Douglas Hofstadter:  I Am a Strange Loop

Many years thereafter, when I was writing a monthly column called “Methamagical Themas” for
Scientific American magazine, I devoted a couple of my pieces to the topic of self-reference in
language, and in them I featured a cornucopia of sentences invented by myself, a few friends, and
quite a few readers, including some remarkable and provocative flights of fancy, such as these:

If the meanings of “true“ and “false“ were switched, this sentence wouldn’t be false.

I am going two-level with you.

The following sentence is totally identical with this one, except that the words “following” and
“preceding” have been exchanged, as have the words “except” and “in”, and the phrases “identical
with” and “different from”.

The preceding sentence is totally different from this one, in that the words  “preceding” and
“following” have been exchanged, as have the words “in” and “except”, and the phrases “different
from” and “identical with”.

This analogy is like lifting yourself up by your own bootstraps.

Thit sentence is not self-referential because “thit” is not a word.

If wishes were horses, the antecedent clause in this conditional sentence would be true.

This sentence every third, but it still comprehensible.

If you think this sentence is confusing, then change one pig.

How come this noun phrase doesn’t denote the same thing as this noun phrase does?

I eee oai o ooa a e ooi eee o oe.

Ths sntnc cntns n vwls nd th prcdng sntnc n cnsnnts.

This pangram tallies five a’s, one b, one c, two d’s, twenty-eight e’s, eight f’s, six g’s, eight
h’s, thirteen i’s, one j, one k, three l’s, two m’s, eighteen n’s, fifteen o’s, two p’s, one q,
seven r’s, twenty-five s’s, twenty-two t’s, four u’s, nine w’s, two x’s, four y’s, and one z.