Gender & History ISSN 0953–5233
Toby L. Ditz, 'The New Men's History and the Peculiar Absence of Gendered Power: Some Remedies from Early American Gender History'
Gender & History, Vol.16 No.1 April 2004, pp. 1–35.

The New Men's History and the Peculiar Absence of Gendered Power: Some Remedies from Early American Gender History*

Toby L. Ditz

When women became professional historians in significant numbers starting in the late 1970s, they immediately blew the whistle on conventional history, pointing out that it was merely men's history masquerading as universal history. By the early 1980s, when I received my PhD, the first cohort of women's historians was already publishing ground-breaking work. Galvanised by second-wave feminism and bottom-up social history, they made it crushingly obvious except to the most resisting readers that women made, and also make, history. Beneficiaries of the interdisciplinary conversations and debates fostered by women's studies programmes, and familiar with theories of gender that were emanating from every corner of the humanities and social sciences, they made it obvious, too, that gender was a major feature of a now greatly expanded historical terrain. When, in 1986, Joan Scott published her now classic article, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Analysis', she was elegantly codifying and propagating among historians as a whole what was by that time a rich, theoretical discussion of gender and history.[1]

Then a strange thing happened, or, rather, did not happen. Women's historians knew in principle that conventional history's first scandal – the absence of women – entailed a second: historians had suppressed the gender of their male subjects. Masculine particularity, like whiteness, had been overlooked precisely to the extent that the power and privilege it signified was hegemonic. The predominantly male historians and cultural critics who had taken such an interest in the doings and writings of European and European-American men had, as Joy Parr points out, treated their historical subjects for the most part as representatives of their classes,

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their callings or their nations, and even as spokesmen for universal human aspirations, but not as gendered persons. Qualities that in retrospect might have been attributed to the historical subjects' gendered power and to their culturally defined masculine identities were 'naturalized so effectively' in historical writing that they 'seemed without names' of their own.[2] The historian's self-conception as a disinterested interpreter of the past, so long as it remained undisturbed, encouraged this misapprehension; the male investigator and his subject both had a stake in downplaying the gendering of cultural and political authority.[3] With a massive challenge to masculine hegemony in our own day well underway, though, the jig was up: the gender of history's usual subjects was no longer so easily ignored.

Even so, historians of women for the most part delayed their systematic deconstruction of manliness and masculinity and repositioning of conventional history's male subjects for another five or ten years. Only in the 1990s did women's historians begin, with increasing momentum, to revisit conventional history, joining forces with the early practitioners of men's history to undo 'the ruses of masculine privilege'.[4] By that time, men's history and men's studies had become specialties in their own right; they (sometimes) acknowledged their debt to women's history and feminism, but they also had their distinctive forums, journals, intellectual affiliations and characteristic preoccupations.[5] Partly as a consequence of this in some respects puzzling intellectual division of labour, men's history runs the risk of occluding women and downplaying men's power over women. Although it undertakes to write 'a history of men as gendered beings', it has not been, as Mark Carnes has recently observed, an 'interactive history of gender'.[6] In the following pages, I examine several orienting premises of men's history and suggest how they abet the displacement of the narrative of men's gendered power. I then discuss several strategies for avoiding this displacement with the help of examples from my own field, the history of the British colonies in America and the early United States.

The first premise of men's history is good news from the vantage point of women and history. It is that manliness and masculinity are a feature of a larger gender order that subordinates women and preserves what the sociologist, Robert Connell, calls the 'patriarchal dividend', a phrase he coined in his influential book, entitled simply *Masculinities*. 'Hegemonic masculinity', he writes, 'is the [historically variable] configuration of gender practices' that legitimates 'patriarchy'. It 'guarantees the dominant position of men and the subordination of women' by ensuring that men have superior control over economic goods, the state and the military and by authorising violence against women as an expression of male right.[7] The 'patriarchal dividend' is, then, men's superior access to valued resources and authoritative political and cultural institutions, and women's

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corresponding exclusion or marginalisation. Dominant masculinity legitimates this patriarchal dividend and preserves it in the face of challenges. Spoken like a good male feminist: so far, so good. And, Connell is not alone in voicing such commitments, although he is among the most theoretically savvy to do so.[8]

The second premise is that masculinity, and the larger gender order within which it is embedded, is also fundamentally about differentiation among men. From its inception, the literature has focused on multiple forms of masculinity and their relationship to one another. It would be hard to overstate this point. The proliferation of linked terms like 'hegemonic', 'complicit', 'subordinate' and 'marginal' masculinities is testimony to the intensity of this interest.[9] This is only partly a question of how manliness co-articulates with racial, ethnic and class distinctions to produce hierarchies among men. The premise is, rather, that the gender order itself is as much about relations of domination and subordination – and competition and affiliation among men – as it is about the subordination of women. This is a profoundly important insight that owes a great deal to the influence on men's studies of queer theory's interest in the processes that (imperfectly) reproduce dominant masculinity and generate alternative gender identifications. Yet the focus on multiple masculinities and their mutual construction is also a major source of gender trouble. Most of us probably view masculinity and femininity as complementary, if not always oppositional terms. We think of them as co-produced and as doing the work, in the first instance, of structuring the division of labour and the allocation of power between men and women. But men's historians tend to hold that many, if not most, forms of masculinity are, in conjunction with race and class, generated primarily in relationship to other masculinities. Together they differentially distribute masculine privileges and structure relations among men. The risk inherent in this otherwise productive insight is, of course, that the question of how masculinity articulates with femininity to confirm the 'privilege, power, and authority' that men have over women will be suspended more or less indefinitely.[10]

Several factors have compounded this risk. The first cohort of men's historians in both the United States and Britain often examined the sex-segregated settings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as fraternal orders, schools and workplaces. Similarly, some early historians of sexuality also singled out the neighbourhoods, places of entertainment and educational settings where a gay, and later homosexual, presence was gradually articulated, established and defended.[11] 'In such situations', Joy Parr observes, 'becoming a man could seem to be a personal journey, an individual accomplishment achieved in solidarity with some men, and in distinction from others, but relatively *abstracted from relations with women*'.[12] This focus was, in turn, partly the product of an approach

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to cultural politics widespread among social historians until as late as the 1990s, one which viewed members of different classes and ethnicities as generating relatively cohesive and distinctive subcultures. Fruitful as this approach initially was for underscoring the possibilities for self-making and historical agency among the enslaved, the labouring classes, and women (white and non-white), it was always subject to the criticism that it downplayed the operations of power among the oppressed.[13] Moreover, its application to the study of the powerful was mistakenly even-handed. Whatever its shortcomings, the exploration of 'women's culture', like the study of the culture of the slave quarters and working-class or gay urban enclaves, was of a piece with the general project of making previously marginalised historical actors 'visible', as women's historians then liked to say.[14] But when applied to the culture of heterosexual white men who already crowded the historical stage, the separatist approach could have oddly perverse results; it certainly initially encouraged men's historians to downplay the deployment of gendered power over women by the men they studied.

More recently, men's history and men's studies, like the rest of the humanities, has moved towards a more processual view of culture and identity formation, so much so that we may state as the third premise of men's studies as it is now practised that masculine subjectivities are internally complex, provisional and dynamic. Gail Bederman beautifully distills this shift in analytic fashion as it applies to men's history. No longer are we apt to see 'manhood as a culturally defined collection of traits, attributes, or sex roles', she writes. Rather, we now typically hold that 'gender – whether manhood or womanhood – is a *historical, ideological process'* through which 'individuals are positioned and position themselves as men or as women'.[15] But the influence of various post-structuralist theoretical tendencies on the historical study of the gender of men has not necessarily worked to offset the occlusion of women. Indeed, the emphasis on the cultural circulation of multiple discourses, the nexus of knowledge and power, and, especially, the open-ended construction of social identities and categories of social difference through contested social practices has tended to encourage an ever more detailed exploration of manly identities and their complexities.[16] Once again, Connell's *Masculinities* is representative. Its approach is resolutely constructionist and processual (if ambivalently post-structuralist). The result is an enormously subtle exploration of the daily social and cultural practices through which men internalise and alter what are, in any case, unstable and fractured gender identities. Connell's passages on homoerotics and homosexuality, for example, illuminate with special sensitivity the policing of gender boundaries that sustains provisional alliances among some men, while creating alternative and/or despised social positions and identities for others. But in spite of these virtues, or even because of them, Connell's *Masculinities*

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focuses primarily on how the patriarchal dividend is allocated among men; Connell is less concerned with the women at the margins of his story or the processes that put them there, and this is true of several other landmark books in men's studies.[17] What makes this doubly interesting is the fact that Connell is elsewhere an astute theorist of gender, not just an analyst of masculinity. Even so, men's gendered power over women does not closely inform the narrative of his masterwork on masculinity.

If we focus for a moment not on an influential text, but on one of the new fields and approaches that left its distinctive imprint on the scholarship of the 1990s, the result is much the same. A few years ago, Mrinali Sinha noted in the pages of this journal that the historiography of India had become closely attuned to the 'gendered investments of colonial discourse' and had generated a large literature on women's history, but that the specialised study of masculinity was just emerging as a distinct area of inquiry.[18] Post-colonial studies has in fact recently fostered, as Sinha had urged, explicit treatments of dominant and subaltern masculinities and their role in sustaining or failing to sustain, imperial hegemony. The masculinity of the post-colonial subject has been thoroughly historicised, understood to be 'shaped by the contingent practices of colonial rule'.[19] Allowing for considerable differences in theoretical emphasis, it is fair to say that this masculine subject has also turned out to be fractured, hybrid and unstable. His structures of self-recognition and demarcation are based not only upon racialised gender distinctions and oppositions, but also upon all manner of intimate exchanges in the form of fantasised projections and cross-identifications between coloniser and colonised, whites and their racial others, and, yes, between masculinity and femininity. The field's embrace of this complexity has encouraged detailed anatomies of the colonial male subject and its relation to other men within an imperial field. Still, with some brilliant exceptions, such as the work of Ann Stoler and Antoinette Burton, these give less attention than they should to the distribution of gendered power over women and its role in sustaining and undermining imperial regimes.[20] And, more often than one would like, 'mimic man,' still simply means colonial *man,* or even a colonial subject emptied of gender.[21]

The emphasis on the unstable and provisional features of (masculine) identity formation has underwritten the curious, and widely remarked upon, tendency to see the masculine subject as everywhere fragile and endangered, and even in constant crisis. And here we are speaking of the men who might be thought most easily to embody, and benefit from, dominant ideals of masculinity. This emphasis on crisis is so pronounced that it amounts if not precisely to a fourth premise, then to a fourth – and quite pervasive – *theme* in men's history and men's studies. Michael Kimmel's influential overview of dominant standards of middle-class

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manhood, *Manhood in America: A Cultural History*, accents crisis and anxiety. And historians of the United States have observed for quite some time now that urban, white and largely professional men at the turn of the twentieth century re-invented a muscular form of outdoor, imperial masculinity to fend off neurasthenic bouts of anxiety and lassitude triggered by the perceived paradoxes of modernity and (over-)civilisation. Gail Bederman, who undertakes a detailed cultural analysis of racialised manhood in her book, *Manliness and Civilization*, is rightly sceptical of the historians' vocabulary of crisis, but she affirms that 'middle class men were unusually obsessed with manhood at the turn of the century'. This worried 'obsession' was only partly eased when dominant ideals of masculinity began to incorporate the putatively natural passions and physicality that white cultural authorities had previously associated pejoratively with lower class and non-white men. Dana Nelson, writing of the early national era as well as the later nineteenth century, says flatly that American national manhood was 'anxiety-making at its foundation'. It held out to middle-class white men an illusory promise of escape from 'competitive, hierarchically ordered relations' into 'a rich emotional mutuality' based on 'fraternal sameness', but denied even this compensatory fantasy of belonging to non-whites and working-class men, and disguised the differential burdens imposed by class and racial inequality. To go back further into the colonial era, Virginia's eighteenth-century planter patriarchs were 'anxious' and the manly identities of Philadelphia's overseas colonial merchants were 'imperiled'.[22]

Despite the literature's sometimes intensive interest in the privileges of whiteness, in the co-making of racial and gender identities, and in the marginalisation of class, sexual and racial others, the privileged men in these texts often come across as fragile, yearning and self-divided to the point of pathology. It is a wonder they ever got out of bed in the morning, and yet they constructed to their own benefit urban, industrial economies and imposed imperial systems straddling the globe at enormous cost to others. As others have observed, something is wrong with this picture.[23] At its most extreme, attentiveness to the social construction of gender identities and to their labile qualities elides the operations of power and creates false equivalences. One gets the impression that the planter's lament about the responsibilities of mastery has the same weight as the burdens borne by the men and women labouring in his fields; or that the CEO's fretfulness about the legal shenanigans of his corporation's subsidiaries and the auditing of his expense accounts is somehow comparable to the troubles of workers laid off in Flint, Michigan or toiling in the sweatshops of the export zones. It is also typically assumed that violence against women, racial minorities and homosexuals signals a crisis in masculinity – that it is always, in effect, the response of insecure bullies defending their

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turf. But such violence is not necessarily a defensive response to crisis. It can be, instead, one of the sanctioned, if uglier techniques that some men routinely use to maintain their gendered privileges over women and other men.

It has been suggested plausibly that the theme of crisis in academic men's history obliquely registers the current social and intellectual challenges mounted by women and racial and sexual minorities to white men's virtual monopoly over the higher precincts of academic and professional life. Practitioners of men's history who seek to explain the more outlandish, anti-feminist outcroppings of the contemporary men's movement may also project onto their historical subjects the sense of masculinity under assault explicitly enunciated by the likes of John Bly.[24] But in addition to these contextual factors, a methodological or theoretical confusion is also partly responsible for some of the excesses associated with the crisis theme. As we have already suggested, many students of men's history are committed to a series of linked propositions: hegemonic masculinity and the men who benefit most from the status quo face constant challenges; dominant ideals of masculinity and their alternatives are internally complex; gender norms must be continually re-inscribed in persons and institutions via practices that never mechanically instantiate or reproduce them. Interpreters with such commitments (rightly) expend enormous intellectual effort exploring the micro-political and cultural dynamics of masculinity. But as a consequence, they may easily confuse the local perturbations and conflicts that attend the making and re-making of gender identities with crisis. And even when competitive relations among men do pose significant challenges to hegemonic masculinity, the literature often passes over the conjoint operations of masculinity and femininity and the role of women in the production of such challenges. Above all, the literature as a whole does not distinguish especially well between crises in masculinity and crises in the larger gender order. Do the former always entail realignments in men's relations with women and significant challenges to men's gendered authority or shifts in the terms of its exercise? The literature is none too clear on this point. Once again, the narrative of competition among men and masculinity in crisis threatens to obscure the dynamics of the larger gender order.

In the end, the new literature on the history of masculinity and men leaves us with the queasy feeling that, cumulatively, it risks replicating the oppressive omissions of conventional history. It is in danger of restoring men – however particularised, differentiated and socially constructed – to the centre of our historical narrative. As Bruce Traister's sceptical review of American masculinity studies puts it, in the act of 'returning man' to his 'historicized particularity', 'Americanist cultural criticism' threatens once again to become the 'study of malekind' and to displace 'the women and texts responsible for the rise of feminism within academic literary studies'.[25]

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Faced with this dismaying prospect, one is tempted simply to throw in the towel and stay within (or rejoin) the ranks of those continuing to do a theoretically informed, women-centered history on the grounds that it remains the most promising place for sustaining a feminist counterweight to this retrograde tendency.

In fact, some of the most interesting work on manhood done by historians of the United States has appeared in the context of larger projects that do not focus *primarily* on men or masculinity. The scholarship on the era of Reconstruction and the Jim Crow era stands out in this regard, although it is not alone. Hazel Carby, who has devoted much of her career to reconstructing the culture and social practices of black women writers and activists in the late nineteenth century, has written one of the most persuasive accounts yet available of white southern manhood during the Jim Crow era in the context of her analysis of Ida Wells's anti-lynching campaign and its scathing critique of racist sexual stereotyping. Glenda Gilmore's *Gender and Jim Crow* follows in the same mould. Writing in sympathetic awareness of developments in men's studies, but more deeply influenced by critical race theory and women's history, Gilmore nests her analysis of new standards of masculinity emerging during the Jim Crow era among middle-class African-American men and among white racists within a larger narrative that centres on middle-class African-American women.[26] Here, the themes of manliness and femininity in the era's political rhetoric, the sexualised racial stereotypes used by whites to justify their campaign of terror, and the resistance to that campaign by African-Americans appears to have created unusually powerful incentives and opportunities for scholars to sustain a simultaneous focus on race and gender, and to do integrated histories of men and women.[27]

Still, integrated histories are no guarantee in and of themselves that gendered power will move to the foreground of our narratives. In a recent forum on the management of 'sexual and affective intimacies' as a technique of imperial administration in North America, Ann Stoler's lead essay draws our attention to the sites of intercultural contact where men and women were, and are, bound together in relations of intimacy and violence, and in the making and remaking of the complex racial categories and inequalities that structure imperial governance. But although the forum's participants effectively link the domains of the familial, the educative and the sexual to the imperial project, these domains remain oddly uncoupled from gendered power: the discussants responding to Stoler's essay do not systemically thematise gender relations or masculinity and femininity, though the differentiated domains of 'intimacy' that the forum highlights would seem to beg for such an analysis. Similarly, some recent histories of marriage in early America downplay the gendered power relations at the heart of marriage. Seeking to redress what they identify as a prior cohort

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of women's historians' inattentiveness to the affections and also to undo the 'myth' of sex-segregated separate spheres, their authors focus on men's relations with women, but they marginalise, often by design, the classic feminist problematic of gendered power.[28]

And, in any case, the specialised study of men as gendered beings is not going to wither away anytime soon.[29] During the 1990s an increasing number of feminist scholars who grew up intellectually and professionally within the fold of women's history and women's studies have claimed, albeit sometimes ambivalently or apologetically,[30] their right to redirect their concentrated attention toward conventional history's male subjects.[31] This should not necessarily be a cause for regret. The analysis of the gender of men is important, and narrower-gauge studies properly done will sometimes be the best approach. From a feminist perspective, what is ultimately at stake in the study of masculinity 'is, or should be, the *effect* of masculinity construction *on women*'.[32] And, if most existing approaches to men's history downplay these effects, then that is all the more reason to create an even stronger rapprochement between women's historians and students of masculinity. Besides, this undertaking has its special pleasures. After all, as Judith Allen has recently reminded her readers, conventional historians had always felt the perfect freedom to turn aside occasionally from their so-called universal histories to probe the woman question, and, for a hundred years and more, certain professions have established and maintained their legitimacy largely by 'problematizing and scrutinizing' women.[33] To reverse this gaze and scrutinise the gender of men is, then, a sign of women's professional power, as well the logical extension of over thirty years of accumulated work on women's history and gender.

The question becomes: how can we do histories of men and masculinity without occluding men's power over women? The pages that follow offer two types of remedies with the help of examples from my own field of early American history. They begin by observing that certain ways of conceptualising men's power and women's subordination are better than others at keeping gendered power in play, and that it therefore pays to be self-conscious about the implicit orienting assumptions informing our work. The remainder of the essay turns to questions of method, inventorying several strategies of problem selection, research design and narrative presentation that have proven useful in counteracting the tendencies that have led to the sidelining of men's power over women.

To turn to our orienting presuppositions first. Note that in Robert Connell's *Masculinities*, the gender order rests on an implied axis of male inclusion and female exclusion: men have superior access to valued, power-conferring resources and institutions, women have less. The gender order is about the way that masculinity and femininity, in conjunction with other categories of social difference, differentially position men and

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women in relation to claims on these resources and institutions. At this level of abstraction, however, an alternative position is that the gender order concerns, in particular, men's *access to women* and how that access is maintained, challenged and altered. It is about the way masculinity and femininity, in conjunction with other categories of social difference, situate persons so that men have access on advantageous terms to women's sexuality, reproductive capacities, labour and/or their kinfolk's resources and social networks. In this view, too, the differential distribution of that access to women also underwrites solidarities and hierarchies among men. This position has a distinguished lineage traceable to the feminist scholarship of the 1970s and early 1980s, when socialist-feminists claimed bluntly, as did Heidi Hartman, that 'patriarchy's material base is men's control of women's labor', and that under capitalism 'the division of labor by gender tends to benefit men' 'both in the household and in the labor market'. Meanwhile, radical feminists, such as Catherine MacKinnon, Andrea Dworkin and Adrienne Rich, found the key to gender domination in the modern world in men's control over women's sexuality and in 'compulsory heterosexuality' specifically. Enforced by the state, its legal institutions, and its tolerance of male violence, compulsory heterosexuality, they argued, becomes hegemonic because it eroticises power asymmetries between men and women and thus embeds them deeply within gendered consciousness.[34] Compulsory heterosexuality, in short, guarantees men's sexual access to women.

In a variant of this position that pays homage to Gayle Rubin's feminist rereading of structural anthropology's concept of the 'traffic in women' and also creates a unified field for the study of sexuality and masculinity, Eve Sedgwick argues that men are oriented primarily towards relationships with other men and to the affective and material rewards attaching to those relationships (rather than to the rewards directly accruing to control over women). But she also insists that the entire spectrum of homosocial bonds, consensual and conflicted, is mediated by the possession of women: women come 'between men'. The social order is, according to Sedgwick, fundamentally triadic and structured by relations of inequality between men and women. Heterosexuality in particular, with its concomitant vigorous policing of the blurry border between homosocial and specifically homosexual desire, has been, on her account, the main form of this mediation and central to men's induction into masculinity since the late seventeenth century at least.[35] At the same time, Sedgwick draws our attention to ruptures and contradictions in the consolidation of heteronormativity and its support for patriarchal power – ruptures and contradictions that signal men's differential positioning in relationship to culturally sanctioned forms of masculinity and, simultaneously, to women and femininity.

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These varied lines of thought have in common the view that what secures the 'patriarchal dividend', however conceived, is not in the first instance the exclusion of women from this or that resource or form of social power, but the possession of women. Access to women defines masculine privilege; it is what makes men alike *as men* and secures, however incompletely, the male bond. Correlatively, disparities in the terms of that access are at the core of competing forms of masculinity and the differential claims to masculine privilege associated with them. To be sure, the quest for a single social site (e.g. sex or reproductive labour) that anchors all systems of gender inequality may now seem quixotic to contemporary readers. The feminist theories of the 1970s and the early 1980s bear in this regard as in others the mark of their structuralist moment and their deep, if critical, engagement with Marxism; revisionists, like Eve Sedgwick herself, prefer a more fully historicised approach. But if this quest now seems dated, it is still worth revisiting the more general proposition that the gender order pivots on men's access to women, its differential distribution, and challenges to it, because this way of thinking has the advantage of linking, almost by definition, manliness and social relations among men tightly to their relations with women and to their gendered power.

The early American case illustrates the enormous interpretive mileage that can result from construing the gender order and masculinity in this way. Before turning to the British colonies in North America and to the new United States, though, a caveat is probably needed. To claim flatly that the gender order always pivots on men's access to women would be to run the risk of asserting a universalist fallacy at a time when most historians are more than ever committed to the view that the factors which sustain inequalities between men and women are historically and culturally variable and cannot be identified *a priori*. Still, the American case has affinities with other social formations in which kinship affiliations and/or household membership are central to the organisation of economic and political life. Let us state more circumspectly, then, that in these allied contexts access to women will also be a central feature of the gender order and structures of masculinity in particular.

The implicit logic of the existing scholarship on gender and masculinity in early America does accord remarkably well with an emphasis on access to women. Women's historians and others have long pointed out that dominant standards of manliness were embedded in the structures of colonial household governance and servitude that sorted men and women, European and non-European, into social relations of mastery and dependence. Whether we consider regions dominated by household systems of family labour, by tenancy and servants, or by slave-based agriculture, these relations of mastery and dependence, including their associated gender inequalities, were at the heart of British colonial-settler societies. This is

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not to say that these relations were evenly institutionalised or everywhere hegemonic, but they structured the macro-dynamics of accommodation and resistance to the expansion and consolidation of colonial rule, and the micro-dynamics of power in daily life. This was true of both the English settlers themselves and of contacts between the British and Native Americans. For, as the British expanded their settlements and their jurisdiction in North America, they, more than the French or the Spanish, attempted to impose their system of household governance, its associated gender roles and its structures of gender inequality on indigenous populations. As a result, conflict along the gender frontiers where Europeans and Native Americans interacted was in significant part about resistance, accommodation or adaptation to this attempted imposition. The vitality of creole or hybrid cultures in some places and eras was a measure of the weakness of this strategy of rule in some areas along the British Empire's moving frontier.

In a provocative overview essay, entitled 'Household Governance', Carole Shammas estimates that in places securely under the jurisdiction of Anglo-Americans, well over half of the adults in the colonies and in the early republic were household dependents legally subordinated to the authority of their masters, fathers and husbands, a considerably higher percentage than in Great Britain itself.[36] Accordingly, socially sanctioned adult manhood in the British colonies was closely associated with becoming a head of household, a status that ordinarily combined the authority of the master, the father and the husband. That status, which was by no means available to all Anglo-American men, let alone to non-European men, conferred the legally sanctioned ability to command the labour of others, to act as overseer of internal household affairs and to represent household dependents in civic and political matters. Manly independence entailed control *over* others as well as freedom *from* social dependence.

One pillar of this control, of course, was the emergence of a racialised system of mastery and servitude, a development that was at every point intertwined with the dynamics of gender. The early history of that system as illuminated by women's historians powerfully reinforces the point that the prerogatives of manliness in this context can be usefully conceived of in terms of access to and control over women. Kathleen Brown's book, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, & Anxious Patriarchs*, became virtually an instant classic because she was among the first to wed a detailed analysis of gender, including structures of masculinity, to the study of the institutionalisation of slavery and the consolidation of racism in late seventeenth and early eighteenth-century Virginia. When conjoined in law and ideology with other ways of organising perceptions of difference, such as the contrasts between African and European, pagan and Christian, and savage and civilised, Anglo-American gender conventions helped to systematise

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an initially inchoate discourse of race, and created sharpened distinctions between black and white womanhood and manhood. Codified in law and social practices, these now firmly racialised gender distinctions laid the foundation for a new, harsher regime of servitude. They tied planter-class masculinity, in particular, tightly to whiteness, to heightened coercive powers over black women and men, and to the patriarchal protection of white women, who were increasingly figured ideologically as domestic, non-labouring and genteel. At the same time, the prerogatives of mastery, including authority over women, were systematically denied to black men.[37]

Jennifer Morgan's work on the migration of populations and the transfer of laws, customs and social practices from Barbados to South Carolina updates these themes. In a slave regime that would quickly come to depend for its perpetuation on natural reproduction as well as the cross-Atlantic trade in commoditised bodies, Morgan examines how property law and inheritance practices defined and distributed possession of female slaves. Both the legal technicalities governing inheritance and the social commentary of colonial observers came quickly to delineate the dual character of their 'laboring' bodies, describing female slaves in terms of their capacity to reproduce and their capacity to work. Control over those bodies and their varied capacities was the material foundation of planter-class pre-eminence, and was central to planters' manly identities as patriarchal masters and leading members of a new planter society. At the same time, attempts to circumscribe the master's access to the labouring bodies of female slaves were one important form of resistance for both enslaved men and women.[38]

Becoming an independent householder depended, in the usual case, on the conjoint operations of marriage and property ownership. Because this was so, marriage was a second central pillar of the British colonies' household-based system of governance. It was also, obviously, a pivotal institution for defining men's access to women and a central guarantor of sex inequality. The law of marriage created a legal subject – the husband – who had access to, and power over, another: the wife. This is not to minimise the brilliant work that has shown us the *de facto* limits on the power of husbands, the complexities and limits on the reach of law, or the robustness in some places of women's ability to wield their skills and responsibilities into significant social and cultural influence and, even, a limited autonomy. Still, marriage institutionalised one main form of men's gendered power over women through its manifold restrictions, in favour of the husband, on the wife's civil and political capacities, her property rights, her rights in her own children and even her right to unfettered physical mobility. As Hendrik Hartog, who has recently published a comprehensive book on the law of marriage in America, puts it, 'the twin achievements of the law of coverture were that it transformed

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women into wives and that it constructed and legitimated a structure of power within marriage'.[39]

One detects a recent quickening of interest in marriage among early Americanists studying manhood, in part because they realise that distinctions among men and definitions of manliness were closely associated with it. Recent work by Thomas Foster, Mark Kann and Richard Godbeer, among others, trace in detail how men's trajectory from youth to marriage (or its short-circuiting) sorted youth and men into those who were and were not entitled to enter into full privileges of adult manhood. Provincial authorities who enacted and implemented marriage laws prohibited some men from marrying altogether, and discouraged or banned interracial unions, often in the face of direct challenge from poor whites, Indians and blacks who fashioned informal marriages among and for themselves. The effect overall was to restrict the access of non-white men to legal marriage and its privileges, and to create an unofficial blurry zone of toleration that nonetheless consolidated along racial lines distinctions between licit and illicit unions. Nor did all Anglo-American men have access to women, white or non-white, through marriage. Those who lacked the property, skills, personal appeal or inclination to attract women and constitute households were politically and culturally suspect, unless they could persuade kinswomen, as some elite men did, to act as substitute wives and become mistresses of their households. At its best, this literature links the sexual and affective dimensions of marriage to manliness without forfeiting its focus on gendered power. Foster's work, for example, shows that the languages of virility and fatherhood, and of marital sexual pleasure and love, fused internal states of desire and masculinised dispositions of the sexual body to the authority of husbands over wives and to the social prerogatives of independent mastery. To the extent that dominant standards of manliness in the eighteenth century came to incorporate an erotics of marriage, marginal and repudiated sexualities also came into sharper cultural focus and became associated especially closely with single men, non-householders and racial outsiders.[40]

Marriage and the access to women that it underwrote also structured relations among men, as we have already implied. This is not just because some men could not become husbands and thus were excluded from the powers over women that came with it. It is also because marriage defined both a couple and a social triad: the husband, the wife and other men. Criminal prosecutions for adultery and civil suits brought by husbands against other men for seducing their wives, for example, defined husbands' rights in wives in terms of sexual 'possession' or 'sexual monopoly' as over and against other men. These legal actions were designed 'to remedy the wrongs that men did to each other, part of a constellation of rights by which a husband defined his rights and his identity as a husband in relation

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to a world of men'.[41] This theme also resounds throughout the literature on manliness and politics, but is perhaps most strongly expressed by Mark Kann, who argues at length that marriage was a key institution for sorting men into those who were worthy of political inclusion and those who were not, and therefore the foundation for political fraternity in the revolutionary era and the early republic. Despite the distinctions between independent men created by wealth, family connections and style of life, becoming a married head of household conferred the capacity to act politically in one's own right, and conjointly with others. Meanwhile, revolutionary era political polemics and moral jeremiads associated the bachelor and single youths with social and political disorder. Thus, marriage, or access to women, demarcated respectable members of the 'political fraternity' from the unruly men cast outside it.[42]

Kann's formulation is heir to a strand of feminist political theory closely associated with Carole Patemen, which holds that revolutionary-era regimes in America and Europe and their contemporary successors were fundamentally, not accidentally, masculinist: only men were active citizen-subjects, and their political self-activity was linked by definition to the possession of domestic women.[43] Kann's position is also in accord with the work of colonial women's historians who argue that as an historical matter, politics had become more masculinised by the revolutionary era than it had been in the past. They cite several factors. As imperial and provincial law and administration became more elaborate and formal, the political salience of family-based political coalitions waned and, with it, so did the informal political influence wielded by women who were members of leading families. Furthermore, by the late eighteenth century, the loopholes that had earlier allowed some property-owning women, especially unmarried women, to acquire some of the privileges of freemen were shutting down.[44]

Not everyone would wish to hold that the political foundations of the early republic were *inherently* masculinist, as Kann's stance would have it. But ideological visions of the active body politic and the national political subject had become, on almost everyone's account, thoroughly masculinised. Republicanism's citizen subject was concretely embodied, and clearly male. He was the yeoman, whose political virtue and capacity to defend liberty was insured by his position as an arms-bearing, property-owning householder. (The era's iconography even typically portrayed him at his door, contemplating his small domain while surrounded by his grateful, hardworking wife and loyal sons.) Competing late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Lockean natural rights and contract language did individuate the bearer of citizenship rights and make him more abstract. But, arguably, the individual subject who consented to form a polity was marked by a now naturalised masculinity (and race); women were now

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categorically effaced as political subjects in virtue of their natures as gendered beings. Moreover, the Lockean citizen still possessed a wife, and with her, a household, although it was one now imagined not so much as a government in miniature and a constitutive political unit, but as a feminised, non-labouring 'home' that centred on the putatively natural conjugal family, and on fostering the moral sensibilities and affections associated with the feminine and the familial.[45] In broad strokes then, gender historians have construed early America as a gendered polity in which the construction of the male citizen was founded on his relations to women.

This brief discussion of recent approaches to manliness and marriage and to the co-articulation of gender and race in early America was meant to illustrate a basic point: that some initial orienting assumptions about gender are better than others if we wish to increase our chances of doing histories of men and masculinity that avoid the field's characteristic occlusions. In the case of early America, conceptualising the gender order in terms of men's access to women works to unify much of what we know about the dynamics of masculinity and competition among men. At the same time, it encourages us to engage systematically rather than simply assert what is after all the first premise of men's history: that the engendering of men involves power over women, whatever else it might also concern. Because access to women was unevenly distributed, exploring the terms of that access also underscores the second premise of men's history, which is that the gender order is also about differentiation among men. And the utility of this orienting insight ought to extend well beyond early America to other social settings in which kinship and household organisation are chiefly responsible for allocating labour and economic resources or regulating participation in politics. We can continue to ponder and debate whether or not access to women, even broadly construed, is so salient a feature of masculinity and the gender order elsewhere, especially in contemporary market-dominated political economies and disciplinary states, though it is a fair guess that attention to it will be very productive in a great many contexts.

Recognising that our theoretical bets or presuppositions do not dictate in a one-to-one fashion our concrete methods of historical research and interpretation, the remainder of this essay examines several studies that successfully yoke histories of men and masculinity in early America to the analysis of gendered power. Proceeding illustratively, it creates a (partial) inventory of strategies of problem definition and historical interpretation that have worked in practice. Many will be familiar to readers, at least in other contexts, but it is instructive to examine how they are put to use by historians of masculinity and gender. And a reminder never hurts. At the same time, these studies allow us to elaborate further some implications

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of the insight that focusing on access to women will produce a more full-bodied understanding of men and masculinity.

First, even when one's scholarly gaze is trained primarily on men, comparisons are a good strategy for avoiding the occlusion of women. That comparisons of men and women typically yield more nuanced understandings of masculinity and femininity than can the study of men or women alone by helping to pinpoint exactly what is gendered about the characters and conduct of men is a basic point, but one to which we too often pay only lip service. Jane Kamensky, for example, takes a comparative approach to the analysis of speech practices among English settlers in seventeenth-century New England. Arguing that the 'prerogative of public speaking' was central to the performance of masculinity, and marked the line between persons with robust political and civil capacities and those who lacked them, Kamensky examines childhood and the very different trajectories of boys and girls out of it.[46] She finds that undifferentiated speech norms and pedagogical practices directed both boys and girls to be modest, circumspect and even silent. But upon becoming adults, men were enjoined, with modulations suiting their different social statuses, to assume the prerogatives of public speech and to speak clearly, even boldly, in a wide array of civic spaces and places. Meanwhile, the 'decorous' speech practices urged upon adult women more closely resembled speech etiquette for children than they did those for adult men, and they tightly circumscribed the places considered appropriate even for 'demure' female speech, limiting them largely to 'godly household' settings. 'Verbal modesty', Kamensky observes, 'amounted to a life's work' for girls and women.[47] Of course, not all women proved interested in the work mapped out for them. Occasionally, some would become learned speakers, engaging in theological disputation – and in mixed company, too: most famously Anne Hutchinson, but others as well. Many more were uninterested in the self-imposed disciplines of committed Puritans, and these mostly lower-class women used earthier, vernacular vocabularies in taverns and in the open air. But Kamensky's comparative exercise at least tells us why New England magistrates reacted with rage at sharp-tongued women who refused to comply with the Puritan etiquette that defined the feminine speaker. Whether gentlewomen or servants, their unwomanly talk challenged a specific and important male prerogative, unsettling one of the primary axes of distinction between household masters with civil personalities and their female dependants.

Second, we can attend to men's uses of the symbolic woman as they attempt to stabilise similarities and differences among men and police their own conformity to prevailing norms of masculinity – one way in which women mediate relations among men. Take for example, men's concern for their reputation and the damage words could do to reputations,

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concern that was very pronounced in the late colonial world. My own work suggests that such concerns were acute among long-distance merchants, in part because their peers' opinions about their competence and practical virtue circulated not just in local conversation and the comparatively well-defined spaces that gave rise to it, but in the correspondence of the indefinitely large network of traders that spanned the far-flung reaches of the British Empire. At especially fraught moments, merchants resorted to highly charged, often overtly misogynist rhetoric and imagery in their own writing. They made use of the long-standing cultural association of malicious and idle talk with women by associating their male detractors with, for example, the unregulated intercourse, conversational and sexual, of the bawd and the bawdy house. Or they would externalise the difficulties of distinguishing the manly, confidential exchange of sober judgements about others from the covert pleasures of retailing rumours by cooking up cautionary tales about merchants ruined not by the irresponsible talk of other men, but by the salacious gossip of ladies 'at a tea table' and 'spread from one tittle-tattle society to another'. Thus, they made use of the symbolic woman not only to castigate their competitors as unmanly or effeminate, but also to repudiate contradictions in their own understanding of manliness and to externalise doubts about their capacity to embody dominant standards of manliness.[48]

We have also long recognised that male political polemicists on both sides of the eighteenth-century Atlantic made frequent use of female monsters. Their sexual voraciousness and uxorious habits stood in for the political corruption of the Court or the temptations of commerce, and marked the moral distance between their male consorts and the virtuous men who condemned them. But these writers also relied on figures of virtuous women to stabilise such distinctions among men. As Carroll Smith-Rosenberg has pointed out, elite male writers used the domestic woman to champion 'bourgeois' and republican morality against both aristocratic luxury and the putative brutishness of the lower orders.[49] One might dub these uses of the symbolic woman the 'Rousseau effect': the domestic, but coyly seductive Sophie, who is the guarantor of Emile's guileless transparency and manly candour – or her negative counterparts, the idle gossiping women at tea table and the sexually corrupt aristocratic woman – suddenly appear, externalising and feminising what was initially a problem among men. Similarly, the nationalist literature of the new republic used a series of symbolic women to mark off a new American male political subject. It highlighted the virtue and virility of the new citizen and distinguished him from Europeans in part by depicting America as a sexually welcoming, yet innocent, female Indian who sought protection from old-world corruption. Simultaneously, the figure of the pure and domestic white woman signalled the civility that fitted him and his band

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of brothers to succeed the first Americans as the continent's rightful guardians, albeit with an occasional sigh of regret for the Indians whom they displaced.[50] We might say along with Eve Sedgwick, then, that the symbolic woman comes 'between men' to authorise necessary distinctions and solidarities among them.

Third, even when competitive relationships among men and the structures of masculine identifications at play in such relations are our primary concern, we should be alert to the fact that these conflicts frequently involve alliances with women. Attention to such alliances is another way of vivifying for historical studies the principle that women mediate relations among men. Janet Lindman's recent work on evangelical ideals of masculinity among Baptists in late eighteenth-century Virginia is a case in point. She shows that white evangelical men were able successfully to challenge elite standards of manliness. They could do so in part because they had the support of many white women, who were on the whole more strongly drawn to the message of spiritual rebirth than were men. In the face of ridicule and opposition, these male evangelicals associated manliness with peaceable resignation and words rather than fists and guns, and, in a reversal of prevailing gender conventions, with suffering and forgiveness rather than the pugnacious defence of impugned honour. Their alliance also fortified evangelical men sufficiently to embrace the fundamental changes in masculine 'bodily comportment' demanded by their religion's austere repudiation of worldly pastimes, whether rowdy (drinking and gaming) or genteel (dancing and exhibits of sartorial elegance). This austerity required, overall, that the white male convert disavow the 'public displays of prowess' that constituted conventional masculinity.[51]

At the same time, the movement included African-American converts of both sexes. The melding of English and African-American styles of worship in mixed-sex congregations accentuated evangelical religion's premium on the emotional and bodily evidence of conversion. The 'weeping sinner' who experienced the paroxysms of his 'trembling, moaning, groaning' body in close physical communion with white women and African-Americans of both sexes was the antithesis of elite white masculinity's emphasis on bodily self-mastery and emotional moderation.[52] Moreover, in a pattern typical of the spread of revivalist movements elsewhere, women who were attracted early to the message of evangelical preachers in turn recruited their own men folk. As a result, these new standards and bodily practices – shall we call them hybrid or creolised standards of masculinity? – appealed successfully not only to large numbers of white 'men of middling rank', but also to many of 'genteel status'.[53] In these cases and others, alliances between women and men, black and white, reverberated to change the balance of cultural authority among white men, many of whom literally came to embody alternative codes of masculinity.

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Once one foregrounds alliances with women, it is difficult to avoid noticing how changing practices of masculinity play out in relation to men's power over women, or how dominant and alternative definitions of masculinity incorporate gendered power. Lindman addresses these matters explicitly. The evangelical movement created for a brief time an opening for a mixed-race fellowship, and more equality for men and women within evangelical churches. Lindman concludes, however, that white evangelical men moved quickly to shut down these challenges to patriarchal authority. They monopolised their church's leadership positions, reserved for themselves the power to discipline its members, and limited the church franchise. As they did so, the 'evangelical church', Lindman writes, 'became a vehicle to strengthen male dominance and white supremacy'.[54] This newly secured institutional domain ensured that one of the rewards of reformed masculinity would be participation in 'new bonds of collective fellowship with like-minded men' comparatively undisturbed by continued challenges to white men's prerogatives.[55] The evangelical movement in late eighteenth-century Virginia embraced reformed masculinity all right, but in new organisational settings it reinstated men's religious authority over women.[56]

This outcome bears directly on my fourth point. Despite the tendency of the literature on the masculine subject to call every crack and fissure in the process of inducting men into their masculine identities a crisis, squabbles among men over their share of the patriarchal dividend, no matter how rhetorically high-pitched or even violent, do not in themselves signal a gender crisis, although they may well precipitate one. We should stipulate that a gender crisis involves challenges to the terms of men's dominance over women, and we should be interested in the outcome. To turn once again to Kathleen Brown's work, her reinterpretation of Bacon's rebellion in late seventeenth-century Virginia links it to gender in ways that had gone largely unexplored in earlier histories. First, she situates it within the history of masculinity by construing it not only as a conflict among provincial leaders, and between leaders and lesser sorts, over Indian policy and the terms of governance, but also as a struggle involving 'two distinct cultures of masculinity':[57] the one based on claims to high birth and displays of aristocratic gentility; the other, a virulently racist and hyper-masculine culture of the gun, the cockfight and the tavern. Bacon's Army was eventually defeated, but its racialised and martial 'lexicon of colonial masculinity' triumphed as the dominant language of manhood in the rebellion's aftermath.[58] Though it retained the older vocabulary of manly honour, it blurred the once finely graded distinctions in the degrees of honour men could possess and replaced them with solidarities based on whiteness. Thus, Bacon's rebellion involved, to be

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sure, a shift in the ascendant culture of masculinity and a conjoint consolidation of racial distinctions among men.

But Brown also locates the rebellion and its outcome within the context of long-term instabilities in gender relations and their resolution.[59] Household governance in general was weakly institutionalised in the recently founded colonial outpost of Virginia prior to the rebellion in 1676. Demographic, social and political conditions had combined to produce multiple challenges to men's control over free women and female servants, in particular; neither individual householders nor local officials could, for example, eradicate preaching by Quaker women or limit the influence of the 'Brabling Women' whom they repeatedly hauled before the local magistrates and accused of fomenting disorder in failed attempts to curb their power as moral arbiters of community life.[60] Despite women's active participation in the rebellion, however, the post-rebellion political settlement marginalised their informal political influence and limited their cultural authority, to a greater extent than before, to the precincts of the household and its immediate neighbourhood. That settlement extended political privileges and property ownership to a larger number of white men, who could now successfully claim to embody the new standards of hegemonic masculinity, but specifically denied them to free blacks, and hardened the distinctions between racialised slavery and other forms of servitude. With class conflict thus reduced, legislators, judges and the newly-enlarged white male electorate could turn to the task of reinforcing their own patriarchal authority not only as masters, but also as husbands and fathers. Enhanced authority over wives, daughters and female servants, white and black, was one of the 'privileges' enjoyed by the enlarged 'fraternity of men' established by the new regime and its 'culture of white manhood'.[61] The episode, properly interpreted, involved competition among men and competing definitions of masculinity, but it simultaneously sprang out of and addressed volatility in men's gendered authority over women. It was, then, indicative of a crisis in men's access to women and its resolution.

The cultural frontiers where Native Americans interacted with Europeans supply especially compelling episodes of gender crisis, and I would like to consider Claudio Saunt's interpretation of one such episode, the Redstick War of 1813.[62] That war is usually understood as a civil war among the Creek Indians of Alabama and Western Georgia that pitted 'religious nativists' against those willing to accommodate Europeans. But Saunt also interprets it as the culmination of a long-term gender crisis, affecting both relations between men, and between men and women.[63] Decades of intermittent warfare in the context of European rivalries in the region had accentuated the power of warriors and their culture of 'violent masculinity' at the expense of alternative bases of male prestige

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and influence within Creek society. The dominance of a warrior culture also created a more polarised vocabulary of masculinity and femininity than had existed in the past. During the same period, trade with Europeans for a variety of reasons increased Creek women's economic dependence on men.[64] In this context, when the British eliminated their Spanish and French rivals in 1763 and then sought, as did their US successors, to pacify the area by inducing Creeks to adopt the settled life of small planters, they found willing allies among many Creek women. Such women explicitly sought to circumscribe the influence of the now demoralised and increasingly reckless warriors, and to find alternative sources of income in market-oriented agriculture and spinning and weaving. At the same time, some Creek men sought to strengthen their power and prestige by interposing themselves as the official spokespersons for their people with US reformers and Indian agents and by embracing new codes of masculinity that made 'cattle, slaves, and specie' the measure of successful manhood.[65] Several decades of tension followed, marked by Creek women's struggles with white and Indian men over the terms on which they would work, and between the Creek men who embraced the new culture of masculinity, including its patriarchal privileges, and the increasingly desperate warriors who repudiated it or were shut out of it. The Redstick War was the result. It was, in short, the violent culmination of a gender crisis on the south-east's colonial frontier.[66]

As several of the foregoing examples indicate, threats to masculine authority often provoked misogynist backlash. And here we are speaking not just of threats produced in men's agonistic encounters with one another – encounters in which women might be mediators or scapegoats – but of women who erode, subvert, or directly challenge men's individual or collective authority over them. My fifth point is that the historical appearance of backlash, however dismaying, is an opportunity to bring studies of masculinity and (threats to) men's access to women into alignment. The virulently misogynist writings of three southern planters analysed by Kenneth Lockridge are examples of backlash by individual, but representative, men. All were, he suggests, ambitious but insecure colonials stymied by their position at the cultural and political margins of Empire and, especially, by their disadvantage in a London-centred patronage game that typically left colonial elites competing for scraps. More immediately, women who controlled their access to much-needed financial resources thwarted all three: the young Thomas Jefferson's mother controlled his inheritance during the years when he might be expected to engage in elite courtship rituals; wealthy, highly placed women rejected outright Robert Bolling's and William Byrd's proposals of marriage. Because marriage was such an important foundation of social connections and wealth, especially for upwardly mobile men with

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elite aspirations or those who had financial repair work to do, these failed courtships posed a double challenge to Byrd's and Bolling's felt sense of manliness; they threatened the material basis of their masculine privilege and their *amour propre* as lovers.

Their response was an outpouring of misogynist writing. The fevered, racist and violence-tinged sexual passages that laced William Byrd's commonplace book may stand for the others. These included shop-worn disquisitions on the hypersexuality of African women, run-on narratives that jumbled up multiple anecdotes about menstruation rituals in Brazil, Roman tales about women who buried their lovers alive, ribald reports of techniques used by the ancients to maintain male erections, and titillating, detailed descriptions of mismatched genitalia. According to Lockridge, the central motif of these 'coruscatingly hostile' passages was the threat that the corrupt bodies and uncontrolled appetites of 'lascivious women' posed to the bodily integrity of men.[67] From one vantage point, these female grotesques are simply additional illustrations of the way in which symbolic women mediate troubled relations among men: they condensed the threat to colonial men's authority that emanated from the corrupt metropolitan centre.[68] But these outpourings were also, as Lockridge only intermittently recognises, the distorted, hyperbolic expressions of male anxiety and anger about their failed relations with women at the fraught place where money and sex met. To the extent that eighteenth-century marriage ideals welded the blunt consideration of wealth and status to the promise of erotised intimacy between beloved 'first friends', courtship was a liminal moment. Though women's economic and social dependence rigged the game of courtship in favour of men, women could, in principle, refuse their suitors – precisely because, in the context of wives' continued subordination to their husband's authority, the promise of mutual pleasures required her consent and her judgement about the terms of the bargain. A refusal was a critique of her suitor's social assets and personal desirability, and a withholding of resources and affections. Not all, or even most, men reacted so strongly to such rebukes as did the men examined by Lockridge. But their enraged, if oblique response to their failures with women indicate characteristic points of instability in the gender order, places where individual women could directly challenge the terms of men's access to them.[69]

Of course, backlash is a collective phenomenon, too. As Carol Karlsen was among the first to tell us, the Salem witchcraft episode of 1692 may be early America's paradigmatic case of collective backlash against women.[70] It occurred in the midst of war between the French, the Indians, and the English on New England's north-eastern frontier and in the aftermath of the brief, but draconian Andros regime and the disruptions of the Glorious Revolution. Facing major defeats in the ongoing war, and

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with the stability of the Commonwealth and their household authority hanging in the balance under a newly issued royal charter and a newly appointed governor, Puritan magistrates and ministers preferred to believe that the colony's recent reversals of fortune were providential afflictions visited on a backsliding people rather than the result of their own rather more temporal political and military failings. As a consequence, they turned what should have been a local incident into a colony-wide witch hunt.

With the help of a religious culture not yet shorn of magic or stripped of theological commitments to the workings of the devil in the world, the largely young female accusers – some of whom had recently fled from the decimated settlements along the frontier – and the male authorities who endorsed their accusations at first targeted unusually powerful or unruly women: propertied widows, but also contentious, haughty neighbours, wandering female beggars and drunks under no one's particular dominion. They then turned on anyone (male or female) who might seem to be under the influence of such women, including people associated with the ranting Quaker women who populated Salem town, and others linked to wartime defeats on the frontier, who, they said, were consorting with Indians in a pact with the devil. All the while, Puritan magistrates, ministers and doctors were transforming through constant probing the physical symptoms and visions of the young female accusers into the legally intelligible signs of witchcraft, reshaping their familial discontents and inchoate fears and aspirations into testimony against the accused and extracting through repeated interrogations confessions from the witches. Thus, in the face of challenges to their position as Puritan patriarchs, the authorities obtained the signs, testimony and confessions needed to reassert state power in its most spectacular form.

But having made gruesome object lessons of independent and obstreperous women and those connected with them, the magistrates and puritan ministers began to have scruples about the accusers and their testimony – scruples that were reinforced as the mostly female accusers began to implicate highly placed people. They now did an about face, and cast the girls and young women not as defenders of a commonwealth besieged by earthly and spiritual enemies, but as the passive and unwitting handmaidens of a devil who spoke through them. This reinterpretation, as Mary Beth Norton points out, conveniently reasserted a gendered division of labour suited to more ordinary times.[71]

Backlash against women, violent or otherwise, is a recurrent feature of manliness under threat. When women in eighteenth-century British-America and the early United States used the opportunities and the languages made available by the colonial order of things and talked out, talked back, talked dirty, said 'no', accused men in court or harangued

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them in public, withheld their property and their favours, their bodies and their labour, took up their looms or smashed them, drank behind barns or ranted in the streets, abandoned old churches and started new ones, worshiped in defiance of their masters and in their own style, preached and prophesised or otherwise made inroads on the patriarchal dividend, backlash was usually forthcoming and usually successful, at least temporarily. This would not necessarily be the case in other places and times. Either way, attending to backlash highlights instabilities in the dynamics of gendered power.

Sixth, and finally, people whose gender practices and identifications disrupted the conventional categories of man and woman, male and female, provide an excellent opportunity to examine the mutual construction of masculinity and femininity, and the policing of the troubled borders between them.[72] The well-known case of Thomas/Thomasina Hall of seventeenth-century Virginia, who spent many years shuttling successfully back and forth across the cultural gender divide, living at various times as a soldier and manservant, but also as a maidservant and skilled seamstress and needle-worker, may be paradigmatic.[73] But cross-dressing women also created gender trouble. Women who passed as men in the British navy and army, in the Continental army and even among bands of pirates were not rarities in early modern Great Britain and the colonies. As Marcus Rediker notes, they 'drew upon and perpetuated a deeply rooted underground tradition of female cross-dressing, pan-European in its dimensions, but especially strong in early modern England'.[74] In the picaresque narratives of adventure left by a few of them, these often impoverished women combined blunt assertions of economic motives – the need for a berth, wages and even pensions – with dreams of 'greater freedom, prestige, and power',[75] and expressed pride in their 'manly' physical courage and their seagoing and martial skills. In short, their thoroughgoing enactment of masculinity allowed them to enter into spaces, places and occupations otherwise inaccessible to women and acquire a portion of masculine privilege.[76]

When such women were discovered, they became the objects of cultural fascination, even admiration. The commentaries written about them show how cultural authorities attempted to reconcile their displays of 'female masculinity'[77] with dominant languages of gender. According to Dianne Dugaw, commentators downplayed their protagonists' typically masculine virtues and accomplishments, and their expressions of pride in them. What they could not ignore – especially the masculine dress and bodily dispositions that were in fact the lynchpins of their narratives – they treated as *mere* subterfuge in the service of a disguised femininity. And, in place of prosaic economic motives, they substituted affirmations of their heroines' exceptional circumstances and inserted archetypically feminine

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motives, such as escape from male predators and defence of sexual chastity.[78] Whether these commentaries ever fully effaced the subversiveness of the 'female sailors bold' for their readers is another question. But however contemporary readers might have construed them, the sailors' creative appropriations of masculinity highlight the social construction of gender categories perhaps more clearly than coupling the study of masculinity with men alone could do.[79] Indeed, insofar as their subjectivities are lost to us, it is an open question whether to call them female sailors or female transvestites at all. They remind us that to speak with assurance of male and female historical subjects as if they had a gendered existence apart from the practices that sustained and altered their gendered subjectivities and their classification by others is to beg the most interesting questions about the conjoined construction of masculinity and femininity, and the power dynamics that pervade it.

Unease about the study of masculinity among women's historians and others with feminist commitments, including many men's historians themselves, appeared more or less simultaneously with the emergence of the new men's history. The proliferation of specialised studies of men and masculinity has done nothing to diminish this disquiet. Indeed, it may be escalating, as growing numbers of women's historians try their hands at such studies, and as newer cohorts of specialists appraise the existing scholarship. The opening pages of this essay distil and systematise the critical insights that prior articulations of this unease have generated, arguing that some of the field's otherwise most fruitful guiding premises and methodological commitments account in good part for its peculiar neglect of gendered power. It offers this critique in the hopes that its diagnosis of the reasons for the occlusions characteristic of men's history will resonate broadly among historians of women and gender, and beyond the author's professional location as an historian of the British colonies in America and the early United States.

Out of a conviction that the scrutiny of the gender of men is an important feminist intellectual concern, and, more pragmatically, on the assumption that the new men's history will flourish for some time to come, the second half of the essay explores how studies of masculinity and manhood might more reliably or consistently foreground gendered power. It argues that conceptualising the gender order in terms of men's access to women is an excellent starting point in a wide variety of historical settings (and for a wide variety of problems). It also generates, still with the help of illustrative studies of early America, a partial inventory of techniques suited to highlighting the mutual construction of masculinity and femininity, gendered power, and challenges to it. As a partial list, it is an open-ended offering to all historians interested in the study of masculinity and gendered power, who will surely see ways of expanding it. The stakes

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involved in our conceptual commitments and methodological choices are high. The new men's history can continue to court the danger of returning us to the *status quo ante*, or it can incorporate, as fundamental to its understanding of the construction of the male subject, sustained attention to the modalities of power that permeate the construction of masculinity and femininity and structure relations of inequality between men and women.

Notes

* This essay originated in an oral presentation for a panel entitled, 'Gendering Colonial America, Making Women's History Colonial,' *Twelfth Berkshire Conference on the History of Women*, Storrs, Connecticut, 6–9 June 2002. My co-panelists were Nancy Cott (acting as moderator), Kathleen Brown, Jane Kamensky, Carol Karlsen and Jennifer Morgan. When I first volunteered to make remarks about the new men's history, I had not focused on the fact that everyone on the panel had done some work on the history of manhood and masculinity. I profited greatly from thinking about my co-panelists' scholarship as I wrote this piece. I also thank Mary Ryan, Judith Walkowitz, my graduate students, and the readers for *Gender & History* who read earlier drafts of the piece. The members of the seminar sponsored by the Women, Gender, and Sexuality Program at Johns Hopkins also provided lively and helpful commentary.

1. Joan Scott, 'Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis', *American Historical Review* 91 (1986), pp. 1053–75.
2. Joy Parr, 'Gender History and Historical Practice', *The Canadian Historical Review* 76 (1995), pp. 367 (quote).
3. In her recent essay review, Judith Allen remarks, 'As … historically the dominant practitioners of history, men as a group have not proved especially curious about men as a sex. In relations of dominance and subordination, as the truism goes, the dominant group remains unmarked, transparent, unscrutinized'. Allen, 'Men Interminably in Crisis?: Historians on Masculinity, Sexual Boundaries, and Manhood', *Radical History Review* 82 (2002), p. 192. Also see Bruce Dorsey, *Reforming Men and Women: Gender in the Antebellum City* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002), pp. 4–6.
4. Toby L. Ditz, 'What's Love Got to Do with It?: The History of Men, The History of Gender in the 1990s', 38 *Reviews in American History* (2000), pp. 167–68. Michael Kimmel observes that the 'invisibility of masculinity' is a 'privilege' associated with power. Michael S. Kimmel, *The Gendered Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 5–6. But see Bruce Traister, who is sceptical about the posture that engaging in the study of 'men as men' qualifies one as a 'critical pioneer'. Bruce Traister, 'Academic Viagra: the Rise of American Masculinity Studies', *American Quarterly* 52 (2000), pp. 281, 282.
5. The American Men's Studies Association became an independent organisation in 1991, and its official journal, *The Journal of Men's Studies*, began in appearing in 1992. Prior to that, the AMSA had been affiliated under another name with the National Organization for Men against Sexism (founded in 1984) and had been sponsoring conferences and a newsletter since the early 1980s. For a useful short summary of the origins of men's studies, especially in the social sciences, see Judith Kegan Gardiner, 'Introduction', in J. Gardiner (ed.), *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory: New Directions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 1–6.
6. Mark C. Carnes, 'Foreword', in Laura McCall and Donald Yacovone (eds), *A Shared Experience: Men, Women, and the History of Gender* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. xi. Nancy Cott suggested in 1990 that there was 'every opportunity for salutary intersection between 'men's' and women's history' and that men's history could illuminate the workings of what we then called 'the sex/gender system'. Nancy F. Cott, 'On Men's History and Women's History', in Mark C. Carnes and Clyde Griffen (eds), *Meanings for*

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Manhood: Constructions of Masculinity in Victorian America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 206.

7. R. W. Connell, *Masculinities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 77, 82–83.
8. Also see, for example, Kimmel, *The Gendered Society*, p. 2.
9. The terms are Connell's, but they and their near-equivalents are in widespread use. Until recently, men's historians were also quite taken with typologies as a way of registering the existence and interaction of multiple masculinities. See, for example, Mark Kann's classificatory scheme, which includes 'the traditional patriarch', 'aristocratic manhood', 'the genteel patriarch', 'republican manhood', and, yes, 'the self-made man'. He has, in turn, derived his terminology from Michael Kimmel. Mark E. Kann, *A Republic of Men: the American Founders: Gendered Language, and Patriarchal Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), pp. 12–15. Michael S. Kimmel, *Manhood in America: A Cultural History* (New York: Free Press, 1996).
10. Lynn Segal, 'Changing Men: Masculinities in Context', *Theory and Society* 22 (1993), p. 626. Also see Parr, who seconds Segal's concerns, but also suggests that 'it is … important to leave open the possibility that some forms of masculinity have not been defined by their difference from femininities, but by their difference from other masculinities.' Parr, 'Gender History', pp. 370–71. Many critics have reiterated Segal's point. See Konstantin Dierks, 'Men's History, Gender History', *Gender & History* 4 (2002), p. 150; Mark Justad, 'Women's Studies and Men's Studies: Friends or Foes?', *The Journal of Men's Studies* 8 (2000), p. 402.
11. Mark C. Carnes, *Secret Ritual and Manhood in Victorian America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), who does argue that the secret rituals and spaces of male fraternities are a reaction to the cultural and social authority claimed by middle-class white women of the era. See also the collected essays in Carnes and Griffen (eds), *Meanings for Manhood*, and W. Jeffry Bolster, *Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997). The high-water mark of gay history in the subculture studies mode is George Chauncey's dazzling *Gay New York: The Making of the Gay Male World, 1890–1940* (New York: Basic Books, 1994).
12. Parr, 'Gender History', p. 369.
13. Women's historians were debating this point more or less from the outset. See Ellen Dubois, Mari Jo Buhle, Temma Kaplan, Gerda Lerner and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 'Politics and Culture in Women's History: A Symposium', *Feminist Studies* 6 (1980), pp. 26–64.
14. On false symmetry see Cott, 'Men's History and Women's History', pp. 205–6; Traister, 'Academic Viagra', p. 299. False symmetry was one aspect of the feminist debates in the mid-1990s about the intellectual and administrative politics of the use of the terms 'gender' and 'gender studies'. Rosi Braidotti, who prefers the language of sexual difference, states that the covering concept of gender 'presumes that men and women are constituted in symmetrical ways' and lambasts gender studies for its 'politically disastrous institutional consequences', among them the 'take-over of the feminist agenda by studies on masculinity'. Rosi Braidotti, with Judith Butler, 'Feminism by Any Other Name', *Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies* 6 (1994) as usefully summarised in Calvin Thomas, 'Reenfleshing the Bright Boys: or, How Male Bodies Matter to Feminist Theory', in Judith Kegan Gardner (ed.), *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory: New Directions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), pp. 61, 65 (quote).
15. Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 7. Bederman's formulation is indebted to Joan Wallach Scott, 'The Evidence of Experience', *Critical Inquiry* 17 (1991), pp. 773–97, and Teresa de Lauretis, 'The Semiotics of Experience', in De Lauretis (ed.), *Alice Doesn't: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 158–86.
16. Judith Butler's work, most notably *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1990), but also *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (New York: Routledge, 1993), has been especially influential in American men's studies.

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17. Connell had previously published a book on women and gender important in his own field of sociology, entitled *Gender and Power: Society, the Person and Sexual Politics* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) and has just released *Gender* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). Similarly, compare Michael Kimmel's *American Manhood* to his overview, *The Gendered Society*. See also, E. Anthony Rotundo, *American Manhood: Transformations in Masculinity from the Revolution to the Modern Era* (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
18. See Mrinalini Sinha, 'Giving Masculinity a History: Some Contributions from Indian History', *Gender & History* 11 (1999), p. 447.
19. Sinha, 'Giving Masculinity a History', p. 454.
20. Antoinette Burton, 'A 'Pilgrim Reformer' at the Heart of the Empire: Behramji Malabari in Late-Victorian London', *Gender & History* 8 (1996), pp. 175–96; Catherine Hall, 'Imperial Man: Edward Eyre in Australasia and the West Indies, 1833–66', in Bill Schwarz (ed.), *The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity and Cultural History* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 130–70; Mrinalini Sinha, *Colonial Masculinity: The 'Manly Englishman' and the 'Effeminate Bengali' in the Late Nineteenth-Century* (New York: St Martin's, 1996); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Can the Subaltern Speak?', in Patrick Williams and Laura Chrisman (eds), *Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 82, 90–104; Ann L. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). Also see the recent forum on the possibilities for drawing the history of North American and post-colonial studies closer together. Ann L. Stoler, Ramón Gutiérrez, Lori D. Ginzberg, Dirk Hoerder, Mary A. Renda and Robert J. McMahon, 'Empires and Intimacies: Lessons from (Post) Colonial Studies: a Round Table', *Journal of American History* (2001), pp. 829–97.
21. Homi Bhabha, 'Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse', *October* 28 (1984), 126–33. On Bhabha's gender-neutral subject, see Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Context* (New York: Routledge, 1995), pp. 362–4. But also see his theoretical treatment of masculinity, anxiety and authoritarian forms of nationalism, Bhabha, 'Are You a Man or a Mouse?', in Maurice Berger, Brian Wallis and Simon Watson (eds), *Constructing Masculinity* (New York: Routledge, 1995).
22. Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 11 (quote), 11–15; Kathleen M. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, & Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia* (Chapel Hill, NC: Institute of Early American History and Culture and the University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Toby L. Ditz, 'Shipwrecked, or Masculinity Imperiled: Mercantile Representations of Failure and the Gendered Self in Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia', *Journal of American History* 81 (1994), pp. 51–80; Dana D. Nelson, *National Manhood: Capitalist Citizenship and the Imagined Fraternity of White Men* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 16, 19.
23. For general appraisals of the crisis theme to which these paragraphs on crisis are especially indebted, see Judith Allen, 'Men in Crisis?', pp. 199–202; Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, 10–20; Frank Mort, 'Crisis Points: Masculinities in Social Theory, *Gender and History* 6 (1994), pp. 124–30; Traister, 'Academic Viagra', pp. 285–99. Also see Judith Kegan Gardiner, 'Introduction', in *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory*, pp. 6–11, 14.
24. Mainstream academics associated with men's studies critique the politically conservative tendencies associated with the men's movement. Judith Kegan Gardiner, 'Theorizing Age and Gender: Bly's Boys, Feminism, and Maturity Masculinity', in *Masculinity Studies & Feminist Theory*, pp. 102–107. Despite the American Men's Studies Association's early affiliation with the anti-sexist men's movement and the generally progressive commitments of its mission statement, its embrace of diverse perspectives on how to interpret men's experience extends to proponents of Bly's mythopoetics. 'Mission Statement', American Men's Studies Association, <www.vix.com/pub/men/orgs/writeups/amsa.html>; James Doyle and Sam Femiano, 'Reflections on the Early History of the American Men's Studies Association and the Evolution of the Field', <www.mensstudies.org/history.htm>.

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25. Traister, 'Academic Viagra', p. 276.
26. Hazel V. Carby, 'On the Threshold of the Women's Era: Lynching, Empire and Sexuality in Black Feminist Theory', in Henry Lewis Gates (ed.), *'Race', Writing and Difference* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 301–316; Carby, *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, *Gender and Jim Crow: Women and the Politics of White Supremacy in North Carolina, 1896–1920* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Also see Jaquelyn Dowd Hall, *Revolt against Chivalry: Jessie Daniel Ames and the Women's Campaign against Lynching*, rev. ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993) and Martha Hodes, *White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the Nineteenth-Century South* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). See Evelyn Brooks Higgenbotham's elegant appraisal of approaches to race and gender in her widely cited essay of the early 1990s, 'African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race', *Signs* 17 (1992), pp. 251–74.
27. Also consider in an adjacent context, Steven J. Stern's magisterial, *The Secret History of Gender: Women, Men, & Power in Colonial Mexico* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
28. Stoler *et al.*, 'Empires and Intimacies', pp. 829–97; Laura McCall and Donald Yacovone, 'Introduction', in *A Shared Experience*, pp. 1–15; Lisa Wilson, *'Ye Heart of a Man': The Domestic Life of Men in Colonial New England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
29. Carnes notes that he and others had wrongly predicted in the 1980s that men's history *and* women's history would 'wither away' in favour of an 'interactive' history of gender. 'Foreword', p. xi.
30. See notably Dana Nelson's felt need, as one who is 'unrelentingly critical of the effects that the institutions and practices of white manhood produce for women and people of color', to account for what might strike the reader as her 'startlingly sympathetic' analysis and interpretation of some of the white men, real and fictional, who appear in her book, *National Manhood*, pp. 25, 26.
31. To name only a few well-known women's historians who have ventured into men's history, consider the following: Elsa Barkley Brown, who developed the concept of 'womanist consciousness' to interpret the culture of late nineteenth-century African-American women in her 'Womanist Consciousness: Maggie Lena Walker and the Independent Order of Saint Luke', *Signs* 14 (1989), pp. 610–33, is now working on a full-scale study of male friendship among early twentieth-century African-American men; Catherine Hall, who together with Lenore Davidoff, wrote the magisterial *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (London: Hutchinson, 1987), later published *White, Male, and Middle Class: Explorations in Feminism and History* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); Darlene Clark Hine, who has in the past co-edited several volumes of essays and documents on African-American women's history of signal importance for institutionalising that field of study, including the widely acclaimed *Black Women in America: An Historical Encyclopedia*, 2 vols., Darlene Clark Hine, Elsa Barkley Brown, and Rosalyn Terborg-Penn (eds), (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), is now co-editor of a series on black manhood. See Darlene Clark Hine and Earnestine Jenkins (eds), *A Question of Manhood: A Reader in U. S. Black Men's History and Masculinity*, vol. 1, *'Manhood Rights': The Construction of Black Male History and Manhood, 1750–1870* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999); and Carroll Smith Rosenberg, who published ground-breaking work on nineteenth-century women's history as early as the mid-1970s, including the touchstone essay, 'Female World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America', in the inaugural issue of *Signs* 1 (1975), pp. 1–30, has lately turned her attention to the gendered rhetoric of the literary men of the early republic. 'Discovering the Subject of the "Great Constitutional Discussion", 1786–1789', *Journal of American History* 79 (1992), pp. 841–73.
32. Thomas is summarising and endorsing the views of Kaja Silverman and Tania Modeleski, 'Reenfleshing the Bright Boys', p. 62 (emphasis in the original).
33. Judith Allen, 'Men in Crisis', pp. 192–3.

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34. Heidi Hartmann, 'Family as the Locus of Gender, Class, and Political Struggle: The Case of Housework', *Signs* 6 (1981), p. 372; Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence', *Signs* 8 (1983), pp. 635–58; Adrienne Rich, 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Experience', *Signs* 5 (1980), pp. 631–60. Also see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988).
35. Gayle Rubin, 'The Traffic in Women: Notes on the "Political Economy" of Sex', in Rayna R. Reiter (ed.), *Toward an Anthropology of Women* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975). Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, *Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).
36. Her estimates exclude the substantial number of adult children who were *de facto* dependants: living at home without property of their own, but legally entitled to depart. Carole Shammas, 'Anglo-American Household Government in Comparative Perspective', *William and Mary Quarterly* 52 (1995), pp. 123 (figures), 104–144.
37. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches, and Anxious Patriarchs*.
38. Jennifer Lyle Morgan, *Laboring Women: Reproduction, and Slavery in Early America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming, 2004); and Morgan, "Some Could Suckle Over Their Shoulder": Male Travelers, Female Bodies, and the Gendering of Racial Ideology, 1500–1770', *William and Mary Quarterly* 54 (1997), pp. 167–92. On sexual access to slave women and its importance in defining slaveholders' masculinity, see also Natalie A. Zacek, 'Sex, Sexuality, and Social Control in the Eighteenth-Century Leeward Islands', in Merril D. Smith (ed.), *Sex and Sexuality in Early America* (New York: New York University Press, 1998). Also see Kirsten Fischer's *Suspect Relations: Sex, Race, and Resistance in Colonial North Carolina* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).
39. Hendrik Hartog, *Man and Wife in America: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 135.
40. Wayne Bodle, 'Soldiers in Love: Patrolling the Gendered Frontiers of the Early Republic', in *Sex and Sexuality in Early America*, pp. 217–39; Thomas A. Foster 'Deficient Husbands: Manhood, Sexual Incapacity, and Male Marital Sexuality in Seventeenth-Century New England', *William and Mary Quarterly* 56 (1999), pp. 723–44; Foster, 'Sex and the Eighteenth-Century Man: Anglo-American Discourses of Sex and Manliness in Massachusetts, 1690–1765', PhD diss., Johns Hopkins University, 2002; Richard Godbeer, *Sexual Revolution in Early America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); Mark Kann, *Republic of Men*; Lisa Wilson, *'Ye Heart of a Man'*; Karin Wulf, *Not All Wives: Women of Colonial Philadelphia* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2000), pp. 106–110, 116–17. On interracial unions and self-made marriages on what has come to be known as the gender frontier, see Nancy F. Cott, *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 27–37; Albert L. Hurtado, 'When Strangers Meet: Sex and Gender on Three Frontiers', *Frontiers* 17 (1996), pp. 52–75; Philip D. Morgan, 'Interracial Sex in the Chesapeake and the British Atlantic World, 1700–1820', in Jan Ellen Lewis and Peter S. Onuf (eds), *Sally Hemings and Thomas Jefferson: History, Memory, and Civic Culture* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1999), pp. 52–84; Peggy Pascoe, 'Gender, Race, and Intercultural Relations: the Case of Interracial Marriage', *Frontiers* 12 (1991), pp. 5–18; and the important collections Martha Hodes (ed.), *Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North American History* (New York: New York University Press, 1999).
41. Hartog, *Man and Wife in America*, pp. 137, 139. The language of sexual 'possession' and 'monopoly' is Hartog's.
42. Mark Kann, *Republic of Men*.
43. Pateman, *Sexual Contract*. For the French case, also see Joan B. Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere in the Age of the French Revolution* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988); and Joan Wallach Scott, *Only Paradoxes to Offer: French Feminists and the Rights of Man* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
44. Cornelia Hughes Dayton, *Women Before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639–1789* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Linda K. Kerber, 'The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the Early Republic: The Case of Martin vs.

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Massachusetts, 1805', *American Historical Review* 97 (1992), pp. 349–78; Mary Beth Norton, *Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming of American Society* (New York: Knopf, 1996), esp., pp. 282–92, 405. Also see the excellent appraisal in Karin Wulf, *Not All Wives*, esp. pp. 181–210. For a similar construction of the south in a slightly later period, see Stephanie McCurry, *Masters of Small Worlds: Yeoman Households, Gender Relations, and the Political Culture of the Antebellum South Carolina Low Country* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). There are considerable differences in emphasis among these authors, but they all stress the masculinisation of politics. This is not the universal consensus about the revolutionary era and early republic. See especially Rosemarie Zagarri's thoughtful article on natural rights talk derived from Scottish Enlightenment traditions as applied to women, 'The Rights of Man and Woman in Post-Revolutionary America', *William and Mary Quarterly* 55 (1998), pp. 228–9 (quote), also 204. On an American variant of salon culture among elites, also see Catherine Allgor, *Parlor Politics: in which the Ladies of Washington Help Build a City and a Government* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2000); Susan Branson, *These Fiery Frenchified Dames: Women and Political Culture in Early National Philadelphia* (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001); Patricia Cleary, *Elizabeth Murray: A Woman's Pursuit of Independence in Eighteenth-Century America* (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2000), esp. pp. 167–220; Bruce Dorsey, *Reforming Men and Women*, pp. 11–49.

45. It should be said that the family so imagined was non-political, but not private in the sense of 'sequestered' or 'opposed to the social'. In the ideology of the early republic, the natural affections and the sensibilities associated with the family and the familiar were preeminently social qualities that linked the domestic hearth to other scenes of sociability. Nancy Cott, Hendrik Hartog and Amy Stanley have recently powerfully extended the theme of marriage as a way of triangulating political relations among men into the nineteenth century. Stanley, for example, argues that in a society increasingly governed by the ideology of contract and its antinomies, 'home' comes to be understood as the antithesis and limit to market logic, and its possession, the sign of a man's freedom and capacity for citizenship. As actual access to homes was differentially distributed along racial and class lines, achieving the status of head of household became a political rallying point for freedman and poor white workers. Amy Dru Stanley, *From Bondage to Contract: Wage Labor, Marriage, and the Market in the Age of Slave Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). Also see Nancy Cott, who shows that the law of marriage played a significant role in creating legal distinctions between US born European-Americans and immigrants and Indians. Cott, *Public Vows*, pp. 120–3, 132–55. Also see Hartog, *Man and Wife in America*.
46. Jane Kamensky, 'Talk Like a Man: Speech, Power, and Masculinity in Early New England', in *A Shared Experience*, pp. 21, 22
47. Kamensky, 'Talk Like a Man', p. 27.
48. The phrase is Defoe's. Defoe, *The Complete English Tradesman* (New York: Alan Sutton, 1987), p. 141. Ditz, 'Shipwrecked' and 'Formative Ventures: Mercantile Letters and the Articulation of Experience', in Rebecca Earle and Carolyn Steedman (eds), *Epistolary Selves: Letters and Letter-Writers, 1600–1945* (London: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 59–78.
49. The scholarly literature on misogyny in eighteenth-century political polemics is vast. On France, see, for example, Lynn Hunt, *The Family Romance of the French Revolution* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). On Rousseau, theatricality, and women, see Landes, *Women and the Public Sphere,* pp. 71–89. On early eighteenth-century England and the colonies, see, among others, Kenneth Lockridge, *On the Sources of Patriarchal Rage: The Commonplace Books of William Byrd and Thomas Jefferson and the Gendering of Power in the Eighteenth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1992), pp. 32–37, 104–111. For more on the virtuous woman and her complications when used 'as both sign and scapegoat' to represent her class, see Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 'Discovering the Subject', pp. 861 (quote), 858–62, and 'Domesticating Virtue: Coquettes and Revolutionaries in Young America', in Elaine Scarry (ed.) *Literature and the Body: Essays on Populations and Persons* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), pp. 162–6.

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50. On nationalist literature and the vanishing Indian, see Carolyn Eastman, '"A Nation of Speechifiers": Oratory, Print, and the Making of a Gendered American Public, 1780–1830', PhD diss, Johns Hopkins University, 2001; Dana Nelson, *National Manhood*, pp. 61–102, Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, 'Discovering the Subject'.
51. Janet Moore Lindman, 'Acting the Manly Christian: White Evangelical Masculinity in Revolutionary Virginia', *William and Mary Quarterly* 57 (2000), p. 395.
52. Lindman, 'Acting the Manly Christian', pp. 401 (quotes), 405–410.
53. Lindman, 'Acting the Manly Christian', p. 416.
54. Lindman, ''Acting the Manly Christian', p. 415.
55. Male evangelicals called their Christian fellowship, 'our fraternity'. Lindman, 'Acting the Manly Christian', p. 414. Here Lindman shares a line of interpretation developed by Susan Juster, *Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New England* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994).
56. Rather then end on this pessimistic note, we should observe that the outcome would be different in the second Great Awakening, especially in the northern states, but to a lesser extent in the south as well. A generation after Virginia's evangelical Baptists reinstated patriarchal authority in their new churches, women in many places gained greater autonomy within the evangelised churches and moral reform associations that dotted the early nineteenth-century landscape. The Second Great Awakening did redistribute cultural authority among men, but it also enabled women to challenge more successfully than had prior generations the gendered power of their male evangelical allies. Christine Leigh Heyrman, *Southern Cross: the Beginnings of the Bible Belt* (New York: Knopf, 1997); Mary Ryan, *Cradle of the Middle-Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790–1985* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
57. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 139 (quote), 137–86.
58. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, p. 174.
59. She also analyses in some detail, as prior historians had not, the participation of women in the Rebellion. In the midst of the actual fighting, women acted as suppliers and informants for both sides, defended their homesteads and relied on their long-standing role as informal arbiters of community morality to influence the course of events. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 162–6, 169, 171, 176.
60. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, p. 145. On the power of women's gossip and their moral authority, especially as regulators of sexual conduct, in what Mary Beth Norton calls the 'informal publics' of local communities, see Norton, *Founding Mothers and Fathers*, esp. pp. 19–21, 253–77; also Norton, 'Gender and Defamation in Seventeenth-Century Maryland', *William and Mary Quarterly* 44 (1987), pp. 3–39.
61. Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 140–9, 179 (quote).
62. For two other studies of cultural interaction and military conflict between European settlers and Indians that systematically analyse competing masculinities without losing sight of women's interactions with men or the overall dynamics of gendered power, see JoAnn Barr, 'The "Seductions" of Texas: The Political Language of Gender in the Conquest of Texas, 1690–1803', PhD Diss, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1999), and Ann Little, *Abraham in Arms: Gender and Power on the New England Frontier, 1620–1760* (University Park, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, forthcoming).
63. Claudio Saunt, '"Domestick … Quiet being broke": Gender Conflict among Creek Indians in the Eighteenth Century', in Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (eds), *Contact Points, American Frontiers from the Mohawk Valley to the Mississippi*, 1750–1830 (University of North Carolina Press, 1998), pp. 151–2.
64. Women's participation in the increasingly lucrative and commercialised trade in deerskins declined and the now masculinised trade in deerskins began to eclipse in importance the economic value of the work that women did control, including crop and textile production Saunt, 'Gender Conflict', pp. 156 (quote), 154–9.
65. Of course, the British and Anglo-American reformers had in mind a gendered political economy that ill-suited the aspirations of Creek women: 'plow agriculture practiced

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by men' based on 'a domestic economy of the patriarchal family.' Saunt, 'Gender Conflict', pp. 153 (quote), 163–6.

66. The dissident men burnt the schools, butchered the cattle, and murdered and then mutilated the bodies of the white women and men who represented the new 'civilized' order, and some Creek women abandoned the use of 'European goods' and became 'prophets, preaching against the plows and looms' that appeared to them to represent a devil's bargain. Saunt, 'Gender Conflict', p. 173.
67. Lockridge, *Patriarchal Rage*, pp. 23, 26–7.
68. They also represented, via displacement, the elements of the self that elite discourses of manly identity and comportment repudiated as unmanly and low (but also covertly elicited), especially the passions and their immoderate expression. Lockridge, *Patriarchal Rage*, p. 37.
69. Lockridge, 'Colonial Self-Fashioning: Paradoxes and Pathologies in the Construction of Genteel Identity in Eighteenth-Century America', in Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute (eds), *Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), pp. 279–87, 323. Richard Godbeer proposes a somewhat different interpretation of Byrd's sexuality and its link to his sense of masculine entitlement as a gentleman. 'William Byrd's 'Flourish': The Sexual Cosmos of a Southern Planter', in *Sex and Sexuality*, pp. 135–55.
70. Carol F. Karlsen, *The Devil in the Shape of a Woman: Witchcraft in Colonial New England* (New York: Norton, 1987). See also Paul Boyer and Stephen Nissenbaum, *Salem Possessed: The Social Origins of Witchcraft* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); John Demos, *Entertaining Satan: Witchcraft and the Culture of Early New England* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Christine Heyrman, *Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690–1750* (New York: Norton, 1984), pp. 109–125; and Mary Beth Norton, *In the Devil's Snare: the Salem Witchcraft Crisis of 1692* (New York: Knopf, 2002).
71. As she puts it, the 'young women' who had been 'momentarily powerful became once more powerless', 'once again … followers, not leaders; governed, not governors; the silent, not the speakers'. Norton, *In the Devil's Snare*, pp. 304 (quote), also especially 297–8, 300.
72. The interest in multiple masculinities among men's historians, especially as reinforced by historians of sexuality, has generated a high level of interest in men who created gender trouble. The quickly accumulating studies of eighteenth-century discourses of effeminacy and homoerotic friendships and the lively debates about the existence of the homosexual subject in the eighteenth century are testimony to these interests among colonial historians. Patricia Bonomi, *The Lord Cornbury Scandal: The Politics of Reputation in British America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Richard Godbeer, '"The Cry of Sodom": Discourse, Intercourse, and Desire in Colonial New England', *William and Mary Quarterly* 52 (1995), pp. 259–86; Jeffrey Merrick, 'Sodomitical Scandals and Subcultures in the 1720s', *Men and Masculinities* 1 (1999), pp. 365–84; John Murrin, '"Things Fearful to Name" Bestiality in Colonial America', *Pennsylvania History* 65 (1998), pp. 8–43; Randolph Trumbach, 'The Birth of the Queen: Sodomy and the Emergence of Gender Equality in Modern Culture, 1660–1750', in Martin Duberman, Martha Vicinus, and George Chauncey (eds), *Hidden from History: Reclaiming the Gay and Lesbian Past* (New York: NAL books, 1989), pp. 129–40.
73. The eventual outcome may also be paradigmatic. When the magistrates did catch up with Hall, they repeatedly tried and failed to pigeonhole Hall as belonging to one sex or the other. Stymied in their effort to align the conventional social and anatomical signifiers of gender, they ordered Hall to dress in men's clothing, with the proviso that s/he was also to wear a female cap and apron. One might argue that the court created a third sex, but it did so only in the form of a humiliating decree that actually shored up gender boundaries. People like Hall might live alternately as a man and as a woman for long periods in a culture that emphasised the embodiment and elaboration of masculine and feminine natures in the outward signs of bodily carriage, comportment and display of skills. But they could not occupy both categories simultaneously, except as living contradictions and objects of

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ridicule. See Brown, *Good Wives, Nasty Wenches*, pp. 75–80; Norton, *Founding Mothers and Fathers*, pp. 183–97.

74. Marcus Rediker, 'Liberty beneath the Jolly Roger: the Lives of Anne Bonny and Mary Read, Pirates', in Margaret S. Creighton and Lisa Norling Irun (eds), *Men, Wooden Women: Gender and Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700–1920* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), p. 10.
75. Dianne Dugaw, 'Female Sailors Bold: Transvestite Heroines and the Markers of Gender and Class', in *Iron Men, Wooden Women*, p. 46.
76. Dugaw comments of one sailor, Mary Ann Talbot, who lived as John Taylor, that when 'dressed as a man and behaving as a man, Talbot is taken for a man and to a large extent understands herself as "manly"'. 'Female Sailors Bold', p. 45.
77. The expression is Judith Halberstam's and is in some ways problematic. See Halberstam, 'The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly: Men, Women, and Masculinity', *Masculinity Studies and Feminist Theory*, p. 345.
78. Dugaw, 'Female Sailors Bold', pp. 37 (quote), 37–43.
79. See Eve Sedgwick's plea that we 'stop presupposing that everything pertaining to men can be classified as masculinity, and everything that can be said about masculinity pertains in the first place to men'. Sedgwick, 'Gosh, Boy George, You Must Be Awfully Secure in Your Masculinity!', in *Constructing Masculinity*, p. 12.

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