Branch Van Pelt Lending https://rapid2.library xolostate.edu/Ill/ViewQueue.aspx?ViewType=P. Ariel IP: 129.82.31.248 CALL #: B21 .P53 LOCATION: PAU :: Van Pelt:: Van Pelt 1 TYPE: Article CC:CCL JOURNAL TITLE: Philosophical studies USER JOURNAL TITLE: Philosophical studies PAU CATALOG TITLE: Philosophical studies. ARTICLE TITLE: THE CONCEPT OF LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS ARTICLE AUTHOR: ROSENBERG, JAY VOLUME: ISSUE: MONTH: YEAR: 1976 PAGES: 171-184 ISSN: 0031-8116 OCLC#: CROSS REFERENCE ID: 250402 VERIFIED: BORROWER: COF :: Morgan Library PATRON: Losonsky,Michael PATRON ID: - PATRON ADDRESS: - PATRON PHONE: - PATRON FAX: - PATRON E-MAIL: losonsky@lamar.colostate.edu PATRON DEPT: - PATRON STATUS: Faculty PATRON NOTES: * m m«hi ■ ■■■■] This material may be protected by copyright law (Title 17 U.S. Code) System Date/Time: 8/17/2007 2:25:02 PM MST lof4 8/17/2007 4:25 PM 129.82.31.248 -1292292 sfismuM* HES A. McGILVRAY JAY F. ROSENBERG ! NOTES fjsive tensed sentences involve a reference to the time of tat referring to times in this sense is not like referring to Iscriptions. I would argue that even dates do not refer in y refer - and sentences do not even need to have dates |t Irrelevant uses: the historical narrative, which is not ch, and the intentional. The latter permits the speaker ibedded clause's 'state of affairs') is relatively certain: Ig Bambi tomorrow, but Supergirl will come to the with most 'reduced future' uses, such as the illustra-esident next year". Time') argues in a different context for a view similar cheerfully allow reference to events, including speech- bait's views on time in his Examination ofMcTaggart's pecially pp. 277-281. Since McTaggart's version of ice is introduced only to show how absurd it really is, ts the notion of becoming as qualitative change, low for this suggestion. ie', pp. 204ff. sibilia for this and similar purposes form a large and henbach, Whitrow, McCall, Rankin, Thomason, and )se who do not actually want to give an account of wssibilia, including possible worlds, to analyze tempo- BIBLIOGRAPHY ion of McTaggart's Philosophy, Cambridge, University ut Time', Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. LI bf Time', In Freeman and Sellars, (eds.), Basic Issues in [5,1971. lical Modalities', In Freeman and Sellars, op. cit. iw', Unpublished ms. The Nature of Existence, Cambridge, University Press, The Unreality of Time', Mind XVII (1908). a Revision of Reichenbach's Indetermimstic Distinc- 967. of Time, Berkeley, U.C. Press, 1956. "ime', Monist XXV (1915). ilewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1963. t Tune and Truth-Value Caps', Theoria, 1970. ity, New York, macmillan, 1929. >sophy of Time, London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, THE CONCEPT OF LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS (Received 18 August, 1975) in a certain very fundamental sort of case, a speaker of a language takes note of some item in the world or of some feature of an item in the world. Confronted by some item or feature of the world, he says in words what it is, that is, he uses a kind-term (common noun) or qualitative (adjectival) predicate to classify or describe the item or feature which he confronts. Thinking of such an occasion of use of a kind-term or qualitative predicate by a speaker as a linguistic response elicited by a non-linguistic stimulus, I shall speak of a responsive using of a general term.1 A responsive using of a term is one very elementary sort — perhaps the most elementary sort - of application of descriptive or classificatory language to the world. Like any such application, a responsive using admits of evaluation. It can be either correct or incorrect. I want to investigate in what the correctness or incorrectness of a responsive using consists. I take this to be the main theme of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, the skeleton upon which all else in that inexhaustible book is hung, although it is not an exegetical thesis which I wish to establish here. While the proper method in philosophy may, in the end, be to advance no theses, I believe that the Philosophical Investigations embodies a thesis concerning the correctness of a descriptive application of language - a thesis which is central, radical, and arguably right. It is that thesis which I hope in this essay to articulate and secure. Like my thesis, both my strategy and my arguments will be drawn from Wittgenstein. In that sense, then, this essay contains nothing new. Yet when, after several years, I finally succeeded in rethinking what Wittgenstein had thought through for us, when I was finally able to appreciate and assimilate what the Philosophical Investigations has to tell us about linguistic correctness, I was vastly surprised by it. Nor could I recall having encountered an effective formulation of the point in what is by now a vast secondary literature. And so I resolved to try my hand at it. Perhaps, then - if I am right and if I am successful — this essay can, in another sense, contain Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) 171-184. All Rights Reserved Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland sUMaaHM tSUHHHÉBÉ 172 JAY F.ROSENBERG LINGUISTIC CORRECT something new - a new understanding of a thesis and an argument which, as I sadly know from my own experience, can be encountered a dozen times without being understood. In contrast to that of the Philosophical Investigations, my own approach will be systematic, the tracing of one reasonably well-marked path — by no means the only one — across the philosophical terrain which Wittgenstein traverses and retraverses. In the process, I shall continually be stumbling across the signposts which he set for us. But since I am following a marked trail to high ground, where Wittgenstein was a nomadic explorer, I shall not encounter them in the order in which he set them. Since exegesis must be responsible to structure as well as content, if I were doing exegesis, this fact would be troublesome. So it is important to stress again that it is not an exegetical thesis which I shall attempt to establish. I shall begin with a single responsive using of a general term T, by a linguistic solipsist — an individual who, de facto or de jure, is linguistically isolated, insulated from the possibility of establishing a consiUence or lack of consilience of his responsive usings with those of others. I shall first argue that no distinction between a correct and an incorrect responsive using can be drawn for this setting. Then, by systematically enriching this initial setting, I shall attempt to ascertain at what point such a distinction can be well-founded. In this way, if successful, we can isolate the locus of the concept of correctness of linguistic application, determine in what such correctness consists. Suppose, then, that, confronted with an item in the world, our speaker, S, responsively utters "T. Have we here the makings of a well-founded judgment of correctness? A natural reply is that we do not, but that this is only because I have failed to tell enough of the story. The correctness of a responsive using, it may be proposed, consists in its fitting the facts, and what I have neglected to specify in my stage-setting is whether the item which S confronts is or is not, in fact, a T (or a T item). The item is correctly called a T if and only if it is a T. Correctness, on this view, consists in a synchronic correspondence of the utterance to the world. But if we were to grant this point, would it offer any real advance on our original question? In what does the item's being or not being a T consist? The world, after all, does not come labeled. (And even if, per impossible, it did, we should still have to ask whether it is labeled correctly.) We must not forget how impoverished this initial setting is. We are inclined imaginatively to substitute for the dummy vocable T some i language — a term which designates some kind < - and then straightaway to conclude that S's res if what he confronts and linguistically responds having that feature). But we and our shared language are not yei distinction between a correct and an incorrect re funded, if at all, wholly from elements containe distinction between the confronted item's being be funded, if at all, wholly from such elements. F distinctions but only one. There is a difference 1 not being a T if and only if there is a difference being correctly responsively used in that setting of these putatively two distinctions will ground be the ground of the other. Our setting, indeed, is even more radically in-far recognized. We do not yet have sufficient da term designating a kind of item or feature of iter supplied by way of a setting, "T from the lips o than is a shriek or a sigh or a sob. All we are entii is an audible response elicited from S by the cc response as linguistic and the utterance as the i stack the cards in a way which precludes the po we have set out to discover, for a term precisely ii correct and incorrect application, the presupposit: to isolate. Given only a single utterance by a spea yet anything to distinguish a term which is -applied by him from a cry which is wrung from 1 we intelligibly think of there being a fact which in that case can we suppose that there is a kind oi of the confronted item in that kind serves as correctness. Items which evoke a shriek or a speaker do not - except perhaps accidentally -sighs, and sobs are not, even in some attenuated (Cf. #199-#202) We need, then, to enrich the original setting, what direction such an enrichment must take, 1 j ŕ F. ROSENBERG itanding of a thesis and an argument which, as I xperience, can be encountered a dozen times Philosophical Investigations, my own approach ; of one reasonably well-marked path — by no i the philosophical terrain which Wittgenstein the process, I shall continually be stumbling set for us. But since I am following a marked ittgenstein was a nomadic explorer, I shall not in which he set them. Since exegesis must be U as content, if I were doing exegesis, this fact j is important to stress again that it is not an ittempt to establish. í responsive using of a general term T, by a idual who, de facto or de jure, is linguistically Dssibility of establishing a consilience or lack of usings with those of others. I shall first argue correct and an incorrect responsive using can be by systematically enriching this initial setting, I : what point such a distinction can be well-issful, we can isolate the locus of the concept of »lication, determine in what such correctness jnted with an item in the world, our speaker, S, ve here the makings of a well-founded judgment :ply is that we do not, but that this is only 1 enough of the story. The correctness of a >posed, consists in its fitting the facts, and what i my stage-setting is whether the item which S . a T (or a T item). The item is correctly called a rectness, on this view, consists in a synchronic ce to the world. is point, would it offer any real advance on our oes the item's being or not being a T consist? come labeled. (And even if, per impossible, it sk whether it is labeled correctly.) We must not initial setting is. We are inclined imaginatively LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 173 to substitute for the dummy vocable T some familiar term of our everyday language - a term which designates some kind of thing (or feature of things) - and then straightaway to conclude that S's responsive using of'T' is correct if what he confronts and linguistically responds to is a thing of that kind (or having that feature). But we and our shared language are not yet in this picture. Just as the distinction between a correct and an incorrect responsive using of T' must be funded, if at all, wholly from elements contained in the initial setting, so the distinction between the confronted item's being and not being a T must also be funded, if at all, wholly from such elements. For these, in fact, are not two distinctions but only one. There is a difference between the item's being and not being a T if and only if there is a difference between 'T's being and not being correctly responsively used in that setting by S. Whatever grounds one of these putatively two distinctions will ground the other, and so neither can be the ground of the other. Our setting, indeed, is even more radically impoverished than we have so far recognized. We do not yet have sufficient data to determine that T is a term designating a kind of item or feature of items at all. For all I have so far supplied by way of a setting, T from the lips of S might no more be a term than is a shriek or a sigh or a sob. All we are entitled so far to posit is that'T' is an audible response elicited from S by the confronted item. To class the response as linguistic and the utterance as the using of a term is already to stack the cards in a way which precludes the possibility of discovering what we have set out to discover, for a term precisely is something which admits of correct and incorrect application, the presuppositions of which we are seeking to isolate. Given only a single utterance by a speaker in isolation, we have not yet anything to distinguish a term which is — correctly or incorrectly -applied by him from a cry which is wrung from him. Only if'T' is a term can we intelligibly think of there being a fact which it may fit or fail to fit. Only in that case can we suppose that there is a kind of item such that membership of the confronted item in that kind serves as a determinant of linguistic correctness. Items which evoke a shriek or a sigh or a sob from a given speaker do not - except perhaps accidentally — form a kind. And shrieks, sighs, and sobs are not, even in some attenuated sense, correct or incorrect. (Cf. #199-#202) We need, then, to enrich the original setting, and we can perhaps discern what direction such an enrichment must take, for we can immediately see 174 JAY F.ROSENBERG LINGUISTIC CORRECTNI that S's diachronic behavior with regard to utterance of "T is crucial. At a minimum, there must exist a practice of responsively uttering 'T' - when confronting things of some one kind (or having some one feature) - of which S's utterance in our original setting is a manifestation. Could S, linguistically isolated, establish such a practice? Let us have him try. Let us have S decide what kind of thing is to be called by the term T. (For there is no-one else yet in the setting to decide it.) On this view, S's utterances of "T can be divided into two groups. Utterances in the first group found a practice. They express decisions, resolves - arbitrary or stipulative definitions - and cannot sensibly be thought of as correct or incorrect. Utterances in the second group, in contrast, continue the practice. They are all subsequent to the utterances constituting the first group and, unlike their predecessors, admit of linguistic assessment. They are correct if they are consistent manifestations of the founded practice; incorrect if inconsistent with it. Where our first proposal held correctness to be constituted by synchronic correspondence with the world, on this view correctness lies in the diachronic consistency of a responsive practice. This is precisely the setting of Wittgenstein's 'Diarist' (#258) and a generalized form of the thesis against which the notorious Private Language Argument is directed. Now what does it mean to speak of S's practice with regard to utterance of "T as being or not being consistent? Consider an utterance drawn from the second group. The natural suggestion is that such an utterance is a consistent manifestation of a practice if and only if it is, on that occasion, uttered in response to a confronted item which is of the same kind as was confronted in the utterances of the first group. Now in one sense this is plainly right. A single term is correctly responsively used in application to two confronted items if and only if the two items are correctly classifiable as of the same kind. That is, the judment that each of two items is (a) T will be correct in all and only those instances in which a judgment that the two items are (of) the same (kind) would be correct. But this only tells us of a pair of judgments that they are correct or incorrect together. What it does not tell us is in what the correctness of either judgment consists. This is the point of #350-1. Given that it is five o' clock here, the judgment that it is five o' clock on the surface of the sun will be conect just in case the judgment that it is the same time on the surface of the sun as it is here is correct. Those two judgments are correct or incorrect together, but we do not yet understand whether or how we can intelligibly speak of either zs correct or incorrect. It follows from these considei explicate consistency of practice in terms of sai advance at all on our original question. We may come at the same point differently distinguish the case in which an item confronted c is of the same kind as one confronted in the fin which it merely, incorrectly, seems to S to be o asking "How are we to distinguish..." I have air« possible confusion, for. we are not yet in the pic distinction between two confronted items' actual seeming to S to be of the same kind, where that di wholly in terms of those elements which we have i of our (diachronically elaborated) setting for a utterance of'T' by S. And we are not among those i way to frame the question, then, is this: Could S, which we have imputed to him in our stage-setting, and non-arbitrary conclusion that one or more c misapplication? Could S have a use for a distinc actually being of the same kind as an item prev merely seeming to him to be of the same kind? Well, why not? Why couldn't S at some time i still later, remember that, on that occasion, the item was not, in fact, of the same kind as those conf occasions? This proposal demands several responses. The fir itself falls within the scope of the concept of corn consonance of S's present inclination to apply < present ostensible memory of first-group items correctness or incorrectness of usings of *T\ What: the ostensible memory itself be correct. (Cf. #265) But why, it may well be replied, should then about memory in this case? Surely S's memory ( more suspect than his memory in general, which suppose that it is - excellent and reliable. This r response: The difficulty is not that there is no way gotten it right. The difficulty is that we have n "getting it right". MiiiaatiHaaMMim ijVY F. ROSENBERG I with regard to utterance of "T is crucial. At a [ja practice of responsively uttering "ľ — when ine kind (or having some one feature) - of which setting is a manifestation. Could S, linguistically tice? Let us have him try. it kind of thing is to be called by the term T. t in the setting to decide it.) On this view, S's ied into two groups. Utterances in the first group fess decisions, resolves — arbitrary or stipulative bnsibly be thought of as correct or incorrect. HP, in contrast, continue the practice. They are ices constituting the first group and, unlike their fistic assessment. They are correct if they are the founded practice; incorrect if inconsistent roposal held correctness to be constituted by ith the world, on this view correctness lies in the sponsive practice. This is precisely the setting of B) and a generalized form of the thesis against .anguage Argument is directed, speak of S's practice with regard to utterance of ksistent? Consider an utterance drawn from the iggestion is that such an utterance is a consistent if and only if it is, on that occasion, uttered in n which is of the same kind as was confronted in up. plainly right. A single term is correctly respon- wo confronted items if and only if the two items f the same kind. That is, the judment that each correct in all and only those instances in which a are (of) the same (kind) would be correct. But f judgments that they are correct or incorrect 1 us is in what the correctness of either judgment I #350-1. Given that it is five o' clock here, the jck on the surface of the sun will be correct just is the same time on the surface of the sun as it is Igments are correct or incorrect together, but we hex or how we can intelligibly speak of either as LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 175 correct or incorrect. It follows from these considerations that our attempt to explicate consistency of practice in terms of sameness of kind offers no advance at all on our original question. We may come at the same point differently by asking how we are to distinguish the case in which an item confronted on a second-group occasion is of the same kind as one confronted in the first group from the case in which it merely, incorrectly, seems to S to be of the same kind. Now in asking "How are we to distinguish..." I have already sown the seeds of a possible confusion, for. we are not yet in the picture. What is wanted is a distinction between two confronted items' actually being and their merely seeming to S to be of the same kind, where that distinction is to be specified wholly in terms of those elements which we have supplied in the description of our (diachronically elaborated) setting for a second-group responsive utterance of'T* by S. And we are not among those elements. A more accurate way to frame the question, then, is this: Could S, given only those resources which we have imputed to him in our stage-setting, arrive at the well-founded and non-arbitrary conclusion that one or more of his usings of 'T' was a misapplication? Could S have a use for a distinction between something's actually being of the same kind as an item previously confronted and its merely seeming to him to be of the same kind? Well, why not? Why couldn't S at some time responsively utter "F and, still later, remember that, on that occasion, the item which he had confronted was not, in fact, of the same kind as those confronted on the first-group occasions? This proposal demands several responses. The first of these is that memory itself falls within the scope of the concept of correctness. Consequently, the consonance of S's present inclination to apply or withhold 'T* with his present ostensible memory of first-group items is not decisive for the correctness or incorrectness of usings of "F. What is further necessary is that the ostensible memory itself be correct. (Cf. #265) But why, it may well be replied, should there be any special problem about memory in this case? Surely S's memory of first-group items is no more suspect than his memory in general, which may be —. indeed, let us suppose that it is - excellent and reliable. This reply leads to our second response: The difficulty is not that there is no way for S to know that he has gotten it right. The difficulty is that we have not yet got any sense for "getting it right". ilAY F. ROSENBERG s that S could at a later time remember that, in tem eliciting 'T was not of the same kind as the proposal only makes sense if there is already — in between actually being and merely seeming to be [citing items confronted by S. But that is precisely »peal to S's memory was to supply for us. int, for it is a subtle one. We originally appealed to stinction between an item's actually being and its b to S to be of the same kind as one previously ive note that an ostensible memory at some time th an inclination to apply or withhold T for an ie. Prima facie, there are five possibilities: kd the inclination cohere and both are correct, id the inclination cohere and neither is correct, id the inclination conflict. The memory is correct I ion incorrect. and the inclination conflict. The inclination is memory incorrect, id the inclination conflict and neither is correct. i that the resources available in our setting are ie distinction between nd the inclination cohere. Ind the inclination conflict. that we nevertheless envision the fivefold set of ostensible memory to be decisive, that we legislate 12) and for (Fl) in preference to (F2) or (F3). And (f we do this, we successfully reduce an envisioned s to the twofold distinction which our descriptive )ws us. But this is a fraudulent victory, for it buys i* and 'incorrectness' for a present responsive using Directness and incorrectness of a present ostensible we rule that none of S's ostensible memories can tever is going to seem right to me is right", #258) LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 177 We could, of course, so rule - although we have come a fair distance from hypothesizing that S's memory is generally excellent and reliable. But, equally obviously, we could alternatively rule that the current responsive inclination was always to dominate, mapping (C) and (F) onto (CI) and (F2) of our envisioned fivefold possibilities, rather than onto (CI) and (Fl). The point is that there is nothing left in our descriptive stage-setting upon which to base a choice between these rulings. What we, in fact, need for the concept of correctness to be well-founded is that there not be scope here for a ruling at all. That is, where responsive inclinations and ostensible memory conflict, it should be able to turn out sometimes that the inclination is correct and the memory faulty, and sometimes conversely. The epistemology of correctness is one of discovery, not one of legislation. But when S has discovered a coherence or a failure of coherence between inclination and memory, there is nothing left for him to discover — and in our present impoverished setting, S is alone. Thinking of S's responsive utterances of "F as forming a sequence in time, we proposed to ground the correctness of some one of them in the diachronic consistency of the sequence to which it belongs. But with what is the sequence to be consistent? It is, of course, consistent with itself - but any sequence of responsive usings satisfies this condition, and so that cannot serve as the locus of a distinction between correctness and incorrectness. Our natural impulse is to insist that the sequence be consistent with the world, the sequence of natural items which evoke S's responsive utterings of'T'. But to surrender to this impulse is to mislocate the relation between S's utterances and the world. The sequence of utterances just is the total outcome of the interactions between S and those items in the world, whatever the items may be or be like. The world is what elicits S's responsive utterances and ostensible memories. They are responses to the world and so cannot be measured against it. It is not an object of comparison. We may better appreciate this point if we consider the case in which S, hawing established in the past a practice of responsively uttering 'T' when ji confronted with certain items and now confronting yet another item, is called li upon to extend his diachronic linguistic practice consistently. Could he possibly fail to do so? Well, S must choose either to apply or to withhold T lor this new item. Now he may find himself inclined to apply "F to the new Item or inclined not to apply it. And he may find himself inclined to judge that this new item is relevantly like (similar to, of the same kind as) the mjjammĚ 178 JAY F.ROSENBERG item(s) he ostensibly remembers confronting on the occasion(s) of founding his practice or inclined to the opposite judgment. If these inclinations coincide, then S will utter or withhold 'T with no feeling of dissonance. Is this extension of his practice consistent or inconsistent with his earlier practice? Well, to what are we to appeal to answer that question? We would like to appeal to the items previously and presently confronted by S, but how are we to appeal to them? What have they to do with the question of consistency? It is helpful to think of us, in this connection, as 'ideal observers' lacking the term "T in our language. In the envisioned case, S clearly judges his most recent utterance (or withholding) to be a consistent extension of his past practice. (That is, S feels no dissonance.) Now we could, in principle, arrive at the opposite conclusion from our ideal standpoint, but only if we could know what "T means, that is, to what kind ofthing 'T' properly applies. But, since "ľ is not a term of our language, we could only come to know what T means from what we observe of S's responsive practices, for, since S is, ex hypothesi, a linguistic solipsist, what "ľ means just is what S means by T and there is no access to that apart from our observations of his practice. But it follows from this that in no case could our judgment of consistency or inconsistency well-foundedly diverge from S's own. We may, of course, scrutinize the confronted item if we like - but that could not help us to overrule S here. We know everything relevant about the item when we know that it evokes without dissonance the response "ľ from S. There is no way of bringing our further observations of the specific empirical character of the item(s) to bear on the question of S's responsive consistency. (Cf. #293 - the 'Beetle in the Box'.) To drive the point home, consider the case in which S's two judgmental inclinations fail to coincide. This is precisely the conflict between responsive inclination and ostensible memory sketched above. What is needed is some higher court to which such a dispute may be referred for adjudication. Now the only possible court of appeals which remains in our deliberately impoverished setting is the world itself, the items previously and presently confronted by S. There is no way, however, in which the world can serve this adjudicatory function, for the dispute is one which breaks out only when S has already finished his business with the world. The world acts and it has acted upon him, and he finds himself in consequence with a certain present LINGUISTIC CORRECT responsive inclination and certain ostensible m which conflict. There is no way, then, in which S's extensior consistent with the world. The only possibli synchronic, in the relation between S's present o present ostensible memories, and to such i irrelevant. The sequence of S's responsive utterings of'T neither with itself nor with the world. But there with which it might be consistent or inconsi consistency at all. Now our second proposal w responsive using of T" consisted in its being diachronic sequence of such usings. But now we sequence is consistent - or, more precisely, t consistent and inconsistent sequences is yet possi do not yet have a distinction between correct an have not yet, in other words, found the locus correctness.2 What we need to add to our stage-setting, ther to measure the consistency of S's responsive pra his usings as being or not being idiosyncratic, standard to which the question of the consistei practice could, in principle, be referred. The wor but it is impotent to serve this function. So we ha is time to put us (or, at least, to put others) into tl It is the mutually consistent responsive prací some) linguistic community which supply the rec against which an individual's practice could be practice may be consistent or inconsistent with ou Wittgenstein's discussions of the practice sequences (#143ff.; #185ff.) are particularly app train a novice that his practice in such matter cannot. Here there is no suggestion of an extra-p student's moves correspond or fail to correspi introduce such a notion is demonstrably idle. Foi of such a putative extra-practical correspondeni attainable consilience of the practices of diverse in HMfikMaMN MNMÜMHi lY F. ROSENBERG >ers confronting on the occasion(s) of founding the opposite judgment. If these inclinations i withhold T with no feeling of dissonance. Is ice consistent or inconsistent with his earlier ve to appeal to answer that question? We would sviously and presently confronted by S, but how What have they to do with the question of js, in this connection, as 'ideal observers' lacking In the envisioned case, S clearly judges his most jlding) to be a consistent extension of his past pissonance.) Now we could, in principle, arrive at our ideal standpoint, but only if we could know fhat kind of thing T properly applies. But, since iguage, we could only come to know what T re of S's responsive practices, for, since S is, ex ist, what T means just is what S means by 'T' t apart from our observations of his practice. But no case could our judgment of consistency or ' diverge from S's own. We may, of course, fem if we like — but that could not help us to erything relevant about the item when we know íance the response 'T' from S. There is no way of itions of the specific empirical character of the on of S's responsive consistency. (Cf. #293 — the , consider the case in which S's two judgmental This is precisely the conflict between responsive Íemory sketched above. What is needed is some dispute may be referred for adjudication. Now f appeals which remains in our deliberately world itself, the items previously and presently ) way, however, in which the world can serve this I lie dispute is one which breaks out only when S liness with the world. The world acts and it has jps himself in consequence with a certain present LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 179 responsive inclination and certain ostensible memories. But it is just these which conflict. There is no way, then, in which S's extension of his practice can fail to be consistent with the world. The only possible locus of inconsistency is synchronic, in the relation between S's present responsive inclinations and his present ostensible memories, and to such inconsistency the world is irrelevant. The sequence of S's responsive utterings of'T' thus can fail of consistency neither with itself nor with the world. But there is nothing else in our setting with which it might be consistent or inconsistent. So it cannot fail of consistency at all. Now our second proposal was that the correctness of a responsive using of 'T' consisted in its being a member of a consistent diachronic sequence of such usings. But now we see that any such diachronic sequence is consistent - or, more precisely, that no distinction between consistent and inconsistent sequences is yet possible. It follows, then, that we do not yet have a distinction between correct and incorrect usings of'T'. We have not yet, in other words, found the locus of the concept of linguistic correctness.2 What we need to add to our stage-setting, then, is something against which to measure the consistency of S's responsive practice, some way of marking his usings as being or not being idiosyncratic. We need an adjudicatory standard to which the question of the consistency or inconsistency of S's practice could, in principle, be referred. The world is already in the picture, but it is impotent to serve this function. So we have run out of alternatives. It is time to put us (or, at least, to put others) into the picture as well. It is the mutually consistent responsive practices of our (or, at least, of some) linguistic community which supply the requisite object of comparison against which an individual's practice could be measured. His diachronic practice may be consistent or inconsistent with ours (theirs). Wittgenstein's discussions of the practice of continuing numerical sequences (#143ff.; #185ff.) are particularly apposite here. Either we can so train a novice that his practice in such matters coheres with ours or we cannot. Here there is no suggestion of an extra-practical reality to which the student's moves correspond or fail to correspond, and any attempt to introduce such a notion is demonstrably idle. For the only possible measure of such a putative extra-practical correspondence would be precisely the attainable consilience of the practices of diverse individuals. 180 JAY F.ROSENBERG With respect to public responsive language, we quite naturally have the feeling that we are better off. The world, after all, is a tertium quid, and we are inclined to suppose that there is some way of appealing to it which can settle questions of diachronic consistency or synchronic correspondence. But this is an illusion. The mutually consistent shared practices of a linguistic community stand collectively to the world precisely in the relation that our linguistically-isolated speaker's diachronic practice did. As the world was not an object of comparison for him, so it is not one for us. We have no access to the world independent of our collective responsive practices. The only fact of the matter is the attainable consonance of our respective individual practices. We may yearn for some further fact — the correspondence of that collective practice with the extra-practical world - but that notion is again idle. Again, the only possible measure of such a putative extra-practical correspondence would be the attainable consonance of our diverse individual responsive practices. The extra-practical world is implicated, of course, but as what elicits those responses, not as something against which they may be checked. There is no way of confronting the world with the question of a putative extra-practical correspondence. The ostensible question again arises only when our business with the world is finished. The world is what our responses are responses to, and hence not something we can subsequently compare our responses with. A threefold comparison may help us appreciate the point. Wittgenstein envisages (#185-#190) a novice, trained to consonance with our practice in developing the series '+2' (= 2, 4, 6, 8, ...) through 1000, who unexpectedly continues by producing '1004', '1008', '1012', and so on. To our objection "But you were to go on beyond 1000 in the same way", he replies "But I am going on in the same way!" . Now this claim of the novice can be defeated. What is important, however, is that it can be defeated only by a recourse to our shared mathematical practices. "That is not what we call 'going on in the same way'." Nothing is served by recapitulating his previous training — it is what has brought him to this point — and there is no sense to be made of the suggestion that we direct his attention to the numbers themselves. Suppose, now, that our linguistic solipsist, initially confronting some item, attempts to found a responsive practice with the resolve 'This, and similar things (things of the same kind), I shall call T." His later conviction that some newly confronted item is similar to (the same kind of thing as) those LINGUISTIC CORRECT previously confronted items to which he apf mathematic novice, is not defeasible. For, as w< the absence of conflict between his current re current ostensible memories of past confrontati here for ascriptions of correctness or incorrectr his testimony because it is not testimony. It on to say.") In the communal setting, however, we agai defeasibility - and hence for correctness an introduce a novice language-user to our collectivi "This and similar things (things of the same kir innocent later protest, following an idiosyncrati similar to (the same kind of thing as) the origin the reply "That is not what we call 'the same kin A coherent communal practice of responsive instance of a Wittgensteinian 'form of life'. What show is that only in the setting of such a shared distinction between correct and incorrect ling there is general communal agreement in respo those utterances become descriptive application the correct or incorrect usings of terms. #242: If language is to be a means of co agreement not only in definitions sound) in judgments. Surprising as this remark may at first appear, it understatement. For it is not merely for comm judgment (responsive using) is required, but language, of performances non-vacuously assess applications of words to the world and thus linguistic} Represent a single responsive utterance of ar piece of paper; his diachronic responsive practice series of such points. The correctness of the sir consist in its synchronic correspondence with th every such point represents a vocable elicited by further sense in which it may correspond or fail %Y F. ROSENBERG sponsive language, we quite naturally have the f. The world, after all, is a tertium quid, and we | there is some way of appealing to it which can p consistency or synchronic correspondence. But Ijually consistent shared practices of a linguistic i to the world precisely in the relation that our i's diachronic practice did. As the world was not him, so it is not one for us. We have no access to r collective responsive practices. The only fact of consonance of our respective individual practices, her fact - the correspondence of that collective ical world - but that notion is again idle. Again, f such a putative extra-practical correspondence »nsonance of our diverse individual responsive 1 world is implicated, of course, but as what b something against which they may be checked, [ting the world with the question of a putative Ice. The ostensible question again arises only jrorld is finished. The world is what our responses jnot something we can subsequently compare our bay help us appreciate the point. Wittgenstein Vice, trained to consonance with our practice in 2, 4, 6, 8, ...) through 1000, who unexpectedly |4\ '1008', '1012', and so on. To our objection pnd 1000 in the same way", he replies "But I am ice can be defeated. What is important, however, mly by a recourse to our shared mathematical we call 'going on in the same way'." Nothing is jrevious training — it is what has brought him to tense to be made of the suggestion that we direct themselves. iguistic solipsist, initially confronting some item, pive practice with the resolve 'This, and similar \ind), I shall call T." His later conviction that i i's similar to (the same kind of thing as) those LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 181 previously confronted items to which he applied "T, unlike that of our mathematic novice, is not defeasible. For, as we have seen, it expresses only the absence of conflict between his current responsive inclinations and his current ostensible memories of past confrontations. And so there is no scope here for ascriptions of correctness or incorrectness. (#386: "I cannot accept his testimony because it is not testimony. It only tells me what he is inclined to say.") In the communal setting, however, we again have conceptual room for defeasibility - and hence for correctness and incorrectness. For if we introduce a novice language-user to our collective practice with the injunction "This and similar things (things of the same kind) are to be called 'TV, his innocent later protest, following an idiosyncratic application, that the item is similar to (the same kind of thing as) the original may properly be met with the reply "That is not what we call 'the same kind of thing'." A coherent communal practice of responsive language use is one concrete instance of a Wittgensteinian 'form of life'. What the preceding considerations show is that only in the setting of such a shared form of life can there exist a distinction between correct and incorrect linguistic performances. Only if there is general communal agreement in responsive utterance behavior do those utterances become descriptive applications of language to the world, the correct or incorrect usings of terms. #242: If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. Surprising as this remark may at first appear, it turns out, in fact, to be an understatement. For it is not merely for communication that agreement in judgment (responsive using) is required, but for the very existence of language, of performances non-vacuously assessible as correct or incorrect applications of words to the world and thus properly characterizable as linguistic.3 Represent a single responsive utterance of an individual by a point on a piece of paper; his diachronic responsive practice by a curve drawn through a series of such points. The correctness of the single responsive using cannot consist in its synchronic correspondence with the extra-linguistic world, for every such point represents a vocable elicited by the world, and there is no further sense in which it may correspond or fail to correspond to the world 182 JAY F.ROSENBERG LINGUISTIC CORREC which elicits it. Nor can the correctness of such a responsive using consist in its being a manifestation of an individual's consistent responsive practice, for no distinction between consistent and inconsistent practice can be funded for an isolated individual. A smooth curve can be drawn through any series of points. What is required is a basis of comparison internal to this conceptual space, yet external to the individual's practice, against which it can be measured for consistency. What must be added to our picture if such a basis is to be provided is a family of parallel curves, collectively singling out one (complex) direction from among the infinitely many possibilities. And what this represents is exactly the consilient responsive practices (the shared form of life) of a community of language-users. The applicability of the concept of correctness or incorrectness to a single responsive utterance of an individual presupposes the possibility of such a double embedding, temporally in his diachronic practice and communally in the consonance of that practice with the practices of those with whom he shares a linguistic form of life. What is assessible as correct or incorrect is punctiform, synchronic and individual - a single responsive utterance by an individual at a time. But its being so assessible requires its embeddability in a two-dimensional conceptual space, one axis of which is time and the other a linguistic community to which the individual belongs. And in any ascription of correctness the existence of such a conceptual space as a whole is presupposed. The philosophical consequences issuing from recognition of this conceptual connection can hardly be overestimated. Its implications in the philosophy of mind and for traditional questions of skepticism have already been profound. And it is clear, too, that, taken seriously, Wittgenstein's argumentation makes a shambles of classical correspondence theories of matter-of-factual truth. But the resonances of the point reach much farther. What holds for speech holds, mutatis mutandis, for thought. The argument is exactly parallel. If, apart from his membership in a linguistic community, an individual cannot correctly or incorrectly call some confronted item a T, neither, in the absence of such a shared form of life, can he correctly or incorrectly think it to be, believe it to be, judge it to be, or know it to be a T. The existence of the appropriate two-dimensional conceptual space, both diachronic and communal, is presupposed in any act's being properly subject to semantic or epistemic appraisal. If there are, then, entities who are speakers, thinkers, and knowers, there must be a community of such entities sharing, at least, those cognitive aspects of entities. The existence of persons as rational inextricable from their existence as social being This, I think, is the deepest and most I Philosophical Investigations. Its Kantian flavo less than the essential substructure of a concep rational nature to his membership in the Kingdc We can look at the Philosophical Investigati a fundamentally Kantian insight, but one wh Kant. For while Kant realizes and makes fully - the indispensible diachronic embedding - of subject to rational appraisal as correct or inci dimension eludes him. (Peirce, on the other li collectivity of rational enterprises - but he si fact, that the Philosophical Investigations is 1 Kantian eyes, but that is an exegetical thesis, a other occasion. Nevertheless, it should not surj For central to the Investigations is Wittgenste positivism, and positivism, we may recall, symbolic logic". University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill NOTES 1 The reader should resist the temptation to import t "ocular irradiation patterns", "dispositions to assent a negative stimulus meaning". By 'responsive', I mean n On such occasions, what the speaker confronts is cai and any adequate explanatory account of his saying v among other things - what he was encountering at th am perfectly prepared to admit considerations of .set: that the objects of encounter can adequately be descr quasi-neurophysiological idiom. No adequate account can be given in purely Pavlovian or Skinnerian terms. Ii of my present story. 2 It may be helpful to think of my project in this way: of semantic facts: S correctly responsively uses "T, £ divides S's responsive utterances of "T into two groups the non-semantic division to which this semantic divi ***■■ -**r-**>»Pll~» ;\Y F. ROSENBERG í j correctness of such a responsive using consist in (an individual's consistent responsive practice, for tstent and inconsistent practice can be funded for jiooth curve can be drawn through any series of t basis of comparison internal to this conceptual f individual's practice, against which it can be hat must be added to our picture if such a basis is of parallel curves, collectively singling out one nong the infinitely many possibilities. And what s consilient responsive practices (the shared form [nguage-users. concept of correctness or incorrectness to a single ^dividual presupposes the possibility of such a Illy in his diachronic practice and communally in ctice with the practices of those with whom he llife. What is assessible as correct or incorrect is individual - a single responsive utterance by an being so assessible requires its embeddability in a space, one axis of which is time and the other hich the individual belongs. And in any ascription of such a conceptual space as a whole is presup- isequences issuing from recognition of this hardly be overestimated. Its implications in the traditional questions of skepticism have already clear, too, that, taken seriously, Wittgenstein's lambles of classical correspondence theories of the resonances of the point reach much farther. Ids, mutatis mutandis, for thought. The argument from his membership in a linguistic community, tly or incorrectly call some confronted item a T, such a shared form of life, can he correctly or Hew it to be, judge it to be, or know it to be a T. opriate two-dimensional conceptual space, both |is presupposed in any act's being properly subject appraisal. If there are, then, entities who are wers, there must be a community of such entities LINGUISTIC CORRECTNESS 183 sharing, at least, those cognitive aspects of their lives. And we are such entities. The existence of persons as rational beings is thus conceptually inextricable from their existence as social beings. This, I think, is the deepest and most far-reaching resonance of the Philosophical Investigations. Its Kantian flavor is inescapable. It is nothing less than the essential substructure of a conceptual bridge leading from man's rational nature to his membership in the Kingdom of Ends. We can look at the Philosophical Investigations, then, as the expression of a fundamentally Kantian insight, but one which goes importantly beyond Kant. For while Kant realizes and makes fully articulate the temporal aspect - the indispensible diachronic embedding — of objective judgment, judgment subject to rational appraisal as correct or incorrect, its essential communal dimension eludes him. (Peirce, on the other hand, recognizes the necessary collectivity of rational enterprises — but he shortchanges time.) I think, in fact, that the Philosophical Investigations is best read as a whole through Kantian eyes, but that is an exegetical thesis, and so to be pursued on some other occasion. Nevertheless, it should not surprise us too much if it is right. For central to the Investigations is Wittgenstein's repudiation of Tractarian positivism, and positivism, we may recall, is nothing but "Hume plus symbolic logic". University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill NOTES 1 The reader should resist the temptation to import here such Quinean higher arcana as "ocular irradiation patterns", "dispositions to assent and dissent", and "affirmative and negative stimulus meaning". By 'responsive', I mean nothing more mysterious than this: On such occasions, what the speaker confronts is causally implicated in what he says, and any adequate explanatory account of his saying what he does must thus mention -among other things - what he was encountering at the time. Unlike Quine, however, I am perfectly prepared to admit considerations of set as well as setting, nor do I believe that the objects of encounter can adequately be described, or should be, in a sterilized quasi-neurophysiological idiom. No adequate account of human linguistic competences can be given in purely Pavlovian or Skinnerian terms. Indeed, that this is so is a large part of my present story. 1 It may be helpful to think of my project in this way: The well-foundedness of the pair of semantic facts: S correctly responsively uses 'T\ S incorrectly responsively uses "T divides S's responsive utterances of'T* into two groups. What I have been searching for is the non-semantic division to which this semantic division corresponds. So we need an ■MiiattiAiB tmm HUM! mĚĚmĚ 184 JAY F.ROSENBERG DAVID M. ROSENT objective empirical difference between those utterances which are (semantically) correct usings and those which are not. The first proposal - synchronic correspondence -attempted to locate that difference in the relation between S's utterance of T and the confronted item. But all responsive utterances are related to the items which evoke them in the same way - as elicited by those items and responses to them. The second proposal - diachronic consistency - attempted to ground a division of responsive utterances parasitically on a division of sequences of such utterances. But the division of sequences of responsive utterances into consistent and inconsistent sequences is a semantic division, and so we again need an objective empirical, non-semantic, difference between those sequences which are (semantically) consistent sequences and those which are not. The most recent point has been that all sequences of responsive utterances are related to the sequences of items which evoke them in the same way as well. So the picture I have so far sketched does not yet contain enough empirical resources to impose a non-arbitrary non-semantic division on S's responsive utterances. We need to enrich it further. 3 That is to say, such agreement in practice is a necessary condition of the existence of language, of 'T's being a term which admits of correct and incorrect usings. I here advance no hypotheses concerning sufficient conditions, except that pre-language probably grades off into language in such a way that no sufficient conditions of the existence of language can be formulated. POSSIBILITY, EXISTEř AN ONTOLOGICAL AR (Received 18 August, l! In 'Why Is There Something and Not Nothing?' 177-181), Fred Sommers presents an argume something is possible, something is actual" (17 way of reductio ad absurdem from three assui since the definition is not wholly unproblemati an assumption on a par with the other three. Sommers' three assumptions are (Al) "Something is possible" (177). (A2) "Whatever is not a categorially po thing" (ibid.). and (A3) There is nothing. And, taking rD~l to abbreviate a monadic gen contrary, Sommers' fourth assumption, whi< categorial possibility, is (A4) "D-things are categorially impossi nothing that is D and nothing that is Sommers argues that these four, taken togetto (A3) is the most natural premise to reject, an argument as showing that from the assumptio together with the unproblematic (A2) and (A4; (A3), that is, that something exists. Intuitively,: view Sommers' argument as going directly fron denial of (A3): If ZJ-things are possible [(Al); categorially possible; but by (A4), ZMhings a Philosophical Studies 30 (1976) 185-191. All Rights Ji Copyright © 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, L