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Machiavelli's Political Science

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Machiavelli is presented as the founder of modern political science, with due regard to the fact that he never spoke of "political science." His usage of "prudence" and "art" in The Prince *is examined to see whether, as founder, he was a teacher or a ruler of future generations. His comprehensive attack on classical political science is outlined and developed through two essential points, the cycle and the soul.*

Modern political science presents itself today as both narrowing and progressive. Despite certain misgivings arising from the encounter with the New Left, most political scientists still put their trust in the fact-value distinction[1] as the method designed to narrow their range of concern and thereby to bring social as well as scientific progress. To an observer, the narrowing might seem more evident than the progress. At least it must be admitted that scientific narrowing has lost its evident connection to progress, since the very meaning of the fact-value distinction is that any good that might come of it is strictly accidental. To understand modern political science, therefore, one should look back to a time when this connection was argued in comprehensive fashion. Before investigating, one cannot exclude the possibility that this comprehensive argument was conceived, not in gradual stages, but *ad uno tratto* ("with one stroke") in the thought of *uno solo* ("one alone"). To set forth this claim on behalf of Machiavelli, with a view to our own self-understanding, is the purpose of this article.

Machiavelli's Modernity

We will not find the fact-value distinction in Machiavelli, for he passes value judgments right and left with unmethodical abandon. But we do find a realism that was ancestor or parent of the fact-value distinction in Machiavelli's famous call, in chapter 15 of *The Prince,* not to depart from what is done for what ought to be done. As opposed to making a profession of good in all regards, one should align one's values with facts in the sense of deeds. So the distinction is between deeds and professions rather than between facts and values, and the lesson is for the good of men, not for a methodological purity that cannot be proved to be for the good of anybody. For the sake of one's preservation (which is good), even for the common benefit of each human being, one must learn how to be not good. With this promise of preservation, Machiavelli connects his political science to progress toward the human good.

What one's preservation requires, according to Machiavelli, will become clear only gradually, but it may be glimpsed behind the meaning today of "modern," as for example in the phrase "modern political science." "Modern" as we use it today is defined against "traditional" so that what is modern constitutes self-conscious progress beyond tradition. But when modernity is established and what is "modern" becomes traditional, modernity must define itself against what had once bravely claimed to be modern. Thus, "modern" is always in danger of being surpassed by "more modern"; defined as against the traditional—that is, in relation to the traditional—"modern" seems to have no definition. Nor does "tradition": "traditional" is or supports the status quo, and "modern" advances—or merely moves—beyond it. "Modern," then, has perhaps a moving definition; it is always ahead of itself, not to say self-destructive. Or one might say that modernity has a certain direction.

In politics, more modern means further left and more democratic, as we can see in the alleged progression of the great modern revolutions—American, French, Russian, Chinese—each more democratic, supposedly, than the preceding one. What is more democratic, it is assumed, disposes of barriers between men, both humanly created and otherwise, as far as possible. Such barriers are especially the forms or formalities that define distances between men, give society a structure, and keep it from dissolving into an undifferentiated mass. Thus, modern art and literature have shown an inherent tendency away from classicism in perfection of form toward romanticism in concern for feeling that overrides form. Similarly, we have learned from Tocqueville that modern politics as a whole may be seen as the drive of extra-constitutional democratic forces to overcome the restraints of constitutional forms that were once

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[1]That science can establish facts but not values.

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modern themselves.[2] The liberalism that was to set men free has been attacked and pushed aside by movements let loose by those dissatisfied with liberal formalism, who desired a more radical freedom: for the decline in respect for forms and formalities is accompanied by a demand for more subjectivity and creativity.

Such, in brief, is the course of the modern world as it races toward perfect democracy and freedom. But this sort of perfection is indefinable; as soon as one defines the modern, it becomes the status quo and hence traditional, an easy target for the next progressive. To understand modernity, therefore, one cannot look to its *end,* as it seems to have none; one must look to its *beginning,* when progress was first set in motion. Especially since modernity now seems out of our control, and "progress" no longer seems progressive, we need to know what was intended and hoped for originally.

When one looks to the periods at which modern history is said to begin, however, they do not appear to suggest, much less to launch, the characteristic dynamism of modernity. Humanism puts man, rather than God, at the center of attention—which does not necessarily imply progress toward a new earthly future for men; and the Renaissance is a rebirth, perhaps a return to the ancients. Only Machiavelli, a single man soaked in the Renaissance and steeped in Humanism, seems, of those in his times, to have declared himself for progress in terms we recognize.[3]

More precisely, Machiavelli is for novelty. In *The Prince,* he praises the new prince over the hereditary prince because the new prince depends only on himself and thus gains more glory; the highest case is the new prince in a new principality who is also the prophet of a new religion (*The Prince* 6, 24). And at the beginning of the *Discourses on Livy,* Machiavelli, comparing himself to those in his times who sought unknown seas and lands, says he is bringing "new modes and orders" to mankind. He appears to be the first political philosopher not merely to admit his own novelty (as for example Marsilius) but even to flaunt it; and he did this not merely to establish his new modes and orders but, in accordance with them, to give new reputation to those who seek out new acquisitions.[4] It is not that Machiavelli invented new political tricks. He admits to having borrowed techniques of government from the ancients and perhaps also from Christianity, and he was aware that before him there had always been half-hearted or untaught Machiavellians in need of instruction.[5] Rather, he believed that political men should be encouraged to make their own innovations so as to increase opportunities for glory and gain for themselves and their peoples, for "preservation" requires both glory and gain. The founder of a state does not legislate once in the hope that his forms will endure; instead, the healthy state must be made and remade, formed and reformed, or it will become corrupt.[6] Machiavelli is far from espousing a formless or stateless society, but he favors frequent reform and he is definitely no respecter of formalities.

Machiavelli's realism unites with his desire for innovation when one sees that learning how to be not good means especially learning how to introduce an innovation.[7] In the chapter of *The Prince* where he calls for learning how to be not good, he announces publicly that he departs in this "from the orders of others." Machiavelli thought he lived in times when men were weak and vile (at least in Italy); he spoke scornfully of modern politics and religion and by contrast appealed to "ancient virtue."[8] Such expressions might appear to put Machiavelli with the Renaissance and to demand a return to the ancients. But Machiavelli, we see, was very far from being reactionary. He rejects the authority of the ancients in this chap-

[2]Tocqueville (1969, p. 698). Consider the criticism of liberal formalism in Karl Marx, "On the Jewish Question," in Marx (1975, pp. 219, 234).

[3]See n. 55 below and *The Prince* 12 (*progressi grandissimi*). Two recent works emphasizing Machiavelli's republicanism have lost sight of his progressivism. In Pocock (1975, pp. 158-77, 218), Machiavelli's concern with innovation is given due emphasis with regard to *The Prince,* but denied with regard to the *Discourses;* and see Skinner (1978, Vol. 1, pp. xiv, 45, 179; cf. Vol. 1, p. 181). See also Gerschmann (1973, p. 175).

[4]Thus, although new acquisitions are useful to princes and peoples, they must mainly appear glorious in order to attract glory-seekers. Machiavelli would have found utilitarianism too staid to be useful. Compare what he says about *cose nuove* in *The Prince* 6 with his remark on *cose presenti* in *The Prince* 24; and note *innovare con nuovi modi li ordini antiqui* in *The Prince* 7. Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis* I.I.3; I.XIX.3.

[5]See especially *Discourses on Livy* I.27 on *knowing* how to be altogether bad or good. On Machiavelli's borrowing from the ancients, see *The Prince* 3 (praise of Romans), 6 (beg.), 19 (end); *Discourses* I, proemium, 2, 4, 5, 21; II.16, 24, 33; III.2. On his possible borrowing from Christianity, consider *The Prince* 7 (on "Remirro de Orco"); *Discourses* I.52; II.16-18.

[6]*Discourses* I.6, 16-20; III.1, 3, 7. Note the progression from *The Prince* 4 (end) to *The Prince* 6 (on form and matter) to *The Prince* 25 (end). But refounding "every day" would be offensive, *The Prince* 8.

[7]*The Prince* 8 (end), 17, 18, 19 (end); *Discourses* III.35.

[8]*Discourses* I. proemium, 12, 55; II.2; III.1; *The Prince* 3, 12, 26; *Art of War,* proemium.

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ter, for they, together with the Christians, were the "others" who based their political science on what should be done rather than on what is done, who elaborated the "profession of good" in all regards, and who therefore constructed imaginary republics and principalities such as Plato's *Republic* and St. Augustine's *City of God.*

In regard to political teaching, the strong ancients are at one with the weak moderns. So in the preface to the first book of the *Discourses on Livy,* Machiavelli indicates that he will honor ancient politics through ancient histories, not by imitating ancient political science. Moreover, the history he chooses is Roman, not Greek; and near the beginning of the *Discourses on Livy* he reveals a definite preference for Rome over Sparta, the Greek city most favored by political philosophers. While making use of Polybius and Livy, he ignores Polybius' statement of indebtedness to Greek political science; and his use of Livy, of which much has recently been said, does not indicate acceptance of Livy's interpretations of events, to put it mildly.[9] Machiavelli puts his own interpretation on ancient virtue so that it becomes Machiavellian *virtù.* He values the large and imperialistic Roman republic above the Greek cities, and judges its virtue by its fortune in war, although that virtue was exercised in conquering the Greek cities among others.[10] While bowing ironically to the authority of the ancients—so that he can use it against the authority of the moderns—Machiavelli in fact uses ancient examples to reproach ancient teachings. He returns to the ancients in order to improve on them.

Unless one dissolves Machiavelli's arguments into phrases and reduces his design to vulgar office-seeking, one cannot find another thinker or statesman in his times or before who reminds us so vividly and profoundly of the realism and dynamism of modernity. Today, many would perhaps agree with this judgment, if not this formulation. But there remains a great reluctance to admit, or even consider, that Machiavelli might be chiefly responsible for the spirit of modernity and thus is himself the origin of the modern world. Modernity now seems so powerful and all-encompassing that it appears to be unstoppable, and if unstoppable, apparently inevitable. Few are ready to believe that the modern world, which wishes to move in the direction of perfect freedom for men and to give men ever greater control over themselves and the world, could have been founded by the free act of a human being. Strangely, we find it more comfortable to believe in confused and contradictory "forces of history," relishing our fate since we cannot maintain our hopes.

Before estimating what Machiavelli's influence might have been, one must see what he intended and what influence he intended for himself. One may begin from a typical view of Machiavelli's realism, which is that he believed that morality can be one's guide in private affairs but not in politics. Such a view seems implied in a remark of Thomas Hobbes', apparently directed at Machiavelli: "Successful wickedness hath obtained the name virtue . . . when it is for the getting of a kingdom" (*Leviathan,* Ch. 15). It is supported in Machiavelli's *Discourses* I.9, where Romulus' killing of his brother is excused because it was necessary for him to rule alone to order a kingdom or a republic for the common good.[11]

Yet, returning to chapter 15 of *The Prince,* we find that the title mentions "men and especially princes," while the principal advice is addressed to "whoever understands." Actual princes may be imprudent; indeed, according to Machiavelli, their sins are responsible for Italy's plight.[12] They must be replaced by prudent princes, who are now private men. But a private man must behave like a prince because a private man, if he is prudent, must become a prince—as Hobbes' remark suggests. Machiavelli's own suggestion, in his punning use of the word *privato,* is that a private man should regard himself as *deprived* of office.[13] Perhaps the rules of politics are not those of private morality, but when private men are compelled to become princes, they no more than princes can live by professions of good. Moreover, the prudent, private man who wants to become prince must not only be ready to make his way by such crimes as fratricide; he must also pave the way by making it easier for such crimes to be accepted as necessary. In *Discourses* I.10, just after providing an excuse for Romulus, Machiavelli shows how a founder is affected by his reputation, in particular how he can be hampered by an evil reputation as a tyrant. Machiavelli may have excused Romulus,

[9] *Discourses* I.5-6. Polybius VI.5.1; Livy IX.36.3; XXXIX.8.3. Strauss (1958, Ch. 3); cf. Gilbert (1977, pp. 115-33).

[10] *Discourses* I.9, 53, 59; II.1, 10; III.16; *The Prince* 3.

[11] Cf. *Discourses* I.18 (end), where Romulus' killing is excused without reference to the common good. See *Florentine Histories* I.3, regarding Attila, who also killed his brother in order to "be alone in the kingdom."

[12] *The Prince* 12; *Discourses* I.21; II.18; III.29.

[13] *The Prince* 2, 6, 7, 8, 14; *Discourses* III.2, 5. Note also the phrase *privata fortuna* in *The Prince* 6, 7, 12, 14. The "private citizen" who must seek office must also have the princely "humor" (*The Prince* 9) to be sure; but this fact does not justify the private lives of those who share the popular humor, who as such are deluded. See Price (1977, p. 620).

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but others—for example, St. Augustine—have not.[14]

Thus, the prudent prince needs a whole new climate of political and moral opinion to facilitate his arrival and maintenance in power. This is what Machiavelli intends to supply. The prince, or founder-prince, "is alone" only if he alone sets the standards by which he is judged and his reputation is made. Only he who sets these standards is alone above ordinary moral persons who live by them and above princes who may share them and who must conform to them, or appear to conform, for the sake of reputation. The highest prince, who is in the fullest sense prince, is the moral or political philospher who establishes the opinions in which lesser princes operate.[15] If, according to Machiavelli, public and private immorality must be controlled by the political necessity of acquiring and maintaining a state, then the highest prince is the political philosopher or scientist, Machiavelli himself—the one who brings "new modes and orders" for the common benefit not merely of Florentines or Italians but also of everyone.

Prudence and the Art of War

In this prospectus for "new modes and orders" establishing a new climate for prudent princes and private men, however, there is an evident difficulty. Is the end of the political scientist to pave the way for princes (thus also improving the lot of peoples), or, since the political scientist too is in a sense a prince, is his end to be prince himself? In the former case, Machiavelli's political science would be teachable to all and his status as teacher of all for the common benefit would be superior to his ambition of ruling as "one alone." He would indeed be teacher rather than prince, for his discoveries, like those of any scientist or philosopher, would not carry along to present and future beneficiaries the personal rule of their discoverer. The scientist, as teacher, is not strictly "one alone," and if he discovers "new modes and orders," his glory is merely to have been the first to see, and not now to be the first in rule, as prince.

Yet this formal truth regarding teaching in general seems overborne by the content of Machiavelli's particular teaching. When the teacher's lesson requires rising to sole rule, it seems unreasonable that the teacher should except himself, and unlikely that he will. In this case, his status as teacher would be subordinate to his ambition as prince, and the prudence he exercises in his own interest would control the science or art that he claims to be in the common interest. How can one sincerely advise "successful wickedness"?[16] If wickedness succeeds for those advised, then why not also for the adviser? And if the advice is wicked, why should it help those advised? Although Machiavelli's difficulty can be sensed by anyone of ordinary moral experience, it is obscured by scholars who make excuses for Machiavelli, conceal the wickedness of his advice and thus blindly rob him of the glory he claimed for having begun the scholarly practice of making such excuses. To excuse Machiavelli is to dismiss not only every popular, but also every interesting, sense of the word "Machiavellian."

In the dedicatory letter to *The Prince,* which was written to be understood "in a very brief time" by an actual prince, this difficulty of Machiavelli's political science appears in the relation between art and prudence, and the word "science" does not occur. Indeed, for some reason Machiavelli does not speak at all of "political science." "Science" is discussed in the *Discourses* (III.39), which were addressed to potential princes with more time on their hands. In this summary treatment, we shall mainly consider *The Prince.*

Machiavelli's dedicatory letter offers to Lorenzo his "knowledge of the actions of great men," which is the gift of everything he knows. From this he dares to "discuss and give rules for the government of princes" and says he possesses knowledge of the nature of princes. What he knows of the government of princes seems to be practical, and what he knows of the nature of princes, theoretical. These two kinds of knowledge appear to combine in the third chapter, where "the Romans" are cited as the example for wise princes of overcoming the particular difficulties of acquiring and maintaining a new principality. The Romans knew the remedies for these difficulties because they knew them "at a distance" (*discosto*) or saw ahead.[17] Such knowledge is likened to that of physicians taking timely measures to cure consumption, but is then limited to "a prudent one," as opposed to "the wise men of our times," and said to be "given" only to that

[14]St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XV.5.

[15]One cannot create opinions altogether, since ordinary morality remains and will remain unaffected even by Machiavelli's instructions; see Mansfield (1979), on *Discourses* I.10. In *The Prince* 15, "the orders of others" from which Machiavelli departs refer to qualities for which men are praised and blamed. See also *Discourses* I, proemium; *Florentine Histories,* proemium.

[16]Or, how can one be a "teacher of evil"? Strauss (1958, p. 9). Lefort (1972, pp. 260-62) has read past the first sentence in Strauss' book and has taken note of the "if" in that sentence.

[17]See also *Florentine Histories* VII.5.

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one. The same foresight is recommended in the sixth chapter to "a prudent man"; he should imitate the great men who have not imitated anybody and have made altogether new principalities. He should behave like "prudent archers" who shoot at a mark above the target in order to hit the target. Where one would expect "skillful archers" one finds "prudent archers," as if prudence, understood as discounting ahead of time, were assimilated to art and art thereby given command over the future.[18] He who follows this procedure is said first to have "some odor" of the great men he imitates, and then, because archers know the virtue of their bows, and use the aid of the high mark, they are allowed to "succeed in their design." In a turn typical of Machiavelli's writing, the (singular) prudent man whose prudence is "given" to him becomes the (plural) prudent archers whose learned prudence supplies the lack of highest virtue. We are made aware of, but not directed to, the difference between the prudence of imitating great men and prudence which is similar to possessing an art. When imitating great men, one follows their beaten track and thus does not truly imitate their innovation; however, each archer, as such, is as "prudent" as any.

Machiavelli alludes to this difference at the end of the ninth chapter when he remarks that "a wise prince" must think of a "mode" through which his citizens will always have need of him and thus will always be faithful to him. Can a wise prince do this with political science? At the end of the tenth chapter, Machiavelli says he has solved the problem of keeping citizens loyal, at least in part, for "a prudent prince." In the first part of *The Prince* (Chs. 1-11), on the kinds of principalities and how to acquire them, he joins theory and practice or wisdom and prudence, while leaving unclear whether they must be given as prudence or may be learned as an art.

The second part of *The Prince* (Chs. 12-14), on the necessity of using "one's own arms," heightens the difficulty. Machiavelli condemns the use of mercenary arms but praises a certain mercenary captain in the service of the Florentines, Paulo Vitelli, as *uomo prudentissimo* for having risen from private fortune to very great reputation. If he had taken Pisa for the Florentines, Machiavelli remarks, the Florentines either would have had no recourse had he left them or would have had to obey him. Machiavelli does not remark that in fact this "very prudent man" did not take Pisa and was thereupon killed by the Florentines. They spied the danger to them in Vitelli's prudence, since "mercenary arms" to them were "his own arms" to him. But they also did not know how to take advantage of his prudence, such as it was. In chapter 13 Machiavelli deplores "the lack of prudence in men" by contrast to the wisdom which is given to the few, and he criticizes the Romans whose prudence he had praised in chapter 3. Among the few wise who order their own arms, he names Philip of Macedon, whom he had cited in the preceding chapter as a mercenary captain who took away the liberty of his employers. Machiavelli says he gives himself over entirely to Philip's (and to others') orders. Does Machiavelli then admit that the few wise, perhaps including himself, hire out their wisdom and rob their employers in the manner of mercenary captains?

Machiavelli answers this question provisionally in the fourteenth chapter of *The Prince*. Although the chapter heading does not mention the art of war, Machiavelli suddenly announces that the art of war should "therefore" be a prince's only object and only thought.[19] Whence the "therefore"? If the dubious mercenary captain named at the end of chapter 13, to whose orders Machiavelli gives himself over entirely, can be presented as teaching an *art*, then his wisdom can be made to appear as benefaction. Such is the virtue of this art that it not only maintains those born princes but also often causes men to rise from private fortune to the rank of prince. When princes have thought more of delicacies (*delicatezze*) than of arms, they have lost their state. Using a weighty phrase, Machiavelli says that the "first cause" of losing one's state is to neglect the art of war, and that the cause of gaining it is to be "professed" in the art.[20]

This is illustrated by Francesco Sforza, who through being armed became Duke of Milan, and by his sons, who through avoiding arms became private men.[21] The example of the Sforzas does not in truth illustrate the principle because it fails to mention the art of war; besides, Francesco, however proficient in that art, did not "profess" it in the sense of teaching it. Nonetheless, as we have seen, a mercenary captain who fights on all sides for hire and gains his own personal "state"

[18]Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139b7-8, 1140a18.

[19]*Quella è sola arte che si espetta a chi comanda:* the article before *sola* is missing perhaps because Machiavelli is at a loss between the definite and the indefinite. Russo's suggestion, assigning *sola* to *chi comanda,* does not make sense; Machiavelli (1963, p. 125n.).

[20]Machiavelli claims to be "professed" in the art of war in *Art of War,* proemium. See also *Discourses* III.13. He does not claim to be a philosopher (*Discourses* I.56) and characteristically uses weighty philosophical phrases only in political contexts.

[21]Elsewhere Sforza is scolded by Machiavelli for having built a fortress which caused his heirs to lose their state; *The Prince* 20; *Discourses* II.24.

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illustrates our problem of art and prudence. Is his art so powerful as to be the first cause of his rise or does he also need his prudence to attune his art to circumstances? In this statement, the art of war has swallowed up prudence. Machiavelli goes on to say that no proportion exists between one who is armed and one unarmed, and that it is not reasonable for the armed to obey willingly whoever is unarmed. Thus, Machiavelli concludes, a prince who understands nothing of militia, among all his other misfortunes, is not trusted by his soldiers. He seems clearly to deny here the fundamental principle of classical natural right, the rule of the wise: it is not reasonable for someone who is unwise but armed to obey one who is wise but unarmed. Yet if the art of war is understood in its full extent as the only object and thought of a prince, Machiavelli in truth affirms the classical principle, while improving on it. For to understand "militia" or to possess the art of war is sufficient to make one armed, and to be armed is sufficient to make oneself obeyed, at least by one's soldiers and perhaps also by one's subjects.[22] Contrary to the classical writers, Machiavelli argues that knowing leads to commanding, and so the art of war in the extended sense includes politics. Nowhere else does Machiavelli give the art of war such amplitude.[23]

Moreover, he says next that a prince (or one) must never lift his thought from the exercise of war, and in peace more than in war. Never?[24] Does this mean that thought (or at least a prince's thinking) should never be detached from advantage in war? Does "effectual truth" mean effectual in war, whether foreign or domestic, and is this the only truth one should seek? Machiavelli's elaboration of this startling "never" seems to take away from its naked force, but only at first. He says that the exercise of war in peace is done in two modes, with works (*opere*) and mind (*mente*). But apart from keeping one's own arms in order, he says that a prince should always be on the chase so that he can accustom his body to hardships and learn the nature of sites. Machiavelli then discusses this topographical knowledge, of which one should take "the greatest care." The "works" of exercising war in peace seem hardly distinct from "mind."

Knowledge of sites is useful because it enables one to understand what is required for self-defense and because the topographical features in one region have a "certain similitude" to those in other regions. Knowledge of one site thus enables one to comprehend any other site. Such knowledge, the "first part" of a captain, is accompanied by reasoning, as Machiavelli makes clear by the example of Philopoemen, a prince who used to ride in the country with his friends and pose hypothetical questions to them concerning all the chances (*casi*) an army might encounter. With these "continuous cogitations," no accident could ever arise for which Philopoemen did not have the remedy: again, a sweeping claim of efficacy for the art of war.[25]

This "first part" of a captain seems equivalent to the "firm science" Machiavelli discusses in *Discourses* III.39, also on the knowledge of sites, where he also praises hunting.[26] He says that Xenophon (in his work that Machiavelli mistitles "Life of Cyrus") makes it clear that hunting is "an image of a war"; and Machiavelli adds that for great men this exercise is honorable and necessary. It appears that particular knowledge of one country can be generalized and the familiar made applicable to the new by the use of images representing the similitudes mentioned in chapter 14 of *The Prince*. By contrast to that chapter, *Discourses* III.39 speaks of both images and sciences so as to suggest that images (in addition to similitudes) are necessary to science (as beyond mere art). It was "firm science" that on one occasion enabled a Roman tribune to save the Roman army, despite the bafflement of the consul in charge, by spying a summit above the enemy on which both he and that army could take refuge. An image, then, might be a similitude visible only to one person or to a few, for sometimes it takes a rare brain to see an invisible similitude in a visible one; and the use of images would make possible the "perfect possession" of a science and therewith the rapid comprehension of new things. Such a science might be teachable only in part to the soldiers of an army, that part being the art of war; but the art of war would imply a complete understanding and might therefore be said to encompass that understanding in a work addressed to ac-

[22]*The Prince* 6 (on armed prophets); 19 (on Severus); *Discourses*, Dedicatory Letter (on the writers' praise of Hiero); I.21; III.13, 38.

[23]Not in the *Art of War*, proemium, I (beg.), where Machiavelli says that the art of war is necessary to defend the other arts and is useful for civil life; not in his exchange with the French cardinal in *The Prince* 3, in which understanding war is distinct from understanding the state. See also the "arts of peace" in *Discourses* I.11.

[24]Cf. milder statements in *Discourses* I.21 and III.31.

[25]Livy merely says (XXXV.28.7) that Philopoemen did this so that "no consideration would be new to him in such a matter." Machiavelli has also suppressed Plutarch's remark that Philopoemen loved military affairs more than necessary; Plutarch, *Philopoemen* 4.6.

[26]For a more complete interpretation, see Mansfield (1979, pp. 421-24).

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tual princes in which Machiavelli does not advertise himself as the inventor of new modes and orders.[27] Even in *Discourses* III.39 Machiavelli speaks modestly of "general and particular knowledge" as knowledge of sites, and is far from claiming the glory of founding a new science in the comprehensive sense, as did Bacon and Descartes.

Machiavelli's "firm science," although making use of images, does not incur his own condemnation of the many (in *The Prince* 15) who have imagined republics and principalities "that have never been seen or known to exist in truth." Those imaginary states are based on a "profession of good," whereas Machiavelli's imagination begins from "what is done." In *Discourses* III.39 he reports Xenophon's use of hunting as an image of war, and by "hunting" Machiavelli indicates he means catching one's prey. One may suppose he was aware of the difference (and the similarity) between hunting as catching and hunting as dialectic in Plato's *Laws*.[28] If hunting is for catching, and hunting is an image of war, we can infer—because politics centers on acquisition—that in *The Prince* and the *Discourses* Machiavelli uses war as an image of politics. More attention might be given to the use of imagination in Machiavelli's behavioral political science.

Returning to chapter 14 of *The Prince,* we see that Machiavelli recommends for the second part of the art of war, the exercise of the mind, that the prince read histories in which the actions of excellent men are considered.[29] He must above all do as some excellent man has done in the past who has taken someone before him to imitate who had been praised and glorified, as it is said Alexander the Great imitated Achilles; Caesar, Alexander; Scipio, Cyrus. Thus, contrary to the impression given at the beginning of the sixth chapter, even excellent men may imitate others. Those they imitate are found in "histories," and as in *Discourses* III.39 Machiavelli singles out the "life of Cyrus written by Xenophon" and asserts that in his chastity, affability, humanity and liberality, Scipio conformed to what had been written about Cyrus by Xenophon. Those whom excellent men imitate, then, are men of whom authors such as Homer and especially Xenophon, the Socratic philosopher, have written. From whatever source princes learn the art of war, they imitate the virtues or qualities taught by authors, and, it is implied, their art is incomplete without these qualities. As with founders as Machiavelli describes them in *Discourses* I.9-10, princes possessing the art of war are not self-sufficient but dependent on the moral opinion of society. Accordingly, Machiavelli closes the chapter with a less promising remark about fortune; with this imitation a wise prince can *resist* fortune's adversities, not have a remedy for any accident.

With this modulation we are led to the fifteenth chapter of *The Prince,* entitled "On those things for which men and especially princes are praised or blamed." Here begins the second half of *The Prince,* in which the difficulties caused by the moral qualities are considered.[30] For apparently the art of war cannot teach one to surmount the moral expectations of one's subjects and friends which stand in the way of one's necessary acquisitions. Machiavelli's exaggeration of the art of war does put one in the right frame of mind; for in representing prudence as art, in contradiction to Aristotle, he makes prudence morally neutral (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1140b 25; 1144a 7-9, 23-37). We are thus prepared to be told that one must be prudent to know how to avoid the infamy of those vices that take away one's state (Ch. 15), for example, "the name of stingy" (Ch. 16), that a new prince must temper his cruelties with prudence and humanity (Ch. 17), and that a prudent lord should not keep faith when keeping it works against him (Ch. 18). Machiavelli offers a definition of prudence in chapter 21 that sums up its morally neutral use of the moral qualities: "Prudence consists in knowing how to recognize the qualities of inconveniences and in picking the less bad as good."

After chapter 14, meanwhile, the status of art is diminished as the arts are reduced to partial human activities such as the art of gaining reputation (Ch. 19) or subordinated to the virtues (Ch. 21) or contrasted with violence (Ch. 25). Remarkably, the art of war, which was said to be the sole object and thought of a prince in chapter 14 because it seemed to comprehend all human activities, is not even mentioned after that chapter. Instead, soldiers are said to love a prince of "military spirit" (Ch. 19), Caracalla and Philip of Macedon are praised as "military men" (Chs. 19, 24) and Lorenzo is exhorted to revive "military virtue" in Italy with a saying of Petrarch's predicting that virtue, not art, will take up arms there (Ch. 26).

[27]In *Discourses* III.39, Decius, the Roman tribune, puts on a cloak so that the enemy would not notice the leader.

[28]Plato, *Laws* 823b; Xenophon makes a characteristically less obtrusive reference to "love of hunting" (*philotheria*), which Cyrus deprecates, *Cyropaideia* II.4.26.

[29]Histories, not mirrors of princes; cf. *Discourses* III.5.

[30]*Resta ora, The Prince* 15 begins; on the four parts of *The Prince,* see Strauss (1958, pp. 56-60).

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As art is reduced to activities that can be ordered but are still subject to chance (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1140a 12-20), prudence is enlarged to include the governing of fortune. At the end of chapter 23, Machiavelli says that a prince who is not wise himself cannot be well advised unless by chance he gives himself over[31] to "one alone" (*uno solo*) to govern him in everything, who would be *uomo prudentissimo*. This second occurrence of *prudentissimo* in *The Prince,* used to describe the adviser of a prince who indeed governs him in everything, reminds us of the "very prudent" Paulo Vitelli (Ch. 12) who would have had the Florentines in a dilemma if he had taken Pisa. Machiavelli will show how to solve the problem of the adviser who governs the advised, thus benefiting the advised and, not incidentally, saving himself from the fate of Vitelli (cf. *Discourses* I.21, II.33). As adviser of princes (or republics), Machiavelli both is and is not a prince himself. He cannot acquire a new principality for himself, but in teaching princes he gains some of their glory, leaving for them the obvious glory enjoyed by successful politicians and taking for himself the glory of having facilitated their glory, a glory evident only to the discerning. Thus, in the next chapter[32] Machiavelli speaks of the double glory of "having given a beginning to a new principality" (*avere dato principio a uno principato nuovo*), a phrase that both falls short of and exceeds "acquiring a new principality." It exceeds acquiring a new principality because this prince does not merely imitate the great men whose beaten tracks a prudent man was previously required to follow (Ch. 6). His advice gives a beginning to every principality by supplying the moral prerequisites and their theoretical foundation.[33]

The last part of *The Prince* (Chs. 24-26) concerns the problem of sustaining the prince's glory despite "the brevity of life" (Ch. 25). Ordinary princes may not receive the glory they deserve or may receive more glory than they deserve, according to how ill or how well their habits and nature are suited to their times. But the prince who gave ordinary princes their beginning can afford to wait patiently while virtue and fortune are sorted out since the opportunities for his virtue, and hence his glory, are not bound by the brevity of his life.[34] He alone has sure defenses against stormy times, as only for him do such defenses depend on himself and his virtue (Ch. 24). Machiavelli's art has disappeared into his virtue, which is his alone. With his virtue he teaches the art of war or something like it to ordinary princes, but their opportunities for using his teaching depend on their fortune after all. Machiavelli will not allow "these princes of ours" to accuse fortune rather than admit their indolence; he demands, in the notorious sentence at the end of chapter 25, that they proceed impetuously to manhandle lady fortune. Imitating the furious Pope Julius II, they should go beyond where "all human prudence" would have led them. This now limited and subdued prudence serves to distinguish virtue from caution for the generality of Machiavelli's readers as they rush from the necessities he describes toward the prizes he holds out for them. But only he is truly impetuous. Only he is not bound by the moral qualities because only he has learned how to be good and not good. His impetuosity is both impetuous and respectful: impetuous in theory by comparison to other writers, and respectful in practice to Lorenzo and other princes, both actual and potential, to whom he allows their subordinate glories. His position as adviser enables him to share in the natures of all whom he advises as he uses the diverse qualities of those who follow his advice. So by the use of the moral qualities of others, he is not bound by his times as are others, hence not bound by his nature.[35] Since he is not bound by his nature and knows how to be flexible (both *facile* and *duro*) in all times,[36] his fortune is assured. Others may absorb his teaching and a few may perhaps equal or surpass him, but if his teaching is true they follow his fortune. They follow the fortune of the man who first showed men how to become responsible for their fortune. His virtue depends on himself alone, his glory is un-

[31]Machiavelli "gave himself over" to the orders of others (*The Prince* 13, end), took that back (15), and now looks for a prince who will give himself over to his adviser (23).

[32]*The Prince* 24 begins: "The things written above, observed prudently. . . ." On the glory of advising, see *Discourses* III.35.

[33]Cf. the double glory in *Discourses* III.13 and *Art of War* VII (in Machiavelli, 1961, p. 515).

[34]On brevity of life, see also *The Prince* 7, 11. And see *Discourses* III.8, 34, 35.

[35]"Nature" occurs 26 times in *The Prince* proper. The first occurrence is "the nature of government" (4); the ninth is "all other things in nature" (6); the eleventh is a "natural defect of spirit" (9); the thirteenth is "the nature of sites" (14); the fourteenth is "the nature of rivers and marshes" (14; cf. 25, beg.); the seventeenth is that a prince needs to know how to use "the one and the other nature" (18); and the nineteenth is "by nature or by art" (19). "Prudence" occurs 28 times and "art" 9 times. The sixth occurrence of "art" is with the nineteenth of "nature," the only association of "nature" and "art."

[36]See especially *The Prince* 24; *facile* and *duro* are the ninth pair in the list of eleven moral qualities in *The Prince* 15, distinct from the others as the qualities of qualities. See also *Discourses* I.41.

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repeatable and he is *uno solo,* not in contemplative isolation but governing for the common benefit of each. His government is established *ad uno tratto* in his books, but also over time as his influence or fortune advances.

Machiavelli could be said to have "ornamented and confirmed" his new principality "with good laws, good arms, good friends and good examples" (Ch. 24) to be found in his books, but he did not write the handbook of an art of politics with rules for all occasions. Nor did he, like Thomas Hobbes, author a new political science or "civil philosophy" on the basis of a new method, and claim credit for it.[37] Even if Machiavelli had thought it possible for a political art to do the work of prudence, and even if the new scientific method had been available to him as it was to Hobbes, he would have had reason to decline the honor of founding a new political art or science. Such a founding would have given him too much glory because it would have subtracted from the glory of later princes—and not enough glory, because later princes applying an impersonal science would not have been subjects of his (see *Discourses* III.13, end).

The Cycle and the Soul

Machiavelli presents his new political science in opposition to classical political science. But despite his statement in chapter 15 of *The Prince* against the imaginary republics and principalities essential to classical political science, his opposition becomes clear only gradually. As can be seen from the preface to the first book of the *Discourses,* he found it convenient to condemn the weakness of his own age by contrast to the ancients, for in doing so he could appeal to opinion in his age favorable to the ancients. My account of his critique of classical political science, passing over the subtlety of his rhetoric, will consider two points of Machiavelli's attack, the cycle and the soul.

In the preface just mentioned, Machiavelli says that the ancients have been imitated in many things, though not in politics. Yet soon after, in *Discourses* I.2, he makes a significant departure from classical political science in regard to the cycle. Classical political science (here assembled from diverse sources) had supposed that regimes tend to change in a regular way—from good to less good to bad to worst; or alternating from good to bad and bad to good. These regular changes make a circle or cycle, coming back to their beginning and beginning again, with the consequence that the progress in human affairs that we moderns expect does not occur and should not be expected. Good times are followed by bad, and bad by good; so, as Isocrates once remarked, a reasonable man might wonder whether it is better to be born in good times that will worsen or bad times that will improve.[38] Civilization may progress as morality, arts and sciences advance; but civilizations are subject to natural catastrophes which return them to their barbarous beginnings, from which they must recommence. The cycle of regimes assumes that the city is self-sufficient; that it becomes better or worse through the actions of its own ruling class, which deserves praise or blame for them; that domestic policy is therefore primary. The cycle of civilizations, however, reminds men of the power of extra-human forces and of the fragility of human constructions. But this reminder of the limits to human choice actually promotes human choice because it teaches men that in the end all merely human force will be overborne, hence that they need not judge their actions merely by their consequences nor their governments by their durability. Moderation—not fearful, but responsible moderation—is the moral lesson of the classical teaching on the cycle.

Machiavelli did not approve of this lesson. In *Discourses* I.2 he almost copies an account of the cycle from Polybius, without naming him as source. The closeness of his copying enables one to see the significant differences, which center on his replacement of "nature" in Polybius by "chance" or "necessity" to explain the origin of governments and of morality.[39] After concluding this account, Machiavelli abruptly adds that almost no republic could survive these ups and downs without becoming subject to a neighboring state better ordered than itself. Speaking for himself ("I say"), he says that all these regimes are pestiferous, the good ones because of their "brevity of life" and the bad ones because of their malignity. Then, having introduced foreign policy as the decisive consideration and thus having denied the assumptions of the classical account of the cycle, he loses interest in the cycle of regimes and never discusses or even refers to it again.

Machiavelli offers, still in *Discourses* I.2, two kinds of legislated beginnings for cities: *uno solo* may make all the laws *ad uno tratto,* as Lycurgus in Sparta; or, as in Rome, the city may lack perfect order but may have made a good beginning

[37]Hobbes (1839-45, I.viii-ix; VII.170-71). Cf. Sternberger (1974, pp. 40-41).

[38]Plato, *Laws* 676b-c; *Republic* 540e-541a; *Statesman* 271e-274e; Aristotle, *Physics* 223b 24-31; *Politics* 1316a 15-22; *On Philosophy* 8; Polybius, VI.9.10; Isocrates, *Areopagiticus* 3-5.

[39]Gennaro Sasso (1967, Chs. 4, 5; 1958, pp. 306-15). Strauss (1958, p. 222); Guillemain (1977, pp. 266-67).

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apt to become better, and through the occurrence of accidents, may be capable of becoming perfect. At first the beginning which is legislated all at once—the mixed regime of classical political science—seems superior, but Machiavelli shows in *Discourses* I.3-8 that the way of perfection through accidents is far better. Although subject to party discord and "tumults" (in which men shout at each other instead of adjudicating their claims),[40] Rome's way was more flexible in meeting "accidents," especially the accident that if someone wishes to conquer you, you will have to conquer him first. Since every state must meet this accident, it should have a regime that enables it to keep what it has got, like Rome's. Rome could expand successfully, converting foreigners into Romans, while Sparta could not. Rome's regime of accidental perfection, with its emergency solutions and individual initiatives, was superior to Sparta's regime of planned perfection. One should not infer from this that human planning is incompetent in politics, however. We may suspect that Machiavelli, who had to overcome the prejudice against tumultuous republics (*Discourses* I.4), arranged the accidents of the Roman republic as supplied by Livy to suit his plan of perfection. His plan, we have suggested, is legislated all at once in his books but allows for accidents, especially of foreign policy, as they arise over time. It thus combines the two kinds of legislated beginnings set forth in *Discourses* I.2.

One particular difficulty in the accidental perfection of Rome calls for Machiavelli's intervention. It appears in *Discourses* I.7, where he is considering why party government worked successfully in Rome and brought disaster in Florence. In Florence certain party politicians were able, when pressed, to appeal to "foreign forces," "outside forces," or "private forces." Machiavelli refers to Francesco Valori, a prince of the city as it were, a man who was judged to have wished "with his audacity and spiritedness [*animosità*] to rise above [*trascendere*] civil life," and who could be resisted only with a "sect" contrary to his. Valori's "sect" was the party of Savonarola, who is not mentioned. Soon after, in *Discourses* I. 11, he refers to Savonarola himself, and says that Savonarola was able to persuade the people of Florence, which did not think itself ignorant or rude, that he spoke with God. Clearly one who can persuade others that he speaks with God has a private advantage over other party politicians. He appeals to both a foreign (or outside) and a private source of power.

In the next chapter Machiavelli informs his readers that the Roman Church keeps Italy disunited, chiefly because the Church is not strong enough to seize Italy but strong enough to prevent anyone else from doing so. It prevents others from conquering—or should one say unifying?—Italy by appealing to outside powers such as the king of France to intervene on its behalf. But why can it do this? Because the pope can persuade not necessarily the king of France but the French people that he speaks with God. Thus Machiavelli speaks in this chapter of "Christian states and republics" and of the "Christian republic." Christian republics are divided from each other because of what unites them—a religion that gives opportunity, or makes it necessary, for priests to interfere in politics.

Therefore, a wider view is necessary. One must look not merely to the regime but also to the religion that controls the part of the world where the regime is, to the *sect.* "Sect" is an important Machiavellian term apparently borrowed from Marsilius; and Machiavelli follows Marsilius' impudent application of it to Christianity, for example in the strange phrase "Catholic sect."[41] Machiavelli takes up the cycle of sects in *Discourses* II.5, where he considers what cause is responsible for their rise and fall—men, heaven or nature. He raises the possibility that men, or even a single man, could control not the cycle of regimes but the cycle of sects. For sect is a more comprehensive phenomenon than regime; it includes language and customs, the moral climate of government, as well as politics. Even names and dates are determined by sects. In the *Florentine Histories* (I.5), Machiavelli refers to the fact that after Christianity was established, people stopped naming their sons Caesar and Pompey and began calling them Peter, John and Matthew. And he takes note of the manner in which we date events by ensuring that all the dates given in the *Discourses*—26 of them—occur in his own lifetime.

From the viewpoint of sects, one must consider foreign or outside forces in the widest sense of things foreign to or outside of man. One becomes aware that Machiavelli is not an unreflective humanist who puts human concerns first but a philosopher reflecting on God and nature who puts human necessities first. He does not behold God and nature with wonder, and discourse on what he understands of them. Rather, he regards them with fear, and sees this fear exemplified in fearful, wholesale changes of sect;[42] and so he discourses on the remedies he finds for the fears men must have of their beginnings. Then, from the

[40] Aristotle, *Politics* 1280a 9-17.

[41] *Florentine Histories* I.5; V.1; Marsilius of Padua, *Defensor Pacis* I.X.3, 7; II.VIII.4; XVI.7; XX.1; Garin (1970, p. 61); Mansfield (1972, pp. 209-66).

[42] *Discourses* III.1; *Florentine Histories* I.5, VII.1.

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viewpoint of sects, one could say that in modern times, that is, Machiavelli's times, the cycle is stalled. The proximate cause of the stall is Christianity, which does not esteem the honor of the world and keeps it weak (*Discourses* II.2). But the ultimate cause is in the principles of classical political science, perhaps especially in the classical notion of soul. In reading through *The Prince* and the *Discourses,* the only works of Machiavelli's in which he says he puts everything he knows, one does not find the word "soul" (*anima*).[43] What does this fact mean?

As conceived by Plato and Aristotle, the soul was intended to give protection against "outside forces" in the extended sense. Having soul enables men to be different from their environment, to have dignity above the rest of nature and to be free of (or within) the forces of nature and gods outside them. In the classical definition of soul there were two essentials: the soul as beginning of motion and the soul as intellect. Having soul, men can begin an action on their own, not determined from outside; and because men have soul, this action can be intelligent. The problem of this definition was in connecting the two essentials. Whatever action one begins seems to be his own, and yet if the action is to be intelligent, one must be capable of detachment from one's own to achieve an impartial outlook that does not merely endorse one's prejudices. Yet while the two essentials are difficult to connect, it is also necessary to connect them. One's actions are not his own if they are determined by fancy or chance, that is, stupidly or by blindly following the authority of another.[44]

According to Machiavelli, and for a reason to be explained, there is terrible danger to mankind in the attempt to detach oneself from what is one's own. He therefore denied the possibility of detachment in the human soul. What was left in the classical definition was the soul as beginning of motion; but the soul cannot begin motion unless it can act intelligently. Other animals have instincts instead of intelligence and are incapable of truly voluntary or deliberate action. So, in denying the possibility of detached intelligence, Machiavelli had to pay the price of denying that men are capable of voluntary action.[45] But instead of having instincts, men are determined by necessity, or by the necessity that they have the prudence to recognize and foresee. Necessity well understood, not any fool's opinion, replaces deliberate choice in the soul as that which begins voluntary actions. Men may choose, but the only prudent choice is anticipation of necessity.[46] The human desire for glory, which seems to be opposed to necessity because it seems to seek what is in excess of necessary, is in truth comprised in necessity.[47] As we have seen, glory is redeemed from incaution by Machiavelli's plan for the common benefit of mankind, and at the same time it is required for the virtuous promotion of one's own.

It is notorious that Machiavelli once said in a letter that he loved his native country more than his own soul.[48] But which was his native country, Florence or Italy? Should he promote Florentine independence or Italian unity; and if one should get in the way of the other, which should he prefer? Machiavelli does not speak only to Florentines or to Italians but to all men. We may not be Florentines or Italians but we can nonetheless be Machiavellians. Machiavelli shows his solicitude for foreigners by giving them advice in both *The Prince* (3) and the *Discourses* (I.23) on how to invade Italy. Much as he loved Florence and Italy, he is not fundamentally a city or national patriot. He is a patriot on behalf of humanity, seeking to protect men against outside forces, consequently a patriot of the home of human beings, the earth.

In *Discourses* III.2 Machiavelli praises a trick played by Junius Brutus, the father of Roman liberty. According to the oracle of Apollo (as reported by Livy), the first among a group of young men, including Brutus, who kissed his mother, would come to the "highest power in Rome." Brutus decided that his mother was the earth, and pretended to fall in order to kiss the earth. Machiavelli urges us to believe not only that Brutus was ambitious for himself but also that he wished to crush the kings and liberate his native

[43]Strauss (1958, pp. 200, 333n.59). *Anima* occurs occasionally in Machiavelli's other works.

[44]Plato, *Laws* 896a-e; *Phaedrus* 245c-d, 247d; *Timaeus* 89a; *Republic* 353d; *Phaedo* 105c; Aristotle, *De Anima* 404b 28-30, 432 a 15-18; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139a 5-12.

[45]Men must make use of the beast, or beasts, in man; *The Prince* 18.

[46]*The Prince* 3, 6, 9, 25; *Discourses* I.1, 30, 32, 33, 52; III.5, 6.

[47]Thus *uno prudente e virtuoso* has the task of introducing form into the matter which will bring honor to him and good to the universality of men (*The Prince* 26); such a one is perhaps not *prudentissimo* to show so much of his virtue. This is the second of three instances of "form" and "matter" together in *The Prince,* where "form" appears 3 times and "matter" 13 times. See also *Discourses* I.1, 36, 37, 43, 60; III.12.

[48]Letter of April 16, 1527 to Vettori. See *Discursus florentinarum rerum post mortem iunioris Laurentii Medices,* in Machiavelli (1961, p. 275), and cf. Plato, *Laws* 731c. In his comments on Machiavelli's famous statement, Berlin (1980) makes it uncertain whether Machiavelli "revealed his basic moral beliefs" (p. 54) or left open the possibility of choosing to save one's soul (pp. 50, 64).

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country. Summing up the point in its highest case, Machiavelli says of a "man who is notable for his quality" that he cannot live quietly and untroubled out of politics. However insistently he forswears honor and profit, his excuses will be heard but not accepted. The attitude of philosophic detachment is impossible even for one who does not feel the attraction of honor and profit. You cannot stand so far from princes as not to arouse their suspicion, and if you attempt it, you will nonetheless be involved in their fall. This "middle way" of classical political science between partisanship and unconcern cannot be sustained because the extreme of unconcern is impossible. Even Plato and Aristotle can be described (though to a pope) as no less ambitious for glory than are princes.[49]

Necessity is always one's own necessity; that is why necessity overpowers any human capacity of detachment. What is necessary for me is especially what is necessary for me against you. Machiavelli says: "It is enough to ask someone for his weapon without saying, I wish to kill you with it; then after you have the weapon in your hand, you can satisfy your appetite" (*Discourses* I. 44). Since necessity is one's own as opposed to the necessity of others, one's designs prompted by necessity must be disguised. Like Brutus, the prudent man must use deceit. The most general mode of deception practiced by humans is by use of authority.[50] You say that some authority, for example the oracle of Apollo, supports or commands you, when in truth necessity requires it. When men use an authority, they put their own opinions in someone else's mouth—in the mouths of God or of their ancestors, or, like poets, in the mouths of their characters. Under necessity reason is translated into authority. Authority is reason in disguise, or better to say, authority is the effectual truth of detachment. Those who live a life of the mind, detached from politics, in effect elevate some authority in politics. This authority is not truly detached; it only pretends to be. It is their own necessity in disguise.

The greatest example of detachment become authority is the Christian God, which for Machiavelli, I will suggest, was the effectual truth of the classical notion of soul. The soul was intended to preserve human freedom and dignity, but the detachment of soul could be preserved only if one supposed that the soul is divine—that intelligence or soul is God, as Aristotle said. To prevent the divinity of soul from endangering human freedom, Aristotle may have conceived God as impersonal, but this reservation was unavailing. Any idea elevated above human beings is bound to be personified by them and made responsible for their good,[51] and the God of intelligence will be humanized and made providential. Aristotle's God was transformed into the personal Christian God that was used by priests to interfere with princes and tyrannize over peoples. The effectual truth of Aristotelianism was Christianity or that combination of Aristotle and Christianity which Thomas Hobbes was to call Aristotelity. Aristotle should have known that his detached intelligence in the soul would become a God that would be an outside force threatening the liberty of men.

Acting under necessity, then, Machiavelli substitutes what he calls *animo* ("spirit" or "spiritedness") for *anima* ("soul").[52] Whereas *anima* never occurs in *The Prince* and the *Discourses*, *animo* occurs frequently. *Animo* means a spirited defense of one's own, especially of one's own body; for *animo* defends a body and is satisfied with that body, but *anima* always attempts to transcend the body. *Animo* also means intent, as when Machiavelli urges the man notable for his quality to conceal his *animo* (*Discourses* III.2); but the intent, even in this case, is never contemplative or detached from one's own concerns. *Animo* is responsible for *ostinazione*, the obstinacy characteristic of spirited infantry who have planted their feet on the ground.[53]

Machiavelli's principle of spirited selfishness offers something for everybody, not in a common

[49]"And this glory [of reforming republics and kingdoms] has been so esteemed by men who have not attended to anything other than glory that, when they have been unable to make a republic in deed, they have made it in writing, like Aristotle, Plato and many others. They wished to show the world that if they were unable to found a civil association like Solon and Lycurgus, they did not fail because of their ignorance but because of their impotence. . ." (Machiavelli, *Discursus*, 1961, pp. 275-76). See also Manent (1977, p. 21).

[50]*The Prince* 7; *Discourses* I.7, 9, 34, 35, 53; II.12, 18; III.3, 5, 10, 30, 35, 38, 48.

[51]As Machiavelli personifies *fortuna, The Prince* 25; *Discourses* II.29. See *Discourses* I.53 for an instance of the people being deceived by a "false image of good"; also I.56, III.43. On the cause of making the Church powerful, see *The Prince* 3 (end), 11.

[52]As in the striking phrase, *virtù di corpo e di animo, The Prince* 8; *Discourses* III.8; *Florentine Histories* VI.6; and in *grande virtù di animo, The Prince* 19; *grandezza dello anima,* 8, 26. See also the greater reliability of touching than seeing, *The Prince* 18 (end), and the use of *umori* (humors of the body) in *The Prince* 9, 19; *Discourses* I.4. Scholarly discussion of *virtù* in Machiavelli as a rule forgets to ask what it is that virtue is the virtue of.

[53]There is republican obstinacy (*Discourses* II.2), religious obstinacy (I.14, 15), obstinacy in the infantry (II.16, 17; III.12), and obstinate conspirators (III.6; *The Prince* 19).

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good to which all may contribute different virtues, but (as he says so precisely) for the common benefit of each one (*ciascuno*). Each one in his separate body is encouraged by Machiavelli in the spirited defense of his own, because one's own body is the only common thing that can be benefited. Thus everybody can fight for his own glory and yet be "good and faithful soldiers" to Machiavelli.[54] Machiavellianism can advance without paying allegiance to Machiavelli. A new sect will emerge with an invisible leader that will offer princes more glory and people more security. Not depending on the virtue of rulers but only on virtue in the Machiavellian sense of imaginative aggrandizement, this sect will not be subject to the ups and downs of the cycle. States will rise and fall, but the whole will remain strong and mankind will progress in a condition Machiavelli calls "the perpetual republic."[55]

If Machiavelli's ambition seems grandiose, we should look carefully at the modern world we live in to see whether our ambition, which resembles his, is reasonable. Machiavelli, indeed, left a restraint on human aggrandizement which has not proved durable. Since for him there is no soul or principle *above* one's own country, there could be no universal principle *beyond* one's country. The crucial political implication is that, for Machiavelli, no *patria* could ever regard itself as essential to the destiny of mankind. There could be no chosen people, race or class. Machiavelli would have abhorred our twentieth-century tyrannies, but with our century in view he might have to admit that he had left no effectual alternative to dubious patriotism but a modern version of the "pious cruelty" (*The Prince* 21) he had meant to destroy. Twentieth-century totalitarianism promises fantastic betterment in the human condition from the realization of universal principles, but it does not claim to improve the soul. It has, without reference to soul, proved to exceed the pious cruelty of any sect with which Machiavelli was acquainted.

Perhaps, then, not the asserted existence of soul but loss of moderation in the soul has been the cause of our troubles. But we shall never learn whether this is so if we hold to a political science that routinely excludes soul from what it calls "behavior" and flutters at the mention of virtue.

[54]*Discourses* I.43. See *The Prince* 19 (end) on maintaining a state without having the respect of peoples.

[55]A perpetual republic is denied in *Discourses* III.17, but affirmed in III.22 after the remedy is found; and it is assumed possible in 1.20; II.5; III.1, 3.

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