

methodological issues we face is symptomatic of the present condition in which we find ourselves. It is simply astonishing to discover that an academic discipline, a "science," of religion has little, if any, concern with theory. Perhaps we have been lulled into this slumber because we have become a part of our subject; "we do what we do because in the beginning our ancestors did it that way." If the impasse is of our own making, we can also overcome it. The following chapters are an attempt to describe a way out of theological disguises, the quest for essences, the ideology of neutrality, the bankruptcy of functionalism as a type of causal explanation, and sloppy methodological eclecticism. Please note that I wrote "a way out." There may be other ways that are more adequate -- I have not discovered them.

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NOTES.

1. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harper, 1963) 19.
2. Eliade 20. The passage and its context is taken from Bronislaw Malinowski, *Magic, Science and Religion* (New York: Doubleday, 1954) 101 and 108.
3. See George C. Homans, "Anxiety and Ritual: The Theories of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown," *American Anthropologist* 43 (1941): 164-171, for the argument and references.
4. See Edmund Leach, *Genesis as Myth and Other Essays* (London: Cape, 1969) 85-112, for the argument and references. The argument is continued on in several issues of *Man*.
5. See Bryan R. Wilson, ed., *Rationality* (New York: Blackwell, 1971) chaps. 7 and 12, for the relevant arguments and references, and Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes, eds., *Rationality and Relativism* (Cambridge: MIT P, 1982) 201ff., for Horton's return to the issues.
6. Barry Barnes, "The Comparison of Belief-Systems: Anomaly Versus Falsehood," *Modes of Thought*, eds. Robin Horton and Ruth Finnegan (London: Faber, 1973) 193. Italics mine.
7. Melford E. Spiro, "Causes, Functions and Cross-Cousin Marriage: An Essay in Anthropological Explanation," *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland* 94 (1964): 30-43. Another useful essay which clearly defines the functional explanations is Melford E. Spiro, "Religion: Problems of Definition and Explanation," *Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion*, ed. Michael Banton (London: Tavistock, 1966).
8. Spiro, "Causes..." 34.
9. Carl G. Hempel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis," *Symposium on Sociological Theory*, ed. Llewellyn Gross (New York: Harper, 1959) 271-307. Hempel's essay has been reprinted in many anthologies; it is included in May Brodbeck, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, 1968) and Carl G. Hempel, *Aspects of Scientific Explanation* (New York: Free, Free Press, 1965).
10. For a good example of this response see Robert N. McCauley and E. Thomas Lawson, "Functionalism Reconsidered," *History of Religions* 23 (1984): 372-381. It should be made clear that I do not disagree with them about the validity of functional explanations in biology. In such explanations, natural selection provides the mechanism which becomes the basis for arguing that beneficial consequences explain their own causes. McCauley and Lawson do not provide us with a similar mechanism in their "reconsideration" of functionalism in the social sciences. It is therefore impossible to determine just what their argument is all about. Appeal to biological explanations which do succeed based on the mechanism of natural selection simply begs the question. An excellent description of this mechanism in biology can be found in Ernst Mayr, *The Growth of Biological Thought* (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1982), esp. chaps. 11, 12 and 13. I do not regard Herbert Burhenn's attempted revisions an adequate solution to the problems which beset functionalism. He does not make any attempt at defining