The Local Corporatist State and NGO
Relations in China
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU* and REZA HASMATH
This article examines the Chinese state’s interactions and influences on the development of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) through a corporatist framework. It suggests that
not only is the central state actively involved in the development of NGOs, but increasingly
the successes of NGOs are determined by their interactions with the local state. We profile
NGOs in Shanghai, of varying sizes, budgets and issue-areas, as a case study to understand
the interplay between NGOs and the local state. The article further discusses reasons behind
the growing shift from central to local state influences, and the potential future implications
for state–NGO relations in China.
Introduction
Since the 1980s, the Chinese state has gradually withdrawn from the delivery of
welfare and social services, creating space for a numerical growth of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs). In the span of nearly three decades,
approximately 440,000 officially registered NGOs—alongside a greater number of
unregistered ones—have emerged.1
The numerical increase of NGOs has, to a large
extent, mirrored the rising social challenges caused, in part, by economic
liberalization—with problems ranging from environmental damages to unsafe
foods becoming an everyday reality that NGOs have sought to address.
Suffice to say, NGOs have increasingly become a significant factor in the changing
social landscape in China, whereby NGOs are slowly receiving recognition for their
positive social contributions to society, ranging from supplementing the state’s role
in providing social services to educating the public about various social issues.
In fact, local state actors are being motivated to become engaged with NGOs due to
* Jennifer Y. J. Hsu is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Alberta.
Reza Hasmath is a lecturer in Chinese politics at the University of Oxford. The authors are grateful for the comments
and suggestions provided by the anonymous reviewers. The authors can be reached by email at jhsu@ualberta.ca or
reza.hasmath@area.ox.ac.uk
1. Pumin Yin, ‘A new dawn for NGOs: registration requirements relaxed for charity work’, Beijing Review,
(4 August 2011), available at: http://www.bjreview.com/nation/txt/2011-08/01/content_380902.htm (accessed 20
June 2012). According to Yin, the 440,000 registered groups are disaggregated as follows: 243,000 social groups,
195,000 private non-enterprise units and more than 2,600 foundations. Xu Ying and Zhao Litao [China’s Rapidly
Growing Non-Governmental Organizations, EAI Background Briefing No. 514 (2010, p. i)] estimate that the number
of unregistered groups can be as large as ten times more than the number of officially registered groups.
Journal of Contemporary China, 2014
Vol. 23, No. 87, 516–534, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2013.843929
q 2014 Taylor & Francis
such activities. For instance, the proceedings from the Thirteenth National Civil
Affairs meeting in March 2012 illustrated the central state’s desire to encourage
greater participation of social organizations in a range of activities, in tandem with
the local state’s efforts to improve its social assistance system to low-income
households.2
In this vein, while the role of the central state in influencing NGO activities has
been commented upon extensively,3
this study will primarily place the analytical
framework at the local state level. Specifically, the study seeks to understand the
development of NGOs by employing a local corporatist state framework, and
utilizing the NGO sector in Shanghai as a case for analysis. At the heart of this article
is an attempt to understand how local authorities have adopted and adapted
corporatist measures in their engagement with NGOs. The article will suggest that
corporatist measures continue to be employed by local authorities as an effective
means of ensuring the potency and relevance of the local state in a rapidly changing
sector. Notwithstanding, there is noticeable adaptation of corporatist measures—
namely, the local state is utilizing subtle or tacit forms of approval to manage the
sector.
The selection of Shanghai is a testament to the emerging vibrant NGO sector in the
city. The municipality has one of the strongest revenue streams in China and, in
principle, has the capacity to devote state resources to social issues without the strong
involvement of NGOs.4
Notwithstanding, the Shanghai government has increasingly
encouraged the contracting of social services to NGOs and thus presents an
interesting case to understand how the state and NGOs will respond to the changes
within the sector.5
The eight NGOs interviewed in Shanghai vary in size and budget,
and operate in a wide array of issues, providing a large representation of the scale,
financial resources and scope of work that NGOs engage in. Representatives of the
NGOs were interviewed in 2007 and again in late 2011.6
While the interviews do not
offer a national representation of the NGO sector, they do provide a depiction of the
increasing involvement of the local state in the work and environs of NGOs. What
can be seen to develop from the cases is the collaborative role of the local state at
various levels—particularly at the municipal and district level—in pursuing the
objectives and operational development of NGOs. In short, how these collaborations
2. ‘Top leaders meet civil affairs staff, urge progress’, People’s Daily Online, (20 March 2012), available at:
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90785/7763003.html (accessed 7 May 2012).
3. See for example, Qiusha Ma, ‘The governance of NGOs in China since 1978: how much autonomy?’,
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 31(3), (2002), pp. 305–328; and Karla Simon, ‘Reform of China’s laws for
NPOs—a discussion related to Shiye Danwei reform’, International Journal for Civil Society Law 3(3), (2005),
pp. 71–89.
4. As an anonymous reviewer pointed out, this situation is unlike areas such as Yunnan where the local coffers
are frequently empty, and there is often little choice but to invite NGOs to help provide services the local state
previously provided.
5. See Jessica Teets, ‘Civil society participation in local governance: outsourcing migrant education in
Shanghai’, in Z. Deng and S. Guo, eds, China’s Search for Good Governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011); Ruojing Chen, Understand Government–Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship using Shanghai
Public Service Bidding as an Example, unpublished M.A. dissertation, Lund University, 2012.
6. Note, the authors endeavored to interview the same NGO representatives in 2007 and 2011. In the event that
this was not feasible, an interview was conducted with a representative at the same position and level of
responsibilities.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
517
evolve and the subsequent impact on state–NGO relationships is a salient subject of
interest.
The local corporatist state
The use of corporatism highlights not only how NGOs are governed and treated, but it
also emphasizes some of the key strategies adopted by both state and NGOs in their
interactions with one another. In using this framework, corporatist arrangements,
irrespective of whether they are authoritarian or the societal variety, do not define any
political system anywhere. Instead, they are institutional mechanisms in the service
of government.7
To further this notion of corporatism as a process, consider
Cawson’s definition:8
Corporatism is a specific socio-political process in which organizations representing
monopolistic functional interests engage in political exchange with state agencies over
public policy outputs which involves those organizations in a role that combines interest
representation and policy implementation through delegated self-enforcement.
Some have questioned the utility of corporatism to understand China’s state–
society relations; others have preferred to emphasize the growth of civil society and
thus offer socially determined explanations for state–society relations.9
Gilley
argues that ‘concepts such as “local state corporatism” are not an accurate reflection
of state–society relationships even in the limited context of local China [because it
is] limited in its explanatory breadth’.10
Using this framework is not to suggest that
this is an uncontested concept and should be applied without reflection. Rather, it is
to acknowledge that the use of local state corporatism will highlight certain aspects
of state–society relations and simultaneously challenge the totality of Gilley’s
conclusion: ‘Yet the dominant Leninist state has persisted precisely by crowding
out competing visions for organizing politics’.11
Hurst furthers the assault on
corporatism labeling it as ‘ill-fitting’.12
Hurst advocates that we ought to study the
nuances and subtlety of state–society interactions, in so far as to consider
‘that associations are essentially government fists in civilian gloves, or that new
forms of citizens’ organizations truly represent societal interests in ways that can
work against, rather than in tandem with, government objectives’. For Yep,
the corporatist framework assumes that there is coherence and strong internal
solidarity among social organizations and thus would perform as an effective
communication channel for members to the state, but neither existed in his study of
7. Jonathan Unger and Anita Chan, ‘China, corporatism, and the East Asian model’, The Australian Journal of
Chinese Affairs 33, (1995), p. 37.
8. Alan Cawson, Organised Interests and the State: Studies in Meso-Corporatism (Bristol: Sage, 1985), p. 8.
9. See for example, The-chang Lin, ‘Environmental NGOs and the anti-dam movements: a social movement
with Chinese characteristics’, Issues and Studies 43(4), (2007), pp. 149–184; and Yongnian Zheng, ‘China in 2011:
anger, political consciousness, anxiety, and uncertainty’, Asian Survey 52(1), (2011), pp. 28–41.
10. Bruce Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese politics: kicking society back out’, Journal of Contemporary China 20
(70), (2011), p. 525.
11. Ibid., p. 532.
12. William Hurst, ‘The city as the focus: the analysis of contemporary Chinese urban politics’, China
Information 20(30), (2007), p. 467.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
518
business associations.13
Clearly, there is not disagreement with the call to examine
the nuances of state–society interactions as it is one of the primary goals of the
article, but Goodman articulates the benefits of a local state corporatist framework
because there is ‘strong evidence that social and economic interests are equally
desirous of a state corporatism that accommodates their presence in politics’.14
These social and economic interests, as demonstrated in this article, are indeed
working closely with the local authorities, to the extent where co-optation is not
uncommon; for many NGOs co-optation is neither negative nor positive, but treated
as a matter of fact to ensure their presence remains in the local authorities’
consciousness.
Where Gilley, Hurst and Yep lament the failure of the local corporatist framework,
others have called for a more thorough investigation of the social stakeholders
involved in affecting state–society relations. Lin’s investigation into China’s antidam
movements, in particular the Three Gorges Dam and Nujiang movements,
confidently observes that ‘society’s ability to challenge the state has intensified’.15
In
a different realm, Read’s assessment of homeowners’ associations in China illustrates
that these localized actions of contention are one reason to give credence to the civil
society framework because civic participation gives people the opportunity and
experience to organize, resist and pressure the government.16
Contemporary state–
society relations are much more negotiated, with the local state seeking to co-opt
certain NGOs as a means of extending the institutional reach of the state within
society. Other authors have sought to explain changes to state–society relations by
analyzing the state as one of many actors, in the tradition of Migdal’s state-in-society
approach.17
Authors such as Fulda, Li and Song believe state-in-society captures the
conflict that often occurs between state agencies, thereby leading to changes.18
For
Alpermann, Migdal’s framework may best be utilized to comprehend the
fragmentation of the state: ‘The state itself is pulled into different directions, and
while parts of it form ties with one section of society, other state actors join forces
with different societal actors’.19
The state-in-society approach may emphasize
alterations to the state, and subsequently impact on society, but this would suggest the
Chinese state’s power is receding which is not the case.20
Despite the problems with
more socially-determined approaches, insofar as they do not adequately account for
the state, one aspect of an agreed congruence is the focus on the local level.
13. Ray Yep, ‘The limitation of corporatism for understanding reforming China: an empirical analysis in a rural
county’, Journal of Contemporary China 9(25), (2000), pp. 547–566.
14. David S. G. Goodman, ‘Foreword’, in J. Y. J. Hsu and R. Hasmath, eds, The Chinese Corporatist State:
Adaption, Survival and Resistance (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. xvi–xvii.
15. Lin, ‘Environmental NGOs and the anti-dam movements’, p. 178.
16. Benjamin L. Read, ‘Assessing variation in civil society organizations: China’s homeowners’ association in a
comparative perspective’, Comparative Political Studies 41(9), (2008), pp. 1240–1265.
17. Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
18. Andreas Fulda, Yanyan Li and Qinghua Song, ‘New strategies of civil society in China: a case study of the
network governance approach’, Journal of Contemporary China 21(76), (2012), pp. 675–693.
19. Bjorn Alpermann, ‘State and society in China’s environmental politics’, in J. J. Kassiola and S. Guo, eds,
China’s Environmental Crisis: Domestic and Global Political Impacts and Responses (New York: Palgrave, 2010),
p. 145.
20. Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese politics’.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
519
The need to account for local discourses of the Chinese state is made ever more
pertinent by China’s decentralization. Local states are given, and are expected to
make, a wide-range of decisions as well as take on responsibilities, including the
delivery of social welfare needs. Goodman notes that the discourse on localism is
now widely accepted in China, which is reflected not only in economic terms, but also
culturally; that is, local cultural identification.21
Case studies of the local state are
therefore critical to providing a more detailed perspective of their interactions with
societal actors and, consequently, changes to policy outputs at the local level.
At the local level, the literature that emerged on the local corporatist Chinese state
throughout the 1990s largely conceived the local corporatist state as an economic
actor, particularly in rural areas. Jean Oi’s extensive analysis of rural industrialization
firmly places the local state as a business corporation.22
Local officials are portrayed
as entrepreneurs fostering business opportunities, mobilizing resources and other
agencies within the local state to nurture selected business enterprises. Fiscal reforms
have provided incentives to local officials to actively promote local industry and
economic development of their region since they had residual claimant rights over the
profits of enterprise (although national regulations stipulated no more than 20% of
after-tax profits could be claimed by the local government).23
Similarly, Walder
conceives the local state as private firms driven by private interests.24
Within the
local corporatist state structure there is an intimate relationship between banks,
finance and tax offices, township and village authorities, whereby each would assist
the other to maximize revenues. While the local state may be actively involved in
promoting economic activity, Blecher and Shue have framed the local state within the
developmental state model, in which the local authorities lead the development
process by picking strategic ‘winners’ of certain industries to back.25
While the
pursuit of individual gain on the part of the local officials is inherent in all these
analyses, and there is a potential for local officials to be rent-seekers and predatory,
Duckett shows that the local state can be entrepreneurial and productive in facilitating
economic reform.26
Nonetheless, Unger, in his assessment of local business
associations, concludes that although these organizations may appear to be
corporatist on paper, the pursuit of their individual interests and agenda outside of the
national goal suggests that the variations of the local state are still important to
consider.27
21. David S. G. Goodman, ‘Structuring local identity: nation, province and county in Shanxi during the 1990s’,
The China Quarterly 172, (2002), pp. 837–862.
22. Jean Oi, ‘Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China’, World Politics
45(1), (1992), pp. 99–126; and Jean Oi, ‘The role of the local state in China’s transitional economy’, The China
Quarterly 144, (1995), pp. 1132–1149.
23. Oi, ‘Fiscal reform and the economic foundations of local state corporatism in China’, p. 111.
24. Andrew Walder, ‘The county government as an industrial corporation’, in A. Walder, ed., Zouping in
Transition: The Process of Reform in Rural North China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998),
pp. 62–85.
25. Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue, ‘Into leather: state-led development and the private sector in Xinji’,
The China Quarterly 166, (2001), pp. 368–393.
26. Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in Reform Era
Tianjin (London: Routledge, 1998).
27. Jonathan Unger, ‘Bridges: private business, the Chinese government and the rise of new associations’,
The China Quarterly 147, (1996), pp. 795–819.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
520
The variation in local states is an understudied concept, but Remick has embraced
the idea, providing a suitable springboard to analyze the differences between the local
state in Shanghai and its engagement with NGOs.28
In understanding the variations of
the local state, the subtleties of state–society relations are brought to the fore. Remick
writes: ‘Local state structure is defined as the organization of local government, and
local state practice is defined as the way local governments implement central policy
and make and implement their own policy in the absence of higher-level guidance’.29
In an article looking at migrant NGOs, Hsu concludes that there is analytical merit
and reward in studying the local state: ‘Analysing the different layers of the urban
state in their interactions with migrant NGOs has unveiled different informal
strategies adopted by the local state to ensure its own relevance within a rapidly
changing social environment’.30
As the intermediaries between the central state and
the local population, local states are vital to the effectiveness and successful
implementation of the central state’s policies.
Thus, by privileging the local state in the analysis of the state–society relationship
one can uncover the different factors that shape the development of NGOs, and why
some NGOs are more effective than others. Of course, the question that will be
inevitably posed at this juncture is: where is the CCP in the analysis of state–society
relations? Granted, the CCP is still apposite in central level policies and the overall
direction of the nation, and discussion of the Party and ensuing ideology elicits barely
a whisper, particularly in the interviews with NGO representatives for this study:
‘While the CCP is much in evidence when matters of PRC policy or strategic
direction are being discussed centrally or provincially, in the examination of case
studies in specific localities the CCP often has either no or only a shadowy
existence’.31
Given the importance of the local state—and the central state in terms of policy
measures governing NGOs—how do we best theorize state–NGO interactions in the
context of China? One can reasonably suggest that the process of economic
liberalization has modified the tools which the state has adopted to manage the
economy and society, moving from an over-reliance on tools of coercion and
propaganda, to the current strategy of developing stronger ties with social
organizations to enable the state to organize societal interests along the lines of
reform. Using the corporatist framework as defined by Cawson, and Unger and Chan,
and incorporating Schmitter’s oft-quoted definition,32
it is necessary to develop a
more flexible application of corporatism to analyze state–NGO interactions in China.
28. Elizabeth Remick, ‘The significance of variation in local states: the case of twentieth century China’,
Comparative Politics 34(4), (2002), pp. 399–418.
29. Ibid., p. 399.
30. Jennifer Hsu, ‘Layers of the urban state: migrant organisations and the Chinese state’, Urban Studies 49(16),
(2012), p. 3527.
31. David S. G. Goodman, ‘Sixty years of the People’s Republic: local perspectives on the evolution of the state in
China’, The Pacific Review 22(4), (2009), p. 443.
32. Philippe Schmitter’s [‘Still the century of corporatism?’, The Review of Politics 36(1), (1974), pp. 93–94]
definition of corporatism: ‘Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest representation in which the constituent
units are organized into a limited number of singular, compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically ordered and
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a deliberate
representational monopoly within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on their
selection of leaders and articulation of demands and supports’.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
521
The Chinese state has moved away from the tactics of days past to compel
individuals and organizations. The former strategy of coercion and propaganda falls
under the guise of overt sanctioning; that is, the state uses overt measures to manage
social organizations. In present day China, both central and local states are more
adept at managing interests that may potentially be detrimental to the state. Hence,
from this behavior, corporatist measures are taking form. Thus, underlying the
corporatist institutional framework is a distinct tacit sanctioning behavior. Tacit
sanctioning behavior is delineated as follows: (1) the state creates and maintains the
relationship; (2) select organizations and groups are granted the privilege to mediate
interests on behalf of their constituents to the state; and (3) these organizations and
groups must adhere to the rules and regulations established by the state. In other
words, the groups and organizations within the corporatist relationship are considered
as a substitute control mechanism for the state. The three types of behavior are
reminiscent of the government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) and the mass
organizations that are regarded as the social arm of the Party-state; for example,
the All-China Women’s Federation or the Communist Youth League, where the state
has actively created these organizations to ensure a bridge between state and society.
The created organizations are to represent the interests of their constituents while at
the same time being given the privilege to bring these concerns to the state. These
organizations must also abide by the rules set forth by the state. Tacit sanctioning in
the context of state–NGO relations is, therefore, useful to understand how the local
state has modified corporatist mechanisms vis-a`-vis social responsibilities and the
increasing activism of NGOs. The idea of tacit sanctioning suggests that the
interactions between the local state and an NGO is conditioned upon an implicit
understanding between the two stakeholders. Nonetheless, as the following sections
will demonstrate, the implicit agreement is subject to the NGO’s active attempts at
engaging with the local state. The local state tempers the NGO’s proactiveness by
adopting tacit sanctioning.
Developing the Chinese NGO sector
In spite of the increasing quantity and diversity of the NGO sector, the reach of the
government has extended to the formation and supervision of NGOs through the
Ministry of Civil Affairs (MCA). The MCA is responsible for the registration and
management of NGOs and is given the authority to issue warnings, orders and cancel
or change an organization’s status.33
As a result of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown,
numerous official documents have emerged detailing the management of NGOs.
Prior to 1989, there was no universal regulatory framework to manage NGOs.
Immediately after the Tiananmen events, the State Council issued the Regulations on
the Registration of Social Organizations in October 1989. This required all social
organizations henceforth to find a willing department or leading unit to sponsor the
organization.
Not surprisingly, finding a sponsoring government department is difficult and
prevents many organizations from completing the registration step. There are
33. In addition, NGOs registered with the MCA must provide annual financial reports to the Ministry.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
522
minimal incentives for government departments to take on the extra administrative
work required to sponsor an NGO—with the greatest disincentive being the threat of
liability in the event that the NGO becomes troublesome for the state’s objectives.
Without a MCA registration, organizations are in effect illegal, with their operations
liable to foreclosure at any juncture. The dual registration system with the MCA and a
sponsoring agency is not only burdensome for those wanting to register; additionally,
as all decisions are required to be approved by the sponsoring agency, this
administrative step erodes the autonomy of the organization. Thus, many
organizations avoid the lengthy bureaucratic process by registering as a for-profit
commercial or business entity with the Bureau of Industry and Commerce. Despite
their official status, many NGOs, including the ones interviewed with this status,
operate and present themselves as NGOs. The underdeveloped legal system, where
loopholes and lack of regulatory enforcement exist, unfavorably affects the
development of NGOs. In an attempt to create a balance between maintaining control
through policies and the law, and wishing to harness the comparative advantages of
social organizations, the central state reasserts its corporatist tendency.
In 1996, former leader Jiang Zeming convened a special session of the Standing
Committee of the CCP Political Bureau to further strengthen the management of
NGOs. The inaugural session dedicated to the discussion of NGO policy signified the
importance of NGOs within the state’s framework, and perhaps a tacit recognition of
the pluralization of Chinese society. As a result of the session, the central state issued
further policy documents to ensure better supervision of NGOs. The 1998
Regulations on the Administration of Social Organizations sought to redefine social
organizations as non-profit, with Chinese citizens voluntarily participating, and the
establishment of common goals.34
While this unification and clarification process
may appear to be a positive movement on the part of the Chinese government, in
practice it created difficulties for NGOs to become a legal entity due to financial and
membership requirements. National associations must have a minimum capital of
100,000 yuan (,US$15,837)35
and local organizations 30,000 yuan (,US$4,751).
Thus, the 1998 Regulations have created further obstacles for NGOs to register.
Finally, the 2004 Regulations on the Administration of Foundations recognized
that organizations could be formed through private initiatives, but still undertake
tasks that were once considered public. Draft versions of the Regulations were made
public and the government solicited the comments of Chinese legal practitioners,
academics and those working with NGOs. Proposals were put forth to eliminate the
requirement of a sponsor agency. However, in the final version the removal of this
requirement was itself removed. To further limit their scope, NGOs cannot officially
establish regional or branch offices. In effect, such government policies will curb the
possibility for many organizations of scaling up their services.36
Additionally, only
one type of each organization may be established in any given region. The excessive
regulatory nature toward NGOs contributes, on the one hand, to maintaining social
34. Simon, ‘Reform of China’s laws for NPOs’.
35. Approximate exchange rate US$1 ¼ 6.3 yuan.
36. Reza Hasmath and Jennifer Hsu, ‘NGOs in China and issues of accountability’, Asia Pacific Journal of Public
Administration 30(1), (2008), pp. 1–11.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
523
stability by keeping out those that the government perceives as a threat; and on the
other hand, it serves to keep the NGO sector weak and relatively small. Despite the
limitations placed on NGOs and their development, recent regulations and pilot
projects denote that there is indeed a slow shift towards utilizing the NGO sector to a
greater extent. For example, the MCA in conjunction with the Shenzhen government
in July 2009 adopted the Cooperative Agreement on Advancing Overall Reforms to
Civil Affairs Undertakings, outlining reforms in 34 areas relating to civil affairs. A
notable reform in the Agreement relates to the registration of NGOs:
Unless other regulations specify otherwise, [the parties will] explore establishing a
system whereby civil society organizations [can] apply and register directly with the
Ministry of Civil Affairs. The Ministry of Civil Affairs shall regard this as a point for
observation, tracking, and research (Item 11).37
This particular item is a noteworthy change from the established norm of NGOs
needing to acquire the support of a sponsoring government unit, as organizations can
directly apply to the MCA for registration, thus permitting NGOs greater space and
autonomy in their development. This reinforces Hildebrandt’s findings that
organization leaders believe that registration increases independence.38
The
Agreement is indicative of the importance of local states in the growth and
expansion of the NGO sector. Furthermore, in November 2011, the director of
Guangdong Civil Affairs declared an easing of registration requirements for social
organizations by eliminating the need for a supervisory agency. Beginning 1 July
2012, cultural, environmental, social services and recreational organizations no
longer need a sponsoring agency, which previously included trade and business
associations. The Minister of Civil Affairs, Li Liguo, encouraged other provinces to
follow the lead of Guangdong.39
Guangdong’s approach has paved the way for other
provinces to experiment with NGO registration, including Yunnan.40
Despite the willingness of a few locales to experiment with NGO law reforms,
including Guangdong, NGO management laws are still very much in the corporatist
tradition. The state’s management system essentially directs the development of
NGOs; NGOs are to channel their efforts ‘into areas the state finds most acceptable,
such as business associations and research societies’.41
Directing where NGOs spend
their energies and resources is an indication of the tacit sanctioning behavior in play.
The state creates and maintains their relationships with the NGOs through
37. The English translation of the Agreement can be found at: http://www.cecc.gov/pages/virtualAcad/index.
phpd?showsingle¼135467. The full Chinese version is available at: http://www.sztx.org.cn/ass/detail.asp?id¼4164.
38. Timothy Hildebrandt, ‘The political economy of social organization registration in China’, The China
Quarterly 208, (2011), p. 976. Hildebrandt further points out that some organization leaders potentially fear that
‘more independence will create a rift between their organization and local governments; they believe independence
breeds antagonism, warranting more government scrutiny of registered groups, not less’.
39. ‘The Minister of Civil Affairs on NGO direct registration: promoting the Guangdong experience’, Xinhua,
(7 March 2012), available at: http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/newsview.php?id¼4784 (accessed 9 April
2012).
40. ‘Yunnan social organizations will be able to directly register this year’, China Development Brief,
(29 February 2012), available at: http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/newsview.php?id¼4754 (accessed 10
April 2012).
41. Christopher Heurlin, ‘Governing civil society: the political logic of NGO–state relations under dictatorship’,
Voluntas 21(2), (2010), p. 233.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
524
designating certain NGOs the privilege to mediate on behalf of their constituents. The
pilot projects in Guangdong indicate that while NGO law reforms are on the horizon,
the designation of certain organizations as being eligible to participate is still
reflective of corporatist measures. Thus, the reforms can be seen within a corporatist
framework, and as Heurlin further observes, new social actors from entrepreneurs to
NGOs must come under the supervision and management of the Chinese state.42
The
management of NGOs by the central state has not precluded the involvement of the
local state. As demonstrated in the next section, the interviews with NGOs in
Shanghai indicate that the local state across all levels has a substantial interest in the
work and operations of NGOs. While such involvement may not be codified in a
formalized framework, the local levels have ensured their own presence in this sector.
The utilization of tacit sanctioning strategies has enabled the local authorities a great
deal of flexibility to work with a growing and diversifying NGO sector.
Profile of NGOs interviewed in Shanghai
The eight NGOs interviewed in Shanghai work in an array of different areas ranging
from giving assistance to the homeless to providing education tuition for migrant
children. For the most part, there was meaningful interaction with the local state at the
municipal and district level.43
Moreover, save for CW, PI and RC, all NGOs
interviewed were formally registered.44
LHA
Two retired schoolteachers started LHA in 1993 due to their belief in a decline of
moral standards and education amongst Shanghai’s students. The aim of the
organization is to improve the educational environment for children and teach all
young people the values of community service and compassion. The organization
conducts a diverse range of activities including education consulting, training,
academic exchanges and publications for teachers and parents. In terms of working
with children, several well-established programs are in place. The LHA Weekend
School provides free tuition to disadvantaged students in the Luwan district where
volunteer teachers are recruited for this program. LHA is supported by Shanghai’s
authorities, including direct support from individual politicians in the city. Its close
connections with local authorities have enabled the NGO to register as a research
organization under Shanghai’s Municipal Education Committee.
RS
RS in Shanghai is part of the wider RS network across China and the world. RS are
dedicated to educating youth about environmental issues and humanitarian values. RS
42. Ibid.
43. Note, the NGOs interviewed reported no interaction with the central state.
44. Given the potential sensitivity of the subject matter, the final version of this article has anonymized the
organizations and individuals interviewed.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
525
Shanghai started its operations in China in 2000, with regional offices established in
Beijing, Shanghai and Sichuan. The organization was granted non-profit status by the
Shanghai municipal authorities in 2004. Each regional office is responsible for
launching and maintaining programs across schools and university groups within its
region of operation. The Shanghai operation has established many projects involving
students to gain greater appreciation of the environment. For example, RS Shanghai
has launched an Organic Gardens Program with nearly 50 schools involved in 2010.
RS Shanghai is cooperating with over 100 schools in the city, and has a range of
programs including environmental curriculum mentoring, tree planting, organic
gardening, sports education and recycling. The financing of its programs comes from
a mixture of donations, grants and monies collected from fundraising activities. In
2011, RS had an operating budget of 4 million yuan (,US$633,514), larger than the
other NGOs interviewed.
PI
Established in 1999, PI is a private initiative amongst a group of European expatriates
in Shanghai. It runs solely on a voluntary basis, with no paid staff members. The
primary activity of the organization is to collect donations from within the expatriate
community to help pay for the school fees of migrant children. This pursuit is
undertaken with the belief that ‘every child deserves a chance’.45
PI seeks to provide
uninterrupted funding for primary school education aged migrant children, where the
combined family income does not exceed 500 yuan (,US$79) per month.46
PI works
closely with migrant schools located in the Minhang and Putuo districts, and sponsors
over 200 students between the ages of four and eleven. Given the lack of human
resources, the selection process is a coordinated effort between the local Education
Bureau, school principals and the NGO. The local district bureau contacts the school
that PI has requested to work with, and the principal is then put into contact with the
organization. The principal provides PI with a list of disadvantaged students for
funding consideration. Partnership with the local education board in the relevant
districts has proved critical for PI to carry out its work within the confines of its
resources.
LQ
LQ was established in 2003 as the first organization in China to provide professional
social services and placements for social workers. The Pudong Social Development
Bureau’s 100,000 yuan (,US$15,837) contract enabled LQ to commence its social
work activities.47
One of its first projects involved the delivery of extra-curricular
activities and tuition to migrant children. The aim of these programs is to provide
youths with leadership skills, confidence and to build up their capacity. LQ’s
45. Personal communication, April 2007.
46. PI did not provide details of its yearly budget. However, with yearly tuition ranging from 1,200 to 1,800 yuan
and with 200 children sponsored, we can gauge that the NGO has approximately 250,000 yuan per annum.
47. ‘Shanghai dances with NGOs’, China Development Brief, (8 November 2006), available at: http://www.
chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/854 (accessed 20 June 2012).
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
526
volunteers are also a mix of university students and professionals. Since its
establishment, LQ has entered other fields of social work including nursing homes
and hospitals. LQ’s work and funding is dependent on its ability to win contracts from
the Pudong authorities to carry out services. This work model left LQ in a precarious
position in 2004 when the authorities had very few contracts to award and thus nearly
caused LQ to end its operations. Since 2004, it has regained momentum and continues
to bid for and win contracts, and deliver social services.
CW
Established in 2005, CW’s primary objective is to deliver tuition services and extracurricular
activities to migrant children. The NGO works with local migrant schools
in the Pudong district to deliver its services. The program is reliant on volunteers to
conduct the activities, including English, drama, life skills and writing. However,
without its partnership with the Pudong branch of the Communist Youth League
(CYL) much of its work would not be possible, according to the NGO
representative.48
CYL covers the operating costs. Moreover, partnership with the
CYL provides the migrant school with assurances of the NGO’s legitimacy and
trustworthiness. According to the representative, CW is not currently registered but
its cooperation with CYL has meant this requirement can be effectively side-stepped.
SL
In 2005, SL was established as a registered non-profit voluntary organization
dedicated to bringing libraries and books to China’s poverty-stricken regions. SL,
unlike many of its counterparts, is registered with Pudong’s Bureau of Civil Affairs.
As a recipient of the Pudong authorities’ Top Ten Organizations, and Top Ten
Projects, SL and its work is recognized by the local state. Its status has enabled the
NGO to conduct fundraising and has attracted substantial support from the business
community in Shanghai, raising approximately 10 million yuan (,US$1.58 million)
for its projects.49
SL’s operations are almost entirely reliant on volunteers who are
generally professionals and university students. For example, it has worked closely
with Fudan University Student Volunteer Association to produce and distribute a
handbook for newly arrived labor migrants from rural areas into Shanghai. SL has
established libraries in AIDS-affected villages in Anhui, Henan and Shanxi
provinces. It also provides scholarships to poor students from primary to university
level.
BY
BY is a registered NGO, operating as an online charity shop since 2011. The concept
behind BY is to essentially collect donated goods, sell goods online, and utilize the
48. Personal communication, March 2007.
49. Liangliang Gao and Pan Zheng, ‘Sunshine spreads love through libraries’, Minghang Times, (7 February
2009), available at: http://www.shanghaidaily.com/minhang/pdf/0902.pdf (accessed 16 April 2012).
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
527
funds raised to finance social development work conducted by other NGOs. Over
90% of the goods collected and sold in 2011 were in the clothing category. In 2011,
BY had revenues in excess of 700,000 yuan (,US$110,865). BY is working closely
with the Shanghai branch of the International Federation of Persons with Physical
Disability, and has established a training center for handicapped workers who are
tasked with aiding in BY’s online operations. According to the NGO representative,
as most of the work is conducted online, there is limited interaction with the local
government.
RC
RC was founded in 2008 as an organization dedicated to servicing the homeless in
Shanghai. The organization provides free meals, limited medical assistance and basic
skills training to assist their job search. RC is in the process of obtaining NGO
registration, but is encountering difficulties. The difficulties of obtaining registration
have resulted in the decision to take a lower profile approach, and not to actively seek
partnership with local authorities. Moreover, since RC was established by a foreigner
it further complicates matters when it comes to their interaction with local authorities
according to RC’s representative.50
Nonetheless, the NGO averages 50–60 guests
each Thursday, when it is open to all guests. Those accessing the services of RC are
largely young male migrants. Its operating budget was approximately 350,000 yuan
(,US$55,432) for 2011, and is actively courting support from the private sector.
Local state–NGO interactions in Shanghai
Municipal level
The two most established NGOs interviewed, LHA and RS, have translated their
engagement with the municipal authorities into substantial independence to conduct
their work. LHA and RS both have strong connections with the Shanghai municipal
departments. LHA is registered with the Shanghai Municipal Education Committee, a
significant benefit for the NGO in terms of space and autonomy to conduct is
programs. LHA proudly promotes its close relationship with the Shanghai municipal
authorities. Support from departments and individual politicians has, to an extent,
enabled its extensive work. It is registered as a research organization under
Shanghai’s Municipal Education Committee. The interviewee noted that her bosses
were ‘part of the establishment’, denoting significant benefits from such close liaison.
Although the authorities have granted LHA the right to work in the area of education,
‘being well connected’ also helps according to the interviewee, and this clearly is the
case when two members of the Shanghai People’s Congress are among its
supporters.51
Its position and support from prolific members of the Congress indicates
that registration status is a definite advantage. Such close personal connections with
members of the Congress have given the NGO its legitimacy. Moreover, the
50. Personal communication, January 2012.
51. Personal communication, March 2007.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
528
interviewee noted that the municipal authorities ‘like what they do’ and this ensures
that the NGO is able to translate the support into financial resources through
corporate sponsorship and donations. Endorsement from individual politicians and
registration with the Education Bureau suggests that Shanghai’s municipal authority
has implicitly acknowledged the work of LHA. Furthermore, this tacit sanctioning has
snowballed, whereby NGOs working in the realm of education are permitted to
conduct their work and receive potential support from local authorities. This is
likewise evident with organizations such as RS (working in environmental
education), CW and PI (migrant children’s education). LHA’s close relationship
with the municipal authorities demonstrates that such public support of the NGO
guarantees that the interests of the local state, whether it is addressing the social
welfare needs of the community or safeguarding socio-political stability, will not be
jeopardized by LHA since it has already been brought into the fold by the local state.
RS is similarly well supported and acknowledged by the Shanghai municipal
authorities. During the interview, TZ proudly noted that its organization was one of
the few to register as a non-profit organization.52
The NGO further states this
achievement on the organization’s website by incorporating it into the goals of the
NGO: ‘To maintain official government recognition and legal registration in China’.
This has led to Shanghai’s municipal officials wanting to learn from RS, to find new
and innovative ways to address some of the city’s social problems. When questioned
over whether their relationship with the local authorities had met any obstacles, the
interviewee expressed surprise and reaffirmed that the Shanghai municipal
authorities view the NGO as an innovator.53
In a follow-up interview in December
2011, the interviewee again mentioned the good relationship between the NGO and
the municipal authorities: ‘They [municipal authorities] mainly provide advice and
information, as well as help with public dissemination of information’. Again, the
interviewee observed that the good reputation of the NGO will be beneficial should
there ever be direct collaborative partnerships between RS and local authorities: ‘Our
success so far has brought about a good reputation, and there are many opportunities
for collaboration’.54
Similar to LHA, RS has successfully courted the support of the
municipal authorities and has converted this into corporate sponsorships and
donations from the likes of BHP Billiton (a global mining company) to local
Shanghai businesses.
Registration status and support from specific institutions—as is the case with LHA
and RS in Shanghai—have opened doors in terms of garnering financial support from
corporate sponsors along with backing from local ones. By granting the registration
to these two NGOs, the municipal authorities implicitly demonstrate an acceptance
for organizations that are seen as both innovators in their sector, and working to
promote the role of education as a means of influencing the morals and values of
Shanghai’s youth. Part of tacit sanctioning, as previously established, is the need to
have groups adhere to the rules and regulations as established by the state. Adherence
is clearly not an issue, especially when NGOs such as RS have sought to incorporate
52. Personal communication, March 2007.
53. Personal communication, March 2007.
54. Personal communication, December 2011.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
529
this into the organization’s goals. At the municipal level, the local state does not
necessarily conform to a traditional form of corporatism, rather it is through tacit
understanding that such organizations will work within the sanctioned parameters;
moreover, registration status essentially guarantees the local state safety in the
knowledge that the NGOs will not become troublesome.
Both LHA and RS demonstrate that the local state’s strategies for incorporating
organizations into its fold and maintaining permissible boundaries in which NGOs
operate are a lot more subtle than either Gilley55
or Hurst56
give credit to. There are
competing visions of how social service should be delivered, as is evident given the
municipal authorities have turned to NGOs like RS to look for innovative models to
deliver environmental education and other types of services. Neither LHA nor RS
would fit what Hurst calls ‘government fists in civilian gloves’57
and nor are these
NGOs working to undermine the interests of the local state. The interviewee from RS
observed that the organizational culture and values of the NGO are very different to
those of the local authorities, as its approach and priorities both differ.58
Thus, the
current case indicates that not only does the local state continue its corporatist
strategies, but it has adapted measures to engage more effectively with NGOs—
hence, tacit sanctioning rather than overt.
District level
The majority of NGOs interact at the district level. It is at the district level where we
see diversity in terms of the relationships with the district authorities and the work
conducted by NGOs. Cooperation of district authorities is particularly important for
the NGOs interviewed since the majority of their work is at this level. At the district
level, engagement with NGOs has reaped fruitful rewards for both NGOs and the
authorities. Further, the observable interactions between local authorities and NGOs
are innovative and thus support earlier assertions of adapting corporatist measures for
the present day.
PI has worked closely with the education authorities of the Minhang and Putuo
districts. PI relies on the authorities to select their partner schools due to the
organization’s lack of resources. On the one hand, such actions are certainly
corporatist on the part of the local state, that is, PI’s lack of human resources reinforces
the dominance of the local authorities. On the other hand, the NGO welcomes it since
it does not have the resources to conduct the background research to select the schools
and students for its scholarships. Although PI is voluntarily entrusting part of its work
to the local state, such action erodes the decision-making powers of the NGO, leading
to greater local state control and coordination. The outcome of such actions entails the
possibility of the local state further infringing on the space for NGOs, and creating
greater barriers for the participation of NGOs in the future.
LQ and CW did not initiate their educational programs with migrant children, rather
it is the district authorities that have approached the two NGOs to collaborate. Indeed,
55. Gilley, ‘Paradigms of Chinese politics’.
56. Hurst, ‘The city as the focus’.
57. Ibid., p. 467.
58. Personal communication, December 2011.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
530
such proactive measures are a sign of the ‘progressiveness’ of Shanghai’s local state
authorities, and demonstrate their willingness to address social concerns. Certainly,
local state authorities should be commended for their efforts, especially when NGOs
are calling on the state to take on greater responsibility to deliver social services to the
community. Nevertheless, the active local state is defining the boundaries for these two
NGOs. Here, it is clear that at the district level, measures taken by these authorities are
corporatist: the state selects the NGO to support and in turn the plight of migrant
children and their education is deemed as paramount. Subsequently, organizations that
work within these parameters are given leeway because the local state has deemed the
issue to be of import. Without the support of the local authorities, LQ would not have
the opportunity to expand its operations beyond migrant children.59
However, support
from the local state is a double-edged sword. LQ’s dependence on government
contracts for work in 2004 meant that a reduction in available contracts affected the
NGO’s ability to meet operating costs,60
and almost led to the closure of the NGO.
However, the NGO continues its operations today and continues to bid for government
contracts. Its dependence on government contracts has not changed: ‘Yes, we have
worked with the local authorities, specifically on programmes that the governments
wants to carry out . . . our organization will bid for providing these services’.61
The
case of LQ reaffirms that support from the state can indeed be detrimental, where it
creates problems of dependency. The local state has certainly gained from its
collaboration with LQ. Not only is the NGO adhering to the rules and regulations of the
state and is unlikely to become problematic, but the state has also made forays into the
realm of social delivery through working closely with NGOs.
Both LQ and CW are at the behest of the local state authorities. However, CW’s
representative expressed appreciation and admiration for the Pudong branch of the
Communist Youth League for taking such a step to support the NGO. The interviewee
was quite convinced that without CYL, CW would have encountered great difficulties
partnering with a local migrant school, as the schoolwould have been ‘uncertain’ about
the NGO and its background.62
In essence, support from the CYL has given CW
legitimacy and indicates to the school its trustworthiness. CYL’s partnership
essentially allows the school to collaborate with CW without any elements of risk and
uncertainty. Through these two NGOs, we see the local state authorities demarcating
the boundaries of NGOs’ work, and thus reaffirm the appropriateness of a local state
corporatist framework.Furthermore,sucha framework helpsusto situate whereNGOs
and their work are located in the political consciousness of the local state. LQ, CW and
PI have not objected to their incorporation by the district authorities perhaps because
‘state corporatism [that] accommodates their presence in politics’.63
For SL it must contend with the uncertainty of the local authorities’ position with
regards to their work. District level authorities can alter their collaboration, in effect
withdraw their tacit sanctioning for NGOs without warning or reason, and thus
59. Personal communication, March 2007.
60. ‘Answering social needs’, Shanghai Star, (26 February 2004), available at: http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/s
tar/2004/0226//fo5-1.html (accessed 2 March 2012).
61. Personal communication, December 2011.
62. Personal communication, March 2007.
63. Goodman, ‘Foreword’.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
531
negatively affect NGOs and their work. SL’s distribution of their manual for migrant
workers illustrates the local states’ oscillating stance. The first round of distribution
of the manual occurred at Shanghai railway station prior to the Spring Festival of
2007. However, subsequent distribution requests were denied by the Public Security
Bureau due to security issues. Despite such setbacks, SL was awarded a Top Ten Best
Organizations by the Pudong authorities, perhaps suggesting that methods of
inclusion and co-optation would avoid dissent. SL’s experience suggests that the state
is in control and that the boundaries of acceptability shift when in the favor of the
local authorities. This constant shifting causes confusion for NGOs as they negotiate
the terrains of the state–society relationship.
Unlike their counterparts, BY and RC have not actively sought out support from the
local authorities for their work. BY has obtained registration status—as a non-profit
social enterprise—but has not sought to engage in activities like its counterparts, e.g.
seeking collaborative opportunities with the local authorities. The dedication to
servicing their online activities—collecting goods, assessing inventory and selling
goods—has rendered a program partnership with the local authorities impractical at
this juncture.64
BY’s representative suggested that cooperation with government
partners ‘must be built on the basis of transparency, equality, and mutual respect for
each other’s values’.65
BY’s belief in transparency has sought to publish its budget
and expenditures on its website. As a model for NGOs, BY is unique. The majority of
its operations are conducted via the Internet, whereas other NGOs have a physical
location to conduct their activities and serve their constituents. This new type of
NGO, relying on the Internet and social media to raise awareness of social issues and
money, may perhaps be the start of a new trend.66
As Hsu and Jiang further note, this
second generation of NGOs where government relations are of less importance or
desired and utilizing the Internet for day-to-day operations, will connect with
younger Chinese. However, as they observe in their paper, those NGOs with the
traditional linkages and interactions with the Chinese state (at both central and local
levels) still have the greatest impact and resources.
In contrast to its counterparts, RC has purposefully avoided interacting or
collaborating with local authorities. The representative from RC noted that the
foreign status of the founder may complicate matters, so at present, keeping a low
profile was the best course of action.67
Despite its intentions of avoiding the local
state, its operations have drawn the attention of local authorities. Officially, the RC
was forced to relocate due to complaints from neighbors. In its present location (on
the banks of the Suzhou River), ‘the local police and neighbors are quite
accommodating’. The complaints and relocation suggest that the NGO may have
little choice in the future but to start engaging with the local authorities, particularly
as it has started to receive some press attention in the local media.68
64. Personal communication, December 2011.
65. Ibid.
66. Carolyn Hsu and Yuzhou Jiang, ‘Chinese NGOs and resource strategies: state alliances and internet
innovations’, paper presented at the Association of Asian Studies, Toronto, 15–18 March 2012.
67. Personal communication, December 2011.
68. For example, Cao Li, ‘Govt urged to help NGO to help homeless’, China Daily, (13 October 2009), available
at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-10/13/content_8785640.htm (accessed 21 June 2012).
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
532
The case of BY and RC suggests that a new generation of NGOs is emerging, shifting
operations,communicationand/orraisingawarenessviathe Internet,but goingbeyond
having just a webpage. Social media such as Twitter or the Chinese version Weibo,
blogging and other forms electronic communication are harnessed by newly emerging
groups.Regarding interactionswiththe localstate,thesecondgeneration ofNGOsHsu
and Jiang notes, are not proactive in their search for collaborative opportunities with
the local state.69
However, these NGOs will inevitably be drawn into the centrifuge
since the local state authorities have shown that they are proactive in seeking out
partnerships with local NGOs and solutions to a range of social problems. Given that
both BY and RC are demonstrating innovation in their work—BY in terms of finding
new ways of raising funds and RC with the issue they are focused on—they will no
doubt come into the orbit of the local state in Shanghai as they seek new methods for
social service delivery. Our study thus shows that the corporatist framework does not
overstate the significance of social organizations as Yep suggests,70
but rather it
demonstrates the dynamic relationship between state and NGOs and the different
forms of engagement. Consequently, the corporatist framework will continue to be
appropriate in assessing state–NGO interactions at the local level, particularly when
the local state in Shanghai has already demonstrated its willingness to find alternate
ways of addressing social problems and simultaneously inserting its presence into the
work of NGOs (for example, PI and CW).
The experiences of NGOs in Shanghai with respect to district level authorities
illustrate that district authorities have a sizable impact on the work and environs of
NGOs, though this power may not be codified. Collaborations with NGOs are subject
to the whim of local state authorities. Notwithstanding, it suggests that NGOs must
ensure some level of support from the district level to ensure the continuation of their
projects. The district authorities of Shanghai have reinforced their presence and
importance in the NGO sector through determining acceptable boundaries of
cooperation and tacit sanctioning behavior. In sum, district authorities through their
(dis)approval are setting the agenda for NGOs.
Conclusion
The article has suggested that the local state does significantly impact the work and
success of NGOs’ activities. This is observed in cases where there is evidence of the
state instigating the co-optation of NGOs such as LQ, and in cases where
NGOs actively seek to be closer to the local state such as LHA. The normative
assumption is that closeness with the state may lead to the detriment of the NGO, and
potentially lead to the loss of independence.71
However, this does not suggest that the
state and NGOs cannot be complementary.72
It is clear that the majority of the NGOs
presented are desirous to be closer to the state. Whether they see themselves as
complementing the work of the local state in Shanghai or not is not the primary
69. Hsu and Jiang, ‘Chinese NGOs and resource strategies’.
70. Yep, ‘The limitations of corporatism for understanding reforming China’.
71. Michael Edwards and David Hulme, ‘Too close for comfort? The impact of official aid on nongovernmental
organizations’, World Development 24(6), (1996), pp. 961–973.
72. Iain Atack, ‘Four criteria of development NGO legitimacy’, World Development 27(5), (1999), pp. 855–864.
THE LOCAL CORPORATIST STATE AND NGO RELATIONS
533
concern. Rather, closeness is seen as one method to further advance their work and,
ultimately, determine the scale and success of their projects. Take LHA and RS for
instance, as the more successful of the NGOs interviewed. It is evident that their
success can be largely attributed to their interactions and support from the local state.
Furthermore, they have translated support into financial resources and private sector
support for their work. The eight NGOs interviewed over the two time points that
stretch over four years, confirm that the local state in Shanghai has adapted
corporatist measures for more effective outcomes in their interactions with NGOs.
These adaptations have moved away from overt forms of co-optation to more subtle
or tacit strategies, whereby it is through repeated interactions and long-term
relationships that NGOs gain a sense and understanding of the boundaries. The case
of SL in its attempt to distribute their manuals to migrants reinforces the idea that the
local state manages NGOs through tacit sanctioning, where NGOs are given the
opportunity to mediate on behalf of their constituents but only within the boundaries
established by the state. And, these boundaries are known through repeated
interactions between the two stakeholders. Clearly, with SL, communication and
interaction had been insufficient for the NGO to determine the parameters of
acceptability.
Given the central state’s preoccupation with regulating NGOs’ activities and
behavior, there is a possibility of perceiving that all levels of the state may fail to
understand NGOs’ work on the ground, and even worse, not effectively harness their
potential. A local corporatist state framework is therefore an appropriate mechanism
to interpret the state’s actions, and the ensuing state–society engagements. While we
may be tempted to focus solely on the various overt and tacit sanctions of state–NGO
interactions, there is, on the other hand, a relaxation at the same time. The relaxation
is particularly noticeable in the context of decentralization where it has permitted
greater involvement of the local state in social issues, leading to a diversification of
state–society relations. However, in an era of slower economic growth and rising
numbers of social problems, China’s future socio-economic development must be
carefully managed, especially when this is the source of state legitimacy: ‘Thus, the
need for effective corporatist strategies becomes ever more significant in order to
ensure the Party-state retains its legitimacy to rule’.73
In short, larger numbers of
government stakeholders involved in the resolution of social issues provide NGOs
with the potential to increase opportunities to collaborate and cooperate with the local
state. As the case of Shanghai suggests, the local state is emerging as an important
stakeholder in the future of the NGO sector.
73. Jennifer Y. J. Hsu and Reza Hasmath, ‘The Chinese corporatist state: lessons learned for other jurisdictions’,
in Hsu and Hasmath, eds, The Chinese Corporatist State, p. 140.
JENNIFER Y. J. HSU AND REZA HASMATH
534