The Clash of Civilizations?
Author(s): Samuel P. Huntington
Reviewed work(s):
Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 22-49
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045621 .
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The Clash of Civilizations?
Samuel P.Huntington
THE NEXT PATTERN OF CONFLICT
World politics is
entering
a new
phase, and intellectuals have
not hesitated to
proliferate visions of what itwill be?the end of his
tory, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the
decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and
globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the
emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect
ofwhat global politics is likely to be in the coming years.
It ismy hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this
new world will not be primarily ideological
or
primarily economic.
The great divisions among humankind and the dominating
source of
conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful
actors inworld affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will
occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash
of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between
civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.
Conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the evo
lution of conflict in the modern world. For a century and a half after
the emergence of the modern international system with the Peace of
Westphalia, the conflicts of theWestern world were
largely among
Samuel P. Huntington is the Eaton Professor of the Science of
Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic
Studies at Harvard University. This article is the product of the Olin
Institute's project
on "The Changing Security Environment and
American National Interests."
[22]
The Clash ofCivilizations?
princes?emperors, absolute monarchs and constitutional monarchs
attempting
to
expand their bureaucracies, their armies, their mer
cantilist economic strength and, most
important, the territory they
ruled. In the process they created nation states, and beginning with
the French Revolution the principal lines of conflict were between
nations rather than princes. In 1793, as R. R. Palmer put it, "The wars
of kings
were over; the wars of peoples had begun." This nineteenth
century pattern lasted until the end ofWorld War I.Then, as a result
of the Russian Revolution and the reaction against it, the conflict of
nations yielded
to the conflict of ideologies, first among communism,
fascism-Nazism and liberal democracy, and then between commu
nism and liberal democracy. During the Cold War, this latter conflict
became embodied in the struggle between the two superpowers, nei
ther of which was a nation state in the classical European
sense and
each ofwhich defined its identity in terms of its ideology.
These conflicts between princes, nation states and ideologies
were
primarily conflicts within Western civilization, "Western civil wars,"
asWilliam Lind has labeled them.This was as true of theColdWar
as itwas of the world wars and the earlier wars of the seventeenth,
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.With the end of theColdWar,
international politics
moves out of itsWestern phase, and its center
piece becomes the interaction between theWest and non-Western
civilizations and among non-Western civilizations. In the politics of
civilizations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civiliza
tions no
longer remain the objects of history
as targets ofWestern
colonialism but join theWest asmovers and shapers of history.
THE NATURE OF CIVILIZATIONS
During the cold war the world was divided into the First,
Second and Third Worlds. Those divisions are no
longer relevant. It
is far more
meaningful
now to group countries not in terms of their
political
or economic systems or in terms of their level of economic
development but rather in terms of their culture and civilization.
What do we mean when we talk of a civilization? A civilization is
a cultural entity. Villages, regions, ethnic groups, nationalities, reli
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [23]
Samuel P.
Huntington
gious groups, all have distinct cultures at different levels of cultural
heterogeneity. The culture of a
village in southern Italy may be dif
ferent from that of a
village in northern Italy, but both will share in a
common Italian culture that distinguishes them from German vil
lages. European communities, in turn, will share cultural features that
distinguish them from Arab or Chinese communities. Arabs,
Chinese andWesterners, however, are not part of any broader cul
tural entity. They constitute civilizations. A civilization is thus the
highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural
identity people have short ofthat which distinguishes humans from
other species. It is defined both by
common
objective elements, such
as
language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the sub
jective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity:
a
resident of Rome may define himself with varying degrees of inten
sity
as a Roman, an Italian, a Catholic, a Christian, a
European,
a
Westerner. The civilization towhich he belongs is the broadest level
of identification with which he intensely identifies. People can and
do redefine their identities and, as a result, the composition and
boundaries of civilizations change.
Civilizations may involve a
large number of people,
aswith China
("a civilization pretending
to be a state," as Lucian Pye put it), or a
very small number of people, such as the Anglophone Caribbean. A
civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with
Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or
only one, as is the
case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and
overlap, and may include subcivilizations. Western civilization has
two major variants, European and North American, and Islam has its
Arab, Turkic and Malay subdivisions. Civilizations are nonetheless
meaningful entities, and while the lines between them are seldom
sharp, they
are real. Civilizations are
dynamic; they rise and fall; they
divide and merge. And, as any student of history knows, civilizations
disappear and are buried in the sands of time.
Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal
actors in
global affairs. They have been that, however, for only
a few centuries.
The broader reaches of human history have been the history of civi
[^4] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume^No^
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lizations. InA Study ofHistory, Arnold Toynbee identified 21major
civilizations; only six of them exist in the contemporary world.
WHY CIVILIZATIONS WILL CLASH
Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the
future, and the world will be shaped in large
measure
by the interac
tions among seven or
eight major civilizations. These include
Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox,
Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most
impor
tant conflicts of the future will occur
along the cultural fault lines sep
arating these civilizations from one another.
Why will this be the case?
First, differences among civilizations are not
only real; they
are
basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, Ian
guage, culture, tradition and, most
important,
religion. The people of different civilizations
have different views on the relations between
God and man, the individual and the group, the
citizen and the state, parents and children, hus
band and wife, aswell as
differing views of the
relative importance of rights and responsibili
ties, liberty and authority, equality and hierar
chy. These differences are the product of centuries. They will not
soon
disappear. They
are far more fundamental than differences
among political ideologies and political regimes. Differences do not
necessarily
mean conflict, and conflict does not
necessarily
mean vio
lence. Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations
have generated the most
prolonged and the most violent conflicts.
Second, the world is becoming
a smaller place. The interactions
between peoples of different civilizations are
increasing; these
increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and
awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities
within civilizations. North African immigration to France generates
hostility among Frenchmen and at the same time increased receptiv
ity to
immigration by "good" European Catholic Poles. Americans
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [25]
The conflicts of the
futurewill occur along
the cultural fault lines
separating civilizations.
Samuel P.Huntington
react farmore
negatively
to
Japanese investment than to
larger invest
ments from Canada and European countries. Similarly,
as Donald
Horowitz has pointed out, "An Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo or an
Onitsha Ibo inwhat was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In Lagos, he
is simply
an Ibo. In London, he is a
Nigerian. In New York, he is an
African." The interactions among peoples of different civilizations
enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invig
orates differences and animosities stretching
or
thought
to stretch
back deep into history.
Third, the processes of economic modernization and social change
throughout the world are
separating people from longstanding local
identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity.
Inmuch of theworld religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in
the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such
movements are found inWestern Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism
and Hinduism, aswell as in Islam. In most countries and most reli
gions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, col
lege-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business
persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has
remarked, "is one of the dominant social facts of life in the late twen
tieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," asGilles
Kepel labeled it, provides
a basis for identity and commitment that
transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations.
Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by
the dual role of theWest. On the one hand, theWest is at a
peak of
power. At the same time, however, and perhaps
as a result, a return
to the roots
phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civiliza
tions. Increasingly
one hears references to trends toward a
turning
inward and "Asianization" in Japan, the end of the Nehru legacy and
the "Hinduization" of India, the failure ofWestern ideas of socialism
and nationalism and hence "re-Islamization" of theMiddle East, and
now a debate over Westernization versus Russianization in Boris
Yeltsin s country. A West at the peak of its power confronts non
Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and the resources to
shape the world in non-Western ways.
In the past, the elites of non-Western societies were
usually the
[26] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
people who were most involved with theWest, had been educated at
Oxford, the Sorbonne or Sandhurst, and had absorbed Western atti
tudes and values. At the same time, the populace in non-Western
countries often remained deeply imbued with the indigenous culture.
Now, however, these relationships
are
being reversed. A de
Westernization and indigenization of elites is occurring inmany non
Western countries at the same time thatWestern, usually American,
cultures, styles and habits become more
popular among the mass of
the people.
Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and
hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and eco
nomic ones. In the former Soviet Union, communists can become
democrats, the rich can become poor and the poor rich, but Russians
cannot become Estonians and Az?ris cannot become Armenians. In
class and ideological conflicts, the key question
was "Which side are
you on?" and people could and did choose sides and change sides. In
conflicts between civilizations, the question is "What are
you?" That
is a
given that cannot be changed. And aswe know, from Bosnia to
the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question
can
mean a bullet in the head. Even more than ethnicity, religion dis
criminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be
half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously
even a citizen of two
countries. It ismore difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.
Finally, economic regionalism is increasing. The proportions of
total trade that were
intraregional
rose between 1980 and 1989 from
51 percent to 59 percent in Europe, 33 percent to 37 percent in East
Asia, and 32 percent to 36 percent inNorth America. The importance
of regional economic blocs is likely
to continue to increase in the
future. On the one hand, successful economic regionalism will rein
force civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic
regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civi
lization. The European Community
rests on the shared foundation
of European culture andWestern Christianity. The success of the
North American Free Trade Area depends
on the convergence now
underway ofMexican, Canadian and American cultures. Japan, in
contrast, faces difficulties in creating
a
comparable economic entity
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [27]
Samuel P
Huntington
inEast Asia because Japan is a
society and civilization unique to itself.
However strong the trade and investment links Japan may develop
with other East Asian countries, its cultural differences with those
countries inhibit and perhaps preclude its promoting regional
eco
nomic integration like that in Europe and North America.
Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid
expansion of the economic relations between the People
s
Republic of
China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese
communities in other Asian countries. With the Cold War over, cul
tural commonalities increasingly
overcome
ideological differences,
and mainland China and Taiwan move closer together. If cultural
commonality is a
prerequisite for economic integration, the principal
East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely
to be centered on
China. This bloc is, in fact, already coming into existence. As Murray
Weidenbaum has observed,
Despite the current
Japanese dominance of the region, the Chinese-based
economy of Asia is rapidly emerging
as a new
epicenter for industry,
com
merce and finance. This strategic
area contains substantial amounts of tech
nology and manufacturing capability (Taiwan), outstanding entrepreneurial,
marketing and services acumen
(Hong Kong),
a fine communications net
work (Singapore), a tremendous pool of financial capital (all three), and very
large endowments of land, resources and labor (mainland China).... From
Guangzhou
to
Singapore, from Kuala Lumpur
toManila, this influential net
work?often based on extensions of the traditional clans?has been described
as the backbone of the East Asian economy.1
Culture and religion also form the basis of the Economic
Cooperation Organization, which brings together ten non-Arab
Muslim countries: Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghan
istan. One impetus to the revival and expansion of this organization,
founded originally in the 1960s byTurkey, Pakistan and Iran, is the
realization by the leaders of several of these countries that they had
no chance of admission to the European Community. Similarly,
Caricom, the Central American Common Market andMercosur rest
1MurrayWeidenbaum, Greater China: TheNext Economic Superpower?, St. Louis:
Washington University Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary
Issues, Series 57, February 1993, pp. 2-3.
[28] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
on common cultural foundations. Efforts to build a broader
Caribbean-Central American economic entity bridging the Anglo
Latin divide, however, have to date failed.
As people define their identity in ethnic and religious terms, they
are
likely
to see an "us" versus "them" relation existing between them
selves and people of different ethnicity
or
religion. The end of ideo
logically defined states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union permits traditional ethnic identities and animosities to come
to the fore. Differences in culture and religion
create differences over
policy issues, ranging from human rights
to
immigration
to trade and
commerce to the environment. Geographical propinquity gives rise
to conflicting territorial claims from Bosnia to Mindanao. Most
important, the efforts of theWest to promote its values of democra
cy and liberalism as universal values, to maintain its military pre
dominance and to advance its economic interests engender
countering responses from other civilizations. Decreasingly able to
mobilize support and form coalitions on the basis of ideology, gov
ernments and groups will increasingly attempt tomobilize support by
appealing
to common
religion and civilization identity.
The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro
level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations
struggle, often violently,
over the control of territory and each other.
At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for rel
ative military and economic power, struggle
over the control of inter
national institutions and third parties, and competitively promote
their particular political and religious values.
THE FAULT LINES BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS
The fault lines between civilizations are
replacing the political
and ideological boundaries of theColdWar as theflash points for cri
sis and bloodshed. The Cold War began when the Iron Curtain
divided Europe politically and ideologically. The Cold War ended
with the end of the Iron Curtain. As the ideological division of
Europe has disappeared, the cultural division of Europe between
Western Christianity,
on the one hand, and Orthodox Christianity
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [29]
Western
Christianity
circa icoo
Orthodox
Christianity
and Islam
MILES c^SP^
Source:W. Wallace, THE TRANSFORMATIONOF
WESTERNEirROPE.London: Pinter, 1990.
Map by lbOhlsson for FOREIGNAFFAIRS.
Samuel P.Huntington
and Islam, on the other, has reemerged.
The most significant dividing line in
Europe,
asWilliam Wallace has suggested,
may well be the eastern
boundary of
Western Christianity in the year 1500. This
line runs
along what are now the boundaries
between Finland and Russia and between
the Baltic states and Russia, cuts
through
Belarus and Ukraine separating the more
Catholic western Ukraine from Orthodox
eastern Ukraine, swings westward separat
ing Transylvania from the rest of Romania,
and then goes through Yugoslavia almost
exactly along the line now
separating
Croatia and Slovenia from the rest of
Yugoslavia. In the Balkans this line, of
course, coincides with the historic bound
ary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman
empires. The peoples
to the north and west
of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they
shared the common
experiences of Euro
pean history?feudalism, the Renaissance,
the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the
French Revolution, the Industrial Revo
lution; they
are
generally economically bet
ter off than the peoples
to the east; and they
may now look forward to
increasing
involvement in a common
European
econ
omy and to the consolidation of democrat
ic political systems. The peoples
to the east
and south of this line are Orthodox or
Muslim; they historically belonged to the
Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were
only
lightly touched by the shaping events in the
rest of Europe; they
are
generally less
advanced economically; they
seem much
[30] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume 72N0.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
less likely
to
develop stable democratic political systems. The Velvet
Curtain of culture has replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology
as the
most significant dividing line in Europe. As the events inYugoslavia
show, it is not only
a line of difference; it is also at times a line of
bloody conflict.
Conflict along the fault line between Western and Islamic civi
lizations has been going
on for 1,300 years. After the founding of
Islam, the Arab and Moorish surge west and north only ended at
Tours in 732. From the eleventh to the thirteenth century the
Crusaders attempted with temporary success to
bring Christianity
and Christian rule to the Holy Land. From the fourteenth to the sev
enteenth century, the Ottoman Turks reversed the balance, extended
their sway over the Middle East and the Balkans, captured
Constantinople, and twice laid siege
toVienna. In the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries asOttoman power declined Britain, France,
and Italy established Western control over most of North Africa and
theMiddle East.
After World War II, theWest, in turn, began
to retreat; the colo
nial empires disappeared; first Arab nationalism and then Islamic
fundamentalism manifested themselves; theWest became heavily
dependent
on the Persian Gulf countries for its energy; the oil-rich
Muslim countries became money-rich and, when they wished to,
weapons-rich. Several wars occurred between Arabs and Israel (cre
ated by theWest). France fought
a
bloody and ruthless war inAlgeria
for most of the 1950s; British and French forces invaded Egypt in
1956; American forces went into Lebanon in 1958; subsequently
American forces returned to Lebanon, attacked Libya, and engaged
in various military encounters with Iran; Arab and Islamic terrorists,
supported by
at least three Middle Eastern governments, employed
the weapon of the weak and bombed Western planes and installations
and seized Western hostages. This warfare between Arabs and the
West culminated in 1990, when the United States sent amassive army
to the Persian Gulf to defend some Arab countries against aggression
by another. In its aftermath nato
planning is increasingly directed to
potential threats and instability along its "southern tier."
This centuries-old military interaction between the West and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [31]
Samuel P.
Huntington
Islam is unlikely
to decline. It could become more virulent. The Gulf
War left some Arabs feeling proud that Saddam Hussein had
attacked Israel and stood up to theWest. It also left many feeling
humiliated and resentful of the West's military presence in the
Persian Gulf, theWest's overwhelming military dominance, and
their apparent inability
to
shape their own
destiny. Many Arab coun
tries, in addition to the oil exporters, are
reaching levels of economic
and social development where autocratic forms of government
become inappropriate and efforts to introduce democracy become
stronger. Some openings in Arab political systems have already
occurred. The principal beneficiaries of these openings have been
Islamist movements. In the Arab world, in short,Western democra
cy strengthens anti-Western political forces. This may be a
passing
phenomenon, but it surely complicates relations between Islamic
countries and theWest.
Those relations are also complicated by demography. The spec
tacular population growth inArab countries, particularly in North
Africa, has led to increased migration toWestern Europe. The move
ment within Western Europe toward minimizing internal bound
aries has sharpened political sensitivities with respect to this
development. In Italy, France and Germany, racism is increasingly
open, and political reactions and violence against Arab and Turkish
migrants have become more intense and more
widespread since 1990.
On both sides the interaction between Islam and theWest is seen
as a clash of civilizations. The West s "next confrontation," observes
M. J.Akbar, an Indian Muslim author, "is definitely going
to come
from theMuslim world. It is in the sweep of the Islamic nations from
theMaghreb
to Pakistan that the struggle for a new world order will
begin." Bernard Lewis comes to a similar conclusion:
We are
facing
amood and amovement far transcending the level of issues and
policies
and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of
civilizations?the perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient
rival against
our Judeo-Christian heritage,
our secular present, and the world
wide expansion of both.2
2Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," The Atlantic Monthly, vol. 266,
September 1990, p. 60; Time, June 15,1992, pp. 24-28.
[32] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
Historically, the other great antagonistic interaction of Arab
Islamic civilization has been with the pagan, animist, and now
increasingly Christian black peoples
to the south. In the past, this
antagonism
was
epitomized in the image of Arab slave dealers and
black slaves. It has been reflected in the on-going civil war in the
Sudan between Arabs and blacks, the fighting in Chad between
Libyan-supported insurgents and the government, the tensions
between Orthodox Christians and Muslims in the Horn of Africa,
and the political conflicts, recurring riots and communal violence
between Muslims and Christians inNigeria. The modernization of
Africa and the spread of Christianity
are
likely to enhance the prob
ability of violence along this fault line. Symptomatic of the inten
sification of this conflict was the Pope John Paul IPs speech in
Khartoum in February 1993 attacking the actions of the Sudans
Islamist government against the Christian minority there.
On the northern border of Islam, conflict has increasingly erupt
ed between Orthodox andMuslim peoples, including the carnage of
Bosnia and Sarajevo, the simmering violence between Serb and
Albanian, the tenuous relations between Bulgarians and their
Turkish minority, the violence between Ossetians and Ingush, the
unremitting slaughter of each other by Armenians and Az?ris, the
tense relations between Russians andMuslims in Central Asia, and
the deployment of Russian troops to protect Russian interests in the
Caucasus and Central Asia. Religion reinforces the revival of ethnic
identities and restimulates Russian fears about the security of their
southern borders. This concern iswell captured by Archie Roosevelt:
Much of Russian history
concerns the struggle between the Slavs and the
Turkic peoples on their borders, which dates back to the foundation of the
Russian state more than a thousand years ago. In the Slavs* millennium-long
confrontation with their eastern
neighbors lies the key
to an
understanding
not
only of Russian history, but Russian character. To understand Russian
realities today
one has to have a concept of the great Turkic ethnic group that
has preoccupied Russians through the centuries.3
The conflict of civilizations is deeply rooted elsewhere inAsia.
The historic clash between Muslim and Hindu in the subcontinent
3Archie Roosevelt, For Lust ofKnowing, Boston: Little, Brown, 1988,pp. 332-333.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [33]
Samuel P.
Huntington
manifests itself now not
only in the rivalry between Pakistan and
India but also in intensifying religious strife within India between
increasingly militant Hindu groups and Indias substantial Muslim
minority. The destruction of the Ayodhya mosque inDecember 1992
brought
to the fore the issue of whether India will remain a secular
democratic state or become aHindu one. In East Asia, China has
_ outstanding territorial disputes with most of its
neighbors. It has pursued
a ruthless policy
toward the Buddhist people ofTibet, and it is
pursuing
an
increasingly ruthless policy toward
itsTurkic-Muslim minority. With the Cold
War over, the underlying differences between
China and th? United States have reasserted
themselves in areas such as human rights, trade
and weapons proliferation. These differences
are
unlikely to moderate. A "new cold war," Deng Xaioping report
edly asserted in 1991, is under way between China and America.
The same
phrase has been applied
to the increasingly difficult rela
tions between Japan and the United States. Here cultural difference
exacerbates economic conflict. People
on each side allege racism on
the other, but at least on the American side the antipathies
are not
racial but cultural. The basic values, attitudes, behavioral patterns of
the two societies could hardly be more different. The economic issues
between the United States and Europe
are no less serious than those
between the United States and Japan, but they do not have the same
political salience and emotional intensity because the differences
between American culture and European culture are so much less
than those between American civilization and Japanese civilization.
The interactions between civilizations vary greatly in the extent to
which they
are
likely
to be characterized by violence. Economic com
petition clearly predominates between the American and European
subcivilizations of theWest and between both of them and Japan. On
the Eurasian continent, however, the proliferation of ethnic conflict,
epitomized
at the extreme in "ethnic cleansing," has not been totally
random. It has been most
frequent and most violent between groups
belonging
to different civilizations. In Eurasia the great historic fault
[34] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumey2No.3
The crescent-shaped
Islamic bloc, from the
bulge ofAfrica to
central Asia, has
bloody borders.
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This is particularly
true
along the boundaries of the crescent-shaped Islamic bloc of
nations from the bulge of Africa to central Asia. Violence also occurs
between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the
Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and
Catholics in thePhilippines. Islam has bloody borders.
civilization rallying: the kin-country syndrome
Groups or states
belonging
to one civilization that become in
volved inwar with people from a different civilization naturally try to
rally support from other members of their own civilization. As the
post-Cold War world evolves, civilization commonality, what H. D.
S. Greenway has termed the "kin-country" syndrome, is replacing
political ideology and traditional balance of power considerations as
the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions. It can be seen
grad
ually emerging in the post-Cold War conflicts in the Persian Gulf,
the Caucasus and Bosnia. None of these was a full-scale war between
civilizations, but each involved some elements of civilizational rally
ing, which seemed to become more
important
as the conflict contin
ued and which may provide
a foretaste of the future.
First, in the Gulf War one Arab state invaded another and then
fought
a coalition of Arab, Western and other states. While only
a
few Muslim governments overtly supported Saddam Hussein, many
Arab elites privately cheered him on, and he was
highly popular
among large sections of the Arab publics. Islamic fundamentalist
movements
universally supported Iraq rather than the Western
backed governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Forswearing Arab
nationalism, Saddam Hussein explicitly invoked an Islamic appeal.
He and his supporters attempted to define the war as awar between
civilizations. "It is not the world against Iraq,"
as Safar Al-Hawali,
dean of Islamic Studies at the Umm Al-Qura University inMecca,
put it in a
widely circulated tape. "It is theWest against Islam."
Ignoring the rivalry between Iran and Iraq, the chief Iranian religious
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, called for a
holy
war
against the
West: "The struggle against American aggression, greed, plans and
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [35]
Samuel P.
Huntington
policies will be counted as a
jihad, and anybody who is killed on that
path is a
martyr." "This is awar," King Hussein of Jordan argued,
"against allArabs and allMuslims and not
against Iraq alone."
The rallying of substantial sections of Arab elites and publics
behind Saddam Hussein caused those Arab governments in the anti
Iraq coalition to moderate their activities and temper their public
statements. Arab governments opposed
or distanced themselves from
subsequent Western efforts to
apply pressure on
Iraq, including
enforcement of a
no-fly
zone in the summer of 1992 and the bomb
ing of Iraq in January 1993. The Western-Soviet-Turkish-Arab anti
Iraq coalition of 1990 had by 1993 become a coalition of almost only
theWest and Kuwait against Iraq.
Muslims contrasted Western actions against Iraq with theWest's
failure to protect Bosnians against Serbs and to impose sanctions on
Israel for violating U.N. resolutions. The West, they alleged,
was
using
a double standard. A world of clashing civilizations, however,
is inevitably
aworld of double standards: people apply
one standard
to their kin-countries and a different standard to others.
Second, the kin-country syndrome also appeared in conflicts in
the former Soviet Union. Armenian military
successes in 1992 and
1993 stimulated Turkey
to become increasingly supportive of its reli
gious, ethnic and linguistic brethren in Azerbaijan. "We have a
Turkish nation feeling the same sentiments as the Azerbaijanis," said
one Turkish official in 1992. "We are under pressure. Our newspapers
are full of the photos of atrocities and are
asking
us ifwe are still seri
ous about pursuing
our neutral policy. Maybe
we should show
Armenia that there's a
big Turkey in the region." President Turgut
Ozal agreed, remarking that Turkey should at least "scare the
Armenians a little bit." Turkey, Ozal threatened again in 1993,would
"show its fangs." Turkish Air Force jets flew reconnaissance flights
along the Armenian border; Turkey suspended food shipments and
air flights
to Armenia; and Turkey and Iran announced they would
not accept dismemberment of Azerbaijan. In the last years of its exis
tence, the Soviet government supported Azerbaijan because its gov
ernment was dominated by former communists. With the end of the
Soviet Union, however, political considerations gave way to
religious
[36] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume7<2No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
ones. Russian troops fought
on the side of the Armenians, and
Azerbaijan accused the "Russian government of turning 180 degrees"
toward support for Christian Armenia.
Third, with respect to the fighting in the former Yugoslavia,
Western publics manifested sympathy and support for the Bosnian
Muslims and the horrors they suffered at the hands of the Serbs.
Relatively little concern was
expressed, however, over Croatian
attacks on Muslims and participation in the dismemberment of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the early stages of the Yugoslav breakup,
Germany, in an unusual display of diplomatic initiative and muscle,
induced the other n members of the European Community to follow
its lead in recognizing Slovenia and Croatia. As a result of the pope s
determination to
provide strong backing
to the two Catholic coun
tries, the Vatican extended recognition
even before the Community
did. The United States followed the European lead.Thus the lead
ing actors inWestern civilization rallied behind their coreligionists.
Subsequently Croatia was
reported
to be receiving substantial quan
tities of arms from Central European and other Western countries.
Boris Yeltsin sgovernment, on the other hand, attempted
to pursue a
middle course that would be sympathetic
to the Orthodox Serbs but
not alienate Russia from theWest. Russian conservative and nation
alist groups, however, including many legislators, attacked the gov
ernment for not
being
more
forthcoming in its support for the Serbs.
By early 1993 several hundred Russians apparently
were
serving with
the Serbian forces, and reports circulated of Russian arms
being sup
plied to Serbia.
Islamic governments and groups, on the other hand, castigated the
West for not
coming to the defense of the Bosnians. Iranian leaders
urged Muslims from all countries to
provide help to Bosnia; in viola
tion of the U.N. arms
embargo, Iran supplied weapons and men for
the Bosnians; Iranian-supported Lebanese groups sent
guerrillas to
train and organize the Bosnian forces. In 1993 up to 4,000 Muslims
from over two dozen Islamic countries were
reported
to be fighting
in Bosnia. The governments of Saudi Arabia and other countries felt
under increasing pressure from fundamentalist groups in their own
societies to
provide
more
vigorous support for the Bosnians. By the
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [37]
Samuel P
Huntington
end of 1992, SaudiArabia had reportedly supplied substantial fund
ing for weapons and supplies for the Bosnians, which significantly
increased their military capabilities vis-?-vis the Serbs.
In the 1930s the Spanish Civil War provoked intervention from
countries that politically
were fascist, communist and democratic. In
the 1990s the Yugoslav conflict is provoking intervention from coun
tries that areMuslim, Orthodox andWestern Christian. The paral
lel has not gone unnoticed. "The war in
Bosnia-Herzegovina has
become the emotional equivalent of the fight against fascism in the
Spanish Civil War," one Saudi editor observed. "Those who died
there are
regarded
asmartyrs who tried to save their fellow Muslims."
Conflicts and violence will also occur between states and groups
within the same civilization. Such conflicts, however, are
likely to be
less intense and less likely
to
expand than conflicts between civiliza
tions. Common membership in a civilization reduces the probability
of violence in situations where itmight otherwise occur. In 1991 and
1992 many people
were alarmed by the possibility of violent conflict
between Russia and Ukraine over
territory, particularly Crimea, the
Black Sea fleet, nuclear weapons and economic issues. If civilization
is what counts, however, the likelihood of violence between
Ukrainians and Russians should be low. They
are two Slavic, pri
marily Orthodox peoples who have had close relationships with each
other for centuries. As of early 1993, despite all the reasons for
conflict, the leaders of the two countries were
effectively negotiating
and defusing the issues between the two countries. While there has
been serious fighting between Muslims and Christians elsewhere in
the former Soviet Union and much tension and some
fighting
between Western and Orthodox Christians in the Baltic states, there
has been virtually
no violence between Russians and Ukrainians.
Civilization rallying todate has been limited, but ithas been grow
ing, and it clearly has the potential
to
spread much further. As the
conflicts in the Persian Gulf, the Caucasus and Bosnia continued, the
positions of nations and the cleavages between them increasingly
were
along civilizational lines. Populist politicians, religious leaders
and the media have found it a
potent means of arousing
mass support
and of pressuring hesitant governments. In the coming years, the
[38] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volumey2No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
local conflicts most likely to escalate into major
wars will be those, as
in Bosnia and the Caucasus, along the fault lines between civiliza
tions. The next world war, if there is one, will be awar between civ
ilizations.
THE WEST VERSUS THE REST
The west is now at an
extraordinary peak of power in relation
to other civilizations. Its superpower opponent has disappeared from
the map. Military conflict among Western states is unthinkable, and
Western military power is unrivaled. Apart from Japan, theWest
faces no economic challenge. It dominates international political and
security institutions and with Japan international economic institu
tions. Global political and security issues are
effectively settled by
a
directorate of the United States, Britain and France, world econom
ic issues by
a directorate of the United States, Germany and Japan,
all of which maintain extraordinarily close relations with each other
to the exclusion of lesser and largely non-Western countries.
Decisions made at the U.N. Security Council or in the International
Monetary Fund that reflect the interests of theWest are
presented
to
the world as
reflecting the desires of the world community. The very
phrase "the world community" has become the euphemistic collec
tive noun (replacing "theFreeWorld") to give global legitimacy to
actions reflecting the interests of the United States and otherWestern
powers.4 Through the imf and other international economic institu
tions, theWest promotes its economic interests and imposes
on other
nations the economic policies it thinks appropriate. In any poll of
non-Western peoples, the imf
undoubtedly would win the support
of finance ministers and a few others, but get an
overwhelmingly
unfavorable rating from just about everyone else, who would agree
4Almost invariablyWestern leaders claim they are acting on behalf of "theworld com
munity." One minor lapse occurred during the run-up to theGulf War. In an interview
on "GoodMorning America," Dec. 21,1990, British Prime Minister JohnMajor referred
to the actions "theWest" was taking against Saddam Hussein. He quickly corrected him
self and subsequendy referred to "theworld community." He was, however, rightwhen
he erred.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [39]
Samuel P.
Huntington
with Georgy Arbatovs characterization of imf officials as "neo
Bolsheviks who love expropriating other people
smoney, imposing
undemocratic and alien rules of economic and political conduct and
stifling economic freedom."
Western domination of the U.N. Security Council and its deci
sions, tempered only by occasional abstention by China, produced
U.N. legitimation of theWest s use of force to drive Iraq
out of
Kuwait and its elimination of Iraq
s
sophisticated weapons and capac
The very phrase "world
community" has
become a euphemism to
give legitimacy to the
actions of theWest.
ity
to
produce such weapons. It also produced
the quite unprecedented action by the United
States, Britain and France in getting the
Security Council to demand thatLibya hand
over the Pan Am 103 bombing suspects and
then to impose sanctions when Libya refused.
After defeating the largestArab army, the
West did not hesitate to throw its weight
around in the Arab world. The West in effect
is using international institutions, military power and economic
resources to run the world inways that will maintain Western pre
dominance, protect Western interests and promote Western political
and economic values.
That at least is the way in which non-Westerners see the new
world, and there is a
significant element of truth in their view.
Differences in power and struggles for military, economic and insti
tutional power are thus one source of conflict between theWest and
other civilizations. Differences in culture, that is basic values and
beliefs, are a second source of conflict. V. S. Naipaul has argued that
Western civilization is the "universal civilization" that "fits all men."
At a
superficial level much ofWestern culture has indeed permeated
the rest of the world. At amore basic level, however, Western con
cepts differ fundamentally from those prevalent in other civilizations.
Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human
rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the
separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic,
Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or Orthodox cultures.
Western efforts to propagate such ideas produce instead a reaction
[40] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volumej2No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
against "human rights imperialism" and a reaffirmation of indigenous
values, as can be seen in the support for religious fundamentalism by
the younger generation in non-Western cultures. The very notion
that there could be a "universal civilization" is aWestern idea, direct
ly
at odds with the particularism of most Asian societies and their
emphasis
on what distinguishes
one
people from another. Indeed, the
author of a review of ioo
comparative studies of values in different
societies concluded that "the values that are most
important in the
West are least important worldwide."5 In the political realm, of
course, these differences are most manifest in the efforts of the
United States and other Western powers to induce other peoples
to
adopt Western ideas concerning democracy and human rights.
Modern democratic government originated in theWest. When ithas
developed in non-Western societies ithas usually been the product of
Western colonialism or
imposition.
The central axis ofworld politics in the future is likely to be, in
Kishore Mahbubani s
phrase, the conflict between "theWest and the
Rest" and the responses of non-Western civilizations toWestern
power and values.6 Those responses generally take one or a combina
tion of three forms. At one extreme, non-Western states can, like
Burma and North Korea, attempt to pursue a course of isolation, to
insulate their societies from penetration
or
"corruption" by theWest,
and, in effect, to opt out of participation in theWestern-dominated
global community. The costs of this course, however, are
high, and
few states have pursued it exclusively. A second alternative, the equiv
alent of "band-wagoning" in international relations theory, is to
attempt to join theWest and accept its values and institutions. The
third alternative is to attempt to "balance" theWest by developing
economic and military power and cooperating with other non
Western societies against theWest, while preserving indigenous val
ues and institutions; in short, tomodernize but not toWesternize.
5Hany
C. Triandis, The New York Times, Dec. 25,1990, p. 41, and "Cross-Cultural
Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," Nebraska Symposium onMotivation, vol.
37>?989, PP- 41-133
6KishoreMahbubani, "TheWest and the Rest," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,
PP- 3-*3
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer1993 [41]
Samuel P.
Huntington
THE TORN COUNTRIES
In the future, as
people differentiate themselves by civilization,
countries with large numbers of peoples of different civilizations,
such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia,
are candidates for dismem
berment. Some other countries have a fair degree of cultural homo
geneity but are divided over whether their society belongs
to one
civilization or another. These are torn countries. Their leaders typi
cally wish to pursue a
bandwagoning strategy and tomake their coun
tries members of theWest, but the history, culture and traditions of
their countries are non-Western. The most obvious and prototypical
torn country isTurkey. The late twentieth-century leaders of Turkey
have followed in the Attat?rk tradition and defined Turkey
as amod
ern, secular,Western nation state.
They allied Turkey with theWest
in nato and in theGulf War; they applied formembership in the
European Community. At the same time, however, elements in
Turkish society have supported
an Islamic revival and have argued
thatTurkey isbasically aMiddle Eastern Muslim society. In addi
tion, while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey
as aWestern soci
ety, the elite of theWest refuses to accept Turkey
as such. Turkey will
not become amember of the European Community, and the real rea
son, as President Ozal said, "is that we areMuslim and they
are
Christian and they dont say that." Having rejected Mecca, and then
being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be
the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportu
nity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving
seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China.
Encouraged by theWest, Turkey ismaking
strenuous efforts to carve
out this new
identity for itself.
During the past decade Mexico has assumed a
position somewhat
similar to that of Turkey. Just as
Turkey abandoned its historic oppo
sition to
Europe and attempted
to
join Europe, Mexico has stopped
defining itself by its opposition to theUnited States and is instead
attempting to imitate theUnited States and to join it in theNorth
American Free Trade Area. Mexican leaders are
engaged in the great
task of redefining Mexican identity and have introduced fiindamen
[42] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72N0.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
tal economic reforms that eventually will lead to fundamental politi
cal change. In 1991 a top adviser to President Carlos Salinas de
Gortari described at
length
tome all the changes the Salinas govern
ment was
making. When he finished, I remarked: "That's most
impressive. It seems tome that basically you want to change Mexico
from aLatin American country into aNorth American country." He
looked atme with surprise and exclaimed: "Exactly! That's precisely
what we are
trying to do, but of course we could never say so
pub
licly."As his remark indicates, inMexico as inTurkey, significant ele
ments in society resist the redefinition of their country's identity. In
Turkey, European-oriented leaders have to make gestures to Islam
(Ozal s
pilgrimage
toMecca); so alsoMexico's North American-ori
ented leaders have to make gestures to those who hold Mexico to be
a Latin American country (Salinas' Ibero-American Guadalajara
summit).
Historically Turkey has been the most profoundly
torn country.
For the United States, Mexico is the most immediate torn country.
Globally the most
important
torn country isRussia. The question of
whether Russia is part of theWest or the leader of a distinct Slavic
Orthodox civilization has been a
recurring
one in Russian history.
That issue was obscured by the communist victory in Russia, which
imported
aWestern ideology, adapted it to Russian conditions and
then challenged theWest in the name of that ideology.The domi
nance of communism shut off the historic debate over
Westernization versus Russification. With communism discredited
Russians once
again face that question.
President Yeltsin is adopting Western principles and goals and
seeking
to make Russia a "normal" country and a part of theWest.
Yet both theRussian elite and theRussian public aredivided on this
issue. Among the more moderate dissenters, Sergei Stankevich
argues that Russia should reject the "Atlanticist" course, which would
lead it "to become European,
to become a part of the world economy
in rapid and organized fashion, to become the eighth member of the
Seven, and to put particular emphasis
on
Germany and the United
States as the two dominant members of the Atlantic alliance." While
also rejecting
an
exclusively Eurasian policy, Stankevich nonetheless
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [43]
Samuel P
Huntington
argues that Russia should give priority
to the protection of Russians
in other countries, emphasize its Turkic and Muslim connections,
and promote "an appreciable redistribution of our resources, our
options,
our ties, and our interests in favor of Asia, of the eastern
direction." People of this persuasion criticize Yeltsin for subordinat
ing Russia's interests to those of theWest, for reducing Russian mil
itary strength, for failing
to support traditional friends such as Serbia,
and for pushing economic and political reform inways injurious
to
the Russian people. Indicative of this trend is the new
popularity of
the ideas of Petr Savitsky, who in the 1920s argued that Russia was a
unique Eurasian civilization.7 More extreme dissidents voice much
more
blatantly nationalist, anti-Western and anti-Semitic views, and
urge Russia to
redevelop itsmilitary strength and to establish closer
ties with China and Muslim countries. The people of Russia are as
divided as the elite. An opinion survey in European Russia in the
spring of 1992 revealed that 40 percent of the public had positive atti
tudes toward theWest and 36 percent had negative attitudes. As it
has been for much of its history, Russia in the early 1990s is truly
a
torn
country.
To redefine its civilization identity,
a torn country must meet three
requirements. First, its political and economic elite has to be gener
ally supportive of and enthusiastic about this move. Second, its pub
lic has to be willing
to
acquiesce in the redefinition. Third, the
dominant groups in the recipient civilization have to be willing
to
embrace the convert. All three requirements in large part exist with
respect toMexico. The first two in large part exist with respect to
Turkey. It is not clear that any of them exist with respect to Russia's
joining the West. The conflict between liberal democracy and
Marxism-Leninism was between ideologies which, despite their
major differences, ostensibly shared ultimate goals of freedom, equal
ity and prosperity. A traditional, authoritarian, nationalist Russia
could have quite different goals. A Western democrat could carry on
an intellectual debate with a Soviet Marxist. It would be virtually
7Sergei Stankevich, "Russia in Search of Itself," TheNational Interest, Summer 1992,
pp. 47-51;Daniel Schneider, "ARussian Movement Rejects Western Tilt," Christian
Science Monitor, Feb. 5,1993, pp. 5-7.
[44] FOREIGN AFFAIRS -
Volume72N0.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
impossible for him to do that with aRussian traditionalist. If, as the
Russians stop behaving likeMarxists, they reject liberal democracy
and begin behaving like Russians but not likeWesterners, the rela
tions between Russia and theWest could again become distant and
conflictual.8
THE CONFUCIAN-ISLAMIC CONNECTION
The obstacles to non-Western countries joining theWest vary
considerably. They
are least for Latin American and East European
countries. They
are
greater for the Orthodox countries of the former
Soviet Union. They
are still greater forMuslim, Confucian, Hindu
and Buddhist societies. Japan has established a
unique position for
itself as an associate member of theWest: it is in theWest in some
respects but clearly
not of theWest in important dimensions. Those
countries that for reason of culture and power do not wish to, or can
not, join theWest compete with theWest by developing their own
economic, military and political power. They do this by promoting
their internal development and by cooperating with other non
Western countries. The most
prominent form of this cooperation is
the Confucian-Islamic connection that has emerged
to
challenge
Western interests, values and power.
Almost without exception, Western countries are
reducing their
military power; under Yeltsin's leadership
so also is Russia. China,
North Korea and several Middle Eastern states, however, are
significantly expanding their military capabilities. They
are
doing
this by the import of arms from Western and non-Western sources
and by the development of indigenous
arms industries. One result is
the emergence of what Charles Krauthammer has called "Weapon
8Owen Harries has pointed out that Australia is trying (unwisely in his view) to
become a torn country in reverse.
Although it has been a fullmember not only of the
West but also of theABC A military and intelligence core of theWest, its current lead
ers are in effect proposing that itdefect from theWest, redefine itself as anAsian coun
try and cultivate close tieswith its neighbors. Australia's future, they argue, iswith the
dynamic economies of East Asia. But, as I have
suggested,
close economic
cooperation
normally requires
a common cultural base. In addition, none of the three conditions nec
essary for a torn country to join another civilization is likely to exist inAustralia's case.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [45]
Samuel P.Huntington
States," and theWeapon States are not Western states. Another
result is the redefinition of arms control, which is aWestern concept
and aWestern goal. During the Cold War the primary purpose of
arms control was to establish a stable military balance between the
United States and its allies and the Soviet Union and its allies. In the
post-Cold War world the primary objective of arms control is to pre
vent the development by non-Western societies of military capabili
ties that could threaten Western interests. The West attempts to do
this through international agreements, economic pressure and con
trols on the transfer of arms and weapons technologies.
The conflict between theWest and the Confucian-Islamic states
focuses largely, although
not
exclusively,
on nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, ballistic missiles and other sophisticated
means
for delivering them, and the guidance, intelligence and other elec
tronic capabilities for achieving that goal. The West promotes non
proliferation as a universal norm and nonproliferation treaties and
inspections
asmeans of realizing that norm. It
also threatens a
variety of sanctions against
those who promote the spread of sophisticated
weapons and proposes some benefits for those
who do not. The attention of theWest focus
es, naturally,
on nations that are
actually
or
potentially hostile to theWest.
The non-Western nations, on the other
hand, assert their right to acquire and to deploy
whatever weapons they think necessary for their security. They also
have absorbed, to the full, the truth of the response of the Indian
defense minister when asked what lesson he learned from the Gulf
War: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear
weapons." Nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and missiles are
viewed, probably erroneously,
as the potential equalizer of superior
Western conventional power. China, of course, already has nuclear
weapons; Pakistan and India have the capability
to
deploy them.
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya and Algeria appear to be attempting
to
acquire them. A top Iranian official has declared that allMuslim
states should acquire nuclear weapons, and in 1988 the president of
[46] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72No.3
A Confucian-Islamic
connection has
emerged to challenge
Western interests,
values and power.
The Clash ofCivilizations?
Iran reportedly issued a directive calling for development of "offen
sive and defensive chemical, biological and radiological weapons."
Centrally important
to the development of counter-West military
capabilities is the sustained expansion of Chinas military power and
itsmeans to create military power. Buoyed by spectacular economic
development, China is rapidly increasing its military spending and
vigorously moving forward with the modernization of its armed
forces. It is purchasing weapons from the former Soviet states; it is
developing long-range missiles; in 1992 it tested a one-megaton
nuclear device. It is developing power-projection capabilities, acquir
ing aerial refueling technology, and trying to
purchase
an aircraft car
rier. Its military buildup and assertion of sovereignty
over the South
China Sea are
provoking
a multilateral regional
arms race in East
Asia. China is also a
major exporter of arms and weapons technolo
gy. It has exported materials to
Libya and Iraq that could be used to
manufacture nuclear weapons and nerve gas. It has helped Algeria
build a reactor suitable for nuclear weapons research and production.
China has sold to Iran nuclear technology that American officials
believe could only be used to create weapons and apparently has
shipped components of 300-mile-range missiles to Pakistan. North
Korea has had a nuclear weapons program under way for some while
and has sold advanced missiles and missile technology
to
Syria and
Iran. The flow of weapons and weapons technology is generally from
East Asia to theMiddle East. There is, however, some movement in
the reverse direction; China has received Stinger missiles from
Pakistan.
A Confucian-Islamic military connection has thus come into
being, designed
to promote acquisition by its members of the
weapons and weapons technologies needed to counter the military
power of theWest. Itmay or may not last. At present, however, it is,
asDave McCurdy has said, "a renegades' mutual support pact, run
by
the proliferators and their backers." A new form of arms
competition
is thus occurring between Islamic-Confucian states and theWest. In
an old-fashioned arms race, each side developed its own arms to bal
ance or to achieve superiority against the other side. In this new form
of arms
competition,
one side is developing its arms and the other
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 [47]
Samuel P
Huntington
side is attempting
not to balance but to limit and prevent that arms
build-up while at the same time reducing its own
military capabili
ties.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WEST
This article does not argue that civilization identities will
replace all other identities, that nation states will disappear, that each
civilization will become a
single coherent political entity, that groups
within a civilization will not conflict with and even
fight each other.
This paper does set forth the hypotheses that differences between civ
ilizations are real and important; civilization-consciousness is
increasing; conflict between civilizations will supplant ideological
and other forms of conflict as the dominant global form of conflict;
international relations, historically
a game played
out within Western
civilization, will increasingly be de-Westernized and become a game
inwhich non-Western civilizations are actors and not
simply objects;
successful political, security and economic international institutions
are more
likely to
develop within civilizations than across civiliza
tions; conflicts between groups in different civilizations will be more
frequent,
more sustained and more violent than conflicts between
groups in the same civilization; violent conflicts between groups in
different civilizations are the most likely and most
dangerous
source
of escalation that could lead to
global wars; the paramount axis of
world politics will be the relations between "theWest and the Rest";
the elites in some torn non-Western countries will try to make their
countries part of theWest, but inmost cases face major obstacles to
accomplishing this; a central focus of conflict for the immediate
future will be between theWest and several Islamic-Confucian states.
This is not to advocate the desirability of conflicts between civi
lizations. It is to set forth descriptive hypotheses
as towhat the future
maybe like. If these are
plausible hypotheses, however, it is necessary
to consider their implications forWestern policy. These implications
should be divided between short-term advantage and long-term
accommodation. In the short term it is clearly in the interest of the
West to promote greater cooperation and unity within its own civi
us] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume72No.3
The Clash ofCivilizations?
lization, particularly between its European and North American
components; to
incorporate into the West societies in Eastern
Europe and Latin America whose cultures are close to those of the
West; to promote and maintain cooperative relations with Russia and
Japan;
to prevent escalation of local inter-civilization conflicts into
major inter-civilization wars; to limit the expansion of the military
strength of Confucian and Islamic states; to moderate the reduction
ofWestern military capabilities and maintain military superiority in
East and Southwest Asia; to
exploit differences and conflicts among
Confucian and Islamic states; to support in other civilizations groups
sympathetic
toWestern values and interests; to strengthen interna
tional institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and
values and to promote the involvement of non-Western states in
those institutions.
In the longer
term other measures would be called for.Western
civilization is both Western and modern. Non-Western civilizations
have attempted
to become modern without becoming Western. To
date only Japan has fully succeeded in this quest. Non-Western civi
lizations will continue to attempt to
acquire the wealth, technology,
skills, machines and weapons that are part of being modern. They
will also attempt to reconcile this modernity with their traditional
culture and values. Their economic and military strength relative to
theWest will increase. Hence theWest will increasingly have to
accommodate these non-Western modern civilizations whose power
approaches that of theWest but whose values and interests differ
significantly from those of theWest. This will require theWest to
maintain the economic and military power necessary to protect its
interests in relation to these civilizations. Itwill also, however, require
theWest to
develop
amore
profound understanding of the basic reli
gious and philosophical assumptions underlying other civilizations
and the ways inwhich people in those civilizations see their interests.
It will require
an effort to
identify elements of commonality between
Western and other civilizations. For the relevant future, there will be
no universal civilization, but instead aworld of different civilizations,
each ofwhich will have to learn to coexistwith the others. ?
FOREIGN AFFAIRS Summer 1993 [49]