

# German film censorship during World War I

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**G**erman film censorship is almost as old as the medium itself.<sup>1</sup> Under pressure from the press and the 'monopolistic demands of the intelligentsia of written culture to give significance and meaning to life',<sup>2</sup> fear of the popular and suggestive new medium of film was especially pronounced in the nationalist, militaristic, semi-autocratic German Empire.<sup>3</sup> A series of different guidelines for film censorship arose as a result of discussions about cinema reform in the separate German states. They were linked by the merging of decision-making and administrative powers in the respective film review offices. On 5 May 1906, film censorship was introduced for the first time in the jurisdiction of Berlin, which did not issue its first order until two years later<sup>4</sup> however. As in all the other German states which introduced film censorship, even in the smaller states like the Grand Duchy Saxony-Weimar which only had four cinemas,<sup>5</sup> film censorship was treated the same as the censorship of the press. Since censorship in the Empire had been done away with in the wake of the Press Law of 1874, film-makers filed suit against Berlin's censorship order. According to the judgement passed down by the Prussian Higher Administrative Court, Berlin censorship rulings were legal since they were based on the Theater Censorship of 1850.<sup>6</sup> This court approval of cinema censorship laws was also applied in the other German States in the ensuing years. A prophylactic police censorship went into effect in April of 1909. Stemming initially from the ministerial decree of 1909, Bavaria issued detailed censorship orders in January 1912.<sup>7</sup> Württemberg followed this step in June of 1914 by issuing orders that were particularly

severe. On 16 December 1910, by way of order, all governing presidents were held responsible for introducing film censorship. Within the framework of simplification and administrative relief, the decisions of the Berlin cinema censorship became authoritative for the entire governmental jurisdiction.<sup>8</sup> By contrast, Hamburg's senate only authorised a commission of teachers to judge the appropriateness of films for a young audience; no further orders were issued.<sup>9</sup>

The censorship orders did not only vary among the separate German states. There were differences between the various cities and governmental jurisdictions. In Prussia there were a total of 24 film censorship centres, of which Berlin was the most important. Within that centre, film censorship was annexed to the theatre department, which was also responsible for variety shows and circus performances. In Bavaria, all films had to be presented to a censorship centre in Munich. Paragraph 2 of the Bavarian film censorship law determined that the local centres in Munich could ban films that had been censored, 'if the local situation should so demand'.<sup>10</sup>

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On the national level, the Undersecretary of the Interior asked the Foreign Office on 25 May 1911 for their ambassadors to provide papers on film censorship policies for the various countries in which they were accredited, 'for eventual steps to be taken by the Empire in the battle against dirt in word and image'.<sup>11</sup> After a short debate in the *Reichstag* 'Mumm and Co.' offered a resolution with the goal of forced concessions for cinemas and a 'tougher and more stream-lined surveillance of cinematographic theatre'.<sup>12</sup> Despite considerable efforts on various sides, by August 1914 not only had all attempts to enforce film censorship failed in each German state, but the attempt to come up with a unified film law for the entire Reich had failed as well.

Independent of these legislative efforts, a comparison of the films shown in Munich and Berlin between 1912 and 1914 shows that the number of movies generally banned for those under age had reached its nadir by 1914. The comparison also shows that we can only speak conditionally of a homogeneous German film market for the period immediately preceding the war: movies that could be shown in Berlin were forbidden in Munich and vice versa, just as in the prior years.<sup>13</sup>

On 1 July 1914, without further explanation, the Berlin police issued an order raising censorship fees by 1,700 per cent. In response, many filmmakers refused to submit new films for censorship review in order to avoid paying the fees.<sup>14</sup> After much protest, the Prussian Minister of Finance signed a new order, which was at first limited to one year. However, the lowered censorship fees were still higher than before 1 July 1914.<sup>15</sup> In April 1915 this fee ordinance was made effective for the duration of the war.<sup>16</sup>

At the same time cinema reformers such as Karl Brummer<sup>17</sup> were unsuccessful in banning films using court orders.<sup>18</sup> The Higher Administrative Court in Berlin took the position that it is not the task of the police 'to march in with police orders whenever doubts are raised from a pedagogical standpoint'.<sup>19</sup> Despite the relatively low actual number of censorship cases in Bavaria and Berlin, public attacks from opponents of cinema, the Württemberg censorship law, and the raising of censorship fees and entertainment taxes for cinema immediately before the outbreak of the war, gave the im-

pression that the economic existence of cinema was seriously threatened. To this extent film censorship remained one of the unsolved problems of the pre-war period.<sup>20</sup>

During the War the number of censorship interventions increased. The ensuing difficulties affected not only the film industry, but also military and governmental positions, which used film as a medium for propaganda especially during the second half of the war.

### The legal basis of film censorship in time of war

The imperial decree of 31 July 1914 placed the entire Empire except for Bavaria under martial law. With the order for mobilisation in accordance with Article 68, the laws of 4 June 1851 for a state of siege also went into effect in the German Empire. This meant that 24 military commanders from the army corps, as well as the 33 governors and commandants, assumed power of enforcement within the territories assigned to them. The army areas were not identical with governmental districts, that is, with province and state borders. Thus the military areas overlapped with the civil government creating a break in the traditional administrative technical structures.<sup>21</sup> This also affected the previous organisation of film censorship. The Reich's plans for mobilisation did not include any specific measures for the press or for film. Immediately prior to the onset of the war the commander in chief of the army dispatched an instruction sheet for the press in a state of war.<sup>22</sup> After 1 August 1914, public governmental work of the Reich was limited to a conference of the general staff with representatives from the press. At this meeting in the Reichstag the governmental representatives guaranteed a generous interpretation of censorship regulations. Press conferences held several times a week in Berlin served as a source of further information about war events in the following weeks. Representatives from various ministries and from the highest command ranks of the army participated. These conferences were meaningless for film production. This publicity, which was limited to written media, is typical in that it makes apparent that the use of pictures for reporting was far from the minds of leading military and ministerial bureaucrats at

the beginning of the war. Like the later establishment of a department for censorship,<sup>23</sup> this example demonstrates that film only received a marginal role alongside other performing arts and that primary attention was focussed on the press during the entire war. As for the majority of the public, the press was the decisive medium in war reportage and the propaganda efforts which went into effect later. During the war, film was increasingly important as a publicity medium, especially for German domestic and foreign propaganda. Yet during the Reichstag discussions on cinema concessions in 1918, many of the delegates were still unaware that film censorship was even being practiced in Germany.<sup>24</sup>

Official reportage of war events was initially limited to reports from the army,<sup>25</sup> First eight<sup>26</sup> and then fifteen rigorously selected war reporters from the press took care of further information.<sup>27</sup> After a corresponding order of the general staff,<sup>28</sup> several film companies were allowed from late September and early October 1914, to do front reportage: Messter-Film, Eiko-Film GmbH as well as a film company from Freiburg and München.<sup>29</sup> All remaining film companies and newspaper reporters were barred from direct war reportage.<sup>30</sup> Department III B of the acting general command was responsible for the censorship of texts, pictures and films.<sup>31</sup> Occasionally pure 'marine films' were censored by the press division of the naval staff.<sup>32</sup> In the various orders and guidelines on censorship contents of the acting general staff, military films were still treated in the second half of the war as part of picture (and thus press) censorship.<sup>33</sup> That is, film was considered by



Fig. 1. Handbill for *Messter Woche* military newsreel, 1916. [*Der Film*, no. 22, 1916.]

military leaders to be a conditionally independent medium of information.

Apart from the decisions made by the general staff, the military commanders, who were responsible in their respective divisions for 'insuring public order', also took over press and film censorship. On the basis of an order of the military commander and by order of the acting general command the state and municipal cinema censorship centres continued their activity from August 1914 onward. A specified film censorship was now introduced in all of those states which had previously done without. Due to the military subordination of the censorship

centres, the Higher Administrative Court could only conditionally be called on to mediate as a decision-making power in legal differences between the censorship office and film producers.<sup>34</sup> Many general commanders did not feel bound by the censorship decisions of Division III B of the deputy general staff, in Berlin, which was responsible, among other things, for military censorship of press and film. Thus the first censored war footage which came into the moviehouses in October of 1914 was banned in Hannover, Halle and Bremerhaven out of fear of espionage.<sup>35</sup> Since from the start only a few cameramen were allowed to take pictures at the front, and even those were strictly censored, the moviehouses were unable to provide the up-to-date war pictures which viewers were expecting.<sup>36</sup> The few pictures which could be shown were 'completely damaged'. They 'increasingly lost the right ... to be considered as such, since they were only harmless genre scenes, which had no drawing power'.<sup>37</sup> Beyond this they were missing the reality which moviegoers wanted due to lengthy censorship decisions.<sup>38</sup> These additional interventions in military censorship first changed when, in April of 1917, the highest censorship office under

General Quartermaster Erich von Ludendorff became the enforcing organ of the highest army command, and the Chief of Division III B, Major Walter Nicolai – who had assumed this function since the beginning of the war – had directive power over the deputy general command. Already in the first days of the war the military commanders issued bans on film production which were later partially raised. From 3 August to mid-September 1914 it was forbidden to film departing troops in Dresden; and in Hamburg<sup>39</sup> and Berlin<sup>40</sup> it was forbidden to take pictures of squares and streets without police permission. In Lübeck, musical performances were forbidden as unpatriotic and Munich moviehouses had to close for ten days in observation of mobilisation day.<sup>41</sup> In Strasbourg all movie houses were




Fig. 2. Major Walter Nicolai, Chief of Division III B of the general staff (signal section and counter-espionage). [Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz.]

closed in August for almost two months. A ban on photography was generally in effect.<sup>42</sup> War coverage was forbidden in all moviehouses in Berlin.<sup>43</sup> On 11 August, the President of the Police gave the following order: 'With respect for the present time of war, it must be expected that performances can only take place which are in keeping with the seriousness of these times and with the patriotic sense of the public. Further, performances are to be avoided which could have the effect of inciting the public to do violence to unarmed foreigners living here. Entrepreneurs who do not abide by this order and create irritation or disturbances to the public order through their performances can reckon with a retraction of the postponement of curfew, and that the closing of their premises will be considered'.<sup>44</sup>



In as much as film censorship did not affect military subject matter, the following writ from the Prussian Ministry of War served the relevant offices during the war as a basis for decision-making: 'Feelings have been voiced here that [the] cinematographic theatre presents many pieces which, because of their superficiality and shallowness, are unsuited for the seriousness of our times, and that many of these are French and English films deserving of the same description which can only be seen as trash of the lowest sort. How much of the people's healthy common sense is destroyed by such poison? On the other hand, by presenting pictures of the fatherland and other noble images of a serious or humorous nature, these well-frequented theatres could contribute to the cultivation and preservation of a love for the fatherland and valuable morals in general. The Ministry of War can only subscribe to these ideas, making a humble plea to the royal commander in chief and the royal general command to bring their influence to bear on the responsible authorities so that these outgrowths can disappear.'<sup>45</sup> This circular was sent in Mid-December 1914 to all deputy general commands, the Chancellor of the Reich, the Prussian Minister of Interior and to the commander in chief in Mark Brandenburg province. The commander in chief answered the Minister at the end of December that this writing corresponded fully with his views, continuing: 'I have been influencing the censorship boards in this direction since the beginning of the war and the insitutions within my jurisdiction are under surveillance in this regard'.<sup>46</sup> He also forwarded this ministerial letter to the appropriate police headquarters, who reacted against the cinema. The Chief of Police in Berlin issued the

Number 56 7. Jahrgang 1914 Seite 5

**L. B. B.**

Fret 1 Programm per 4. Sept. (Nähe Berlin)  
2 Programme per 11. September  
und 2 Programme per 18. September

Wir empfehlen sofortige Entschliehung. Alle Anfragen werden der Reihe nach erledigt.

Des enormen Erfolges  
wegen mußten wir  
noch 2 weitere  
Kopien anfertigen lassen  
von  
unserem  
erfolgreichen

# Kriegs-Programm

Insgesamt sind sieben komplette Programme fünf Wochen lang hintereinander besetzt.

Von überall her werden uns unaufgefordert die größten Erfolge gemeldet; u. a. schreiben die U.T.-Theater Dresden:  
„Wir teilen Ihnen hierdurch mit, daß wir mit den beiden Filmen „Lieb Vaterland magst ruhig sein“ und „Unsere Marine“ gestern ein fast ausverkauftes Haus erzielten und das Publikum zum Schluß unter stürmischem Applaus d.Theater verließ“

**Monopolfilm-Vertriebs-Ges.**  
m. b. H.  
Zentral-Büro: **Berlin SW 48**  
Friedrichstr. 25-26  
Tel.: Moritzplatz, No. 14584, 14585  
Telegr.-Adr.: Saxofilms Berlin.

**Hanewacker & Scheler**  
Filialen:  
München, Bayerstr. 7a  
Tel.: No. 8710. Telegr.-Adr.: Saxofilms  
Düsseldorf, KaiserWilhelmstr. 52  
Tel. No. 2922. Telegr.-Adr.: Saxofilms

Fig. 3. War film advertisement, *Licht-Bild-Bühne*, 7 October 1914.

following order on 4 January 1915: 'An ordinance issued by the Minister of War sent to me in the Mark Brandenburg mandates that all films not in keeping with our earnest times due to shallowness or banality should not be shown in our cinemas'. A notice for movie theatres dated 13 January 1915, continues in this vein: 'This is where, above all, the so-called trashy backstair novels belong, presentations of events from the lives of whores and criminals (all detective films as well), further films with humorous contents which are either offensive to the heart or mind of the viewer, or, for want of any larger idea, comprise a chain of crazy, outlandish, exaggerated and often meaningless scenes. Recommended, in contrast, are the presentation of solid

pictures of a serious and humorous character which are suited to maintain high morals and to cultivate love for the fatherland. Non-compliance with this order can lead to coercive measures leading ultimately to a closing down of the movie theatre.<sup>47</sup> The commander in chief in Altona strictly interpreted the mandate of the Minister of War.<sup>48</sup>

In the summer of 1915, the Berlin censorship ruling was rendered obsolete for the VII Army Corps (Düsseldorf) and its jurisdiction. It was replaced by local censorship. Officials as well as literary and pedagogical advisers were employed there as censors.<sup>49</sup>

The various orders from the General Command based on interpretations made by the Minister of War could not be translated into legal action because the specifications placed a focus on very general qualitative moments. Since corresponding criteria could not be described more precisely and there was no consensus about transposing conceptual contents into film, film censorship was based more and more on questions of taste. This meant that subjective ideas about morals and conventions determined the nature of prohibitions and partial prohibitions. Under these conditions, arbitrary decisions could not be ruled out, thus adding to the already reduced viability of the German film market before the war. Valid film censorship laws from before the war only remained in effect in Bavaria<sup>50</sup> and Württemberg.<sup>51</sup> There only supplementary specifications for the censorship of war pictures were issued.

Censorship measures were extended not only to films submitted for review during the war, but also to old films. For example, in Berlin all films censored before August 1914 had to be censored again.<sup>52</sup> By adding regulations for young viewers, film censorship became even more nebulous. The local variance from state to state in viewer age-limitations had an effect on the development of cinema.<sup>53</sup> An ordinance in Hannover ordered the separation of sexes for one group of viewers.<sup>54</sup> Under penalty of school disciplinary measures, young viewers in Württemberg up to the age of 18 were required to see films specified for children or young audiences, regardless of the fact that such showings were rare.<sup>55</sup> An ordinance in Rhineland Palatinate and Westphalia demanded 'the honorary cooperation of voluntary forces', to prevent youth and children

from going to the movies.<sup>56</sup> Visits to the movies were forbidden for those under sixteen years of age unless school officials or the police gave special permission.<sup>57</sup> In Munich shows for young audiences were forbidden. Occasional special shows with 'programs arranged by teachers themselves' were allowed.<sup>58</sup> The First Bavarian Army Corps issued a decree on 7 March 1916 forbidding all viewers under 17 from going to the movies. As a protective measure, cinema owners were only allowed to display written announcements. Offenders could be sentenced to up to a year in jail.<sup>59</sup>

Following the Berlin ordinance of the end of April 1915, all films which had been approved for young audiences before 31 December 1912 had to be censored again by 1 October 1915 if they were to continue to be shown to this age group. Due to the acute lack of such films, a cost-free re-censorship on the part of the Berlin police expedited the process. At the same time the rigorous surveillance of movie houses was further intensified.<sup>60</sup> Beyond the qualitative moments contained in general film censorship specifications, the initiator of the ordinances issued especially for young viewers also attempted to establish pedagogical guidelines for the medium itself, which were not only limited to the age group in question. The Berlin Youth Censorship explicated the ordinance further: 'It has been repeatedly observed in recent times that owners of movie houses in greater Berlin have ignored police ordinances. Some of the movie house concessionaires in greater Berlin have recently been actively engaged in making the children's shows more attractive to unsupervised youth by showing forbidden pictures. In parts of the city with a high population of children these shows do in fact draw large numbers. Countless movie house owners are able to prevent observation by adults who would like to protect our youth from moral danger and the threat to their safety in overfilled rooms by preventing adult admittance to shows for younger audiences. Such inappropriate transgressive action will be met in the future with harsh measures. In order to enable authorities to move forward with more weight, police headquarters has been empowered by Higher Command in the provinces to close violating movie houses temporarily or permanently if necessary.'<sup>61</sup>

The German press was allowed to print army

reports during the entire war without censoring. Furthermore, all larger German newspapers were allowed to regularly publish reports of events in enemy territory. In addition, with the increased duration of the war, articles appeared about war events from the distant past, which at first could not be printed for fear of espionage. In contrast to all the larger newspapers, which regularly reported various events in foreign states, the showing of all films from countries with which Germany was at war was strictly limited. This self-isolation was a result of the impression made by the 'August experience'<sup>62</sup> and hefty attacks from a broad spectrum of the population against all French and English films<sup>63</sup> which were initially instigated by the cinema owners themselves.<sup>64</sup> Movie house owners, who had joined the Deutscher Filmbund founded after the beginning of the war, hung up a coloured placard with the text: 'No films from enemy countries will be shown here and no posters will be displayed which come from such countries. This movie theatre is a member of the German Filmbund.'<sup>65</sup> At a conference of the Society for the Protection of Common Interests of Cinematography and Related Branches, called in October 1914, many of the members debated, whether films brought from England and France prior to August should still be shown or not.<sup>66</sup> The Minister of War had already expressly referred to the negative influence of French and English films in October 1914,<sup>67</sup> yet had not specifically forbidden them.<sup>68</sup> During the period after the ban on all movies from allied nations which were not in Germany by August 1914, these were made a solid part of film censorship in agreement with many movie goers themselves.<sup>69</sup> As a result, old English and French films were shown in many parts of Germany due to a lack of films.<sup>70</sup> Thus, the deputy commanding general in charge in Münster placed special emphasis in his ordinance issued on 15 February to keep the ban on English, French and Belgian films.<sup>71</sup> The verbal disparagement of films from the *entente* states on the part of broad segments of the German population shows that the historical significance of these films for the development of the medium was ignored due to the influence of the war. At the same time the import embargo issued in 1914 meant that the German Reich could not participate internationally in the development of the medium for almost an entire decade.

In November 1915 the deputy general command extended its censorship domain to cinema advertising. After August 1914 advertising was done by artists and caricaturists, who, as a result of the war, had no more work in their own field.<sup>72</sup> Against the guidelines of the Press Law, on 8 November 1915, the Leipzig Police Department subjected all newspaper announcements, posters and advertising pictures for films to censorship before and after, threatening them with fines and imprisonment.<sup>73</sup> In Baden an ordinance of March 1916 limited the announcements of film showings to 'a simple announcement of the title of the piece to be shown without any reference to its content and without the addition of advertising pictures'.<sup>74</sup> After colour film posters in Stettin, Coburg, Düsseldorf and other cities gave in to censorship and were no longer allowed, almost all other cities in the German Empire followed suit.<sup>75</sup> The VIII Army Corps established for Koblenz that film advertising posters with pictures be subject to pre-censorship. Furthermore, these were only to be allowed if the corresponding films were also approved for young audiences.<sup>76</sup> A police ordinance issued on 11 July 1916, established that cinema and variety shows were to be limited to dimensions 'typical for theatre'. 'Renditions of crime, violence and other such shocking things as well as morally offensive pictures were forbidden'. In addition, the letter print size for posters, with a maximum of 10 cm for large and 6 cm for small letters, was precisely stipulated.<sup>77</sup> As with many other censorship specifications, this one also used the term 'morally offensive,' that is, 'a thing about which not even a hundred people have ever been able to agree on'.<sup>78</sup> In September of 1916 poster censorship in Düsseldorf became more strict. Coloured posters, which enjoyed particular popularity on the front, were fundamentally banned during the second half of the war.<sup>79</sup> Press releases were no longer allowed to use scenes from movies for advertisements. Despite pre-censorship, advertising posters were only allowed to be hung on bill posts and theatre entryways.<sup>80</sup> In some Corps areas not only posters but even advertising photos were forbidden.<sup>81</sup> Some cities had to rescind poster bans in practice on the basis of court rulings, since the police could not prove 'their detrimental moral influence'.<sup>82</sup>

The uncoordinated interventions of the second



Fig. 4. Traugott von Jagow, Berlin police chief from 1909–1916, was responsible for motion picture censorship in that city during the first years of the war. [Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz.]

that division existed between the larger theatres showing two long films at a time<sup>87</sup> and the smaller movie houses which showed one long film and several short ones.<sup>88</sup>

The dissatisfaction with these disparate censorship practices on the part of the press and film producers led to numerous extra sessions and debates in the German Parliament. The *Reichstag* alone spent some 20 controversial sessions on press censorship.<sup>89</sup> During these debates, the plenum also addressed issues concerning film censorship in May/June 1916 and in October 1917 and in March/April 1918. On the state level the Prussian House of Representatives dealt with the same topic in February of 1916 and 1917. The opinions on film censorship diverged considerably between the individual parties of the different parliaments. Thus on 4 May 1916, in a plea to the Chancellor of the German Empire, Representative Ferdinand Werner demanded of the German Social Economic Unification 'to successfully avert the escapades of the cinema which were especially shocking at the time'.<sup>90</sup> The Minister of the Interior answered to a similar demand from

the Reich Chancellor with the request, 'that it be emphatically conveyed to Representative Werner that his description of the situation contains gross exaggeration and unacceptable generalisations about specific negative situations, whose rectification should be entirely left up to the individual states, who have been giving these problems their attention for sometime'.<sup>91</sup> The newspaper *Vorwärts* responded critically to the enterprising nature of the film producers and those running the movie houses.<sup>92</sup> During a censorship debate in the *Reichstag*, social democratic delegate Gustav Noske pointed out 'how ruinous the effects of censorship and the state of occupation had been for the cinematographic theatre'. He continued further: 'the

commander in chief were not only limited to film and to the press. Berlin censors banned the Sarasani Circus which had just held 75 performances in Dresden.<sup>83</sup> Between August 1914 and the end of 1916 around 2,000 censorship orders for the press were issued altogether.<sup>84</sup> 311 films during the same time were banned in Berlin, 244 of which were banned for the duration of the war.<sup>85</sup>

The implications of these figures are significant in as much as 'no film was shown in Germany during the war which did not pass Berlin censorship'.<sup>86</sup> Since it was not possible to show all the films approved in Berlin in the provinces as well, a divided movie market arose between the capital city and censorship practices in the provinces. Within Berlin

deputy general commanders have further aggravated the situation with the cinema by extensive limiting of viewing time, and disallowing young viewers from going to the movies after 6 o'clock.<sup>93</sup> Representative Georg Gothein of the German Progressive Party elaborated before parliament:

The incommodation due to film censorship is really unheard of and we are in dire need of uniformity and a reduction of the inconvenience, if we are going to keep this film censorship at all.<sup>94</sup>

During the same session, Gustav Stresemann, later Chancellor of the German Reich and Foreign Minister, sided with demands for uniform censorship throughout the Empire made by representatives of cinema concessionaires in cooperation with those affected in the corresponding committees.<sup>95</sup> All of these discussions had no effect whatsoever until after the war because of legal rulings regarding the state of war and the various notions of censorship.

Independent of these discussions, the *Bundesrat* attempted on 3 August 1917, to circumvent the *Reichstag* by introducing compulsory business for movie houses 'according to need' and declaring this order as a war time measure.<sup>96</sup> The concept of 'need' however was not defined in the law. Initial steps taken by the states toward enacting this law show that this lack led to very different interpretations. The proposed law was turned down on 11 October 1917 on formal grounds.<sup>97</sup> It was maintained that the present version of the parliamentary order touched on areas governed by business law. These far-reaching consequences did not conform to the content of the empowerment law from 4 August 1914 giving the *Bundesrat* far-reaching competence in war-related and economic issues. As a consequence the *Bundesrat* had to lift the law regarding compulsory business at the end of October 1917 once more. A second version of the law presented by the *Bundesrat* was also vetoed by the *Reichstag* in the summer of 1918.

In addition to the censorship boards installed by the deputy general commanders, local communities also attempted to place limitations on film consumption. The municipal office of Angermünde determined that it was a criminal act for war-supported wives of servicemen to go to the movies.<sup>98</sup>

The Weida parish council in Saxony-Weimar threatened the same people with a withdrawal of support if they were found visiting the movies.<sup>99</sup> Due to the intervention of a pastor, two wives of servicemen with six children each lost their weekly support of two loaves of bread.<sup>100</sup>

Independent of concrete censorship ordinances and all other attempts to limit the population's film consumption, all measures demonstrated the attempt to enforce conformity with regard to expectations of relaxation and entertainment by making use of power politics and the consciousness of an elitist distance toward moviegoers. The political orientation for the conceptual shaping of the orders and all other measures was less a result of specific interests than of ideal purposes, which, at the same time, offered larger social guidelines for ordering thought and action.

### Censorship interests of individual social groups during the war

Just a few days before the war started, the *Licht-Bildbühne* newspaper praised 'Die Waffen nieder' (Lay Down Your Arms), a film produced by the Nordica Film Co., based on a novel by the same name written by Margarete von Suttner.<sup>101</sup> The same newspaper declared on 1 August 1914, that now 'apparently all insignificant disruptions of business have naturally withdrawn totally behind the burning danger of war itself'.<sup>102</sup> There was little sign in the cinematographic press of the hawkish enthusiasm that was apparent during the first few days of the war in some segments of the population; rather, concern about the future predominated.<sup>103</sup> On the other hand, decisions to withdraw French and English films from schedules and considerations on the future of German film<sup>104</sup> showed that even the film industry had become caught up in the patriotic enthusiasm that struck Germany in August 1914, pushing, 'for the time being, all internal conflicts and tensions to the side'.<sup>105</sup> For a short time, this respite also implied that the film industry would refrain from encounters with state agencies such as the censorship board or local governments regarding entertainment taxes. No protests took place in Berlin against film censorship,<sup>106</sup> which was intensified at the start of the war, nor against the forced closings of movie theatres in various parts of the Empire. The

ban on allied films, harsh censorship and insufficient transportation all contributed to an acute shortage of films in the early days of the war. At the same time, war recruitment efforts caused the number of movie house patrons to drop dramatically. Moreover, movie theatres as an institution and the films shown there were subjected to increased criticism during the first few weeks of the war. And finally, there was a shortage of projectionists since they were drafted, or even enlisted, for military service.<sup>107</sup> All of these reasons led to the closure of many cinemas, especially in August 1914.

Under the circumstances, some members of the film press and cinematographic associations feared the end of their industry. This is why they started defending themselves against new attacks as early as late autumn 1914. They declared an end to the truce that had meant deliberately refraining from public debate and pressure regarding differences of opinion in both the political and economic spheres. In late October and November, the *Licht-Bildbühne* had already printed numerous articles polemicising against the legal restrictions placed on film documentation from the front.<sup>108</sup> *Der Kinematograph* compared the manipulation of public opinion through the press in general and film in particular with the impact of the 42 cm cannon, one of the most powerful German artillery weapons, indirectly demanding the authorities approve more films.<sup>109</sup> On 16 February 1915, thirteen companies from a variety of branches submitted a several-page statement to the Prussian ministry of war, describing the circumstances facing German cinematography and requesting that measures be taken to improve the situation.<sup>110</sup> For the first time, the film industry was relatively unanimous in protesting the restrictions placed on motion picture advertising when it submitted a statement signed by approximately 70 companies and associations to the Prussian ministry of war, ministry of the interior and other departments.<sup>111</sup> Movie theatre owners in Saxony turned to the emperor, requesting that he mitigate the cinema decrees issued by the IVth army corps, which was responsible for their area.<sup>112</sup> In the course of the war, film industry representatives attempted to take preventive action to avert possible attacks. The Association of Cinema Owners of Greater Berlin and the Province of Brandenburg, for example, sent several letters of protest directly

to the imperial chancellor in connection with a proposal for even more severe film censorship introduced on 4 May 1916 by Reichstag representative Dr. Werner.<sup>113</sup> During the second half of the war, the censorship board and the Society for the Protection of Common Interests of Cinematography proposed having regular meetings 'to initiate and preserve mutual understanding'.<sup>114</sup>

All the protest forms clearly show that the cinematographic associations and companies did not protest censorship in general. Despite many differences on specific issues, there was broad consensus that censorship was necessary, or at least inevitable. All existing documents reflect the associations' objection to excessive resolutions only. The respective authors demanded a uniform film censorship law within the territory of the German Empire and the right to participate in all decisions on censorship.<sup>115</sup> In addition, film producers tried to develop material that experience showed would just barely make it past the censors, since this promised the highest box office returns.<sup>116</sup>

'The World War brought in new elements. It was the first war that mobilised nations in their entirety, including the home front, and it was waged with massive armies, and set ... against a background of ideology'.<sup>117</sup> This also defined the relationship of different social groups to motion picture censorship. In particular, it was the harshest critics of cinematography and the staunchest supporters of film censorship whose attitudes were ideologically motivated. These people came from the ranks of the intelligentsia, including professors, teachers and artists who remained loyal to the system, and especially Church representatives.<sup>118</sup> The way these educated classes feared 'rising mass society ... verged on obsession. It served to strengthen aristocratic and exclusive traits, including dislike of any extension of egalitarian, democratic rights and institutions' and any pluralistic cultural offerings, as represented by cinemas and other popular entertainment establishments. This educated bourgeoisie saw all forms of popular culture as inferior, since these did not spread the "'idealistic" ideals, elevated and lofty goals and norms, as cultivated and supported by the major institutions of socialisation: schools and the church'. 'The relationship of this group to politics, the power politics of the nation-state',<sup>119</sup> contradicted – especially in times of



Fig. 5. The Welt-Biograph Theater in pre-war Pritzkow, c. 1913. The posters are all in French.

war – the distance to politics that was normally exercised in other contexts. Power politics was considered legitimate as long as it served the implementation of the propagated goals.

In the prewar period, motion picture developments had neglected many of the reform efforts of the intelligentsia. Social as well as cultural polarisation seemed to be eliminated, not only by the apparently smooth integration of the 'army of workers' into the war machinery, but by the immediate willingness of movie house owners to stop showing French and English films once the war started.<sup>120</sup> The 'dull monotony'<sup>121</sup> and the 'superficial comfort'<sup>122</sup> of the prewar period seemed to have made way for a new 'community'.<sup>123</sup> The spiritual sense of mission was supposed to be carried beyond Germany's borders as a service 'to humanity' in the 'holy war'.<sup>124</sup> But domestically as

well, it was supposed to reestablish the 'spiritual harmony' that was lacking before the war and eliminate mammonism. This group hoped the coming peace would bring 'a healthy national soul', just as the 'peace of 1871 [created] a healthy national body'.<sup>125</sup> Correspondingly, the most important task of politics, especially in war, was seen as 'leading the national soul'.<sup>126</sup> At the same time, the war as 'the most powerful of all bringers of culture', was supposed to 'awaken [everything] that exhibits inner health and is still worthy of existence to a new, rich life'.<sup>127</sup> 'German culture is moral culture ... If it relinquishes its moral purity, then it stops being German.' The task of the war and the postwar period was to re-establish 'its pure image', that 'was spoiled by the fever of an insatiable desire for wealth, degenerate sensual pleasure, sprawling lascivious sensation-seeking and a superficial pres-



umption of knowledge and ability'.<sup>128</sup> In other words, this single-minded way of thinking about war and society, denying all change, did not only equate spiritual values with military ones, but also negated the diversity of sensory perceptions, needs and life plans.

German Party representative Reinhard Mumm, one of the most prominent critics of cinemas, also considered film to be 'un-German'. He referred to it as 'a first-class devastator of the people, destroying more of their moral values than a hundred educators could sow in quiet labour. The average film is capable not only of trivialising, but of destroying',<sup>129</sup> since 'from its very beginnings until the present day, the new industry ... is virtually in Jewish hands'.<sup>130</sup> Other critics saw the French influence as the primary cause for movies to be 'un-German':

The war has been the greatest cinema reformer of all. It accomplished that which we hardly dared to dream of. It destroyed the magnificent business organisation based outside our borders that was the support and secret of success of trash cinematography – the organisation that achieved the miracle of keeping alive the artificial, even anti-natural demand for thousands of worthless meters of film in hundreds of thousands of movie theatres around the world, serving the interests not of movie theatres, but of film capital. This organisation, in the end tracing back to the Pathé model, has been broken, and if we know even the very least of what we want, then it shall never return again.<sup>131</sup>

Even regarding films he thought were outstanding, like *Bismarck* and *Andreas Hofer*, Mumm disputed their 'certain, very refined impact ... on account of the facial expressions and title links'.<sup>132</sup>

Basing his statement on this criterion, Mumm spoke out in the authorisation debates in the German Reichstag in March 1918:

The strongest grounds of moral life of our people speak in favour of it. We cannot let the soul of the people be devastated by unbridled capitalism ... That which is offered here and there under the influence of certain capitalistic circles – pepper, strip scenes, over and over a

mockery of marriage and family life in general – that is not German humour; that is un-German gutter humour, and if censorship proceeds there with a very distinct degree of severity and takes vigorous action, then such measures will doubtless find the approval of all members of our German people with healthy feelings.<sup>133</sup>

Centre Party representative Kuckhoff made a similar remark during the same session:

It is true that movies are largely to blame for the rising incidence of crime among adolescents in war times ... When the war is over and the restrictions are lifted, the audience will be the sole decision makers, determining the movie schedules of the cinemas. Show business will be dependent on the whims of the movie patrons. Competition will force even highly esteemed businesses to give in to the wishes of the majority of the audience, opening the floodgates to sensationalism. The small movie houses in the towns and on the outskirts of the cities will rise again, and we will once again be confronted with the regrettable phenomena that represent a serious threat to the health of the nation – dangers that can also be brought on by movie theatres with poor technical management. On top of that, we will suffer further insult to our aesthetic sensibilities whenever we walk through the streets and are forced to see the dreadful movie advertisements. We will once again have to expect that, wherever we go, criers will harrass us and tell us to go to the cinema. This situation must be avoided at all costs.<sup>134</sup>

Despite the divergent political opinions expressed, both speeches show a clear tendency toward a strong state that stands above the individual, politically oriented toward ideal aims and paternalistic concepts in order to resolve existing conflict. At the same time, both politicians succumbed to an unrealistic line of reasoning. On the one hand, they did not want to do without movie theatres totally, since they wanted certain pictures to receive as broad circulation as possible, and also because the film industry employed several thousand people.<sup>135</sup> On the other hand, companies interested in commercial profit were asked to sacrifice that in favour

of educating the country. Private companies were thus given the task that the intelligentsia had failed to accomplish in the preceding decades. Without expressing it explicitly, the reformers pursued the goal of transforming the cinema into a partial substitute for adult education centres. Attitudes toward films, such as the ones cited here, were essentially determined by conservative newspapers, in particular the *Tägliche Rundschau* (Daily Review) and the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* (German Daily), papers read primarily by the educated classes,<sup>136</sup> and various family newspapers.<sup>137</sup> In addition, in the initial years of the war they also influenced the movie descriptions in newspapers, such as *Vorwärts* (Forward), which at this time was oriented toward ideas of the movie reformers.<sup>138</sup> To this extent, even during the war, public opinion was essentially determined by the intelligentsia's interpretation of the cinema and its accompanying ideas regarding censorship.

During the reign of Wilhelm II, many members of the educated classes were 'very active in extra-parliamentarian associations that were nationalistic in nature; in the Pan-German League, for example, 50 per cent of the members in 1901 were from the educated professions – professors, lecturers, artists, civil servants and teachers'.<sup>139</sup> Reserve officers were also over-represented in these associations. They saw themselves as a whole 'as the embodiment of the state'.<sup>140</sup> The common ground of these two social groups in these associations was apparent, first of all, in their shared conservative identity: that is, in their dislike of political parties and parliamentarianism, their antipathy towards social democracy, their affinity for heroic mythology, monumentality and pathos, everything Spartan and warlike, and the corresponding lack of contact with reality. Furthermore, both groups demonstrated particular loyalty to the emperor and nationalistic convictions. On the other hand, they complemented each other, making up for their respective deficiencies. 'The intellectual horizon of many officers before the war was very narrow'.<sup>141</sup> Everything relating to the military, battles and war enjoyed particularly high esteem compared with that which was 'merely' civilian, and the civilian virtues among the nationalistic supporters of public culture. Their common basic convictions and mutual respect were important reasons

why film censorship was implemented essentially according to the wishes of cinema reformers, as was documented especially in the first half of the war.

### Aims of the censors

Despite all objections, critics of the cinema did not intend to bring the trade to a total standstill. Even before the war, demands for German nationalistic films were made again and again. Theologian Konrad Lange, one of the most prominent cinema reformers, wrote the following in 1913:

No one wishes to keep the cinema from photographically documenting all kinds of daily events according to the methods of a conscientious reporter. There have never been any objections to showing beautiful landscapes and travelogues from moving trains in the movie theatres. And who would have anything against presenting motion pictures of interesting movements such as maneuver scenes, technical manipulations, agricultural procedures and the like, not to mention using cinematographic techniques for scientific purposes.<sup>142</sup>

Mumm, continuing his previous line of argument, stressed in a Reichstag speech in the last year of the war that 'images can be used in the service of the nation. If for example, we were soon to see a wealth of pictures in the cinema of the oldest land of German colonisation, the German Baltics, then we would enjoy such presentations, and maybe the urban scenes of German Riga, German Mitau, German Reval, would show the masses that have been miseducated by the Left press that these are countries of old German culture ... In this regard cinema can do an important job. It can do good work when it steps in for a generous propaganda project on the idea of a war homestead, which warmed Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's hearts. Constructive strength could come out of a film for a change'.<sup>143</sup> Even before the war, the imperial army used cinematographers to train soldiers how to shoot.<sup>144</sup> Moreover, films on imperial maneuvers and other military events, and those on military technology were part of the standard repertoire of movie theatres.<sup>145</sup> The military was even requested to provide a greater selection, especially of technology

films.<sup>146</sup> Teachers also used these films in the schools.<sup>147</sup>

It is conspicuous that both in military circles and among the intelligentsia, certain pictures of nature, industry, cities, landscapes and military subjects were not only permissible but expressly characterised as deserving support. At the same time all films with dramatic content were rejected if they did not deal with German history, as did *Bismarck* and *Andreas Hofer*.<sup>148</sup> After August 1914, the censors had no objections to the numerous sentimental films that showed war in the clichés of the theatre productions of the war in 1870–71,<sup>149</sup> such as *Fräulein Feldgrau – Ein heiteres Spiel in ernster Zeit* (Miss Feldgrau – A lively game in serious times), *Es braust ein Ruf wie Donnerhall* (A shout is roaring like thunder),<sup>150</sup> *Ruf der Fahnen* (Call of the Banners), or *Ich hatt einen Kameraden. Aus dem Tagebuch eines Kriegsfreiwilligen* (I had a comrade. From the diary of a war volunteer).<sup>151</sup> Common to all the films either sponsored or well-meaningly tolerated by the military or the intelligentsia was the fact that the audience was not allowed any room for autonomous feelings beyond that

of a very narrow emotionality, and no other fantasies were permitted except for the one recognised as nationalistic and supporting the state. In other words, any emotional freedom was considered potentially threatening and thus rejected. This explains some of the reasons for censorship: 'A film could be permitted in which a cadaver with a smashed skull is clearly shown, whereas another film is banned because the funny heroine crosses her legs. A film showing an atmosphere of champagne and dancing might be allowed and the forward dive of an acrobat is banned for the duration of the war because of excessive burlesque features. A detective who fights with poison, daggers and boxing gloves might be permitted and another, who has a trap door in his house, will be banned.'<sup>152</sup>

A scientific explanation for these views was offered at the end of the nineteenth century by Gus-



Fig. 6. Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell, Prussian Minister of the Interior (on the right), defended existing film censorship procedures in 1917. [Archiv der Landesbildstelle, Berlin.]

tave Le Bon in his book, *La psychologie des foules* (The psychology of the crowd). His research findings had already been transferred to film before the war started. A physician, H. Duenschmann, declared in 1912 that 'the crowd thinks only in images and can only be influenced by images that have a suggestive impact on their imagination. Such images can, for example, be awakened by certain magically sounding words and stereotypical formulas ... Even though the written word can simultaneously have a suggestive impact on a greater number of people, the spoken word is generally superior. The most powerful of all rapid means of suggestion, however, is the example. If you want to motivate the crowd to a particular action, the best method is to show them what to do.' After a few comments on the significance of pantomime, Duenschmann came to the conclusion the 'we can

thus see that cinematography, by suggestively influencing the imagination of the crowd, is not only on a par with theatre in a qualitative sense, but often must be considered superior to it. At the same time, it is quantitatively infinitely superior, since, numerically, a virtually unlimited increase in the mass impact is possible, namely, through mechanical reproduction.<sup>153</sup>

This theory of the weak-egoed consumer and the inferiority of the masses equated the statements and intentions of films with the reactions of the audience. At the same time it provided the intelligentsia with the necessary basis from which to argue their own intellectual superiority and the spiritual sense of mission they drew from that. They were not able to determine their intellectual qualities rationally, but they accepted nothing but their own opinions, nor did they attach any importance to material realities. Instead, representatives of these groups regarded their own views as universally valid and they tried to make all social needs and demands subordinate to their own standards and values. They attempted to disregard existing laws<sup>154</sup> and assumed they could control, according to their own views, the content of films through censorship and restrictions on subject matter and forms of presentation. Since this minority used the written word to definitively declare those basic social, political and aesthetic ideas they considered correct, they also lacked the necessary understanding for the specific qualities of the language of film. Their criticism of motion pictures remained correspondingly vague and indefinite.

The fundamental appraisal of the cinema hardly changed among the members of the intelligentsia. During the budget debates in the Prussian parliament, Minister of the Interior Friedrich Wilhelm von Loebell stressed that the existing laws on censorship had proven effective. Between the onset of the war and 1 December 1916, the Berlin Censorship Board had banned 311 films, '244 of which for the duration of the war'. In 1916 alone, 116




Fig. 7. The wartime activities of the German film industry were praised by Major Georg Schweitzer, member of the general staff in charge of film censorship.

films had been banned. Nevertheless, Centre Party representative Linz and Conservative representative von dem Osten demanded at the same session that everything 'undignified should disappear' from the cinemas.<sup>155</sup> Their comments emphasised the efforts of the intelligentsia to counter the 1914 ruling of the Berlin Higher Administrative Court, using the military censorship board to push through their educational ideas. Despite the consistency of their protest, generalised opinions like 'the average movie is nothing more than a projected lesson in trash',<sup>156</sup> which had been commonplace at the beginning of the war, largely disappeared. Parallel to the changes in statements, the practical ways of dealing with censorship decrees were also different in the first and second halves of the war. Major Georg Schweitzer, the member of the General Staff in charge of cinema censorship, said

that 'German cinematography, it must be said without reservation, under the difficult conditions of the present – doubly hard, since they were totally new – has done its job entirely'.<sup>157</sup> The Conservatives' monthlies,<sup>158</sup> which were harsh critics of film, declared in 1917, 'Up to now there has been an all-too-strong tendency in Germany to view film and the cinema under the aspect of a more or less dubious means of entertainment and, much to the detriment of our cause, the extraordinary cultural and economic significance of film and cinema in the lives of the peoples, especially now during the world war, has been overlooked'.<sup>159</sup>

### Censorship and propaganda

Censorship as a negative way of influencing film content and propaganda, as its positive counterpart, were constantly combined during the first world war. The theoretical origin of all efforts to use the media for the propagation of a particular interpretation of the war and its goals was based – as was censorship – on clear ideas about the weak-goed consumer. This led to belief in rather extreme possibilities for propaganda both inside and outside Germany. Especially in the second half of the war, this model of behavior and consciousness had to be able to explain the unsettling developments in the hinterlands and on the front. This is why, starting in 1916–17, propaganda, demanded increasingly by the state and various interest groups, was used domestically and in neutral countries.

At the time war was declared censorship had been solely the responsibility of the military, but as of September 1914 a number of partly or wholly state-run institutions and 'private institutions competed in this area, dealing with constant reorganisation and unclear, overlapping responsibilities. Domestic and foreign efforts increased, as did news acquisition, reporting and manipulation. Efforts to influence the German public joined similar efforts in allied, neutral and enemy states'.<sup>160</sup> The Central Department for Foreign Service within the Foreign Office took on a key role when it was founded on 5 October 1914. The Empire tried to use it in allied and neutral countries to pursue active cultural propaganda aimed at spreading a positive image of Germany and its allies. It was hoped that this would prove to be useful foreign policy for waging war;

culture thus became a weapon in the war. The main task of the Central Department was to circulate books, brochures and pictures in neutral countries. It also started sending a weekly war-newsreel, the 'Messter-Woche', to neutral countries on a regular basis.<sup>161</sup> Germany thus became the first war-waging country to pursue active state-organised foreign film propaganda. In the years following, concerts, art exhibitions and theatre performances were organised in allied and neutral countries. Within Germany, it was primarily members of the intellectual elite that took on propaganda tasks in the first year of the war by holding lectures. In addition, numerous writings and poems were published that interpreted the war and tried to justify it. In the first few months, differences in views were already visible with respect to the use and political opportunity of certain films. This debate continued for the duration of the war. For example, a letter from Switzerland in spring 1915 charged that 'Messter-Woche' number 12 showed Germans torturing Russian prisoners of war. The responsible censorship board definitively opposed this view.<sup>162</sup> A letter of 4 July 1916 to the embassy in Bern reported the following: 'The "Messter-Wochen" are often very boring'. They need 'exciting, impressive pictures... that unobtrusively show our strength and greatness'.<sup>163</sup> On 9 January 1917, Bintz, the German officer for propaganda in Scandinavia, telegraphed the director of the military film and photography department of the Foreign Office, as follows: 'films for Sweden far too little plot ... Urgently recommend preparing effective feature films; otherwise I have no material'.<sup>164</sup> In a cinema report made in the summer 1917, all other films propagating German's greatness were rejected, suggesting instead that more films be shown that deal with German social welfare and care for the wounded soldiers and prisoners.<sup>165</sup> According to research conducted by the *Lichtbild-Bühne*, even staff members of the Central Department for Foreign Service appraised the war footage as 'so harmless and meaningless', that they were useless 'in spreading truth'. For propaganda purposes the staff demanded 'real war reports that show battles and not boring, peaceful scenes'.<sup>166</sup>

The manifold difficulties regarding foreign propaganda also show that blocked or damaged communication lines due to the war, excessive

patriotism and nationalism, and the limited content in the media due to censorship all served to form an intellectual cage that made it increasingly difficult in the course of the war for the responsible persons to understand foreign views of Germany and respond accordingly.<sup>167</sup> As a result, once a concept was acknowledged as correct, its implementation usually continued unchanged until the end of the war.

On 28 August 1916, Hindenburg and Ludendorff took over the Military High Command. In contrast to their predecessors, the naming of Hindenburg and Ludendorff had plebiscitary qualities. Since they enjoyed such broad-based support within both the military and the population at large, they were able to quickly develop their command into the most significant military and political force in the Empire. At the same time, as the war proceeded it became obvious that not only a massive army, but the entire strength of society was necessary to end it. It was no longer appropriate to separate military and civilian sectors, as had been typical in earlier wars. Instead, the struggle took place among nations in their entirety, with all their military strength, scientific know-how, industrial production capability and ideological inclination to wage war. As the war continued, increased psychological and physical tensions intensified the need for entertainment expressed by a broad base of the public. Film could fill this need for three main reasons. First, movie theatres were among the few recreational facilities that had not been prohibited during the war, especially in the rural areas; second, films were a welcome diversion from the dreariness of daily events of the war, both at home and among all divisions at the front; finally, with cinema, it was possible to reach classes of the population that did not take advantage of other forms of propaganda, such as lectures or written statements.




Fig. 8. General Erich Ludendorff, who took over the military high command in 1916, saw film as a more important tool than written literature in the education of the masses. [Archiv der Landesbildstelle, Berlin.]

Increased censorship, also including propaganda, could be observed in Germany starting in the second half of the war. Ludendorff, for example, saw film primarily as 'a means of educating the masses' that, 'today, has a more insistent and concentrated impact on the masses ... than the written word'.<sup>168</sup> This attitude led to the founding of the Military Department of the Foreign Office in 1916. Through the efforts of seven film teams, it started shooting footage at the front. Since it was difficult to circulate the films that were made, the Photography and Film Office (*Bild- und Filmamt, BuFa*) was formed in January 1917. Together with the Balkan-Orient Film Co., Bintz's organisation of distribution

in the north, and others, the necessary distribution companies for foreign film propaganda were thus established.<sup>169</sup> The main censorship board became the executive body of the army in April 1917, subject to the orders of the heads of Department III B of the General Staff. Because of the prestige of the High Command among the acting military commanders, this step was an essential prerequisite for creating uniform censorship standards for military content throughout the Empire, the BuFa films would achieve the desired circulation.

After much preliminary work – going back as far as 1915 – the German Cinema Company (*Deutsche Lichtspiel-Gesellschaft*, DLG) was finally founded on 18 November 1916 by groups related to heavy industry. The DLG attempted to use a commercial basis to spread cultural propaganda domestically and abroad. Whereas the BuFa concentrated on war films, the DLG produced mostly short urban, industrial and landscape films.<sup>170</sup> At the same time, the 'Central Institute for Education and Curriculum' started using more and more educational films for lessons in schools.<sup>171</sup> Despite changing attitudes toward film as a result of the diverse activities and new companies, the subjects of the DLG films and those of the BuFa were oriented toward the ideas of the intelligentsia. Not until the negotiations for the founding of the Universum Film Company (Ufa) in late 1917 did it become apparent that narrow, cinema-reforming ideas had lost their dominating impact on the leading commercial institutions and the military.

As early as spring 1916, the Berlin Association for the Protection of Common Interests of Cinematography and Related Branches had intervened to have films re-evaluated that were banned either entirely or for the duration of the war. As a result, a number of films could be shown with a few edits or even none at all. The Association was also able to achieve, by referring to the propagandistic significance of the medium, that even several acting Supreme Commands authorised some films that they had previously banned.<sup>172</sup> Berlin film censorship data for 1917 shows that the number of banned feature film productions had declined considerably. There were two main reasons for this. First, many film companies based their films on family newspaper novels.<sup>173</sup> Due to the subject matter, the target audience was the entire family, therefore refraining

from the outset from everything 'that could possibly have disturbed the peaceful and comfortable atmosphere within the circle of the family'.<sup>174</sup> Second, the number of one and two act productions banned for the duration of the war decreased from 1916 to 1917 by 20 per cent, and bans on longer films decreased by about 35 per cent.<sup>175</sup>

Changed social attitudes toward the cinema around the end of the reign of Wilhelm II were also reflected by the 1918 Reichstag debate on the issue of licensing. In the corresponding Cinema Committee, only the Centre Party, the Conservatives and the German Party voted for the law; all other parties opposed it.<sup>176</sup> Although this committee decision did not mean cinema opponents stopped verbally attacking the subject matter of the films,<sup>177</sup> all attempts were finally crushed to pass a law going beyond the existing film censorship law to restrict film content even after the war, or to reduce the number of movie houses through non-economic regulations.

On 1 October 1918, the Berlin film censorship law was already ten years old; a few days later, the revolution started. On 12 November the imperial government declared that 'there is no more censorship. The theatre censorship law is hereby repealed'.<sup>178</sup> Initially, however, the Berlin chief of police continued to enforce all ordinances enacted by the Supreme Command, including the poster ordinance and the 'child ban'.<sup>179</sup> The justification given was that the new government had not abolished the relevant theatre censorship department, but the departments of the political police. On 11 December, the Association of Cinema Owners and film distributors asked the imperial minister of the interior to rescind the relevant regulation.<sup>180</sup> In late 1918, the Prussian government passed a resolution to repeal the film censorship law. Censorship was also lifted in other states, but it remained in effect in Bavaria and Württemberg.<sup>181</sup> The Weimar national assembly confirmed the abolition of censorship in Article 118 of the constitution, but section 2 allowed for a special censorship law pertaining to film. At the 100th session of the national assembly in 1919, Representative Mumm referred to sex education films in proposing a reinstatement of film censorship, thus continuing the same line of reasoning he pursued before and during the war. In spring 1920 this was then instituted throughout the Republic. ♦



## Notes

1. cf. Herbert Birett. *Verzeichnis in Deutschland gelaufener Filme. Entscheidungen der Filmzensur 1911–1920* (Berlin, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart 1980), 1.
2. Thomas Nipperdey. *Deutsche Geschichte 1916–1918. Bd. 1* (vol.1), *Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist* (Munich 1991): 817.
3. On the cinematic reform movement cf. for example: Anton Kaes. *Kino Debatte. Texte zum Verhältnis von Literatur und Film 1909–1929* (Munich, Tübingen 1978); *Prolog vor dem Film. Nachdenken über ein neues Medium 1909–14*, Jörg Schweinitz, ed. (Leipzig, 1992): 55ff.
4. Bundesarchiv, Abteilungen Potsdam (Federal Archives, Potsdam) (BA) Auswärtiges Amt (foreign ministry AA), no. 33018 B. 28.
5. 'Weimar. Eine Ministerialverordnung über den Betrieb von Lichtspielunternehmungen'. *Bild und Film*, no. 2 (1912) vol. 13: 148.
6. Griebel, 'Die Kinematographenzensur'. *Das Land*, no. 14 (1913): 273.
7. 'Die bisherige landespolizeiliche Regelung des Kinowesens in Bayern'. *Bild und Film*, no. 12 (November 1912–13): 277f.
8. BA AA, no. 33018 B. 27.
9. W. Warstadt. 'Aus dem Kampfe um die Kinoreform'. *Die Grenzboten. Zeitschrift für Politik, Literatur und Kunst*, no. 3 (1914): 128.
10. BA AA no. 33018 B. 81.
11. BA AA no. 33018 B. 8.
12. BA Reichsministerium des Innern (Reich Ministry of the Interior RMdl), no. 14033 B. 28.
13. The corresponding information will be published in the forthcoming dissertation on film censorship before 1914, by Gabriele Kilchenstein (Humboldt University, Berlin).
14. 'Der Berliner Filmkrieg zwischen Polizeipräsidium und Filmfabrikanten'. *Lichtbild-Bühne (LBB)* (8 July 1914), no. 41.
15. 'Filmzensur'. *LBB* (5 September 1914), no. 58.
16. 'Die Berliner Film-Zensur-Gebühren'. *LBB* (20 February 1915), no. 8.
17. cf. for example: Karl Brunner. *Der Kinematograph von heute – Eine Volksgefahr* (Berlin, 1913).
18. Wilhelm Hennicke. 'Bumke auf der Anklagebank. Ein neuer Zensurstreich des Professors Dr. Brunner' *LBB* (11 July 1914), no. 42, cf. 'Ein aufgehobenes Zensurverbot. Eine über die gebräuchlichen Mittel der dramatischen Kunst nicht hinausgehende Film-darstellung kann nicht verboten werden. Urteil des Preußischen Oberverwaltungsgerichts vom 13. January 1914'. *LBB* (1 August 1914), no. 48.
19. BA Reichswirtschaftsministerium (Reich Ministry of economics)(RWM), no. 2005 B. 46, 23.
20. cf. for example: Denkschrift betreffend die Lichtbild-theater und die gesetzliche Regelung des Kinogewerbes. Überreicht vom Schutzverband deutscher Lichtspieltheater – Sitz Berlin. BA RMdl, no. 14033 B. 38.; 'Zur Lage'. *Der Kinematograph* (29 August 1914), no. 396.
21. *Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Second series: Militär und Politik*, Erich Matthias and Hans Meier Welker, eds., vol. 1/1 *Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914–1918*, Wilhelm Deist, ed., part 1 (Düsseldorf, 1970): XL f.
22. Geheimes Staatsarchiv Stiftung Preußischer Kulturbesitz Rep. 77 Preußisches Ministerium des Innern (Prussian Ministry of the Interior) tit. 949 Nr. 1<sup>m</sup> Bd.1 B. 71 ff.
23. Herrmann Cron. *Die Organisation des deutschen Heeres im Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1923): 15.
24. 'Die Zensur ist tot – es lebe die Zensur!' *Der Kinematograph* (11 December 1918): no. 623.
25. Detailed: Walter Nicolai. *Nachrichtendienst, Presse und Volksstimmung im Weltkrieg* (Berlin, 1920): 51 ff.
26. Heinrich Binder. *Mit dem Hauptquartier nach Westen. Aufzeichnungen eines Kriegsberichterstaters* (Berlin, Stuttgart, 1915): 26.
27. Ludolf Gottschalk von dem Knesebeck. *Die Wahrheit über den Propagandafeldzug und Deutschlands Zusammenbruch. Der Kampf der Publizistik im Weltkriege* (Berlin, 1927): 44.
28. 'Das Photographieren auf den Kriegsschauplatz'. *Der Kinematograph* (14 October 1914), no. 407.
29. The LBB claimed that four companies had permission to do frontal exposures, however the Erste Internationale Filmzeitung claims seven on the western front and four on the eastern front. A. Mellini: 'Das Monopol der Kriegsaufnahmen', *LBB*, (31 October 1914), no. 74. 'Der große Generalstab und die Kriegsaufnahmen. Ein Wort zur Abwehr bedauerlicher Angriffe, ein Wort auch zur Verständigung', *Erste Internationale Film-Zeitung* (7 October 1914), no. 45.

30. Film companies which had gone to the front without permission, had to call back their crews in order to evaluate the pictures that had already been taken. Cf. A. Mellini: 'Das Monopol der Kriegsaufnahmen (III)', *LBB* (14 November 1914), no. 78.
31. Special conditions issued for frontal exposures on 6 October 1914, corresponded to those of the press. Cf. Gertrud Bub. *Der deutsche Film im Weltkrieg und sein publizistischer Einsatz* (Berlin, 1938): 94.
32. BA Militärarchiv (Military Archiv)(MA) Reichsmarinemat (Reich Department of Navy) (RM 3), no. 9875 B. 64.
33. BA MA RM 3 no. 10297 B. 189 ff.; 264 ff.
34. Richard Treitel. 'Aufhebung eines Filmverbotes unter dem Belagerungsgesetz', *Der Kinematograph* (6 June 1917), no. 545.
35. 'Zensur-Schwierigkeiten der Films von den Kriegsschauplätzen', *LBB* (17 October 1914), no. 70.
36. 'Der Mangel an Aktualitäten', *Der Kinematograph* (26 August 1914), no. 400.
37. 'Das Ende der Kriegs-Aufnahmen', *LBB* (20 March 1915), no. 12.
38. 'Die Hemmnisse bei den Kriegsaufnahmen', *LBB* (31 March 1915), no. 14.
39. 'Hamburg, Dresden', *LBB* (19 September 1914), no. 62.
40. 'Photographieren auf der Straße in Berlin', *LBB* (29 August 1914), no. 56.
41. 'Kriegszustand und Theaterpraxis', *LBB* (22 August 1914), no. 54.
42. 'Straßburger Kinos und der Kriegszustand', *LBB* (10 October 1914), no. 68.
43. 'Keine Kriegerläuterungen in Berliner Kinos', *LBB* (10 October 1914), no. 68.
44. Karl Brunner, 'Die Filmzensur in der Kriegszeit', *Der Hochwart*, no. 10, (1915): 180
45. BA RMdl no. 14033 B. 52; 69
46. 'Um das große Erbe'. Aufhebung eines Filmverbots', *Der Kinematograph* (4 July 1917), no. 549.
47. *Ibid.*; cf. also Karl Brunner. 'Die Filmzensur in der Kriegszeit', *Der Hochwart*, no. 10 (1915): 181.
48. 'Das General-Kommando in Altona veröffentlicht': *LBB* (16 January 1915), no. 3.
49. 'Verschärfte Kinozensur im Bereich des VII. Armeekorps', *Der Kinematograph* (8 September 1915), no. 454.
50. 'Vorführung militärischer Bilder in Bayern', *LBB* (20 March 1915), no. 15.
51. 'Zur Württembergischen Filmzensur', *LBB* (10 April 1915), no. 15.
52. 'Die Nachzensur alter Films', *LBB* (16 January 1915), no. 3.
53. 'Dritter ordentlicher Verbandstag des Verbandes zur Wahrung gemeinsamer Interessen der Kinematographie und verwandter Branchen zu Berlin E.V.', *Der Film* (12 February 1916), no. 3.
54. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. *Legislaturperiode*, II. Session (Reichstag Proceedings, 13th legislative period, 2nd session), vol. 307 (Berlin 1916): 1296.
55. 'Kultusministerium und Kriegszustand', *LBB* (29 August 1914), no. 56.
56. 'Verschärfte Kinozensur im Bereich des VII. Armeekorps', *Der Kinematograph* (8 September 1915), no. 454.
57. 'Verschärfte Kinozensur im Bereich des VII. Armeekorps', *Der Kinematograph* (8 September 1915), no. 454.
58. 'Münchener Notizen', *LBB* (20 January 1917), no. 3.
59. 'Nachrichtenteil', *Der Film* (11 March 1916), no. 7
60. 'Das neue Kinderverbot für die Kinos', *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung*, 21 September 1915, no. 441 cf. also 'Der 1. Oktober und die Kinderfilms', *LBB* (30 September 1915), no. 40.
61. Karl Brunner. 'Die Filmzensur in der Kriegszeit', *Der Hochwart*, no. 10 (1915): 182.
62. Detailed: Wolfgang Kruse. 'Die Kriegsbegeisterung im Deutschen Reich zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges. Entstehungszusammenhänge, Grenzen und ideologische Strukturen', *Kriegsbegeisterung und mentale Kriegsvorbereitung. Interdisziplinäre Studien*, Marcel van der Linden und Gottfried Mergener unter Mitarbeit von Herman de Lange (ed.) (Beiträge zur Politischen Wissenschaft Bd. 61) (Berlin 1991), 78 ff.
63. 'Die Hetze gegen die deutschfeindlichen Films', *LBB* (3 October 1914), no. 66.
64. cf. for example, 'Aus dem Kampfe gegen französische Films', *Projektion* (20 August 1914), no. 32 – 33.
65. 'Der Kampf gegen die ausländischen Films', *LBB* (29 September 1914), no. 64.
66. 'Verband zur Wahrung gemeinsamer Interessen

- der Kinematographie und verwandten Branchen E.V.', *LBB* (31 October 1914), no. 74.
67. 'Gegen das Film-Franzosenentum', *Bild und Film*, no. 4-5 (1914-15): 34.
68. BA RMDl no. 14033 B. 59.
69. The showing of a film in the summer of 1915 with shots of French castles and beautiful scenes from nature led to tumultuous scenes in a Berlin movie-house. 'Französische Filme in Berliner Kinos', *LBB* (28 August 1915), no. 35.
70. 'Kinematographie und Krieg', *Der Kinematograph* (21 July 1915), no. 447.
71. Karl Schüller. 'Das schlecht beratene VII. Armeekorps. Freimütig-sachliche Betrachtungen über das für den Bezirk des VII. Armeekorps erlassene Verbot der Vorführung von Filmen der Dreiverband-Länder und Konsorten', *LBB* (6 March 1915), no. 10.
72. Schmidl. 'Der Krieg, das Kino und die Karikaturisten', *Der Kinematograph* (10 February 1915), no. 424.
73. 'Die Plakat- und Inserat-Zensur in Leipzig', *LBB* (13 November 1915), no. 46.
74. 'Unhaltbare Zustände in Süddeutschland', *LBB* (7 October 1916), no. 40.
75. Alfred Leopold. 'Kinoreklame unter Polizeizensur', *LBB* (6 May 1916), no. 18.
76. 'Coblenz', *Der Kinematograph* (31 January 1917), no. 527.
77. BA RMDl no. 14033 B. 199 ff.
78. 'Das gebändigte Kinoplatkat. Eine neue polizeiliche "Reinigung"', *Vossische Zeitung*, (14 July 1916), no. 356; cf. also 'Pädagogen-Urteil über die Bedeutung der Kinematographie', *Der Kinematograph* (21 February 1917), no. 530.
79. Alfred Rosental. 'Das deutsche Feldkino. Ein Kapitel aus der Kulturgeschichte des Weltkrieges', *Der Kinematograph* (7 March 1917), no. 532.
80. 'Nachrichtenteil', *Der Film* (9 September 1916), no. 33.
81. BA RMDl no. 14033 B. 135.
82. 'Aufgehobenes Plakatverbot', *LBB* (1 July 1916), no. 26.
83. 'Zensur-Verbote', *Berliner Morgenpost* (28 January 1915), no. 28.
84. Helmut Rathert. *Die deutsche Kriegsberichterstattung und Presse als Kampfmittel im Weltkrieg* (Heidelberg 1934), p. 40.
85. 'Kinorede des Minister des Innern v. Loebell. Zur Etatsberatung im preußischen Abgeordnetenhaus', *LBB* (17 February 1917), Nr. 7.
86. 'Die Filmstatistik. Die Nordische Film Co. beherrscht mehr als 1/3 des deutschen Filmmarktes', *LBB* (6 January 1917), no. 1.
87. 'Beratungen im Reichsamt des Innern. Zur Frage der kurzen Films', *LBB* (9 December 1916), no. 49.
88. Albert Hellwig. 'Krieg und Lichtspielwesen', *Konservative Monatshefte für Politik, Literatur und Kunst*, no. 8 (1916): 638.
89. For the various political positions, compare, for example: 'Zensur und Belagerungszustand. Wiederaufnahme der Verhandlungen im Reichstagsausschuß' *Berliner Morgenpost* (11 January 1916), no. 11.
90. BA RMDl no. 14033 B. 90.
91. BA RMDl no. 14033 B. 104.
92. 'Kino-Schund. Ludwig Frank als Kino' held', *Vorwärts*, 10 August 1916, no. 218; Gertrud David. 'Die Reform des Kinos', *Vorwärts* (5 November 1916), no. 305.
93. *Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session* (Reichstag Proceedings, 13th legislative period, 2nd session), vol. 307 (Berlin, 1916): 1296.
94. *Ibid.*, 1304 f.
95. *Ibid.*, 1309.
96. 'Des freien Kinogewerbes Ende. Die Verordnung des Bundesrats vom 3. August 1917 betreffend den Konzessionszwang der 'Lichtspiele' nach Maßgabe des Bedürfnisses. - Ihr Inkrafttreten am 1. September 1917 und ihr amtlicher Wortlaut', *Der Film* (4 August 1917), no. 31.
97. *Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session* (Reichstag Proceedings, 13th legislative period, 2nd session), vol. 311 (Berlin, 1918): 3901, 3904, 3931 f.
98. Ludwig Brauner. 'Der Kino vor, während und nach dem Kriege', *Der Kinematograph* (19 January 1916), no. 473.
99. 'Kinobesuch als Unterstützungshindernis', in: *Vossische Zeitung* (16 August 1916), no. 418.
100. 'Die Strafe für den Kientoppbesuch', *Vorwärts* (27 January 1915), no. 27.
101. 'Die Waffen nieder!' *LBB* (25 July 1914), no. 46.

102. A. Mellini. 'Deutschland im Kriegszustand!' *LBB* (1 August 1914), no. 48.
103. cf. also 'Kino und Krieg. Mars regiert die Stunde'. *Der Kinematograph* (5 August 1915), no. 397; for Messter's statements at the beginning of the war, see Helga Belach. Henny Porten. *Der erste deutsche Filmstar 1890–1960* (Berlin, 1968): 45.
104. cf. also Malwine Rennert. 'Nationale Filmkunst', *Bild und Film*, no. 3. (1914-15): 53; 'Film und neue deutsche Form'. *Der Kinematograph*, (25 August 1915), no. 452; 'Kinematographie und Krieg'. *Der Kinematograph* (21 July 1915), no. 447.
105. Thomas Nipperdey. *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, Bd. 1* (vol. 2), *Machtstaat vor der Demokratie* (Munich 1992): 779.
106. The Lubitsch production, 'Der Stolz der Firma' (Pride of the Company), which premiered on 30 July 1914, was also banned. On 9 January 1915 the film had its public reopening.
107. Josef Aubinger. 'Die Kinematographie in Kriegzeiten', *Der Kinematograph* (12 August 1914), no. 398; A. Mellini. 'Krieg und Kino. Der Pleitegeier. –Die Adressenliste –Die LBB als Feldpostsendung –Patriotismus und Geschäft –Der Schutzmann als Förderer deutscher Filmfabrikation. Die Feinde im eigenen Lager', *LBB* (26 September 1914), no. 64.
108. A. Mellini. 'Das Monopol der Kriegsaufnahmen'. *LBB* (31 October 1914), no. 74; cf. also A. Mellini. 'Das Monopol der Kriegsaufnahmen II'. *LBB* (14 November 1914), no. 78.
109. Horst Emscher. 'Der Film im Dienste der Politik'. *Der Kinematograph* (4 November 1914), no. 410.
110. A RMdl no. 14033 B. 52ff.
111. 'Eine Eingabe gegen das Verbot der Kinoreklame'. *Vossische Zeitung* (21 July 1916), no. 370.
112. '§ 9b ... Ein Notschrei aus der Provinz Sachsen! Immediatgesuch sämtlicher Lichtspieltheaterbesitzer an Seine Majestät den Kaiser um Aufhebung oder Milderung der militärischen Kinoerlasse'. *Der Film* (20 May 1916), no. 17.
113. BA RMdl no. 14033 B. 90; 94f.; 105 ff.
114. 'Die Kino-Tagung. Regelmäßige Aussprachen mit der Zensur.' *Vossische Zeitung* (15 February 1917), no. 83.
115. 'Förderung deutscher Filmkultur'. *Der Kinematograph* (2 May 1917), no. 540.
116. A. Lassally. 'Kinogewerbe und Kinoreform'. *Die Umschau. Wochenschrift über die Fortschritte in Wissenschaft und Technik*, no. 18 (1916): 342.
117. Peter Grupp. 'Voraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda in den neutralen Staaten während des Ersten Weltkrieges. In Wolfgang Michalka', ed., *Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse*. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (Munich, Zurich 1994): 799.
118. cf. for example, Vorstand der Generalsynode. ed. *Verhandlungen der siebten ordentlichen Generalsynode der evangelischen Landeskirche Preußens* (Berlin 1916), 47f., 50ff.; 'Zensur im Abgeordnetenhaus'. *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, (23 February 1916), no. 98; Heiner Schmitt. 'Kirche und Film'. *Kirchliche Filmarbeit in Deutschland von ihren Anfängen bis 1945. Schriftenreihe des Bundesarchivs* 26 (Boppard, 1979): 21ff.
119. Thomas Nipperdey. *Deutsche Geschichte 1866–1918, Bd.1* (vol. 1), *Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist* (Munich, 1991): 818.
120. cf., for example, 'Ausländische Filme'. *Der Türmer. Monatsschrift für Gemüt und Geist* no. 4 (1914): 296.
121. Paul Natorp. 'Deutscher Weltberuf. Geschichtsphilosophische Richtlinien'. Erstes Buch. Paul Natorp. ed., *Die Weltalter des Geistes* (Jena, 1918): 35.
122. Hans Krailsheimer. 'Huldigung'. Reinhold Buchwald, ed., *Der Heilige Krieg. Gedichte aus dem Beginn des Kampfes* (Jena, 1914): 4.
123. Adolf Deißmann. 'Der Krieg und die Religion'. Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt, ed., *Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit* (Berlin, 1914): 12.
124. Heiliger Krieg. *Ein Aufruf an deutsche Soldaten. Von einem Pfarrer* (Munich, 1915): 17.
125. Reinhard Mumm. *Der Christ und der Krieg* (Leipzig, 1916): 21f., 28.
126. BA RWM no. 14127 B. 264.
127. Otto von Gierke. 'Krieg und Kultur'. Zentralstelle für Volkswohlfahrt, ed., *Deutsche Reden in schwerer Zeit* (Berlin, 1914): 7.
128. *Ibid.*, 23.
129. BA Nachlaß (unpublished works) (NL) Mumm, no. 22 B. 2.
130. Reinhard Mumm. *Die Lichtbühne. Ein Lichtblick aus den Verhandlungen der Deutschen verfassunggebenden Nationalversammlung* (Berlin, without year): 3.
131. Hermann Häfker. 'Kinematographie und Krieg'. *Bild und Film* no. 1. (1914): 1.
132. BA NL Mumm, no. 22 B. 2.

133. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session (Reichstag Proceedings, 13th legislative period, 2nd session), vol. 311 (Berlin, 1918): 4418.
134. *Ibid.*, 4409.
135. 'Berliner Kriegsfragen im Abgeordnetenhaus'. *Berliner Lokalanzeiger*, (25 February 1916), no. 102; cf. also 'Minister v. Loebell gegen die Schliessung von Kinos'. *Vossische Zeitung* (14 February 1917), no. 81.
136. cf., for example, Wilhelm R. Richter. 'Deutsche Art im Lichtspiel wesen'. *Der Türmer* no. 15 (1915): 177f.; Wilhelm Heinz. 'Kino im Kriege', *Kunstwart* no. 23 (1915): 152f.; 'Vaterländisches Pflichtgefühl und Lichtspielhaus', *Die Hochwacht* no. 6. (1915): 117f.
137. cf. for example, Alfred Geiser. 'Der Film als Waffe im Völkerring'. *Daheim* no. 51 (1917).
138. 'Kinos Offenbarung'. *Vorwärts* (21 September 1914), no. 258.
139. Klaus Vondung. 'Zur Lage der Gebildeten in der wilhelminischen Zeit'. In Klaus Vondung, (ed.) *Das wilhelminische Bildungsbürgertum. Zur Sozialgeschichte seiner Ideen* (Göttingen: 1976), 31.
140. Quellen zur Geschichte des Parlamentarismus und der politischen Parteien. Second series: *Militär und Politik*, Erich Matthias and Hans Meier Welker, eds., vol. I: 1. *Militär und Innenpolitik im Weltkrieg 1914-18*, Wilhelm Deist, ed., part 1 (Düsseldorf, 1970), XIX.
141. Erich Otto Volkmann. 'Das Soldatentum des Weltkrieges'. In Bernhard Schwerfeger and Erich Otto Volkmann, (eds.) *Die deutsche Soldatenkunde*, Bd. 1 (vol. 1) (Leipzig, 1937): 154.
142. Konrad Lange. 'Die "Kunst" des Lichtspieltheaters'. *Die Grenzboten*, 24 (1913): 509; cf. also Erwin Ackerknecht. 'Lichtbild und Bildungspflege'. *Illustrierte Zeitung*, no. 3889 (10 January 1918): 40.
143. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. XIII. Legislaturperiode, II. Session (Reichstag Proceedings, see note 133), vol. 311 (Berlin, 1918): 4418; cf. also: *BA NL Mumm*, no. 214: 167.
144. Walter Thielemann. 'Schießausbildung durch den Kinematographen'. *Bild und Film* no. 11-12 (1913-14): 282.
145. *Der Kinematograph* wrote the following at the onset of the war, when there was a shortage of current footage due to the censorship: 'Every factory could use its older, stored material to put together a film about the equipment and organisation of the Austria, Serbian, Russian, or French armies'. Josef Aubinger. 'Die Kinematographie in Kriegszeiten'. *Der Kinematograph* (12 August 1914), no. 398.
146. Oefele. 'Kinematographie für Heereszwecke'. *Frankfurter Zeitung* (10 March 1913), no. 69; cf. also Hildebrand Freiherr von Clas, Friedrich Swoboda. 'Kinematographische Aufnahmen von Geschützprojektilen während der Bewegung bei Tageslicht'. *Sitzungsberichte der mathematisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Klasse der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, vol. CXXIII (1914), dept. IIa (Vienna, 1914): 757ff.
147. Max Wilberg. 'Schulfeiern im Kinematographen'. *Bild und Film* no. 2 (1912-13): 34ff.
148. Malwine Rennert. *Nationale Filmkunst. Bild und Film* no. 3 (1914-15): 53.
149. cf. Roswitha Flatz. *Krieg im Frieden. Das aktuelle Militärstück auf dem Theater des deutschen Kaiserreichs* (Frankfurt/Main, 1976): 248ff.
150. This film title, taken from the first line of the song 'Die Wacht am Rhein', was also cited as the eighth subject in the first 'Messter-Woche'. (Friedrich von Zglinicki. *Der Weg des Films* (Hildesheim New York, 1979): 338) This line also appears in contexts other than the film, such as the poem written in August 1914 by Rudolf Herzog: 'Das eiserne Gebet'. Reinhold Buchwald ed., *Der Heilige Krieg. Gedichte aus dem Beginn des Kampfes* (Jena, 1914): 16.
151. *BA RWM* no. 8031 B. 18.
152. 'Die Film-Zensur'. *LBB* (15 December 1917), no. 50.
153. H. Duenschmann. 'Kinematograph und Psychologie der Volksmenge. Eine sozialpolitische Studie'. *Konservative Monatsschrift* no. 9 (1912): 924; cf. also Albert Hellwig. 'Schundfilm und Filmzensur', *Die Grenzboten* 6 (1913): 142; Ferdinand Avenarius. 'Von Suggestion und Massenseele als zweien der "aktuellsten" Fragen'. *Deutscher Wille des Kunstwarts* no. 1 (1st quarter 1918): 1ff.
154. cf. for example, Konrad Lange. 'Die "Kunst" des Lichtspieltheaters'. *Die Grenzboten* no. 24 (1913): 511f.; *Verhandlungen des Reichstags (Reichstag Proceedings) 13th legislative period, 2nd session*, vol. 311 (Berlin, 1918): 3904.
155. 'Kinorede des Ministers des Innern v. Loebell. Zur Etatsberatung im preußischen Abgeordnetenhaus'. *LBB* (17 February 1917), no. 7.
156. Wilhelm Heinz. 'Das Kino im Kriege'. *Kunstwart* no. 23, 1915, 152; for an exception, see the following essay: 'Die Kino-Seuche'. *Kreuzzeitung* (17 October 1916), no. 531.

157. Major Schweitzer. Die Kinematographie im Kriege. *Der Film* (29 January 1916): no. 1.
158. cf., for example, Oertel. 'Kinematographenrecht'. *Konservative Monatsschriften* no. 12 (1912): 1278 f.; Albert Hellwig. 'Krieg und Lichtspielwesen'. *Konservative Monatsschriften* no. 8 (1916): 636ff.
159. 'Film und Kino als Waffe im Weltkriege'. *Konservative Monatsschriften* no. 10 (1917): 794.
160. Peter Grupp. 'Voraussetzungen und Praxis deutscher amtlicher Kulturpropaganda in den neutralen Staaten während des Ersten Weltkrieges'. Wolfgang Michalka, ed., *Der Erste Weltkrieg. Wirkung, Wahrnehmung, Analyse*. Im Auftrag des Militärgeschichtlichen Forschungsamtes (Munich, Zurich, 1994): 804.
161. BA AA, Zentralstelle für Auslandsdienst (Central Department for Foreign Service) (ZfA) no. 1744 B. 169.
162. BA RMDI no. 14033 B. 71.
163. Aktenauszüge über Filmpropaganda während des Weltkrieges unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Feindpropaganda und der Organisationen von Bufa, Deulig, und Ufa. Excerpts from the Reich Archiv and the Military Archiv in Potsdam by Hans Traub, part 1 (Berlin, 1938): 34.
164. AA ZfA no. 947 B. 161.
165. AA ZfA no. 949 B. 38.
166. 'Die Hemmnisse bei den Kriegsaufnahmen'. *LBB* (31 March 1915), no. 14.
167. cf. also Theodor von Bethmann Hollweg. *Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, part 2, Während des Krieges* (Berlin, 1921): 58.
168. Erich von Ludendorff. *Meine Kriegserinnerungen 1914-1918* (Berlin, 1919): 300.
169. BA AA ZfA no. 1030 B. 142ff.
170. BA Reichspostministerium (Reich Postal Ministry) no. 4727 B. 34ff.
171. 'Die Neuorientierung des Films'. *LBB* (5 May 1917), no. 18.
172. BA RWM no. 2005 B. 46 26ff.
173. 'Was die Zensurstatistik verrät'. *LBB* (2 March 1918), no. 9.
174. Dieter Barth. *Zeitschrift für alle. Das Familienblatt im 19. Jahrhundert. Ein sozialhistorischer Beitrag zur Massenpresse in Deutschland* (Münster, 1973): 178.
175. 'Was die Zensurstatistik verrät'. *LBB* (2 March 1918), no. 9.
176. 'Die Kino-Verhandlungen im Reichstag'. *Der Kinematograph* (18 July 1918), no. 600.
177. cf. for example, 'Rhode kontra Hindenburg'. *LBB* (14 September 1918), no. 37; T. Behme. 'Der Krieg als Abendunterhaltung'. *Deutscher Wille des Kunstwarts* no. 23 (4th quarter 1918): 151 'Der "Amüsier" – Teufel'. *Deutsche Tageszeitung* (29 October 1918), no. 551.
178. 'Die Zensur ist tot – es lebe die Zensur!', *Der Kinematograph* (11 December 1918), no. 623.
179. Die Filmzensur bleibt. *LBB* (30 November 1918), no. 48.
180. Theodor Zimmermann. 'Zur Lage in der Zensurfrage'. *Der Kinematograph* (18 December 1918), no. 624.
181. 'Die Zensur'. *LBB* (28 December 1918), no. 52.