted non-partisan activities.
The Nationalist Party, in its response to the 19 November 1977
election, attempted numerous reforms.16 Interviews at the Central Party
Headquarters in Taibei during mid-1979 indicated a realistic commitment
on the part of some new appointees to implement these reforms. Unfortunately,
several of these people had lost their positions within a year
and interviews at the Central Party Headquarters during early 1980 revealed
much less commitment to at least some of the reforms.
After observing the 19 November 1977 election in Taiwan's countryside,
I agreed with the explicit claims of the non-partisans and the implicit
admissions of the Nationalist Party that the 'Nationalist Party suffered
an unprecedented "defeat"'. 17 However, I could not,'8 and still cannot,
entirely agree with the electoral analysis given by many non-partisans and
their intellectual supporters in Taibei which emphasised the anti-Party
appeals of the non-partisan candidates and the anti-Party votes they
received, especially from educated youth. This analysis seems valid for
only a few areas of Taiwan where politically conscious and highly articulate
young non-partisans ran issue-oriented campaigns, e.g. Nantou and Yilan
counties where Zhang Junhong and Lin Yixiong respectively won the
most votes for Provincial Assembly and Taoyuan County where Xu
Xinliang became County Executive.'9
If citizens in most areas of Taiwan did not consciously reject the
Nationalist Party when casting their ballots, why did so many non-partisans
defeat Nationalist Party nominees? During the 1970s the Nationalist Party
gained strength throughout Taiwan as Party membership increased and
the Party organisation penetrated deeper into local levels and played an
increasingly important role in basic-level politics.20 The increased strength
of the Nationalist Party organisation infected many professional Party
cadres with hubris, leading to two major errors in the 19 November 1977
election. First, professional Party cadres played favourites during the
nomination process, alienating many long-term, loyal Party members. Many
unhappy Party members ran for office 'against Party discipline' (weiji)
while other local leaders belonging to the Party, who normally would have
helped Party nominees, either sat on their hands or quietly helped the
'against Party discipline' campaigns of their friends. Most persons who
supported the opponents of Nationalist Party nominees, therefore, did
so out of anger with the local Party organisation and/or on the basis of
particularistic ties (guanxi) with the opponents of the Nationalist Party
nominees. They did not work against the Nationalist Party per se or desire
to 'overthrow the system'. Secondly, the Nationalist Party organisation
campaigned so vigorously in support of its nominees that it created
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 29
resentment (fangan) against the Party and enabled non-partisans (including
those running 'against Party discipline') to seek 'sympathy votes' (tongqing
piao). Several non-partisan candidates tor Provincial Assembly, who won
overwhelming victories, appealed to voters for sympathy without
emphasising anti-Party themes in their campaign speeches.21
The 19 November 1977 Election Results in Historical Perspective
As a 'key event' which ultimately led to the jailing of several nonpartisans,
the election of 19 November 1977 seemed to require a detailed
re-analysis and an attempt to place it in historical perspective. To do this
I have focussed on the contests for Taiwan's two most important elected
offices, County Executive (and mayoral equivalent) and Provincial
Assemblyman. Elections for these posts were held in 1950-1951, 1954,
1957, 1960, 1963 (Provincial Assembly), 1964 (County Executive), 1968,
1972, and 1977. For each of these elections I have examined the number of
seats won by non-partisans as well as the proportion of votes cast for nonpartisan
candidates. I have excluded the 1950-1951 elections from the
following analysis for three reasons: the Nationalist Party, in the midst
of its 1950-1952 Reform, did not nominate candidates and in fact
supported some non-partisans against Party members during the 1950-
1951 elections;22 the County Assemblies indirectly elected the 1951
Provincial Assembly in contrast to the popularly-elected 1954 and
subsequent Provincial Assemblies; and the 1950-1951 County Executive
elections were held on several dates and used run-off elections, procedures
changed for the 1954 and subsequent County Executive elections. All
the Provincial Assembly and County Executive elections from 1954 to
1977, excepting those held in 1963 and 1964 and with some minor
exceptions in 1954, were conducted simultaneously.
The counties and equivalent municipalities serve as the electoral
districts for both the County Executive (and equivalent mayoral) and
Provincial Assembly elections. (The Provincial Assembly also has
electorates for mountain aborigines and plains aborigines.) Since 1954,
the County Executive candidate obtaining a plurality of votes wins the
elections. Most counties elect more than one Provincial Assemblyman,
but each voter may cast a ballot for only one candidate. The Provincial
Assembly candidates with the most votes win, though a 'female guarantee'
assures women occupy at least ten percent of the Provincial Assembly
seats.23
The Nationalist Party, in its efforts to maximise its electoral victories
while allowing non-partisans some legislative seats, can choose from several
alternative strategies in each electorate. In County Executive elections, the
Party usually nominates (timing) a candidate, which means no other Party
member may run against the nominee; if a Party member runs against a
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30 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Party nominee, he runs 'against Party discipline' and is expelled from the
Party. If two or more good Party members desire a nomination and one of
these good candidates seems certain to win, or if no party member worthy
of a Party nomination can win, or if a nomination will certainly result
in an 'against Party discipline' candidacy, the Party organisation may
declare a 'free election' (ziyou jingxuan) in an electorate in which any
Party member may run, but in which no member receives official support
from the Party organisation. The Party declares relatively few 'free
elections' for County Executive. Theoretically, the party can also decide
not to nominate a candidate for County Executive and leave the position
to a non-partisan, though the one time this occurred (in the 1972 Yilan
County Executive election), the desired non-partisan became 'ill' and the
party finally nominated a candidate.
The Party organisation's strategies in the Provincial Assembly elections
resemble those for County Executive, but the multi-member nature of most
Provincial Assembly electorates gives the Party more options. The Party
may nominate a full slate of candidates or it may nominate a partial slate
leaving one or more Provincial Assembly seats in the electorate to nonpartisans.
Usually, the Party nominates a partial slate if a powerful nonpartisan
will win against a Party nominee and/or if the Party organisation
does not find the probable non-partisan victor too distasteful. 'Free
elections' are much more common for the Provincial Assembly than for
County Executive. The strengths and quality of the various Party and nonParty
candidates and attempts to balance geographic and occupational
representation all help determine the strategy employed by the Party in
each electorate. Non-partisans generally wait for the Party strategy to
become clear before responding. The most important decision facing a
non-partisan is whether or not to contest the election. Most elections for
County Executive and Provincial Assembly have more candidates running
than seats available, meaning some candidates must lose. Uncontested
elections do occur, however, necessitating the distinction between
contested and uncontested elections in any electoral analysis. Nonpartisans
generally do not co-ordinate their electoral strategies, but a nonpartisan
candidate may decide not to run, to withdraw, or to run for
another office after determining another non-partisan candidate has greater
strength.24
The foregoing analysis noted that both the non-partisans and the
Nationalist Party responded to the 19 November 1977 electoral results
as though the 'Nationalist Party suffered an unprecedented "defeat" '. Were,
in fact, the 1977 electoral results 'unprecedented'? Examination of the
1954-1977 electoral data reveals the non-partisans did well in the 1977
election, especially in terms of seats, but they did not win unprecedented
proportions of the vote. Table 1 shows the seats won by non-partisans in
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 31
the seven County Executive elections between 1954 and 1977.25 Nonpartisans
did very well in the 1977 County Executive election; only the
1964 non-partisan candidates for County Executive equalled their
performance.
TABLE 1: Non-partisan Seats Won in County Executive Elections, 1954-1977
Year Non-partisan Contested % Total %
Seats Seats Non-partisan Seats Non-partisan
[A] [B] [A/Bx100l [C] [A/Cx100]
1954 2 13 15.4 21 9.5
1957 1 18 5.6 21 4.8
1960 2 13 15.4 21 9.5
1964 4 12 33.3 21 19.0
1968 3 15 20.0 20 15.0
1972 0 11 0.0 20 0.0
1977 4 13 30.8 20 20.0
Sources:
ZZZY, pp. 689-691
ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3
ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3
LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3
See note 25 for full citations.
The brightest aspect of the 19 November 1977 election for the nonpartisans
came in the seats won in the Provincial Assembly. Table 2 shows
the number of Nationalist Party nominees (Column A) and the number
of nominees defeated by non-partisans (B), the number of contested
Provincial Assembly seats in which non-partisans ran against Nationalist
Party candidates be they nominees or in a 'free election' (C) and the
number of non-partisans who defeated Nationalist Party candidates (D),
the number of seats deliberately allocated to non-partisans by the
Nationalist Party's nomination of partial slates (E) and, finally, the total
number of non-partisans elected (D+E) and the total number of Provincial
Assembly seats (F) in the seven Provincial Assembly elections between
1954 and 1977. As Table 2 shows, non-partisans won more seats in all
categories than ever before, though the 1977 proportion of non-partisans
defeating Party nominees only marginally exceeded the performance of
the 1957 non-partisans. The non-partisans won an unprecedented percentage
of Provincial Assembly seats in 1977 because they did well in the
contested elections and because the Nationalist Party allocated them a
much greater proportion of seats than in 1957.
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32 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
The significance of the 19 November 1977 elections in terms of seats
lies primarily in the simultaneous non-partisan success in both the County
Executive and Provincial Assembly elections. In previous years, nonpartisans
had performed poorly in the County Executive contests when
they did well in the Provincial Assembly elections and vice versa. In 1977
they did well, in terms of seats, in both sets of elections. In terms of votes,
however, the non-partisans did only moderately well.
TABLE 2: Non-partisan Scats Won in Provincial Asscinbly Elcctions, 1954-1977
Year Nationalst Nominees % Contested Non-partisans % Seats Total Total %
Party Defeated Defeated Seats Elected Non-partuan Allocated to Non-partisan Provincial Non-partisan
Nominees Non-partisans Seats Assembly
Seats
fAj fBj fB/Ax1O01 IC] fDJ fD/Cx1OO fEJ I D+EI IFI f(D+E)/Fxl00j
1954 44 5 11.4 52 5 9.6 5 10 57 17.5
1957 54 10 18.5 63 10 15.9 3 13 66 19.7
1960 58 5 8.6 64 6 9.4 9 15 73 20.5
1963 57 5 8.8 68 7 10.3 6 13 74 17.6
1968 60 4 6.7 66 5 7.6 5 10 71 14.1
1972 60 6 10.0 66 8 12.1 7 15 73 20.5
1977 69 14 20.3 70 14 20.0 7 21 77 27.3
Data calculated from following sources:
ZZZY, pp. 684-689;
ZYRB, 2 March 1968, p. 3; ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3;
ZYRB, 23 September 1972, p. 1; ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3;
ZYRB, 11 August 1977, p. 1 (Int. Ed.); LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3.
See note 25 for full citations.
After the 19 November 1977 elections, non-partisan leaders claimed
the non-partisans had obtained between thirty and forty percent of the
vote. Analysis of the 1977 election results shows this claim to be true,
but two qualifications must be noted. First, although the proportion of
votes cast for non-partisans in 1977 increased over the 1968 and 1972
elections, non-partisans had obtained higher proportions of the votes in
at least some of the pre-1968 elections. Secondly, the non-partisan vote
included many ballots cast for 'false' non-partisans.
Table 3 gives the percentage of votes cast for non-partisan County
Executive candidates in both contested electorates, where non-partisans
competed against Nationalist Party candidates, and for the whole of Taiwan
Province. In contested electorates, the 1977 non-partisans ranked only
equal third in the seven elections as the 1977 non-partisans obtained a
substantially smaller percentage of votes than did the 1954 and 1964
non-partisans and only equalled the 1960 non-partisans' performance.
Table 4 shows the percentage of votes received by non-partisans in
Provincial Assembly electorates where the Nationalist Party nominated
full slates (Column A), where the Nationalist Party allocated one or more
seats to non-partisans by nominating partial slates (B), in electorates
where non-partisans competed against Nationalist Party members be they
nominees or running in a 'free election' (C), and for the whole of Taiwan
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 33
TABLE 3: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in
County Executive Elections, 1954-1977
Year In No. In No.
Contested Electorates All Electorates
Electorates Electorates
[A] [BJ
1954 45.4 13 28.7 21
1957 38.9 18 33.6 21
1960 40.9 13 28.0 21
1964 45.9 12 24.8 21
1968 35.6 15 27.6 20
1972 35.0 11 21.9 20
1977 40.9 13 30.7 20
Data calculated from following sources:
ZZZY, pp. 413-425, 689-691
DFZZ, pp. 136-146
LHB, 19 April 1954, p. 1
ZYRB, 3 May 1954, p. 1
LHB, 19 July 1954, p. 4
LHB, 20 December 1954, p. 1
LHB, 22 April 1957, p. 1
LHB, 25 April 1960, p. 2
ZYRB, 27 April 1964, p. 3
ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3
ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3
LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3
See note 25 for full citations.
TABLE 4: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in Provincial Assembly Elections, 1954-1977
Year Full No. Partial No. Contested No. All No.
Slates Electorates Slates Electorates Electorates Electorates Electorates Electorates
Nominated Nominated
[Al [BJ IC] ID]
1954 28.7 15 35.3 3 31.2 19 29.5 20 a
1957 29.7 17 35.5 2 31.2 20 30.3 22J
1960 29.5 11 46.7 8 36.4 20 34.6 23
1963 26.9 13 44.8 6 32.4 22 32.0 23
1968 17.4 13 45.7 5 26.1 20 25.5 22
1972 22.9 9 47.9 6 33.5 16 29.3 22
1977 32.2 13 41.1 5 34.9 19 34.0 22
Notes: a) Data cannot be calculated with
mountain aborigines, and plains aborigines. These three electorates accounted for about 4% of the total 1954
Provincial Assembly vote.
b) No data are available for one of the 23 electorates in the 1957 election, the plains aborigines, who cast 1.1% of the
total 1957 Provincial Assembly vote.
Data calculated from the following sources:
ZZZY, pp. 253-257, 267-272, 295, 684-688:
DFZZ, pp. 88-93;
LHB, 19 April 1954, p. 1; TWXSB, 19 April 1954, p. 1; ZYRB, 3 May 1954, p. 1;
LHB, 22 April 1957, p. 1; LHB, 25 April 1960, p. 2;
TWXSB, 29 April 1963, p. 1;
ZYRB, 2 March 1968, p. 3; ZYRB, 22 April 1968, p. 3: TWXSB, 22 April 1968, p. 1;
ZYRB, 23 September 1972, p. 1; ZYRB, 25 December 1972, p. 3;
ZYRB, 11 August 1977, p. 1. (Int. Ed.); LHB, 20 November 1977, p. 3;TWSB, 20 November 1977, p. 1.
See note 25 for full citations.
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34 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
Province (D). Only in the electorates where the Nationalist Party nominated
a full slate of candidates did the 1977 non-partisans win an unprecedented
proportion of the vote; otherwise, non-partisans won a greater proportion
of votes in 1960 and came reasonably close to the 1977 results in all of
the other elections except 1968. As would be expected, non-partisans have
won much larger percentages of the votes in electorates where the Nationalist
Party has allocated at least one seat to the non-partisans (Column B)
than in electorates where the Party has nominated a full slate (A). Nonpartisan
candidates in the 1977 County Executive and Provincial Assembly
election did well, but they did not win an unprecedented proportion of
the votes cast.26
The non-partisan vote totals, rather substantial for a political system
frequently characterised as a one-party dictatorship, must be partially
discounted since some votes went to 'false' non-partisans. The term 'nonpartisan',
as noted above, encompasses an extraordinarily diverse grouping
of individuals. During an interview Huang Xinjie, a non-partisan elected
to the Legislative Branch in 1969 and sentenced to fourteen years in
prison on 18 April 1980 for his role in the Gaoxiong Incident, divided nonpartisans
into 'genuine' and 'false' categories. Of the twenty-one nonpartisans
elected to the Provincial Assembly in 1977, Huang classified
only thirteen as 'genuine'.27 Interestingly, the right-wing opponents of
the 'genuine' non-partisans, the sponsors of the magazine Gust (Jifeng),
basically agreed with Huang's evaluation; the right-wingers claimed only
eleven of the non-partisan Provincial Assemblymen belonged to the 'Black
Fist Gang'.28 (Interviews in mid-1979 with 'genuine' non-partisan Provincial
Assemblymen confirmed my observation that Huang's list included a
couple of non-political non-partisans.) Thus, according to both sides, a
fairly substantial proportion of the votes cast for non-partisans in 1977
went to 'false' non-partisans.
The Unimportance of Party Affiliation in Voting Behaviour
The focus on the distribution of seats and votes according to party
affiliation in the preceding analysis suggests party affiliation plays an
important role in determining voter behaviour. In fact, observation and
statistical analysis both show party affiliation has little saliency in
aggregate voting behaviour. Voters in Taiwan usually cast their ballots
on the basis of particularistic ties called guanxi. Political leaders support
the candidate with whom they have the closest guanxi and voters cast
their ballots either for the candidate with whom they have the closest
guanxi or for the candidate supported by the local leader with whom
they have the closest guanxi. Party members find it difficult to work
openly on behalf of non-partisans running against Party nominees, but
otherwise party membership makes little difference in voting behaviour.
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 35
In the rural township where I observed the 19 November 1977 election,
the local leader who basically ran the Party organisation's campaign had
been a life-long non-partisan.29
Analysis of voting statistics verifies these observations about the low
saliency of party affiiation. If voters cast ballots on the basis of party,
then the support received by party candidates in the simultaneous County
Executive and Provincial Assembly elections should correlate closely. In
fact, calculations of Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the simultaneous
County Executive and Provincial Assembly elections show extremely low
correlations which are statistically insignificant even at the .1 level.30
Statistical analysis also shows party affiliation remained unimportant in
the 19 November 1977 election itself. In the thirteen counties and
equivalent municipalities which had contested elections for both County
Executive and Provincial Assembly (Table 5), voters clearly did not vote
according to party affiliation.31 This lack of correlation is especially
pronounced in the counties where 'genuine' non-partisans ran. In Taoyuan
County, Xu Xinliang won 61.5 percent of the votes for County Executive,
but the five non-partisans competing against five Party nominees for
Provincial Assembly obtained only 27.3 percent of the votes. In Yilan
County, Lin Yixiong won 42.7 percent of the Provincial Assembly vote
while the non-partisan candidate for County Executive obtained only
13.4 percent of the vote. (In Nantou County where Zhang Junhong won a
Provincial Assembly seat, no non-partisan contested the County Executive
election.) Thus, we can conclude that party affiliation has played a very
small role in Taiwanese voting behaviour.
TABLE 5: Percentage of Votes Cast for Non-partisan Candidates in
Contested County Executive and Provincial Assembly Elections,
19 November 1977
County/ County Provincial
Municipality Executive Assembly
Jilong Mun. 43.3 33.2
Taizhong Mun. 50.4 27.0
Tainan Mun. 53.6 35.7
Gaoxiong Mun. 44.7 51.2
Taibei Co. 34.7 29.1
Taoyuan Co. 61.5 27.3
Miaoli Co. 30.8 27.9
Taizhong Co. 35.7 41.1
Zhanghua Co. 34.8 28.0
Yunlin Co. 43.0 36.1
Jiayi Co. 32.0 26.3
Gaoxiong Co. 50.3 45.7
Yilan Co. 13.4 42.7
Data calculated from Lianhe bao [United Daily News], 20 November 1977, p. 3.
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36 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
III. GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION FROM THE ELECTION
OF 19 NOVEMBER 1977 TO THE GAOXIONG INCIDENT
During the two years between the 19 November 1977 election and the
Gaoxiong Incident of 10 December 1979, the 'genuine' non-partisans
continuously expanded their activities and widened the parameters of
acceptable political discourse. The government response to these pressures
varied in a seemingly erratic manner. While the government banned some
books and reorganised a forthright newspaper, it also licensed outspoken
periodicals and allowed other newspapers to report and comment on an
increasingly wide range of formerly forbidden topics. This seemingly
uneven response to the growing opposition activities probably reflected
wide disagreements within the ruling elite about the desirability of greater
openness in the political arena. I believe that the pro-democratic elements
in the ruling elite succeeded in convincing Nationalist Party Chairman
Jiang Jingguo (Chiang Ching-kuo) to continue the broad process of
'democratisation', but that the more conservative and security-oriented
forces proved able to convince Jiang to take actions to deal with specific
situations. Thus, for two years, Taiwan experienced ever more open
political debate in public gatherings and publications. At the same time
the government banned books and journals and conducted political trials.
Following the election of 19 November 1977, the non-partisans'
activities centred on the Provincial Assembly where the 'genuine' nonpartisans
had sufficient numbers to interpellate effectively and to organise
an unofficial 'Seventh Committee' after refusing to participate in the
Provincial Assembly's six official Standing Committees. The focus of
attention then turned to the central-level elections scheduled for 23
December 1978. Numerous young, articulate and politicily conscious nonpartisans
registered for the Legislative Branch and National Assembly
elections in electorates all around Taiwan. Debate during the campaign,
according to all sides, substantially exceeded previous limitations. The
number of 'genuine' non-partisans who would have won office cannot be
ascertained because the authorities postponed the election in the tense
period following the 16 December 1978 announcement of 'normalisation'
between Beijing and Washington.
The ability of the non-partisans to organise a 'campaign organisation'
(zhuxuantuan) to liaise and co-ordinate their campaigns around the island
provided an advance even more significant than the broadened scope of
political debate. For years non-partisans had attempted to co-ordinate
their campaigns, but such attempts always seemed to fail after the
organising banquet, partly because of the non-political orientation and
concern for 'face' of many non-partisans, partly because the government
clearly opposed attempts to establish an opposition organisation. The
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 37
authorities' apparent toleration of the non-partisan 'campaign organisation'
in late 1978 encouraged the non-partisans to anticipate a fundamental
change in the policy towards political opposition.
Since their removal from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, the
Nationalist authorities had made clear they would not tolerate the
organisation of another opposition political party in addition to the
'friendly' Youth and Democratic-Socialist parties. The classic political
case testing this policy occurred in 1960 when Lei Zhen, a former
Nationalist Party official who had held very high positions on the mainland
before 1949, organised the Democratic Party (Minzhudang). Lei, the chief
editor of the fortnightly journal Free China (Ziyou Zhongguo) during
its 260 issue life from November 1949 to September 1960, angered leading
Nationalist officials with his outspoken articles on democracy and freedom
and was expelled from the Nationalist Party in 1954 for criticising
educational policy. During the summer of 1960 the Democratic Party
leaders made substantial progress, convening large meetings in several
localities of Taiwan attended by numerous non-partisans, but on 4
September 1960 Lei and three others were arrested. After a one day
military court trial on 3 October 1960, the court sentenced Lei to a ten
year sentence. He was released on 4 September 1970 and died of brain
cancer on 7 March 1979, aged 81.32 Thus, until the apparent acceptance
of the 'campaign organisation' in the aborted 23 December 1978 election,
the prognosis for an opposition organisation appeared dim.
Following the postponement of the December 1978 election, the nonpartisans
felt the need to maintain campaign momentum. They decided to
use the Chinese tradition of 'literary politics' and follow in the footsteps of
earlier intellectuals in Taiwan by founding magazines. Several important
political journals have been published, but the most important prior to
1979, in addition to Free China, were Apollo (Wenxing) published from
1957 until 1965, The Intellectual (Daxue) which had its greatest influence
in the early 1970s,33 and Taiwan Political Review (Taiwan zhenglun)
which published five issues during August-December 1975.
Several journals appeared in 1979, but the two most important reflected
a split in the non-partisans which had occurred during the December
1978 election campaign. Kang Ningxiang, an astute young Taiwanese elected
to the Legislative Branch in 1972 and re-elected in 1975, organised The
Eighties (Bashi niandai) which first appeared in June 1979 and lasted
seven issues until December 1979, the month of the Gaoxiong Incident.
Kang had split with the 'campaign organisation' in the December 1978
election since their policy of running as many non-partisans as possible
threatened to divide the non-partisan vote and cost him re-election. While
advocating many of the same ideas as those in the 'campaign organisation',
Kang has possessed a clearer understanding of Taiwan's political realities
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38 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
and acted accordingly. Thus, although he spoke at the Gaoxiong Incident,
he has avoided arrest. Kang has worked tirelessly on behalf of the arrested
despite their earlier conflict.34
The 'campaign organisation' founded the second important political
magazine, Formosa (Meilidao), which published four issues from August
to November 1979. Formosa differed from the other political journals
because it quite openly operated as an opposition political organisation,
a 'political party in all but name'. Its leaders established 'Service Offices'
(fuwuchu) in most of Taiwan's counties and municipalities which
sponsored various meetings and forums on a wide variety of issues.35 When
the November 1979 issue of Formosa reached a self-proclaimed circulation
of 100,000, the organisation clearly had become threatening.
Endeavouring to stay in the public eye in order to prepare for the
postponed election, the non-partisans organised numerous rallies and
demonstrations throughout 1979. Their success varied as local authorities
responded differently. But, despite an occasional soaking from fire hoses
and some political arrests, the non-partisans continued their activities. The
Human Rights Day rally, sponsored by the Gaoxiong 'Service Office' of
the Formosa Magazine, which became the Gaoxiong Incident, was only a
prelude to a bigger rally scheduled for Taibei on 16 December 1979, the
anniversary of the announcement of 'normalisation' between Beijing and
Washington. But the violence, which after considerable investigation I
believe resulted from errors on both sides, gave the conservatives and
security forces their opportunity to end the 'dangerous' democratic trends.
The fifty hour delay between the Gaoxiong Incident and the arrests,
during which the Formosa Magazine leaders conducted a lengthy press
conference, clearly indicates a long debate about how to deal with the
non-partisans occurred among the top levels of Taiwan's ruling elite. The
conservatives and security forces argued that they had predicted the nonpartisan
activities would lead to violence. This argument has special
strength in Taiwan because the Chinese Nationalists believe the Chinese
Communists exploited social unrest on the mainland to defeat the Chinese
Nationalists. Thus, the Nationalists have striven to maintain social stability
on Taiwan, a factor which partially explains the implementation of policies
leading to a comparatively egalitarian distribution of income on the island.
Furthermore, the security authorities claimed they had the evidence
to convict the Formosa Magazine leaders. The more liberal forces had to
give the conservatives an opportunity to prove their point. In fact, the
relatively open military court trial of the eight major defendants (virtual
transcripts appeared in some major daily newspapers) showed the weakness
of the prosecution case. Nevertheless, the judgment of 18 April 1980
sentenced the eight major defendants to long prison terms: one person
received life imprisonment, a second person fourteen years, and the six
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 39
other defendants twelve years. The judgme
accusations in the indictment and ignored the
judicial perspective the trial need not have
provide the non-partisans with an opportunity
of Taiwan's population to their ideas. Over forty other persons have
received sentences in other trials related to the Gaoxiong Incident.36
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER QUESTIONS
Why did the authorities crack down on the non-partisans? What
conclusions do recent events enable us to draw about the political syste
on Taiwan?
While the Nationalist authorities tolerate opposition both in and out
of government, they will not permit the existence of any opposition which
shows even the potential of attempting to replace them in government.
Thus, opposition organisations such as the Democratic Party of Lei Zhen
or the Formosa Magazine organisation must be destroyed before they have
an opportunity to develop a mass base which could threaten the Nationalist
leadership with an alternative government.
Additionally, any opposition activity must not threaten social stability.
Until the Gaoxiong Incident, the authorities had gradually relaxed the
restrictions on public gatherings both in election campaigns and in the
various non-partisan rallies such as Xu Xinliang's 'Birthday Party' attended
by 10,000-30,000 persons in Zhongli on 26 May 1979.37 The violence
which occurred during the Gaoxiong Incident and, retrospectively, during
the Zhongli Incident of 19 November 1977, means that the authorities
will not tolerate mass public demonstrations for a long time.
Further, the leaders of the non-partisans appeared especially
threatening because, as home-grown products educated under the
Nationalist system in Taiwan, they should have supported the system.
Many of those now in jail had been the system's bright stars, ranking at
the top of their classes in the best universities. They possessed unlimited
opportunities for success, yet they turned to opposition and, as idealists,
could not be bought off with money or prestige.
The termination of the Mutual Security Treaty between the United
States and Taiwan as of 1 January 1980 also helps explain the crackdown
on the non-partisans. Although 'normalisation' between Washington and
Beijing became effective on 1 January 1979, the United States terminated
the Mutual Security Treaty according to the Treaty's provisions, giving
one year's notice. Thus, while the United States conducted normal
diplomatic relations with Beijing, it also maintained the Mutual Security
Treaty with Taiwan during 1979. The imminent absence of the treaty
guarantee worried many people in Taiwan and the authorities labelled
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40 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
1980 Self-Reliance Year (ziqiangnian). Determined to create solidarity
within the island, Taiwan's leaders repeatedly emphasised, in xenophobic
tones, the Republic of China's sovereignty and the impermissibility of
foreign interference in the island's domestic affairs. The non-partisans,
who appeared to threaten solidarity in this time of perceived crisis, received
much less sympathy both in and out of government than they might have
obtained in more secure times.
The Formosa Magazine case again revealed the widespread disagreements
within Taiwan's top leadership over whether to stress 'democracy'
or internal security. These divisions have been apparent ever since the
Nationalist removal to Taiwan in 1949, but during the 1970s the
'democrats' seemed to be gaining influence. Unfortunately, recent event
suggest 'democratisation' has not become an integral part of Taiwan's
political system, but has developed or retreated upon the decision of one
man, Jiang Jingguo, the eldest son and successor of President Chiang Kaishek.38
One finds it difficult to be optimistic about the future of
democratisation if its existence depends upon the decision of one man.
On the other hand, Taiwan has a very highly educated population
and Chinese in Taiwan seem able to organise groups (e.g. factions, interest
groups, lineages, etc.) for political activities. According to 'liberal'
democratic theorists, high educational levels and the ability to form groups
for political activity have been two important factors in the establishme
and maintenance of western democracies.39 Taiwan has these attributes as
well ag many people in and out of government committed to democratisation
and some experience with relatively open political discourse
and activity. Have these assets established sufficiently strong roots able to
provide a basis for the re-emergence of democratisation in the future?
Finally, the non- partisans suffered as a result of being caught up in
the succession strugg[e. President Jiang Jingguo became seventy years old
in March 1980 and, although in apparent good health despite diabetes,
cannot remain in power indefinitely. Yet he has made no provisions for
the succession and several persons in the security forces, who see themselves
as protectors of the Republic of China, have tried to grasp as many
levers of power as possible in order to be prepared when the fateful day
arrives. Unfortunately for the people of Taiwan, the security forces have
not demonstrated much capability. If they could not even stage a political
trial competently, a task within their area of specialisation, how will they
be able to manage the increasingly sophisticated and complex economy
and society of Taiwan?
These various factors in Taiwan's present political system do not all
necessarily lead to one pre-determined future for Taiwan. The situation in
Taiwan, as in all complex political systems, contains many contradictory
elements. It is the apparent preponderance of factors which has given me
the feeling of pessimism noted at the beginning of this article. I hope I am
wrong.
30 January 1981
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 41
Notes
* An earlier version of this article was presented at the Taiwan Political Economy
Workshop, Columbia University, New York, 18-20 December 1980, sponsored by the
American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Sciences Research Council (ACLSSSRC)
Mellon Program. Grants from the La Trobe University Travel Committee and
the ACLS-SSRC Mellon Program enabled my participation in the Workship. This article
has also benefitted greatly from field research in Taiwan during 1977, 1978, 1979, and
1980, which grants from the Australian Research Grants Committee (ARGC) made
possible. A more theoretical version of this article is scheduled to appear in Edwin A.
Winckler (ed.), Authoritarianism and Dependency on Taiwan, forthcoming.
1 See, inter alia, J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1973: Consolidation of the Succession',
Asian Survey, XIV:1 January, 1974), esp. 27-29; J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan: Background
and Prospects', World Review, XVIII:2 (June, 1979), 65-66; and J. Bruce
Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979: "Normalcy" after "Normalization" ', Asian Survey, XX:1
(January, 1980), esp. 88-93. The last article was completed just two weeks before the
Gaoxiong Incident.
2 See, for example, Robert A. Dahl (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies,
(New Haven and London, 1966); Barbara N. McLennan (ed.), Political
Opposition and Dissent, (New York and London, 1973); Leonard Schapiro (ed.),
Political Opposition in One-Party States, (London, 1972).
3 Frank S.T. Hsiao and Lawrence R. Sullivan, 'The Chinese Communist Party and
the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943', Pacific Affairs, LII:3 (Fall, 1979), 455-456; Edgar
Wickberg, 'The Taiwan Peasant Movement, 1923-1932: Chinese Rural Radicalism
Under Japanese Development Programs', Pacific Affairs, XLVI1I:4 (Winter, 1975-
1976), 570-571.
4 Cai Xiaoqian, Jiangxi suqu: hongjun xicuan huiyi [The Jiangxi Soviet Area:
Memoirs of the Red Army's Escape Westwards], (Taibei, 1970).
5 Hsiao and Sullivan, 'Chinese Communist', 456.
6 Jacobs, 'Taiwan: Background and Prospects', 71-72.
7 George H. Kerr, Formosa Betrayed, (Boston, 1965), pp. 451-472; Douglas Mendel,
The Politics of Formosan Nationalism, (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp. 146-170.
8 Peng Mingmin had travelled overseas widely before his arrest; see Peng Ming-min,
A Taste of Freedom: Memoirs of a Formosan Independence Leader, (New York et al.,
1972). Shi Mingde, a Taiwanese graduate of Taiwan's Military Academy born in 1941,
clearly participated in Taiwanese Independence activities and began serving a sentence
of life imprisonment in 1962. Following the death of President Chiang Kai-shek in
1975, the authorities reduced his sentence to fifteen years and released him in June
1977. Shi actively participated in the non-partisan campaign for the aborted December
1978 elections and became General Manager of the Formosa Magazine (Meilidao)
during 1979. A leader of the demonstrators during the Gaoxiong Incident, Shi received
a sentence of life imprisonment on 18 April 1980, which he is currently serving in a
prison on Green Island off the East Coast of Taiwan.
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42 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
9 J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1972: Political Season', Asian Survey, XIII:1 (January,
1973), 110-111.
10 A recent journalistic report, apparently based on foreign diplomatic sources in
Taiwan, states the two minor parties have a combined membership of less than 15,000
and that the Nationalist Party gives them a monthly subsidy of NTS1 million
(USS27,750); see Paul Wilson, 'A moderately successful poll', Far Eastern Economic
Review, CX:51 (12 December 1980), 9.
11 For an analysis of the politics of 'face' in Taiwan, see J. Bruce Jacobs, Local Politics
in a Rural Chinese Cultural Setting: A Field Study of Mazu Township, Taiwan,
(Canberra, 1980), pp. 60-68, 112-113 et passim.
12 Jacobs, Local, pp. 13-14, 31-39.
13 The text of the 'Declaration' may be found in Victor H. Li (ed.), The Future of
Taiwan, (New York, 1980), pp. 186-187.
14 Schapiro, Political Opposition, pp. 9-10.
15 See Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', 88-89.
16 J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978: Economic Successes, International Uncertainties',
Asian Survey, XIX: 1 (January, 1979), 22-24.
17 Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 20.
18 Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 21-22.
19 Zhang and Lin received twelve-year sentences on 18 April 1980 in the aftermath of
the Gaoxiong Incident, sentences they are now serving in a suburban Taibei prison.
Xu most likely would also be in prison except that he was, and is, 'studying' overseas
as a result of his mid-1979 impeachment and suspension from office. On the Xu case,
see Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', 91-92.
20 Jacobs, Local, pp. 25-31, 176-199 et passim; J. Bruce Jacobs, 'Paradoxes in the
Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Politics', Politics, XIII:2 (November,
1978), 241-243.
21 Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', 21-22. See Jacobs, Local, pp. 182-202 for a detailed description
of the 19 November 1977 election in a rural township.
22 Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao [Annals of Local Self-Government in Taiwan
Province], (Taizhong, 1965), pp. 684, 689.
23 The only other country using this single-vote, multi-member district electoral
system, to the best of my knowledge, is Japan. See Jacobs, Local, pp. 117-118 for a
preliminary analysis of this electoral system and p. 123n for the operation of the
'female guarantee'.
24 For case studies of the Party nomination process and non-partisan responses, see
Jacobs, Local, pp. 149-152, 160-164, 182-189.
25 The abbreviations and full citations of the sources used in preparing the tables
follow:
DFZZ: Difang zizhi [Local Self-Government], (Taizhong, 1971).
LHB: Lianhe bao [United Daily News].
TWSB: Taiwan shibao [Taiwan Times].
TWXSB: Taiwan xinsheng bao [Taiwan New Life Newsl.
ZYRB: Zhongyang ribao [Central Daily News].
ZZZY: Taiwan sheng difang zizhi zhiyao [Annals of Local Self-Government in
Taiwan Province], (Taizhong, 1965).
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TAIWAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE 43
26 Statistical calculations lend support to the analysis that the non-partisans did
much better winning seats than votes in the 19 November 1977 elections. Calculations
of Pearson Correlation Coefficients showed no significant correlations between percentage
of votes received and percentage of seats won in the elections from 1954 to
1977. For example, R = 0.5825 for correlations between Column A in Table 3 and the
corresponding percentage column (A/Bx100) in Table 1 and R = 0.1699 for correlations
between Column B in Table 3 and the corresponding percentage column (A/Cx100) in
Table 1; neither R value is significant even at the .1 level. The corresponding Provincial
Assembly statistics for Columns A, B, C and D in Table 4 and the seats won in those
electorates (data not presented) also showed statistically insignificant R values except
for the R value between Column C and the corresponding non-partisan seats which
was significant at the .05 level (R = 0.7593). Considering that the data in Column C
are integrally related to the data in Columns A, B, and D, one must assume this
relatively high correlation occurred by chance.
27 Zhen Boya, 'Lin shi wu ju, bu mou wu cheng' [If one does not plan, one cannot
successfully approach a crisis without fear], Da shidai [Great Epoch], II:4 (April
1980), 13-14.
28 Ziliao shi [Reference Office], 'Baifen zhi sa xuanpiao de shuzi moshu' [The
wizardry of the thirty percent vote figure], Jifeng [Gust], 1:9 (April, 1980), 49; this
analysis contains several factual errors.
29 Jacobs, Local, p. 190 et passim. For three electoral case studies, see Jacobs, Local,
pp. 148-160, 160-172, 182-202. On the concept of guanxi, see Jacobs, Local, pp. 40-60
et passim or J. Bruce Jacobs, 'A Preliminary Model of Particularistic Ties in Chinese
Political Alliances: Kan-ch'ing and Kuan-hsi in a Rural Taiwanese Township', The
China Quarterly, 78 (June, 1979), 237-273.
30 R = 0.3184 for electorates in which non-partisans competed against Nationalist
Party members (Column A in Table 3 and Column C in Table 4 excluding the nonsimultaneous
1963 and 1964 data) and R = 0.2582 for all electorates in Taiwan
Province (Column B in Table 3 and Column D in Table 4 excluding the 1963 and 1964
data).
31 In fact, the correlation is marginally negative: R = -0.0671.
32 In retrospect, the Lei Zhen case possesses great importance in the post-1949
political history of Taiwan and deserves a full scholarly analysis. The best article I have
found is Wen De, 'Lei Zhen, Hu Shi, Zhongguo minzhudang' [Lei Zhen, Hu Shi and the
China Democratic Party], Bashi niandai [The Eighties], I:3 (August, 1979), 87-9 1. Lei's
own memoirs have been published: Lei Zhen, Lei Zhen huiyi lu [Memoirs of Lei
Zhen], (Hong Kong, 1978). Short summaries of the Lei case in English may be found
in Kerr, Formosa, pp. 446-448; Mendel, Politics, pp. 114-117; and three articles
published in Mark Mancall (ed.), Formosa Today, (New York et al., 1964): Mancall,
'Introduction: Taiwan, Island of Resignation and Despair', pp. 38-41; John Israel,
'Politics on Formosa', pp. 61-64; and Ong Joktik, 'A Formosan's View of the Formosan
Independence Movement', pp. 168-169.
33 See Mab Huang, Intellectual Ferment for Political Reforms in Taiwan, 19 71-1973,
(Ann Arbor, 1976).
3 Before the closure of The Eighties in December 1979, Kang had announced a
'sister' journal, The Asian (Yazhou ren), which ran for two issues in January and
February 1980 before being suspended. The Current (Nuanliu), a more recent attempt
to found a successor to The Eighties, lasted one issue (August 1980) before being closed.
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44 THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF CHINESE AFFAIRS
35 The Nationalist Party's township-level offices are called Service Stations; see Jacobs,
Local, p.28.
3 This summary cannot do justice to the eventful and significant two years leading
to the Gaoxiong Incident. A much more comprehensive account will appear in a book
I am currently writing. Some details and the context of these events can be found in
Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1978', esp. 26-27 and Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979', esp. 89-93.
37 For details of the 'Birthday Party' rally, see Jacobs, 'Taiwan 1979',91-92.
38 Jiang Jingguo effectively succeeded his father in the early 1970s becoming Premier
in 1972 and President in 1978. Upon his father's death in 1975, he became Chairman
of the Nationalist Party.
39 For example, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, (Princeton,
1963).
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