

# 9

## Interpretation as Rhetoric

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It is very much more difficult to talk about a thing than to do it. In the sphere of actual life that is of course obvious. Anybody can make history. Only a great man can write it.

—Oscar Wilde

In contemporary theoretical inquiry, the study of rhetorical processes often reduces to tropology, with special attention to those “master figures” of metaphor and metonymy.<sup>1</sup> As Chapter 2 indicated, this book takes a broader and more old-fashioned view. I treat rhetoric as a matter of *inventio* (the devising of arguments), *dispositio* (their arrangement), and *elocutio* (their stylistic articulation).<sup>2</sup> This scheme allows me to discuss how a wide range of factors, including the critic’s persona and the constructed reader, will shape the finished interpretation. The classical outline also lets us trace how the schemata and heuristics that operate in the problem-solving process emerge as premises and evidence for arguments. Throughout, I shall be insisting that rhetoric is a dynamic factor in exploring issues, sharpening differences, and achieving consensus within a community.

High-minded as this sounds, there is a potential danger. Few critics like having their arguments treated as instances of rhetorical conventions, and so this chapter risks seeming cynical or destructive. Such is not my intent. I am hoping that contemporary critics’ commitment to the analysis of how positions are “discursively constructed” will make my inquiry seem not only timely but revelatory. Critics who believe that discourse can never be a neutral agency ought to welcome analysis of the intersubjective presuppositions and implications of their own writing.<sup>3</sup> Further, and more plainly, for me rhetoric does not amount to a disinterested manipulation of language. One can be sincere and rhetorical at the same time; indeed, rhetoric can help one be sincere. (Forster: “How can I know what I think till I see what I

say?") Rhetoric is the shaping of language to achieve one's ends, and in the act of shaping the language, the ends get sorted and sharpened. The rhetor's purposes may be cynical or selfish ones, but they may also be—*should* be—ones which are grounded in socially desirable goals. Such is, at least, the way I take not only my analysis of critical rhetoric but also the rhetoric I deploy myself. If nothing else, this chapter offers tools for analyzing my own persuasive strategies throughout the book.

### Sample Strategies

"The speaker," writes Aristotle, "must frame his proofs and arguments with the help of common knowledge and accepted opinions."<sup>4</sup> Rhetorical argument is adjusted to the audience's preconceptions, even if the rhetor aims to change some of them. If the critic's audience will not assume that a home movie or an educational documentary or a "slasher" film is an appropriate object of interpretation, the critic must generate arguments for discussing such despised genres.

From the rhetorical standpoint, the interpreter's basic task—building a novel and plausible interpretation of one or more appropriate films—becomes a matter of negotiating with the audience's institutionally grounded assumptions. There is a trade-off. Risk a more novel interpretation, and you may produce an exemplar; fail, and you will seem merely odd. Stick closely to the limits of plausibility, and you will pass muster, but you may seem routine. In general, the best preparation is to study exemplars. This teaches the critic what will go down with an audience and what degrees of originality are encouraged by particular institutional circumstances.

In creating a novel and plausible interpretation, the critic draws upon strategies associated with rhetorical *inventio*. For instance, the critic must establish her expertise—by reviewing the literature or the state of a question, by making fine distinctions, by displaying a range or depth of knowledge about the film, the director, the genre, and so on. These ethos-centered appeals create the critic's persona—a *role* (Partisan, Judge, Analyst) and a set of *attributes* (rigor, fairness, erudition).<sup>5</sup> A rare recognition of ethos emerges from a moment in a 1959 *Cahiers* roundtable on *Hiroshima mon amour*, in which Rivette follows mentions of Stravinsky, Picasso, and Braque with the obser-

vation: "Well now, we've mentioned quite a few 'names,' so you can see just how cultured we are. *Cahiers du cinéma* is true to form, as always."<sup>6</sup> So pervasive is the power of rhetoric that the remark endows the speaker with a self-conscious honesty.

Another aspect of invention is *pathos*, the appeal to the reader's emotions. This is evident in belletristic film interpretation, and is no less present, though more circumspectly, in academic writing. A critic writes that one scene of *L'Atalante* "humanizes the thief, modeling his frail body wasted by cold and hunger."<sup>7</sup> The description triggers feelings which drive home the interpretive claim. The critic who probes for symptomatic readings also uses pathos, at least insofar as he seeks to gratify an urge for knowledge, mastery, or refined discrimination. The defiant call for analytical sobriety, such as Mulvey's claim in "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" that she aims to destroy the pleasure of the image, can excite feelings of liberation, a "passionate detachment."<sup>8</sup>

Whatever the critic's approach, she will also create identificatory roles around which the reader's emotions can crystallize. One such role is that of the constructed reader, a kind of parallel to the rhetor's own persona. The other role is that of the "mock viewer," the hypothetical spectator who responds in the fashion best suited to the critic's interpretation. The interpreter must give each role some emotion-laden attributes and relate the two—making them congruent, or demystifying the activities of the mock viewer in order to heighten the constructed reader's awareness. For instance, the *L'Atalante* critic cited above ends his essay with an invitation:

If the film charms rather than preaches, it is because for Vigo, as for Père Jules, there is nothing transcendent about art or morality. These are not achievements so much as instincts, instincts, it is true, that civilization has lost, but instincts all the same. Catlike, Père Jules is the film's most artful and moral being, his sensuality a guarantee of his authenticity. The same rhythm of life, the same fever that drives the cats, drives Jules, Vigo, and each spectator not yet immunized against it.<sup>9</sup>

By this point the reader should have identified with the constructed reader of the essay, one who can appreciate the film's nonnarrative, richly physical qualities. Now the reader is asked to take the role of the sensitive viewer who welcomes the film's "fever." I shall suggest

later how a critic's use of "we" often blends the rhetor's persona, the mock viewer, and the constructed reader into a single vague but rhetorically conventional entity.

Invention's case-centered proofs are no less significant than its ethical and pathetic ones. An argument often passes or fails by its use of *examples*. Michel Charles has proposed that in fact the key convention of literary interpretation is what he calls the *integral citation* of parts of the text under study. By absorbing stretches of the original text into his discourse, the critic presents that discourse as seeking to approximate the act of reading, while the fragmentation of the text gives him great freedom to arrange extracts in a compelling sequence.<sup>10</sup>

The film critic's examples are principally those nodal passages of the film that bear ascribed meanings. Through vivid writing and varied degrees of amplification, these passages must become what Frank Kermode, following Wilhelm Dilthey, calls "impression-points."<sup>11</sup> From one angle, the history of film interpretation looks to be one of steadily increasing finesse in the presentation of such examples: the incisive description practiced by Bazin, the richer detail work of *Movie*, and the shot lists, bird's-eye views, and frame enlargements that appeared in the late 1960s. The greater detail lets more cues activate more semantic fields—producing longer and more intricate interpretations. Although diagrams and stills offer the skeptical reader an opportunity to spot disparities in the interpretation, they convince the charitable reader through "presence."<sup>12</sup> Like Caesar's bloody tunic or the scientist's graph, these devices offer themselves as purified data, examples beyond words: the reader need only look and see.

Still, examples would not carry much force if tacit and widely accepted beliefs were not also giving the critic's case a logical cast. The *enthymeme* is an incomplete syllogism; the audience, from its stock of knowledge and opinions, supplies premises never set forth in the argument.<sup>13</sup> Some of these premises will be specific to different critical schools, as when the critic presupposes that the Oedipal trajectory or organic unity underwrites a certain interpretive move. Other premises subtend the institution as a whole. All the problem-solving processes I have brought out in previous chapters can operate enthymematically. When the critic personifies the camera or claims that a character's surroundings reveal a psychological condition, she is using an inferential procedure as a warrant for the conclusion. The rhetor typically makes certain interpretive moves seem logically inevitable by turning semantic fields into hidden meanings, schemata and heuristics into

tacit premises, inferences into argumentative points and conclusions, and the model film into the film itself.

There are, however, widely used enthymemes that do not derive from cognitive discovery procedures. Chief among these is an appeal to authority.<sup>14</sup> The rhetor can count on his audience to trust knowledgeable individuals, and the appeal to respected names and writings is basic to an institution's coherence and continuity. Thus the critic can drop names (Leavis, Lévi-Strauss, Laplanche) or metonymically invoke the massive authority of vast realms of knowledge ("according to Marxism" or "semiotics"). In self-consciously theoretical criticism, the authorities cited often stand outside the institution, and the credibility arises from a belief that they possess knowledge about matters larger and more weighty than cinema. That is, claims about cinema now depend upon truth-claims about wider realms—social power, the nature of language, the dynamics of the unconscious. In this connection, the arrival of citational footnotes in *Cahiers*, *Screen*, and *Artforum* should be seen as a major event, signaling not simply "academicization" but a move toward arguments from external expertise.

The authority most frequently called upon is the filmmaker. In Chapter 4 I suggested that both explicatory and symptomatic critics habitually trace effects of the film back to such a source, and in Chapter 7 I showed that both trends personify the filmmaker as a calculating or expressive agent. Now we can see how the filmmaker's words can function as rhetorical backup for an interpretation. One critic can take a statement by John Ford as confirming the ideological problems of *Fort Apache*, while another can quote interviews with Sirk to show that his films are about happiness and knowledge.<sup>15</sup> Hitchcock's comments about fetishism can support a reading of *Marnie*.<sup>16</sup> A critic can describe *Riddles of the Sphinx* in terms established by the makers: the Sphinx presents 'a stream of questions, contradictions, and word associations' (Wollen), a 'voice asking for a riddle' (Mulvey). Implicit here is a conception of feminist strategy which is not solely in the realm of the conscious, for the Symbolic world into which women enter 'is not their own' (Mulvey).<sup>17</sup> Interviews, manifestos, and essays furnish evidence for even the symptomatic critic who denounces the idea of origins or creative agency. If the author is dead, film critics are still holding seances.

More exactly, the appeal to the artist functions in relation to several alternative topoi, or commonplace enthymemes. The critic makes a claim about the film's meaning. If the filmmaker's statement confirms

it, the statement becomes a piece of causal evidence. (The filmmaker “put” the meaning there, as either a rational or an involuntary agent.) What if the filmmaker’s statement does not square with the reading? The critic can simply ignore it (a common tactic). Or she can cite D. H. Lawrence’s dictum “Never trust the teller, trust the tale,” and point out how unself-conscious the artist is. Alternatively, the symptomatic critic can use the filmmaker’s counterstatement as just another trace of repressed meanings. In any case, the critic has great freedom. The *Movie* critics dismissed Hitchcock’s answers at press conferences but used claims he made in more serious interviews as evidence for an interpretation.<sup>18</sup> More recently, another writer builds her interpretation of *Presents* out of statements by Michael Snow about the film’s techniques and themes, but then she cites other Snow remarks to demonstrate that he is unaware that the film “leaves no room” for the female spectator’s look.<sup>19</sup> In such exercises, film criticism plows long-broken ground; Kant, then Schleiermacher, took it as a goal of interpretation to understand an author better than he understood himself.<sup>20</sup>

Two can play this game. The flexibility of the ask-the-artist topos gives filmmakers a chance to manipulate the interpretive institution. In experimental production, the filmmaker’s statement can lead the critic to preferred interpretations of an otherwise opaque work. If Peter Wollen claims that the Sphinx in *Riddles of the Sphinx* represents “a repressed instance of the female unconscious,” critics can pick up the hint and expand the interpretive point.<sup>21</sup> (This tactic is not unknown in the history of avant-garde art; Joyce turned over his plan of *Ulysses* to Stuart Gilbert and helped a circle of friends write explications of what would become *Finnegans Wake*.<sup>22</sup>) Such skills can be wielded by more commercial creators as well. The director of *In a Lonely Place* tells critics that one of his constant themes is man’s loneliness.<sup>23</sup> David Cronenberg acknowledges that in *Videodrome* he deliberately entices critics with a tension between medieval and Renaissance thought, as well as quotations from Yeats and Leonardo.<sup>24</sup> Chabrol supplies a more cynical reason for the literary citations in his films:

I need a degree of critical support for my films to succeed: without that they can fall flat on their faces. So, what do you have to do? You have to help the critics over their notices, right? So, I give them a hand. “Try with Eliot and see if you find me there.” Or “How do you fancy Racine?” I give them some little things to grasp at. In *Le Boucher* I stuck Balzac there in the middle, and they threw themselves on it like poverty upon the world. It’s not good to leave them staring at a blank sheet of paper, not knowing how to begin . . . “This film

is definitely Balzacian," and there you are; after that they can go on to say whatever they want.<sup>25</sup>

If critics can use the artist's statements as evidence for their interpretation, artists versed in interpretive procedures can use the critics.<sup>26</sup>

A complete list of topoi at work in film interpretation would run very long, but let me pick out a few which have given pleasure over the years.

A critically significant film is ambiguous, or polysemous, or dialogical.

A critically significant film is strikingly novel in subject, theme, style, or form.

A critically significant film takes up an oppositional relation to tradition (old version: ironic; new version: subversive).

A film should make its audience work.

Putting characters in the same frame unites them; cutting stresses opposition.

Montage is opposed to *mise-en-scène*, or camera movement.

The first viewing is different from later viewings.

Lumière is opposed to Méliès.

The image always escapes verbal paraphrase (old version: through richness; new version: through excess or plenitude).

The filmmaker in question is not solely a master of technique; the film also harbors profound meanings.

In the artist's late period, technique is thrown aside and the work becomes simpler, more schematic, and more profound.

The film asks a question but doesn't answer it.

The film is a reflection or meditation on a sophisticated philosophical or political issue.

The film is Shakespearian (Anglo-American version) or Racinian (French) or Faulknerian (either).

The film's style is so exaggerated that it must be ironic or parodic (useful for Sirk, late Vidor, Visconti, Ken Russell, and so on).

Previous interpretations of the film are inadequate, if not downright wrong.

The critic may capsule special topics in maxims such as: "If the woman looks, the spectacle provokes, castration is in the air," or "I daresay that ambiguity is an infallible sign of value in the cinema."<sup>27</sup> People are delighted, writes Aristotle, when the rhetor expresses as a general truth the opinions they hold about individual cases.<sup>28</sup>

We are now in a position to understand another function of self-consciously theoretical discourse within film criticism. Theoretical doc-

trines are often parceled out into enthymemes, topoi, and maxims that assist the rhetorical phase of interpretation. "Theory" has become a binding institutional force, creating tacit beliefs to which the rhetor may appeal. For instance, this book's analysis might be more persuasive to certain readers if whenever I mention critical "practice" or "discourse," I were to attach a quotation or two from Foucault. If debate within explicatory criticism rests on the premise "My theme can lick your theme,"<sup>29</sup> disputes within symptomatic criticism appeal to something like "My theory can lick your theory." In this respect, post-1960s film criticism turns from the Judeo-Christian tradition of putting philosophy at the service of the text and recalls the Stoic tradition of treating literature as a diversion to be mastered by the rigor of theoretical reflection.<sup>30</sup> The taken-for-granted power of the theory can appear to validate the interpretation; in turn, the interpretation can seem to illustrate the theory, confirm it, or extend its range of application. The critic may also grant an avant-garde or subversive film the power to investigate conceptual issues and reveal truths; a film becomes significant insofar as it aspires to the condition of theoretical writing (see Chapter 4).

So much, in overview, for the ethical, pathetic, and pseudological proofs that constitute "invention." *Dispositio*, the second major heading within classical rhetorical theory, concerns the organizational structure of the interpretation. Given the standard formats of criticism—the essay or the book chapter—we might want to make an initial distinction. The explicatory critic frequently structures the argument around an intuitively apprehended experience of the film, while the more "theoretical" critic characteristically mixes an exposition or elaboration of concepts drawn from the writings of an authority (Freud, Lacan, Althusser) with claims that the film illustrates or manifests those concepts. In recent years, however, the distinction between these approaches has become blurred, as academic protocol makes even explicatory critics lean on experts and received doctrines. A more basic argumentative structure is at work in both trends. The typical film interpretation follows the scheme laid down by Aristotle and revised by Cicero:

Introduction:

Entrance: An introduction to the issue.

Narration: The background circumstances; in film interpretation, either a brief account of an issue's history or a description or synopsis of the film to be examined.



Proposition: The statement of the thesis to be proven.

Body:

Division: A breakdown of points that support the thesis.

Confirmation: The arguments under each point.

Confutation: The destruction of opposing arguments.

Conclusion: A review and emotional exhortation.<sup>31</sup>

Any piece of criticism may rearrange these components. Very often, the division of points is spread piecemeal throughout the essay, and the confutation (if present at all) is set close to the opening.

Beginnings are a problem. Whereas the journalistic reviewer strives for a novel, arresting opening, the academicization of film criticism has created a few predictable preliminaries. The critic will seldom start with a question, a provocative statement, or an abrupt, disorienting description of a stretch of the film at hand. The standard opening ritualistically positions this essay with respect to established or up-and-coming work, sometimes by a quick review of the current literature. At its most pallid, the essay's opening invokes "recent developments." This gambit conveys at least three things: (1) "I keep up with what's happening [ethos] and so do you [pathos]"; (2) "Film studies progresses; the more recent a work is, the more attention it demands"; (3) "I hereby put the top card on the pile; no work is more recent, hence more potentially significant, than what you're reading now." In the course of the essay, the rhetor can exploit the "recency" topos in two ways. Either: "I extend recent theory by showing how it applies to a fresh case," or: "I revise recent theory in a cooperative spirit by showing how, with some tinkering, the theory can account for an anomalous film." Very seldom will the critic challenge "recent developments" by using the film at hand to show that they have come to a dead end.

The body of the essay offers the critic an important organizational choice. Following the tradition of interlinear commentary and Lansonist *explication de texte*, she can move step by step through the film, letting "plot order" structure the argument. In effect, the "narration" component of the rhetorical framework swallows up the division and confirmation of points. The argument gains credence by apparently adhering to the contours of the viewing experience; but the essay risks conceptual diffuseness and makes any omission from the film's flow more glaring. Alternatively, the critic can organize the essay around the conceptual structure of the interpretation. Thus the "division" component becomes an outline of the film's principal semantic fields

and a tracing of their interplay, while the “confirmation” portions will cite the nodal passages that instantiate those fields. The advantage of this strategy is conceptual clarity, elegance, and power. The critic subordinates the film to his overarching argument, ranging over the film and plucking out the datum that supports the point at hand. The disadvantage of this strategy is that it may seem partial and one-sided; the critic may appear to be concealing those parts of the film that don’t fit. It is also significant that exponents of this pattern usually also resort to the step-by-step approach. Most often, the climax of the critic’s argument coincides with a discussion of the climax of the film, and the critic achieves conceptual and rhetorical closure by ending with an interpretation of the film’s final sequence.

The rhetor may vary the body of the argument by creating a comparative structure that sets two films off against each other: an ordinary genre film versus an auteur masterpiece, a “classical” film counterposed to a modernist or oppositional work.<sup>32</sup> In general, the more the critic seeks to make the film illustrate or demonstrate a theoretical argument, the more such comparative tactics can come into play. The risk is that the skeptical reader will argue that the theoretical framework distorts or impoverishes the films mentioned.

The ending of the interpretive essay is the most conventional aspect of critical *dispositio*. Whether the critic presents the interpretation as issuing deductively from a theoretical doctrine or arising inductively from the data of the film, the proposition announced at the outset must eventually stand affirmed. The thesis may be stated in a tentative fashion; the inquiry may present itself as exploratory; but the essay’s ending will seek to establish the foregoing argument as a tenable interpretation. Richard Levin notes: “The critic will frequently claim or imply that the reading is to serve the function of testing his conception of the work’s real meaning, which is presented initially as a kind of hypothesis. And his hypothesis always passes this test, because the reading . . . is a self-confirming demonstration . . . No reading on record has ever failed to prove the critic’s thesis.”<sup>33</sup>

The ending may also include, as Cicero recognized, a sharp emotional appeal. The critic can summon up particular feelings represented in or evoked by the film. (*Europa 51* shows that Rossellini is a “terrorist,” presenting a cinema “of war, of guerilla action, of revolution.”<sup>34</sup>) Or the critic can “place” the film’s symptomatic qualities and remind the reader of social action. (*Klute* contains, despite itself, “fragments that refer forcefully to the images and problems of a

struggling feminism."<sup>35</sup>) The appeal to pathos at the end of the essay (paralleling the ethos that must be established at the beginning) reveals the extent to which critical logic relies heavily upon rhetorical force.

The power of the film interpreter's *dispositio* lies largely in its familiarity. The essay has the structure of the standard literary or art-historical critical article. Like them, it derives from such forms of oral scriptural exegesis as the rabbinical *petihhta* that introduces the Torah reading, and the Scholastic sermon that develops theme, protheme, and *dilatatio*.<sup>36</sup> The structure can be writ large across a book, so that the first chapter functions as the introduction, providing a review of the literature and a preview of the thesis, while the subsequent chapters produce interpretations of particular films, each chapter supporting points of the main argument. The conventions also acknowledge the interpretation to be part of a communal effort. Within such standard formats, social cohesion—of critic and reader, of critic and critic—can be reaffirmed.

## Theory Talk

That critical *elocutio* is highly rhetorical probably needs no proving. Most film interpreters have considered themselves artificers of language. Some, such as Bazin and Parker Tyler, have been superb stylists. Academic critics have not shrunk from the stylistic flourishes of popular prose fiction.

On *Psycho*: "Does Marion imagine no one in the world with the power to make her feel this alive, no one to whom she might offer herself this freely and passionately?"<sup>37</sup>

On *Rebecca*: "If death by drowning did not extinguish the woman's desire, can we be certain that death by fire has reduced it utterly to ashes?"<sup>38</sup>

On *Empire of the Senses*: "Let us come back to the anecdote with which we began: Saito, the reception, the assassination, the abortive putsch. Yes, of course, *Naughty Marietta* has nothing to do with all that, is only, precisely, pure anecdote. And yet . . ." <sup>39</sup>

On *The Phantom of the Opera*: "The crowd freezes, the Phantom laughs and opens his hand to reveal that it contains . . . nothing at all."<sup>40</sup>

And no one can miss the blatantly persuasive effect of such passages as these:

On how the flatness of Antonioni's shots eliminates tactility: "To touch is to confirm, and people who are out of touch have a desperate need for tactile reassurance."<sup>41</sup> The punning heuristic discussed in Chapter 6 invites the critic to use homonymies metaphorically, as here with the "out of touch" phrase.

"If I were a gossip columnist, I would attribute this new tentative optimism [in *L'Avventura* and *La Notte*] to the arrival of Monica Vitti in Antonioni's life."<sup>42</sup> Here *praeteritio* ("I pass over this in silence") is used to get the biographical anecdote on the record while simultaneously attributing interest in such matters to scandalmongers.

"Think, for example, of Polanski's *Chinatown* and of Altman's *The Long Goodbye*, films which construct a whole set of discourses about voyeurism around the character of the private eye. Or think of individual scenes in any number of detective films and thrillers in which the central protagonist is engaged, simply, in secretive looking."<sup>43</sup> Rather than itemize the discourses or scenes, the critic invites the reader, who is presumed to share the rhetor's degree of knowledge, to recall a few. The phrases "a whole set" and "any number," like such phrases as "Had I sufficient time . . ." or "If space permitted . . .," function to imply that the press of more important matters forces the writer to withhold information he could otherwise supply. (Figure: *periphrasis*, or circumlocution.)

On *Beyond a Reasonable Doubt* and Lang's earlier works: "What in fact do we see in each case? In the earlier films, innocence with all the appearances of guilt; here, guilt with all the appearances of innocence. Can anyone fail to see that they're about the same thing, or at least about the same question?"<sup>44</sup> The first sentence instantiates "reasoning by question and answer." The second, with its play on "guilt" and "innocence," is a fancy *isocolon*, like Herodotus' "In peace, sons bury their fathers; in war, fathers bury their sons." The third sentence asks a rhetorical question, then withdraws it in part by *epanorthosis* (correcting an initial claim); here it depicts the writer as seeking precision by qualifying his remark.

Less overt eloquence also serves the interpreter's ends. Consider the tactic I shall call "associational redescription,"<sup>45</sup> the movement from a comparatively neutral description to one keyed to the interpretive

point. Here is a small-scale instance: “[In *Phantom of the Opera*] her unmasking of his face reveals the very wounds, the very lack, that the Phantom had hoped her blind love would heal.”<sup>46</sup> The objectival phrase (“the very wounds”) is uncontroversial, but the appositional phrase (“the very lack”) functions as a redescription that carries an extra inference. Without the first phrase the interpretation would seem more forced; without the second phrase, there would be no interpretation at all. A more extended example comes from an explication of the ending of *Strangers on a Train*. In the scene, Guy and Ann are startled when a minister sits down across the aisle, and, as the critic puts it initially, they “look at each other, then smile and, without reply, quickly move away.”<sup>47</sup> After the critic interprets this as symbolizing a rejection of stability, putting their future in “grave doubt,” associational redescription occurs: the action is now a “fearful drawing back from marriage.”<sup>48</sup>

Once film criticism moved into the academy, its diction took on the colors of its habitat. In scholarly writing, certain formulas signal rhetorical procedures. “As X has shown” (or pointed out, or argued) flags an appeal to authority. If I assert that “it is no accident” that something happens, I make the weakest causal claim in a decisive way. If I say that Y “forgets” a crucial point, I credit Y with once having known it—that is, agreeing with me but straying from the path. There are still more minute conventions, such as the colon in the title (“Told by an Idiot: Enunciation and Voice in the Films of Jerry Lewis”) or the casually dropped “of course,” “needless to say,” and “it goes without saying” that soothe the reader while bringing crucial presuppositions into view.


Within the discourse of Academese (which really deserves a book to itself<sup>49</sup>), the rise of theory has generated particular formulas. The opacity of theory has become the source of many jokes, such as the one about the deconstructionist Godfather who makes you an offer you can’t understand. Despite the standard tirades against jargon, though, it serves important rhetorical functions. Jargon can yield the critic some ethos, especially if she invents a new term. C. J. van Rees points out that an academic critic’s reputation can be made by coining a term, and subsequent users will tend to adopt the premises implicit in it.<sup>50</sup> Jargon also serves to close the ranks, shutting out the uninitiated and reinforcing communal solidarity. Here is an instance drawn from a discussion of Lang’s *Man Hunt*:

Indeed, the scene of interrogation seems a condensation of Langian style, as Raymond Bellour and others have staked out its dimensions. First, there is a deconstruction of psychological and dramatic depth through a deliberate flatness—for example, the opening shot of the torture sequence which focuses on a mountain which is obviously a backdrop. Second, there is a deliberate emptying of the image until it becomes a virtual blankness against which a few objects emerge to gain a value that is emblematic, or to use Brecht's term, *gestic*. Third, despite (or because of) these obvious ways in which the "naturalistic" image is theatricalized, turned into a staging, there is a certain emphasis on the space of the frame as a potentially open space. Creating a kind of dialectic of onscreen and offscreen space, the visible image gives glimpses of another space beyond the frame: open doorways that we only get a glimpse into; windows that appear to indicate an elsewhere; entrances and exits that turn the framed area into an arbitrary cutout of space. But unlike, say Renoir, for whom openness can seem an attempt to create the reality effect of a real world in vibrant flux (as in Leo Braudy's reading of Renoir), Lang's openness seems one in which the notion of the frame as *analagon* of a real is displaced by a notion of the frame as mere element in a formal structure, a combinatory, whose value is the quasi-mathematical one of the articulation of forms, not the suggestion of human(ist) meanings of life's richness (33). In a film that has already begun to deprive its hero of agency and turn him instead into a mere figure of the enunciative apparatus, the very composition of space deprives the "hero" of a ground in which his actions could take on a full sense.<sup>51</sup>

Here quotation marks make terms function in oblique, deprecatory ways, and the diction is faintly French ("combinatory" and "real" as nouns). Many names are mentioned, but only Braudy's is footnoted. The constructed reader can catch references to Brecht's theory of representation, Burch's account of off-screen space, and the Bazinian tradition in Renoir criticism. To those in the know, "condensation" and "displaced" cite Freud and Lacan, "deconstruction" recalls Derrida and Burch, "reality effect" and "*analagon*" summon up Barthes, and "enunciative apparatus" echoes Benveniste, Baudry, Metz, and Bellour. The embedded parentheses, as in the morpheme "human(ist)," have, like the connection of words by slashes or spaces, become an emblem of theoretical discourse as such.<sup>52</sup> Strictly speaking, the passage relies on the device of the shibboleth: "a catchword or formula adopted by

a party or sect, by which their adherents or followers may be discerned, or those not their followers may be excluded.”<sup>53</sup>

“A certain emphasis,” “a kind of dialectic”—such phrases in the passage quoted imply both specificity (this, not that) and generality (the writer is aware of larger implications). Theory’s rhetoric can thus distinguish itself by diction which is not jargon in the usual sense. Critics use ordinary language in extraordinary ways. To say that a doctrine or thinker “teaches” something becomes formulaic, portraying the rhetor as pupil or disciple. Critics of the contradictory text are drawn to San-Andreas Fault metaphors: cracks, gaps, crevices, fissures, collapses, and explosions. Certain lexical items become fixed counters to be shuffled and recombined. (Some hypothetical examples: *Language/Politics/Desire: A Reading*; *Reading Language: Politics and Difference*; *Desiring Differently: Reading, Materialism, Language*.) Innocent italics, jutting up at the end of a sentence, take on an ominous urgency. Barthes: “Psychoanalysis teaches us to read *elsewhere*.”<sup>54</sup> A film interpreter: “And now it is possible to *look elsewhere*.”<sup>55</sup>

Self-conscious as contemporary film studies is, it  not acknowledged the role of such rhetorical tactics in the 1970s victory of theory. There persists the myth of an embattled Grand Theory triumphing over its predecessors by virtue of its sweeping conceptual innovations. Here is one retelling of the tale:

Auteurism could have led cinema studies to adopt a conservative, Arnoldian role (can it be an accident that the American director most studied by the auteurs—John Ford—was one who celebrated the mythology of American society, especially the victory of culture over anarchy?). Historical developments, however, prevented auteurism from becoming the dominant approach in film studies; the most important of these was the radicalization of French film/literary criticism which followed in the wake of the upheavals of 1968, a radicalization most obvious, perhaps, in the *Cahiers* circle itself (which published a long, collectively-authored piece on the ideology of Ford’s *Young Mr. Lincoln*). Structuralist and post-structuralist theory and approaches, imports from France though importantly mediated by those writing for the British journal *Screen*, greatly influenced the work of American cinema scholars in the formative years of the early seventies. These scholars were more open to new ideas in part because of their marginalized position within academe. During the middle seventies film scholarship in this country became a heavily theorized

enterprise, a complex intersection of Marxist (largely Althusserian), psychoanalytic (largely Lacanian), feminist, and traditional (mostly auteurist and genre) approaches.<sup>56</sup>

This book has sought to show that, on the contrary, these developments were hardly an abrupt change. Apart from the overarching interpretive practices that made new approaches “applicable,” there were more gradual and piecemeal changes of the sort traced out in Chapters 2, 3, and 4: symptomatic criticism of the 1940s and cultural criticism of the 1950s; auteur premises governing *Cahiers’s* ideological critique, BFI structuralism, and *Screen* readings; the ratification of long-standing critical habits by theoretical fiat; and so on.

The standard story also neglects important material preconditions. For a critical school to win a share of power, it should dwell in an urban culture—Paris, London, New York, or some other “center of calculation” that attracts money, documents, public events, and talent.<sup>57</sup> The school should command a journal or a book series. It should have bright young people (important critics, like filmmakers, start before they are thirty) and tolerant elders (a Bazin, a Paddy Whannel). It also needs financing, which, since the 1970s, has tied successful schools of film criticism to the rising fortunes of higher education. Now nearly all important film periodicals in English are run by academics and attached to universities; on the whole, the same thing seems to be happening in Europe. In the United States, college film courses started in earnest in the 1960s, and the first wave of film students went on to graduate school in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By the end of the 1970s, the first generation of film scholars had been hired and tenured, moving into positions of leadership in the emerging discipline. This activity coincided with that academicization of writing and publishing mentioned at the outset of this book. The growth of film interpretation requires the sort of shared conventions I have described, but they have flourished chiefly because of the post-1960s consolidation of intellectual power within colleges and universities—a political development that is only now beginning to receive the analysis it warrants.<sup>58</sup> The emergence of “theory” is at once a symptom of this process and a powerful maneuver within it.

That maneuver’s success also depended upon a rhetoric that kept skeptics and adversaries on the defensive. Choices hardened: one was either materialist, liberatory, conceptually sophisticated, rigorous, and interested in ultimate questions of mind and society; or one could be



idealist, entrenched in the status quo, naive, impressionistic, and preoccupied with superficialities. In their "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism" of 1969, Comolli and Narboni attacked the empiricism of current film writing in the name of scientific dialectical materialism.<sup>59</sup> A rhetorical advantage always lay with the theorist, who could not only invoke powerful authorities to back up an argument but could also show *why* the opponent was bewitched by false ideas. The editor of *Screen* could denounce mainstream British criticism and *Movie*: "Both formalism . . . and semiology have revealed the essential realist and hence ideological impulse involved in this species of romantic aesthetics."<sup>60</sup> A feminist could show that Peter Gidal's attempt to create a "structuralist/materialist" cinema resembled "the *fort/da* game as described by Lacan in which the child plays out obsessively, repetitively the concept of separation, of loss."<sup>61</sup> Rhetorically, Marxism and psychoanalysis enjoy the ability both to propose arguments and to explain the etiology of opponents' errors.

The research program underlying the rhetoric of theory has yielded attractive strategies of proof and diction. Since theory is committed to asking questions, the writer can assume that all work is *in medias res*. The critic can point to difficulties, offer notes or reflections, and end the essay with an invitation to pursue the knotty problems disclosed. Consider this passage:

This continuousness, the effect of framing as the disposition—the *Einstellung*—of the subject, is evident most immediately in the form of the "continuity" of the sequence-binding of the narrative functions. Festival of affects, a film is equally in the intermittence of its process of images a perpetual metonymy over which narrative lays as a model of closure, a kind of conversion of desire into affectivity as the *direction* of the subject through the image-flow (representation is much less a fact of the image in film than of the organisation of the images).<sup>62</sup>

Anyone who complains about the style here is rebuked by this reply:

No one writes difficultly in *Screen* for the sake of difficulty; the difficulties come from the development of film theory within the perspectives mentioned above, from the fact that this development is a process. It is this that we recognise as a problem and it is this that we are determined to solve, not by simplifying but by an increased care in identifying and defining the points of difficulty, pres-

enting them as clearly as possible and carrying them through as points of debate in the magazine.<sup>63</sup>

Despite the exploratory qualities claimed for theory, however, the theorist remains pledged to some solid premises. There is not much allowance for questions, problems, and debate in one theorist's claim that the self-consciousness of semiology "puts the nail in the coffin of the unified self."<sup>64</sup> A rhetoric of musts and onlys, of always alreadys, of dangers and complicities portrays the writer as one guided by certainties.

A feminist theory of film must examine the ideological effects of the cinematic apparatus on the spectator/subject, understanding the spectator as a social subject, a locus of ideological determination.<sup>65</sup>

Nor can the Lacanian theory have any relation to those theories involving a concept of misrecognition as false consciousness, thereby assuming, even if it is always unknowable in any future sense, that reality can be described by theory, and that ideology operates a systematic distortion or falsification of that reality. This latter would have to rely on a privileged relation between knowledge and its object (to be in a position to know the real beyond the phenomenal forms); ultimately this can only rely on an idealist form of consciousness.<sup>66</sup>

Although the introduction of the critical category of POV constitutes an attempt to locate the text in relations of subjectivity, it is still complicit with the ideology of centrality and identity, with the model of communication theory which the development of a theory of the subject seeks to displace.<sup>67</sup>

Over the last two decades, an aggressive rhetorical stance has helped win and maintain theory's institutional authority.

That authority might have been challenged by an equally attractive set of ideas deploying an equally vigorous discourse. None emerged. Instead, there appeared a rhetoric of conversion, confession, and abjuration. In "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism," Comolli and Narboni admitted that they had fallen into the two traps of structuralism ("phenomenological positivism and mechanistic materialism").<sup>68</sup> Looking back at his 1965 writing on *Vertigo*, Robin Wood finds it "shot through with a subtle and insidious sexism (at that time I had no awareness whatever of the oppression of women within our culture), and, closely related to this, it lacks any psychoanalytic account of the nature of 'romantic love,' accepting it as some eternal and unchanging given of 'the human condition.'"<sup>69</sup> Back in 1973, calling

himself a “star-struck structuralist,” Geoffrey Nowell-Smith offered a self-criticism of his *Visconti*, charging it with idealism, essentialism, and a “then fashionable historicist Marxism.”<sup>70</sup> Soon thereafter, Charles Eckert repudiated his allegiance to Lévi-Strauss and announced that he had since been “educated” by the writings of Marvin Harris and Julia Kristeva.<sup>71</sup> He issued a ringing prophecy pledging support to the new vanguard: “There is a stiff, cold wind blowing against partial, outmoded, or theoretically unsound forms of film criticism—and it just might blow many of them away.”<sup>72</sup> Two years later, I criticized my essay on *Citizen Kane* for idealist naiveté and announced my adherence to current work in theory (Russian Formalism, structuralism, and post-structuralism).<sup>73</sup> Again, I am not saying that such self-criticisms are insincere, or that the new positions which the authors take are not improvements on earlier ones. My aim is to show that the public articulations of such intellectual commitments have, inevitably, a persuasive component. In this respect, using “theory” as a topos and a stylistic appeal resembles other rhetorical procedures in social life as a whole.

130. Stephen Jenkins, "Lang: Fear and Desire," in Jenkins, ed., *Fritz Lang: The Image and the Look* (London: British Film Institute, 1981), pp. 84–87.
131. Elizabeth Cowie, "Fantasia," *m/f* 9 (1984): 90–91.
132. This is one part of a larger tendency toward the epiphanic structure of that "boundary situation" story that Horst Ruthrof has found in this century's fiction: plays, novels, and short stories have long been organized around "pointed situations in which a presented persona, a narrator, or the implied reader in a flash of insight becomes aware of meaningful as against meaningless existence." *The Reader's Construction of Narrative* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1981), p. 102.
133. See, for examples, Brooks and Warren, *Understanding Fiction*, p. 87; Northrop Frye, *A Natural Perspective: The Development of Shakespearean Comedy and Romance* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), pp. 73–87; Simon O. Lesser, *Fiction and the Unconscious* (New York: Vintage, 1957), pp. 222–224, 233–234.
134. Kaplan, *Women and Film*, p. 158.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
136. Northrop Frye, *Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 90.
137. Jacqueline Suter and Sandy Flitterman, "Textual Riddles: Woman as Enigma or Site of Social Meanings? An Interview with Laura Mulvey," *Discourse* 1 (Fall 1979): 95.
138. See, for an extended instance, Eugene R. Kintgen, *The Perception of Poetry* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983). The book's treatment of "preaesthetic" interpretation as problem-solving complements several points I have sought to make here.

## 9. Interpretation as Rhetoric

1. See, for example, Hayden White, *Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). For a critique, see Maria Ruegg, "Metaphor and Metonymy: The Logic of Structuralist Rhetoric," *Glyph* 6 (1979): 141–157.
2. See, for an attempt to integrate these within a structuralist framework, Tzvetan Todorov, *Symbolism and Interpretation*, trans. Catherine Porter (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 75.
3. Attentive readers will have noticed my own rhetorical tactics showing here. For the technique-minded, the category is epideictic, the device is the artifice of praising associated qualities. See Aristotle, *The Rhetoric*, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, in Jonathan Barnes, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 2176.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 2224–2225.
5. See Donald McCloskey, *The Rhetoric of Economics* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), p. 121.
6. "Hiroshima, notre amour," in Jim Hillier, ed., *Cahiers du cinéma: The*

- 1950s: *Neo-Realism, Hollywood, New Wave* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 66.
7. Dudley Andrew, *Film in the Aura of Art* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 65.
  8. Laura Mulvey, "Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," *Screen* 16, 3 (Autumn 1975): 18.
  9. Andrew, *Film in the Aura of Art*, pp. 76–77.
  10. Michel Charles, *L'Arbre et la source* (Paris: Seuil, 1985), pp. 278–289.
  11. Frank Kermode, *The Genesis of Secrecy: On the Interpretation of Narrative* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. 16.
  12. Chaim Perlman, *The Realm of Rhetoric*, trans. William Klubeck (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), p. 35.
  13. Lloyd F. Bitzer, "Aristotle's Enthymeme Revisited," *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 45, 4 (December 1959): 407–408.
  14. Chaim Perlman asserts: "In a controversy it is most often not the *argument* from authority which is questioned but the *authority* who is called upon." *Realm of Rhetoric*, p. 94.
  15. Robert B. Ray, *A Certain Tendency of the Hollywood Cinema, 1930–1980* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 173; Fred Camper, "The Films of Douglas Sirk," *Screen* 12, 2 (Summer 1971): 44.
  16. Raymond Bellour, "Hitchcock the Enunciator," *Camera Obscura* 2 (Fall 1977): 72.
  17. Tony Safford, "Riddles of the Political Unconscious," *On Film* 7 (Winter 1977–78): 41.
  18. Ian Cameron and Richard Jeffrey, "The Universal Hitchcock," *Movie* 12 (Spring 1965): 21.
  19. Teresa de Lauretis, *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 76.
  20. Immanuel Kant, *The Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 310; Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Dilthey: Philosopher of the Human Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 266.
  21. See Don Ranvaud, "Laura Mulvey/Peter Wollen: An Interview," *Framework* 9 (1979): 31; Safford, "Riddles of the Political Unconscious," p. 41; Elizabeth Cowie, "Riddles of the Sphinx; Views: 1," in Cowie, ed., *Catalogue: British Film Institute Productions, 1977–1978* (London: British Film Institute, 1978), p. 49.
  22. See Stuart Gilbert, *James Joyce's Ulysses: A Study* (New York: Vintage, 1958), pp. vi–ix; Sylvia Beach, "Introduction (1961)," in Samuel Beckett et al., *Our Exagmination Round His Factification for Incamination of Work in Progress* (New York: New Directions, 1972), pp. vii–viii.
  23. Adriana Aprà et al., "Interview with Nicholas Ray," *Movie* 9 (1963): 14.
  24. Tim Lucas, "The Image as Virus: The Filming of *Videodrome*," in Piers Handling, ed., *The Shape of Rage: The Films of David Cronenberg* (Toronto: General, 1983), p. 157.
  25. "Chabrol Talks to Rui Nogueira and Nicoletta Zalaffi," *Sight and Sound* 40, 1 (Winter 1970–71): 6.

26. See Kristin Thompson, *Breaking the Glass Armor: Neoformalist Film Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 11, for a discussion of how Godard employed such a strategy with respect to *Sauve qui peut (la vie)*.
27. Stephen Heath, "Difference," *Screen* 19, 3 (Autumn 1978): 72; André Bazin, *Orson Welles* (Paris: Chavane, 1950), p. 30.
28. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, pp. 2223–2224.
29. Richard Levin, *New Readings vs. Old Plays: Recent Trends in the Reinterpretation of English Renaissance Drama* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 28–41.
30. Jon Whitman, *Allegory: The Dynamics of an Ancient and Medieval Technique* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 61.
31. See James L. Kinneavy, *A Theory of Discourse* (New York: Norton, 1971), pp. 264–272.
32. See, for example, Stephen Heath, *Questions of Cinema* (London: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 19–75, 145–164.
33. Levin, *New Readings*, p. 4.
34. Adriana Aprà, quoted in Peter Brunette, *Roberto Rossellini* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 148.
35. Christine Gledhill, "Feminism and *Klute*," in E. Ann Kaplan, ed., *Women in Film Noir* (London: British Film Institute, 1978), p. 128.
36. David Stern, "Midrash and the Language of Exegesis: A Study of Vayika Rabbah, Chapter 1," in Geoffrey H. Hartman and Sanford Budick, eds., *Midrash and Literature* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986), p. 107; T.-M. Charland, *Arts praecandi: Contribution à l'histoire de la rhétorique au Moyen Age* (Paris: Vrin, 1936), pp. 135–218; Charles, *L'Arbre et la source*, pp. 139–141.
37. William Rothman, *Hitchcock—The Murderous Gaze* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), p. 294.
38. Tania Modleski, "'Never to Be Thirty-Six Years Old': *Rebecca* as Female Oedipal Drama," *Wide Angle* 5, 1 (1982): 41.
39. Heath, *Questions of Cinema*, p. 159.
40. Linda Williams, "When the Woman Looks," in Mary Ann Doane, Patricia Mellencamp, and Linda Williams, eds., *Re-Vision: Essays in Feminist Film Criticism* (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984), p. 87.
41. Seymour Chatman, *Antonioni, or The Surface of the World* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 121.
42. Ian Cameron and Robin Wood, *Antonioni* (New York: Praeger, 1968), p. 72.
43. Steve Neale, *Genre* (London: British Film Institute, 1980), p. 43.
44. Jacques Rivette, "The Hand," in Hillier, *Cahiers: The 1950s*, p. 143.
45. It resembles what Kenneth Burke calls "amplification by extension." *A Rhetoric of Motives* (New York: World, 1962), p. 593.
46. Williams, "When the Woman Looks," p. 87.
47. Donald Spoto, *The Art of Alfred Hitchcock: Fifty Years of His Motion Pictures* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979), p. 216.

48. Ibid., p. 217.
49. A start is Linda Brodkey, *Academic Writing as Social Practice* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987).
50. C. J. van Rees, "How a Literary Work Becomes a Masterpiece: On the Threefold Selection Practised by Literary Criticism," *Poetics* 12 (1983): 408.
51. Dana Polan, *Power and Paranoia: History, Narrative, and the American Cinema, 1940–1950* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 147–148.
52. Bernard Dupriez calls the device *double lecture* and can find no examples of it outside recent French theory. See *Gradus: Les procédés littéraires (dictionnaire)* (Paris: Bourgeois, 1980), p. 167.
53. *The Oxford Universal Dictionary on Historical Principles*, 3d ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 1872.
54. Roland Barthes, *The Grain of the Voice: Interviews, 1962–1980*, trans. Linda Coverdale (New York: Hill and Wang, 1985), p. 241.
55. Mary Ann Doane, *The Desire to Desire: The Woman's Film of the 1940s* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), p. 183.
56. R. Barton Palmer, "Editor's Introduction," *Studies in the Literary Imagination* 19, 1 (Spring 1986): 1–2.
57. Bruno Latour, *Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 232.
58. Russell Jacoby, *The Last Intellectuals: American Culture in the Age of Academe* (New York: Basic Books, 1987); William E. Cain, *The Crisis in Criticism: Theory, Literature, and Reform in English Studies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984); Régis Debray, *Teachers, Writers, Celebrities: The Intellectuals of Modern France* (London: New Left Books, 1981).
59. Jean-Louis Comolli and Jean Narboni, "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism (1)," in John Ellis, ed., *Screen Reader 1: Cinema/Ideology/Politics* (London: SEFT, 1977), p. 9.
60. Sam Rohdie, "Editorial," *Screen* 13, 3 (Autumn 1972): 3.
61. Constance Penley, "The Avant-Garde and Its Imaginary," *Camera Obscura* 2 (Fall 1977): 11.
62. Stephen Heath, "Film and System: Terms of Analysis, Part 2," *Screen* 16, 2 (Summer 1975): 98–99.
63. Ben Brewster et al., "Reply," *Screen* 17, 2 (Summer 1976): 114.
64. E. Ann Kaplan, *Women and Film: Both Sides of the Camera* (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 16.
65. The *Camera Obscura* Collective, "Feminism and Film: Critical Approaches," *Camera Obscura* 1 (Fall 1976): 10.
66. Rosalind Coward, "Class, 'Culture,' and the Social Formation," *Screen* 18, 1 (Spring 1977): 102.
67. Paul Willemsen, "Notes on Subjectivity: On Reading Edward Branigan's 'Subjectivity under Siege,'" *Screen* 19, 1 (Spring 1978): 49.
68. Comolli and Narboni, "Cinema/Ideology/Criticism," p. 9.
69. Robin Wood, "Male Desire, Male Anxiety: The Essential Hitchcock," in

- Marshall Deutelbaum and Leland Poague, eds., *A Hitchcock Reader* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1986), pp. 221–222.
70. Geoffrey Nowell-Smith, "I Was a Star-Struck Structuralist," *Screen* 14, 3 (Autumn 1973): 98.
  71. Charles Eckert, "Shall We Deport Lévi-Strauss?" *Film Quarterly* 27, 3 (Spring 1974): 64.
  72. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
  73. David Bordwell, "Addendum, 1975," to "Citizen Kane," in Bill Nichols, ed., *Movies and Methods*, vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 288–289.

## 10. Rhetoric in Action

1. From *Cahiers du cinéma* 113 (1960); translated in Jim Hillier, ed., *Cahiers du cinéma: The 1960s: New Wave, New Cinema, Reevaluating Hollywood* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 150–157. Page numbers in parentheses refer to this version.
2. *Hitchcock's Films* (South Brunswick, N.J.: A. S. Barnes, 1977). All parenthetical page numbers cite this edition.
3. David Thomson's interpretation of the film in *Movie Man* (New York: Stein and Day, 1967), pp. 196–201; James Naremore's dissection of it in his monograph *Filmguide to Psycho* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); and Donald Spoto's discussion in *The Art of Alfred Hitchcock: Fifty Years of His Motion Pictures* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1979) all take Wood's interpretation as a point of departure.
4. All parenthetical references are to *Films and Feelings* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), pp. 209–220.
5. *Film as Film* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 107–115. Page references in parentheses are to this edition.
6. As a contrast, see Perkins' much earlier essay on *Psycho*, "Charm and Blood," *Oxford Opinion*, 25 October 1960, 34–35.
7. The term is used by Charles L. Stevenson in "On the 'Analysis' of a Work of Art," in Francis J. Coleman, ed., *Contemporary Studies in Aesthetics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), p. 71.
8. See Noël Carroll, "The Future of Allusion: Hollywood and the Seventies (and Beyond)," *October* 20 (Spring 1982): 54–56, 65.
9. Royal S. Brown, "Herrmann, Hitchcock, and the Music of the Irrational," *Cinema Journal* 21, 2 (Spring 1982): 14–49; Graham Bruce, *Bernard Herrmann: Film Music and Narrative* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1985), pp. 183–213.
10. Pages cited in parentheses refer to the version reprinted in Marshall Deutelbaum and Leland Poague, eds., *A Hitchcock Reader* (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1986), pp. 311–331.
11. William Rothman, *Hitchcock—The Murderous Gaze* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 245–341. This book was completed in 1980 and does not cite Bellour, so it seems likely that Rothman arrived at his reflexive interpretation independently.