

Intentionality, analyzed completely, would involve an analysis of its threefold complexity as "directed toward something [the ego pole], appearance of something [the subjective pole] and something [the object pole]."32

Husserl makes it clear in his early publications that consciousness as an "intentional act" is one experience or fact. We must never think of intention as bifurcated. That is, analysis of intentional experience is not to be described as presenting two things; an object experienced and, beside it or along with it, an intentional experience, which somehow directs itself to the object. "There are," says Husserl, "no two facts in the sense of a part and a surrounding totality, but only one fact is present, the intentional experience... [and] If this experience is present so is eo ipso, the object 'intentionally presenting.'"33 Husserl, of course, includes objects which do not exist, that are not "real," such as in fantasy and the like. Some of the most fascinating pages in Husserl's writing are those where he is concerned with the intentionality of fantasy, dreams and fiction.

In Ideen I, the two terms which characterize intentionality are noesis and noema. Noesis can be designated as the psychical side of intentionality. It is the experiencing, or "sense-giving," in the act itself.34 Noesis is not to be understood as sensation. It is made explicitly clear in the analysis that I do indeed experience sensations, but I do not perceive them. When I perceive a tree, for example, I do not perceive the sensations, or the HYLE, as Husserl calls it. Sensations are nonintentional. Noesis as "consciousness of something" is not a designation of "psychic complexes," or "streams" of sensations. Noesis as the subject of experiencing the specific act is thoroughly conscious.35

Noema is the "sense" of the object as well as "how" it is given. Noema is not the object itself; it is an ideal sense, or, as Husserl calls it, an "irreal" signification.36 The noesis or noetic aspect of the intentional correlation is a multiplicity of acts. The noematic side is "irreal" because it remains identical as sense. It is the sense of the object as "how" it is given as such. Every judgement, for example, is a judgement about something. Every perception includes that which is perceived and "how" it is perceived, judged or felt. The existence or non-existence of the object does not effect the analysis of intentionality itself. Whether the

object exists or not, is real or "irreal," every intentional process of experience has its intentional object, which means its "objectivating sense."37 The essential rule which must be remembered is that there is "no noetic moment without its specific noematic moment which belongs to it."38 Or, to put it in other words, "no sense without 'something' and no 'something' without the sense, when we say, 'consciousness of something'."39

All the above statements describe what Husserl means by transcendental phenomenology. The generous quotations from Husserl should confirm that, at least for Husserl, phenomenology is not just a method for description, nor is it a neutral method for gaining objectivity. It is neither an idealistic nor a realistic metaphysics but is an attempt to go beyond these traditional philosophical positions and the impasse of the long debate between them. I must add at this point that the argument that Husserl's phenomenology is naive in its proclamation that it is "presuppositionless" is at best misguided. The term appears in the context of the "natural orientation" which, as we have seen, Husserl defines as the uncritical empiricist assumption that there is an objective world in which subjectivity remains anonymous if not non-existent.

Husserl asserts in Ideen I that a phenomenology of natural science, nature and culture should be possible since transcendence as bracketed is not negated. All transcendence, that is to say, all reality including the world, is a correlate of consciousness. We should, then, be able to work out a phenomenology of these realities, he thinks, not just from the side of consciousness but also from their modes, the "how" of their givenness.40 This kind of analysis would follow the bipolar structures of reduction and intentionality as an analysis of noeticnoematic correlations. Seebohm believes this correlation is a new way of stating that "a world without ego, but also, an ego without world, is unthinkable." 41

Husserl was well aware of his own assumptions and subjected them to the same critical reflections as others. At the end of his career he was also aware of how his thought was being misunderstood, misused, if not abused, by the interpretations of his students, such as Scheler, Heidegger and others.42 The major misunderstanding, or abuse, was the revision of the notion of "the lived-world" (lebenswelt) in