

28. L. U. II 130; Ideen I 207,216.
29. See Ideen I 203ff.; also Ideen II 336.
30. Ideen I 216.
31. Ideen I 1217,357.
32. Krisis 174. Orth, *Bedeutung*, has attempted a schema of these interrelated terms in Chapter Five, p. 248. If I understand Orth correctly, he does not understand the central theme of intentionality in Husserl's work as applicable to a so-called "mundane phenomenology." I agree. How Husserl's notion of intentionality becomes reduced to a "mundane phenomenology" is important but quite beyond the purpose of this chapter.
33. L. U. II 372.
34. Ideen I 210-211.
35. Ideen I 213. Cf. Aron Gurwitsch on Husserl's doctrine of intentionality in *Studies in Phenomenology and Psychology* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern UP, 1966) 124ff.
36. Ideen I 245. Those familiar with Husserl's thought will know that his concept of "noema" as well as "intentionality" are difficult to interpret. The difficulty is illustrated by the different interpretations of these terms in the secondary literature on Husserl. For examples see Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl's Notion of Noema," *The Journal of Philosophy* 66 (1969): 680-87; Richard H. Holmes, "An Explication of Husserl's Theory of the Noema," *Research in Phenomenology* 5 (1975): 143-53; Robert C. Solomon, "Husserl's Concept of the Noema," *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, eds. Fredrick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick (Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1977) 168-81; Robert Sokolowski, "Intentional Analysis and the Noema," *Dialectica* 38 (1984): 113-129; and Lenore Langsdorf, "The Noema as Intentional Entity: A Critique of Føllesdal," *The Review of Metaphysics* 37 (1984): 757ff.
37. Ideen I 223.
38. Ideen I 232.
39. Ideen I 321, 322.
40. Ideen I 175; Ideen II and Krisis are attempts to work this out relative to the natural and human sciences.
41. Seebohm 154.
42. For an example of his awareness see Krisis 439-440.
43. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1980) 167-68, note 5.
44. Krisis 4; see 60ff. and 70ff. for the dualism of objective and subjective worlds.
45. Ideen II 231.
46. Examples of this close relationship can be found in the scattered instances where Husserl speaks of God, existence, etc. See Ideen I 121-122, 138-140; Ideen II 85; and Krisis 67, 95.
47. L. U. I 113-114, 110-125, and Husserl's assertion that "Everything that is, is 'in itself capable of being known...'" L. U. II 90.
48. Th P. van Baaren and H. J. W. Drijvers, eds., *Religion, Culture and Methodology* (The Hague: Mouton, 1973) 168.
49. J. D. J. Waardenburg, "Research on Meaning in Religion," *Religion, Culture and Methodology* 117.
50. Waardenburg, "Research on Meaning..." 112.
51. Waardenburg, "Research on Meaning..." 122; also 113, 114, 117 and 121.