The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919-1922
Author(s): F. Gregory Campbell
Source: The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Sep., 1970), pp. 361-385
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/1905870
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia, 1919-1922
F. Gregory Campbell
University of Chicago
At the junction of Central Europe's three old empires lay one of the
richest mineral and industrial areas of the continent. A territory of some
4,000 square miles, Upper Silesia was ruled by Austria and Prussia
throughout modern history. The northern sections and the area west
of the Oder River were exclusively agricultural, and inhabited largely by
Germans. In the extreme southeastern corner of Upper Silesia, Polish
peasants tilled the estates of German magnates. Lying between the
German and the Polish agricultural areas was a small triangular area
of mixed population containing a wealth of mines and factories. That
Upper Silesian "industrial triangle" was second only to the Ruhr basin
in Imperial Germany; in 1913 Upper Silesian coalfields accounted for
21 percent of German coal production. At the close of the First
World War Upper Silesia lay in the midst of dissolving empires; it contained
a mixed German and Polish population, and it included a vital
economic area of Central Europe.
Both Germany and Poland laid claim to the area, but Upper Silesia
could not remain a matter of purely local concern in 1919. The fate of
Upper Silesia became a subject of intense debate at the Paris Peace
Conference.1 The original draft of the Treaty of Versailles stipulated
that the entire area would become part of the new Polish state. As a
result of the protests in the German reply to the draft treaty, Lloyd
George took up the issue and fought vehemently for a plebiscite. Warning
against the danger of creating a "new Alsace-Lorraine" and emphasizing
the doubtful national loyalties of the area, he overrode the
opposition of Clemenceau and the indecision of Wilson, and succeeded
in placing the provision for a plebiscite in Upper Silesia in the
Treaty of Versailles. That decision was one of few important concessions
granted to the Germans at the peace conference, and it resulted purely
from the initiative of Lloyd George. Already at Paris the lines of the
unfolding struggle for Upper Silesia were drawn, with British policy
1 See Piotr S. Wandycz, France and Her Eastern Allies, 1919-1925 (Minneapolis,
1962), pp. 29-48; Arno J. Mayer, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking
(New York, 1967), pp. 804-5. I would like to thank Prof. Joseph J. Mathews for
first arousing my interest in this topic.
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362 F. Gregory Campbell
supporting the German claims and French efforts just as solidly on the
side of the Poles.
I
Twenty-one months passed between the signing of the Treaty of Versailles
and the holding of the plebiscite. Until January 1920 when the
treaty took effect, the area remained under German administrative
control. The police and the old officials, schooled in the traditions of the
Prussian bureaucracy, were a force for stability and order-in the
German sense, of course. Pitted against the bureaucracy and police
forces were a Polish people's council under the leadership of Wojciech
Korfanty and a military command just across the border of Poland.
The name of Korfanty was to become associated with the Polish cause
in Upper Silesia as that of no other.2 A Catholic and a native of the
area, a former representative in the Reichstag and the Prussian parliament,
he was a shrewd politician with an intimate understanding of the
Upper Silesians and an instinct for demagoguery. And he had returned
to Upper Silesia from the successful Polish revolt in Posnania. Whereas
the Germans were the conservative force in seeking simply to maintain
the status quo, Korfanty and his Polish followers were the revolutionaries,
dedicated to incorporating the area into the new Polish state.
In mid-August 1919, the first of three so-called Polish uprisings
broke out on the occasion of a general strike in the industrial area.
The insurrection was quickly successful in the two southeastern counties
of Rybnik and Pless, which were the Polish strongholds; but as the
Polish forces massed for a push northward into the industrial area they
met strong German resistance. The German Commissioner for Upper
Silesia was Otto Horsing, a member of the Social Democratic Party,
who had been sent to Upper Silesia in January 1919 to become chairman
of the local Workers and Soldiers Council. Despite his membership
in the SPD, Horsing was not loath to quell strikes and demonstrations,
particularly Polish ones. Proclaiming martial law and a state of siege,
he ordered German troops against the insurrectionists and succeeded
in reestablishing his authority over the entire area within a week.
Naturally each side accused the other of precipitating the conflict and
resorting to inhuman measures. German sources blamed Spartacists as
well for inciting the workers to rebel (and there obviously was considerable
Spartacist agitation in Upper Silesia). In a secret report to the
2 For an informative but unsympathetic political biography of Korfanty, see:
Ernst Sontag, Adalbert (Wojciech) Korfanty: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der
polnischen Anspriiche auf Oberschlesien (Kitzingen-Main, 1954).
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 363
German cabinet on August 28, 1919, Horsing warned that the Poles
might attempt to present the Allies with a fait accompli by seizing and
holding Upper Silesia with force.3
When word of the uprising reached Paris, the Allies requested Berlin
to permit a prompt Allied occupation of Upper Silesia without
waiting for ratification of the Treaty.4 The German government refused
not only for reasons of domestic prestige but also because of important
political and economic considerations. Berlin hoped to use the remaining
months of its control over the area to influence the inhabitants
in a pro-German sense; and, at the same time, the Germans
tried to mine as much coal and to gather as many foodstuffs from the
area as possible.5 On the other hand, the German government could
not afford to be overtly uncooperative with the Allies. It therefore
agreed to allow an Allied military commission to make an inspection
tour of Upper Silesia, and the commission in turn issued a report in
mid-September taking a moderate and conciliatory position toward
both sides. The suggestions of the commission for restoring peace were
generally followed by both Germans and Poles, and an uneasy calm
return to the area.6 But the uprising had furnished a preview of more
serious clashes to come.
In the late summer and autumn, Horsing demanded repeatedly that
communal elections be held in Upper Silesia despite grave doubts in
3 Alte Reichskanzlei, protocol of the cabinet meeting of August 28, 1919,
3438/742986-999. These numbers refer to the microfilms of the archives of the
German Chancellery and the Foreign Office. The first number is the serial number,
and the second set are the frame numbers of the particular document cited.
The microfilms are available in the National Archives in Washington.
4For Allied deliberations concerning the uprising, see Foreign Relations of
the United States: Paris Peace Conference (hereafter FRUS: PPC, 7: 698-701,
735-36, 768-74, 927-29.
5 At the time of the uprising a common fear among all interested partie
the possible destruction of the coal mines. Upper Silesian coal was parti
crucial for a Central Europe facing its second postwar winter. In regard to
German agricultural policies, see the remarks of Herbert Hoover in the meeting
of the American delegation at Paris on September 3, 1919. FRUS:PPC, 11: 413.
For documents in the archives of the German Foreign Office concerning the uprising
see, Auswiirtiges Amt. (hereafter AA), "Die Zukunft Schlesiens," Der
Weltkrieg 31, no. 3, vol. 1. The documents of the German Foreign Office that
were not microfilmed are cited by their archival number in Bonn.
6To the Polish side, the commission report urged that the Poles stop their
nationalist agitation from across the border, that they withdraw their infiltrators
from the area, and that they await patiently the arrival of the plebiscite commission.
To the Germans it urged a general amnesty for those involved in the
uprising, permission for Polish refugees to return to their homes and jobs in
Upper Silesia, and the avoidance of any reprisals against the Polish population
(Schulthess' Europdischer Geschichtskalender [1919], 1: 399-400).
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364 F. Gregory Campbell
Berlin concerning the likely outcome of the vote. Horsing hoped that
Germany-and particularly the Social Democrats-would win a propaganda
victory while the area was still under his administration, and he
designated the first anniversary of the German revolution as the date
of the balloting. The effort to identify allegiance to Germany with loyalty
to the socialist movement proved a failure, however, for the election
results showed a large majority for Polish candidates. Moreover,
the Social Democrats suffered severe losses to the more radical Independent
Socialists.7 Although the Allies refused to recognize the election
on the grounds that it might unduly influence the plebiscite results,
the fiasco brought about Horsing's resignation. Having failed
to promote the German cause by an appeal to socialism, the Weimar
Coalition thereupon turned to its other major party, the Catholic
Center, for a new commissioner in Silesia. Thereafter, an increasingly
important part of German propaganda in the area involved an appeal
to Catholic loyalties.8
After the Treaty of Versailles finally took effect on January 10,
1920, the interallied plebiscite commission assumed control of Upper
Silesia in early February. Only three of the Allied powers were ever
represented on the commission. At the peace conference it had been decided
that no Japanese representative would be included; and, with the
refusal of the U.S. Senate to ratify the treaty, American participation also
fell by the wayside.9 The occupation forces were overwhelmingly
French, as were in the administrative personnel of the commission. The
French sent 11,000 troops, the Italians 2,000, and the British none;
of the twenty-one district controllers, eleven were French, five Italian,
and five British. The vital importance that the French attached to the
Upper Silesian question was underscored by their choice of a representative-General
Le Rond, who had been one of their leading experts for
Polish affairs at the peace conference. Le Rond served as chairman of
7Ibid, pp. 477-78.
8 Sontag, p. 73.
9 Because of the general trust in American troops, the possibility of an
American occupation was one of the inducements used at the peace conference
to win Polish acceptance of a plebiscite. Already in June 1919, however, Wilson
indicated that it might not be possible to send American forces to Upper Silesia
(FRUS:PPC, 6: 201, 534). The growth of isolationist sentiment in the United
States was illustrated during August 1919 when Representative William R. Wood
introduced a resolution in Congress against the sending of American soldiers
to Upper Silesia for the mere purpose of "protecting the private property of
citizens of said allied countries" (Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 1st Session,
58, pt. 5: 4461-62. Two days later, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker
promised that no American troops would occupy Upper Silesia (New York
Times, August 30, 1919, p. 3).
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 365
the commission, and it was obvious from the start that his sympathies
lay with the Poles. The British representative, Col. H. F. P. Percival,
and the Italian, Gen. Alberto de Marinis, soon found themselves allied
against Le Rond on almost all matters of dispute.'0
Despite mounting tensions in Upper Silesia, the first grave dispute
arose only in August 1920. With Polish fortunes in the war with the
Soviet Union at their nadir, a false report spread in Upper Silesia on
August 16 that the Soviet army had captured Warsaw. Riots immediately
broke out in Kattowitz as a result of German demonstrations celebrating
the supposed Russian victories. French troops remained passive
as German mobs attacked and burned the Polish propaganda headquarters
and sacked Polish stores. Korfanty reacted by issuing a call
to arms to the Polish population, and for a week young Polish bands
roamed the eastern part of the province, upset civil administration,
and committed occasional atrocities. The main object of Polish efforts
was the disbandment of the German security police since it was largely
through that body that Germans continued to exercise influence in the
area. The interallied commission had promised to replace the security
police with a gendarmerie composed equally of Poles and Germans,
but what the commission had not yet carried through peacefully the
Polish insurgents accomplished by force. In every area where they
gained control, they dissolved the old German police system and established
their own."
In Germany, despite widespread animosity toward the Poles and
sympathy for the Russians, the government adopted a strictly neutral
policy in the Soviet-Polish war. A complete Soviet victory against the
Poles would have brought the Bolshevik threat to the very boundaries
of Germany, which itself was torn by mass strikes and civil unrest. The
German minister in Warsaw delivered an urgent warning against any
temptation to support the Bolsheviks and argued that Poland was necessary
as a buffer state between Germany and the Soviet Union.'2 Active
intervention in the war was never a serious possibility for Germany in
10 See Percival's reports to London in Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939 (hereafter DBFP), 1st ser., vol. 11. Concerning the composition of
the commission and its initial difficulties, see pp. 11-14. The best secondary
account of the activities of the plebiscite commission is in Sarah Wambaugh,
Plebiscites since the World War (Washington, D.C., 1933), vol. 1, chap. 6.
11 The international press carried a running account of the uprising. See, for
example, the issues of the New York Times and the London Times for the week
from August 16 to August 23. Percival's reports concerning the uprising are
published in DBFP, 1st ser., 11: 36-45, 48-50, 58-65.
12 AA, Geheimakten, K170/K023969-973, Report of Alfred Count von
Oberndorff to the German Foreign Office, July 1, 1920.
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366 F. Gregory Campbell
its weakened state in 1920. Berlin did warn repeatedly, however, of
the economic consequences of the riots in Upper Silesia. At the Spa
Conference in July the Germans had reluctantly undertaken reparation
obligations, which they claimed could be fulfilled only if Upper Silesian
coal production maintained the predicted level. Through informants
in Paris, they were aware of a deep split between the British and the
French in the Conference of Ambassadors.'3 They knew that their
argument would find resonance in London, and the importance of Upper
Silesia for Germany's ability to pay reparations remained Berlin's
strongest propaganda weapon.
The failure of French troops to take effective steps against the
Polish insurgents greatly upset British policymakers. In September
Curzon made the first of several unsuccessful attempts to force the dismissal
of Le Rond. Le Rond came to Paris and defended his actions so
adeptly that the British were left isolated in the Conference of Ambassadors.
They had to content themselves with a few procedural changes
within the plebiscite commission.'4 Although the commission managed
to restore its authority in Upper Silesia, the success of the uprising enabled
the Poles to abandon their former delaying tactics and to, press for
a quick plebiscite.'5 The Germans, however, after having lost their
security police and much of their election organization, tried to postpone
the plebiscite until they could remap their strategy.
Through the autumn and winter of 1920-21 the question of the
suffrage of nonresident voters dominated the diplomatic preparations
for the plebiscite. Over the years, many people born in Upper Silesia
had moved out of the area. The Treaty of Versailles gave them the right
to vote in the plebiscite, largely as a result of the urging of the Polish
delegation. Closer study subsequently indicated that the majority of the
"outvoters" would likely vote German; as initial estimates placed their
number as high as 300,000 it was conceivable that they could tip the
balance for Germany."' The Poles therefore reversed their policy, bitterly
opposed the suffrage of nonresidents, and argued that only current
13 The chairman of the German peace delegation, Gerhard von Mutius, maintained
close contacts with Carlo Garbasso, an Italian representative in Paris, who
kept the Germans informed of events in the meetings of the Conference of
Ambassadors. See Mutius's letters to Foreign Minister Walther Simons on
September 25 and October 19, 1920 (AA, Biuro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601-
479-481, D601493-495).
14 DBFP, 1st ser., 11: 54-82.
15 Ibid., pp. 55-56.
16 Ibid., p. 96; Wambaugh, 1: 242. The controversy concerning nonresident
voters is a central theme running through the published British documents for
the winter of 1920-21. See DBFP, 1st ser., 11: 83-190.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 367
inhabitants should vote. Here they received strong French support.
The Germans and the British just as avidly contended for the outvoters.
The diplomatic struggle concerning the outvoters touched upon considerations
that were to become crucial. For one thing, the British were
attempting to oppose French policy in Upper Silesia without actually
having any troops stationed in the area. The French claimed that they
could not maintain order during the plebiscite if there were a large influx
of nonresident voters. As a result, various schemes for the holding
of the plebiscite were concocted in an effort to lighten the police duties
of the occupation troops. One proposal was that Upper Silesia be divided
into zones that would vote on separate dates; but here another
difficulty developed, for the Germans were wary of possibly setting a
precedent for an ultimate division of Upper Silesia. Berlin continued to
lay claim to all of Upper Silesia, and, when the German ambassador
in Paris discussed the possibility of dividing the area into zones for
voting purposes, he received a sharp rebuke from the German Foreign
Office.'7 The British soon became convinced of the danger of
any system of voting that would allow for differentiation between the
ballots of resident and of nonresident voters, and in January 1921
the British Cabinet finally decided to send 2,000 troops to Upper Silesia.
At a meeting of the Supreme Council in February, Lloyd George forced
Briand to agree to the British plan for a plebiscite to include nonresident
voters and to be conducted on a single voting day in the entire area
of Upper Silesia.18 In the last major diplomatic dispute before the
actual balloting, the British-German side emerged victorious.
Although London and Paris were the focal points of diplomacy during
the preparations for the plebiscite, both Germans and Poles were
deeply engaged in propaganda efforts in Upper Silesia. An essential
factor in all calculations was the Catholic church. The vast majority
of Upper Silesians were Catholic, and the church could be highly influential
in political questions. Upper Silesia lay in the archbishopric
of Breslau, where the Prince-Bishop, Cardinal Adolf Bertram, made no
secret of his German national sympathies. But whereas the higher clergy
was largely German, the lower ranks and particularly the parish priests
were strongly Polish. Themselves the sons of Polish workers and peasants,
they saw nothing wrong with influencing their congregations in
favor of the Polish cause. Thus, there developed an increasingly intense
17Ambassador Wilhelm Mayer mentioned the idea to Lord Hardinge, the
British ambassador in Paris. He was reproved by Foreign Minister Simons in a
letter of January 15, 1921 (AA, Biuro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601532-533).
18 DBFP, lst ser., 15: 141-47.
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368 F. Gregory Campbell
struggle among the clergy in which Breslau vainly sought to curtail the
political activities of the local priests.
Neither Polish nor German officials were oblivious to the importance
of church influence. Korfanty in his masterly propaganda campaign
missed no chance to equate Catholic convictions and Polish loyalties.
Making use of popular opinions stemming from the time of Bismarck's
Kulturkampf, Korfanty seized upon and promoted the old slogan:
"Being Catholic means being Polish." But the main diplomatic efforts of
both Warsaw and Berlin concentrated on the Vatican. In the spring
of 1920, Allied and Polish diplomats exercised sufficient pressure in
Rome to achieve the temporary removal of Upper Silesia from Bertram's
jurisdiction. The Vatican appointed Monsignor Achille Ratti, the papal
nuncio in Warsaw, to serve as the church's commissioner for the
Polish-German plebiscite areas. Since Bertram was German and Ratti
sympathetic to the Polish cause, that decision obviously resulted in a
freer hand for the local priests in Upper Silesia. That Polish success was
the signal for the opening of a long diplomatic contest in Rome in which
the German and the Polish representatives vied for the favor of the
church.'9
In April 1920 the German Foreign Office sought an appropriate
representative who could present the German case convincingly in
Rome. The choice fell on Hans Count Praschma, a loyal Catholic whose
own estates in Upper Silesia lay outside the plebiscite area. Praschma
traveled to Rome in May and depicted to Pope Benedict XV the sad
fate of German Catholics if they should fall into Polish hands. After his
audience with the pope, Praschma felt that he had won papal support
for current German policies in Upper Silesia and that the Vatican would
curtail the pro-Polish activities of the local clergy.20 Despite Praschma's
special mission, German diplomatic influence at the Vatican was exercised
primarily by the German ambassador, Carl-Ludwig Diego von
Bergen, and by a close associate of Bertram, Monsignor Steinmann
of the cathedral chapter in Breslau. Bertram never reconciled himself
to the limitation of his authority over Upper Silesia, and through the
autumn and winter of 1920 German political figures also grew increasingly
resentful of Ratti's Polish leanings. (In Germany the papal
nuncio, Eugenio Pacelli, was equally sympathetic to the Germans al-
19 In this instance, British policy supported a decision that was essentially
in Polish interests. The British expected or at least hoped that Ratti would be
truly neutral, and they strongly desired that he actually reside in Upper Silesia
(DBFP, lstser., 11: 1-3).
20AA, division 2, Piipstlicher Stuhl, Politik 24, vol. 1, telegram from Ambassador
Bergen to the German Foreign Office, May 31, 1920.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 369
though he was never involved in the Upper Silesian dispute to the same
extent as Ratti. In retrospect, there was in 1920 the intriguing situation
of two future popes, one in Poland and one in Germany, each closely
identified with the nation to which he was papal nuncio and therefore
with sharply contrasting policies in Central Europe.)
Between October and December the dispute between Bertram and
Ratti reached its climax. It began with the decision of the plebiscite
commission to forbid Bertram's coming to Upper Silesia on the grounds
that his presence would disturb public order. Since the area still officially
belonged to Bertram's archbishopric, the Vatican supported
his protests of the decision. However, mindful of Polish resentment of
Bertram, Church officials hoped that he would voluntarily cancel his
visit if the commission formally recognized his right to enter Upper
Silesia.2' In early November Ratti visited Bertram in Breslau in order
to urge that compromise upon him. Their meeting was a complete
failure. Bertram adamantly insisted upon actually coming to Upper
Silesia. Prince Hatzfeldt, the German plebiscite commissioner, reported
to the Foreign Office that Bertram would not likely be willing to receive
Ratti again, and he added his own description of Ratti's personality that
was hardly complimentary to the man who was to become pope within
fifteen months: "We will never find the slightest support from this
man. He is the typical diplomat of the Middle Ages, slick as an eel, and
he squirms like an earthworm; he engages in monologues-even with
the Cardinal [Bertram]-and in every sentence there is a 'but'."22
Such reports helped influence the German government to adopt a cool
and sceptical attitude toward Ratti when he ascended the papal throne
in February 1922 as Pope Pius XI.
Bertram remained in close contact with the German Foreign Office
and relied on German diplomatic support at the Vatican. On December
5 he had a conversation in Berlin with a high official of the Foreign
Office, most likely Foreign Minister Simons, in which the discussion
ranged over the entire scope of German-Polish disputes as they affected
the archbishopric of Breslau. The account of their discussion of the
Upper Silesian problem ended with this notation:
At the close of this part of our conversation, the Cardinal PrinceBishop
requested that we put pressure on the Cardinal State-Secretary
so that the Holy See in its decisions in Upper Silesian matters rely not
21 Ibid., Vatikan, Breslau, Politik 20, vol. 1, telegram from Ambassador Bergen
to the German Foreign Office, October 26, 1920.
22Ibid., Piipstlicher Stuhl, Politik 24, vol. 1, report from Hatzfeldt to the
German Foreign Office, November 8, 1920.
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370 F. Gregory Campbell
exclusively on information from Nuncio Ratti, but rather, where plebiscit
questions are concerned, that it hear as well the opinions of the Nuncio
to the Reich, Pacelli, so that a clear picture can be acquired. Ratti is
scarcely fitted for his post, was formerly a library administrator in the
Ambrosiana, and is hardly qualified to be a diplomat. On the other hand,
the Prince-Bishop has reason to believe that the Holy Father is sympathetic
to the German viewpoint in the Upper Silesian question, so that it is only a
question of supplying him with accurate information. . . . The PrinceBishop
ended the discussion with the request that contacts between the
Foreign Office and the Prince-Bishopric be upheld in the fight against
chauvinistic Polonism.23
Throughout the Weimar era, those contacts were indeed well maintained
not only in Poland but also in Czechoslovakia, where the Breslau
archbishopric possessed vast estates.
Bertram reached the summit of his public activities in late November
when he issued a pastoral letter that seemed to promote German
efforts in Upper Silesia. By publicly claiming Vatican support while
actually exceeding Rome's policies, he aroused the wrath of Cardinal
State-Secretary Pietro Gasparri. On December 7 Gasparri and Bertram's
deputy in Rome, Monsignor Steinmann, held an extended conversation
about the Upper Silesian situation. The Polish minister at the
Vatican had demanded the abrogation of Bertram's proclamation, and
the Polish government held the Vatican responsible for Bertram's actions.24
In view of German objections to Ratti and Polish opposition
to Bertram, Gasparri decided to appoint a special representative to
reside in Upper Silesia and to enforce political neutrality within church
circles. The choice fell upon Monsignor Ogno Serra, the Vatican's
charge d'affaires in Vienna. Ogno was ordered by the Vatican to forbid
all clerical political agitation in Upper Silesia. That applied to
Bertram just as to the Polish parish priests. Steinmann greeted the decision
to send Ogno to Upper Silesia, for it thereby eliminated Ratti's
authority in the area. Steinmann considered the general attitude among
Gasparri and his assistants to be positive toward the German cause,
and he remarked that Ratti's increasingly pro-Polish attitudes had
caused head-shaking in the Vatican.25
During the months of his residence in Rome, Steinmann exploited
local sympathies for Germany with a skillful propaganda campaign.
He pointed out that Poland would remain a Catholic country even without
Upper Silesia whereas the loss of two million believers would be
231bid., unsigned memorandum of December 5, 1920.
24 Ibid., vol. 2, letter from Steinmann to Bertram, December 7, 1920.
25 Ibid.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 371
a hard blow for the Catholic cause in Germany. In addition, he claimed
that in the probable case of a renewed outbreak of Soviet-Polish fighting
the Bolsheviks would occupy and control Upper Silesia if it were
part of Poland, whereas they would respect the international boundary
if it were part of Germany. Therefore, giving Upper Silesia to Poland
meant running a greater risk that it would be Bolshevized. He pleaded,
as he phrased it, that the Vatican preserve its neutrality in the contest
by supporting the "just" demands of the Germans. In the winter of
1920-21 that meant supporting the suffrage of nonresident voters, delaying
the plebiscite until spring when the outvoters could travel to
Upper Silesia more easily, and opposing any division of the area into
zones for voting purposes.26 As has been seen, all these demands were
eventually won for the Germans by British diplomacy.
In conjunction with events in Upper Silesia the German ambassador
at the Vatican had launched a campaign in Rome in which he had attempted
to persuade Gasparri to recall Ratti from Warsaw. That request
was more than Gasparri would grant.27 But the Germans did
consider the sending of Ogno to Upper Silesia and the removal of
Ratti's influence to be a diplomatic victory. Ogno's reports from Upper
Silesia were sympathetic to the German side, and the Vatican was
moved to authorize Ogno to discipline local clergy who were engaging
in Polish political propaganda.28 Such was the situation in the late
winter of 1920-21 as the date for the plebiscite approached.
II
The February meeting of the Supreme Council decided that the plebiscite
should be held in the middle of March 1921. The intervening weeks
proved to be one of the most strained periods in postwar diplomacy.
At the beginning of March, Allied statesmen met in London with German
representatives for a definitive conference on reparations, which,
however, quickly developed into a stalemate. Following their decisions
in Paris in January, the Allies demanded German agreement to a final
reparations bill of some 150 billion gold marks. The Germans had a
much lower estimate of their ability to pay, and Foreign Minister
26 Ibid., memorandum presented by Steinmann at the Vatican. A copy of the
memorandum accompanied Steinmann's letter to Bertram of December 7,
1920.
27Ibid., vol. 1, telegram from Ambassador Bergen to the German Foreign
Office, December 9, 1920.
28 Ibid., vol. 2, letter from Ambassador Bergen to Ernst von Simson, director
of Division II of the German Foreign Office, January 27, 1921; telegram from
Ambassador Bergen to the German Foreign Office, February 22, 1921.
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372 F. Gregory Campbell
Simons was careful to point out that even that offer was contingent
upon German retention of Upper Silesia. In reprisal for the German
failure to agree to terms, the Allies established a separate customs
regime in the occupied Rhineland and ordered their troops across the
Rhine to occupy the cities of Dusseldorf, Duisburg, and Ruhrort as
well. Those events illustrated issues that were inextricably bound up
with the Upper Silesian dispute. The Germans could not formulate
separate diplomatic policies on the reparations question and on Upper
Silesia; rather, they had to harmonize their overall policy, making
compromises on one issue in the hope of winning concessions in the
other. Although the amount of reparations that Germany could pay
depended in part on German retention of Upper Silesian mines and
industries, French diplomacy consistently refused to recognize any connection
between the two issues. In addition, the occupation of the three
cities on the right bank of the Rhine created a new consideration for
diplomats in the spring and summer of 1921. The fact that Allied troops
were poised to occupy the entire Ruhr industrial area-and the manifest
willingness of some to do so-limited even more sharply the room
for German diplomatic maneuvering.
On Sunday, March 20, 1921, the plebiscite finally took place in a
surprisingly peaceful atmosphere. Both Warsaw and Berlin had accused
each other of making military preparations in order to disrupt the voting,
but neither side was yet willing to resort openly to force. Of the
registered voters, 98 percent actually cast ballots, with 707,488 for
Germany and 479,369 for Poland. Germany thus won 60 percent of the
overall vote. In accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
the balloting was by communes; 844 voted for Germany and 678
for Poland.29 There were 191,000 outvoters, the majority of which
doubtlessly voted for Germany. The transport of the outvoters across
Germany to Upper Silesia had become a popular display of patriotism,
featuring political speeches, band music, and women and children
distributing food packages at the stops in the railroad stations along
the way.30 In answer to Polish complaints about the outvoters, the
29A table containing a breakdown of the vote is printed among selected
documents of the plebiscite commission in Wambaugh, 2: 246-47; for an analysis
of the vote, see Wambaugh, 1: 249-51.
30 Many of the outvoters were Upper Silesians of Polish extraction who had
moved to other parts of Germany and had there became germanized. Their
numbers were particularly large in the Ruhr industrial area, and for that reason
the British had suggested Cologne as a balloting site for the outvoters. Concerning
germanization policies among the Poles in the Ruhr valley, see Hans-Ulrich
Wehler, "Die Polen im Ruhrgebeit bis 1918," in Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte,
ed. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Cologne, 1966).
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 373
Germans claimed that the decision of the plebiscite commissionnot
to allow the suffrage of residents who had moved to Upper Silesia
after 1904-robbed Germany of some 50,000 votes. Poles pointed out
that the Germans built up their majority in the northern and western
areas of the province that had never really been claimed by Poland.Y
Nevertheless, the plebiscite area was exactly the same as that originally
granted to Poland by the Entente in the draft treaty at Paris; and
the Poles had never shown any hesitation then about their willingness
to annex the entire area. In the strategic industrial region situated
within the triangle Beuthen-Gleiwitz-Kattowitz (Boytom-Gliwice-Katowice),
the vote was more evenly divided, with 259,000 votes recorded
for Germany and 205,000 for Poland.
The mixed results of the election afforded ample opportunities for
widely differing interpretations of the vote. With the exception of the
Germans, everyone was agreed in principle that Upper Silesia should
be divided between Germany and Poland, but it was clearly impossible
to draw a boundary line without leaving national minorities on both
sides. The northern and western agricultural areas had voted overwhelmingly
German; in the extreme southeast the counties of Rybnik
and Pless with their untapped ore reserves were clearly Polish. The
communes in the industrial area, however, formed a mosaic of conflicting
loyalties; the cities were German, but the outlying mining communes
were Polish. The vote could therefore be interpreted according
to national interests in order to support varying boundary proposals.
Neither side was completely happy with the outcome. Two days
after the plebiscite, Prince Hatzfeldt wrote to Foreign Minister Simons
that the results were worse for Germany than expected, that the idea of
making Upper Silesia a free state was gaining popularity, and that the
British and the Italians in any case would probably agree to Polish
acquisition of the counties of Pless, Rybnik, and Tarnowitz (Tarnowskie
Gory).32 Simons, however, contended that only one solution
was acceptable for Germany-namely, the retention of the entire province,
and the claim to all of Upper Silesia remained the official German
policy.33 The Germans based their position on the result of the plebiscite,
the supposed economic indivisibility of the area, and the assertion
that any partition of Upper Silesia would be contrary to the Treaty of
31 This was particularly true of the district of Leobschiitz. See the discussion
of the plebiscite and ensuing diplomacy in Wandycz, pp. 225-37.
32 AA, Biiro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601632-633, letter from Hatzfeldt to
Simons, March 22, 1921.
33 Ibid., 3057/D601634-635, letter from Simons to Hatzfeldt, March 30, 1921.
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374 F. Gregory Campbell
Versailles. But even a hasty reading of the treaty was sufficient to demonstrate
that that interpretation was as fallacious as the Polish and
French argument against the outvoters had been.34
The real bargaining position of the Germans involved an offer to
make concessions in the reparation issue in return for the right to retain
Upper Silesia. The logic of the position was best set forth in a letter
from Gerhard Mutius, German representative at the Conference of
Ambassadors in Paris, to Simons on April 2. Mutius argued that the
possession of Upper Silesia was more important than a smaller or larger
reparations figure, especially since -Germany would have to agree to
the reparations demands of the Entente anyway. He urged that concessions
be made on the reparation question in order to strengthen the
German bargaining position for Upper Silesia, as well as to avoid further
Allied occupations of German territory.35
Simons had already written to Ambassador Sthamer in London that
a reparations agreement was both possible and necessary, but that Germany
could make concrete proposals only after it was assured of the
retention of Upper Silesia.36 In the week after the plebiscite, the
German representatives in London, Paris, Rome, and Brussels met
for a strategy conference in Berlin, and a specialist for Upper Silesia
returned with each of them to their respective capitals. In addition,
Simons insisted that the Foreign Office send a formal note to the Entente
powers officially laying claim to all of Upper Silesia. Simons
wrote to State-Secretary Haniel that German domestic politics necessitated
such a note and that it was advisable as a historical precedent as
well. Contending that any division of Upper Silesia without German
agreement could not endure, Simons warned that silence by Germany
might later be interpreted as consent to the division of the province.37
34 In the interwar years it became a popular opinion in Germany that the
Allies violated their own treaty by allowing a division of Upper Silesia. That
belief was obviously mistaken. In the Treaty of Versailles, para. 5 of the Annex
to Article 88 stipulated: "On the conclusion of the voting the number of votes
cast in each commune will be communicated by the Commission to the Principal
Allied and Associated Powers, with a full report as to the taking of the vote
and a recommendation as to the line which ought to be adopted as the frontier
of Germany in Upper Silesia." Similarly Article 90 stipulated: "Poland undertakes
to permit for a period of fifteen years the exportation to Germany of the
products of the mines in any part of Upper Silesia transferred to Poland in
accordance with the present Treaty."
35 Mutius, because of his dealings with the Conference of Ambassadors in
Paris, was in a particularly good position to give advice concerning the overall
formulation of German foreign policy (AA, Buiro des Reichsministers, 3057/
D601689-692, letter from Mutius to Simons, April 2, 1921).
36 Ibid., 2368/490042-043, letter from Simons to Sthamer, March 30, 1921.
87 Ibid., 3057/D601628, letter from Simons to Haniel, March 29, 1921.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 375
On April 1, Berlin dispatched a formal note demanding the retention
of the whole area.
Whereas the Germans naturally tried to exploit the result of the
plebiscite, the Poles attempted to discount it. Paderewski-still a Pole
if not a premier-expressed the Polish outlook quite plainly when he
observed that the plebiscite had been held only "for the information of
the commission in Paris" and that "the actual line of division of Silesia
between Germans and Poles will be drawn later in Paris by Allied
authorities, who have the power to ignore the vote if they so desire."38
Korfanty did all he could to extend Polish claims. He proposed a
boundary that would have advanced the Polish frontier to the Oder
River in the south and given Poland about two-thirds of the population
and all of the industrial resources. As justification for his proposal
Korfanty claimed that, whereas the area west of the line was definitely
German, the part to the east had voted-narrowly to be sure-for
Poland.39
But whatever the conflicting claims of the Poles and the Germans,
the final decision still rested in the hands of the Entente, and the recommendation
of the plebiscite commission was therefore crucial.
Throughout late March and April Le Rond, Percival, and De Marinis
debated various boundary alternatives but found themselves unable to
agree on a common proposal. On April 30 they finally submitted two
conflicting recommendations to the Conference of Ambassadors in
Paris. Le Rond suggested a boundary that varied only slightly from the
Korfanty line. He contended that there were two "blocks" in Upper
Silesia, one German and one Polish, and that his line followed the division
between these "blocks." Admitting that there were German
majorities in the urban areas that he would have given Poland, Le Rond
explained: "It is not the population, in large part transient, of these
cities which constitutes the fundamental nationality of the country; it is
the permanent peasant and working population."40 On the other hand,
Percival and De Marinis submitted a joint report that gave only the
extreme southeast counties of Rybnik and Pless to Poland. By detaching
those two counties, the British and the Italians were also able
to claim that they were respecting the results of the plebiscite, for the
industrial triangle itself had returned a German majority.4' Their solu-
38 New York Times, March 22, 1921, p. 2.
89Wambaugh, 1: 251.
40 "Expose du representant de la France sur 1'establissement de la frontiere
de I'Allemagne en Haute-Silesie," in ibid., 2: 243-50.
4' "Proposition des representants de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie sur la
ligne frontiere a tracer entre I'Allemagne et la Pologne en Haute-Silesie i la
suite du plebiscite du 20 mars 1921," in ibid., 2: 251-57.
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376 F. Gregory Campbell
tion would have given Poland only 23 percent of the population and
25 percent of the communes, whereas 40 percent of the votes and 42
percent of the communes had gone for Poland in the plebiscite. Even
worse for the Poles, all the developed industrial area would have
stayed with Germany.42
On May 1 a newspaper article entitled "The Diplomats Have
Spoken" spread the false report that the interallied commission had
decided in favor of the British-Italian boundary proposal.43 It served
as a cue for the third and largest Polish uprising. As workers went on
strike and youths streamed across the border from Poland, the insurgents
swept through the province up to the Korfanty line. Whereas
it could be argued that the first two uprisings had been largely spontaneous-or
even provoked by the Germans-the organization and
efficiency of the May revolt left little doubt that it had been carefully
planned in advance. The object was to gain control of the area claimed
by the Poles and to present Allied diplomatic councils with a fait
accompli. Openly acknowledging his leadership of the rebellion, Korfanty
warned that any counteraction by the Allies or the Germans
would cause the insurgents to destroy the mines and the factories. On
the third day of the uprising, Korfanty announced that the Polish government
had removed him from his position as Polish plebiscite commissioner,
but the open border between Poland and Upper Silesia, over
which the insurgents were streaming, did little to allay suspicions of
the collusion of official circles in Warsaw.
The striking success of the insurgents was in large part possible because
of the lack of resistance from French troops. The 2,000 British
soldiers sent to Upper Silesia to police the plebiscite had been withdrawn
immediately after the balloting, and the French again bore almost
sole responsibility for maintaining order in the province. Their
failure to resist the insurgents effectively caused a new controversy
between Paris and London. The situation in Upper Silesia became a
topic for almost daily debate in the House of Commons. It became
obvious that at least some British circles were becoming increasingly
apprehensive about the possibility of French economic dominance of
the continent, particularly of the European coal fields.44
Simultaneously with the outbreak of the uprising, the Allies had delivered
an ultimatum to Germany on the reparations question, demand-
42 Wambaugh, 1: 253.
43See Wambaugh's account of the uprising, 1: 253-55.
44See the statements by J. M. Kenworthy in Parliamentary Debates, Commons,
5th ser., 141 (1921): 2357-61.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 377
ing German acceptance of a final reparations bill of 132 billion gold
marks and immediate payment of one billion gold marks. That ultimatum-backed
by the threat of an occupation of the Ruhr valley-produced
another cabinet crisis in Berlin; from this a new government
under Joseph Wirth emerged. Wirth's government was committed to a
policy of fulfillment of Allied demands. One calculation in the adoption
of that policy was the hope that German acquiescence on reparations
could purchase Allied favor in Upper Silesia. In protesting Allied failure
to prevent the Polish uprising, the Germans pointed out that the Allies
were bound by the Treaty of Versailles to maintain order in the area
and that it was inconsistent for the Allies to list German violations of
the Treaty while failing to maintain their own obligations.45 Lloyd
George seized upon that argument in Commons on May 13 to provoke
an open controversy with Briand: "Either the allies ought to insist
upon the Treaty being respected, or they ought to allow the
Germans to do it. Not merely to disarm Germany, but to say that such
troops as she has got are not to be permitted to take part in restoring
order in what, until the decision comes, is their own province-that is
not fair. Fair play is what Britain stands for, and I hope she will stand
for it to the end."46
Lloyd George may well have been seeking a way to avoid sending
British troops back to Upper Silesia. But Briand obviously could not ignore
an open invitation to the Germans to send their own troops into
the area, and his reaction was immediately forthcoming: "I am certain
that Mr. Lloyd George would never on his own initiative invite German
troops to march against Poland, and so against France. No such invitation
could possibly be issued except in concert with the Allies. We
have been getting a lot of advice from England recently, but it would
be more useful for the reestablishment of order if we could get men to
help our 12,000.... Never, never could the French Government consent
to German troops entering Upper Silesia."47 After a flurry of activity
between Paris and London, each man issued a public statement
to conciliate the other, and 5,000 British troops departed for Upper
Silesia to help restore order.
The idea of using German forces against the Polish insurgents was
by no means dead. Shortly after the outbreak of the uprising, the
45AA, Biiro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601730-73 1, note from Simons to
German embassies in London, Paris, and Rome, May 5, 1921; Alte Reichskanzlei,
protocol of the cabinet meeting of May 6, 1921, 3438/748012-013.
46Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th ser., 141 (1921): 2380-86.
47New York Times, May 15, 1921, p. 2.
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378 F. Gregory Campbell
Wirth government secretly engaged Lt. Gen. Karl Hofer to lead the
German paramilitary bands in Upper Silesia, which styled themselves
the "self-protection" forces.48 Composed largely of war veterans, the
German volunteer units quickly became a significant military force
under Hofer's command. They launched a counteroffensive against
the Poles and succeeded in recapturing key military positions. Official
Berlin admitted no connection with Hofer or his troops, nor did the
British openly condone Hofer's activities. But no one was fooled, least
of all the French, who sought with all means at their disposal to disarm
and disband the "self-protection" units. Despite the usefulness of Hofer
and his men, top officials of the British Foreign Office were apprehensive
about a possible clash between the German forces and the French
plebiscite troops. There was deep fear in London that the French would
seize such an opportunity to invade the Ruhr area, and that was by no
means in accord with London's policy.49 Nor was it in German interests
in Upper Silesia itself to press the military campaign, for Korfanty's
forces repeated their threat to destroy the mines and factories of the
industrial area before being driven out of the province.50
By early June the main activity of the plebiscite commission consisted
in trying to establish a neutral zone between the Polish insurgents
and the German paramilitary forces. The commander of the
newly arrived British troops, General Henneker, served as the contact
man with Hofer, and Le Rond brought his influence to bear upon
Korfanty.5' After successfully establishing the neutral zone, they then
brought about the simultaneous withdrawal from Upper Silesia of the
German and the Polish forces during the first week of July; the plebiscite
48 For Hofer's own account of his expedition in Upper Silesia, see Karl
Hofer, Oberschlesien in der Aufstandszeit, 1918-1921: Erinnerungen und Dokumente,
(Berlin, 1938). Also see Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge,
Mass., 1952), pp. 227-32.
49The possibility of a French occupation of the Ruhr was a recurrent theme
in the British documents in the spring and summer of 1921. For British policy
on Upper Silesia in 1921, see London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office
file 371, vols. 5886-5933.
50 Fearing that drastic steps would prejudice Germany's case with the Allies,
the Berlin government sought to maintain strict control over H6fer and his troops
(Alte Reichskanzlei, protocol of the cabinet meeting of June 7, 1921, 3438/
748334-335.
51 British-German cooperation in the face of the Polish uprising is documented
in the archives of both the British and the German foreign offices. For
British reports coming from Upper Silesia during June 1921, see volumes
5910-5915 of Foreign Office file 371. Memoranda by German Foreign Minister
Rosen serve as a useful complement to the British documents. See AA, Biiro
des Reichsministers, 3057/D601762-765, memorandum of Rosen, June 15, 1921;
3057/D601780-781, memorandum of Rosen, June 20, 1921.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 379
commission thus managed to regain some of its lost prestige. The Germans
and the Poles had matched force with force and had fought to a
standstill.
The fate of Upper Silesia still hung in the balance. At the time of
the Polish uprising Percival suffered a nervous breakdown and had to
be replaced by Sir Harold Stuart, the British representative on the
Rhineland commission. Stuart soon formed the opinion that "rather
more" of Upper Silesia should be given to Poland than Percival and
advocated but that the entire industrial area should definitely stay with
Germany.52 Stuart therefore was no more able to reach agreement
with Le Rond than Percival had been. In June Curzon once more tried
to persuade Briand to replace Le Rond on the commission, but Briand
would not hear of the idea. Briand and Curzon did agree to request the
plebiscite commission to try again to reach a common boundary proposal,
but conditions in Upper Silesia were at a stalemate.53 It was soon
apparent that the heads of the Allied governments themselves would
have to wrestle with the problem.
During June and July, British policy concentrated on an effort to
force an early meeting of the Supreme Council, where the final division
of Upper Silesia would be determined.The British knew that they had
Italian support, and they hoped to isolate Briand in the Council and to
force him to give way on the boundary dispute. Briand used every delaying
tactic at his disposal, but, eventually backed into a diplomatic
corner, he agreed to a meeting of the Allied prime ministers in Paris
during the first week of August. The Italians obviously hoped that the
dispute would not rupture what remained of the alliance, and officials
in the Foreign Office in London also were concerned about the possible
permanent damage to Anglo-French relations.54 In the discussions
52 London, P.R.O., F.O. 371, vol. 5915, C14232/92/18, dispatch from Stuart
to S. P. Waterlow, July 1, 1921. The numbers, taken together, form the archiv
number of the document cited.
5 DBFP, 1st ser., 15:598-608.
54 Throughout the struggle the Italians generally supported British po
On July 25, for example, the counsellor of the British embassy in Rome reported
that Foreign Minister Toretta feared that France might become too
powerful and "get her knife into Italy" (London, P.R.O., F.O. 371, vol. 5918,
C15217 and C15218/92/18). Through the spring and summer, the Germans
conducted an apparently effective campaign in Rome in the hope of winning
Italian support in the Upper Silesian question. German promises included concessions
concerning the delivery of Upper Silesian coal to Italy and even the
possibility of Italian participation in Upper Silesian industrial undertakings. See
AA, Buiro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601701-702, memorandum by Erdmann
Count von Podewils-Diirnitz, April 15, 1921; 2784/D537285, unsigned memorandum
in the German Foreign Office, April 17, 1921; 3057/D601821, memThis
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380 F. Gregory Campbell
within the Foreign Office, specialists for the Upper Silesian problem
favored pushing the dispute to victory despite the dangers, but Sir
Eyre Crowe took a considerably more cautious view.55 If the French
refused to give way, the ultimate question confronting British policymakers
was nothing less than the choice between destroying the alliance
or compromising in Upper Silesia. Both London and Paris had to decide
what price each was willing to pay for a victory, and that decision
hinged upon the ultimate and relative importance of Upper Silesia for
Great Britain and for France.
One of the most curious twists in the diplomacy concerning Upper
Silesia came in the days immediately before the council meeting. Briand
called in the German charge d'affaires, Leopold von Hoesch, and
pressed for German agreement to the cession of Rybnik, Pless, and the
industrial area to Poland. The window dressing that Briand used was
the possibility of an anti-Bolshevik bloc composed of France, Germany,
Great Britain, and the United States-a possibility that might be
realized if Germany would only give way concerning Upper Silesia.
Briand mentioned that the Germans could retain the actual economic
control over Upper Silesian industry while Poland was given merely a
"sovereignty of appearances" over the industrial sector. Finally coming
to his immediate and real goal, Briand suggested to Hoesch that Berlin
urge London not to be so unrelenting concerning the boundary line.66
It must have seemed to Briand that the British had become more German
than the Germans.
The Germans continued to maintain their claim to the entire province,
but even the British would not support that demand. In addition to
conversations in London between Foreign Office personnel and German
Embassy officials, the British ambassador in Paris, Lord Hardinge, emphasized
to Hoesch that some concession was necessary in order to
orandum by Foreign Minister Rosen, July 18, 1921. While the Italians were
naturally willing to accept those advantages offered to them, theirs was essentially
a cautious policy, and they had no desire to see the complete break-up of the
Entente.
55 As early as June 1, Crowe had warned German Ambassador Sthamer that
the German claim to all of Upper Silesia was not "practical politics" (see London,
P.R.O., F.O. 371, vol. 5910, C11877/92/18, memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe,
June 1, 1921).
56 AA, Buro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601843-849, two telegrams from
Hoesch to the German Foreign Office, August 5, 1921. Foreign Minister Rosen
immediately instructed Hoesch to visit Briand again and to reaffirm the German
claim to the entire area. Polish sovereignty in Upper Silesia was "completely
indiscussable" (see AA, Buro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601850-851, telegram
from Rosen to the German Embassy in Paris, August 5, 1921).
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 381
appease French public opinion. In response, Hoesch pointed out the importance
of the industrial area for Germany and, by implication, indicated
possible German assent to the cession of Rybnik and Pless.
That went beyond Berlin's official policy, although many Germans
were well aware that some compromise was necessary. In their conversation,
which took place on the day before Lloyd George arrived in
Paris, Hardinge characterized the idea of turning the matter over to
the League of Nations as "foolish" and promised Hoesch that Lloyd
George would not leave Paris without a solution to the boundary prob-
lem.57
The meeting of the Supreme Council opened on August 8 for what
turned out to be five days of difficult and often bitter negotiations. Despite
the presence of Prime Minister Bonomi and Foreign Minister
Toretta of Italy, of Japanese representatives and American observers,
the two men of ultimate importance were Briand and Lloyd George.
After listening to the reports of their experts in the opening plenary
sessions, they quickly brought their long dispute about Upper Silesia
to a climactic, personal confrontation. Lloyd George talked about "justice
and fair play," accused the French of being primarily concerned
with their own security, and even charged them with entertaining Bolshevik
notions (i.e., of wanting to steal from the rich Germans in order
to give to the poor Poles) .5 Where Lloyd George used bombast,
Briand tried finesse. Defending the French viewpoint to be sure, Briand
nevertheless treasured the importance of Allied understanding "in this
matter so difficult, so delicate."59 As long as Lloyd George and Briand
declaimed to the galleries, there was no possibility of narrowing the gap
between them. The real negotiations followed in their private meetings.
The issue was the industrial area. The British were willing to concede
the extreme southeastern section of the province to Poland, and
the French agreed that the northern and western areas should remain
with Germany. But in the industrial triangle, a boundary variation of
a few miles meant the difference of a wealth of mines and factories, and
Briand and Lloyd George fought each other town by town and commune
by commune. In their debates, Lloyd George's low estimate of
Polish abilities appeared once more, as pronounced as it had at the Paris
peace conference. Again and again he emphasized that the Poles would
not make adequate use of the commercial opportunities afforded by
5 7Ibid., 3057/D601867-870, telegram from Hoesch to the German Foreign
Office, August 6, 1921.
58DBFP, 1st ser., 15: 632-38.
59Ibid., pp. 640-47.
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382 F. Gregory Campbell
Upper Silesia, and he also kept Briand on the defensive with charges
that France was attempting to cripple Germany permanently. During
the four days of negotiations Lloyd George made several concessions
that would have given the Poles more of the industrial area than originally
foreseen in the British-Italian proposal, while still leaving most of
the mines and industries in German hands. Briand agreed to present
the compromise proposal to the French council of ministers, but both
the British and the Italians foresaw its likely rejection by the French
cabinet. News arrived simultaneously that the political situation in
Ireland had grown more acute, and Lloyd George hurriedly had to decide
to return to London. With no time left for debate, the British
and the Italians agreed to propose the submission of the problem to
the League of Nations, should the French cabinet decline the compromise
proposal. On the morning of August 12 the cabinet did refuse
to accept the boundary suggestion on the grounds that Germany would
retain its industrial arsenal in Upper Silesia and that Poland's share of
the province would not be economically viable. With a parting shot at
French policy, Lloyd George won Briand's quick agreement to turn the
matter over to the League and departed from Paris.60
The outcome of the Paris meetings could be interpreted only as a
victory for French and Polish policies. The French had been isolated
in the Supreme Council, and had foreseen no real chance of winning
acceptance for their own point of view. Yet their intransigence and
British troubles in Ireland had robbed Lloyd George of his anticipated
victory. British power was spread too thinly. The other important matter
of discussion at the Paris conference was the Greek-Turkish conflict,
where the British were deeply involved. Added to the Irish dilemma
and the Middle East conflict were the Rhineland occupation obligations
and the problems of a worldwide empire. Most British subjects knew
and cared little or nothing about Upper Silesia, and it was not to be
expected that they would support a break with France in order to do
Germany a favor less than three years after the war. Lloyd George
pursued his objectives with dogged willpower, but, faced with the possibility
of destroying the alliance, he hesitated and retreated. In Berlin
the Germans received the decision of the Supreme Council with disappointment
and anger.
The Upper Silesian situation afforded, for the first time, an opportunity
for the League of Nations to demonstrate its ability to settle a
key issue among the great powers. Since the permanent members of
60 See chap. 6 of DBFP, 1st ser., vol. 15, for the progress of negotiations in
Paris as portrayed by the British documents.
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 383
the Council of the League were those powers that had found it impossible
to reach an agreement, the Council requested its four temporary
members to recommend a boundary line for Upper Silesia. Those
countries-Belgium, China, Spain, and Brazil-therefore suddenly took
on great significance in the Upper Silesian dispute. The Germans could
expect little or no support from Belgium, China, and Brazil, but they
did attempt to win backing from Spain. Both in Paris where Hoesch
talked with Quiniones, the Spanish ambassador to France and Spain's
representative on the League Council, and in Madrid, where the German
ambassador dealt directly with the King, the Germans asserted
that anything less than full support for the German position would be
an unfriendly act. While formally maintaining their claim to all of Upper
Silesia, they indicated their preparedness to accept a compromise,
but not in the industrial area.6' At the beginning of September, Ambassador
Langwerth reported from Madrid that the King had instructed
the Spanish representatives in Geneva to support the German viewpoint.62
(In more recent times, however, it has been alleged in a Polish
periodical that Warsaw was able to buy Spanish support through favorable
treatment of the Habsburg relatives of King Alfonso XIII. )63
In September the League commission appointed two expertsHerold
of Switzerland and Hodac of Czechoslovakia-to study the
problem and to draw up a boundary line in Upper Silesia. Herold could
make a claim to neutrality between Germans and Poles, but Berlin was
particularly upset about the appointment of a Czech to decide the
boundary line.64 Although relations between Warsaw and Prague were
cool, Benes was committed through his ties with the French to back the
Polish cause in Upper Silesia. The extent of his support was never as
great as he tried to pretend in his public and private statements, which
were meant for French and Polish consumption, but it still could not be
claimed that the Czechs were completely neutral on the Upper Silesian
issue. At Geneva in September Beneg did help to influence Balfour in a
Franco-Polish sense.65 Through September and the first week of Oc-
61AA, Biuro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601875-877, telegram from Foreign
Minister Rosen to the German Embassy in Madrid, August 20, 1921.
62 Ibid., 3015/D592805-808, letter from Ambassador Ernst Freiherr Langwerth
von Simmem to Foreign Minister Rosen, September 3, 1921.
63 See Stanislaw Zabiello's review of Jerzy Krasuski's Stosunki polskoniemieckie,
1919-1925 (Poznan', 1962), in Sprawy Miedzynarodowe 16 (February
1963): 93. I am indebted to Dr. Vincent Kroll for calling my attention to
this information.
64AA, Biuro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601948-955, unsigned memorandum
in the German Foreign Office, October 10, 1921.
65 In the summer of 1921 reports reached the British Foreign Office that
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384 F. Gregory Campbell
tober the matter stayed within the League of Nations, but by early
tober rumors began to circulate that a decision was forthcoming.
Word reached the Germans that the result would be unfavorable to
them; and there was an immediate movement within the government,
led by Walter Rathenau, for the resignation of the Wirth cabinet.66
The German Foreign Office did try to persuade the British to intervene
once more, but all efforts in London were fruitless. Curzon pointed out
that both Britain and France were obligated to accept whatever the
League might decide and maintained that it would be "unfair" to influence
the decision.67 On October 12 the recommendation of the
League was officially communicated to the Supreme Council.
The proposal called for the drawing of the political frontier through
the industrial triangle, while at the same time establishing controls
that would allow the area to survive at least temporarily as an economic
unit. Economic matters and minority disputes were to be handled
by an "Upper Silesian Mixed Commission," to be composed
equally of Germans and Poles as well as a neutral member. On the
basis of population and territory, the boundary that was suggested by
the League was as fair as any that had yet been proposed. Whereas
the Germans had won 60 percent of the votes and 55 percent of the
Benes was maintaining that he had "pleaded" with the British to honor Polish
claims to Upper Silesia. Sir Eyre Crowe commented on the matter: "It is true
that Mr. Bened mentioned the subject to me. It was, I thought, a casual remark.
It merely said that in his opinion the chances of securing a lasting peace would
be greater if Poland and not Germany received the industrial area. I considered
this obiter dictum at the time as hardly deserving to be recorded." See P.R.O.,
F.O. 371, volume 5911, C12450/92/18, comments on a report by Sir Harold
Stuart to the British Foreign Office, June 12, 1921. Concerning the conversation
between Balfour and Bene's in September, see P.R.O., F. 0. 371, vol. 5925,
C18382/92/18, memorandum by Balfour, September 10, 1921. On CzechoslovakPolish
relations concerning Upper Silesia, see Jaroslav Valenta, "Czechoslowacja
i przynaleznosc Gornego Sl4ska do Polski w latach 1918-1921," Slqski Kwartalnik
Historyczny Sob6tka 17 (1962): 31-57.
66Alte Reichskanzlei, protocols of the Cabinet meetings of October 10, 11,
12, 21, 22, 24, and 27, 1921, 3438/749647-662, 749690-706.
67London, P.R.O., F.O. 371, vol. 5927, C19444/92/18, exchange of letters
between Curzon and Rosen, October 6 and October 10, 1921; AA, Biuro des
Reichsministers, 3057/D601963-964, telegram from Ambassador Sthamer to the
German Foreign Office, October 11, 1921. The British ambassador in Berlin,
Lord d'Abernon, did his best to console the Germans about the Upper Silesian
decision (see AA, Biuro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601966, memorandum by
Foreign Minister Rosen, October 13, 1921; 3057/D601992-994, memorandum by
Foreign Minister Rosen, October 22, 1921). At the same time, d'Abernon was
conveying his own sharply negative reaction to the Geneva decision in personal
letters meant for Lloyd George (London, Beaverbrook Library, Lloyd George
papers, F/54/2/4, 5, 6, 7).
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The Struggle for Upper Silesia 385
communes in the plebiscite, the division gave Germany 57 percent
of the inhabitants and 70 percent of the territory of Upper Silesia.
The line, however, cut through the western corner of the industrial
triangle and left most of the industries and mines to Poland. At least
three-quarters of the coal mines and ore reserves went to Poland as
well as most of the industrial installations.68 In Paris, Briand reportedly
tried to nullify the provisions for the economic unity of Upper Silesia
in order to give the Poles immediate control over the industrial area,
but his efforts were thwarted by the British.69
On October 15 the Conference of Ambassadors accepted the report
of the League and by so doing established the permanent division
of Upper Silesia. Neither Berlin nor Warsaw was completely happy
with the settlement, but the Germans had more to mourn than did the
Poles. A storm of protest broke out in Berlin, and the decision precipitated
another German cabinet resignation although Wirth did return
as chancellor in the new government. Without the support of
their British confreres, however, the Germans could accomplish nothing
of substance. After the reluctant German and Polish acceptance
of the decision at the end of October, all significant Allied diplomacy
concerning Upper Silesia came to a close.
For half a year thereafter German and Polish diplomats worked
out the provisions for economic cooperation and the protection of
minorities. They established, in accordance with the recommendations
of the League, two bodies designed to maintain the economic
unity of the area and to insure the rights of national minorities for a
transitional period of fifteen years. The Upper Silesian Mixed Commission
and the Arbitral Tribunal subsequently helped to alleviate
the difficulties inevitably associated with the drawing of an international
frontier through a densely settled industrial area. On May 15,
1922, representatives of the two governments signed one of the longest
and most detailed treaties ever fashioned; by the end of the month
both the Sejm and the Reichstag, which was draped in mourning for the
occasion, ratified the convention; in June Allied troops withdrew,
leaving Upper Silesia divided between Germany and Poland.
68 U. S. Department of Commerce, "The Upper Silesian Decision," Commerce
Reports 4 (November 28, 1921): 795-800; Wambaugh, 1: 259.
69 AA, Buro des Reichsministers, 3057/D601983-984, telegram from Ambassador
Mayer to the German Foreign Office, October 16, 1921.
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