CHAPTER 4
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA
i. Preliminaries
I now begin the detailed treatment of the items on my initial list of alleged
epistemic desiderata. I will be concerned with clarification of the nature of
each desideratum, how it should be construed. Where there are serious
questions as to the viability ofan item, those will be addressed. I discuss the
deontological group first because it gives rise to crucial problems about viability,
as a result ofwhich I postponed consideration ofit in Chapter 3 until
and unless they can be resolved.
Here are the deontological candidates for epistemic desiderata of belief
(B) that were listed in Chapter 3·
9. B is held permissibly (one is not subject to blame for doing so).
10. B is fonned and held responsibly.
11. The causal ancestry of B does not contain violations of intellectual
obligations.
First a word about my terminology. 'Deontology' and'deontological' come
from the Greek deon-'what is binding' or 'duty'. In ethics, deontology is
the study of duty or obligation, and a deontological theory of ethics is one
that takes duty or obligation to be the most basic ethical concept and treats
it as an intrinsic ethical value of an act rather than in terms of the consequences
of the act. J\1y use is broader. I use it to range over any kind of
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 59
requirement, not restricted to moral obligation, and not excluding requirements
that are based on consequences of what is required. And I identify
deontological considerations as having to do with the triad of statusesrequired,
forbidden, and permitted. Thus any way in which it would be epistemically
desirable (desirable from the standpoint of an aim at true belief)
for a beliefto be required or permitted (i.e., not forbidden) would count as
a deontological desideratum in my tenninology.
Back to the above list, I think it will suffice to concentrate on 9 and I I.
Each of these can be construed as focusing on something's being permitted,
not being in violation of any intellectual requirements. Desideratum 9
is matter of the having or the acquiring of the belief being permitted.
Desideratum 1 I is a matter ofthe permissibility or lack thereofofwhat one
did that led to the acquisition of the belief. Although 10, the formation in
terms of responsibility, is familiar in the literature, I think it is ambiguous
between 9 and I I and so does not require separate treatment. The basic difference
between 9 and I I is what is said to be permitted-either the believing
itself or what led up to it. Thus, to foreshadow a major point in the
ensuing discussion, 9 gives rise to problems about voluntary control of
belief whereas I I does not.
I have already pointed out in Chapter I that it is plausible to suppose
that 'justified' came into epistemology from its more unproblematic use
with respect to voluntary action. I am justified in doing something, for
example, appointing someone to a Teaching Assistantship on my own, provided
my doing so is in accordance with the relevant rules and regulations,
provided it is permitted by those rules and hence that I could not rightfully
be blamedor held to acwunt for it, and was acting responsibly in doing so.1 The
rules could be institutional, as in the above example, or legal or moral.
Thus I would be morally justified in failing to make a contribution to a certain
organization provided my doing so doesn't violate any moral rule.
Because of this provenance it is natural to think ofbelieving, when taken to
be subject to being justified or unjustified, as subject to requirement, prohibition,
and permission. We say things like "You shouldn't have supposed
so readily that he would not return", "You have no right to assume that",
"You shouldn't jump to conclusions", and "I ought to have trusted him
more than I did". Locutions like these seem to be interchangeable with
speaking of a belief as being, or not being, justified. These considerations
1 I don't suggest that doing what is not permitted by the rules is coextensive with being
subject to blame for doing it. One might have a valid excuse for doing it despite the rules.
When I speak of violating a rule as being blameworthy, it is presupposed that there is no
such excuse.
60 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
were introduced in this book prior to the abandonment of a justificationbased
epistemology of belief, and in the new dispensation they have no
force. Since we are thinking of 9 and I I simply as states of affairs that are,
or may be thought to be, important goals of cognition, the fact that they
have often been thought to constitute a belief's being justified, with all the
associations that brings from talk of the justification of actions, has lost
whatever meta-epistemological significance it had under the old dispensation.
The idea ofa belief's being required, permitted, or forbidden will have
to swim or sink on its own, without support from the etymology of 'justified'.
I will now enter onto the elucidation of 9 and a critical discussion of
its credentials as an epistemic desideratum. The criticism will mostly hinge
on whetl1er we have effective voluntary control of believings. I will argue
that we do not.
It seems clear that the terms of the deontological triad, permitted,
required, and forbidden, apply to something only if it is under effective
voluntary control. By the time-honored principle "Ought implies can",
one can be obliged to do A only if one has an effective choice as to
whether to do A. It is equally obvious that it makes no sense to speak of
S's being permitted or forbidden to do A if S lacks an effective choice as
to whether to do so. Therefore, the most fundamental issue raised by the
claim of 9 to be an epistemic desideratum is whether believings are under
effective voluntary control. If they are not and hence if deontological
terms do not apply to them, alleged epistemic desiderata like 9 do not get
so far as to be a candidate for an epistemic desideratum. It suffers shipwreck
before leaving port. I will argue that believings are not subject to
voluntary control. But before that, there are some preliminary points to
be made.
First, ifl considered the possibility ofdeontological ED for beliefs to be
a live one, I would need to consider a belief's enjoying the stronger deontological
status of being a case of complying with an epistemic obligation,
doing what is required, as well as the weaker status of merely being something
that is epistemically permitted. But since I hold that no dcontological
status is possible for beliefs, I will not need to go into the different
statuses separately. And since justificationists of a deontological bent have
concentrated on a belief's being epistemically permitted, I will go along
with that focus.
Second, although the discussion in the book thus far has been solely in
terms of belief, we need to include consideration of other propositional
attitudes that are contrary to belief. Chisholm (1977, chap. I) speaks in
terms of a trichotomy of'believe' (or 'accept'), 'reject', and 'withhold' that
p. Since rejecting p is identified with believing some contrary of p, at least
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 61
not-p, it brings in no new kind of propositional attitude, but withholding
p, believing neither it nor any contrary, does. The basic point here is that
one has control over a given type of propositional attitude only if one also
has control over some field of incompatible alternatives. rio have effective
control over believing that p is to have control over whether one believes
that p or takes on some alternative thereto. Therefore, to be strictly accurate
we should say that our problem about 9 concerns voluntary control
over intellectual propositional attitudes generally. Though my formulations
will mostly be in terms of belief, they should be understood as having
this more general bearing.
Third, something must be said about the relation between the voluntary
control of actions and of states of affairs. Thus far I have been oscillating
between the two. A belief is a more or less long-lived state of the psyche
that can influence actions and reactions of the subject so long as it persists.
And the same holds for other propositional attitudes. Thus, in speaking of
voluntary control of beliefs, we have been speaking ofthe control ofstates.
But couldn't we just as well speak of the voluntary control of the action of
bringing about such states: accepting, rejecting, or withholding a proposition?
If the two are strictly correlative, we could equally well conduct the
discussion in terms of either. Whenever we are responsible for a state of
affairs by virtue of having brought it about, we may just as well speak of
being responsible for the action of bringing it about. There are reasons,
however, for proceeding in terms ofstates.
The main reason is this. Ifwe hold that belief'> are subject to deontological
evaluation because they are under voluntary control, we need not
restrict ourselves to beliefs that are formed intentionally by a voluntary act.
I could be blamed for believing that pin the absence of adequate evidence,
even if the beliefwas formed automatically, not by voluntarily carrying out
an intention to do so. Provided believing in general is under voluntary control,
it is enough that I could have rejected or withheld the proposition by
a voluntary act had I chosen to do so.
The final preliminary note is this. Our issue does not concern free will
or freedom of action, at least in any sense in which that goes beyond
one's action being under the control of the will. On a "libertarian" conception
of free will this is not sufficient; it is required also that both A
and non-A be causally possible, given all the causal influences on the
agent. A libertarian will, no doubt, maintain that if deontological concepts
are to apply to believings in the same sense in which they apply to
overt actions, then all the libertarian conditions will have to apply to
believings. Here, however, I am concerned only with whether believings
are under voluntary control.
62 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
ii. Basic Voluntary Control of Believing
Locutions like the ones cited earlier as encouraging the application of
deontological terms to believing-"You shouldn't jump to conclusions", "I
had to accept his testimony; I had no choice"-also strongly suggest that
belief is under voluntary control. Else why could we speak of what beliefs
one should or shouldn't form, or that one did or did not have a choice as to
whether one forms a certain belief? Though this view is distinctly out of
favor today, it still has its defenders.2 Such locutions also naturally suggest
not only that believing is under voluntary control but that this control is of
the maximally direct sort that we have over the motions of our limbs, the
voluntary movements ofwhich constitute basic actions. A basic action is one
that we perform "at will", just by an intention, volition, choice, or decision
to do so. It is something we "just do", not by doing something else. Let's
call the kind ofcontrol we have over states of affairs we can bring about by
basic actions basic voluntary control. If we do have voluntary control of
beliefs, we have the same reason for supposing it to be basic control that we
have for supposing ourselves to have basic control over movements of our
limbs, namely, that we are hard pressed to specify any action by doing
which we get tl1e limbs moved or the beliefs acquired. Hence it is not surprising
that the basic voluntaty control thesis has had distinguished proponents
throughout the history ofphilosophy. Augustine, Aquinas, Descartes,
Kierkegaard, and many others have usually been read this way.3 And discussions
pro and con ofthe voluntary control ofbeliefs have mostly focused
on the basic control version. Nevertheless, as the subsequent discussion
will show, there are other forms ofvoluntarism about beliefthat need to be
taken into account in a complete treatment.
But for now I am concerned to give a critical examination of the basic
voluntary control thesis. Those who have attacked it are divided between
those who hold that believing at will is logically impossible and those who
hold that it is only psychologically impossible, a capacity that we in fact lack
though one we conceivably could have had.4 I cannot see any sufficient reason
for the stronger claim, and I shall merely contend that we are not so
constituted as to be able to take propositional attitudes at will. My argument
2 See, e.g., Ginet 1985 and Meiland r98o.
l On the basis of a distinction between believing that p and "accepting" that p, according
to which the latter but not the former is a voluntary action, I have argued that these philosophers
and others are best construed as ascribing voluntary control to accepting, not believing.
See Alston r996b.
4 The best-known defense of the logical impossibility is Bernard Williams's "Deciding to
Believe", in vVilliams 1972. It has been criticized in, inter alia, Govier 1976 and Winters 1979.
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 63
for this, if it can be called that, simply consists in asking you to consider
whether you have any such power. Can you, at this moment, start to believe
that the Roman Empire is still in control ofwestern Europe, just by deciding
to do so? Ifyou find it incredible that you should be sufficiently motivated
to even try to believe this, suppose that someone offers you $500
million to believe it, and that you are much more interested in the money
than in believing the truth. Could you do what it takes to get that reward?
Remember that we are speaking of believing at will. No doubt, there are
things you could do that would increase the probability of your believing
this, but we will get to that later. Can you switch propositional attitudes
toward that proposition just by deciding to do so? It seems clear to me that
I have no such power. Volitions, decisions, or choosings don't hook up with
propositional attitude inaugurations, just as they don't hook up with the
secretion of gastric juices or with metabolism. There could conceivably be
individual differences in this regard. Some people can wiggle their ears at
will, but most of us cannot. However, I very much doubt that any of us are
endowed with the power of believing that p, for any given p, at will. The
temptation to suppose otherwise may stem from conflating that power with
others that are clearly distinct. If I were to set out to bring myself into a
state of belief that p, just by an act of will, I might assert that p with what
sounds like conviction, or dwell favorably on the idea that p, or imagine a
sentence expressing p emblazoned in the heavens with an angelic chorus in
the background intoning the Gloria of Bach's Mass in B Minor. All this I
can do at will, but none of it amounts to forming a belief that p. It is all
show, an elaborate pretense of believing. Having gone through all this, my
propositional attitudes will remain just as they were before; or if there is
any change, it will be as a result of these gyrations.5
Don't suppose that our inability to believe at will is restricted to what is
obviously false. It also extends to beliefs that are obviously true. I have
already made the point that voluntary control attaches to sets ofcontraries.
'Io take the simplest case, if the sphere of my voluntary control does not
extend both to A and to not-A, then it attaches to neither. If I don't have
the power to choose between A and not-A, then we are in no position to say
that I did A at will, rather than just did it, accompanied perhaps by a volition.
Thus, even ifi willingly, or not unwillingly, form perceptual beliefs in
the way I do, it by no means follows that I form those beliefs at will, or that
I have voluntary control over such belief formation. It would have to be
true that I have voluntary control over whether I do ordo not believe that the
tree has leaves on it when I see a tree with leaves on it just before me in
5 A bit later in the discussion I will present other tempting conflations.
64 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
broad daylight with my eyesight working normally. And it is perfectly clear
that in this situation I have no power at all to refrain from that belief. So it
is with everything that seems obvious to us. We have just as little voluntary
control over ordinary beliefs formed by introspection, memory, and simple
uncontroversial inferences from uncontroversial premises.
The above discussion may suggest to the voluntarist that he can still
make a stand on propositions that do not seem clearly true or false and hold
that there one often has the capacity to adopt whatever propositional attitude
one chooses. In religion, philosophy, history, and high-level scientific
inquiry it is often the case that, so far as one can see, the relevant arguments
do not definitively settle the matter one way or the other. I engage in a prolonged
study of free will or causality. I carefully consider arguments for and
against various positions. It seems to me that none of the positions have
been decisively established, though there are weighty considerations that
can be urged in support of each. There are serious difficulties with all the
positions, though, so far as I can see, more than one contender is left in the
field. So what am I to do? I could just abandon the question. But, alternatively,
I could, so it seems, simply decide to adopt one ofthe positions. Is that
not what I must do if I am to make any judgment on the matter?
There are also practical situations in which we are confronted with
incompatible answers to a certain question, none of which we see to be
clearly true or false. Here we often do not have the luxury of leaving the
field; since we must act in one way rather than another, we are forced to
form and act on some belief about the matter. It would be a good idea for
me to plant these flowers today iffit will rain tomorrow. But it is not at all
clear to me whether tomorrow will be rainy. I must either plant the flowers
today or not, and ifl just ignore the issue, that will he equivalent to assuming
that it will not rain tomorrow. Hence the better part ofwisdom would
be to make a choice between the alternative predictions. On a larger scale,
a field commander in wartime is often faced with questions about the current
disposition ofenemy forces. But often such information as he has does
not tell him just what that disposition is. In disposing his own forces he
must act on some assumption about the enemy's forces. Hence he is forced
to decide on a hypothesis as to that disposition and act on that basis. What
else can he do?6
6 Even if beliefs can be formed at will in these kinds of cases, there still remain vast
stretches of our belief, including all the cases discussed above, where it seems obvious what is
the case, where we have already seen believing at will not to be a possible move. And so it
would still be true that believing permissibly would not be generally viable as an epistemic
desideratmn.
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 65
Despite the intuitive appeal of the idea that beliefs are formed at will in
these cases, there are several alternative construals, one or another of
which is a better reading of each. Begin with the philosopher who really
does come to believe the libertarian account offree will or the epiphenomenalist
position on the mind-body question. \Vhere that happens it is presumably
because at least for the moment the considerations in favor of the
position seem to be conclusive, even though previously they did not. And
at that time the belief follows automatically from that momentary seeming
of conclusiveness, just as it does in cases where it always seems obvious
what the truth of the matter is whenever one turns one's attention to
it. At that moment, S is no more able to accept a compatibilist account of
free will or a hard-nosed materialism on the mind-body problem than he
would be if the positions he comes to believe had seemed obviously true
from his first consideration of the problem. If, at a given time, it still
seemed to the philosopher that libertarianism and compatibilism were
approximately equally well supported, how could she simply decide to
believe one rather than another? How could we do that any more than,
lacking any reasons at all for one alternative rather than the other, we
decide to believe that the number of ultimate particles in the universe is
even rather than odd?
The above account in terms ofa momentary sense ofconclusive support
for one alternative could also apply to our practical cases. It could be that
the military commander, at a certain point in his deliberations, comes to
think the reasons for a particular hypothesis concerning the disposition of
enemy forces are conclusive. But I believe that there are other construals
for both the theoretical and practical cases. For one thing, the subject may
be resolving to act as though it is true that p, adopting it as a basis for action
without actually believing it. This could well be a correct description ofthe
military commander. He may have said to himself: "I don't know what the
disposition of enemy forces is. I don't even have enough evidence to consider
one hypothesis much more likely than any other. But I have to proceed
on some basis or other, so I'll just assume that it is H and make my
plans accordingly". If that's the way the land lies, it would be incorrect to
describe the commander as believing that the disposition of enemy forces
is H or having any other belief about the matter. He is, self-consciously,
proceeding on an assumption concerning the truth of which he has no
beliefat all. One may also make an assumption for theoretical purposes, in
order to see how it "pans out" in the hope that one will thereby obtain some
additional reasons for believing it to be true or false. A scientist can adopt
"as a working hypothesis" the proposition that the atomic nucleus is positively
charged, draw various consequences from it, and proceed to test
66 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
those consequences. He need not believe that the atomic nucleus is positively
charged in order to carry out this operation. Indeed, he would be
doing this because he does not yet know what to believe about the matter.
Likewise a philosopher might take materialism as a working hypothesis to
see how it works out in application to various problems.
Working hypotheses may also be involved in activities that are a blend
of the theoretical and the practical. One may accept the existence of God,
or some more robust set of religious doctrines, as a guide to life, t1ying to
live in accordance with them, seeking to act and feel one's way into a religious
community, in order to determine how the doctrines work out in the
living of them, both in terms of how satisfactory and fulfilling a life they
enable one to live and in terms of what evidence for or against them one
acquires. Again, at least in early stages of this process, one does not yet
believe the doctrines in question.
There are other possibilities as well. S may be seeking, for whatever reason,
to bring herself into a position of believing p, and she, or others, may
confuse this activity, which can be undertaken voluntarily, with believing
the proposition to be true. Or S may align herself with some group-a
church, a political party, a group of thinkers-that is committed to certain
doctrines, and this, which can be done voluntarily, may be confused with
coming to believe those doctrines. Finally, there is the distinction between
acceptance and beliefthat was briefly mentioned earlier. The basic distinction
is that belief is something that one finds oneself with, something that
springs into consciousness spontaneously when the question is raised.
Whereas acceptance ofa proposition is, at least in the first instance, a deliberate
voluntary act of accepting a proposition as true. It differs from the
"working hypothesis" or "assuming that p as a basis for action" in that,
unlike these cases, S does commit himself top's being true. He "takes it on
board" as one of the things he acts on and draws consequences from. It is,
we might say, just like belief except that the commitment to p's being true
doesn't arise spontaneously but, at least at the outset, has to be kept in activation
by a deliberate voluntary act. Thus the philosopher and the religious
seeker might accept, in this sense, a position on the free-will issue or the
mind-body problem or various religious doctrines. The philosopher, even
though libertarianism does not seem to him to be conclusively established,
might accept it-take it as his position on the issue, defend it, draw various
consequences for it, while seeking for conclusive evidence pro or con, and
not yet finding himself believing it. And there is an analogous possibility
for religious doctrines.?
7 The latter application is explored in detail in Alston r996b.
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 67
Thus I take it that the analysis of a wide variety of supposed cases of
believing at will reveals that in each case coming to believe that p may well
have been confused with something else. Hence I think that there is a considerable
case for the position that no one ever acquires a belief at will.
iii. Other Modes ofVoluntary Control ofBelieving
The demise ofbasic control of beliefis by no means the end ofvoluntarism
about belief. Many deontologists, after avoiding any commitment to what
they call "direct voluntary control of belief'' (what I have called "basic voluntary
control"), insist that beliefs are subject to what they tenn "indirect
voluntary control".8 They generally use this tenn in an undiscriminating
fashion to cover any sort of voluntary control that is not basic. Hence they
fail to distinguish the three kinds ofnonbasic control I will proceed to enumerate.9
Some oftheir examples fit one ofmy three types and some another.
First, note that we take many nonbasic overt actions and their upshots
to be under voluntary control in a way that is sufficient for their being
required, pennitted, or prohibited. Consider opening a door, turning on a
light, and informing someone that p. Succeeding in any of these requires
more than a volition; in each case I must make one or more bodily movements,
and these movements must have certain consequences. In order for
me to open a door, I must pull it, push it, kick it, or put some other part of
my body into suitable contact with it (assuming that I lack telekinetic powers),
and this must result in the door's coming to be open. In order to
inform II that p, I must produce various sounds, marks, or other perceivable
products, and the product in question must fall under linguistic rules
in such away as to constitute avehicle for asserting that p. Thus actions like
these are not immediately consequent on a volition and are not strictly
done "at will". Nevertheless, I might be blamed for my failure to open the
door when it was my obligation to do so and I was not prevented from performing
basic bodily movements sufficient to bring it about that the door
was open. In typical cases we take the extra conditions for success for
granted. We suppose that if tl1e agent will just voluntarily exert herself in a
way that is open to her, the act will be done. Here we can say that the action
and its upshot are subject to the immediate voluntmy control of the agent
8 See, e.g., Alvin Goldman 1980, Plantinga 1983, Wolterstorff 1983, Moser 1985, Steup
1988.
9 Even the extended treatment in Pojman 1986 fails to make any distinctions within "indirect
control".
68 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
(more strictly, nonbasic immediate voluntary control), even though more
than an act ofwill is required. I call this control "immediate" since the agent
is able to carry out the intention right away, in one uninterrupted intentional
act, without having to return to the attempt a number oftimes. 10 I will
use the term 'direct control' for both basic and nonbasic immediate control.
If beliefs were subject to one's direct control in either way, that would suffice
to render them susceptible to deontological evaluation.
But are beliefs always, or ever, within our immediate nonbasic voluntary
control? As in the discussion of basic control we can first exempt most
beliefs from consideration. Where it is perfectly clear that a certain proposition
is true or false, as with typical perceptual, introspective, memory, and
simple inferential beliefs, it is absurd to think that one has any such control
over whetl1er one accepts, rejects, or withholds the proposition. When I
look out my window and see rain falling, water dripping off the trees, and
cars passing by, I no more have immediate nonbasic control over whether
I accept those propositions than I have basic control. I fonn the belief that
rain is falling willy-nilly. There is no way I can inhibit this belief or acquire
a contrary belief. At least there is no way I can do so on the spot, in carrying
out an uninterrupted intention to do so. What button would I push? I
could try asserting the contrary in a confident tone of voice. I could
rehearse some skeptical arguments. I could invoke tl1e Vedantic doctrine of
Maya. I could grit my teeth and command myself to withhold the proposition.
But none of these will have the least effect on my doxastic condition.
Since cases in which it seems obvious to the subject what is the case constitute
an enormously large proportion of propositional attitudes, the above
considerations show that immediate nonbasic voluntary control cannot be
the basis for the application ofdeontological concepts to most ofour beliefs
and withholdings.
But what about situations in which it is not clear whether a proposition
is true or false? Here I can simply refer the reader back to the last section,
in which I art,rued with respect to basic control that the cases in which it
may look as if one comes to believe a proposition at will are best construed
in other ways. In those cases involving the philosopher, the general,
and the gardener, it is, I claim, implausible to suppose that the
subject acquired a belief voluntarily, whether by a mere act ofwill or by a
series of basic or more nearly basic actions that led right away to the
intended result. Here, as with the obviously true or false cases, we are at
a loss to think what button to push, what bodily movements to make so
10 Of course, opening a door or turning on a light may, in special cases, require repeated
attempts with intervals between. In the above I was speaking of the simple unimpeded cases.
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 69
as to bring about the formation of an intended belief. Until some plausible
story can be told as to what one can do voluntarily to result in a belief's
being formed immediately, we can ignore the possibility of treating voluntary
control of beliefs on the model of nonbasic but immediate voluntary
control of doors being open and lights being on.
This brings us to a second grade of what is commonly called "indirect
voluntary control", what I will call long-range voluntary control. It will be
noted that the types ofvoluntary control I am considering are arranged in
an order of increasing indirectness, increasing distance from the most
immediate control. Here, as with immediate nonbasic voluntary control,
we think ofthe beliefas being produced by the carrying out ofan intention
by one or more actions that are designed to produce the belief rather than
as being produced by a mere act ofwill, choice, or decision. But unlike the
last case, the belief production is not carried out in one uninterrupted
action. It involves a series of actions spread out over a greater or smaller
period of time, the smallest period of which is too extended to accommodate
a single uninterrupted act.11 A number of voluntarists seem to be
thinking in these terms of the cases in which it is not immediately obvious
whether a given proposition is true or false. After all, they say, that is what
inquiry is for, to resolve such issues. One certainly has voluntary control
over whether to keep looking for evidence or reasons, and voluntary control
over where to look, what steps to take to find relevant considerations,
and so on. It is suggested, in effect, that since we have voluntary control
over these intermediate steps, this amounts to what I call long-range voluntary
control of a propositional attitude. Chisholm, for example, says:
If self-control is what is essential to activity, some of our beliefs, our bclievings,
would seem to be acts. VVhen a man deliberates and comes finally to a
conclusion, his decision is as much within his control as is any other deed we
attribute to him. If his conclusion was unreasonable, a conclusion he should
not have accepted, we may plead with him: "But you needn't have supposed
that so-and-so was true. VVhy didn't you take account of these other facts?"
vVe assume that his decision is one he could have avoided and that, had he
only chosen to do so, he could have made a more reasonable inference. Or, if
his conclusion is not the result of a deliberate inference, we may say, "But if
you had only stopped to think'', implying that, had he chosen, he could have
stopped to think. \Ve suppose, as we do whenever we apply our ethical or
moral predicates, that there was something else the agent could have done
instead. (1968, 224)
11 Obviously, there is no precise boundary between a "single uninterrupted act" and a
"series of temporally extended acts" where the temporal extension is small. But there are
enough clear cases on either side of the distinction to make it usable.
70 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
Tb be sure, the mere fact that one often looks for evidence to decide an
unresolved issue does not show that one has voluntary control over one's
propositional attitudes. That would also depend, at least, on the incidence
of success in these enterprises. And sometimes one finds decisive evidence
and sometimes one doesn't. But let's ignore that complexity and just consider
whether there is a case for long-range voluntary control of belief in
the successful cases.
No, there is not, and primarily for the following reason. Claims like
those in the quote from Chisholm ignore the difference between doing A
in order to bring about E, for some definite E, and doing A so that some
effect within a certain range will ensue. In order that the phenomenon of
looking for more evidence would show that we have voluntary control over
propositional attitudes, it would have to be the case that the search for evidence
was undertaken with the intention of taking up a certain attitude
toward a specific proposition. For only in that case would it have any tendency
to show that we have exercised voluntary control over what propositional
attitude we come to have. Suppose that I can't remember AI Kaline's
lifetime batting average, and I look it up in the baseball almanac. I read
there the figure .3zo, and I thereby accept it. Does that show that I have
voluntaty control (of any sort) over my belief that Kaline's lifetime batting
average was .po? Not at all. At most it shows that I have long-range voluntary
control over whether I take up some propositional attitude toward
some proposition ascribing a lifetime batting average to Kaline. So this is
not at all parallel to cases where we definitely do have some (albeit fallible)
long-range voluntary control over other sorts ofaffairs. Suppose that I can
perform voluntary actions that will result, subject to the usual chances that
infect all human endeavor, in my losing twenty pounds. Here there is a
completely definite and unique result toward which my voluntary efforts
are directed, and success, or at least repeated success, will show that I do
have long-range voluntary control (within limits) of my weight.
What the situation described by Chisholm is closely analogous to is the
following. I am a servant, and I am motivated to bring the door into whatever
position my employer chooses. He has an elaborate electronic system
that involves automatic control of many aspects of the household, including
doors. Each morning he leaves detailed instructions on household
operations in a computer. Doors can he operated only through the computer
in accordance with his instructions. There is no way I can carry out
an intention of my own, no matter how long range, to open or to close a
particular door at a particular time. All I can is to actuate the relevant program
and let things take their course. Since the employer's instructions will
be carried out only ifl actuate the program, I am responsible for the doors'
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 71
assuming positions he specified, just as in the Kaline case I was responsible
for taking up some attitude or other toward some proposition within a
given range. But I definitely am not responsible for the front door's being
open rather than closed at a particular time, nor can I be said to have voluntary
control over its specific position. Hence it would be idle to apply
deontological concepts vis-a-vis the specific position of the door: to forbid
me or require me to open it, or to blame or reproach me for its being open.
I had no control over that; it was not subject to my will. And that's the way
it is where the onlyvoluntary control I have over my propositional attitudes
is to enter onto an investigation that will eventuate in some propositional
attitude or other on what is being considered.
Or consider propositions concerning what is visible. I have the power to
voluntarily open my eyes and look about me, thereby putting myself in a
position, when conditions are favorable, to reliably form propositions
about the visible environment. Again, with respect to past experiences, I
can "search my memory" for the details ofmy experiences of the middle of
yesterday, thereby usually putting myselfin a good position to form beliefs
reliably about my experiences at that time. No one, I suppose, would take
these facts to show that I have voluntary control over what I believe about
the visible environment or about my remembered experiences. What I can
control voluntarily is whether I form (or am in a position to form) some
accurate beliefs or other about my current visible environment or about my
experiences ofyesterday. And yet this is the same sort ofthing as the search
for additional evidence of which Chisholm speaks, differing only in the
type of belief-forming mechanisms involved.
I suspect that those who take positions like the one in the passage just
quoted from Chisholm secretly suppose that the additional evidence,
rather than "automatically" determining the propositional attitude, simply
puts the subject in a position to make an informed choice of an attitude.
That is, they really locate the voluntary control in the moment of attitude
formation rather than in the preliminary investigation, thereby in effect
taking the (basic or nonbasic) immediate-control position. But then, faced
with the implausibility ofthose positions, they think to save the application
of deontological concepts to beliefs by pushing the voluntary control back
to the preliminary search for decisive considerations. But their undercover
attachment to the immediate-control thesis prevents them from seeing that
voluntary control of the investigative phase has no tendency to ground the
deontological treatment of propositional attitudes themselves.
Despite the above arguments against false pretensions to the title of
"long-range voluntary control of belief'', I have no intention of suggesting
that there could not be legitimate claimants. Let's take a fresh start and lay
72 THE NATURAL! STIC APPROACH
out what it takes for a genuine case ofsuch control in general (not restricted
to belie£<;). It requires the capacity to bring about a state of affairs, C, by
voluntarily doing a number of different things over a considerable period
of time, typically interrupted by activity directed to other goals. One has
this sort of control, to a greater or lesser degree, over many things: one's
weight, cholesterol concentration, blood pressure, and disposition; the
actions of one's spouse or one's of£<;pring. One can, with some hope ofsuccess,
set out on a long-range project to reduce one's weight, improve one's
disposition, or get one's spouse to be more friendly to the neighbors. The
degree of control one is likely to have varies markedly among these examples.
But all these examples and many more illustrate the point that one can
have long-range control over many things over which one lacks immediate
control. I cannot markedly reduce my weight right away by the uninterrupted
carrying out of an intention to-by taking a pill, running around the
block, or saying 'Abracadabra'. But that doesn't nullify the fact that I have
some degree of long-range control.
To return to our main concern, it does seem that we have some degree of
long-range voluntary control over at least some of our beliefs. People do set
out on long-range projects to get themselves to believe a certain proposition,
and sometimes they succeed in this. Devices employed include selective
exposure to evidence and deliberate attention to supporting considerations,
seeking the company ofbelievers and avoiding nonbelievers, self-suggestion,
and more bizarre methods like hypnotism. Bysuch devices people sometimes
induce themselves to believe in God, in materialism, in communism, in the
proposition that they are loved by X, and so on. Why doesn't this constitute
a kind ofvoluntary control that grounds deontological treatment of beliefs?
Well, it would if we do have sufficient control of this sort. People could
properly be held responsible for their attitudes toward propositions in a certain
range only ifthose who set out to intentionally produce a certain attitude
toward such a proposition and made sufficient efforts were frequently successful.
For only if we were generally successful in bringing about goal G
when we try hard enough to do so, do we have effective control over whether
G obtains. And ifl don't have effective control over G, I can hardly be held
to blame for its nonoccurrence. This is a generally applicable principle, by no
means restricted to beliefs. IfI am so constituted that the most I can do with
respect to my irritability is to make it slightly less likely that it will exceed a
certain high average threshold, I can hardly be blamed for being irritable.
It is very dubious that we have a reliable long-range voluntary control
over any of our beliefs, even in the most favorable cases, such as beliefs
about religious and philosophical matters and about personal relationships.
Sometimes people succeed in getting themselves to believe (disbelieve)
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 73
something. But I doubt that the success rate is substantial.! know of no statistics
on this, but I would be very much surprised if attempts of this sort
bore fruit in more than a small proportion of the cases. In thinking about
this, let's first set aside cases in which the attempt succeeds because the subject
happens onto conclusive evidence that would have produced the belief
anyway without deliberate effort on his part to produce that belief. Thus
we need to consider cases in which the subject is swimming against either
a preponderance ofcontrary evidence or a lack ofsufficient evidence either
way. That is, S is fighting very strong tendencies to believe when and only
when something seems true to her. Whether these tendencies are innate,
or engendered and reinforced by socialization, they are deeply rooted and
of great strength. To combat them one must exercise considerable ingenuity
in monitoring the input ofinformation and in exposing oneself to nonrational
influences. These are tricky operations, and it would be very
surprising if they were successful in a significant proportion of cases. I am
not suggesting that it is unusual for people to form and retain beliefs without
adequate grounds. That is all too common. But in most such cases the
proposition in question seems clearly true to the person, however ill supported.
The typical case of prejudice, for example, is not one in which S
manages to believe something contrary to what seems to him to be the case
or something concerning which he has no definite impression of truth or
falsity. It is a case in which his socialization has led it to seem clearly true to
him that, for example, blacks are innately inferior.
Thus the possibility of long-range voluntary control of beliefs does not
provide significant grounding for deontologism, even for the sorts of
propositions people do sometimes try to get themselves to believe or disbelieve.
Much less is there any such support for deontologism for those
propositions with respect to which people don't normally even try to
manipulate their attitudes. We have already noted that most of our beliefs
spring from doxastic tendencies that are too deeply rooted to permit of
modification by deliberate effort. In such cases the project of deliberately
producing beliefor disbelief is one that is never seriously envisaged. Thus,
even if we were usually successful when we set out to produce a propositional
attitude, the voluntary control thus manifested would not ground the
application of deontological concepts to beliefs generally.
iv. Indirect Voluntary Influence on Believing
Up to this point I have been considering various ways in which believing,
rejecting, and withholding propositions might be themselves under effective
74 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
voluntary control. vVe have seen that for most of our beliefs we have no
such control and that for the others we have at most some spotty and unreliable
control of the long-range sort. But this is not the end of the line for
the prospects ofan epistemic desideratum ofthe deontological kind. There
is still one more way in which subjects might be held responsible for their
believings, for believings to be required, forbidden, or permitted, even
though they themselves are not under effective voluntary control. To see
this, consider the general point that we can be blamed for a state of affairs
F, provided something we voluntarily did (didn't do) and should have not
done (done) was a necessary condition (in the circumstances) ofthe realization
ofF. That is, Fwould not have obtained had we done (not done) something
we should have done (not done). If my cholesterol buildup would
have been prevented had I regulated my diet in the way I should have done,
but didn't, I can be blamed for that buildup, whether or not I have direct
effective voluntary control of my cholesterol level.
Applying this general point to beliefs, we can say that even though
believings are not under effective voluntary control, we can be blamed for
holding a certain belief, B, if there are things we can voluntarily do such
that we should have done (not done) them and if we had done (not done)
them we would not have held that belief. Suppose that I accept some idle
gossip to the effect that Jim is trying to undermine Susie's position as
departmental chair. If I had done what I should have done by way of
checking into this matter, I would not have formed that belief or would
not have retained it for as long as I did. Hence I could be blamed for holding
the belief. To take a case where I am blameless in holding a belief,
consider a visual belief where my vision and my belief-forming mechanisms
are working normally. There is nothing relevant to that belief formation
that I should have done but didn't, and so I am not subject to
blame in forming the belief. Note that other deontological terms like
'ought' and 'should' are also applicable to states of affairs not themselves
under direct voluntary control in this derivative way. Thus we can say that
I ought to have a lower cholesterol count and that I should not have
believed that he did it.
Note that this kind of application of the deontological categories of
blameworthiness or the reverse to believings is a derivative one. It is the
(actual or possible) voluntary acts in the causal ancestry ofthe beliefto which
blameworthiness and other deontological terms of evaluation apply in a primary
way. My checking, or failing to check, on the accuracy of the gossip is
something that is directly, underivatively blameworthy or the reverse. The
propositional attitude that eventuates is blameworthy or the reverse only by
derivation from the voluntary acts that give rise to it. Strictly speaking, in
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 75
thinking ofthe matter in this way we should not think ofthe forming ofthe
propositional attitude itself as required, forbidden, or permitted since it
itself is not under effective voluntary control. Its blameworthiness or
blamelessness stems from the required, forbidden, or permitted voluntary
acts in its causal ancestry. Harking back to the initial list ofcandidate deontological
desiderata, we have now moved from
9. B is held permissibly (one is not subject to blame for doing so).
to
11. The causal ancestry of B does not contain violations of intellectual
obligations.
I will call this kind of impingement of the voluntary on belief indirect voluntary
influence. 12
I will now proceed to put a bit of flesh on the idea of an indirect influence
ofvoluntary actions on propositional attitudes. First, let's note that we
do have voluntary control over many actions that can influence our believings,
rejectings, and withholdings. These can be divided into two groups:
(a) activities that bring influences to bear, or withhold influences from, a
particular candidate, or field ofcandidates, for belief, and (b) activities that
affect our general belief-forming habits or tendencies. There are many
examples of(a). YVith respect to a particular issue, I have voluntary control
over whether and how long I consider the matter, over whether and where
I look for relevant evidence or reasons, reflect on a particular argument,
seek input from other people, search my memory for analogous cases, and
so on. Here we come back to the activities we saw Chisholm wrongly classifying
as the intentional inauguration of an attitude toward a specific
proposition. Group (b) includes such activities as training myself to be
more critical of gossip, instilling in myself a stronger disposition to reflect
carefully before making a judgment on highly controversial matters, talking
myself into being less (more) subservient to authority, and practicing
12 This kind ofrelation ofvoluntary action to beliefis given much less attention in the literature
than the kinds I have judged to lack viability. Nevertheless, as an important aspect of
cognitive endeavors, it deserves more attention than it receives. I should also mention that in
Alston I988a I argue that a concept of epistemic justification based on this kind of voluntary
influence on belief is not adequate, not because there is no such influence but rather because
it is not closely enough related to the goal of true belief. Though I am not concerned here
with how to construe epistemic justification, I will make a similar point about treating I I as
an epistemic desideratum.
76 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
greater sensitivity to the condition of other people. It is within my power
to do things like this or not, and when I do them with sufficient assiduity I
make some difference to my propositional attitude tendencies, and thus
indirectly to the formation ofsuch attitudes.
There would be no harm in including in (a) attempts to bring about a
particular attitude to a specific proposition. For these too would be things
that influence our propositional attitudes and over which we have voluntary
control. The point ofstressing other things is that since the earlier discussion
provided reason for thinking such attempts are rarely successful, I
want here to emphasize the point that even ifwe are never successful in voluntarily
bringing about a beliefthat p, there are still many things we can do
voluntarily that do have a bearing on what propositional attitudes are
engendered. .
The next question is whether the deontological triad ofconcepts applies
to activities like those canvassed in the next-to-last paragraph. Is it ever the
case that we ought or ought not to engage in an activity of these sorts, such
as searching for new evidence or critically examining the credentials ofgossip?
Is it ever the case that we ought or ought not to strive to make ourselves
more (less) sensitive to contrary evidence? Deontologists typically
hold that we have intellectual obligations in such matters, obligations
rooted in our basic intellectual obligation to seek the true and avoid the
false in belief. I accept this view, which seems eminently plausible.
Thus it will sometimes be the case when I believe that p that I would not
have done so had I done various things in the past that I could and should
have done but failed to do, and it will sometimes be the case that I would
not have believed that p had I not done various things in the past that I
could and should not have done but did. In either of these cases there is a
failure of obligations in the causal ancestry of the belief that renders me
blameworthy for having the belief. And if neither ofthese is the case, then
I am blameless, not properly held to blame for the belief. (All this applies
equally to rejectings and withholdings). Hence the indirect voluntary influence
on the formation of propositional attitudes does have an evaluative
bearing on those attitudes, either positive or negative.
I must pause to refine the above formulation. There are certain ways in
which dereliction of intellectual duty can contribute to belief formation
without rendering S blameworthy for forming that belief. Suppose that I
fail to carry out an obligation to spend a certain period in training myself
to look for counterevidence. I use tl1c time thus freed up to take a walk
around the neighborhood. In the course of doing so I see two dogs fighting,
thereby acquiring the belief that they are fighting. There was a relevant
intellectual obligation I didn't fulfill, which is such that ifi had fulfilled
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 77
it I wouldn't have acquired that belief. But if that is a perfectly normal perceptual
belief, I am obviously not to blame for having formed it.13
Here the dereliction of duty contributed to belief formation simply by
facilitating access to data. That is not the kind of contribution we had in
mind in the above formulations. The sorts of cases we had in mind were
those most directly suggested by the two sorts of voluntary activities that
affect beliefformation: (a) those that involve looking for considerations relevant
to the beliefin question, or not doing so, and (b) those that affect our
general belief-forming habits or tendencies. By revising I I so as to make
this explicit, we can avoid counterexamples like the above.
llA. S is intellectually to blame for believing that p ijfif S had fulfilled all
her intellectual obligations, then S's access to relevant considerations,
or S's belief-forming habits or tendencies, would have changed in such
a way that S would not have believed that p.14
It follows from the above that I IA is a genuine intellectual desideratum,
a desirable feature of belief outputs of cognition. And it also follows from
the above discussion that, unlike 9, I IA does not fail to qualify as an epistemic
desideratum because it is not a real possibility for human beings. But
though it is a cognitive desideratum, it will still not be an epistemic desideratum
ifit is not connected in the right way with the truth goal. And how do
we determine whether it is? Since we have identified three groups of cognitive
desiderata that are, in their several ways, related to the truth goal so
as to qualify as epistemic desiderata, an obvious way to proceed is to consider
whether I I is related to the truth goal in one of those ways.
I think we can straightaway eliminate the Group III and the Group V
ways from consideration. As for III, it is obvious that where there are no
violations ofintellectual obligations in the ancestry ofa considerable number
of S's beliefs, this in no way provides S with resources for determining
under what conditions a belief is likely to be true and thereby putting S in
a good position to restrict belief formation to true beliefs, in the way
higher-level epistemic knowledge or the capacity for such does. Nor does
IrA presuppose such a capacity as 8 does. As for Group V, although it could
13 I am indebted to Emily Robertson for calling this problem to my attention.
14 Another fine-tuning point has to do with the "absoluteness" of the counterfactual
involved. Desideratum I IA says S would not have believed that p under these conditions. But
perhaps S is also blameworthy for believing that p even if it is only much less likely that S
would have believed that p under these conditions. I am inclined to accept this weaker interpretation,
but I will not press the matter here since I will go on to reject I I as an epistemic
desideratum anyway.
78 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
be argued that fulfillment ofintellectual obligations has an intrinsic cognitive
value that is independent of truth, as I 2-I 5 do, that value is in no way
dependent on being associated with a preponderance of true beliefs, as is
the case with the Group V desiderata. Even ifS's beliefs are preponderantly
false, it is a good thing for S to fulfill her intellectual obligations, insofar as
this is possible in the face of something less than an outstanding record of
achieving the truth.
So this leaves us with Group II, the directly truth-conducive desiderata.
Though I will argue that I IA is not related to the truth goal in this way
either, I do not think that this is obvious on the face ofit, as is the case with
the Group III and Group V desiderata. Hence this suggestion deserves
more serious consideration. It is prima facie conceivable that being formed
in a way that does not depend on violations ofintellectual obligations should
be a way of rendering a beliefprobably true. Nevertheless, there are many
counterexamples to such a claim, some ofwhich I shall now make explicit.
Before we embark on this, something needs to be said about what would
constitute failure to fulfill an intellectual obligation. What makes this difficult
is that attempts to conform to an obligation might or might not be
successful, and where they are not they might be more or less close to
achieving it. On a sufficiently rigorous interpretation we are almost always
failing in some intellectual obligation or other. This in turn depends on just
how it is specified what one is intellectually obliged to do. Consider the
obligation to look for relevant considerations pro and con when it is not
clear whether the proposition in question in true. How long and how assiduously
does one have to look to fulfill the obligation? To require that every
conceivably relevant consideration must be taken into account would be a
counsel ofperfection that is beyond any ofour powers, not to mention the
fact that we couldn't know whether that limit had been reached. It seems
that to make the notion of fulfilling intellectual obligations usable we have
to build in a limitation to what could reasonably be expected of a subject,
and that is itselfis a very imprecise notion and one that is subject to varying
interpretations. Moreover, there is the point that what could be reasonably
expected along this line will vary for different people in accordance
with their abilities, experience, education, propensities, and so on. So the
question whether a given subject has done as much as could be expected of
him or her is beset with uncertainties, imprecision, and disagreements.
Keeping all this in mind, let's do the best we can by proceeding on the
basis ofsome sense ofwhat could be expected ofa given subject and on the
basis ofsome plausible construal ofthe content ofintellectual obligations. I
now want to suggest that there are very many sorts of cases in which one
does as much as could be reasonably expected ofone in the way ofvoluntary
DEONTOLOGICAL DESIDERATA 79
acts leading up to a given belief without the beliefs thereby acquiring any
considerable likelihood oftruth.
First, there are cases of cognitive deficiency. Consider one who forms
the beliefthat socialism is contrary to Christianity for the reasons that are
often given for this view by the Christian Right, and is intellectually incapable
offiguring out how bad these reasons are, cases that I fear are all too
common. Such a person may have done as well as could be expected ofhim
in coming to this belief, but that fact does nothing to make the belieflikely
to be true. (Thoroughly bad reasons are not truth-conducive). Or consider
a college student who doesn't have what it takes to follow abstract philosophical
exposition or reasoning. Having read parts of Bk. IV of Locke's
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, he takes it that Locke's view is that
everything is a matter of opinion. He is simply incapable of distinguishing
between that view and Locke's view that one's knowledge is restricted to
one's own ideas. There is nothing he could do that would lead him to
appreciate the difference. Hence he cannot be blamed for interpreting
Locke as he does; he is doing the best he can to fulfill his intellectual obligations.
But his belief about Locke's view is outrageously ill-grounded,
based as it is on his dim-witted impression of Bk. IV ofthe Essay.
Second, consider the innumerable beliefs each ofus forms on testimony
or authority. Practically everything we believe about science, history, geography,
and current affairs is taken on authority. Ideally, we would check out
each source to make sure that it is reliable before accepting the testimony.
But who has time for that? We can do it in special cases where the matter
is ofspecial importance, but it is not a real option for such beliefs generally.
If we tried to do so, our doxastic structure would be so impoverished that
we would not be able to function in society. Moreover, even ifwe had time
to check up on each authority, in most cases we lack the resources for making
an informed judgment. Thus in most cases in which I uncritically
accept testimony I have done as much as could reasonably be expected of
me. Now consider those cases in which the authority is incompetent or the
witness is unreliable. There we are forming a beliefon an objectively unreliable
basis and hence the beliefis not probably true, even though no dereliction
ofintellectual duty is in the background.
Next consider irresistible beliefs and belieftendencies. Ifit is impossible
for me to alter a certain belief or belieftendency, I can hardly be expected
to do so. But some irresistible beliefs are formed in an unreliable fashion in
such a way as not to make them likely to be true. The most obvious examples
concern strong emotional attachments that are unshakable. For many
people their religious or irreligious beliefs have this status, as do beliefs
concerning one's country, one's close relations, or one's political party. Such
80 THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH
beliefs are often not formed in a truth-conducive way that would render
them likely to be true. But S cannot be blamed for doing or having something
she can't help doing or having. Here too the believing's not depending
on any violation of intellectual obligations is no (even fallible)
guarantee of the belief's likelihood of being true.
Ofcourse, showing that r rA is not related to the truth goal in any ofthe
ways the desiderata already approved as epistemic are is not a proof that it
is not an epistemic desideratum. Perhaps it is related to the truth goal in
some other way that qualifies it as epistemically desirable. That is an
abstract possibility. Why shouldn't there be a fourth way, as different from
the first three as they are from each other? But I must confess that I have
found no fourth way. And until I do, I must rest with the conclusion that
I rJ\ does not qualify as an epistemic desideratum.
Thus none ofthe deontological candidates makes the grade. The first three
(alternative versions of 9) fail through the failure of the version of voluntary
control of beliefpresupposed by each to be a real possibility for human
beings. And the last (r rA) fails through not being connected with the truth
goal in the right kind ofway. Thus they will receive no further attention in
the development of the ED approach to the epistemology of belief.