ART AND OBJECTHOOD Essays and Reviews MICHAEL FRIED The University of Chicago Press .:c:J; Chicago and London � MICHAEL FRIED is the Herbert Boone Professor of Humanities at thejohns :Hopkins University. Cover photograph: Michael Fried in Anthony Caro's studio, Triangle Art Workshop, Pine Plains, New York,july 1986. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © tgg8 by Michael Fried All rights reserved. Published 1998 Printed in the United States of America o6 o504030201 oo gg g8 1 2 3 4 5 ISBN: o-226�26318-5 (cloth) ISBN: o-226-26319-3 (paper) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Fried, Michael. Art and objecthood : essays and reviews I Michael Fried. p. em. Mainly reprints of the art criticism written by the author between 1961 and 1977· Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN o-226-26318-5 (cloth : alk. paper).-ISBN o-226-26319-3 (pbk. ' alk. papec) 1. Art, Modern-2oth century. 2. Art. I. Title. N64go.F727 1998 709'.04.-dc21 @The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirement.<:> of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39·48-1992. To Anna He could not persuade himself that, if he wrote round about his subject with facility or treated it from any standpoint of impression, good would come of it. On the other hand he was persuaded that no-one served the generation into which he had been born so well as he who offered it, whether in his art or in his life, the gift of certitude. -JamesJoyce, Stephen Hero Contents List of Illustrations xi Preface andAcknowledgments XV An Introduction to MyArtCriticism 1 PART ONE: 1966-77 Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons (1966) 77 Morris Louis (1966-67) 1oo Jules Olitski (1966-67) 132 Art and Objecthood (1967) 148 New Work byAnthonyCaro (1967) 173 Ronald Davis: Surface and Illusion (1967) 176 Two Sculptures byAnthonyCaro (1968) 180 Recent Work by Kenneth Noland (1969) 185 Caro'sAbstractness (1970) 189 Problems of Polychromy: New Sculptures by Michael Bolus (1971) 193 Larry Poons's New Paintings (1972) 197 AnthonyCaro's Table Sculptures, 1966-77 (1977) 202 ix x I CoNTENTS PART TWO: 1965 Three AmericanPainters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski,Frank Stella (1965) 213 PART THREE: 1962-64 Anthony Caro (1963) 269 Frank Stella (1963) 277 New York Letter: Oldenbnrg,Chamberlain (October 25,1962) 279 New York Letter: Louis,Chamberlain and Stella,Indiana (November 25,1962) 281 New York Letter: Warhol (December 25,1962) 287 New York Letter: Johns (February 25,1963) 289 New York Letter: Hofmann (April 25,1963) 294 New York Letter: Noland,Thiebaud (May 25,1963) 297 New York Letter: Hofmann,Davis (December 5,1963) 304 New York Letter: Kelly,Poons (December-January 1963-64) 308 New York Letter: Judd (February 15,1964) 312 New York Letter: De Kooning Drawings (April 25,1964) 314 New York Letter: Olitski,Jenkins,Thiebaud, Twombly (May 1964) 316 New York Letter: Brach,Chamberlain,Irwin (Summer 1964) 324 Writings by Michael Fried,1959-77,Exclusive ofPoetry 327 Index of Names in "An Introduction to My Art Criticism" 331 Illustrations FRONTISPIECE Frank Stella, Portrait ofMichaelFried Standing on His HeadFarabove Cayuga's Waters, I959 BLACK-AND-WHITE FIGURES I-3 1 (followingpage 74 ) I. Jackson Pollock, Number1, 1948, I948. 2. Jackson Pollock, White Cockatoo: Number 24 A, 1948, 1 948. 3· Jackson Pollock, The Wooden Horse: Number Io A, 1948, I948. 4· Jackson Pollock, Cut-Out, ca. 1 948-50. 5· Jackson Pollock, Autumn Rhythm: Number30, 1950, 1 950. 6. Jackson Pollock, Number3, 1951, 1 951. 7· Barnett Newman, Cathedra, 1 951 . 8. Helen Frankenthaler, Mountains and Sea, 1952. g. Morris Louis, Trellis, 1 953· 1o. Morris Louis, Intrigue, 1 954 1 1 . Morris Louis, Floral, 1 959. 1 2. Morris Louis, Aleph, 1 g6o. 1 3. Kenneth Noland, YellowHalf, 1 963. 14· Kenneth Noland, Hover; 1 963. 15. Kenneth Noland, Karma, 1 964. 16. Kenneth Noland, Thaw, rg66. 1 7. Kenneth Noland, Via Token, 1 g6g. xi xii I ILLUSTRATIONS 18. Jules Olitski, Cleopatra Flesh, 1 962. 19. Jules Olitski, FatalPlungeLady, 1 963. 20. Jules Olitski, Tin Lizzie Green, 1 964- 2 1 . Jules O!itski, Bunga45, 1 967. 22. Frank Stella, DieFahneHock, 1 959. 23. Frank Stella, Union Pacific, 1 960. 24. Frank Stella, Cipango, 1 962. 25. Frank Stella, Sharpeville, 1 962. 26. Frank Stella, Iwana Sonnabend, 1 963. 27. Frank Stella, Moultonb!ffo III, 1 966. 28. Frank Stella, Chocorua III, 1 966. 29. Frank Stella, Conway III, 1 966. 30. Frank Stella, Union III, 1 966. 31. Frank Stella, Effingham III, 1 966. BLACK-AND-WHITE FIGURES 32-72 (followingpage 184 ) 32. Anthony Caro, Midday, 1 g6o. 33· Anthony Caro, Midday, 1 960. 34- Anthony Caro, Sculpture Seven, 1 96 1 . 35· Anthony Caro, 1ztan, 1 964. 36. Anthony Caro, Bennington, 1 964. 37· Anthony Caro, Yellow Swing, 1 965. 38. Anthony Caro, Horizon, 1 966. 39· Anthony Caro, RedSplash, 1 966. 40. Anthony Caro, Carriage, 1 966. 4 1 . Anthony Caro, Span, 1 966. 42. Anthony Caro, Deep Body Blue, 1 966. 43· Anthony Caro, Prairie, 1 967. 44· Anthony Caro, Trefoil, 1 968. 45· Anthony Caro, Orangerie, 1 969. 46. Anthony Caro, Deep North, 1 969-70. 47· Anthony Caro, SunFeast, 1 969-70. 48. Anthony Caro, WendingBack, 1 969-70. 49· Anthony Caro, Tab&Piece VIII, 1 966. 50. Anthony Caro, Tab&Piece XXII, 1 966. 5 1 . Anthony Caro, Tab&PieceXLJX, 1 968. 52. Anthony Caro, Table PieceLIX, 1 968. 53· Anthony Caro, TablePieceLXIV(The Clock), 1 968. 54· Anthony Caro, TablePieceXCVII, 1 969-70. ILLUSTRATIONS i Xiii 55· Anthony Caro, 7CtblePiece CLXXXII, 1974- 56. Ron Davis, Six Ninths Blue, 1 g66. 57· Ron Davis, Two Ninths Grey, 1g66. 58. Michael Bolus, Untitled, 1971. 59· DonaldJudd, Untitled, 1 966. 6o. Robert Morris, Untitled (Ringwith Light), 1 965-66. 6 1 . Carl Andre, Lever, 1g66. 62. Carl Andre, two floor pieces. Front: 144 Magnesium Square, 1 g6g. Back: I44 Lead Square, 1g6g. 63. Tony Smith, Die, 1 962. 64- Tony Smith, TheBlack Box, 1 963-65. 65. Vasily Kandinsky, Paintingwith WhiteForm, 1913. 66. Vasily Kandinsky, Composition8, 1923. 67. John Chamberlain, Miss Lucy Pink, 1 962. 68. JasperJohns, Diver, 1962. 6g. Hans Hofmann, Memoria in Aeternum, 1962. 70. Ellsworth Kelly, Blue-on-Blue, 1963. 7 1 . Jacques-Louis David, The Oath ofthe Horatii, 1 785. 72. Jacques-Louis David, The Intervention oftheSabine Women, 1 799· COLOR PLATES 1-16 (followingpage 2 38) 1. Jackson Pollock, Out ofthe Web: Number 7, 1949, 1 949· 2. Morris Louis, Terranean, 1 958. 3· Morris Louis, Saraband, 1959. 4· Morris Louis, AlphaPi, 1g6o. 5· Morris Louis, Number 2-76, 1962. 6. Morris Louis, Hot Half, 1962. 7. Kenneth Noland, That, 1 958-59. 8. Kenneth Noland, GoldenDay, 1964g. Kenneth Noland, 17th Stage, 1964. 10. Jules Olitski, Hidden Combination, 1965. 1 1 . Jules Olitski, PrincePatutsky's Command, 1966. 12. Jules Olitski, End Run, 1967. 13. Anthony Caro, Midday, 1 g6o. 1 4. Anthony Caro, Prairie, 1 967. 1 5. Larry Poons, RailroadHorse, 1971. 16. Larry Poons, Ly, 1 97 1 . Preface and Acknowledgments THIS BOOK reprints much, though by no means all, of the art criticism I wrote between the fall of 1 961 and 1977, the date of a short catalog introduction for a traveling exhibition ofAnthony Caro's table sculptures. It is organized in three parts, arranged in reverse chronological order, but within each part the writings it comprises are presented in the order in which they were written. (In part 1 , which includes both longer and shorter texts, the longer ones come first and then the shorter ones.) This sounds more complicated than it is. What the reverse chronological arrangement means is that the reader comes across my best or most mature criticism first and so is not led to plow through inferior stuff before reaching it. Moreover, since I have always tended from essay to essay and book to book to advance my arguments in stages, summarizing what has gone before and sometimes recycling previous texts, such an ordering helps neutralize the repetitiveness that can result. In any case, o�ly when I thought of organizing a selection from my criticism in this way did I come to feel that it made sense as a book. The texts are reprinted as they first appeared or were republished early on, though I have feltfree to make small improvements of style and punctuation (while longing to make more sweeping changes) , to remove italics, to eliminate or simplify footnotes. Here and there I have added footnotes to supply missing references, to correct factual errors, or, in a few cases, to cite relevant passages from earlier essays of mine that I have chosen not to include in this book. I have also updated certain references, notably to essays by Clement Greenberg that are now conveniently available in volume 4 ofJohn O'Brian's edition of The Collected Essays and Criticism, entitled Modernism with a XV xvi I PREFACE AND ACKNOWLliDGMENTS Vengmnce, 1957-1969 (Chicago, 1 993) . On the other hand, in a few instances where there is a difference in phrasing between an essay as it is given in O'Brian's edition and as it earlier appeared in ajournal, anthology, or Greenberg's own one-volume selection from his art criticism, Artand Culture (New York, 1 96 1 ) , I have remained faithful to the earlier version on the grounds that it was the one I initially read and cited. (Other references I have updated are to texts by Stanley Cavell and Maurice Merleau-Ponty.) Also, in my writings of the 1 g6os the words "modernist" and "modernism" were sometimes spelled with a capital M and sometimes not; I have opted for the latter course throughout this book. However, in no instance have I modified views originally expressed or corrected theoretical or descriptive points that now seem to me mistaken. As for the contents of this book, I haven't hesitated to leave out reviews and essays that now strike me as hopelessly immature or otherwise not worth republishing. So, for example, I have omitted all my 1 961-62 monthly reviews from London, an essay on anticompositional aspects of the art of Anthony Caro and Kenneth Noland of 1 965, my contribution to a Brandeis symposium of 1 966, and the introduction to the catalog for Caro's 1 969 retrospective exhibition at the Hayward Gallery, and I have reprinted only parts oftwelve of the fourteen "New York Letters" I wrote for ArtInternationalin 1 962- 64. I have also dropped certain early essays that are superseded by later ones on the same artist; I have omitted several texts from the 1 98os and after that belong to a different time frame from that of the book as a whole; and I have kept illustrations to a minimum. On that score, Hnding photographs and transparencies for the illustrations in this book has been an ordeal, and in various instances I have had to resort to reproducing illustrations from earlier publications. The results are sometimes much inferior to what I would have wished. Worse, certain key works that I would have liked to reproduce in color turned out to be available for illustration only in black and white (that is, the work itself was unlocatable and no reliable trasparency could be found) . I wish I could say that I am satisfied with the bulk of the texts that have made it into this book. For the record, it seems to me I carne into my own as an art critic and theorist only in the fall of 1 966, with "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons" and with "The Achievement of Morris Louis," which roughly a year later I expanded to form the text of my book on Morris Louis (reprinted here). That PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS l xvii I then went on to write "Art and Objecthood" provides the rationale, as well as the title, for the volume as a whole. I'm grateful to the editors who printed my criticism, Hilton Kramer at Arts Magazine, James Fitzsimmons at ArtInternational, and Phil Leider at Artforum. Leider in particular was a treat to write for: his years at Artforum are legendary, and it was a privilege to be part of them. I'm also grateful to the president and fellows of Harvard College for permission to republish the introduction to ThreeAmerican Painters: KennethNoland,Jules Olitski, Frank Stella; to Harry N. Abrams, Inc., for permission to republish the text of my book Morris Louis, now out of the print; to Anthony Korner, publisher ofArtjorum, for permission to reprint essays that first appeared in it; to Catherine Lampert, director of the Whitechapel Gallery, for permission to reprint my introduction to the exhibition catalog Anthony Caro: Sculpture 1960-1963; and to Jack Cowart, Deputy Director and Chief Curator of the Corcoran Gallery of Art for permision to reprint my introduction to the exhibition catalog jules Olitski: Paintings 1963- 1967. I might never have written art criticism at all had I not met Frank Stella at Princeton; my debt to him and to the other artists discussed in these pages is unpayable. During the years I wrote the pieces in this book I discussed many of the ideas in them with Stanley Cavell,John Harbison, Rosemary Harbison, and Ruth Leys. More recently, Cavell, Leys, Frances Ferguson, Marc Gotlieb, Herbert L. Kessler, and Walter Benn Michaels read and commented helpfully on a penultimate draft of the introduction to this book. Lauren Freeman assisted in the preparation ofthe manuscript. Among those who were especially helpful to me in my search for illustrations are Ian Barker, Robert Brockhouse, Helen Harrison, Steven Harvey, Ann Jareckie, and Lauren Poster. My sincere thanks to all. The deepest, though also the most difficult, acknowledgment I have saved for last. No one familiar with the pieces gathered in this book will need to be told how indebted they are to the writings of the late Clement Greenberg, whom I am not alone in regarding as the foremost art critic of the twentieth century. As I explain in the introduction, I knew Greenberg personally and on more than a few occasions visited studios and warehouses to look at recent painting and sculpture with him, and forseveralyears I enjoyed not his friendship (the difference between our ages alone might have precluded that) but at least his qualified approval. Then for reasons I only partly understand, our relations gradually became impossible. But I would xviii ! PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS not have been the art critic I was, I would not have become the art historian I am, had it not been for the need to come to terms with his thought. * * * With joy I dedicate this book to my daughter, Anna Lei Ci Fried. An Introduction to My Art Criticism Each answer remains in force as an answer only as long as it is rooted in ques� tioning. -Martin Heidegger, "The Origin ofthe Worh ofATt"1 HERE ARE some things I do not do in this introduction. I do not update the pieces in this book by engaging with developments or issues that emerged after they were written. So, for example, I neither address the topic of postmodernism nor discuss conceptual art, performance art, or other such developments that lie beyond the scope of my criticism. On the same principle, I say nothing about the later work of the artists-Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella, Larry Poons, Anthony Caro-whose paintings and sculptures of the rg6os and 1 970s largely inspired my activity as a critic. Also, "Art and Objecthood" and my critical position generally have drawn a lot of fire over the years, butby and large I do not reply to my critics (in the body of the text, at any rate). Here and there I correct misrepresentations of my views, which of course is a reply of sorts. But I have read only some of the books and articles that take me on, and in any case I wouldn't want this introduction to come across as a reaffirmation of my convictions and rhetoric circa 1967. Although it hasn't been possible to avoid all selfjustification, that has been the ideal. A word about the timing of this book. It's not accidental that I've waited until now to bring out a selection of my art criticism. Early on it didn't occur to me to do so, and later, when it began to seem a good idea, I became involved in a long-term art-historical project, an 2 I AN lNTRODUC'l'ION TO MY ART CRITICISM attempt to develop an account of the evolution of a central tradition within French paintingfrom the first genre paintings ofJean-Baptiste Greuze in the mid-1 750s to the emergence of modernism in the art of Edouard Manet and the Impressionists in the r86os and 187os. The core issue for that tradition concerned the relation between painting and beholder, which is to say that it was a version of the issue I had invoked in "Art and Objecthood" when I accused Minimalist art ofbeing theatrical. At that point it made sense to hold offgathering my art criticism until I had completed the art-historical task I had set myself, which I have now done in three books: Absorption and Theatricality:PaintingandBeholderin theAgeofDiderot ( 1 980) , Gaurbet's Realism ( 1 990), and Manet's Modernism, or, The Face ofPainting in the r86os ( 1 996).2 This makes it possible to think of the present book both as a prologue to my art-historical trilogy and as a sequel to the historical problematic it analyzes. (When I wrote "Art and Objecthood" and related essays I was a Diderotian critic without knowing it.) The remarks that follow are in three parts. In part 1 I give a brief account of how I began writing art criticism and how and when the pieces in this book came to be written. In part 2 I try to clarify my aims in writing various texts as well as to gloss some basic themes and concerns at work in my criticism generally. Finally, in part 3 I make a few basic points about the relation of the art criticism gathered in this book to the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French painting that I went on to write. One more preliminary comment. Although the latest text reprinted here dates from 1 977, the chronological focus of this book is the 1 96os, in particular the years 1 963-67. I won't try to characterize those years other than to say that they were intense and eventful, but I want to suggest that the art mainly discussed in these pagesthe modernist abstract painting and sculpture of Morris Louis (who died in 1 962), Noland, Olitski, Stella, and Caro, as well as the Minimalist critique ofthat art in the interests ofol:!jecthood and theaterwas fully as central to the period as any other cultural manifestation. In that sense this is yet another book about the 1 96os by an author who, then in his twenties, continues to bear their mark. 1. Some Autobiographical Background I FIRST became interested in wntmg art cnt1osm while an undergraduate at Princeton (class of 1 959) . In grade school AN INTRODUCTION TO Mv ART CRITICISM I 3 1 had painted in watercolors and oils, and at Forest Hills High School in New York City 1 had drawn cartoons for the school newspaper. Then my freshman year at college 1 met Frank Stella, who was one year ahead ofme, and through him some time later I met Darby Bannard, who graduated in 1956 but who continued to live in Princeton, where he worked in a framing shop and painted. Stella had begun painting seriously at Andover Academy, and by the time I met him in the fall of 1 955 he was committed to painting as his life's work. Princeton during those years had a modest program in the creative arts, and in the fall of 1 956 Stephen Greene, then thirtyeight, began a three-year stint as professor of painting. Greene at once recognizedStella's genius, and they became close. In myjunior year I too took Greene's course, but what mattered to me even more than the practical experience ofmaking abstract pictureswasmy participation, at first mainly as a listener, in conversations with Stella, Bannard, and Greene about recent painting in New York and about modern art generally. Greene was up-to-date on developments in New York and encouraged his students to make the one-hour train trip to Manl}attan to visit art galleries. Also, it was in the course of those conversations that I first heard of Clement Greenberg, who had not yet published Art and Culture and so could only be read in the library, in back issues of PartisanReviewor the Nation, apart from the occasional current piece. (Greenberg's eminence once Art and Culture appeared in 1 96 1 became so great that it's hard for latecomers to realize that that wasn't always the case.) Greenberg's verbally austere and intellectually rigorous yet passionately engaged criticism was at the farthest pole from the low-grade existentialist rhetoric and "poetic" appreciation that characterized most of the writing in Art News, the leading magazine of contemporary art of the mid- and late 1 950s, and it says a lot about what Stella, Bannard, and 1 already thought and felt about painting that Greenberg was the only art critic we valued and wanted to read. Throughout my years at Princeton I wrote poetry (1 majored in English), and by myjunior year 1 had formed the plan of also writing art criticism (at that time 1 had no definite academic ambitions). Some time during the spring of 1 958 I wrote a letter to Greenberg (Steve Greene probably gave me his address) expressing my admiration for his writing and asking whether 1 might come and get his advice about starting out as an art critic. Greenberg replied by postcard inviting me to call and set a time for a visit, whereupon I got cold feet and did nothing. A few weeks later a second postcard ar- 4 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM rived saying that several pieces of mail he had recently sent out seemed to have gone astray and maybe that had happened to the card to me; he again gave me his number and invited me to call. This time I followed through, and so made my first visit to Greenberg (at go Bank Street) in the late spring of 1958. I don't remember much about the visit other than the nervousness I felt being in his presence. Greenberg was then in the process of revising the essays that would go into Art and Culture and at one point asked my opinion of Theodore Roszak's sculpture. I said I didn't like it, which impressed him. (Greenberg to his wife Jenny: "He sees through Ted Roszak!") He also said that art criticism as usually practicedwas a pitiful activity and went on to warn n1e against the dangers of studying art history. This was one of Greenberg's hobbyhorses: he believed that the historical approach was inherently nonjudgmental and therefore antithetical to criticism. I had begun to take art history courses, which I loved, and was starting to think about becoming an art historian. During my senior year ( 1958-59) I stayed in close touch with Stella, who wasliving and painting in New York butwho made several visits to Princeton, sleeping on the couch in a suite of rooms I shared with two friends, and I also saw something of Bannard and Greene. In the fall of 1958 Greenberg gave a series of six Christian Gauss Seminars in Criticism on modern painting at Princeton, which is when he met Stella and Bannard for the first time (Stella came down for at least one and possibly more of the seminars) . The Gauss Seminars, then under the direction of R. P. Blackmur, my mentor in poetry, was (and is) a highly prestigious lecture-plus-discussion series which during those years was open only to members of the faculty and selected invitees from the larger intellectual community; as a rule undergraduates and their ilk could not attend, but Greenberg arranged for Frank, Darby, and me to be admitted. I wish I could remember more about the content of Greenberg's sessions; my impression is that they weren't well received, both because Greenberg's dogmatic and humorless cast of mind chilled discussion from the start and because his refusal to use slides (on the grounds that they misrepresented the works they ostensibly reproduced) meant that his audience had no way of visualizing what he was talking about. But for Stella, Bannard, and me the seminars were an event, if only because they brought Greenberg to Princeton for six weeks running and exposed us to a broad range of his views; as was typical of him, he was more interested in meeting Stella and Bannard, young paint- AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM l 5 ers whom he knew nothing about, than in exchanging pleasantries with academics, whom he largely distrusted. Around Christmas 1 958 I was awarded a Rhodes Scholarship to Oxford for the following two years; I had entered the competition without imagining that I might be selected, and now was faced with the unappealing prospect of being away from New York at just the moment I had thought to begin writing and publishing art criticism. It must have been during the spring of 1959 that I visited Hilton Kramer, then editor of Arts Magazine, with a letter of introduction from Greenberg. Kramer set me to write several trial art reviews, not for publication but so that he might assess my potential as a critic, with the thought of perhaps using me when I was in England. In the meantime Stella had broken through to his first series of black paintings, which quickly met with enthusiastic responses from (among others) John Myers of the Tibor de Nagy Gallery, who included one such painting in a group show in April 1 959; Leo Castelli, whose gallery Stella joined a few months later; and Dorothy Miller, who chose four large black canvases for inclusion in the important exhibition Sixteen Americans, which opened at the Museum of Modern Art in December 1 959. At the age of twenty-three Stella was on the threshold of a remarkable career, and it was doubly painful to think of going off to England just at that moment. (A few evenings before I sailed in September 1 959, Stella and I were taken out to a Japanese meal by JasperJohns and Robert Rauscbenberg. I often thought of that dinner during the next two years, and not only at mealtimes.) In the course of the summer of 1 959, which I spent living in Princeton and working on an opera libretto for the composer John Eaton, Bannard too made a remarkable series ofpaintings, only some of which are extant today. I saw a lot of Bannard during those months and believed that he too was on the verge of an important career. Oxford I loathed. I refused to study for a second B.A. in English; I wasn't academically advanced enough to write a dissertation without the sort of graduate training that wasn't available there; the possibilities for study in art history were effectively nil; and when in desperation I applied to study for a degree in history, thinking that it would be useful for later work in art history, I was turned down on the grounds that I bad never studied history before, which was perfectly true but from an American perspective was a reason for taking a subject up, not for being shut out from it forever. So I soon bad no 6 1 AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM academic relation to the university at all. But I made some friends, both American and English, spent long stretches of time in Paris and Rome looking at paintings and wandering the streets, worked on my French, and read more or less systematically on several fronts, including, for the first time, Marxism and philosophy. (It was then that I first encountered the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty.) I also continued to write and publish poems. (Among the friends I made at Oxford was the poet Ian Hamilton, who went on to found and edit the Review, the leading British new poetryjournal of the 1 96os and early 1 97os; under its imprint I published a book of poems, Powers, in 1 973.) In addition to letters from Stella, there were two reminders of the life I had planned to live before sailing to England: once each of the two years I spent in Oxford, Hilton Kramer commissioned me to review a book for Arts. This was encouraging, but by the end of mysecondyear Iwas sufficiently disoriented not to want immediately to return to the United States; instead, I decided to live in London for a year, sharing a small apartment near Primrose Hill with an English friend, teaching literature in teachers' colleges (as they were then called) and for the Workers' Educational Association, and studying philosophy on a part-time basis at University College London, where I would be tutored by the distinguished philosophers Stuart Hampshire and Richard Wollheim (I had met Hampshire in Oxford and arranged this with him in the spring of 1 96 1) . My year in London ( 1 96 1-62) worked out beautifully. The city itself-getting into gear for the decade to come-was exciting and inexpensive, I was glad finally to be earning my living, I was involved in the founding of the Review, I enjoyed University College as much as I had abhorred Oxford (Wollheim and I soon became friends) , but most important, at the very moment I moved there in September 1 96 1 , Hilton Kramer offered me the post of London correspondent for Arts. Naturally I accepted. This meantwriting a monthlycommentary on a selection of shows in galleries and museums (the choice to be made by me), and it paid enough to meet my share of the rent (seventy-five dollars a month) . So at the age of twenty-two, unexpectedly, I was an accredited art critic, publishing regularly in New York! All this was heady, but it soon became even more so. Early that fall, following the opening of a show by the painter Robyn Denny at the Molton Gallery, I attended a group dinner in an Italian restaurant in Soho; at the table across from me was a somewhat aggressive character in his midthirties who said he was a sculptor and bluntly asked when I would come and see his work. We arranged that I would visit AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 7 him the next weekend, and I have a vivid memory of climbing a maze of streets in Hampstead in search of his address. Finally I arrived; there was a gate, and as I stepped through it into the courtyard beyond I found myselfin the presence of two ofAnthony Caro's earliest abstract sculptures, Midday ( 1 960; figs. 32 and 33, pl. 13) and Sculpture Seven ( 1 96 1 ; fig. 34) . I was alone with these for several minutes before Caro came out of the house. But that was long enough to experience the unshakable conviction that they were two of the most original and powerful sculptures I had ever seen, that Midday in particular was nothing Jess than a masterpiece, and that the aggressive character in the restaurant-whom I had never heard of-was a great sculptor. I told Caro all this when he joined me in the garden and he seemed genuinely pleased. Our friendship took off from there. In the months that followed I saw him often, and before the year was done (at least I think this is the case) he invited me to write the introduction for an exhibition of his abstract sculptures to be held at the Whitechapel Art Gallery in the East End in the fall of 1 963. One reason why that first experience of Caro's work remains so present to me is that it was so unexpected, in that sense so "pure." I don't mean that nothing in my earlier experience had prepared me for his art: on tbe contrary, I was familiar, within limits, with David Smith's abstract steel sculptures, and by nature and training I was already at home in abstraction. But Caro's sculptures weren't at all like Smith's structurally or expressively, and it was thrilling to discover in myself so intense, spontaneous, and convinced a response to work that I had come upon in this way. (Even in the cases ofStella and Bannard, my friendship with them had preceded my experience of their crucial early pictures.) Throughout 1 96 1-62 I wrote my London letters and a few additional pieces; rereading them for possible inclusion in this book I found them even more immature than I remembered; but nothing could have been more valuable than cutting my teeth as a critic in that way-even the distance from New York was a blessing, shielding me from external influences and forcing me to write about ar:tists whose work I was seeing for the first time. In November 1 96 1 Frank Stella came to London with his fiancee, Barbara Rose; they married there on November 7, with me as best man. All this while, I had been trying to figure out what to do when the year was over; finally I applied to study for a Ph.D. in art history at Harvard, was admitted to the program, and in the late summer of 1 962 returned to the United States. 8 I AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM Graduate work at Harvard was demanding, especially at the start: my first semester saw me enrolled in Sydney J. Freedberg's seminar on Northern Italian maniera painting without ever having had a course on the Italian Renaissance. But even before settling in Cambridge I had been invited by James Fitzsimmons, editor of Art International, a magazine of contemporary art based in Lugano, to write a monthly "New York Letter" (I was to be one of two regular critics from New York, along with Max Kozloff). Art International had recently emerged as an importantjournal-Greenberg had published his article "Louis and Noland" there in 1 g6o and in October 1962 would bring out "After Abstract Expressionism" in its pages-and I was pleased to have the opportunity to continue writing art criticism on a regular basis. Later that year Barbara Rose wrote an essay on Pop Art and sent it to Fitzsimmons, and when he published it in Art International, she too was under way. By the next year she was added to the New York coverage along with "Kozloff and me. My routine those firsttwoyears at Harvard was simple but strenuous: most of the month I lived in Cambridge, attending lectures and seminars, reading as much as possible in the subjects I was studying, writing seminar papers, and familiarizing myselfwith the paintings, prints, and drawings in the Fogg Art Museum and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts. Then one Friday each month I took the shuttle from Logan Airport to La Guardia, spent two days visiting art galleries and museums, usually with Frank Stella, and returned to Cambridge on Saturday evening or Sunday morning. (In New York I stayed with Frank and Barbara, first in their apartment on East Sixteenth Street and later in one on Seventy-third and Madison; they were already the center of an artistic world-Barbara ran a continual salon-and nothing could have made a sharper break with my Harvard life than my brief visits with them. I also saw Greenberg from time to time.) Back in Cambridge I spent Sunday and Monday writing my "New York Letter" for Fitzsimmons and by Tuesday immersed myself again in my studies. (This was not a recipe for distinguished critical prose.) Practically speaking, I kept my activity as an art critic distinct from my work in art history; I never considered writing a dissertation on a living artist or seeking academic credit for my New York reviews. Intellectually, however, it was another story: from the start the distinction between art criticism and art history seemed to me a matter of emphasis rather than of principle, and my understanding of contemporary art had implications for the questions I began to put to the past. (See, however, my remarks on the difference between my art-critical and Ai\' INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM I 9 art-historical writings with respect to the issue of antitheatricality in part 3 of this introduction.) At some point in my secondyear at Harvard ( 1 963-64) ,John Coolidge, then director of the Fogg·Art Museum, invited me to organize a major exhibition of contemporary art. (The suggestion originated with Coolidge's assistant at the time, Charles W. Millard III.)" I leaped at the chance and decided to focus on three painters I especially admired, Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, and Frank Stella. I spent the fall and winter of 1 964-65 writing a long catalog essay in which the work of each of the three was interpreted in the context of the development of modernist painting sinceJackson Pollock. (The first part of that essay, a defense of "formal criticism," had been written some months previously for the American Scholar.) The exhibition, Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland,Jules Olitski, Frank Stella, opened in April 1 965. I had met Noland at a dinner with the Greenbergs on one of my early visits to New York, and we had hit it off at once; some time after that I met Olitski, probably at his studio near Bennington, Vermont, where he taught at Bennington College and where Noland also lived. (Caro too spent much of the year 1963-64 at Bennington teaching in the sculpture program; it was there that he made some of his most original early pieces, including Titan, Bennington, and Shaftesbury.) In my eyes Noland and Olitski were the strongest painters of their generation (Noland was born in 1 924, Olitski in 1 92 1 ) , and despite their being considerably older than Stella, I thought that by showing a half-dozen first-rate pictures by each of the three and by writing a long critical-historical essay it would be possible to convey a sense of the present state and future prospects of ambitious abstraction. Coolidge gave over the main second-floor galleries of the Fogg to the exhibition, which I loved hanging and which made a powerful impression: the paintings more than held their own in the classical rooms, and it may be too that the Fogg's distance from New Yorka distance that was more than simply geographical-gave them a special radiance. The exhibition was favorably reviewed by Hilton Kramer in the New York 1zmes, and, most gratifying of all, Greenberg sent me a postcard (his favorite medium of communication) praising my introduction. Around the moment of the Fogg exhibition, Olitski had begun making paintings by spraying paint into lengths of canvas, which he then cropped and framed. The new pictures struck me and others as an event, and in the early fall of 1 965 I wrote an article about them ('jules Olitski's New Paintings") which I have omitted from this 1o \ AN INTRODUCTION To MY ARr CRITlCISM book. I then spent the rest of the academic year 1 965-66 reading and thinking about earlier art. As ajunior fellow in the Harvard Society of Fellows, I had been invited by the Department of Fine Arts to teach a course or seminar on a subject of my choosing in the spring semester. I decided to give a series of lectures on the development of French painting from the middle of the eighteenth century through the advent of Manet in the r86os; I spent the fall term preparing, then drafted the lectures as I went along. Going through the lecture notes that survive, I see that I was taking the first steps toward the interpretation of that period since put forward in Absorption and Theatricality, Courbet'sRealism, and Manet'sModernism. Equallyimportant, the course confirmed my growing sense that my main concern as an art historian would be the prehistory of modernist painting, which is how things turned out. Among those in my audience was the philosopher Stanley Cavell, whom I had first met in the fall of 1 962, when he was visiting Harvard from the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton; Cavell had recently been appointed to a chair in the Harvard Department of Philosophy, and soon after he took up that position in September 1 963 we began an intense and wideranging conversation that, with inevitable lapses, has continued to this day. During those years, too, I sat in on several of Cavell's courses and seminars and generally became familiar with his original and profound readings of the work of J. L. Austin and Ludwig Wittgenstein. As already mentioned, I had become interested in philosophy during my years in England, and now my friendship with Cavell gave me access to a style of thinking I found, to the extent that I grasped it, wonderfully congenial. Cavell himself was deeply concerned with the arts-originally he had hoped to become a composer-and the factthat I was internal to modernist poetry, painting, and sculpture and to the issue of modernism generally gave our relations a symmetry and equality that the difference in our ages might have seemed to preclude. At any rate, our conversations soon carne to explore the question of artistic modernism as well as aspects of the pictorial developments that were my particular obsession.' (A third party in many of those conversations was the composer John Harbison, whom I met in 1 964 and who soon became a close friend as well. In this connection let me also mention another composer I came to know and admire, Seymour Shifrin, who died at the age of fifty in 1 980. He and Cavell had known each other at Berkeley, before Cavell moved to Harvard and Shifrin to Brandeis. For Shifrin modernism was a way of life.) AN INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM I ll l had assumed that I would follow up that course of lectures hy working full-time on a doctoral dissertation, but the claims of the contemporary situation again proved irresistible. During the academic year 1966-67 (actually starting in August 1 966) I wrote four essays and several shorter pieces; I didn't know it at the time, but that year was the high-water mark of my activity as an art critic. First, I wrote an essay on a new series of shaped, multicolor paintings by Frank Stella, under the title "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's New Paintings" (the second half of the title has been changed to "Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons" in the present book); this was an important piece for me because in it for the first time I took issue with Greenberg's theorization ofmodernism in "Modernist Painting" and "After Abstract Expressionism," and also because I began to develop the critique ofMinimalist art that would be taken further in "Art and Objecthood." Next I wrote "The Achievement of Morris Louis," the introduction to a catalog for the first full retrospective exhibition of Louis's painting. I had been enthralled by Louis's art ever since reviewing a show of his late stripe paintings at the Emmerich Gallery immediately following my return to the United States in the fall of rg62 (Louis had died a short time before);' so when Henry Hopkins of the Los Angeles County Museum invited me to organize and write the catalogfor a large retrospective exhibition of his work, I was glad to accept. Choosing the works to be shown meant that I had to see everything Louis had painted between 1 954 (and even earlier) and the summer of 1 962. Many ofhis paintings hadn't yet been stretched and could only be viewed unrolled on the floor of the warehouses in New York and Washington, D.C. On those occasions I wasjoined by Greenberg, who was serving as artistic adviser to the estate; our relations had begun to fray toward the end of 1965, but throughout my labors on the Louis exhibition they were still good enough to make surveying Louis's oeuvre together a memorable experience. As soon as the Louis essay was done, I wrote an introduction to the catalog for an exhibition ofjules Olitski's paintings of 1 963-67 that opened at the Corcoran Gallery of Art in the spring of 1 967. I admired Olitski's work enormously and had been following it closely for the previous fouryears, but the introduction never quite rises to its occasion; nevertheless, I have included it in this volume. I also wrote short pieces on Caro and a young California painter, Ron Davis. Finally, for a special issue ofAriforumon sculpture, I wrote "Art and Objecthood" (reprinted in this book), recognizing as I did so that it was bound to be controversial but of course not anticipating the full extent of the 12 � fu� INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM notoriety that was in store for it. With the exception of the Olitski introduction, the essays I have just cited, long and short, were published in Artforum, which by the mid-1 96os, under the brilliant and energetic editorship of Philip Leider, had become the foremost magazine ofcontemporary art. I first met: Phil at the Stellas in early 1 965, then spent several days with him when I visited Los Angeles in February 1 967 for the opening of the Louis exhibition. Artforum was founded in San Francisco in 1 962, moved to Los Angeles in 1 965, and finally came to New York in June 1 967. Although by then I was no longer writing art criticism on a regular basis, I saw Phil on all my frequent trips to New York and considered him a close friend. In 1 972 Phil decided he had had enough of the art world, gave up the magazine, and moved back to California. After a short break in the summer of 1 967 I finally turned my attention to my dissertation, which I wrote on Edouard Manet's paintings of the 186os, in particular on the meaning of his many deliberate allusions to the art of the Old Masters. First, though, I doubled the length of my Louis essay to provide the text of a copiously illustrated book on his art, which was published by Abrams in 1971 (it is that text, under the title "Morris Louis," that appears in this book). I then spent the fall of 1 967 in London doing much of the research for my dissertation in the libraries of the British Museum and Victoria and Albert Museum. Why didn't I go to Paris, as I ought to have? Partly because of my friendship with Caro and my interest in various younger British artists (especially the sculptor Tim Scott, who in the 1 96os was doing work of great originality) , partly because I was already familiar with London and had other friends there, notably Ian Hamilton, whereas in Paris I knew no one and would be struggling to deal with libraries I had never previously worked in. In any case, I was living in London when in the fall of 1 967 Caro exhibited Prairie, one of the definitive, some would say culminating, works of high modernist sculpture, at the Kasmin Gallery. I admired it greatly and wrote a short article on that show ("Two Sculptures by Anthony Caro," reprinted in this book) that I'm still pleased with. Also, on a visit to London in the summer of 1 966, Caro and I had had a conversation about the problem of making small abstract sculptures. As a result Caro began making smaller pieces that included at least one element that ran or extended below the plane of the tabletops on which the sculptures were placed. I discuss the significance of that strategy in several essays in this collection (and will say more about it shortly) , but my point here is that by the fall AN iNTRODUCTION TO MY ART CR['fiCISM I 13 of 1967 Caro had begun to produce a variety of pieces based on that structural (or "syntactic") principle, and it was fascinating to be around and watch them take shape. Finally, later that fall I made a briefvisit to New York in order to see Noland's exhibition of his first horizontal stripe paintings at Emmerich's; for those of us in the color-field, high modernist camp, that too was a dramatic event, and togetherwith Caro's Prairieand table pieces and Olitski's recent spray paintings it conveyed a sense of a movement in full flower. (I mention this because today it is often assumed by writers who weren't actually there that with the advent of Minimalism in the mid- r g6os the high modernist groupwas put on the defensive-in fact "Art and Objecthood" is sometimes read in that light. But the mood in 1 967- 68, artistically speaking, was distinctly upbeat.) At some point in the fall of 1 967, I don't remember when, I hit upon the basic argument ofmy dissertation, namely, that Maner's use of sources in the art of the past was directed, first, toward securing the Frenchness ofhis own painting and second, toward using Frenchness itself to secure a kind of universality, which I associated with his pursuit of a comprehensive totalization of as many of the resources ofpainting as seemed to him artisticallyviable. From fhen on, writing the dissertation was a race against the clock (I was scheduled to take up a teaching appointment at Harvard the following September) ; I didn't complete my dissertation until the winter of 1g68-6g, toward the end of my first semester as an assistant professor in the Department of Fine Arts. Something else I did during the spring of 1 968 was organize a retrospective exhibition of Caro's sculptures to be held at the Hayward Gallery in London in early 1 g6g, and I spent a few weeks in the fall of 1 968, in the interstices of teaching <)Bd working on my dissertation, writing the introductory essay for the catalog. The strain shows, and I have omitted that essay too from these pages. But the exhibition was beautiful, especially the large downstairs room with a basketball-court-quality wooden floor in which we displayed about a dozen ofCaro's sparest, most radical sculptures of the early and midrg6os. I submitted my dissertation in time to receive the Ph.D. in January 1 g6g, and two months later Phil Leider published it, under the title "Manet's Sources: Aspects of His Art, 185g-186s," in a special issue ofArtforumcontaining nothing else. No other editor would have dreamed of doing something so infuriating to the bulk of his readership. The following September Theodore Reff, a leading scholar ofnineteenth-century painting, raked "Manet's Sources" over 14 I Al\1: INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM the coals in a short article in Artforum, and although I at first imagined firing off a quick response to his critique, as things turned out it took me more than twenty-five years to decide on what I wanted to say. My reply to Reff, along with much new material bearing on the topic, may be found in chapter 2 of Manet's Modernism. Thereafter, my activity as a critic lessened sharply. In 1 969 I wrote a short piece on some paintings by Kenneth Noland. In London for another half-year in the fall of 1 970, I wrote short reviews of gallery exhibitions of sculptures by Caro and Michael Bolus, and in 1 972 I wrote a brief essay on Larry Poons's first "poured" paintings, which excited me as his previous work had failed to do. (I now feel that I underestimated his early "Op" pictures.)6 Five years later, at Caro's request, I wrote an introduction for a traveling exhibition of his table pieces. Basically, though, I stopped writing about contemporary art, for several reasons. In the first place, I had pretty much said what I had to say. My interest as a practicing critic or critic-theorist had always focused on a small group of artists: Pollock, Louis, Noland, Olitski, Stella, and Caro. By 1 969 I had written about each of them several times, and although Noland, Olitski, Stella, and Caro all went on to develop in surprising ways, whatever I was likely to write about them was bound to be repetitive. Second, in "Shape as Form" and, especially, in "Art and Objecthood" I described the emergence of a basic opposition between the radically abstract painting and sculpture I most admired and what I characterized, pejoratively, as the "literalist" and "theatrical" work of a group of artists usually called the Minimalists-Robert Morris, Donald Judd, Tony Smith, Carl Andre, et al. (The art I admired I thought of as "antitheatrical.") No one with even the sketchiest awareness of recent history needs to be told that "theatricality," not just in the form of Minimalism, went on to flourish spectacularly while abstraction in my sense of the term became more and more beleaguered. This too made the prospect of writing art criticism less attractive: in addition to championing yet again the same handful ofartists, I would have had to insist yet again that the dominant avant-garde modes of the day were not worth taking seriously, and that, I had the wit to realize, was unlikely to interest anyone. Nothing I could have said would have improved upon the position laid out in "Art and Objecthood," which continued to be read and in that sense to express the indifference or hostility I felt toward much that was taking place. A third factor in my turn away from art criticism was that I became engrossed in the art-historical project mentioned earlier, an attempt fu"J INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 15 to give an account of the evolution of the antitheatrical tradition in French painting that arose in the middle of the eighteenth century and climaxed more than a century later in the art of Manet and the Impressionists. So that even as I sought to recover crucial aspects of the historical specificity of a large body of earlier painting and art criticism, I realized that I was also trying to understand the origins of a set of concerns that I had independently-in my activity as a critic-detected at work in the contemporary sitnation. And that made it seem as if! hadn't. abandoned art criticism so much as discovered a new and, under the circumstances, more rewarding use for the intellectual energies it had called forth. Finally, I remember feeling as early as the late r g6os, and with increasing force during the 1970s and after, that what might be called evaluative art criticism no longer mattered as it previously had. No longer was it read with the same interest, no longer could the critic imagine that his or her words might intervene in the contemporary situation in the way in which, perhaps delusively, I had sometimes irnagined my words intervening in it, no longer were there critical reputations to be made by distinguishing the best art of one's time from the rest or by analyzing that art with respect to its treatment of issues that were, in a strong sense of the word, "inescapable." The inference seems clear that the kind of criticism Greenberg and I practiced, each in his own way, was intimately linked with the values, qualities, and aspirations of the high modernist art we found so compelling, and that with the ever growing eclipse ofhigh modernism in the later r g6os and 1970s (and after) the role of criticism became transformed-into cultural commentary, "oppositional" position taking, exercises in recycled French theory, and so on. (Ifthis book's subtitle were to be expanded it would perhaps be "Essays and Reviews from the Close of High Modernism.") In any case, the abandonment ofevaluative criticism and the disparagement oflate modernist painting and sculpture have only grown more sweeping with the passage of time. 2. Some Thoughts on My Art Criticism As ALREADY mentioned, I regard the reviews I wrote in London for Arts in r g6 r-62 as apprentice work. The same goes for the fourteen "New York Letters" I wrote for Art International in rg62-64, but I have chosen to republish portions of twelve of those as representative of my views and rhetoric at the time. I see no need 1 6 \ AN lNTRODUC'l'ION TO MY ART CRlTICISM to comment on them individually, or on the hriefremarks on Stella's early stripe paintings that I contributed to the catalog of the exhibition Toward a New Abstraction at the Jewish Museum in 1 963. What strikes me today, when I consider the "New York Letters" as a group, is the prominence of a linked pair of motifs: a distaste for "sentimentality" in an improbably wide range of forms and an urgent concern with issues of pictorial structure, the tough-mindedness of which was evidently conceived by me as ruling out the sort of looseness of feeling I found repugnant (but not as ruling out the expression of feeling altogether) . Indeed, my enthusiasm for Hans Hofmann was largely based on what I saw as his ability to redeem otherwise intractably corny or sentimental paint handling and color as well as his gift for resolving pictorial problems in artistically satisfying ways without being a formal absolutist. Not that I had anything against the formal absolutism ofBarnettNewman or Stella-on the contrary, both were for me among the exemplary artists of the day. But Hofmann's never merely "subjective" spontaneity seemed exceptional enough to warrant special praise. (By the time I wrote my penultimate "New York Letter" in the spring of 1 964 I had come to see Olitski in not dissimilar terms.) By the same token, my admiration for Andy Warhol's paintings of Marilyn Monroe was based in part on the idea that she was a genuinely mythic figure, hence beyond the unavoidably subjective element that entered into the same artist's images ofTroy Donahue; what made the Marilyn pictures moving, it's implied, is that they came by their expressiveness by properly "impersonal" means. (A thematics of impersonality would later run through my analyses of figuration and color in Pollock, Louis, Noland, Olitski, and Stella, and in general an insistence on making ethically loaded distinctions between modes of subjectivity is a leitmotif of my criticism from start to finish.) Another early text, my essay for Caro's 1963 exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery, will be discussed in connection with other writings on Caro later in this section. The first text that seems to me to warrantspecific commentary, then, is my introduction to the catalog for the Fogg Art Museum exhibition of paintings by Noland, Olitski, and Stella. But rather than work through my art criticism item by item, I shall proceed more irregularly, sometimes dealing with issues, sometimes with individual artists, and once, toward the end, with a single essay, "Art and Objecthood" itself. The appeal to 'formal" criticism THE FIRST part of "Three An1erican Painters" makes several related claims: first, that the development of modernist paint- fu'l" INTRODUCTION TO Mv ART CRITICISM I 17 ing from Maner to the mid-rg6os evinces "an increasing preoccupation with problems and issues intrinsic to painting itself"; second, that the nature of those problems and issues is "formal," that is to say, presumably, a matter of "form"-a term I don't quite use-as distinctfrom subjectmatter (the tendency toward abstractness would thus be a function of that order of priorities); and third, that "formal criticism" as practiced by Roger Fry and, especially, Clement Greenberg is therefore better suited than any other approach to throw light on modernist painting, by which I mean not just elucidate the problems and issues in question but also provide as nearly objective a basis as possible for specific valuejudgments, which, however, remain ineluctably su�jective in nature and origin.' (I explain that "there is nothing binding in the valuejudgments of formal criticism" and that the "objectivity [the formal critic] aspires to can be no more than relative.") I further suggest that the best model for fhe evolution of modernist painting is fhat of the dialectic understood as an unceasing process ofperpetual radical self-criticism or, as I also put it, "perpetual revolution"; and I gloss my invocation of the dialectic by insisting on the latter's nonteleological nature: thus, I say that "the work of such painters as Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, and Frank Stella . . . aspires to bejudged, in retrospect, to have been necessary to the finest modernist painting of the fi.tture." The decisive criterion ofquality or value is thus a certain effectiveness or "fecundity" that in the nature of the case can be known only after the fact;8 indeed, something of the same situation prevailswith respect to "formal" or "stylistic" discriminations themselves, in that we are able to make such discriminations within a given body of work only where subsequent modernist painting has invested certain differences with a significance they did not originally have (I make th.is point in the opening paragraph of part 2 of the Fogg introduction and, focusing specifically on the relationship between Pollock and Louis, in a footnote to "Morris Louis , ') . There are difficulties with some of these formulations which should be mentioned before moving on to consider more substantial matters (one reason for owning up to them is to underscore the fact that they disappear from my work after this point) : 1 . I say in a brief note in 'Three American Painters" that the difficulties surrounding the notion of problems and issues "intrinsic" to painting are begged in that work, and of course that's true. What does "intrinsic" mean in a situation that I specifically characterize as one in which the relevant problems and issues are describable as such only in retrospect, and then only in terms that are determined by 1 8 � AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM later developments? In the same note I remark that the idea that there are problems intrinsic to the art ofpainting "has to do with the concept of a 'medium'" (what I ought to have said is that the inadequacy of my way of putting things called for a certain development of that concept) and add that this is a topic philosophy and art criticism might fruitfully discuss. But I don't pursue the topic, which had to wait for Stanley Cavell's remarks on the concept of a medium in The World Viewed roughly five years later. 2. My contention that only "formal" criticism is capable ofmaking "convincing discriminations of value" or, as I also put it, of "objectifying" critical intuitions which nevertheless remain grounded in subjectivity isn't helpful either. (By this time I had at least stopped using "subjective" and "subjectivity" as pejorative notions.) The idea of objectification in particular is a red herring, which is to say that the subjective/objective opposition as I invoke it is beside the point.9 What matters is that, as I remark, "alljudgments of value begin and end in experience"; the task of the critic is, first, not to flinch from making suchjudgments, which are nothing less than the lifeblood of his enterprise, and second, to try to come up with the most telling observations and arguments on their behalf. What those observations and arguments will turn out to be, what features of the works in question theywillfocus on and what sorts ofissues theywill involve, is in principle unknowable in advance, and in any case, as I rightly insist (following Kant in this if in nothing else) , the arguments themselves will not be binding, which is what it means to say thatjudgments of value end in experience as well as begin there. 3· My invocation ofthe dialectic and of an ideal ofperpetual radical self-criticism implies too simplistic or abstract a model of the evolution of modernist painting as a whole. What excited me at the time was the seeming theoretical sophistication of such a model, which in efrect gave dramatic form to certain Hegelian assumptions behind Greenberg's avowedly Kantian reading of modernism as selfcriticism (the joint influence on me of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's remarks on Hegel in his essay "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" and of Georg Lukacs's History and Class Consciousnesswas important here).10 But the sophistication, such as it was, came at too high a price. 4· Similarly, my attempt to use "fecundity" as a decisive criterion of quality or value-of artistic success-which also had its roots in Merleau-Ponty's essay,11 was soon afterward put to the test by the advent of Minimal Art, which involved, as I at once recognized, an at- AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I Lg tempt to go "beyond" the work ofNoland and Stella in the direction of what I called "literalism" and "objecthood." As things turned out, I was sharply critical of those development,, but were they not testimony to the fecundity of Noland's and Stella's art? No, because in my view the Minimalist work that ostensibly established that fecundity was not a legitimate successor to the paintings in question. But that determination wasn't based on a criterion of fecundity so much as on my actual, present-tense responses to the works in question. And in fact, all my subsequent criticism (starting with the rest of my introduction to Three American Painters) stresses the need for new work to compel conviction here and now rather than to wait: upon events.12 5· Not surprisingly, then, I wish I hadn't celebrated "formal" criticism the way I did. Not that there is no intellectually legitimate meaning that can be given to the term.13 But myadvocacyofit in the introduction to ThreeAmerican Painters is inseparable from the belief that the evolution ofmodern painting has been awayfrom considerations of subject matter toward an ever more exclusive preoccupation with problems and issues intrinsic to the art, a narrative I soon came to think was wrongly conceived, not only because of the problems with '�intrinsic" I have cited, but also because it assumes that considerations of subject matter cannot bear directly on issues of form, or, say, of the medium. (The latter assumption is at odds with everything I have written about eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French painting.) Unfortunately, the epithet "formal," soon modified to "formalist," became current to the extent that notjust a certain type ofcriticism but also the work of Louis, Noland, Olitsk.i, Stella, Poons, and others came to be characterized in those terms: as if their work constituted merely one of several or many possible styles of painting rather than being, as I insisted was the case, thevalid manifestation of the art of painting at that time. Such are the risks of theorizing about art and art criticism at an early age.14 The issue of"opticality" NoTHING IN Greenberg's art CntlClsm or for that matter in mine has come in for more sustained assault in recent years than the claim that modernist painting posits or privileges or establishes the illusion of a purely visual or "optical" space, one addressed to eyesight alone. I have no wish to defend that claim here, but it should at least be noted that the idea of opticality (and related notions) plays a double role in Greenberg's criticism of the early r g6os. 20 \ AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM Consider the following passage from his most famous essay, "Modernist Painting": "The flatness toward which Modernist painting orients itself can never be an utter flatness. The heightened sensitivity of the picture plane may no longer permit sculptural illusion, or trompe-l'oeil, hut it does and must permit optical illusion. The first mark made on a surface destroys its virtual flatness, and the configurations of a Mondrian still suggest a kind ofillusion of a kind of third dimension. Only now it is a strictly pictorial, strictly optical third dimension. Where the Old Masters created an illusion of space into which one could imagine oneself walking, the illusion created by a Modernist is one into which one can look, can travel through, only with the eye."15 This amounts to a globalclaim about modernist painting, which in its drive to distinguish itself from sculpture is said to have pursued opticality along with flatness from the start. "With Manet and the Impressionists," Greenberg writes in the same essay, "tbe question ceased to be defined as one of color versus drawing, and became instead a question of purely optical experience as against optical experience modified or revised by tactile associations" (p. 7 1 ) . I think it is .fuir to say that this is the position that critics of Greenbergian opticality have been attacking. (A few years before, in the essay originally called "Sculpture in Our Time" [ 1958], Greenberg described what he took to be "a new common style" in painting, sculpture, and architecture in terms that anticipate the stress on opticality in "Modernist Painting." "Instead of the illusion of things," he wrote, "we are now offered the illusion of modalities: namely, that matter is incorporeal, weightless, and exists only optically like a mirage."16 That all the arts should have converged in that direction is global in another sense of the term, and there is perhaps no sentence in Greenberg's essays that has been more often cited by his critics.) But in other texts of that moment Greenberg appealed to the notion of opticality in a distinctly nonglobal, chronologically specific way, as one of the key stylistic markers of the recent American painting he had come most to admire-the work, for the most part "keyed to the primacy of color," of Clyfford Still, Barnett Newman, Mark Rothko, Jackson Pollock (in his thinned black Duco enamel paintings of 1 95 1 ) , Helen Frankenthaler, Louis, and Noland. For example, in "Louis and Noland" ( 1 960) , whicb I first read while still at Oxford, be describes Louis's adaptation of Pollock's and Frankenthaler's stain technique by saying: 'The effect [of staining] conveys a sense not only of color as somehow disembodied, and there- A"" INTRODUCTI00.: TO MY ART CRITICISM I 2 1 fore more purely optical, but also of color as a thing that opens and expands the picture plane."17 As in "Modernist Painting," opticality is contrasted with its traditional antithesis, tactility: "The more closely color could be identified with its ground, the freer it would be f!·om the interference of tactile associations."18 But tactility in turn is linked, in the important essay "Mter Abstract Expressionism" (r g62), not with the sculptural as such, but rather with the widespread tendency within both the American and the European branches of Painterly Abstraction (a term Greenberg preferred to Abstract Expressionism) toward a heightened illusion of threedimensional space. In American painting that tendency led to the de Kooningesque manner Greenberg calls "homeless representation" and describes as "a plastic and descriptive painterliness that is applied to abstract ends, but which continues to suggest representational ones," while in European painting the taste for illusionism took the form of a "literal three-dimensionality of piled-on paint" he dubs "furtive bas-relief."19 In opposition to such a tendency, the painting of Newman, Rothko, and Still is described as aiming above all at "an almost literal openness that embraces and absorbs color in the act of being created by it."20 The term "openness," already hinted at in "Louis and Noland," was a new coinage for Greenberg and carne largely to replace "opticality," which nowhere occurs in "Mter Abstract Expressionism," in his writings of the mid-r g6os. Not that the two uses of the notion of opticality I have been charting are entirely distinct in Greenberg's writings. There can be little doubt fhat his admiration for Still, Newman, and Rothko on the one hand and Frankenthaler, Louis, and Noland on the other-or perhaps his belief that the work ofboth groups of artists pointed in the same direction-helped crystallize the global thematization of opticality in "Modernist Painting." But he himself seems to have been uncertain as to whether the recent painting he most admired marked a return to the optical values and emphases of Impressionism or whether on the contrary it simply made it apparent that those had been fhe decisive values and emphases of modernist painting all along. A sign of that indecision is the removal of a keysentence from the first version of "Modernist Painting." In the original essay, immediately following thesentence aboutthe difference between Old Master and modernist modes of illusionism, the next paragraph began as follows: "The latest abstract painting tries to fulfill the Impressionist insistence on the optical as the only sense that a completely and quintessentially pictorial art can invoke. "21 In the final version ofthat 2 2 I AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM essay, however, the sentence in question has been dropped, which has the effect of removing all suggestion of a return to earlier priorities in favor of implying a consistently optical bias from Manet and Impressionism through Mondrian to the present.22 All this is somewhat tangled, and more than a little confusing. My aim in going into it here is to point out, first, that recent critiques of Greenberg on opticality have without exception failed to acknowledge the double valence of that concept in his writings of the early 1 960s (they treat it exclusively in its global construal) , and second, that my own exploitation of the notion of opticality in my writings on Pollock, Louis, Noland, Olitski, Stella, and Caro derives chiefly from Greenberg's historically more limited use of it (along with the allied notion ofopenness) in "Louis and Noland" and "After Abstract Expressionism," the two essays of the early 1 96os that most clearly articulate his view of the current situation. That is, I had no interest whatever in the idea ofopticality as a defining characteristic of modernist painting generally-in fact I mostly failed to recognize the centrality of that idea in "Modernist Painting" when I finally read it in 1 965 or 1 966. But as early as the spring of 1 964 I took Greenberg's analysis of the role of opticality in the art of Louis and Noland in particular, along with his critique in "After Abstract Expressionism" ofde Kooningesque PainterlyAbstraction as tactile in its associations, as the basis for a reading of Pollock's allover drip paintings of 1947-50 as essentially optical despite the sensuous materiality of the skeins ofpigment out ofwhich they were made (see the introduction to Three American Painters).23 And I went on from there, in "The Achievement of Morris Louis" and the enlarged version of that essay in my Louis book, to develop an account of the complex and shifting relations between figuration-more broadly, drawing-and color in Louis's oeuvre that still seems to me valid, an account that gives precise meaning to the intuition that between Pollock's works of 1947-5 1 (not just the drip paintings but the semirepresentational ones in thinned black Duco enamel as well) and Louis's mature oeuvre there exists, if only by Nachtraglichheit, a deep continuity of basic concerns. In short, although I would no longer baldly state, as I do in the introduction to ThreeAmericanPainters, that "the materiality of [Pollock's] pigment is rendered sheerly visual,"24 I continue to believe that the dyad opticalityItacticality or indeed opticalityImateriality is pertinent to his and Louis's art, and I continue to have a stake in my analyses of their achievements (the Louis text in particular seems to me a high point ofmy criticism) . In any case, a critic inevitably works with the conceptual tools at hand; what matters in the long AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 23 run is not the inherent allure of the tools themselves, which is bound to wax and wane with changes of intellectual fashion, but rather the quality of the critical and/or historical work that is done with them. (For my appeal to the concept of opticality in connection with Noland, Olitski, Stella, and Caro, see the sections "The Issue of Shape," "The Example ofAnthony Caro," and "The Critique ofTheatricality in 'Art and Objecthood'" below.)25 The issue ofshape A CENTRAL concern of the essays in this book is the problem of shape. The fullest discussion of it is found in two essays of rg66-67, "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons" and "Art and Objecthood," but a preoccupation with shape-more broadly, with pictorial structure-goes back to my earliest writings on Stella's stripe paintings (e.g., the "New York Letter" of November 25, r g62, reprinted in this book as "New York Letter: Louis, Chamberlain and Stella, Indiana") and the brief catalog textfor theJewish Museum's Toward a NewAbstraction exhibition), where it is anchored, obviously, in the paintings themselves. (See also my insistence on the importance of structural considerations keyed to the framing edge in the discussions ofworksby Newman, Noland, and Olitski in several of the "New York Letters" excerpted in this volume. From the start, influenced by Stella's practice, I advocated a "strictly logical" relation of painted elements to the framing edge.) In the introduction to Three American Painters I tried to generalize the notion of a new concern with the primacy of shape into a concept of "deductive structure."26 The thin vertical bands (or "zips") in Newman's paintings, I wrote, "amount to echoes within the painting of the two side framing edges; they relate primarily to these edges, and in so doing make explicit acknowledgment of the shape of the canvas. They demand to be seen as deriving from the framing edge-as having been 'deduced' from it-though their exact placement within the colored field has been determined by the painter."" I saw this as a new development and related it to the recent tendency toward opticality, on the grounds that the latter took pressure off flatness (a tactile feature) while putting pressure on shape, the other major physical or literal characteristic ofthe picture support. But it was in Stella's stripe paintings of the late 1 950s and early rg6os that the concept of deductive structure really came into its own: As early as 1958-sg, partly in reaction against Abstract Expressionist painting such as that of Kline and de Kooning-both of whom he 24 I A"! INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM strongly admired-and partly in direct response to the work of Barnett Newm�n, Stella began to make paintings in which parallel stripes of black paint, each roug·hly 2 Y2 inches wide, echo and reecho the rectangular shape of the picture support until the entire canvas is filled. . . . In subsequent series of paintings, executed in aluminum, copper, and purple metallic paint-in rg6o, rg6r, and 1963, respectively-Stella's grasp of deductive structure grew more and more tough minded, until the paintings came to be generated in toto, as it were, by the different shapes of the framing edge, and variation occurred only within the series as a whole rather than within a particular shape of canvas.2s I went on to argue that in this respect Stella's paintings represented a significant advance on the work of the Cubists or even Mondrian, by which I meant that they embodied "more consistent solutions to a particular formal problem-roughly, how to make paintings in which both the pictorial structure and the individual pictorial elements make explicit acknowledgment of the literal character of the picture support." Within the next year or so, however, this way of putting the issue of shape came to seem unsatisfactory on several counts. For one thing, the notion of deductive structure seemed to imply that what was at stake was nothing more than a way of arranging pictorial elements relative to the framing edge, a morphological view I came increasingly to reject. For another, I no longer believed that the notion of "deducing"structural elements from the shape of the support adequately described what Newman and Stella were up to: it didn't fit Newman's intuitive determinations of where precisely to place his zips, and it failed to capture the sense in which in Stella's aluminum, copper, and metallic purple series the stripes and the shapes of the support are given together in a single gestalt.29 Finally, the remarks quoted above imply that the Cubists and Mondrian had been engaged with the same problem as Stella but had failed to resolve it with equal consistency and rigor, which I came to see was an ahistorical way of describing Stella's relationship to his predecessors. By the time I wrote "Shape as Form," my approach to the issue of shape, indeed to the writing of art criticism, was significantly different, as the first paragraph of that essay makes clear: Frank Stella's new paintings investigate the viability of shape as such. By shape as such I mean not merely the silhouette of the support (wliich I shall call literal shape), not merely that of the outlines of elements in a given picture (which I shall call depicted shape), but shape as a medium within which choices about both literal and AN INTRODUCTION TO Mv ART CRITICISM I 25 depicted shapes are made, and made mutually responsive. And by the viability of shape, I mean its power to hold, to stamp itself out, and in-asverisimilitude and narrative and symbolism used to impress themselves-compelling conviction. Stella's undertaking in these paintings is therapeutic to restore shape to health, at least temporarily, though of course its implied "sickness" is simply the other face of the unprecedented importance shape has assumed in the finest modernist painting of the past several years, most notably in the work of Kenneth Noland and Jules Olitski. It is only in their work that shape as such can be said to have become capable of holding, or stamping itselfout, of compelling conviction-as well as, so to speak, capable of failing to do so. These are powers or potentialities-not to say responsibilities-which shape never until now possessed, and which have been conferred upon it by the development of modernist painting itself. In this sense shape has become something different from what it was in traditional painting or, for that matter, in modernist painting until recently. It has become, one might say, an object of conviction, whereas before it was merely . . . a kind ofobject. Stella's new pictures are a response to the recognition that shape itself may be lost to the art of painting as a resource able to compel conviction, precisely because-as never before-it is being called upon to dojust that. The distinction betweer. an oqject of conviction and merely a kind of object anticipates "Art and Objecthood," as does much else in "Shape as Form" (more on this too presently) .30 And my reference to shape as a medium reflects conversations with Cavell, to whom I showed "Shape as Form" in draft. But I want to stress certain other aspects of my argument in the latter essay. First, the recent tendency toward opticality is again described as having played a crucial role in neutralizing flatness and thereby shifting the balance of modernist concern toward considerations of shape. But it's important to be clear that my analyses of shape in the art of Noland, Olitski, and Stella don't present opticality itself (or visual illusionism) as sufficient to enable a depicted shape, or for that matter a literal one, to compel conviction in the way I begin by claiming shape now had to do. So, for example, I am troubled, not satisfied, by Noland's narrow (eight feet by two feet) , diamond-shaped paintings, whose extreme attenuation together with "the sheerly visual illusion generated by the interaction of [their] colored bands" makes their enclosing shapes seem to vibrate and shimmer, with the result that "the physical limits of [their] support[s] are overrun, indeed all but dissolved, by the painting's illusionistic presence." More broadly, I find in Noland's and Olitski's paintings different manifesta- 26 \ AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM tions of a "conflict between opticality and the literal character of the support," but neither literalness as such (the Minimalist option) nor untrammelled visual illusionism (as in Noland's narrow diamonds) is seen by me as capable of resolving that conflict as it then stood. (Note, by the way, that for all the stress on opticality in my criticism of the 1 960s, I never followed Greenberg in equating the "strictly pictorial" with the "strictly optical," as he did in "Modernist Painting" and other texts of that period.) I do claim that SteHa's irregular polygons succeed in resolving the conflict by making literalness itself illusive, but what underwrites that feat in my account is the way in which his paintings ingeniously and systematically overcome the distinction between literal and depicted shape, that is, in which at their best they establish an "unprecedented continuity between the 'outside' of a given painting (its physical limits) and its 'inside' (everything else)." (Exactly how they do this is the burden ofmy analysis.) And that in turn has the effect of "suffusing" literalness throughout the painting, thereby "unmak[ing], . . . in the event and for the moment, the distinction between shape as a fundamental property of objects and shape as an entity belonging to painting alone that emerge [d] for the first time in Noland's and Olitski's paintings." This amounted, I thought, to legitimately sidestepping the newly urgent demand that shape stamp itself out (and in) , which is what I meant when in the opening paragraph of "Shape as Form" I characterized Stella's undertaking as therapeutic, restoring shape to health. In "Art and Objecthood," written several months later, I put all this as follows: "What is at stake . . . is whether the paintings or objects in question are experienced as paintings or as objects, and what decides their identity as paintingis their confronting of the demand that they hold as shapes. [Legitimately side-stepping thatdemand, a Ia Stella's irregular polygons, was tantamount to confronting it, evidently.] Otherwise they are experienced as nothing more than objects. This can be summed up by saying that modernist painting has come to find it imperative that it defeat or suspend its own objecthood, and that the crucial factor in this undertaking is shape, but shape that must belong to painting-it must be pictorial, not, or not merely, literal."31 I would not deny that my analyses of Noland's, Olitski's, and Stella's paintings continually strain against their conceptual limits. In fact, rereading for this book not just "Shape as Form" and "Art and Objecthood" but 'jules Olitski's New Paintings" ( 1 965; omitted from this book) and 'jules Olitski" (the introduction to the catalog for an exhibition of Olitski's work at the Corcoran) , I was struck by the ex- AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 27 tent to which my focus on issues of shape and structure leads me to devote insufficient space to considerations of color and facture (not that the latter are wholly neglected) . Nor would I wish to endorse each and every judgment that contributed to my arguments in r g66-67: for example, the best of Noland's narrow, diamond-shaped pictures now seem to me superb, regardless of what takes place at their edges. But my account of Stella's irregular polygons still feels largely right, along with my insistence that theyrepresent a renewed commitment to painting, and I see no reason to back away from the claim that the issue of shape, understood in the terms I developed at the time, lay at the heart of the situation of ambitious painting at that moment. (My impression from conversations with Greenberg, incidentally, is that he never really approved of paintings that departed from the rectangle.) It's worth noting, moreover, that in my last piece of criticism proper, a 1 972 article on recent paintings by Larry Poons, I observed that starting in the late rg6os there had been "a shift of pressure away from issues of shape toward issues of picture surface," and that what was at stake in that shift was precisely the question·of objecthood. "The most ambitious pictorial art of the past several years," I wrote, "[has] found itself compelled to declare its identity as painting . . . by continual acknowledgment . . . that paintings consist in or are limited to their surfaces in ways that distinguish them, as it were absolutely, from other kinds of objects in the world. That is how I understand what has seemed to me the compulsion of certain recent painting of major ambition to affirm that the entire surface, which is to say every bit of it, is spread out before the beholder-that every grain or particle or atom of surface competesfor presentnesswith every other."32 My point in citing these remarks is not to praise their perspicuity, though I still think that this too is right (Poons's snbsequentwork, a body ofmajor painting, would soon confirm my intuition) . It is rather thatwith the new focus on surface the previous emphasis on opticality went into eclipse (I went on in the Poons article to stress the "tactility" of his color) , which confirms the general point that in my criticism, if not consistently in Greenberg's, "opticality" functions in a nonglobal, temporally and stylistically specific way. The example ofAnthony Caro As I mentioned earlier, I first met Caro and was knocked on my heels by his work in London in the fall of rgfir. Not quite two years later, in the late spring of 1 963, I wrote my first essay 28 ! A..�� INTRODUCTION '1'0 MY i\RT CRITICISM on his art, the introduction to the catalog for his exhibition at the Whitechapel Gallery in London in the fall of that year. It's an immature production: the writing is turgid and studentish, the approach it takes is indirect and full of pitfalls, the appeal to authoritiesGreenberg, Mer!eau-Ponty, Blackmur, Stuart Hampshire, Rilke-is obtrusive, and there is no analysis of specific works to help flesh out my general claims. (I wrote it with a sense of acute difficulty: I felt I saw Caro's sculptures clearly, even presciently, but found it almost impossible to put that vision into words. Welcome to art criticism.) But I've chosen to republish it, both because Caro's art has remained basic to my understanding of the modernist enterprise and because the Whitechapel introduction epitomizes the "mixed" state of my thinking at that early moment in my critical career. In brief, my claims on behalf ofCaro's early abstract steel sculptures fell into four more or less distinct categories. First, I cited and endorsed Greenberg's account of the consequences of what he called "the modernist 'reduction'" in sculpture, consequences that included a tendency toward opticality as well as a mode of making described as "not so much sculptured as constructed, built, assembled, arranged."33 Here as elsewhere in my early criticism, Greenberg's writings provided the framework within which my own thought gradually found its voice. Second, although Caro's sculptures, being abstract, in no way depicted the human figure, they nevertheless seemed to me to evoke a wide range of bodily feeling and movement. In this connection I appealed to the writings of the French existential phenomenologist Merleau-Ponty, whom I had begun to read in England: his major book, The Phenomenology ofPerception, had recently been translated, and the French original of his essay "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" (mentioned above in connection with my appeal in "Three American Painters" to notions of the dialectic and fecundity) was on my desk as I wrote the Whitechapel introduction. Not that Merleau-Ponty was required to alert me to the bodily aspects of Caro's art, or of art in general. Some of my most powerful early experiences of painting and sculpture had been along those lines, and when I first saw Midday and Sculpture Seven in Caro's garden I felt I was about to levitate or burst into blossom. But Merleau-Ponty provided philosophical sanction for taking those feelings seriously and trying to discover where they led (one place they eventually led was to my book Courbet's Realism), and it was my good fortune that I became aware of his writing when I did. AN INTRODUCTION TO ?vfy ART CRITICISM I 29 Third, my particular treatment of bodiliness in the Whitechapel introduction was to emphasize the notion of abstract expressive gesture-a modality of gesture made possible by the medium of constructed steel sculpture. Here the influence of my Princeton mentor in poetry, R. P. Blackmur, author of a collection of essays called Language as Gesture, reinforced that of Merleau-Ponty, who repeatedly invokes the notion of gesture in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence." Finally, one more set ofconcerns is discernible in the Whitechapel text., and it soon proved the most important of all. It first surfaces in the claim that a prelingual child in the company of adults conversing among themselves will respond to the "abstract configurations in time made by the spoken words as they are joined to one another" (the point of this was to suggest a crude analogy with our situation in the face of Caro's sculptures). But what I was trying to say came into much sharper focus when I wrote: "Everything in Caro's art that is worth looking at-except the color-is in its syntax." I associated the notion ofsyntax with that of abstract gesture, but what I sawwas that the entire expressive weight of Caro's art was carried by the relations among the girders, I- and T-beam segments, and similar elements out of which his sculptures were made, not (for example) by the shapes of individual parts, nor by anything that could be called imagery, nor by what was then sometimes taken to be the industrial, modern-world connotations of his materials. (Two years later Greenberg in an essay on Caro quoted my remarks on syntax and added: "This emphasis on syntax is also an emphasis on abstractness, on radical unlikeness to nature. No other sculptor has gone as far from the structural logic of ordinary ponderable things"31-observations that I in turn would make use of in "Art and Objecthood" and my introduction to the catalog for Caro's rg6g retrospective exhibition at the Hayward Gallery.) Here too "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence" played a role in my thinking, in particular its brief account ofFerdinand de Saussure's theory oflinguistic meaning as a function of purely differential relations among inherently meaningless elements." Characteristically, however, Merleau-Ponty found it impossible fully to subscribe to Saussure's ideas with respect to "creative" or "truly expressive" (as opposed to "everyday") uses oflanguage, which he seems to have thought ofas somehow-as ifbodily or gesturallybreaking through the "lateral" relational network to grasp or express meaning "directly."36 In this and other respects, the "mixed" nature of my discourse in the Whitechapel catalog had much in common 30 ! AN INTRODUCTION TO MY .ART CRITICISM with the tensions and contradictions in "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," but it also perfectly suited Caro's early abstract sculptures, which in effect combined an evocation of bodiliness with an emphasis on syntax to extraordinary effect." In the years that followed I wrote often about Caro's art, to which I have always felt a special closeness. I have also found it good to think about on several fronts. Starting around 1 966-67, for example, I began to try to develop a new, philosophically interesting concept. of abstraction by recasting in Wittgensteinian terms the largely phenomenological language of my earliest writings on Caro's work as well as by mobilizing the contrast, put forward in "Art and Objecthood," between literalness and theatricality on the one hand and radical abstraction and antitheatricality on the other. The short article "Two Sculptures by Anthony Caro" ( t g68) is an example of such an attempt, especially the opening paragraphs with their analysis ofDeep Body Blue (fig. 42) , a seemingly si.mple piece featuring a schematic, lintel-less "door" (two upright steel flats less than five feet high) . What is crucial to our experiencing those flats as a door, I remark, is that they stand in the same plane: It doesn't matter that they are no more than four feet high [actually they are four feet, ten inches high], that they lack any sort of lintel, that we are not tempted nor even able to pass between them: the fact that they stand several feet apart in the same plane is enough to make us experience them as an abstract door (and a large, or wide, one at that) . By the same token, if they are moved even very slightly out of alignment their "doorness" disintegrates and the sculpture as a·whole begins to fall apart, to become arbitrary and therefore meaningless as art. This aspect of Caro's achievement may be described in different ways. One can say that he discovered what constitutes an abstract door, or that he discovered the conventions-corresponding to deep needswhich make something a door. Caro did not consciously set out to discover anything of the kind. On the contrary, it is because Deep Body Blue began in a preoccupation with particular modes of being in the world that its very success as sculpture carne to depend on the making of the above discovery in, or by, the piece itself. It is as though with Caro sculpture itselfhas become committed to a new kind ofcognitive enterprise: not because its generating impulse has become philosophical, butbecause the newly explicit need to defeat theater in all its man� ifestations has meant that the ambition to make sculpture out of a primordial involvement Mth modes of being in the world can now be realized only if antiliteral-that is, radically abstract-terms for that AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 31 involvement can be found. (At the risk of seeming to overload the point, I will add that the cognitive enterprise in question is related, in different ways, both to European phenomenology and to the later philosophy ofWittgenstein. It isn't only modernist art that has found it necessary to defeat theater.) Again, I want to hold offdiscussing "Art and Objecthood" for a while longer. What I wish to stress is my equating of a certain notion of abstraction ("what constitutes an abstract door") with the discovery of the essence of a door, or alternatively with the discovery of the conventions that make something a door, phrasing that, apart from the notion of abstractness, comes directly from the later Wittgen­ stein. Specifically, it comes from a passage in the Remarks on theFoundar tion ofMathematics in which Wittgenstein, reflecting on the nature of proofs and of the conviction they elicit, imagines the following exchange: "It is as if this expressed the essence of form.-! say, however: ifyou talk about essence-, you are merely noting a convention. But here one would like to retort: there is no greater difference than that between a proposition about the depth of the essence and one about-a mere convention. But what if I reply: to the depth that we see in the essence there corresponds the deep need for the convention."" (Minus the first sentence, this serves as the epigraph to 'Jules Olitski.") In the 'Two Sculptures" article, I interpreted depth ofneed in phenomenological terms, which I knew was notwhatWittgenstein meant in the passage in question (but would he have objected?): my dream was to bring together Merleau-Ponty's concern with modes of being in the world with a savor of Wittgenstein's "grammatical" investigations, and although even that may have been overambitious it still seems to me to have been worth the attempt." Another, exemplary instance of what I meant by radical abstraction concerned Caro's efforts, starting in 1 966, to make small sculptures that, as I first put it in "Caro's Abstractness" ( 1 970; reprinted in this book) , "could not be seen merely as reduced versions oflarger ones-sculptures whose smallness was to be secured abstractly, made part of their essence, instead of remaining simply a literal, quantitative fact about them." The solution to that problem was, as I explained in the same article, to run or set at least one element in every piece below the level of the tabletop on which the sculpture was to be placed, thereby precluding its transposition, in fact or in imagination, to the ground. It at once 32 I fu'\' INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM turned out thatby tabling, or precluding grounding, the sculptures in this way Caro was able to establish their smallness in terms that proved virtually independent of their actual size. That is, the distinction between tabling and gi:ounding·, because determined (or acknowledged) by the sculptures themselves instead ofmerely imposed upon them by their eventual placement, made itselffelt as equivalent to a qualitative rather than a quantitative difference in scale. (Not only has the abstract smallness ofCaro's table sculptures proved compatible with surprising largeness of actual size; it soon became apparent that a certain minimum size was required .for their tabling to be experienced in these terms.) In these and other respects Caro's table sculptures mark the emergence of a sense of scale for which there is no precedent in earlier sculpture and no dear parallel in our experience of the world. As I added in my 1 977 introduction to a traveling exhibition of Cam's table sculptures: "From this point of view . . . Caro's abstract sculptures, large and small, grounded and tabled, inhabit another worldfrom the literal, contingent one in which we live, a world which so to speak everywhere parallels our own but whose apartness is perceived as all the more exhilarating on that account.'"10 (See figs. 49-55-) To elaborate slightly, it's on a table rather than on the ground that one expects to encounter manipulable objects of a certain small but not minute size (e.g., cups, scissors, books, telephones, portable computers) , whence the potential importance of the tabletop as a privileged locus for Cam's small pieces. But simply placing a physically small sculpture on a tabletop would not have realized the abstract smallness Caro sought; the tabletop needed to be incorporated into the sculpture, not literally, though eventually Caro did that too, but syntactically, on the plane of "form": only then would a simple phenomenological truth, that objects of a certain size tend to be found on tables, be invested with sculptural significance. And that was accomplished, at a stroke, by going below the plane of the tabletop, though exactly how a given work makes that move is crucial to its specific effect. (Note, by the way, what this account Caro's table sculptures implies about the issue of esthetic autonomy. It is sometimes assumed that because in "Art and Objecthood" I criticized Minimalism's foregrounding of what might be called situationality or exhibitionality, I believed and perhaps still believe that modernistworks of art exist or aspire to exist in a void. But I didn't and I don't. In the table sculptures, for example, Caro found himself compelled to acknowledgeto find or devise appropriate means for acknowledging-the generic AN INTRODUCTION TO Mv ART CruncrsM I 33 conditions of their inescapable "framedness." Similarly, in 1 977 I characterized the momentousness of Caro's elimination of the pedestal in his abstract steel scalptmes of the early 1g6os by saying that the latter were the first sculptures [in the Western tradition] "which demandedto be placed on the ground, whose specific character would inevitably have been traduced if they were not so placed" [emphasis added] . In other words, their syntax was such as to require the ground as their "frame," which in tarn was the precondition for the posing of the problem of smallness that eventually led to the invention of the table sculptures. Indeed, it was precisely that relation to the issue of framing that in my view distinguished Caro's sculptures from the Minimalist object's emphasis on the installation as snc!L)41 For a while I hoped that a comparable understanding of abstraction or abstracmess could be broadened to encompass notjust the whole of Caro's oeuvre but also the other recent painting and sculpture I most admired, but in the end that proved impossible. However, my inability to make Caro's work the basis for a rethinking of the meaning of abstraction in modernist painting and sculpture generally takes nothing away from the intense philosophical interest of these and other episodes in his remarkable career. I will add here, though it doesn't bear directly on Caro, that it would be hard to overstate the importance of Wittgenstein's later writings, as expounded and developed by Cavell, to my sense of my own project not just as a critic but also as an art historian. For example, the passage from the Remarks on theFoundation ofMathematics quoted above suggests that rather than give up all thought of "essence" in connection with painting or sculpture (as doctrinaire antiessentialism would have one do), one might instead seek to historicize essence by producing a narrative of the shifting depths over time of the need for one or more basic conventions within a pictorial or sculptural tradition. This was what I had in mind when I first criticized Greenberg's theory of modernism (see below) , and it is also one way of describing my endeavor in Absorption and Theatricality, Courbet's Realism, and Manet's Modernism. In particular, the seeming oxymoron "the primordial convention that paintings are made to be beheld," which recurs throughout those books, demands to be understood in the light of Wittgenstein's thought. My double critique ofGreenberg's theory ofmodernistpainting and ofMinirnalisrn's Greenbergian advocacy ofliteralism FROM MY undergraduate years, the idea of modernism and of modernist painting and sculpture-and poetry and mu- 34 I AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM sic-was important to me. (But not, it's worth remarking, the idea ofan avant-garde. I believedfrom the first thatwhat in a contribution to a symposium of 1 966 I called the "traditional avant-garde" was over and done with, and I had little sympathy for what had taken its place.)42 In part this had to do with my early education in poetry under Blackmur, whose chief admirations were the great modernist poets from William Butler Yeats to Wallace Stevens, but the influence of Greenberg was surely decisive. It isn't surprising, therefore, that for the first few years of my activity as an art critic it never occurred to me to question Greenberg-'s account ofthe inner logic ofmodernism put forward in such essays as 'The New Sculpture," "Modernist Painting" (which as I've said I don't think I read until around 1 965), and "After Abstract Expressionism," though my early notion of perpetual radical self-criticism or perpetual revolution, taken literally, was at odds with his ideas. But by the time I wrote "Shape as Form" in the fall of 1 966 I had arrived at a different understanding of the modernist dialectic. Greenberg's accountwas this.43 Starting around the middle of the nineteenth century, he claimed in "Modernist Painting," the major arts, threatened for the first time with being assimilated to mere entertainment (or entertainment as therapy) , discovered that they could save themselves from that fate "only by demonstrating that the kind of experience they provided was valuable in its own right and not to be obtained from any other kind of activity" (pp. 67-68). (The crucial figure in painting was Manet, whose significance, as Greenberg saw it, for the inauguration of a truly optical mode of painting has already been discussed.) He continued: Each art, it turned out, had to effect this demonstration on its own account. 'What had to be exhibited and made explicit was that which was unique and irreducible not only in art in general but also in each particular art. Each art had to determine, through the operations peculiar to itself, the effects peculiar and exclusive to itself. By doing this, each art would, to be sure, narrow its area of competence, but at the same time itwould make its possession ofthis area all the more secure. It quickly emerged that the unique and proper area ofcompetence of each art coincided with all that was unique to the nature of its medium. The task of self-criticism became to eliminate from the effects of each art any and every effect that might conceivably be borrowed from or by the medium ofevery other art. Thereby each art would be rendered "pure," and in its "purity" find the guarantee ofits standards ofquality aswell as ofits independence. "Purity" meant self-definition, AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 35 and the enterprise of self-criticism in the arts became one of selfdefinition with a vengeance. (P. 68) As described by Greenberg, the modernist enterprise involved testing a wide range ofnorms and conventions in order to determine which were inessential and therefore to be discarded, and which on the contrary constituted the timeless and unchanging essence of the art ofpainting. (Greenberg didn't use either ofthe lasttwo adjectives but both are implicit in his argument.) By the early 1 g6os, the results of that century-long project, Greenberg's famous modernist "'reduction,"' were in. As he wrote in "Mter Abstract Expressionism": Elsewhere [in "Modernist Painting"] I have written ofthe kind ofselfcritical process which I think provides the infra-logic of modernist art. . . . The aim of the self-criticism, which is entirely empirical and not at all an affair of theory, is to determine the irreducible working essence of art and the separate arts. Under the testing of modernism more and more of the conventions of the art of painting have shown thifnselves to be dispensable, unessential. By now it has been established, it would seem, that the irreducible essence of pictorial art consists in but two constitutive conventions or norms: flatness and the delimitation of flatness; and that the observance of merely these tvvo norms is enough to create an object which can be experienced as a picture: thus a stretched or tacked-up canvas already exists as a picture-though not necessarily as a successfulone.44 Greenberg may have been somewhat uneasy with this conclusion; at any rate, he went on to state that Newman, Rothko, and Still (the exemplary artists of "Mter Abstract Expressionism") had "swung the self-criticism of modernist painting in a new direction simply by continuing it in its old one. The question now asked through their art is no longer what constitutes art, or the art of painting, as such, but what irreducibly constitutes good art as such. Or rather, what is the ultimate source of value or quality in art?" And the answer he gave was "conception alone," by which he meant "invention, inspiration, even intuition (in the usage of Croce, who did anticipate theoretically what practice has just now discovered and confirmed for itself) ."" I first took issue with these ideas in "Shape as Form," where I criticized the idea of '"reduction"' in a footnote: I take a reductionist conception of modernist painting to mean this: that painting roughly since Manet is seen as a kind of cognitive enterprise in which a certain quality (e.g., literalness) , set of norms 36 l AN INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM (e.g·., flatness and the delimitation of flatness), or core of problems (e.g., how to acknowledge the literal character of the support) is progressively revealed as constituting the essence of painting-and, by implication, as having done so all along. This seems to me gravely mistaken, not on the grounds that modernist painting is not a cognitive enterprise, but because it radically misconstrues the kind of cognitive enterprise modernist painting is. VV'bat the modernist painter can be said to discover in his work-what can be said to be revealed to him in it-is not the irreducible essence of all painting but rather that which, at the present moment in painting's history, is capable of convincing him that it can stand comparison -with the painting of both the modernist and the premodernist past whose quality seems to him beyond question. The immediate target of my critique of reductionism in "Shape as Form" was not Greenberg himself so much as the group of artists known as Minimalists, for whom, I wrote, "all conflict between the literal character of the support and illusion of any kind is intolerable and for whom, accordingly, the future of art lies in the creation of works that, more than anything else, are wholly literal-in this respect going 'beyond' painting." Hence my introduction of the term "literalist" as a way of characterizing their views. What I don't quite say, however-though it's implicit in my definition of reductionism, which no one could have failed to recognize as a paraphrase of Greenberg-is that precisely with respect to his understanding of modernism Greenberg had no truer followers than the literalists. For if, as Greenberg held, the "testing" ofmodernism led to the discovery that the irreducible essence of pictorial art was nothing other than the literal properties of the support, that is, flatness and the delimiting of flatness, it's easy to see how a cohort of artists might come to feel that that discovery did not go far enough, in particular that it stopped short of recognizing that what had mattered all along was not those particular properties but rather literalness as such, which in the end could only be incompletely or equivocally expressed within the art of painting-for example, by Greenberg's notional stretched or tacked-up canvas or even by Stella's black and metallic stripe paintings, the recent works which more than any other were formative for literalist sensibility. From such a perspective, what was called for was the surpassing of painting in the interests of literalness or, as I also called it, objecthood: this at any rate was my reading of the Minimalist pr<(ject. And my further claim in "Shape as Form" was that Stella himself had refused the literalist option in favor of a re- fu'-1 li"TRODUC:TION TO Mv ART CRITICISM I 37 newed commitment to the enterprise ofpainting, a comrnitment that was spelled out, as if in the teeth of the literalist reading of his work, in the irregular polygons.'16 In "Shape as Form," too, after saying that the Minimalists aspired to make works that were wholly literal and thus went beyond painting, I observed that the literalness isolated and hypostatized in the work ofartists like Donald Judd and Lany Bell is by no means the same literalness as that acknowledged by advanced painting throughout the past century: it is not the literalness ofthe support. Moreover, hypostatization is not acknowledgment. The continuing problem of how to acknowledge the literal character of the support-of what counts as that acknowledgment-has been at least as crucial to the development of modernist painting as the fact ofits literalness, and that problem has been eliminated, not solved, by the artists in question. Their pieces cannot be said to acknowledge literalness; they simply are literal. And it is hard to see how literalness as such, divorced from the conventions which, from Manet to Noland, Olitski, and Stella, have given literalness value and have made it a bearer of conviction, can be experienced as a source of both of these-and what is more, one powerful enough to generate new conventions, a new art. My insistence on a problematic of acknowledgment understood in this way marks another stress in the difference between my view of modernism and Greenberg's, and it also represents a further link between my writing and Cavell's, in which the concept of acknowledgment plays a fundamental role:" (In this introduction I have already wielded the concept of acknowledgment as defined above in the citation from my article on Poons of 1 972 and in the remarks on Caro's table sculptures in the previous section.) In "Art and Objecthood," written some months after "Shape as Form," I took on Greenberg directly (again in a footnote). After quoting his remarks about a stretched or tacked-up canvas already existing as a picture though not necessarily as a successful one, I ob­ served: To begin with, it is not quite enough to say that abare canvas tacked to a wall is not "necessarily" a successful picture; it would, I think, be more accurate [what I originally wrote was "less of an exaggeration"] to say that it is not conceivably one. It may be countered that future circumstances might be such as to make it a successful painting, but I would argue that, for that to happen, the enterprise ofpainting would 38 \ AN INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM have to change so drastically that nothing more than the name would remain. (It would require a far greater change than that which painting has undergone from Manet to Noland, Olitski, and Stella!) Moreover, seeing something as a painting in the sense that one sees the tacked-up canvas as a painting, and being convinced that a particular work can stand comparison with the painting ofthe past whose quality is not in doubt, are altogether different experiences: it is, I want to say, as though unless something compels conviction as to its quality it is no more than trivially or nominally a painting. This suggests that flatness and the delimitation offlatness ought not to be thought ofas the "irreducible essence ofpictorial art," but rather as something like the tninimal conditionsforsomething's beingseen as a painting; and that the crucial question is not what those minimal and, so to speak, timeless conditions are, but ratherwhat, at a given moment, is capable ofcompelling· conviction, of succeeding as painting. This is not to say that painting hasno essence; it is to claim that that essence-i.e., that which compels conviction-is largely determined by, and therefore changes continually in response to, the vital work of the recent past. The essence of painting is not something irreducible. Rather, the task of the modernist painter is to discover those conventions that, at a given moment, aloneare capable of establishing his work's identity as painting. My attempt to historicize the concept of essence in this way was of course indebted to Wittgenstein on essence and convention. But what I want to focus on here is the related stress on the importance of conviction (another Wittgensteinian motif, already present in earlier quotations) , which has the virtue, among other things, of undoing the artificial separation that Greenberg was compelled to posit between two distinct yet somehow continuous phases in the modernist dynamic: a first phase, lasting from Manet through Abstract Expressionism, directed toward the discovery of the irreducible working essence of pictorial art, and a second phase, beginning with Newman, Rothko, and Still, directed toward the discovery of what irreducibly constitutes "good" art-a phase, as Greenberg puts it in the quotation cited above, that asks the question "What is the ultimate source ofvalue or quality in art?" I say Greenberg was compelled to posit two such phases for the simple reason that on his basic account of modernist self-criticism in "Modernist Painting" the enterprise of painting would necessarily come to an end with the discovery of its irreducible norms or conventions-a further point of inadvertent collusion between him and the Minimalists.'" For Greenberg in 1 962, however, despite the discovery AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 39 of the irreducibility of flatness and the delimiting of flatness, painting hadn't yet come to an end, by which I mean that certain painters continued to produce works he greatly admired, and so in "After Abstract Expressionism" he was forced to devise a second dynamic, the search for what constitutes value or quality in art, to account for that otherwise inexplicable fact. But if, as I maintained against him, the "cognitive" dimension of the modernist dynamic was an attempt to discover those conventions which, at a given historical conjuncture, were capable of compelling or eliciting conviction, then there was no reason to imagine either that that dynamic would have the shape of a "reduction" or, a fortiori, that it would be succeeded by a second dynamic aimed at determining the general grounds of value or quality in art. My way of putting this in "Art and Objecthood" was to say, "But I would argue that what modernism has meant is that the two questions-What constitutes the art of painting? And what constitutes good painting?-are no longer separable; the first disappears, or increasingly tends to disappear, into the second." (I seem to have been allowing for the possibilitythatatan earlierstage ofmodernism they were distinguishable, at least in the minds of its practi­ tioners.)49 My further claim that a tacked-up bare canvas couldn't conceivably be a successful painting, that is, compel conviction as a painting, is something else again: in effect I was betting, with perfect confidence but also in the absence of any possibility of proof, that more than that was required. What in retrospect may seem surprising or even ironic about Greenberg's implication that a bare canvas might be enough is that no one at that moment approached his insight into the coloristic achievements of Newman, Rothko, Still, and others. But the reductionist logic of Greenberg's theory of modernism meant that color or indeed "openness" in recent painting could not assume the constitutive or essentialist significance of flatness and the delimiting of flatness, despite his claim that "by the new openness they have attained Newman, Rothko and Still point to what I would risk saying is the only way to high pictorial art in the near future";50 they belonged, in his account, to modernism's supposed second phase, but therewhat turned out to be decisive was not Rothko's, Newman's, or Still's (or Louis's, Noland's, or Olitski's) handling of color or attainment ofopenness but rather the philosophical revelation in their works of the primacyof conception, invention, inspiration, intuition. The gulf between Greenberg's critical insights and his theoretical model was never greater than in "After Abstract Expressionism."51 40 I ;\;.'\!. INTRODUCTION TC) MY ART CRITICISM (Recently, rereading "Morris Louis" in the light of my insistence in "Art and Objecthood" on the inevitable insufficiency of tbe bare canvas, it occurred to me that my discussion of Louis's unfurleds may be taken as showing what in fact was required in order that a large expanse of canvas compel conviction as painting, that is, be endowed with specifically pictorial, not simply literal, significance -''' By the same token, my account in "Larry Poons's New Paintings" (reprinted in this book) of the exhaustion of the authority of the bare canvas ground in all recent pictures in which it had appeared suggests that by the early 1 970s the evolution ofadvanced painting had been away from the possibility that Greenberg had glimpsed ten years before. In the Wittgensteinian terms developed above, this-more broadly, the shift away from an emphasis on shape toward one on surfaceamounted to a change in the essence of painting over that period.) I might add that along with my revision of the logic of modernist painting went a recognition of the need to rethink the significance of Manet's art, in particular his momentous canvases of the early 1 86os (the OldMusician, Diijeunersurl'herbe, Olympia, Angels atthe Tomb ofChrist, etc.) . I have attempted that twice, first in "Manet's Sources" and recently in Manet's Modernism, where I close by suggesting that Greenberg's account ofManet as the first modernist painter byvirtue of the flatness and opticality of his paintings is largely an artifact of Impressionism. (I return to this point briefly at the end of part 3.) The critique oftheatricality in ''Art and Objecthood" IT's HARD to know what should be said at this late date about my critique ofMinimalist theatricality in "Art and Objecthood." There is no need to rehearse the details of that critique here. But several points seem worth making. 1 . The essay largely proceeds by analyzing a series oftexts by three leading Minimalist, that is, literalist, figures-Donald Judd, Robert Morris, and Tony Smith. But its chief motivation in the first place had to do with my experience of literalist works and exhibitions during the previous several years, in particular my recurrent sense, especially in gallery shows devoted to one or another artist, of!iteralism's singular effectiveness as mise-en-scene (Morris and Carl Andre were masters at this) . As I said in a talk at the Dia Art Foundation in 1 987, it was as though their installations infallibly offered their audience a kind of heightened perceptual experience, and I wanted to understand the nature of that surefire, and therefore to my mind essentially inartistic (I should have said unrnodernist) , effect.53 I quickly AN INTRODUCTION TO My ART CRITICISM I 41 realized that the basis of that effect was that both work and installation (in a sense the installation was the work, as Thierry de Duve has emphasized)"' solicited and included the beholder in a way that was fundamentally antithetical to the expressive and presentational mode of the recent painting and sculpture I most admired. And that led to the further claim that the present moment in advanced art was marked by an irreconcilable conflict between the "theatrical" workin-situations of the literalists and the "antitheatrical" painting and sculpture of the radically abstract artists I championed. 2 . Another source of that vision of conflict was the recognition arrived at in "Shape in Form" that whereas literalist work aimed to project and hypostatize objecthood, the abstract painting and sculpture I admired sought to undo or neutralize objecthood in one way or another. With respect to painting, the struggle against objecthood was mainly carried out (as I've said) in and through the medium of shape; while as regards Caro's sculptures the means chiefly cited in "Art and Objecthood" were those ofsyntax, radical unlikeness to nature, and the imitation of the efficacy of gesture. (Unfortunately, I muddied the issue by quoting Greenberg on the new sculpture offering the illusion "that matter is incorporeal, weightless, and exists only optically like a mirage" before going on to stress again the syntactic nature of Caro's art.)55 I also said of Caro's sculptures that "like certain music and poetry, they are possessed by the knowledge of the human body and how, in innumerable ways and moods, it makes meaning . . . as though the possibility ofmeaning what we say and do alone makes his sculpture possible." This is obscure, as is my claim that Caro's sculptures imitate the efficacy of gesture. But especially in the light of my previous discussions of the evocation of bodiliness in Caro's art, not to mention my subsequent articles "Two Sculptures by Anthony Caro" (which includes the discussion of Dee-p Body Blue quoted above) and "Caro's Abstractness," as well as the introduction to the catalog for the Hayward Gallery retrospective of rg6g (where if anything I overstate the role of the body in his work) ,56 it ought at least to have meant that I can't be charged with denying the body in favor of conceiving of the viewer as "floating in front of the work as pure optical ray."57 (Is there another frontline art critic writing in the rg6os who harped on the importance of bodily experience to the extent that I did? I can't think of one.)58 The crucial point, however, is that after writing "Shape as Form" I had a growing sense that something more was at stake in the struggle over objecthood. And I soon came to feel that that something more concerned the issue of the 42 I AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM relationship between work and beholder (Morris's "Remarks on Sculpture" insist� on this) . The literalist projection and hypostatization of objecthood, I went on to argue, amounted to a new genre of theater, while the modernist imperative to seek to negate objecthood expressed a fundamental hostility to theater in all its manifestations. (My critique ofthe literalist address to the viewer's bodywas not that hodiliness as such had no place in art but rather that literalism theatricalized the body, put it endlessly on stage, made it uncanny or opaque to itself, hollowed it out, deadened its expressiveness, denied its finitude and in a sense its humanness, and so on. There is, I might have said, something vaguely monstrousabout the body in literalism.) 3· As the essay makes clear, I saw those as recent developments. For example, I wrote that "objecthood has become an issue for modernist painting only within the past several years. This, however, is not to say that before the present situation came into being, paintings, or sculptures for that matter, simply were objects. It would, I think, be closer to the truth to say that they simply were not. The risk, even the possibility, of seeing works of art.. as nothing more than objects did not exist. That such a possibility began to present itself around rg6o was largely the result of developments within modernist painting." I also wrote that "theater is now the negation ofart" (emphasis added) and in general strongly implied that the high moderniststruggle with theatricality was itself something new. But my invocation of Bertolt Brecht andAntonin Artaud also suggested that theatricality had been an issue for the theater for decades. And with the publication of my subsequent books on the French antitheatrical tradition between the middle of the eighteenth century and the advent of Manet and the Impressionists in the r86os and 1 87os, it became all too easy to assume, first, that I believe that a struggle between theatricality and antitheatricality was continuously central to painting from the mideighteenth century to the present, and second, that I agree with Diderot and other antitheatrical critics in their negative and positive assessments of a host of painters between Greuze and Manet (and earlier). Both assumptions are mistaken and could only be based on a careless reading of my work, but I want to postpone discussing the question of the relation of my art criticism to my art-historical writings until part 3 of this introduction. 4- In historical retrospect, "Art and Objecthood" was both right and wrong about the developments it described. On the one hand, it seems clear that literalism did represent a break with modernism as regards the terms of its appeal to the viewer. In fact, subsequent A.� INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 43 commentators who have taken issue with "Art and Objecthood" are in agreement with it on that score; where they disagree hotly is with respect to my evaluation of Minimalist theatricality. This is to say that the terms of my argument have gone untouched by my critics, an unusual state of affairs in light ofthe antagonism "Art and Objecthood" has provoked.59 On the other hand, my essay is nowhere near as pessimistic as future events would warrant from my point ofview; I don't seem to have imagined the possibility that within a few years the art I admired would be all but submerged under an avalanche of more or less openly theatrical productions and practices, as proved to be the case. It's important to recognize, however, that the extraordinary efflorescence of theatricality in the 1 970s and 1 g8os was accompanied by a conceptual or theoretical crisis as regards the question of artistic value as such. As I wrote in "Art and Objecthood": 'The concepts of quality and value-and to the extent that these are central to art, the concept ofart itself-are meaningful, or whollymeaningful, only within the individual arts. What lies between the arts is theater."60 And with the widespread turning away from the high modernist emphasis on painting and sculpture, not only were the new practitioners driven to ever more overtly theatrical interventions, but the very notions of value or quality or conviction lost all relevance to what was going on. This had been anticipated byJudd's claim, "A work needs only to be interesting," with which I took issue in both "Shape as Form" and "Art and Objecthood." In the same spirit, but more programmatically, Hal Foster commented in 1 987: "There's a line in 'Art and Objecthood' to the effect that painting must compel conviction. Now a primary motive of the innovative art of my generation [Foster was born in 1955] is precisely that it not compel conviction-that it trouble conviction, that it demystify belief: that it not be what it seems to be."61 Elsewhere Foster has characterized the postmodern impulse in terms that relate it to Marcel Duchamp's original expose of the institutional nature of art: "Quality," . . . exposed as an imposition of a set of norms, is displaced as a criterion by "interest," and art is henceforth seen to develop less by formal historicist refinement (as in "pursue the pure, extract the extraneous") than by structural historical negation (as in "how can I as an artist expand the aesthetic and ideological limits of the artistic paradigm that I have received?"). At this point, too, the object ofcritical investigation becomes less the essence ofa medium [Foster means this in Greenberg's sense, not mine, but it would make no difference 44 � AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM to his argument if the reverse were true] than "the social etfect (function) of a work" in the present, and, perhaps most important, the intent of artistic intervention becomes less to secure a transcendental "conviction" in art and its institutions than to undertake an immanent critique of its rules and regulations. Indeed, this last may be seen as a provisional distinction between formalist-modernist and avant-gardistpostmodernist art: "to compel conviction" versus "to cast doubt"; "to seek the essential" versus "to reveal the conditional."62 In other words, what I have called a crisis with respect to notions of value is described by Foster, not unreasonably, as the replacement of one set of concerns by another, altogether different set. But the question, my question, is how deep or compelling or significant! would even ask how difficult-an achievement "casting doubt" or "revealing the conditional" or "troubling conviction" or "demystifYing belief" finally is? Put the other way around, bow much is lost · when the modernist enterprise as I have described it is replaced by Foster's "immanent critique"? To appeal once more to a famous crux: Tony Smith's night car ride on the unfinished NewJersey Turnpike led him to some stark conclusions. "I thought to myself;" Smith said, "it ought to be clear that's the end of art. Most painting looks pretty pictorial after that. There is no way you can frame it [the car ride, he seems to have meant], you just have to experience it" (I quote and discuss this in "Art and Objecthood") . This is perhaps the exemplary post-Ducharnp instance of the revelation of the conditional, and how much weight does it finally have? Why should any experience that is not an experience of art be taken as laying bare the end of art? Would the experience of a spectacular sunset or a nuclear explosion do as much, and if not, why not? What's wrong with painting, even modernist painting, "looking pictorial"? And how tenable is the contrast between "framing" and "experiencing" on which Smith insists? (There is no more sacred term in Greenberg's lexicon than "experience.")" 5· A final crux in "Art and Objecthood" concerns the issue oftemporality. In the essay's last pages I claimed that literalist sensibility was preoccupied with experiences that persist in time, and more broadly that the "presentment" ofduration, of "time itselfas though it were some sort of literalist object," was central to the new esthetic. Here too I drew a sharp contrast with the modernist painting and sculpture I most admired. "It is as though one's experience of [modernistpainting and sculpture] has no duration," I wrote, "not because one in fact experiences a picture by Noland or Olitski or a sculp- A;-; hTRODUCTIOl\ TO lv1Y ART CRITICISM j ,;j,;) ture by David Smith or Caro in no time at all, but because at every moment the work itselfis wholly manifest. . . . It is this continuous and entire presentness [a term I adopted in opposition to literalist "presence"], amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, that one experiences as a kind of instantaneousness, as though ifonly one were infmite!y more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it." For de Duve, who endorses my view that Mimimalist work "is an art of time" ("like theater," he adds) , my invocation of presentness made me "but the last in a long line of aestheticians who, from Lessing to Greenberg through Wolfflin, sought in the instantaneous spatiality of painting the specific essence of plastic art." More broadly, de Duve argues that the literalist preoccupation with duration-nowhere more developed than in the work of Robert Morris-gave "a fatal blow" to that basic tenet of classical and modernist esthetics 6'1 But in the first place my overall insistence on a nonreductive modernist dialectic militated against there being any "specific essence of plastic art" as such.65 And in the second, my account of the struggle between literalism and modernism disputes in advance de Duve's notion of a "fatal blow." More precisely, a major strand of my argument in both "Shape as Form" and "Art and Objecthood" was that literalism arose within modernism as a misreading of its dialectic (a misreading anticipated, on the plane of theory, hy Greenberg in "Modernist Painting" and "After Abstract Expressionism") , which implies that at a certain point in the recent history of modernist painting and sculpture (mainly painting) , the projection and hypostatization of literalness and duration (also of endlessness, of resistance to closure) emerged as inner ternptations which it was now necessary for the modernist arts to recognize as such and to take positive measures to refuse and defeat. "It should be evident," I wrote in "Shape as Form," "that . . . literalist sensibility is itself a product, or by-product, of the development of modernist painting itself-more accurately, of the increasingly explicit acknowledgment of the literal character of the support that has been central to that development." Not that "inner" and "outer" could be kept wholly distinct from one another. "Literalist sensibility," "Art and Objecthood" also says, is . . . a response to the samedevelopments that have largely compelled modernist painting to undo its objecthood-more precisely, the same developments seen differently, that is, in theatrical terms, by a sensibility already theatrical, already (to say the worst) corrupted or perverted by 46 \ AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM theater. Similarly, what has compelled modernist painting to defeat or suspend its own objecthood is notjust developments internal to itself, but the same general, enveloping, infectious theatricality that corM rupted literalist sensibility in the first place and in the grip of which the developments in question-and modernist painting in generalare seen as nothing more than an uncompelling and presenceless kind of theater. It was the need to break the fingers of that grip that made objecthood an issue for modernist painting. In an obvious sense, the characterization of theatricality as a corrosive force external to both modernism and literalism is at odds with a stress on inner conflict. But in another sense it heightens that stress by placing modernism and literalism on the same footing: why did the one fight off theatricality and the other accede to it?66 In any case, the conflict between modernism and literalism evoked in "Shape as Form" and "Art and O�jecthood" resists being redescribed as a matter of simple supercession and demystification, as if modernist painting had in fact come to an end with Stella's black pictures (Stella himself refused to regard them in that light),67 to be notjust succeeded but invalidated by literalism, which in its e.mhrace of objecthood and temporality-also by virtue of its frankly situational character-is imagined to have established not only a new paradigm of art making but a new, more "contemporary" (e.g., nontranscendental, embodied, "externalized," entropic, divided, decentered) model of the subject or self68 Indeed, a sense of inner combat motivated the overtly theological cast ofmyessay's rhetorical frame: "Art and Objecthood" opens with an epigraph from Perry Miller's wonderful book on Jonathan Edwards and closes with two sentences that soon became notorious (the second one anyway) : 'We are all literalists most or all of our lives. Presentness is grace." As for the epigraph, it quotes Edwards writing in hisjournal, '"It is certain with me that the world exists anew every moment; that the existence of things every moment ceases and is every moment renewed.' The abiding assurance," Miller comments, "is that 'we every moment see the same proof of a God as we should have seen ifwe had seen Him create the world at first."'69 I meant the epigraph to be taken as a gloss on the concept of presentness, and in particular as suggesting that what was at stake in my invocation of that concept was something other than mere instantaneousness (however that is defined) , which incidentally is why dutifully rehearsing Derrida's deconstruction of the Husserlian "now" has no bearing on my argurnents.70 (Note too my reliance in the passages quoted above on constructions involving AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM ! 47 "as though," which by itself should have ruled out taking instantaneousness literally, so to speak.) My point, I would say today, was that at every moment the claim on the viewer of the modernist painting or sculpture is renewed totally, as if nothing Jess than that is the condition of its expressiveness. By the sarne token, the viewer's conviction in a work's seriousness, its "quality," is never for a moment, or is only for a moment, safe from the possibility of doubt (a modernist state of affairs with a vengeance) ; conviction-grace-must be secured again and again, as though continuously, by the work itself but also, in the act of experiencing, by the viewer, by us. A further feature of the epigraph is its obvious "sublimity," which means that from the outset "Art and Objecthood" can't be read in terms ofan implied contrastbetween the (good) beautiful and (bad) sublime. I don't. say I fully understood this at the time; if someone had asked me, I might have consented to the latter equation, if only because of being struck by the all-too-obviously "sublime" connotations of Smith's story of his nocturnal car ride or his evocation in the same interview of the enormous drill ground at Nuremburg. But what I actually wrote exceeds that frame (in particular, my frame exceeds that frame) .7l 3· Art Criticism and Art History As I'vE already suggested, one source of confusion for readers familiar both with my art criticism and my art-historical writings turns on the role played in each by the concept of theatricality. Starting in the mid-1g7os, when I began publishing preliminary versions of parts of Absorption and Theatricality, and ending with Manet'sModernism more than twenty years later, I put forward an account of the evolution of a central tradition within French painting between the middle of the eighteenth century and the advent of Manet and the Impressionists in the 1 86os and 1 87os. The core issue in that tradition-lucidly theorized at the outset by the great philosophe and pioneer art critic Denis Diderot-concerned the relationship between painting and beholder, which is to say it concerned the same relationship as the one that bore the brunt of my analysis in "Art and Objecthood." Furthermore, throughout that tradition the same values were in force as in "Art and Objecthood." (As we shall see, in this context sameness isn't quite identity.) By that I mean that for Diderot and the French antitheatrical tradition generally, the painter's taskwas crucially to negate or neutralize what I have called 48 I A.'<. INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM the primordial convention that paintings are made to be beheld. This was to be done, in the first place, by depicting figures so engrossed or (a key term in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century criticism) absorbed in what they were doing, thinking, and feeling that they appeared oblivious of everything else, including, crucially, the beholder standing before the painting. To the extent that the painter succeeded in that aim, the beholder's existence was effectively ignored or, put more strongly, denied; the figures in the painting appeared alone in the world (alternatively we may say that the world of the painting appeared self-sufficient, autonomous, a closed system independent of, in that sense blind to, the world of the beholder) , though it was also true that only by making a painting that appeared to ignore or deny or be blind to the beholder in this way could the painter accomplish his ultimate purpose-bringing actual viewers to a halt in front of the painting and holding them there in a virtual trance of imaginative involvement. The antithesis of absorption was theatricality, playing to an audience, which quickly emerged as the worst ofall artistic faults. Indeed, the issue of theatricality was from the outset defined in the starkest possible terms: either the figure or figures in a painting seemed entirely oblivious to being beheld orthey stood condemned as theatrical. Equally all-or-nothing was the opposition between drama and theater: whereas previously the two terms were, if not interchangeable, at any rate inseparable from one another, for Diderot and the French antitheatrical tradition they were faced off against one another by definition. Drama, the positive term, absolutely precluded all suggestion that the beholder had been taken into account (no addressing the audience, falsely rhetorical gestures, symmetrical arrangement of personages, elaborate costumes) ; conversely, the least hint of theater turned drama into melodrama (to use a third term that would become current only in the early nineteenth century) . For obvious reasons, the starkness of those oppositions has reminded many readers of the evaluative schema of "Art and Oqjecthood" and related texts. And since my further claim in Absorption and Theatricalityand its sequels has been that at the heart of the evolution of painting in France between Greuze and Manet was a constantly renewed attempt to defeat theatricality by means of absorption and/or drama, and In the case of Courbet by an effort on the part of the painterbeholder to merge all but corporeally with the painting on which he was working, many readers have also assumed that my critical and AN INTRODVCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 49 art-historical writings form a seamless whole. But that assumption is wrong in several respects. For one thing, it ignores my insistence, spelled ont in Courbet's Realism and implicit in Absorption and Theatricality, on the futility of trying to determine whether or not a given painting conclusively succeeded or for that matter conclusively failed in overcoming the condition I have been calling theater. Consider, for example, Jacques-Louis David's Oath ofthe Horatii ( 1785; fig. 7 1 ) , the picture that more than any other marks the early triumphant phase of the modern French schooL In my reading, the Horatii was intended by David as a rigorously dramatic, not theatrical, painting, in which each of the figures and all of them together were meant to be seen as wholly engaged in the strongly contrasted actions ofswearing an oath to fight to the death for Rome (the men) and of all but collapsing in horror and grief (the women) . (The contrastbetween the two groups was itself a vehicle of the drama.) But we also know that roughly ten years later, while working on the Intervention of the Sabine Women ( 1 799; fig. 72), David characterized the composition of the Horatii as theatrical in a pejorative sense, by which I take him to have meant that the unprecedented evocation of physical and emotional intensity in the earlier work and perhaps also the starkness of the contrast between the men and women now struck him as excessive and exaggerated, which is to say as too deliberately seeking to impress. And in fact the Sabines marks a deliberate withdrawal from the values and effects of pictorial drama in favor of a Jess instantaneous and impassioned representational mode. Within roughly a decade, however, the Sabines was attacked as theatrical by various commentators precisely because it was seen to depict personages merely posing (i.e., insufficiently impassioned) , and by the time Stendhal wrote in the mid-1 82os it had come to stand for all that appeared mannered and unmotivated in the art of the David schooL Now it may seem that, confronted with these shifting interpretations of the issue of theatricality on the part of the artist, the task of the art historian is to try to resolve the matter once and for all by determining (to begin with) whether David was right about antitheatricality in 1784-85, when he painted the Horatii, or in 1796-99, when he found the Horatii theatrical and devised the significantly different mise-en-scene of the Sabines. (A third possibility is that he was wrong on both occasions.) But in fact the art historian ought to do nothing of the kind. From a historical perspective, looking back 50 I A;� INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM at David's paintings from the late twentieth century, the Horatii, like the Sabines, is inherently neither dramatic nor theatrical. All we are justified in saying, if I am right in my claims about what David was up to, is thatwhereas in 1 784-85 he aimed to produce an antitheatrical work by intensely dramatic means, by the second half of the 1790s the dramaturgical and stylistic resources he had earlier mobilized in the interests of visual drama now seemed to him overdone and in that sense theatrical in effect, and that he was therefore led to modify his original solution inways that themselves were later found theatrical on exactly opposite grounds. More broadly, antitheatricality emerges in my books and essays on French painting as a structure of artistic intention on the part of painters and as a structure of demand, expectation, and reception on the part of critics and audiences, not as a formal or expressive quality inhering or failing to inhere, timelessly and changelessly, in individual works. This seems to be a hard idea to grasp. The Sabines in particular tends to strike the modern viewer as so self-evidently theatrical that it can feel perverse to reject the temptation to declare it such in favor of seeking to understand, first, how it carne to be the way it is and second, how it was seen both by its contemporaries and by succeeding generations of viewers.72 (This is even truer of Greuze's genre paintings of the 176os and after.) Perhaps one way of making that rejection feel less odd is to observe that, in my account, it was precisely the constitutive instability of the paintings and prints of the central French tradition-the works ofGreuze, David, Gras, Gericault, Daumier, Couture, Millet, Courbet, Fantin-Latour, Legros, Whistler, and others-with respect to the issue of antitheatricality that provided the tradition's hidden motor, in a manner of speaking. Because the paintings in question were in themselves neither antitheatrical nor theatrical, the overarching, transgenerational aim of making paintings that seemed genuinely indi±Ierent to the beholder could never be realized definitively and so remained continually in force. Works that at one moment were felt to satisfy that aim soon appeared not to do so, though by the same token works that were once dismissed with scorn could also come back into at least partial favor (as happened with Greuze in the 186os) . Indeed, in the r 8sos and r 86os a single artist, Millet, violently divided the viewing public. For one group of critics, his works were exemplary because they appeared devoid of the least trace of consciousness of an audience; for another group, the obviousness of his efforts to produce that effect made his pictures seem unbearably theatrical-and here too the task AN INTRODUCTION ·ro Mv ART CRITICISM I 5 1 of the art historian is to try to understand the basis of that division of opinion, not to seek to resolve the dispute by coming down on one side or the other.73 It follows that those commentators who have assumed that in my art-historical writings I share the views and in particular the judgments of Diderot and other antitheatrical critics whom I cite and discuss are mistaken. Simply put, my art-historical writings are resolutely nonjudgmental with respect to individual works and oeuvres in the antitheatrical tradition (and outside it, e.g., the art ofWatteau and Boucher), not in the name of an ideal of historical objectivity (whatever the feasibility of such an ideal) , but rather in the interest of a particular historical project: tracking the constantly shifting and by no means unitary structure of valuejudgments keyed to the issue of antitbeatricality as tbat structure found expression both in paintings and in art criticism. In short, between myself as historian of the French antitheatrical tradition and the critic who wrote "Art and Objecthood" there looms an unbridgeable gulf. For not only is "Art and Objecthood" harshly critical of Minimalist theatricality. More important, the present writer, commenting in this introduction both on his early art criticism and his later art history, sees no way of negotiating the difference between the priority given in his criticism tojudgments ofvalue both positive and negative and the principled refusal of all suchjudgments in the pursuit of historical understanding, despite the fact that the developments explored in Absorption and Theatricality, Courbet's Realism, and Manet's Modernism are part of the deep background to those discussed in "Shape as Form" and "Art and Objecthood"-and despite the fact that the latter essays belong to a tradition ofantitheatrical criticism founded by Diderot more than two centuries before (as I've said, I wasn't aware of that when I wrote them) . In other words, my art-historical writings investigate crucial aspects of the genealogy both of the issues treated in "Art and Objecthood" and related essays and of the judgments expressed in them. But genealogical knowledge turns out to be powerless to "historicize" my present relation to those essays: although I sometimes feel thattheywere written by another person (or at least in another world, that ofAmerica in the age ofthe Vietnam War, the struggle for civil rights, the assassinations) , I cannot disconnect my present self from the evaluations they express (although I could not write those essays now, I have no choice but to stand behind them) .71 Nor is this simply a matter ofmy continued indifference to the work of.Judd, Morris, Smith, and other 52 I r'U"'i INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM literalists: those feelings might hy now have found different expression-for example, the entire issue of theatricality might by now have come to strike me as a red herring-but that hasn't happened. It's as if somewhere around rg6o time undergoes a twist, and as if this side of that twist my relation to that issue remains implacably critical, not historical."' (To that extent, I find myself in unexpected agreement with Greenberg's distinction between the judgmental approach of art criticism and the nonjudgmental stance of art history, though not of course with bis deprecation of the latter.) And as mentioned earlier, no one of all those who have written against "Art and Objecthood" has contended that literalist art was not theatrical; instead, they have tried to reverse my negative assessment of theatricality itself, which is understandable but also suggests that the relation of work to beholder took a new, as yet "unhistoricizable" form with and around the literalist adventure. Shortly after "Art and Objecthood" appeared, Robert Smithson wrote a characteristically brilliant letter to Artforum in which he asked: "Could it be there is a double Michael Fried?" Whatever the right answer was in 1 967, the answer now is yes.76 (Actually, the answer is yes only as regards the critical as distinct from the theoretical claims of "Shape as Form" and "Art and Objecthood." My case against the argumentsbehind literalism and reductionism was ahead of its time: I owe to Walter Benn Michaels the recognition that my disagreement with the literalists on the plane of theory anticipates by fifteen years crucial aspects of the "Against Theory" debate in which Michaels and his then Berkeley colleague Steven Knapp sought to refute the premises of de Manian and other varieties of linguistic "materialism."77 With respect to those issues, there is no question of a conflict between history and criticism, distance and proximity.) Another assumption I sometimes meet is that I think there exists notjust a certain parallel but an actual continuity between the antitheatrical tradition from the 1 750s to the advent of Maner and the struggle against theatricality in abstract painting and sculpture in the tg6os. But of course I don't. Not only is there no strict equivalent in "Art and Objecthood" and related texts for the notions ofabsorption and drama in my art-historical writing.78 My work on eighteenth- and nineteenth-century French painting has from the first been governed by the belief that the antitbeatrical tradition reached a stage of absolute crisis, indeed was liquidated asa tradition, in and by Maner's revolutionary canvases of the first half of the 1 86os, and that at least AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM I 53 as regards the issue of beholding whatever took place after that crisis ·was in an important sense discontinuous with all that had gone before. In Manet's Modernism I complicate that notion by describing the radically innovatory status of Manet's pictures of the r 86os as all but inseparable from the interpretation of those paintings posited by early Impressionism, but I nevertheless regard their repudiation of absorption in favor of facingness and strikingness-their embrace of what I call a "presentational" as distinct from "actional" kind of theatricality-as breaking fundamentally with the Diderotian tradition as a whole. And yet the break with that tradition did not mark the disappearance of the sort of concerns that had motivated it all along. "Painting after Manet," I write in the coda to Manet's Modernism, "would be severed from the Diderotian tradition that had made it possible (it would no longer be a requirement of ambitious painting that it defeat theatricality, though antagonism to the latter would remain a live option). But painting after Manet would not. be liberated from the concerns of that tradition (it would not thereafter be indifferent to problems of beholding) , least of all when a final step in a formalist-modernist evolution would purport to go beyond painting into Minimalist objecthood."79 (For "formalist-modernist" read Greenbergian.) A great. deal more remains to be discovered about the vicissitudes of the relationship between painting and beholder from Manet to Stella. But that is a task for other occasions and in part for other writers. Finally, in the introduction and coda to Manet's Modernism I argue that the basic formalist-modernist view-enshrined in Greenberg's "Modernist Painting"-that paintings consist essentially in flat surfaces conjoined to a sheerly visual or optical mode of spatiality amounts to nothing more nor less than a theoretical rationale for the Impressionist picture.80 For some time now, as was noted above in "The Issue of 'Opticality,"' formalist-modernism's overinvestment in opticality has been under widespread attack. But potentially far more productive of a genuine change in thinking, I suggest, is the recognition of lmpressionism's role in virtually rewiring the human sensorium as far as the experience of paintings is concerned, for it is only on that. basis that. we can begin to gauge the extent to which even the most sophisticated-seeming modern commentaries on painting, including those of formalist-modernism's mostvocal critics, have remained captive to a set of assumptions that first took shape more than 1 25 years ago.81 !t was in shifting the focus ofattention to a consideration of the relationship between painting and beholder 54 I A� INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM that (I don't see how else to put this) I accomplished the arthistorical work that made that recognition possible, and my closing point is simply that although ''Art and Objecthood" and the other pieces in this book were not yet engaged in that work, it was only once they werewritten that it began to seem a necessary thing to do. THROUGHOUT THE years when I waswriting art criticism I alsowrote poems, some ofwhich were collected in the volume called Powers mentioned in part 1 of this introduction. Andjust over twenty years later, in 1994, Farrar, Straus and Giroux brought out a second book of poems, To the Center ofthe Earth, which comprises a selection from Powers along with new work.82 I have always believed that the poems, the art criticism, and the art history go together, that they share a single vision of reality. More than that isn't for me to say. NOTES Baltimore, Maryland May 28, 1 996 1 . Martin Heidegger, ''The Origin of the Work of Art," in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York, 197 1 ) , p. 7 1 . 2. All three have been published by the University of Chicago Press. 3· Millard was then an advanced graduate student at the Fogg; he subsequently became chief curator at the Hirshhorn Museum and Sculpture Garden and also wrote art criticism for the Hudson Review. Other graduate students at Harvard during those yearswho became involved -with contemporary art include Kermit Swiler Champa, Rosalind Krauss, and Kenworth Moffett. The senior professor of modern art at Harvard at that time, Frederick B. Deknatel, sympathized with that involvement. It's fair to say, though, that for all of us the dominant intellectual presence in the Department of Fine Arts during those years was Freedberg, arguably the foremost art historian of the Italian High Renaissance and Mannerism of his generation and a teacher of genius. F'reedberg's "formalist" methodology no doubt reinforced our interest in Greenberg (see part 1 of the introduction to the catalog for the exhibition Three American Painters, reprinted in this book as "ThreeAmerican Painters: Kenneth Noland,jules Olitski, Frank Stella"), but what the two men, otherwise so different, also had in common was the distinction of their "eyes": this is evident in Freedberg's writings, but no one who wasn't present at his extraordinary lectures and seminars can imagine the inspiration they offered toward a life of looking. 4- For his early response to those discussions see Stanley Cavell, "Music Discomposed" and "A Matter of Meaning It," in Must We Mean "What We Say?A Book of&says (New York, 1g6g), and the section entitled "Excursus: Some Modernist Painting," in his book The World Viewed: Rejlections on the Ontology of.P'ilrn (1970; AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM 1 55 enlarged ed., Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1979). An early essay by Cavell that meant a great deal to me is "The Availability ofWittgenstein's Later Philoso� phy" ( 1962), reprinted in Must We Mean 'What We Say? 5· Justover ayear later Iwrote an article, ''Some Notes on Morris Louis" (Arts Magazine 30 [Nov. 1963]: 22-27), inspired by an exhibition of seventeen of his paintings at the Guggenheim Museum (organized by Lawrence Alloway) , in ·which I first discussed his relation to Pollock, a point developed further in the introduction to ThTee American Painters and "Morris Louis" (reprinted in this book). 6. Through no fault of Stella, who admired them and urged them on me from the first. 7· As mentioned above, part 1 of 'Three American Painters" was written in 1963-64; itwas published under the title "Modernist Painting and Formal Criti� cism" in the American ScholaT 33 (autumn 1964): 642-48. 8. See the last sentences of my 1963 text on Stella for the jewish Museum's exhibition Toward a Newilbstmction (reprinted in this book as "Frank Stella"). g. Cf. Greenberg'sattempt to argue that "the objectivity oftaste is probatively demonstrated in and through the presence of a consensus over time" (Clement Greenberg, "Can Taste Be Objective?" Art News 72 [Feb. 1973]: 22-23, 92). See also his "Complaints ofanArt Critic" ( 1967), where he wrote: "Because aesthetic judgments are immediate, intuitive, undeliberate, and involuntary, they leave no room for the conscious application ofstandards, criteria, rules, or precepts. That qualitative principles or norms are there somewhere, in subliminal operation, is certain; otherwise aestheticjudgments would be purely subjective, and that they are not is shown by the fact that the verdicts ofthose who care most about art and pay it the most attention converge over the course of time to form a consensus" (Clement Greenberg, A1odernism with a Vengeance 1957-1969, vol. 4 of The Col� lected Essays and Criticism, ed. John O'Brian [Chicago, 1993], p. 265). Thierry de Duve rightly takes Greenberg to task for confusing Kant's transcendental account of estheticjudgment's claim to universality with the empiricist notion of objectivity in Clement Greenberg between the Lines, trans. Brian Holmes (Paris, 1996), pp. 106-ro. 1o. See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence," in Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary (Evanston, Ill., 1964), pp. 39-83. The original essay in French, "Le Langage indirect et les voix du silence," was first published in Les Temps Modernes in 1952 and was included in Merl�au-Ponty, Sig;nes (Paris, 1g6o). See also Georg Lukacs, History and Class-Consciousness: Studies inJ.WarxistDialectics, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, Mass., 197 1 ) . Lukacs's book was first published in German in 1923; I became familiar with it in the French translation of 1g6o. Another book that influenced me was MerleauPonty's LesAventures de la dialectique (Paris, 1955). The claim that modernism in the arts proceeds by acts ofself-criticism is at the heart of Clement Greenberg's essay "Modernist Painting," which was first made widely available in ATts YeaTbook 4 ( 1961) but which (like almost everyone) I didn't read until it was reprinted in slightly revised form in Gregory Battcock, ed., The NewArt: A CriticalAnthology (New York, tg66), pp. 66-77. (The revised version had also been reprinted a 56 ! fu� INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM year earlier in Art andLiterature [spring 1965], but I don't remember seeing that either.) However, in "After Abstract Expressionism," which I read and absorbed when it appeared in October 1962, Greenberg spelled out the nature of "the kind of self-critical process which . . . provides the infra-logic of modernist art" (Greenberg, "After Abstract Expressionism," Artlnternational 6 [Oct. 25, 1 962]: 30; Greenberg's essay is reprinted with minor changes in 1.\!Iodernisrn with a Vengeance, pp. 1 2 1-34). 1 1 . As I realized only recently, preparing to teach that essay in a seminar. "A man isjudged by neither intention nor fact but by his success in making values become facts," Merleau-Ponty wrote. "VVhen this happens, the meaning of the action does not exhaust itselfin the situationwhich has occasioned it, or in some vaguejudgment ofvalue; the action remains as an exemplary type and will survive in other situations in another form. It opens a field. Sometimes it even institutes a world. In any case-it outlines a future. History according to Hegel is this maturation of a future in the present, not the sacrifice of the present to an unknown future; and the rule of action for hiril is not to be efficient at any cost, but to be first ofall fecund" ("Indirect Language," p. 72). 12. In the Stella section of the introduction to Tlm;e American Painters I cite only the first sentence ofthe passage from Merleau-Ponty quoted in the previous note in my own translation, adding: 'The values in Stella's case are pictorial values; they are to be found, or found wanting, only in one's firsthand experi� ence of the paintings in question." 1 3. See, e.g., Yve�Alain Bois, "Introduction: Resisting Blackmail," in Painting as Model (Cambridge, Mass., 1990). 14. Greenberg protested against the idea that there existed a formalist school of painters or indeed criticism in "Complaints of an Art Critic" (i\!Iodernisrn with a Vengeance, pp. 265-72). But he himself later wrote: "It remains that Modernism in art, ifnot in literature, has stood or fallen so far by its 'formalism.' Not that Modernist art is co-terminous with 'formalism.' And not that 'formalism' hasn't lent itself to a lot of empty, bad art. But so far every attack on the 'formalist' aspect of Modernist painting and sculpture has worked out as an attack on Modernism itself because every such attack developed into an attack at the same time on superior artistic standards" (Clement Greenberg, "Necessity of Formalism," New Litera?)' flistmy 3 [autumn 1971): 171-75). Incidentally, Kramer as early as 196 1 referred to both "formalist criticism" and "formalist art" CHilton Kramer, "Notes on Clement Greenberg," Arts 37 [Oct. 196 1 ] : 62). 15. My reference is to "Modernist Painting" as it appeared in Battcock, ed., TheNewArt> p. 73· Subsequent page references to that essay \viii be in parentheses in the text. 16. In Greenberg, Modernism with a Vengeance, p. 6o. In Greenberg's own selection of his art criticism, Art and Culture: Critical Essays (Boston, 196 1 ) , that essaywas retitled "The New Sculpture." 17. See Greenberg, 1\1odernism with a �ngeance, p. 97· 18. Ibid. 19. Greenberg, "After Abstract Expressionism," p. 25. 20. Ibid., p. zg. AN lNTRODUCTJON TO MY ART CRITICISM 57 21. Greenberg, Modernism with a Vengeance, p. go. 22. See, however, "Louis and Noland" (1960), ·where he writes: "The 'aes� thetic' of post-Cubist painting-by which I mean painting after Kline, after Dubuffet, and even after Hans Hofmann-consists mostly in this renewal oftlte lmjJressionist emphasis on the exclusivel)' visual" (Greenberg, Modernism with a Vengeance, pp. 97-98; emphasis added). And from "The 'Crisis' of Abstract Art" (1964): "What looms beyond, and grows out of, PainterlyAbstraction is a newer (though not necessarily superior) kind of abstract art that puts the main stress on color as hue. For the sake of this stress painterliness is being abandoned, not to be replaced by the geometrical or the 'hard-edged,' but rather by a way of paint-handling that blurs the difference between painterly and non-painterly. Harking back in some ways to Impressionism, and reconciling theImpressionist glow with Cubistopadty, this newer abstract painting suggests possibilities of color for which there are no precedents in Western tradition. An unexplored realm of picturemaking is being opened up-in a quarter where young apes cannot followthat promises to be large enough to accommodate at least one more generation of major painters" (Greenberg, lviodemism with a Vengeance, p. 1 8 1 ; emphasis added). The truth seems to be that Greenberg wavered with respect to the question ofthe persistence ofImpressionist opticality in subsequent modernist paint� ing, perhaps without fully realizing that he did so. On another kind ofwavering in Greenberg's texts as �·egards opticality and materiality, see Yve-Alain Bois, "Greenberg's Amendments," Kunst &i\iuseumjournaal 5 (1993): 1-9. 23. I first presented a version of my reading of Pollock's drip paintings at a one�day symposium on modern drawings at the FoggArt Museum at Harvard in the spring of 1964; the other speakers were Kermit Champa and Max Kozloff. See the remarks on Pollock in Michael Fried, "New York Letter," Art International 8 (Apr. 25, 1964): 57-58 (those remarks are not included in the selection reprinted in this book as "New York Letter: De Kooning Drawings"). Following Merleau�Ponty, I also insist in the introduction to ThreeAmelican Painters that the distinction benveen opticality and tactility isn't absolute-that the senses ofsight and touch "open onto the same space." 24. I moderated this claim in "Morris Louis." See T.]. Clark's important essay 'Jackson Pollock's Abstraction," in Reconstructing A1odernism, ed. Serge Guilbaut (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1990), pp. 172-242, for a thoughtful critique of my stress on the opticality of Pollock's allover paintings. Clark himself, however, implies that the viewer loses sight of the materiality of Pollock's picture surfaces at distances greater than "three feet or so," which he calls "a quite ordinary viewing distance" (p. 236 n. 6o). But that is not an ordinary distance from which to view Pollock's allover drip pictures \vith the aim ofseeing them in their entirety-just try holding your ground no more than three feet or so from Number One (1948) or Lavender J.\1ist ( 1950). So even for Clark the "optical" reading of Pollock remains an open question. There is also a strong affinity between Clark's "agonistic" account of Cut-Out ( 1948) and related works, including The Wooden Horse (1948), and my own analysis of those works in the introduction to s8 l AN lNTRonucnoN To Mv ART CRITicisM Three American Painters (as Clark acknowledges, p. 237 n. 78). Another recent writer who alludes to the "non-atmospheric opticality" of Pollock's allover drip paintings is de Duve in Clement Greenberg between theLines, p. 22. 25. By far the most extreme recent critique of Greenberg and me on opticality is Rosalind Krauss's book The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1993). But the highly personal tone of her treatment ofGreenberg is such that readers may fail to grasp that the true target of Krauss's antagonism is not Greenberg's or my writings on modernist painting and sculpture so much as modernism itself. Like Greenberg in the revised "Modernist Painting," she holds an adamantly global vision of "mainstream" modernist painting as optical from start to finish, which in hercase means that she regards modernist painting itself as promulgating a single, unchanging set of misconceived values and assumptions associated with vision (e.g., vision as a vehicle of pure immediacy, instantaneity, transparence, disembodiedness, self-knowledge, and autonomy)with the exception of a few seemingly marginal but for her exemplary artistic episodes in which something she calls the "optical unconscious" comes to the fore. Her antioptical heroes include Max Ernst, Marcel Duchamp, Alberto Giacometti in his Surrealist phase, Georges Bataille the theorist of l'injorme, Pablo Picasso in certain quasi-"flipbook"drawings, Pollock in his allover drip paintings, which Krauss reads as "indexically" belonging to the floor or ground to the extent that they are traduced when hung on a wall (which of course is how they were made to be viewed), the trio CyTwombly, Andy Warhol, and Robert Morris in certain Pollock-derivedworks, and Eva Hesse. Krauss's project in her book is thus to sketch "an alternative history, one that had developed against the grain of modernist opticality, one that had risen on the very site of modernism only to defy its logic, to cross the wires ofits various categories, to flout all its notions about essences and purifications, to refuse its concern with foundations-above all a foundation in the presumed ontological ground of the visual" (p. 21). Although I can't begin to assess her alternative history here, the very terms of her project mean that she has at least as great (and as unexamined) an investment in the global idea of modernist opticality as any critic or historian before her. For an acute review ofher book see Stephen Bann, "Greenberg's Team," Raritan 13 (spring 1994): 146-59. There are also pertinent observations in Mikkel Bogh, "Det beg·rn, pp. 15-18. 73· See Fried, Manet's Modernism, pp. 190-92 and passim. 74- I have no choice but to stand behind them inasmuch as I haven't been led by further reflection or subsequent events to renounce them. 'What I can't do, it turns out, is disengage from them, which is to say treat the author of those texts jJUrely as a historical figure. 75· In a recent article, W.J. T. Mitchell writes that I argue in Absorption and Theatricality that the emergence ofmodern art [in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] is precisely to be understood in terms of the negation or renunciation of direct signs of desire. The process of pictorial seduction Fried admires is successful precisely in proportion to its indirectness, its seeming indifference to the beholder, its antitheatrical "absorption" in its own internal drama. The veryspecial sort ofpictures that enthrall Fried getwhat theywant by seeming not to want anything, by pretending they have everything they need. Fried's discussion ofGericault's TheRaft oftheMedusa and Chardin's Boy with a Bubble might be taken as exemplary here and help us see that it is not merely a question of what the figures in the pictures appear to want, but the legible signs of desire that they convey. The desire may be enraptured and contemplative, as it is in Boy with a Bubble, where the shimmering and trembling globe that absorbs the figure becomes "a natural correlative for [Chardin's] own engrossment in the act ofpainting and a proleptic mirroring ofwhat he trusted would be the absotption of the beholder ofthe finished work" (Absmption and Theatricality, p. 5 1 ) . Or it may be violent, as in The Raft ofthe Medusa, where the "strivings of the men on the raft" are notsimply to be understood in relation to its internal composition and the sign of the rescue ship on the horizon, "but also by the need to escape our gaze, to put an end to being beheld by us, to be rescued from the ineluctable fact ofa presence that threatens to theatricalize even their sufferings" (ibid., p. 1 54) . The end point of this sort of pictorial desire is, I think, the purism of modernist abstraction, whose negation of the beholder's presence is articulated in Wilhelm Worringer's Abstmction andEmpathy and displayed in its final reduction in the white paintings of the early Rauschenberg. Abstract paintings are pictures that want not to be pictures. But the desire not to show desire is, as Lacan reminds us, still aform of desire. The whole antitheatrical tradition reminds one again of the default feminization of the picture, which is treated as something that must awaken desire in the beholder while not disclosing any signs ofdesire or even awareness that it is being beheld, as if the beholder were a voyeur at a keyhole. ("What Do Pictures Really Want?" October, no. 77 [summer 1996]: 7g-8o) There is much I disagree with in the second paragraph, but what I want to stress is that Mitchell misreads Absorption and Theatricality when he speaks of me AN INTRODUCTION TO ::vfy ART CRITICISM 73 admiring an indirect process of pictorial seduction or being enthralled by Chardin's Boy with a Bubble and Gericault's R{ift ofthe i\1edusa, as if my stance to-ward the problematic traced in that. book and the two that followed it were that of a knowing aficionado instead of a hard-working art historian. The same issue of Octobercontains an article by Rosalind Ktauss, the next to last paragraph ofwhich states: If this peculiar convergence between Lacan [in The FourFundamental Concepts ofP�)'choanal)'sis] and Michael Fried's [analysis of Pollock's Out of the Web] is interesting to contemplate, it is because Fried has generalized his analysis beyond Pollock or even modernism, to a condition he advocates as highly desirable for painting (and indeed for art itself) , and which he calls "absorption.'' That "absorption" should now be welcomed by "picture theory" [Krauss refers here to Mitchell's article], which is to say, that a convergence between it and concerns with image-as-identification that are generalized throughout Cultural Studies should be conceivable, seems unsurprising insofar as "absorption" itself is symptomatic of the way art history is recutting even its most "proper" concerns to meet the requirements ofthe "cultural revolution." ("Welcome to the Cultural Revolution," Octobe>; no. 77 [summer 1996]: 96) Here as often when Krauss writes about mywork the crucial question is whether she is being disingenuous or whether she really doesn't understand what I've said. For a long time I thought I knew the answer, but I'm no longer sure. Someone else who conflates my art-critical and art-historical writings, to the extent ofclaiming that "Didcrot's criticism ofart and of the theater is the touchstone of Fried's entire critical project, whether it concerns eighteenth- or nineteenth-century French painting or sculpture made in the United States in the Ig6os," is Margaret Iversen in AloisRiegl:Art History and Theory (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1993), pp. 1 3 1-32. 76. See Robert Smithson, "Letter to the Editor," in The Collected Writings, pp. 66-67. The key sentences read: "Every refutation is a mirror of the thing it refutes-ad infinitum. Every war is a battle with reflections. What Michael Fried attacks is what he is. He is a naturalist who attacks natural time. Could it be there is a double Michael Fried-the atemporal Fried and the temporal Fried?" (p. 67). Although I didn't realize it then (Phil Leider did though), Smithson's writings of the late 1 g6os amounted to by far the most powerful and interesting contemporary response to "Art and Objecthood." 77. Knapp and Michaels's original essay (1982), alongwithvarious responses to it and two replies by them to their critics, are usefully gathered in W. J. T Mitchell, ed., Against Them·y: Literary Studies and the New Pragmatism (Chicago, 1985). In this connection it's significant that Smithson argued for a proto-de Manian view of language in the same essay in which he responded to "Art and Objecthood" ("A Sedimentation of the Mind," p. 107), which is to say that he alone among contemporary artist-writers seems to have been aware ofthe impli� cations for the question of linguistic meaning of my assault on literalism (or at least of his antithetical position). Smithson's linguistic materialism rnay be 74 I AN INTRODUCTION TO MY ART CRITICISM contrasted in turn with the altogether different (i.e., "against theory") view of writing and its materiality put forward in the introduction and Crane chapter of my book Realism, Writing, Disfiguration: On Thomas Eakins and Stephen Crane (ChiM cago and London, 1987). Michaels is currently preparing an essay on questions of theory in the 1 g6os that will deal in part with this aspect of the controversy over "Art and Objecthood." 78. A point missed by Didi-Huberman when he characterizes Tony Smith's sculptures as "monuments of absorption" and by Krauss when she says that absorption is "a condition [Fried] advocates as highly desirable for painting (and indeed for art itself)" (see notes 63 and 75 above, respectively). The term "absorption" does occur once in "Art and Objecthood," where I remark in deprecation of the cinema, or at any rate in explanation of my claim that it isn't a modernist art, that it provides "a refuge from theater and not a triumph over it, absorption not conviction."-But this is a contrast thathas no place in mywritings on earlier art. 79· Fried, Manet:S Modernism, p. 407. It's noteworthy, too, the extent to which photography-based (or simply photographic) work of the 1970s and after-for example, that of Cindy Shennan, Jeff Wall, and Gerhard Richter-has found itself compelled to address issues ofbeholding, often by an appeal to absorptive means and effects. This is a large topic. So. Ibid., pp. 17-19, 407-9. 8 1 . Among those assumptions is the basic modernist tenet that what matters is the ability of new paintings to "sustain comparison" with older works whose quality is not in doubt, a tenet I unequivocally endorsed even as I first forrnu� lated rny critique of a reductionist conception of modernist painting in "Shape as Form" and then reiterated in "Art and Objecthood." On the historical roots of that idea see Manet's Aiodernism, pp. 414- 1 5; for its indispensableness to my project in that book, see ibid., p. 416; for fresh evidence ofits continued life see de Duve, Clement Greenbergbetween theLines, chap. 2, "Silences in the Doctrine." 82. Michael Fried, Powers (London, 1973); and idem, To the CenteroftheEarth (New York, 1994). Figure 1 . Jackson Pollock, Numher I, 1948, 1 948. Oil on canvas, 68 x 104 inches. The Museum ofModern Art., NewYork. Purchase. © 1997 Pollock-Krasner Foundation I Artists Rights Society (ARS) , NewYork. Photo: © 1997 The Museum ofModern An, NewYork. Figure 2. Jackson Pollock, VVltite Coclwtoo: Number 24A, 1948, 1 948. Enamel and oil on canvas, 35 x 1 14 inches. Private collection. Photo: Oliver Baker. © 1997 The Pollock-Krasner Foundation I Artist.s Rights Society (AR.S), NewYork. Figure 3· Jackson Pol!ock, The Wcoden H1:rrse: Number roA, 1948, 1948. Oil, enamel, and wooden hobby horse head on brown cotton canvas, mounted on board, 35'l2x 75 inches. Moderna Museet, Stockholm. © 1997 The Pollock-Krasner Foundation I Artist� Rights Society (ARS), NewYork. Photo courtesy Statens Konstmuseer, Stockholm. Figure 4· jackson Pollock, Cut-Out, ca. 1 948-50. Oil on cut-oul paper mounted on canvas, 30Y:! x 23Y2 inches. Ohara Museum ofArt, Kurashiki,japan. © 1997 The PollockKrasner Foundation I Artists Rights Society (ARS), NewYork. Photo: Ohara Museum of Art, Kurashiki,japan. I I Figure 5· Jackson PoHock, Autumn R.hythrn: NumberJO, 1950, l9EJO. Oil on canvas, 106Y2 x 2 l 2 in<.::hes. The Metropolitan Museum ofArt, NewYork. GiftofFrancisV. O'Connor and Eugene V. Thaw. © 1 997 The Pollock-Krasner Foundation I Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York. Photo: The Metropolitan Museum ofArt, NewYork. George A. Hearn Fund, l957 (57·92). Figure 6. Jackson Pollock, Number 3, 1951, 1931. Enamel on canvas, 56 x 24 inches. Private collection. Photo: © 1997 The Pollock-Krasner Foundation I Artists Rights Society (ARS), NewYork. Figure 7· Barnett Ne>vman, Cathedra, 1951. Oil and Magna on canvas, 96 x 213 inches. Stedeltjk Museum, Amsterdam. © 1997 The Barnett Newman Foundation I Artists Rights Society (ARS), NewYork. Figure 8. Helen Frankenthalcr, Mountains and Sea, 1 9:)2. Oil on canvas, 86'1.� x 1O!)Y.'t inches. Collection of the artist, on extended loan to the National Gallery ofAn, Washington, D.C. © 1 997 Helen Frankenthaler. Photo: © Board ofTrustees, National Gallery of Art, VVashington, D.C. Figure g. Morris Louis, 'Trellis, 1953· Acrylic resin on canvas, 76 x 104 inches. Estate ofthe artist. Figure 1o. Morris Louis, Intrigue, 1954. Acrylic resin on canvas, 8oY2 x 105Y2 inches. Private collection, New York. Estate ofthe artist. Figure l l . MorrisLouis, I'Yaral, 1 959· Acrylic resin on canvas, 103 x 142 inches. Collection ofMr. and Mrs. Irwin Green, Detroit. Estate ofthe artist. Figure 12. MorrisLouis, Aleph, 1g6o. Acrylic resin on canvas, 104 x 93 inches. Private collection, NewYork. Estate ofthe artist. Figure 13. Kenneth Noland, YellowHalf, 1963. Acrylic resin on canvas, 70 x 70 inches. Albright-Knox Art Gallery, Buffalo, N.Y. Gift ofSeymour H. Knox, 1964. © 1997 Kenneth Noland I Licensed by VAGA, NewYork, N.Y. Photo: Albright�Knox An Gallery, Buff'.,I: FRANK STELLA'S IRREGULAR POLYGONS way perspicuous, or even particularly interesting in itself; one does not "recognize" any of them-except perhaps the trapezoid at the bottom of Wolfeboro (and then, as we shall see, it is an open question what one "recognizes" it as). And far from being inclined to distance or frame these pictures, I for one feel strongly that, more than any pictures I have ever seen, they ought not to be framed at all. Moreover, the fact that the physical limits of the support do not make themselves felt as a single entity but in effect belong segment by segment to individual shapes the remainder of whose limits do not coincide with those of the support implies a strong and, I think, unprecedented continuity between the "outside" of a given painting (its physical limits) and its "inside" (everything else) . The eight-inchwide colored bands deployed throughout the new paintings are a kind ofparadigm for that continuity. In general one such band begins by running along at least one side of the support (in Union Ill the same band runs along four or five sides) until at some point or other it encounters another shape whose "merely" depicted portion it follows into the heart of the canvas, taking the beholder with it. That is, a particular stretch ofthe edge ofthe painting is first isolated from the rest ofthat edge-the band broadens and usurps the office of the edge-and is then carried into the interior of the painting. The result is both that the paintings are infused with an extraordinary and compelling directionality, and that one is made to feel that the important difference in them is not between "outside" and "inside" but between open and closed. The side or sides along which the bands run are experienced as closed (or closed ojf) while the others are felt as open-and when, as in Union Ill and Effingham Ill (figs. 30, 3 1 ) , the open side or sides are at the top of the painting, the effect can be one ofan astonishingvertical acceleration, soaring, or release. There is, one might say, no more "outside" or "inside" to the best of Stella's new paintings than to the individual shapes they comprise; and to the extent that a given shape can be said to have an "outside" and "inside" the relation between the two is closer to that, say, between the edge ofa tabletop and the rest of that tabletop than to the relation between the edge of a Noland or an Olitski or even a Stella stripe painting and the rest of that painting. This is not to say that Stella's new pictures are nothing more than objects. Unlike Judd's constructions, for example, or Bell's glass boxes, they do not isolate and hypostatize literalness as such. At the same time, however, literalness in them is no longer experienced as the exclusive property of the support. Rather, it is suffused more generally and, as SHAPE AS FoRM: FRANK STELLA's lRREGUCAR PoLYGONS I 93 it were, more deeply throughout them. It is as though literalness in these pictures does not belong to the support at all except by coincidence: specifically, the coincidence between the limits of the individual shapes that constitute a given painting and the physical limits of the support-as though, that is, one's experience of literalness is above all an experience of the literalness of the individual shapes themselves. Though ofcourse what I havejust called their literalness is identical with their success as shapes-and that, while not a direct function of the literalness of the support, is at any rate inconceivable apart from that literalness. The dissociation of literalness from the support that I have just tried to describe is intimately related to another aspect of Stella's new paintings, namely, their extraordinary, and sheerly visual, illusiveness. This is not to say that, in a given picture, each shape seems to lie in a definite or specifiable depth relation to every other. On the contrary, nothing is more fundamental to the nature of the new paintings' illusiveness than the extreme ambiguity, indeterminacy, and multivalence of the relations that appear to obtain among the individual shapes, as well as between those shapes and the surface of the picture (or, at any rate, the plane of that surface) . In Moultonboro Ill, for example, although one is not made to feel that the light yellow triangular band stands in any single or definite spatial relation to the turquoise blue Z-shaped band into which it fits, one nevertheless experiences their juxtaposition somewhat as though both were objects in the world, not simply or even chiefly shapes on a flat surface-objects, moreover, whose relation to one another, and indeed whose actual character, are ineluctably ambiguous. This is most salient in the case of the Z-shaped turquoise band, largely becauseor so it seems-its top and bottom segments are not parallel to one another. (The first, running as it does along the upper edge of the square, is horizontal, while the second, flush with the lowest side of the triangle, slants from the lower left toward the upper right.) That is, one tends to see the bottom segment, or the bottom two segments, as though somewhat from above and in perspective-while at the same time one is not given enough data to locate them in a definite spatial context, in relation either to contiguous shapes or to some ground plane. Moreover, because the top segment ofthe Z-form runs across the upper edge of the square and is therefore horizontal, one tends to experience that segment as frontal. But this would mean that the Z-form is not only irregular in two dimensions but bent or warped in three-though it is not at all clear which segment or seg- 94 I SHAPI<: AS FoRM: FRANK STELLA's IRREGULAR POLYGONS ments are bent orwarped and which, ifany, are to be taken as normative. The beveled ends of the Z-form, each parallel to nothing else in the painting, compound the ambiguity by implying that the respective planes of both the bottom and top segments are warped away from, or are oblique to, that of the picture surface-though, of course, they might notbe. (Almost all the bands in Stella's new paintings are beveled in this way, a factor that adds immeasurably to the illusionistic power and general complexity of the paintings in question. In fact, its absence from Conway is partly responsible for the relatively flat and conventional appearance of that picture.) The result is that the Z-form is seen as participating in a wide range of equally ambiguous and indeterminate spatial situations-more accurately, an entire gamut of such situations, each ofwhich is simultaneously not merely compatible with but continuous with or transparent to every other. But it is not just the situations in which the Z-form finds itself or the relationships into which it enters that continually escape one but-more than anything else-its "real" shape. (Similarly, when one "recognizes" the shape at the bottom of Wolfeboro Ill, does one "recognize" it as a trapezoid-its configuration on the surface of the canvas-or as a rectangle seen in perspective?) It is as though across the entire gamut of illusionistic possibilities the "real" Z-form-flat or warped, regular or irregular, partly or whoHy parallel or oblique to the picture surface-lies somewhere out there, beyond the painting, waiting to be known. There is, ofcourse, a "real" Z-form on the surface ofthe canvas. But the configuration on that surface of the individual shapes that constitute a given picture is no more definitive in this regard than their possible configurations in illusionistic space: above all because, as I have claimed, literalness in these paintings is primarily experienced as the property not ofthe support, but of the shapes themselves. All this makes Stella's new paintings as radically illusive and intractably ambiguous as any in the history of modernism. Radically illusive in that what is rendered illusive in them is nothing less than literalness itself; and intractably ambiguous in that the shapes they comprise are experienced as embracing an entire gamut of existential possibilities, including theirjuxtaposition on the surface ofthe canvas, each ofwhich is "continuous" with every other and none of which is sufficiently privileged to make one feel that it, at any rate, is really there. There is, one might say, no it at all. Stella's new paintings, then, depart from his stripe paintings in two general respects-first, by not acknowledging literal shape, and second, by resorting to illusion-both ofwhich ought to make them SHAPE AS fORM: FRANK STELLA's IRREGULAR POLYGONS l 95 unpalatable to literalist sensibility. Indeed, I suggest that it is one of the most significant facts about his new pictures that Stella seeks in them to repudiate not literalist taste or sensibility exactly, but the literalist implications which, in the grip of a particular conception of the nature of modernist painting, his stripe paintings appear to carry. This is not to claim that his new pictures are chiefly a response to the drawing of those implications by Judd and others. Rather, I am suggesting that it was in his own unwillingness, even inability, to pursue beyond painting whatwere to him as well, if not indeed before anyone else, his stripe paintings' apparent implications in that direction that Stella discovered both the depth of his commitment to the enterprise of painting and the irreconcilability with that commitment of what may be called a reductionist conception of the nature of that enterprise.11 At the same time, it is hard not to see their relation to Noland's and Olitski's paintings as issuing, at least in part, from a dissatisfaction or an uneasiness with their work that-to my mind, at any rate-has much in common with that which literalist sensibility appears to feel. Moreover, it is tempting to regard this in turn as evidence in favor of the suggestion that the impulse behind the work ofliteralists likeJudd and Bell is anything butalien to Stella. Because ifit is true that, unlike Noland and Olitski, Stella has actually felt a reductionist conception of his undertaking urge toward the isolation and hypostatization of literalness, it would be surprising if there were not at least some agreement between his response to painting other than his own and the literalist attitude toward that same painting. And in fact Stella's new paintings can, I believe, be seen as responding critically to the same aspect of Noland's and Olitski's paintings that, I suggested earlier, literalist taste finds unacceptable, though here again the differences between Stella and the literalists lie deeper than their apparent agreement. From a literalist point of view the aspect in question is experienced as a conflict between pictorial illusion of any kind on the one hand and literalness as such on the other; the conflict is unacceptable because it compromises the latter; and its elimination entails making works of art (or putative works of art) that are nothing but literal-works in which illusion, to the extent that it may be said to exist at all, is itself literal. Whereas Stella's new paintings, by making literalness illusive, not only come to grips with but actually resolve what I described earlier as the conflict in Noland's and Olitski's paintings between a particular kind of pictorial illusionism-addressed to eyesight alone-and the literal character of the support. And by so doing they unmake, g6 I SHAPE AS FORM: FRANK STELLA's IRREGULAR POLYGONS at least in the event and for the moment, the distinction between shape as a fundamental property of objects and shape as an entity belonging to painting alone that emerges for the first time in Noland's and Olitski's paintings. 4 IN CLOSING I want merely to touch on another aspect of Stella's new paintings: what seems to me their intimate and profoundly significant relation to the finest modernist sculpture of the recent past. (I am thinking chiefly of the work of English sculptor Anthony Caro.) Almost any of the remarks and observations I have made about the new pictures could, I think, lead to an obvious comparison with Caro's sculptures: in pieces like Bennington (1 964; fig. 36) and Yellow Swing ( 1 965; fig. 37) , is not literalness made illusive? Moreover, the relation between Stella and contemporary sculpture is far from superficial or coincidental. Rather, it has to do with the problematic character ofshape in the most advanced painting of our time-even, I want to say, with the nature of shape itself, with what shape is. In any case, I am suggesting that one result of the development within modernist painting discussed in this essay is thatfor the first time since the late eighteenth century sculpture is in a position to inspire painting, and that in Stella's recent paintings this has actually begun to happen. At the same time, however, painting is in a position not simply to be inspired by advanced sculpture, but in certain respects fundamental to that sculpture actually to have certain advantages-though not ofquality-over it. I will mention three: ( 1 ) The intractable ambiguity of the visual illusionism in Stella's new pictures goes beyond advanced sculpture in the direction of the opticality and illusiveness-of seeming a kind of mirage-that, as Greenberg was the first to remark, is basic to the latter.12 Because sculpture is literal it can, in the end, be known; whereas the shapes that constitute Stella's new paintings, and the new paintings as experienced wholes, cannot. (2) The fact, or the convention, that paintings hang on a wall means that Stella's new paintings begin off the ground, whereas advanced sculpture-which, as Greenberg has again remarked, is illusively weightless-has to begin at ground level and literally climb to whatever height it reaches. This "advantage" is perhaps most strikingly evident in Effingham Ill, largely because that painting as a whole is most like a ground plan. UnionIIIas well profits from it immensely. And in general Stella can float or suspend ele- SHAPE AS FoRM: FRANK STELLA's IRREGULAR PoLYGONS I 97 ments as though without visible means of support. (3) There is no general difficulty about the use of color in Stella's paintings, but the problem of color in contemporary sculpture is in important respects acute. By this I mean not simply the propriety of applied color but the fact that all sculpture, like all solid, opaque objects, is colored, or has color, or anyway has surface. It is as though, finally, the opticality toward which advanced sculpture aspires brings one up short, not against its literalness exactly, but against the fact that when we perceive a solid object, eyesight makes contact with no more than its surface (and then only part of that) . Put slightly differently, it is as though advanced sculpture, such as Caro's, makes that fact a disturbing one, and in effect thrusts it into our awareness. In comparison with such sculpture, painting, I want to say, is all surface." (Which is not the same as saying that it is done on a flat and very thin surface; an element of equal thinness in a Caro is experienced as solid.) Stella's paintings, by the closeness of their relation to advanced sculpture, make that difference more salient than it has ever been. NOTES 1 , Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Aesthetics," in Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief, compiled ffom notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees, and James Taylor, ed. Cyril Barrett (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1g66), p. 36. 2. Clement Greenberg, "Modernist Painting," in The New Art: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gregory Battcock (New York, 1966), p. 73· 3· Mondrian, in his paintings of the 1920s and after, often seems to be attempting to combatjust this minimal illusionism. Sometimes, fOr example, he stops his black lines short of the framing edge, thereby emphasizing their paintedness, i.e., the fact that they are marks on a flat surface. In other paintings he takes the more radical step of continuing the black lines and even the blocks of color j;ast the edge onto the sides of the canvas (which was to be exhibited with its sides visible). The result is that one tends to see these paintings as solid slabs, which helps to counteract-though it cannot efface-their minimal illusionism. 4· Greenberg says this of Noland's paintings in Clement Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," Artlnternational4 (May 1g6o): 28. 5· That Noland's long horizontal paintings make their own shapes ungraspable in this way was observed by Rosalind Krauss in "Allusion and Illusion in DonaldJudd," Art[orum 4 (May 1966): 24-26. 6. In my essay 'Jules Olitski'sNewPaintings," Artforum 4 (Nov. 1965): 36-40, not reprinted in this volume. 7· In his brief remarks on Olitski's work, published in the catalog to the 98 ! SHAPE AS FORM: FRANK STELLA'S IRREGULAR POLYGONS United States pavilion at the last Biennale, Clement Greenbergwrote, "The degree to which the success ofOlitski's paintings depends on proportion ofheight to width in their enclosing shapes is, I feel, unprecendented." Greenberg goes on to note the relative superiority of the pictures with tall, narrow formats. See Greenberg, "Introduction toJules Olitski at the Venice Biennale," in Modernism with a Vengeance 1957-1969, val. 4 of The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed. john O'Brian (Chicago, 1993), pp. 228-30. [In fact, Greenberg wrote: "Because they attract too little notice as shapes, and therefore tend to get taken too much for granted, he has had more and more to avoid picture formats that are square or approach squareness. He has had also to avoid picture fOrmats that are long and narrow, simply because these tend to stamp themselves out as shapes less emphatically than formats that are tall and narrow do" (pp. 229-30). In 'Jules Olitski's New Paintings" I had previously observed that "despite their hostility to deductive structure, Olitski's spay paintings depend for their success upon the new and more acute awareness of the shape and size of the support embodied for the first time in deductive structure. . . . In fact, no paintings, Noland's and Stella's included, have ever been put under greater pressure by considerations ofshape and size; or, more accurately, have ever put those considerations under greater press�re" (p. 40).-M. F., 1996] 8. The aluminum paintings of 1960 are an exception to this. Although not illusionistic, they can, I think, be said to hold as shape-chiefly by virtue of the fact that their supports depart from the rectangular only by a few shallow notches at the corners and sides. As a result the paintings are seen as restrained or held back by those notches from completing the rectangles they all but occupy. This gives the shapes of these paintings something to hold against, i.e., the pressure from within each painting toward the rectangle it almost is, and in effect makes the question ofwhether or not they compel conviction as shape a real one. 9· Judd, almost certainly the foremost ideologist ofthe literalist position, has written: "A work needs only to be interesting" (DonaldJudd, "Specific Objects," Arts Yearbook, no. 8 [ 1 965], p. 78). It is hard to know exactly what this means, because some work, such as Noland's, Olitski's, and Stella's paintings, is more than just interesting. It is, I want to say, good-more accurately, good painting. And in fact-despite the proliferation ofwork that is neither painting nor sculpture, and despite the pervasiveness of the facile notion that the arts in our time are at last heading towards synthesis-what modernism has come increasingly to rnean is that, more than ever, value or quality can persuasively be predicated ofwork that lies only within, not between, the individual arts. (Though it has also come to mean that that work must challenge, in characteristic ways, what we are prepared to count as belonging more than trivially to the art in question.) The circularity of this state of affairs will be repugnant to many, and it is certainly harrowing, but I do not think that it is self-condemning. The crucial question, after all, is not so much whether anything artistically valuable lies outside the circle, as whether a meaningful concept of artistic value or a significant experi� ence of it can reside anywhere but in its coils. Myown impulse is to say that interest is basic to art-but not to either making SHAPE AS FoRM: FRANK STELLA's IRREGULAR PoLYGONS I 99 orjudging it. And if it is objected that what we ought to try to do is enjoy art rather than judge it, I would simply say that that may have been possible once but isn't anymore. This, however, is not to contrast enjoyment withjudging-it is rather to insist that there is no real enjoyment, or no enjoyment of what is really there, apart fromjudging. One can still erUoy Olitski's paintings simply as color, if one wants, but that is not to enjoy them or be moved by them or see them as jJaintings. And this means that there is an importantsense in which one is not seeing them at all. But to experience painting as painting is inescapably to engage with the question ofquality. This, too, is the work of modernism, and if one does not like it one ought to face the fact that \Vhat one does not like is painting, or at leastwhat painting has become. 1o. Stella madefourpaintingsin each ofthe eleven formats. There are, then, eleven subseries within which not only the shape ofthe supportbut the configurations on the surface of the canvas are identical. 1 1 . I take a reductionist conception of modernist painting to mean this: that painting roughly since Manet is seen as a kind ofcognitive enterprise in which a certain quality (e.g., literalness), set of norms (e.g., flatness and the delimitation offlatness) , or core of problems (e.g., how to acknowledge the literal character ofthe support) is progressively revealed as constituting the essenceofpainting-and, by implication, ofhaving done so all along. This seems to me gravely mistaken, not on the grounds that modernist painting is not a cognitive enterprise, but because it radically misconstrues the kind ofcognitive enterprise modernist painting is. What the modernist painter can be said to discover in his work-what can be said to be revealed to him in it-is not the irreducible essence of allpainting but rather that which, at the present moment in painting's history, is capable ofconvincing him that itcan standcomparisonwith the painting of both the modernist and premodernist past whose quality seems to him beyond question. (In this sense one might say that modernist painting discovers the essence ofall painting to be quality.) The object ofhis enterprise is therefore both knowledge and conviction-knowledge. through, or better still, in, conviction. And that knowledge is simultaneously knowledge of painting (i.e., what it must be in order to elicit conviction) and ofhimself (i.e., what he finds himself convinced by)-apprehended not as two distinct entities but in a single, inextricable fruition. It should be clear that the conception of modernist painting that I havejust adumbrated is not only antireductionist but antipositivist; in this respect I believe it has significant affinities with the persuasive account of the enterprise of science put forward by Thomas S. Kuhn in TheStmcture ofScientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962). The further exploration of these affinities would, I am sure, prove rewarding. But a footnote is not the best place to begin. 12. Clement Greenberg, 'The New Sculpture," in Art and Culture (Boston, 196 1 ) , p. 14+ 1 3. See Thompson Clarke's essay, "Seeing Surfaces and Physical Objects," in Philosophy in America, ed. Max Black (London, 1966), pp. g8-1 q. The fact that eyesight touches only the surface of solid objects, and then only part of that surface, has traditionally played an important role in philosophical skepticism. Morris Louis The forming ofthe fiVe senses is a labor of the entire history ofthe world down to the present. -Karl Marx1 MORRIS Loms was born Morris Bernstein in Baltimore, Maryland, on November 24, 1912, and died of lung cancer in Washington, D.C., on September 7, 1962. He lived for painting. According to his widow, the former Marcella Siegel and now Mrs. Abner Brenner, he habitually rose early and worked at least as long as there was daylight in a small, first-floor room in their suburban Washington house. The period ofLouis's m4jor accomplishment began some time in 1 954 after he had given up traditional easel painting in favor of staining acrylic paint into lengths of canvas (at first sized and later unsized) and continued until about three months before his death, when the malignant')' was first diagnosed. Louis's technique during these years entailed constant stooping and bending, which resulted in a chronic condition of the lower back that caused him great pain but could not keep him from working. Among those who knew him there is universal agreement that Louis's integrity was remarkable. This integrity-which, not surprisingly, appears to have made itself felt from time to time as something harsh, secretive, even This is the text of Morris Louis (NewYork, 1971), which forsome years has been out of print. Afirstversion ofthe presentessay, roughly halfits length, served as the introduction to the catalog ofthe full Louis retrospective exhibition of 1 966-67 (Los Angeles, Boston, and St. Louis) and was published under the title "The Achievement of Morris Louis" in Artfki's art prior to his taking up spraying, the exhibition insists on the importance of seeing the spray paintings in relation to these. And this, I suggest, means acknowledging both the Originally published as the introduction to the catalog for the exhibitionjules Olilski: Paintings 1963-1967 at the Corcoran Gallery of Art, Washington, D.C., Apr. 28-june 1 1 , 1967; the Pasadena Art Museum, Aug. 1-Sept. 10, 1967; and the San Francisco Museum ofArt, Sept. 26-Nov. 5, 1967. JuLES OuTSKI I 1 33 sheer unexpectedness of the spray paintings and the depth of their connection with his previous work. It is as though on the one hand they are without precedent: in Olitski's oeuvre, while on the other they bring his previous work to a fruition or culmination that., in retrospect, seems almost inevitable. They are simultaneously that original and that rooted in what Olitski has already done. More than anymodernistpainterbefore him Olitski has been willing-indeed he seems to have found it necessary-to change the look of his art frequently and sweepingly. (On one level, it is possible to see in this an unwillingness to be recognized publicly as a master, if not an unwillingness to succeed publicly at all.) But it is also true that, as Clement Greenberg has remarked, none of the phases through which Olitski's art has gone since the late 1950s remains as distinct from the rest as each felt at the time.' From the vantage points provided by successive phases, above all by that of spray paintings, those aspects of previous phases that at first may have struck one as idiosyncratic or arbitrary have tended to drop away, or rather to be absorbed by the paintings in question. And as this has happened, the continuity between the earlier phases and the spray paintings has become manifest. But the spray paintings demand understanding in a wider context than that ofOlitski's development alone-one provided by the development of modernist painting generally since the late 1950s. Only in this context does the momentousness of the spray paintings become fully intelligible: they are momentous not so much because they abandon the look ofimmediately antecedent paintings by Olitski as because they revoke, or refuse to accept, conventions of fundamental importance to the work of painters otherwise as different from one another as Kenneth Noland and Frank Stella. And since what gives those conventions their importance is nothing less than the entire history of painting since Manet, the spray paintings will need to be seen in a context as long and as deep as that of modernism itself. 2 OLITSK!'S SPRAY technique could hardly be simpler. [See pl. ro.] He lays a length of unprimed and unsized canvas on the floor and sprays into it acrylic paint of different colors from as many as three spray guns powered by an electric air compressor. (In his first spray paintings he began by drawing the canvas through a 134 ! JULES OLITSKI trough filled with paint, but after a while stopped preparing it in this way.) By the time he stops working, often with two spray guns simultaneously, the raw canvas itself is no longer visible, except in rare cases toward the edges. In some paintings the surface of the canvas consists of small flecks of different colors which, depending on the wetness of the surface at the moment they were sprayed on, are distinct or slightly blurred or almost dissolved into adjacent flecks, and depending on the size ofthe droplets in a given burst of spray, fluctuate in size from extremely fine points to larger though still minute splashes or beads of pigment. In other paintings the droplets seem to have flowed into one another completely and there are no flecks at all. Differences of this kind are experienced as differences of facture rather than of color. Throughout the spray paintings the actual character of the picture surface varies enormously while the import of spraying for color remains roughly the same. Above all, spraying makes possible the interpenetration of different colors, the intensity ofeach of which appears to fluctuate continuously, independently of the intensity of the others. The different colors, one might say, inhabit not merely the same space but the same points in space. The originality of the spray paintings in this respect is striking. In "Mter Abstract Expressionism," Greenberg described Still's and Newman's color in these terms: It no longer fills in or specifies an area or even plane, but spea.ks for itselfby dissolving all definiteness of shape and distance. To this endas Still was the first to show-it has to be warm color, or cool color infused -with warmth. It also has to be uniform in hue, with only the subtlest variations in value if any at all, and spread over an absolutely, not merely relatively, large area. Size guarantees the purity as well as the intensity needed to suggest indeterminate space: more blue simply being bluer than less blue.4 The first two sentences are true ofthe spraypaintings as wei!, but the last two are not. Olitsk.i exploits fluctuations ofvalue, often ofa quite dramatic sort. More importan� intensity of color in these paintings is not proportional to its two-dimensional extension. Instead, it is a function of the concentration or density of a given color at any point-what might be called that color's intension. (This is the case whether or not the painting in question consists of discrete flecks.) It is as though Olitski has found himselfworking in another dimension from that of lateral extension. Or as though he has discovered in spraying another direction for color to take-not out but in.5 JULES 0LITSKI I 1 35 It is, finally, as though by atomizing color Olitski has atomized, even disintegrated, the picture surface as well. Depending partly on the colors used and partly on facture, the spray paintings establish to different degrees an illusion of depth whose power and richness are withoutprecedent both in Olitski's previouswork and in recent modernist art. This has to do largely with the difference between spraying and staining. The latter "identifies" color with its canvas ground,6 whereas in his spray paintings Olitski seems intent on driving color back into its ground, both literally and illusionistically. But precisely this makes the actual character of Olitski's picture surface important in a new way. Greenberg was the first. to recognize the almost paradoxical character of this state of affairs: The grainy surface Olitskicreateswith his way ofspraying is a new kind ofpaint surface. It offers tactile associations hitherto foreign, more or less, to picture�making; and it does new things with color. Together with color, it contrives an illusion of depth that somehow extrudes all suggestions of depth back to the picture's surface; it is as if that sur� face, in all its literalness, were enlarged to contain a world of color and light differentiations impossible to flatness but which yet manage not to violate flatness.7 Surface and depth, literalness and illusion, are, in these paintings, inextricably mixed. In some of the early spray paintings Olitski had added streaks of pastel along, or very near, their perimeters. Then, during the winter of 1965-66, he began to mask already sprayed canvases except for a partial "frame" around two or three sides, spray some more, and then remove the masking. [See pl. 1 1 .] This procedure, which he has used more or less regularly since its invention, produces both a clear difference and an unprecedented continuity between the previously masked and unmasked areas. One experiences the abruptness of the transition from one area to the other as something like linear drawing, while at the same time one is gripped and carried by the continuity ofsprayed color across that transition-a continuity that, in effect, makes these picturesjust as seamless and integral as the spray paintings in which no masking had taken place. Throughout both types of paintings color flows continuously into color, individual colors being isolated or differentiated from one another only by their specific identities. Put anotherway, the emphasis in both is on the continuity ofcolor as such and the uniqueness or autonomy or isolation ofindividual colors. This is true as well of the recent paintings, most of whose formats are horizontal rectangles, in which Olitski has worked 136 I juLES OurSKI both in pastel and with brush and paint up close to the framingedge: the nearness to the limits of the support of the pastel streaks and protracted, fraying brushstrokes ofbright color keeps the streaks and brushstrokes from being seen as disrupting the continuity ofsprayed colorwithin those limits, while at the same time they are experienced as specifying particular colors with great intensity. [See pl. 1 2.] In most of these respects the spray paintings have deep roots in Olitski's previous work. For example, in a number ofpaintings made during 1963-64 by rubbing and staining acrylic paint into unsized and unprimed canvas Olitski modulated from one color to another without leaving a sharp boundary between them. At first, as in the exquisite Fatal Plunge Lady (1963; fig. 19) , the modulation occurs between two colors extremely close to each other in hue, in this instance between rose brown and orange brown; but in Hot Ticket ( 1964) the broad vertical curtain of color which occupies most of the canvas inflects dramatically from intense green down through deep blue to bright red-three colors, incidentally, that occur frequently in the spraypaintings. In these works color flows into color in a way that clearly anticipates the continuity of color that is so salient a feature of the spray paintings. Hot Ticket, especially in the zone of transition between the blue and red segments of the curtain, anticipates the interpenetration of different colors as well. There is even a sense in which the flow of color in these pictures is felt to extend across, or at least to implicate, portions of the canvas that in fact are bare-as when, in Fatal Plunge Lady, the colored areas seem to participate in a single descent of color from the top of the canvas toward the lower right. What I have described as an emphasis on the uniqueness, autonomy, or isolation of individual colors in the spray paintings is manifest also in Olitski's previous work. Olitski has always been concerned with what in the introduction to ThreeAmericanPainters (reprinted in this book) I called the mutually repulsive rather than attractive relations among colors; his aim has always been to distinguish individual colors rather to than bring them together. Paintings like FatalPlunge Lady, Hot Ticket, and Flaubert Red virtually compel one to experience the individual colors they comprise far more intensely than if each color were confronted in actual isolation from the others. One is forced, that is, to bear down on each color with unaccustomed intensity, as though each color competes for presentness with every other. Moreover, bearing down on each color means bearing down on each bit of it, as though it were subtly and continuously changing from jULI�S 0LITSKI \ 137 point to point, from present moment to present moment. What sustains one's attention is both the spread of color across a particular area and the particularity of color at every point. Because of this, the intensity of a given color in Olitski's 1963-64 paintings is not proportional to its extension. Nothing is initially more surprising, even disturbing, about these paintings than the extreme disparity in size between the areas occupied by different colors,8 yet the colors themselves are not experienced as differing in intensity. Or rather, what is at stake is not so much the relative intensity of different colors as their ability to sustain the kind of attention I have tried to describe-as though what one means by the intensity of a color in these paintings is precisely its ability to sustain being borne down on by the beholder. Finally, the 1963-64 paintings in this exhibition represent two distinct stages in what seems to be an ongoing struggle between color and drawing. In earlier paintings-for example, those exhibited at the Poindexter Gallery in the spring of 1963-the tension between the two is relatively extreme: on the one hand, the colored areas are experienced as clearly, even sharply, shaped or contoured; on the other, the color tends to dissolve its own limits, or at any rate to direct attention away from them ' Drawing and color mainly work autonomously, even against one another. By 1963, however, Olitski begins to minimize the drawnness of the limit' of the colored areas. For example, in FatalPlunge Lady those areas are experienced as having just this moment assumed their final configurations after having flooded down from the top of the painting toward the lower right. This frees color from the compulsion, labored under the year before, to oppose and in effect to nullify drawing. In these paintings color is dominant from the start, and as a result can be much subtler, much lower keyed, much more concerned with internal inflection. In paintings done in 1964-for example, Hot Ticket, Flaubert Red, and Flaming On-the minimizing of drawing is carried still further; it reaches an extreme in the first spray paintings, in which, as Greenberg has pointed out, "linear drawing is displaced from the inside of the picture to its outside, that is, to its inclosing shape, the shape of the stretched piece of canvas." (He adds: "Olitski's art begins to call attention at this point, as no art before it has, to how very much this shape is a matter oflinear drawing and, as such, an integral determinant ofthe picture's effect rather than an imposed and external limit.") 10 In this sense the spray paintings can be seen as realizing to the limit of possibility what Greenberg has characterized as l38 I jULES OLITSKI "Olitski's urge to escape from incisive drawing."11 But it is consistent with Greenberg's observations to see those paintings as realizing, in a wholly unexpected way, a passion to draw as well. That is, Olitski's development during the past five years expresses not so much an urge to escape or even to minimize drawing as a desire to find a place for it in his art. In this connection it is significant that, almost at once, Olitski reintroduced various kinds of drawing inside the picture (a fact that Greenberg has discussed) . The crucial point is that for Olitski, color and drawing are antagonists: every stage in his development during the past five years, including the spray paintings, has constituted a specific settlement of their conflicting claims. 3 THE WIDER context in which Olitski's spray paintings are to be viewed is constituted by the discovery around 1960 by Kenneth Noland and Frank Stella of a new mode of pictorial structure, grounded 1;,, and lucidly evincing, a more acute awareness of the shape and size of the picture support than had been the basis of any previous painting. The shape of the picture support has played an important role throughout modernism. Cubism in particular, by adjusting the elements within a painting to a rough congruence with the framing edge, showed an awareness of the shape of the support which, although less exacerbated than that evinced in Noland's and Stella's paintings, was nevertheless considerable. In fact there is an important sense in which the structural mode of their paintings can be said to reaffirm Cubism's implicit but decisive interpretation of the half-century of painting between Manet's seminal pictures of the early 1 86os and the late works of Cezanne in terms of a growing consciousness of the literal character of the picture support and a draining ofconviction in traditional illusionism. Cubism's interpretation of that painting consisted chiefly in its increasingly perspicuous acknowledgment of the flatness of the support. But flatness is a tactile characteristic, and the denial of tactility manifested in the most advanced painting prior to that ofNoland and Stella-notably in the work ofjackson Pollock, Barnett Newman, and Morris Louis-meant that flatness was no longer something an ambitious painter had to, or even could, establish positively. But neither could it be violated, however ambiguously, by illusionistic incursions into a fictive tactile space. Rather, Newman's and Louis's paintings-as well as, from our present vantage, Pollock's allover drip paintings of '947-50-estab- JULES 0LITSKI I 1 39 !ish what I have elsewhere described as a depth or space accessible to eyesight alone. This constitutes a new illusion, one in which the integrity of the picture surface remains intact at the same time as its flatness is dissolved or anyway neutralized. More than any other factor, the emergence of this purely visual or optical mode of illusionism crystallized the new and more acute awareness of the shape of the support, including its exact proportions and dimensions, that becomes the basis of the structure of Noland's and Stella's paintings.12 Roughly, Noland and Stella became painters ofmajor importance when they began to relate the elements within their paintings to the shape of the support in such a way that the structure of their paintings could be said to acknowledge that shape more lucidly and explicitly than had ever been the case." For Noland this meant centering concentric rings and radiating armatures ofcolor in square canvases, while in Stella's stripe paintings-for example, the aluminum and copper series of pictures on shaped supports executed in rg6o and rg6 1 , respectively-2 \1,-inch-wide stripes begin at the framing edge and repeat themselves inside the painting until the entire canvas is filled. In subsequent paintings, consisting of stacked chevrons, Noland found that running the lower edge of the bottom chevron into the upper corners of the canvas enabled him to dispense with lateral symmetry as well as with the square format; more recently he has worked with diamond-shaped canvases in which several bands of color ofequal width are aligned with one or the other pair of parallel sides, and with very long horizontal rectangles in which parallel bands of color run their entire lengths. Because Noland, unlike Stella, has never been interested in structure in its own right hut rather has always been chiefly concerned with color, his development is more revealing. Specifically, the fact that Noland's ambition to make major art out ofcolor has compelled him to discover structures on which that ambition can rely-structures in which the shape of the support is acknowledged lucidly and explicitly enough to compel conviction-reveals the depth of the need for such structures in a way that Stella's exclusively structural preoccupations do not. (It was not until 1964, with the appearance of his first paintings containing asymmetrical chevrons, that that revelation was complete, not until then that the structural significance of his previous work, as well as its affinities with what Stella had done, became evident.) If Olitski's spray paintings are seen, as I believe they ask to he, in the light of this development, one thing is clear: they cannot be described in terms ofthe conception ofpictorial structure that I have 140 I JULES 0LITSKI claimed has been central to the work of Noland and Stella. They are, in fact, profoundly opposed to that conception, though the grounds of that opposition are coloristic as much as structural. By the time Olitski made the first of his spray paintings he seems to have come to regard the division of the canvas into clearly delimited areas of color-without which the structures of Noland's and Stella's paintings would be inconceivable-as incompatible with his own aspirations as a colorist. This is not to say that in Noland's paintings color plays a role of secondary importance. On the contrary, the urge toward color is central; the problem at any moment is how color must be organized within the picture shape-as well as what that picture shape must be-in order that his paintings compel conviction. Structure is at the service of color; color, one might say, is the instrument of nothing-nothing beyond feeling itself. But whereas the structure of a given painting by Noland can be represented schematically, and in that sense at least can be detached or at least distinguished from the color, Olitski's spray paintings, by refusing clearly delimited areas of color, rule out from the start the very possibility of such a distinction. In the previous section of this essay I tried to show that the spray paintings are rooted in Olitski's previous work. This means that it was his desire to realize his deepest pictorial aspirations as completely as possible, rather than antipathy to Noland's and Stella's work, that brought him to a position of fundamental opposition to the structural mode of their paintings. But this desire was both informed and inflamed by his growing awareness not only of the importance of the shape of the support to the structure of their paintings, but of the significance of that aspect of their work for modernist painting generally. And this, it seems to me, amounted to the recognition that his previous paintings did not realize his aspirations as fully or perspicuously as he now saw to be possible. In paintings like Fatal Flung• Lady, Hot Ticket, Flaubert Red, and f7arning On structure is subsumed by color in that the first can be grasped only in the experience of the second. And in general the desire to make paintings whose structures appear to have been determined by, to consist in, nothing but the interaction of individual colors and the overall flow of color as such seems to have been a powerful force in Olitski's art during the years 1963-64. At the same time, however, the fact that those paintings contain discrete shapes and clearly delimited areas ofcolor-in short, drawing-makes them vulnerable, or answerable, to the demand that they acknowledge the JULES OLITSKI I 141 shape of the support. In this sense they do not oppose the structural mode ofNoland's and Stella's paintings so much as they are opposed by it. The result is that each of the paintings in question is compelled to overcome, by the sheer intensity of its color, what one cannot help but perceive as its failure or refusal to acknowledge the shape of the support-a perception, it should be noted, that takes an essentially diagrammatic view of the areas and shapes they contain. That the finest of those paintings succeed triumphantly does not erase the demand, or make their structures as significant for modernist painting generally as those of Noland's and Stella's paintings. What I want to suggest is this: Olitski's growing awareness of the inescapability of the demand (corresponding to the depth of the revealed need) to acknowledge the shape of the support incited him to try to make paintings that would defeat that demand completely-paintings in which it could find no handhold, in which there would be nothing that could be diagrammed, in which colorwould assume the full burden of pictorial structure. At that moment, if I am correct, realizing his deepest pictorial aspirations and opposing the structural mode of Noland's and Stella's paintings became for Olitski one and the same enterprise. And this suggests that while it is true that the spray paintings bring his previous work to an astonishing fruition, Olitski might never have come to make them-he might never have gone that far-if it had not been for Noland's and Stella's discovery of a mode of pictorial structure that ran counter to those aspirations and yet answered so profound a need that it could not be ignored. 4 NOTHING, MOREOVER, lays bare the depth of that need more dramatically than the fact that the spray paintings depend for their success upon an awareness of the shape and size of the support equal to that which Noland and Stella were the first to embody in their paintings. There are, of course, important differences between the ways in which this awareness is evinced in their pictures and in Olitski's spray paintings. For example, it would not make sense to say that the spray paintings acknowledge the shape of the support. (They don't fail or refuse to acknowledge it either; a demand for acknowledgment is empty in the face of them.) But it can be claimed, I think, that in the strongest early spray paintings the entire contents of a given picture relate as an integral entity to the limits ofthe support experienced as a whole, as a single shape. One's 1 42 I jULES 0LITSKI conviction in front of such paintings is that the framing edge has been arrived at by the colors themselves: as though the paintings in question only happen to end up rectangular and of a certain size. Furthermore, when two paintings very similar as regards facture and color (perhaps having been cut from the same length ofsprayed canvas) but different in size and shape strike one as unequal in quality, it is always because in the less successful picture Olitski has, so to speak, failed to possess the framing edge as completely and convincingly as he has possessed the picture surface. (In such instances the sprayed canvas feels to me like background in traditional painting.) No paintings, Noland's and Stella's included, have ever been put under greater pressure by considerations of shape or, more accurately, have ever put those considerations under greater pressure. Greenberg, writing in the Biennale catalog, remarked: 'The degree to which the success of Olitski's paintings depends on proportion of height to width in their inclosing shapes is, I feel, unprecedented. Because they attract too little notice as shapes, and therefore tend to get taken too much for granted, he has had more and more to avoid picture formats that are square or approach squareness. He has also had to avoid picture formats that are long and narrow, simply because these tend to stamp themselves out as shapes less emphatically than formats that are tall and narrow do."11 This can be verified in one's experience. The narrow verticals are the strongest of Olitski's early spray paintings, largely because of the perspicuousness with which they stamp themselves out as shapes. (The question of whythe narrow vertical paintings tend to make themselves felt as shapes with such force is one of the most interesting raised by recent modernist painting.)1' I have argued elsewhere that their perspicuousness as shape-the fact that their shapes are experienced as pictorial, not merely literal-is what secures their identity as painting.16 Either the support stamps itself out as shape or the painting is experienced as nothing more than a kind of object. (The demand that the paintings in question hold as shape plays a role in Olitski's spray paintings equivalent to the demand to acknowledge the shape of the support in Noland's and Stella's work. It is, one might say, the demand that has to be faced when color assumes the full burden of structure.) This inescapably puts the shape of the support under enormous pressure, and it is questionable whether any pictorial convention, not to say one apparently as central to the entire enterprise of modernist painting as the shape of the support, will stand up under pressure of that kind for long. jULk�S 0LITSKI I 1 43 In a number of paintings executed in early 1966-PrincePatutsky's Command (pl. 1 1 ) and Thigh Smokeamong them-the pressure is suddenly and unexpectedly off. This is also true of more recent paintings-for example, C+]+B, Maximum, Patutsky in Paradise, and Heightened [also EndRun, pl. 1 2 ] -in which for the first time Olitski has attained mastery over the horizontal rectangle as well as, in the superb Sleep !wbber; the square (or near square) . To claim that in all these paintings the pressure is off is to say more than that their quality does not depend on their efficacy as shape, though that is in fact the case. It is also to say that the question of whether or not they stamp themselves out as shape does not really arise. One doesn't sense that the paintingsjust mentioned succeed despite not making themselves felt as shapes. Rather, the issue ofwhether or not they do so has been eluded or staved off, ifonlyfor the moment, by the paintings themselves. This I believe is what has enabled Olitski to extend his authority-that ofa major painter at the height ofhis powers-to include the horizontal and square formats which had, until recently, proved intractable. The eluding or staving off of the issue of pictorial versus literal shape is accomplished largely by the sprayed bands (the partial internal "frame") or long brushstrokes of color that run along two or three sides of a given painting. The limits of the support are no longer simply and nakedlyjuxtaposed to the rest of the painting, as in the early spray pictures. Instead, the bands or brushstrokes are experienced as belonging simultaneously to both, hence as mediating between the two-with the result that any qualms that arise about a given picture no longer concern its shape bnt tend to focus on the bands or brushstrokes instead. At the same time, the recent paintings mark a new stage in Olitski's exploration of the framing edge-specifically, the discovery of the immediate vicinity of that edge as a terrain of extraordinary freedom and possibility. It is as though as long as he remains close to the limits of the support Olitski can do whatever he wants: repossess the square, use the horizontal rectangle without alluding to the horizon, even resurrect Abstract Expressionist brushwork. What is almost incredible is that in paintings like C+J+B, Maximum, and Heightened, such brushwork is made to serve the ends ofcolor. (In the most recent paintings this chiefly means close values of livid, sour hues-principally yellows, greens, pinks, oranges, and an almost phosphorescent violet.) The freedom Olitski seems to enjoy in the immediate vicinity of the edge has its corresponding constraints, above all that of not being able to place his bands and brush- 144 I jULES 0LITSKI strokes anywhere else. Even at the edge, of course, notjust anything goes. But the best of the recent paintings, although in one sense imageless, provide an image ofan achieved freedom that is nothing less than exalting. 5 THE PAST twelve years have seen the emergence of three painters-Morris Louis, Kenneth Noland, and Jules Olitskiwho rank with the supreme masters of color in modern art. Each broke through to his proper work when he discovered in color something that he had been looking for all along and had been able to find nowhere else: a way to make paintings whose quality could stand comparison with the art of the museums. The precise content of that discovery, what exactly it can be said to have consisted in, differs radically in the three cases. This is to claim much more than that each painter's feeling for color, or even his use of it, is different from the others'. When each of these painters found in color a way to make paintings in which he could believe, he found in it his own artistic identity as well. Similarly, while there is a clear sense in which all three may be said to use color-roughly, the sense in which they all use paint-there is another, less obvious sense in which they do not use color so much as exploit its resources or realize its possibilities for the making of bigh art. That color in our time has been found to possess such resources and to contain such possibilities has made it, perhaps more explicitly than ever before, a mediumof painting." But the particular resources and possibilities whose exploitation and realization have established color as a medium of painting for Louis, Noland, and Olitski are different in each case-indeed they are internal to the uniqueness of their respective achievements. The question with which I close is this: What is it that Olitski has found in color that establishes it for him as a medium of painting?-that makes color something within which he can work? He has found in color a way, perhaps the only way now open, to a primordial involvement with the sensuous nature of paint itself. His aspirations as a colorist have been determined, even dictated, by this involvement. In Olitski's paintings color is paint-not because in painting all color is produced by paint in the first place (in this sense all lines or shapes are produced by paint in the first place) , but because Olitski's color is the instrument of an overriding passion for the physical, one might say the defining, properties of paint. The juLES OuTSKI I 145 continuing conflict in his work between color and drawing is at bottom a conflict between paint and drawing; and this in turn (within the inescapable demand that drawn shapes acknowledge the shape of the support) is a conflict between paint and the support. It is this struggle between a material substance and a material entity-the one volatile, formless, spreading, penetrating, varied, and fluctuating, the other passive, definite, delimited, ineluctable, unitary, and constant-that lies at the heart ofOlitski's development, and whose resolution, on shifting terms, lies at the heart of Olitski's painting. It is a conflict in which the ultimate condition for the existence of painting in the world (that there be paint) is held against the ultimate condition for the existence of the world itself (that there be objects). Philosophy asked: What is an object of art? Now painting asks: Why should a color be ofan object at all, why can't color escape objects altogether? But it equally asks: Why should objects "have" a color (or set of colors) at all, why can't objects escape color altogether? NOTES 1 . Ludwig Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of iviathematics, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford, 1956), p. 23e (pt. 1 , par. 74). 2. In this essay I make use ofsome ofmy own previous writing about Olitski, mainly the articles 'Jules Olitski's New Paintings" (Artjarum 4 [Nov. 1965]: g6- 40) and "Olitski and Shape" (Artforum 5 [Jan. 1 967] : 20-2 1 ) . 3 · Clement Greenberg, "Introduction to Jules Olitski at the Venice Biennale," in Modernism with a Vengeance, 1957-1969, vol. 4 of The CollectedEssays and Criticism, vol. 4, ed.John O'Brian (Chicago, 1993), pp. 228-30. + Clement Greenberg, "Mter Abstract Expressionism," Art International 6 (Oct. 25, 1962): 29. 5· In fact, the spray paintings make the concept of a color's "extension" or "quantity" problematic as never before. For example, whereas from a distance the color blue may appear to be confined to a small portion of a given tanvas, on closer looking it may turn out that most ofthe surface contains tiny flecks of blue paint. The "extension" ofthe color blue might then be taken to mean either its apparent restriction to and continuity across a small area of the canvas (viewed at a distance) , or its actual but discontinuous dispersal across most of the canvas (viewed at close range). Neither interpretation, however, equals what the concept ofthe "extension'' ofa color means in the work ofStill or Newman, and in the end we are I think forced to regard it as inapplicable to Olitski's art 6. See Clement Greenberg, "Louis and Noland," Artlnternational4 (May 25, rg6o): 26-29. 7. Greenberg, "Introduction tojules Olitski at the Venice Biennale," p. 230. 8. It mightbe more accurate to say thatwhatis disturbing is the conspicuous� ness of this disparity-the way in which Olitski seems to be making a point ofit. In contrast, in Noland's concentric-ring paintings it never occurs to one to re- l46 jULI�S 0LITSKI mark the fact that an outer ring contains a lot more color than a ring Jtricality of objecthood. By the same token, however, the imperative that modernist painting defeat or suspend its objecthood is at bottom the imperative that it defeat M suspend theater. And that means that there is a war going on between theater and modernist painting, between the theatrical and the picJ:()rial-a war that, despite the literalists' explicit rejection of modernist painting and sculpture, is not basically a matter of program and ideology but of experience, conviction, sensibility. (For example, it was a particu- . lar experience that engendered Smith's conviction that paintingthat the arts as such-were.finished.) The starkness and apparent irreconcilability of this conflict are something new. I remarked earlier that objecthood has become an issue for modernist painting only within the past several years. This, however, is not to say that before the present situation came into being, paintings, or sculptures for that matter, simply were objects. It would, I think, be closer to the truth to say that they simplywere not.'5 The risk, even the possibility, of seeing works of art as nothing more than objects did not exist. That such a possibility beg-an to present itself around rg6o was largely the result of developments within modernist painting. Roughly, the more nearly assimilable to objects certain advanced painting had come to seem, the more the entire history of painting since Manet··could be understood-delusively, I believe-as consisting in the progressive (though ultimately inadequate) revelation of its essential objecthood," and the more urgent became the need for modernist painting to make explicit its conventional-specifically, its pictorial-essence by defeating or suspending its own objecthood through the meqium of shape. The view ofmodernist painting as tending toward objecthood is implicit in Judd's remark, "The new [i.e., literalist] work obviously resembles sculpture more than it does painting, but is nearer to painting"; and it is in this view that literalist sensibility in general is grounded. Literalist sensibility is, therefore, a response to the same developments that ART AND Ol3JECTH00D I 161 have largely compelled modernist painting to undo its objecthoodmore precisely, the same developments seen differently, that is, in theatrical terms, by a sensibility already theatrical, already (to say the worst) corrupted or perverted by theater. Similarly, what has compelled modernist painting to defeat or suspend its own objecthood is notjust developments internal to itself, but the same general, enveloping, infectious theatricality that corrupted literalist sensibility in the first place and in the grip of which the developments in question-and modernist painting in general-are seen as nothing more than an rmcompelling and presenceless kind of theater. It was the need to break the fingers of that grip that made objecthood an issue for modernist painting. Objecthood has also hecome an issue for modernist sculpture. This is true despite the fact that sculpture, being three-dimensional, resembles both ordinary objects and literalist work in a way that painting does not. Almost ten years ago Clement Greenberg summed up what he saw as the emergence of a new sculptural "style," whose master is undoubtedlyDavid Smith, in the following terms: To render substance entirely optical, and form, whether pictorial, sculptural, or architectural, as an integral part ofambient space-this brings anti-illusionism full circle. Instead of the illusion of things, we are now offered the illusion ofmodalities: namely, that matter is incorporeal, weightless, and exists only optically like a mirage.17 Since rg6o this development has been carried to a succession of climaxes hy the English sculptor Anthony Caro, whose work is far more specifically resistant to being seen in terms of objecthood than that of David Smith. (See figs. 32-55, pis. 13, 14.) A characteristic sculpture by Caro consists, I want to say, in the mutual and nakedjuxtaposition of the I-beams, girders, cylinders, lengths of piping, sheet metal, and grill that it comprises rather than in the compound object that they compose. The mutual inflection of one element by another, rather than the identity of each, is what is crucial-though ofcourse altering the identity of any element would be at least as drastic as altering its placement. (The identity of each element matters in somewhat the same way as the fact that it is an arm, or this arm, that makes a particular gesture, or as the fact that it is this word or this note and not another that occurs in a particular place in a sentence or melody.) The individual elements bestow significance on one another precisely by virtue of their juxtaposition: it is in this sense, a sense inextricably involved with the concept of meaning, that 162 l ART AND OBJECTHOOD everything in Caro's art that is worth looking at is in its syntax. Caro's concentration upon syntax amounts, in Greenberg's view, to "an emphasis on abstractness, on radical unlikeness to nature." And Greenberg goes on to remark, "No other sculptor has gone as far from the structural logic of ordinary ponderable things."18 It is worth emphasizing, however, that this is a function of more than the lowness, openness, part-by-partness, absence of enclosing profiles and centers of interest, unperspicuousness, and so on, of Caro's sculptures. Rather, they defeat, or allay, objecthood by imitating, not gestures exactly, but the efficacy ofgesture; like certain music and poetry, they are possessed by the knowledge of the human body and how, in innumerable ways and moods, it makes meaning. It is as though Caro's sculptures essentialize meaningfulness as such-as though the possibility of meaning what we say and do alone makes his sculpture possible. All this, it is hardly necessary to add, makes Caro's art a fountainhe'ad of antiliteralist and antitheatrical sensibility. There is another, more general respect in which objecthood has become an issue for the most ambitious recent modernist sculpture, and that is in regard to color. This is a large and difficult subject, which I cannot hope to do more than touch on here. Briefly, however, color has become problematic for modernist sculpture, not because one senses that it has been applied, but because the color of a given sculpture, whether applied or in the natural state of the material, is identical with its surface; and inasmuch as all objects have surface, awareness of the sculpture's surface implies its objecthoodthereby threatening to qualify or mitigate the undermining of objecthood achieved by opticality and, in Caro's pieces, by their syntax as well. It is in this connection, I believe, that a recent sculpture by Jules Olitski, Bunga 45 (1 967; fig. 2 1) , ought to be seen. Bunga 45 consists ofbetween fifteen and twenty metal tubes, ten feet long and of various diameters, placed upright, riveted together, and then sprayed with paint of different colors; the dominant hue is yellow to yellow orange, but the top and "rear" of the piece are suffused with a deep rose, and close looking reveals flecks and even thin trickles of green and red as well. A rather wide red band has been painted around the top ofthe piece, while a much thinner band in two differentblues (one at the "front" and another at the "rear") circumscribes the very bottom. Obviously, Bunga 45 relates intimately to Olitski's spray paintings, especially those of the past year or so, in which he has worked with paint and brush at or near the limits ofthe support. At the same time, it amounts to something far more than an attempt I ART AND OBJII.CTHOOD I 163 simply to make or "translate" his paintings into sculptures, namely, an attempt to establish surface-the surface, so to speak, of j;ainting-as a medium of sculpture. The use of tubes, each of which one sees, incredibly, asflat-that is, flat but rolled-makes Bunga 4fs surface more like that ofa painting than like that ofan object: like painting, and unlike both ordinary objects and other sculpture, Bunga 45 is allsurface. And of course what declares or establishes that surface is color, Olitski's sprayed color. 7 AT THIS point I want to make a claim that I cannot hope to prove or substantiate but that I believe nevertheless to be true: theater and theatricality are at war today, not simplywith modernist painting (or modernist painting and sculpture) , but with art as such-and to the extent that the different arts can be described as modernist, with modernist sen�ibility as such. This claim can be broken down into three propositions or theses: 1. The success, even the survival, ofthe arts has come increasingly to depend on their ability to defeat theater: This is perhaps nowhere more evident than within theater itself, where the need to defeat what I have been calling theater has chiefly made itself felt as the need to establish a drastically different relation to its audience. (The relevant texts are, of course, Brecht and Artaud.) 19 For theater has an audienceit exists for one-in a way the other arts do not; in fact, this more than anything else is what modernist sensibility finds intolerable in theater generally. Here it should be remarked that literalist art too pbss .esses an audience, though a somewhat special one: that the beholder is confronted by literalist work within a situation that he experiences as his means that there is an important sense in which the work in question exists for him alone, even if he is not actually alone with the work at the time. It may seem paradoxical to claim both that literalist sensibility aspires to an ideal of "something everyone can understand" (Smith) and that literalist art addresses itself to the beholder alone, but the paradox is only apparent. Someone has merely to enter the room in which a literalist work has been placed to become that beholder, that audience of one-almost as though the work in question has been waiting for him. And inasmuch as literalist work depends on the beholder, is in,<:o.mplete without him, it has been waiting for him. And once he is in the room the work refuses, obstinately, to let him alone-which is to say, it refuses to stop con- 164 \ ART AND OBjECTHOOD fronting l}im, distancing him, isolating him. (Such isolation is not solitude any more than such confrontation is communion.) It is the overcoming of theater that modernist sensibility finds most exalting and that it experiences as the hallmark of high art in our time. There is, however, one art that, by its very nature, escapes theater entirely-the movies.20 This helps explain why movies in general, including frankly appalling ones, are acceptable to modernist sensibility whereas all but the most successful painting, sculpture, music, and poetry is not. Because cinema escapes theater-automatically, as it were-it provides a welcome and absorbing refuge to sensibilities at war with theater and theatricality. At the same time, the automatic, guaranteed character ofthe refuge-more accurately, the fact that what is provided is a refuge from theater and not a triumph over it, absorption not conviction-means that the cinema, even at its n1ost experimental, is not a modernist art. 2. Art degenerates as it approaches the condition of theater. Theater is the common demoninator that binds together a large and seemingly disparate variety of activities, and that distinguishes those activities from the radically different enterprises of the modernist arts. Here as elsewhere the question ofvalue or level is central. For example, a failure to register the enormous difference in quality between, say, the music of Elliott Carter and that of John Cage or between the paintings ofLouis and those ofRobert Rauschenberg means that the real distinctions-between music and theater in the first instance and between painting and theater in the second-are displaced by the illusion that the barriers between the arts are in the process of crumbling (Cage and Rauschenberg being seen, correctly, as similar) and that the arts themselves are at last sliding towards some kind of final, implosive, highly desirable synthesis. Whereas in fact the individual arts have never been more explicitly concerned with the conventions that constitute their respective essences. 3· The concepts ofquality andvalue-and to the extent that these are central to art, the concept of art itself-are meaningful, or wholly meaningful, only within the individual arts. What lies between the arts is theater. It is, I think, significant that in their various statements the literalists have largely avoided the issue ofvalue or quality at the same time as they have shown considerable uncertainty as to whether or not what they are making is art. To describe their enterprise as an attempt to establish a new art does not remove the uncertainty; at most it points to its source. Judd himself has as much as acknowledged the problematic character of the literalist enterprise by his ART AND OBJECTHOOD I 1 65 claim, "Awork needs only to be interesting." ForJudd, as for literalist sensibilitygenerally, all that matters is whether or not a given work is able to elicit and sustain (his) interest. Whereas within the modernist arts nothing short of conviction-specifically, the conviction that a particular painting or sculpture or poem or piece of music can or cannot support comparison with past work within that art whose quality is not in doubt-matters at all. (Literalist work is often condemned-when it is condemned-for being boring. A tougher charge would be that it is merely interesting.) The interest of a given work resides, in Judd's view, both in its character as a whole and in the sheer specificity of the materials of which it is made: Most of the work involves new materials, either recent inventions or things not used before in art. . . . Materials vary greatly and are simply materials-formica, aluminum, cold-rolled steel, plexiglass, red and common brass, and so fOrth. They are specific. Ifthey are used directly, they are more specific. Also, they are usually aggressive. There is an objectivity to the obdurate identity of a material. Like the shape of the object, the materials do not represent, signify, or allude to anything; they are what they are and nothing more. And what they are is not, strictly speaking, something that is grasped or intuited or recognized or even seen once and for alL Rather, the "obdurate identity" of a specific material, like the wholeness of the shape, is simply stated or given or established at the very outset, if not before the outset; accordingly, the experience of both is one of endlessness, or inexhaustibility, ofbeing able to go on and on letting, for example, the material itself confront one in all its literalness, its "objectivity," its absence of anything beyond itself. In a similar vein Morris has written: Characteristic of a gestalt is that once it is established all the information about it, qua gestalt, is exhausted. (One does not, for example, seek the gestalt ofa gestalt.) . . . One is thenboth free ofthe shape and bound to it. Free or released because ofthe exhaustion ofinformation about it, as shape, and bound to it because it remains constant and in­ divisible. The same note is struck by Tony Smith in a statement the first sentence of which I quoted earlier: I'm interested in the inscrutability and mysteriousness of the thing. Something obvious on the fact of it (like a washing machine or a 166 I ART AND OBJECTHOOD pump) is of no further interest. A Bennington earthenware jar, for instance, has subtlety of color, largeness of form, a general suggestion of substance, generosity, is calm and reassuring-qualities that take it beyond pure utility. It continues to nourish us time and time again. We can't see it in a second, we continue to read it. There is something absurd in the fact that you can go back to a cube in the same way. Like Judd's Specific Objects and Morris's gestalts or unitary forms, Smith's cube is always of further interest; one never feels that one has come to the end ofit; it is inexhaustible. It is inexhaustible, however, not because of any fullness-that is the inexhaustibility of artbut because there is nothing there to exhaust. It is endless the way a road might be, if it were circular, for example. Endlessness, being able to go on and on, even havirrg to go on and on, is central both to the concept of interest and to that of objecthood. In fact, it seems to be the experience that most deeply excites literalist sensibility, and that literalist artists seek to objectify in their work-for example, by the repetition ofidentical units (judd's "one thing after another") , which carries the implication that the units in question could be multiplied ad infinitum.21 Smith's account of his experience on the unfinished turnpike records that excitement all but explicitly. Similarly, Morris's claim that in the best new work the beholder is made aware that "he himself is establishing relationships as he apprehends the object from various positions and under varying conditions of light and spatial context" amounts to the claim that the beholder is made aware of the endlessness and inexhaustibility if not of the ol:(ject itself at any rate of his experience of it. This awareness is further exacerbated by what might be called the inclusiveness ofhis situation, that is, by the fact, remarked earlier, that everything he observes counts as part ofthatsituation and hence is felt to bear in some way that remains undefined on his experience of the object. Here finally I want to emphasize something that may already have become clear: the experience in question persists in time, and the presentment of endlessness that, I have been claiming, is central to literalist art and theory is essentially a presentment of endless or indefinite duration. Once again Smith's account of his night drive is relevant, as well as his remark, "We can't see it [thejar and, by implication, the cube] in a second, we continue to read it." Morris too has stated explicitly, 'The experience of the work necessarily exists in time"-though it would make no difference if he had not. The literalist preoccupation with time-more precisely, with the duration ART AND OBJECTHOOD I 167 ofthe o:piffience-is, I suggest, paradigmatically theatrical, as though theater confronts the beholder, and thereby isolates him, with the endlessness notjust ofobjecthood but of tirne; or as though the sense which, at bottom, theater addresses is a sense of temporality, of time both passing and to come, s{rnultaneously approaching and receding, as if apprehended in an infinite perspective. . . .22 That preoccupation marks a profound difference between literalist work and modernist painting and sculpture. It is as though one's experience of the latter has no duration-not because one in fact experiences a picture by Noland or Olitski or a sculpture by David Smith or Caro in no time at all, but because at every moment the work itselfis wholly manifest. (This is true of sculpture despite the obvious fact that, being threedimensional, it can be seen from an infinite number of points of view. One's experience ofa Caro is not incomplete, and one's conviction as to its quality is not suspended, simply because one has seen it only from where one is standing. Moreover, in the grip of his best work one's view of the sculpture is, so to speak, eclipsed by the sculpture itself-which it is plainly meaningless to speak of as only partly present.) It is this continuous and entire presen!ness, amounting, as it were, to the perpetual creation of itself, that one experiences as a kind of instantan¢ousness, as though if only one were infinitely more acute, a single infinitely brief instant would be long enough to see everything, to experience the work in all its depth and fullness, to be forever convinced by it. (Here it is worth noting that the concept of interest implies temporality in the form of continuing attention directed at the object whereas the concept of conviction does not.) I want to claim that it is by virtue of their presentness and instantaneousness that modernist painting and sculpture defeat theater. In fact, I am tempted far beyond my knowledge to suggest that, faced with the need to defeat theater, it is above all to the condition of painting and sculpture-the condition, that is, of existing in, indeed of evoking or constituting, a continuous and perpetual present-that the other contemporary modernist arts, mo�t notably poetry and music, aspire.23 THIS ESSAY will be read as an attack on certain artists (and critics) and as a defense of others. And of course it is true that the desire to distinguish between what is to me the authentic art of our time and other work which, whatever the dedication, passion, and intelligence of its creators, seems to me to share certain charac- 168 I ART AND OBJECTHOOD teristics associated here with the concepts of1iteralism and theater has largely motivated what I have written. In these last sentences, however, I want to call attention to the utter pervasiveness-the virtual universality-of the sensibility or mode ofbeing that I have characterized as corrupted or perverted by theater. We are all literalists most or all of our lives. Presentness is grace. NOTES 1 . Perry Miller,jonathan Edwards (1949; rpt., New York, 1959), pp. 329-30. 2. This was said byJudd in an interview with Bruce Glaser, edited by Lucy R. Lippard and published as "Questions to Stella and Judd" in Art News in 1966 and reprinted in MinimalArt, ed. Gregory Battcock (New York, 1g68) , pp. 1 48- 64- The remarks attributed in the present essay to Judd and Morris have been taken from that interview; from DonaldJudd's essay "Specific Objects," Arts Yemo. book, no. 8 (rg65), pp. 74-82; and from Robert Morris's essays, "Notes on Sculpture" and "Notes on Sculpture, Part 2," published in Ariforum in Feb. and Oct. 1966, respectively, and reprinted in Batt<,:ock, ed., MinimalArt, pp. 222-35. I have also taken one remark by Morris from the catalog to the exhibition Eight Sculptars: The AmbiguousImageat the Walker Art Center, Minneapolis, Oct.-Dec. 1g66. I should add that in laying out what seems to me the position judd and Morris hold in common I have ignored various differences between them and have used certain remarks in contexts for which they may not have been intended. Moreover, I haven't always indicated which of them actually said or wrote a particular phrase; the alternative would have been to litter the text with footnotes. 3· See Michael Fried, "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons"; idem, 'jules Olitski"; and idem, "Ronald Davis: Surface and Illusion." (All these essays are reprinted in this volume.) 4· Clement Greenberg, "Recentness of Sculpture," in the catalog to the Los Angeles County Museum ofArt's 1967 exhibition American Sculpture ofthe Sixties (see Greenberg, Modernism with a Vengeance I957-I969, vol. 4 of The Collected Essays and Criticism, ed.John O'Brian [Chicago, 1993], pp. 250-56). The verb "project" as I havejust used it is taken from Greenberg's statement, ''The ostensible aim of the Minimalists is to 'project' objects and ensembles of objects that are just nudgeable into aft" (Modernism with a Vengeance, p. 253). 5· Greenberg, Modernism with a Vtmgeance, pp. 255-56. 6. Greenberg, "After Abstract Expressionism," Art International 6 (Oct. 25, 1962): go. The passage from which this has been taken reads as follows: Under the testing of modernism more and more of the conventions of the art ofpainting have shown themselves to be dispensable, unessential. By now it has been established, itwould seem, that the irreducible essence ofpictorial art consists in but two constitutive conventions or norms: flatness and the delimitation of flatness; and that the observance of merely these two norms is enough to create an object which can be experienced ART AND OBJECTHOOD I l6g as a picture: thus a stretched or t.:lcked�up canvas already exists as a picture-though not necessarily as a succes�ful one, In its broad outline this is undoubtedly correct. There are, however, certain qualifications that can be made, To begin \vith, it is not quite enough to say that a bare canvas tacked to a wall is not "necessarily" a successful picture; it would, I think, be more accurate [what I originally wrote was "less of an exaggeration"-M,E, 1996] to say that it is not conceivably one, It may be countered thatfuture circumstances might be such as to makeit a successful painting, but I would argue that, for that to happen, the enterprise of painting would have to change so drastically that nothing more than the name would remain. (It would require a far greater change than that which painting has undergone from Manet to Noland, Olitski, and Stella!) Moreover, seeing something as a painting in the sense that one sees the tacked-up canvas as a painting, and being convinced that a particular work can stand comparison with the painting ofthe pastwhose quality is not in doubt, are altogether different experiences: it is, I want to say, as though unless something compels conviction as to its quality it is no more than trivially or nominally a painting. This suggests that flatness and the delimitation of flatness ought not to be thought of as the "irreducible essence of pictorial art," but rather as something like the minimal conditionsfcrrsomething's beingseen as apainting; and that the crucial question is not what those minimal and, so to speak, timeless conditions are, but ratherwhat, at a given moment, is capable of compelling conviction, of succeeding as painting. This is not to say that painting has no essence; it is to claim that that essence-i.e., that which compels conviction-is largely determined by, and therefore changes continually in response to, the vital work ofthe recent past The essence of painting is not something irreducible. Rather, the task of the modernist painter is to discover those conventions that, at a given moment, alone are capable of establishing his work's identity as painting. Greenberg approaches this position when he adds, "As it seems to me, Newman, Rothko, and Still have Swung the self-criticism of modernist painting in a new direction simply by continuing it in its old one. The question now asked through their art is no longer whatconstitutesart, or the art ofpainting, as such, but what irreducibly constitutes good art as such. Or rather, what is the ultimate source ofvalue or quality in art?" But I would argue that what modernism has meant is that the two questions-VVhat constitutes the art ofpainting? And what constitutes good painting?-are no longer separable; the first disappears, or increasingly tends to disappear, into the second. (I am, &f course, taking issue here with the version of modernism put forward in the introduction to ThreeAmerican Painters [reprinted in this book].) For more on the nature of essence and convention in the modernist arts see my essays on Stella and Olitski cited in n. 3 above, as well as Stanley Cavell, "Music Discomposed," and "Rejoinders" to critics of that essay, to be published as part ofa symposium by the University ofPittsburgh Press in a volume entitled Art, MindandReligion. [For those essays see Cavell, "Music Discomposed" and "A Matter of Meaning It," in Must We Mean VVhat WeSay?A Book ofE5sa)'S (New York, 1g6g) , pp. 180-237·-M. F., 1996] 170 I ART AND OBJI<:CTHOOD 7· Greenberg, Modernism with a Vengeance, p. 252. 8. Ibid., pp. 253-54. g. Quoted by Morris as the epigraph to his "Notes on Sculpture, Part 2." 1o. Except for the question-and-answer exchange quoted by Morris, all statements by Tony Smith have been taken from Samuel Wagstaff, Jr., "Talking to Tony Smith," Ariforum 5 (Dec. 1966): 14-19, and reprinted (with certain omissions) in Battcock, ed., MinimalA1·t, pp. 381-86. 1 L This appears in the Wagstaffinterview in Ariforum (p. 1 7) but not in the republication ofthat interview in lvlinima1Art.-M.F., 1966 1 2. In the catalog to last spring's Primary Structures exhibition at the Jewish Museum, Bladen wrote, "How do you make the inside the outside?" and Grosvenor, "I don't want my work to be thought ofas 'large sculpture,' they are ideas that operate in the space between floor and ceiling." The relevance of these statements to what I have adduced as evidence for the theatricality of literalist theory and practice seems obvious (catalog for the exhibition Primary Structures: Younger American and B1iti5h Sculptors, shown at the Jewish Museum, New York, Apr. 27-June 1 2, 1966, no page numbers) . 13. It is tjleatricality, too, that links all these artists to other figures as disparate as Kaprow, Cornell, Rauschenberg, Oldenburg, Flavin, Smithson, Kienholz, Segal, Samaras, Christo, Kusama . . . the list could go on indefinitely. 14- The concept ofa room is, mostly clandestinely, important to literalist art and theory. In fact, it can often be substituted for the word "space" in the latter: something is said to be in my space ifit is in the same room \vith me (and if it is placed so that I can hardly fail to notice it). 15. In a discussion ofthis claim with Stanley Cavell it emerged that he once remarked in a seminar that fOr Kant in the Critique ofjudgment a work of art is not an object.-M. F, 1966 16. One way of describing this view might be to say that it draws something like a false inference from the fact that the increasingly explicit acknowledgement ofthe literal character of the support has been central to the development of modernist painting: namely, that literalness as such is an artistic value of supreme importance. In "Shape as Form" I argued that this inference is blind to certain vital considerations, and that literalness-more precisely, the literalness ofthe support-is a value only within modernistpainting, and then only because it has been made one by the history of that enterprise. 17. Clement Greenberg, ''The New Sculpture," in Art and Culture: CriticalEssays (Boston, 1961), p. 144- 18. The statement that "everything in Caro's art that is work looking atexcept the color-is in its syntax" appears in my introduction to Caro's 1963 exhibition at the Whitechapel Art Gallery (reprinted in this book as "Anthony Caro") . It is quoted with approval by Greenberg, who then goes on to make the statements quoted above, in "Anthony Caro," Arts Yearbook, no. 8 ( 1965), reprinted as "Contemporary Sculpture: Anthony Caro," in Modernism with a Vengeance, pp. ::ws-o8.) Caro's first step in that direction, the elimination of the pedestal, seems in retrospect to have been motivated not by the desire to present his work without artificial aids so much as by the need to undermine its ob- ART :\ND 0BjECTH001) 1 1 7 1 jecthood. His work has revealed the extent to which merely putting something on a pedestal confirms it in its objecthood, though merely removing the pedestal does not in itself undermine objecthood, as literalist work demonstrates. 19. The need to achieve a new relation to the spectator, which Brecht felt and which he discussed time and again in his writings on theater, was not simply the result of his Marxism. On the contrary, his discovery of Marx seems to have been in part the discovery of what that relation might be like, what it might mean: "VVhen I read Marx's Capital I understood my plays. Naturally I want to see this book widely circulated. It wasn't of course that I found I had unconsciously written a whole pile of Marxist plays; but this man Marx was the only spectator for my plays I'd ever come across" (Bertolt Brecht, Brecht on ?heater, eel. and trans.John Willett [New York, 1964], pp. 23-24) . 20. Exactly how the movies escape theater is a difficult question, and there is no doubt but that a phenomenology of the cinema that concentrated on the similarities and differences between it and stage drama-e.g., that in the movies the actors are not physically present, the film itself is projected away from us, and the screen is not experienced as a kind of object existing in a specific physical relation to us-would be rewarding. 21. That is, the actual number of such units in a given piece is felt to be arbitrary, and the piece itself-despite the literalist preoccupation with holistic forms-is seen as a fragment of, or cut into, something infintely larger. This is one of the most important differences between literalist work and modernist painting, which has made itself responsiblefOr its physical limits as never before. Noland's and Olitski's paintings are two obvious, and different, cases in point. It is in this connection, too, that the importance of the painted bands around the bottonl and the top of Olitski's sculpture Bunga becomes clear. _22. ·}The connection between spatial recession and some such experience of ter�j)�Q)·ality-almost as if the first were a kind of natural metaphor for the second-is present in much Surrealist painting (e.g., De Chirico, Dali, Tanguy, Magritte). Moreoever, temporality-manifested, for example, as expectation, dread, anxiety, presentiment, memory, nostalgia, stasis-is often the explicit subject of their paintings. There is, in fact, a deep affinity bet\veen literalist and Surrealis_t s_ensibility (at any rate, as the latter makes itself felt in the Work of the above painters) that ought to be noted. Both employ imagery that is at once holistic and, in a sense, fragmentary, incomplete; both resort to a similar anthropomorphizing of objects or conglomerations of objects (in Surrealism the use of dolls and manikins,,makes that explicit); both are capable of achieving remark� able effects of "pres�Pce"; and both tend to deploy and isolate objects and persons in "situations"-the dosed room and the abandoned artificial landscape are as important to Surrealism as to literalism. (Tony Smith, it will be recalled, described the airstrips, etc., as "Surrealist landscapes.") This affinity can be summed up by saying that Surrealist sensibility, as manifested in the work of certain artists, and literalist sensibility are both theatrical. I do not 'Wish, however, to be understood as saying that because they are theatrical, all Surrealist works that share the above characteristics fail as art; a conspicuous example of major work that can be described as theatrical is Giacometti's Surrealist sculpture. On 172 I ART AND OBJECTHOOD the other hand, it is perhaps not without significance that Smith's supreme example of a Surrealist landscape was the parade ground at Nuremberg. 23. What this means in each art will naturally be different. For example, music's situation is especially difficult in that music shares \vith theate� the convention, if I may call it that, of duration-a convention that, I am suggesting, has itself become increasingly theatricaL Besides, the physical circumstances of a concert closely resemble those of a theatrical performance. It may have been the desire for something like presentness that, at least to some extent, led Brecht to advocate a nonillusionistic theater, in which for example the stage lighting would be visible to the audience, in which the actorswould not identifywith the characters they play but ratherwould show them forth, and in which temporality itselfwould be presented in a new way: Just as the actor no longer has to persuade the audience that it is the author's character and not himselfthat is standing on the stage, so also he need not pretend that the events taking place on the stage have never been rehearsed, and are now happening for the first and only time. Schiller's distinction is no longervalid: that the rhapsodist has to treat his material as wholly in the past: the mime his, as wholy here and now. It should be apparent all through his performance that "even at the start and in the middle he knows how it ends" and he must "thus maintain a calm independence throughout." He narrates the story ofhis character by vivid portrayal, always knowing more than it does and treating "now" and "here" not as a pretence made possible by the rules ofthe game but as something to be distinguished from yesterday and some other place, so as to make visible the knotting together of the events. (Brecht on Theater, p. 194) Butjust as the exposed lighting Brecht advocates has become merely another kind of theatrical convention (one, moreoever, that often plays an important role in the presentation of literalist work, as the installation view ofJudd's sixcube piece in the Dwan Gallery shows), it is not clear whether the handling of time Brecht calls for is tantamount to authentic presentness, or merely to another kind of "presence"-to the presentment of time itself as though it were some sort of literalist object. In poetry the need for presentness manifests itself in the lyric poem; this is a subject that requires its own treatment. For discussions of theater relevant to this essay see Stanley Cavell's essays "Ending the Waiting Game" (on Beckett's End�Garne) and 'The Avoidance of Love: A Reading of King Lear," in Must We i\1ean 'What We Say? pp. 1 1 5-62 and 267-353· New Work by Anthony Caro ANTHONY CARo's recent show at the Andre Emmerich Gallery concentrated on four sculptures (two more were in the back room) , each of which was superb and no two of which were alike. Hrmzon ( 1 g66; fig. 38) exploits contrasts of scale, chiefly among the four vertical cylinders, more explicitly than any other piece by Caro that I know. The aptness of the hollow cylinder for this kind of exploration is striking, and constitutes one of the numerous incidental discoveries ofwhich his oeuvre, like Kenneth Noland's, is full. There is also a contrast betwe!'n the cylinders and the unusually cursive (for Caro) linear elements that connect them-a contrast that makes for an extraordinarily intense experience as of abstract detail. (See for example the near di�junction between the two linear elementsjust to the left of the middle cylinders.) The hollowness ofthe cylinders is important as well: one sees their rims as circles-that is, as linear, cursive-not as discs. In Red Splash ( 1 966; fig. 39) four vertical cylinders support two rectangular pieces ofrather coarse steel mesh which cross diagonally. On top of their crossing a flat steel rectangle lies parallel to the front and back of the sculpture. Everything about Red Splash is elusive, refractory, arbitrary; nothing is perspicuous, nothing makes obvious sense, structural or otherwise. The pieces of mesh do not rest on the tops of the cylinders but barely touch them several inches down; the planes of the mesh are not parallel to each other, to the ground, or to anything else; the view we are offered is from underneath, and Originally published in Artjarurn 5 Feb. 1967): 46-47. 173 1 74 I NEW WORK BY ANTHONY CARO perhaps for that reason seems to be from the rear as well; the steel rectangle seems simply, even baldly, put where it is; and so on. Caro's growing willingness to explore arbitrariness has its roots, I believe, in his experience of the work of David Smitb. But whereas arbitrariness in Smith's work always makes itself felt as something personal, as expressing an aspect of his nature, one senses that to Caro it is a basically alien if not actually repugnant resource which, nevertheless, he is determined to explore. This perhaps explains the depth or radicalness of arbitrariness in RedSplash: the sculpture does not refuse to answer certain demands of sense and perspicuousness so much as establish a situation in which the demands themselves are rendered nugatory. In Carriage ( 1966; fig. 40) the use ofmesh enables Caro simultaneously to delimit-almost to enclose or box in-a tract of space and to assert its continuity with the rest of the sculpture's immediate environment. How one ought to describe the mesh itself is a nice problem: for example, although there is an obvious sense in which one can see through it, there is another, perhaps less obvious (or obviously important) sense in which one cannot. It is not transparent, but opaque; one looks both at and past it-as opposed to the way one looks through a pane of glass. By partly superimposing at an angle two meshes of different degrees of openness, Caro establishes a plane ofvariation, not oftransparency exactly, but ofvisual density. It is as though the mesh is seen as cross-hatching-as literal but disembodied shading or value. In this respect Carriage is intimately related toJules Olitski's spray paintings, in which fluctuations ofvalue are divorced from their traditional tactile associations. More generally, an adequate discussion of Caro's use of mesh would relate it to the opticality both of his own work since 1959 and of the most important painting since Jackson Pollock, whose Number 29 ( 1 950) , a painting on glass, deploys mesh in the interests of accessibility solely to eyesight achieved by his allover paintings as early as the .winter of 1946-47. Span ( 1 966; fig. 41) consists of eight seemingly rather disparate, individualized parts-including a heavy grid-connected to one another with what one experiences as disconcerting freedom. Here as in RedSplashthe parts feeljuxtaposed rather than connected, though the relations among contiguous parts are nowhere near as unperspicuous as in that piece. It is as though nothing in Span is attached to anything else-as though anything could be moved or disarranged. For all its size and weight, the piece as a whole represents the achieve- NI�W WORK BY ANTHONY CARO I 1 75 ment, not of a perilous or delicate balance, but of a rather opposite state of openness, fragility, vulnerability. . , , No two elements are parallel, or for that matter at right angles, to one another in the ground plan. This too is unusual in Care's work, and is at first disorienting; with familiarity, however, Span discloses a coherence based on the acceptance (though not really the stating) of horizontal and vertical axes, the establishment of different levels (the ground being only the lowest of several), and the individual character of each almost disjunct part. Span exemplifies Care's occasional tendency to arrive, inadvertently, even reluctantly, at something like an image-! keep seeing the hollow rectangle at the upper left as a painting or mirror, and in general I am struck by the somewhere Surrealist flavor of the work as a whole-without detriment to the abstractness, or strength as abstract idea, of the sculptures in question. Whatever images one finds in Care's work come last, not first; when the piece is done they simply are there. But they do not help organize the piece, even when one is most aware of them. Sculptures like Span and Horizon are held together not by the images they may be seen to constitute, but, I want to say, by the meanings they make. It is as though Care's art essentializes meaningfulness as such-as though the possibility of meaning what we say and do alone makes his sculpture possible. Ronald Davis: Surface and Illusion RoN DAVIS is a young California artist whose new paintings, recently shown at the Tibor de Nagy Gallery in New York, are among the most significant produced anywhere during the past fewyears, and place him, along with Frank Stella and Darby Bannard, at the forefront ofhis generation. In at least two respects Davis's work is characteristically Californian: it makes impressive use of new materials-plastic backed with fiberglass-and it exploits an untrammeled illusionism. But these previously had yielded nothing more than extraordinarily attractive objects, such as Larry Bell's coated glass boxes, or ravishing, ostensibly pictorial effects, as in Robert Irwin's recent work. (In the first instance illusion is rendered literal, while in the second it dissolves literalness entirely.) Whereas Davis's new work achieves an unequivocal identity as painting. That this is so is a matter of conviction. One recognizesDavis's new work as painting: in my case, with amazement-and, at first, distrust, even resentment-that what I was experiencing as paintings were, after all, made of plastic. Not that Davis's paintings are what they are in spite of being made ofplastic or presenting a compelling illusion ofsolid object in strong perspective. On the contrary, it is precisely Davis's refusal to settle for anything but ambitious painting that, one feels, has compelled him to use both new materials and two-point perspective. What incites amazement is that that ambition could be realized in this way-that, for example, after a lapse of a century, rigorous perspective could again become a medium of painting. Davis's paintings are, I suggest, the most extreme response so far Originally published in Artforum 5 (Apr. 1967): 37-4 1 . RoNALD DAvis: Smu'ACE AND ILLUSION I 177 to the situation described in my essay "Shape as Form: Frank Stella's Irregular Polygons" (reprinted in this book) . Roughly, Davis has used perspectival illusion-the illusion that the painting as a whole is a solid object seen in two-point perspective from above-to relieve the pressure under which, within that situation, the shape of the support (or literal shape) has come to find itself. The limits of Davis's new paintings present themselves as the edges of a three-dimensional entity rather than of a flat surface, and in fact it is virtually impossible to grasp the literal shape ofpaintings like SixNinthsBlue (fig. 56) and SixNinthsRed (both rg66) just by looking at them. (One is forced, so to speak, to trace their limits and then see what one has.) As a result, the question ofwhether or not the literal shapes ofDavis's new paintings hold, or stamp themselves out, or compel conviction-a burning question within the situation referred to-simply does not arise. More precisely, it does not arise as long as the illusion of threedimensionality remains compelling: if in a given painting, for whatever reason, the illusion is felt to be injeopardy, that painting's ability to hold as shape is rendered questionable as well. (Something of the kind may happen in Two Ninths Grey [ r g66; fig. 57] , in which the projected "object" is not, to my mind, sufficiently comprehensible. What, for example, is the precise relation of the two grey blocks to the larger red slab on which they seem to sit? In general Davis cannot afford much ambiguity or indeterminacy, both ofwhich compromise his paintings' illusory objecthood.) 1 A great deal, then, depends upon the power of the illusion; and it was, I believe, in order to achieve that power that Davis gave up working in paint on canvas and began to explore the possibility ofmaking his new paintings in plastic. In any case, the fact that in his new paintings color is not applied to the surface in any way, but instead seems physically to lie somewhere behind it, makes the illusion of objecthood infinitely more compelling than would otherwise be the case. In this respect Davis's new paintings represent not only an inspired resuscitation of traditional illusionism but also a deep break with it: instead of paint on the surface of the canvas creating the illusion of objects in space, in Davis's paintings whatever makes the illusion is not, it seems, situated on or at the surface at all. (The illusion of objecthood is intensified still more by the way in which the colored plastic-in which Davis has also mixed mirror flake, aluminum powder, bronze powder, and pearl essence-not merely represents but imitates the materiality of solid things.) Conversely, the surface of these paintings is experienced in unique isolation from the illusion. 178 I RoNALD DAvrs: SuRFACE AND ILLUSION It has been prized loose from the rest of the painting-as though what hangs on the wall is the surface alone. In Davis's new paintings a detached surface coexists with a detached illusion. (In this respect his paintings are the opposite of Olitski's, in which there is "an illusion of depth that somehow extrudes all suggestions of depth back to the picture's surface.")' Indeed, the detached surface coincides with the detached illusion, which is why the question of whether or not the shape of that surface holds or stamps itself out does not arise. Davis deliberately-and, I think, profoundly-heightens one's sense ofthe mutual independence ofsurface and illusion by rather sharply beveling the edges of his paintings from behind. This means that even when the beholder is not standing directly in front of a given painting, no support of any kind can be seen. The surface is felt to be exactly that, a surface, and nothing more. It is not, one might say, the surface of anything-except of course a painting. Moreover, Davis's surface is something new in painting: not because it is shiny and reflects light-that was also true ofthe varnished surfaces of the Old Masters-but because what one experiences as surface in these paintings is that reflectance and nothing more. The precise degree ofreflectance is important. If the painting is too shiny the surface is emphasized at the expense of the illusion, and this in turn undermines the independence of both. At the same time, Davis's paintings make transparency important as never before: not because their surfaces are experienced as transparent-one does not, I want to say, look through so much as past them-but because the layers of colored plastic behind their surfaces vary in opacity. The relation between the surface and the rest of a transparent object is different from that between the surface and the rest of an opaque one: in the former case it is as though the beholder can see all of the object, notjust the portion that his eyesight touches. In Davis's new work, this difference becomes important to painting for the first time, by making possible, or greatly strengthening, the relation between surface and illusion I have tried to describe. Finally, I want at least to mention the character of the illusionism in these paintings. Despite its dependence on the rigorous application of two-point perspective, it too is new in painting. Roughly, the illusion is of something one takes to be a square slab (some portions of which have been removed) , turned so that one of its corners points in the general direction of the beholder, and seen from above. What seems to me of special interest is this: the illusion is such that one simply assumes that the projected slab is horizontal, as though RONALD DAVIS: SURFACE AND IttUSION I 179 lying on the ground; but this means that looking down at it could be managed only from a position considerably above both the slab itself and the imaginary ground plane it seems to define. Moreover, the beholder is not only suspended above the slab; he is simultaneously tilted toward it-otherwise he would not be in a position to look down at the slab at all. In Davis's new paintings the illusion of objecthood does not excavate the wall so much as it dissolves the ground under one's feet, as though experiencing the surface and the illusion independently of one another were the result of standing in radically different physical relations to them. Davis's illusionism addresses itselfnotjust to eyesight but to a sense that might be called one of directionality. There have been strong intimations of such a development in recent painting, notably that of Noland and Olitski; in fact, I recently claimed of Olitski's spray paintings that what is appealed to is not our ability in locating objects (or failing to) but in orienting ourselves (or failing to) .3 This seems to me dramatically true of Davis's new paintings as well. The possibilities Davis has been able to realize in his first plastic paintings still seem to me scarcely imaginable. The possibilities those paintings open up belong to the future of painting. NOTES 1 . At the moment I wrote this article, I had evidently not yet arrived at the argument of "Art and Objecthoocl" (reprinted in this book); had I done so, I probably would have found a way to characterize Davis's paintings other than in terms of an illusion of "objecthood," a loaded notion in the essay I was soon to begin.-M. F., 1996 2. Clement Greenberg, "Introduction to Jules Olitski at the Venice Bien� nale," in Modernism with a Vengeance 1957-1969, vol. 4 of The CollectedEssays and Criticism, ed. John O'Brian (Chicago, 1993), p. 230. 3· In 'jules Olitski" (reprinted in this book) . Two Sculptures by Anthony Caro Deep Body Blue (1967; fig. 42) , the smaller of the two pieces in Anthony Caro's recent show at the Kasmin Gallery, is open as widespread arms and then as a door is open. The two contrasting elements that run along the ground, a length of tubing and a flat sheet standing on its long edge, gather the beholder into a far more compelling embrace than could be achieved by literally embracing him-the way, for example, one is embraced by Bernini's colonnades in front of St. Peter's-while the two uprights are experienced as a kind of abstract door on the other side of which two similarly contrasting elements converge, touch, and go their ways. Like several recent sculptures by Caro, Deep Body Blue explores possibilities for sculpture in various concepts and experiences that one would think belonged today only to architecture: for example, those of being led up to something, ofentering it, perhaps by going through something else, of being inside, of looking out from within. , , , Not that Caro's work is architectural in look or essence. But it shares with architecture a preoccupation with the fact, or with the implications of the fact, that humans have bodies and live in a physical world. This preoccupation finds a natural, and inescapably literal, home in architecture. The same preoccupation no longer finds a naturalhome in painting and sculpture: it is the nearly impossible task of artists like Caro to put it there, and this can only be done by rendering it antiliteral or (what I mean by) abstract. The heart of Caro's genius is that he is able to make radically abstract sculptures out of concepts and experiences which seem-which but for his making are and would Originally published in Artjorum 6 (Feb. 1968): 24-25. 1 80 Tvm ScuLPTURES BY ANTHONY CARO I 181 remain-inescapably literal and therefore irremediably theatrical; and hy so doing he redeems the time if anyone does. Not only is the radical abstractness of art not a denial of our bodies and the world; it is the only way in which they can be saved for high art in our time, in which they can be made present to us other than as theater. In the course of his enterprise Caro makes discoveries as sudden and imperative as any in modern philosophy. For example, it is essential to our experiencing the two uprights in Deef! Body Blue as a kind of door that they stand in the same plane. It doesn't matter that they are no more than four feet high, that tbey lack any sort of lintel, that we are not tempted nor even able to pass between them: the fact that they stand several feet apart in the same plane is enough to make us experience them as an abstract door (and a large, or wide, one at that) . By the same token, if they are moved even slightly out of alignment their "doorness" disintegrates and the sculpture as a whole begins to fall apart, to become arbitrary and therefore meaningless as art. This aspect of Caro's achievement may be described in different ways. One can say that he discovered what constitutes an abstract door, or that he discovered the conventions-corresponding to deep needs-which make something a door. Caro did not consciously set out to discover anything of the kind. On the contrary, it is because Deep Body Blue began in a preoccupation with particular modes of being in the world that its very success as sculpture came to depend on the making of the above discovery in, or by, the piece itself. It is as though with Caro sculpture has become committed to a new kind of cognitive enterprise: not because its generating impulse has become philosophical, but because the newly explicit need to defeat theater in all its manifestations has meant that the ambition to make sculpture out of a primordial involvement with modes of being in the world can now be realized only if antiliteral-that is, radically abstract-terms for that involvement can be found. (At the risk of seeming to overload the point, I will add that the cognitive enterprise in question is related, in different ways, both to European phenomenology and to the later philosophy ofWittgenstein. It isn't only modernist art that has found it necessary to defeat theater.) The larger sculpture, Prairie (1967; fig. 43, pl. 14) , consists offour long poles of aluminum tubing suspended parallel to one another about eleven inches above a sheet of corrugated metal-more exactly, a flat sheet with four channel-like depressions in it-which runs north-south to the poles' east-west and is itself suspended about twenty-one inches above the ground. Ifwe approach Prairie from ei- 182 1 1\vo SCULPTURES BY ANTHONY CARO ther end of that sheet, the physical means by which these suspensions are accomplished are not apparent; but as we move around the sculpture it becomes clear that the sheet is held up by two sharply bent pieces of metal plate, one on each side, which spring out and down from the underside of the sheet until they touch the ground, whereupon they angle upward and outward until they reach the height of the poles, which they support also. Two of the poles are supported at only one point, about twenty inches from the end; a third is supported about twenty inches from both ends, that is, by both of the bent, upward-spring·ing metal plates; while a fourth is not supported by these at all but is held up by a large upright rectangle of metal which stands somewhat apart from the rest of the sculpture and in fact is not physically connected to it in any way. But grasping exactly how Prairieworks as a feat ofengineering does not in the least undermine or even compete with one's initial impression that the metal poles and corrugated sheet are suspended, as if in the absence of gravity, at different levels above the ground. Indeed, the ground itself is seen not as that upon which everything else stands and from which everything else rises, but rather as the last, or lowest, of the three levels which, as abstract conception, Prairie comprises. (In this sense Prairie defines the ground not as that which ultimately supports everything else, but as that which does not itself require support. It makes this fact about the ground both phenomenologically surprising and sculpturally significant.) The result is an extraordinary marriage of illusion and structural obviousness. Once we have walked even partly around Prairie tbere is nothing we do not know about how it supports itself, and yet that knowledge is somehow eclipsed by our actual experience of tbe piece as sculpture. It is as though in Prairie, as often in Caro'swork, illusion is not achieved at the expense ofphysicality so much as it exists simultaneously with it in such a way that, in the grip of the piece, we do not see past the first to the second. This is mostly due to the nature of the relationships among the various elements that compose Prairie, relationships which make a different kind of sense to the mind and to the eye. For example, that three of the long metal poles are held up at only one end is understood to mean that the full weight of each pole is borne by a single support far from its center; but the poles are seen as being in a state of balance as they are, as if they weighed nothing and could be placed anywhere without support. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the two poles supported at one end by a bent, upward-springing metal plate are held up by different Two ScuLPTURES BY ANTHONY CARO I 183 plates and atopposite ends. Similarly, the one pole supported atboth ends is held up by the far corner of the nearer plate and by the near corner of the farther one; and this deliberate staggering, while perfectly understood by the mind, disconcerts the eye enough to make it see that pole as if it were not truly supported at all. That all four poles are parallel to and equidistant from one another, and that three of them are the same length, are other factors which obstruct the eye from giving weight to the specific means by which each is supported. (It should also be said that the fact that the four poles are an almost imperceptibly lighter shade of sandy yellow than the rest of the sculpture gives them an added suggestion oflift.) In these and other ways Caro on the one hand has frankly avowed the physicality ofhis sculpture and on the other has rendered that physicalityunperspicuous to a degree that even after repeated viewings is barely credible. This is not in itself a new development in his work; it has been a steady feature of his art since his conversion to radical abstraction around 1959. But it reaches in Prairie an extreme that may also be a kind of culmination. More emphatically than any previous sculpture by Caro, Prairie compels us to believe what we see rather than what we know, to accept the witness of the senses against the constructions of the mind. Finally, Caro has never before sought openness through abstract extension as explicitly as here. For the first time the openness Caro achieves is above all a lateral openness-with the result that we are made to feel that lateralness as such is open in a way that verticality or obliqueness or head-on recession are not. This is a point of deep affinity between Prairie and the superb paintings in Kenneth Noland's last show at the Emmerich Gallery, in which the lateral extension of the canvas and its colors accomplished, among other things, an unexpected liberation from the constrictions ofthe picture shape. In both Prairieand Noland's recent paintings the decisive experience is one of instantaneous extension, roughly from somewhere in the middle of the poles or canvas out towards both ends. In each the exact dimensions of what is extended laterally are of crucial importance: if either the poles or the canvas were too long or short, the result would be a flaccid or blocky objecthood. (Objecthood of one kind or another is the aim of literalist work, which does not begin or end so much as it merely stops, and in which an indefinite-by implication, infinite-progression takes place as if in time.) Caro seems to have faced the further risk that Prairie might be too open, atanyrate that the eye might be compelled away from the piece itself 184 I Two ScuLPTURES BY AtHHONY CARO into the space around it, in which case it would strike one less as open than as merely insufficient. That this does not occur is partly owing to Caro's use of the solid rectangle of metal which supports the fourth pole: placed largely beyond the previous limits of the sculpture, it actually extends the sculpture at the same time as it helps contain is energies by giving the eye something flat, vertical, and opaque to come up against. The lack of physical connection between the rectangle-and-pole and the rest of the piece has been made as unperspicuous as the precise character of the connections among the other elements: this is largely why Prairie is by far the most successful sculpture in two or more parts that I have ever seen. I believe that Prairie is a masterpiece, one of the great works of modern artand a touchstone for future sculpture, and thatDeepBody Blue, while Jess ambitious, is nevertheless beyond the reach of any other living sculptor. In the radicalness of their ambition both have more in common with certain poetry and music, and certain recent painting, than with the work of any previous sculptor. And yet this very radicalness enables them to achieve a body and a world of meaning and expression that belong essentially to sculpture. Figure 32. Anthony Caro, J.V!idday, tg6o. Painted steel, 7' i%" x 37%" x 1 2 ' 1:Yt. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. Mr. lo: Roben Newman. Figure 35· Anthony Caro, Titan, 1964. Steel painted blue, 4 1 Y2 x 1 44 x 1 1'1 inches. Art Galler;,• of Ontario, Toronto. Courtesy Annelyjuda Fine Arts. Photo: Art Galle!)' of Ontario, Toronto. Gift from the Volunteer Committee Fund, 1983. Figure 36. Anthony Caro, Bennington, 1964. Steel painted black, 40 x 1 66 x 133!1:! inches. Private collection, U.S.A. CourtesyAnnely]ucla Fine Arts. figure ?.7· Anthony Caro, Yellow Swing, 1965. Painted steel, 74 x 73Y2 x 1 60 inches. The Tate G{D, OuTSKI, ST�LLA j 237 whatNoland himself felt were the most important formal issues engaged with in his work, this would amount to nothing more than an extremely interesting historical fact, to be kept in mind and used, if necessary, as a kind of counterweight to how the paintings actually look. How Noland's paintings actually look will be the subject of the remainder of this section. More exactly, I want to put forward an account ofwhat seems to me the development of pictorial structure in Noland's work since the late 1950s, in an attempt to make clear in what sense he is a formal innovator ofgreat resourcefulness as well as in the hope that by giving an account of that development I will in effect be pointing at an aspect of his work roughly analogous to that ofsyntax in a verbal language: an aspect, that is, which has to do with how the colored elements inNoland's paintings arejuxtaposed to one another with the result that they make sense, and which, if grasped, may increase the likelihood that the spectator will come to experience them as the powerful emotional statements I believe they are. The analogyat work here, between modernist painting and a verbal language, is drastically inexact and deeply problematic. But it is also potentially highlyinstructive, even (or perhaps especially) where it breaks down, and I hope to see it pursued further elsewhere." Noland's first wholly individual paintings date from 1958-59. They are executed in a stain technique deriving ultimately from Pollock's black stain paintings of 1951 by way of Helen Frankenthaler; but an even more important source-not so much of pictorial ideas as of reinforcement for his own growing convictions-seems to have been the then largely unappreciated work of another Washington painter, Morris Louis.Noland had known and admired Louis for several years, and in fact had brought him toNew York in 1953 to meet Clement Greenberg. On that visit both painters saw and were deeply impressed by a painting ofFrankenthaler's, Mountains andSea (1952; fig. 8), and on their return to Washington they determined to explore possible alternatives to the Abstract Expressionist mode of painting then dominant inNew York.30 For Louis, already in his forties, the experience seems to have been decisive. By 1954 he had succeeded in adapting Frankenthaler's stain technique-which in her hands has always retained a strong element of traditional drawing-to his oven unique vision, founded in part on the eschewal of drawing, and had begun making paintings of astonishing beauty by staining acrylic paint into (for the most part) unsized canvas. This became Noland's technique as well, and in general it seems to have 238 I THREE A"\1ERICAN PAINTERS: NOLAND, OLITSKl, STELLA been the case that Louis's achievement gave important impetus to Noland's own breakthrough in the late 1950s. But it cannot be stated too emphatically that the exchange of impetus and inspiration that went on between the two men up until Louis's death in 1962 at the height of his powers appears to have been mutual. Noland's paintings of the late 1950s differed from Louis's in at least two fundamental respects apart from color. First, Noland tended to leave much more ofthe raw canvas untouched by the stain image than Louis, who preferred at that point to spread thin layers of pigment across most of the picture field; second, Noland favored a precisely centered image-either armature-like or, more usually, 1. . ·.· of concentric rings�that avoided making contact with the framing edge, while Louis worked chiefly with vertically oriented, veil-like images that often ran off the canvas along at least one of the framing edges (generally the bottom) . The first of those differences meant !that from the start of his career as a modernist painterNoland was �even more radical than Louis in his rejection of the packed, tactile �space of de Kooning's kind of Abstract Expressionism. Aspiring at , fonce toward a virtually elliptical economy of means and effect, No- 1.·.land made the raw canvas in his paintings function as an essential part of the overall image-something that does not quite occur in Louis' work until the splendid unfurleds of 1960, which may have come about partly in response toNoland's prior achievements in that vein. In other words, the stain technique not only helped to ensure the opticality ofNoland's paint image, by identifYing the thinned pigment with its woven canvas ground, as in Louis' work; it also allowed him to make the raw canvas itselfwork as optical space with unprecedented intensity. In a sense, the raw canvas in Noland's concentricring paintings of the 1950s and early 196os fulfills much the same function as the colored fields inNewman's large pictures of around 1950; more generally, Noland in those paintings seems to have managed to charge the entire surface of the canvas with a kind of perceptual intensity which until that time only painters whose images occupy most or all of the picture field-Pollock, Still, Newman, Louis-had been able to achieve. The significance of the second difference betweenNoland's and Louis's paintings through about 1960-the fact thatNoland's stain images are centered in square canvases and avoid making contact with the framing edge, while Louis's vertical images appear fairly casual about such contact-is perhaps not immediately apparent. It may seem at first that Louis, because ofhis willingness to run images Plate 1. Jackson Pollock, Out ofthe Web: Number 7, 1949, 1949. Oil and enamel on Masonite, cutout, 48 x g6 inches. Staatsgalerie, Stuttgart.© 1997 The Pollock�Krasner Foundation I Artists RightsSociety (ARS), NewYork. Photo: Smatsgalerie, Stuttgart. Plate 2. Morris Louis, 1Crranean, 1958. Acrylic resin on canvas, 90 x 146 inches. Collection ofKenneth Noland, North Bennington, Mass. Estate ofthe artist. Plate 3· Morris Louis, Saraband, 1959. Acrylic resin on canvas, 101Ys x 149 inches. Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, NewYork. Estate ofthe artist. Photo: by David Heald ©The Solomon R. Guggenheim Foundation, NewYork, FN 1685. Plate 4· Morris Louis, Alj)/taPi, 1g6o. Acrylic resin on canvas, 102Y2 x 177 inches. The Metropolitan Museum ofArt, NewYork. Estate ofthe artist. Photo: The Metropolitan Museum ofArt, NewYork, Arthur .Hoppock Hearn Fund. Plate 5· Morris Louis, Number 2-76, l 962. Acrylic resin on canvas, 84!1:! x 27% inches. David Mirvish Gallery, Toronto. Estate of the artist. Photo: David Mirvish Gallery, Toronto. Plate 6. Morri� Louis, Hot Half, 1962. Acrylic resin on canvas, 63 x 63 inches. E.state ofthe artist. Plate 7· Kenneth Noland, '!1wt, L9!)8-s9· Acrylic resin on canvas, 81% x 81.Y1 iB<;:hcs. Co!!euion of Me and Mrs. David Min··ish, Toronto.© 1997 Kenneth Noland I Licensed by VAGA, NewYork, N.Y Plate 8. Kenneth Noland, GoldenDay, 1964. Acrylic resin on canvas, 72 x 72 inches. Private collection.© 1997 Kenneth Noland I Licensed byVAGA, New York, NY Plate g. Kenneth Noland, lJlh Stage, 1964. Acrylic resin on canvas, 93!12 x 8oY2 inches. Virgini<.l l'duseum of Fine Arts, Richmond. Gift of Sydney and Frances Lewis.© 1997 Kenneth :\:ol