The Concept of "Greater China": Themes, Variations and Reservations
Author(s): Harry Harding
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The China Quarterly, No. 136, Special Issue: Greater China (Dec., 1993), pp. 660-686
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The Concept of "Greater China":Themes,
Variations and Reservations*
HarryHarding
The world is suddenly talking about the emergence of "GreaterChina."
The term has appeared in the headlines of major newspapers and
magazines, has been the topic of conferences sponsored by prominent
think-tanks,andis now the theme of a special issue of the world's leading
journal of Chinese affairs. It thusjoins other phrases - "thenew world
order," "the end of history," "the Pacific Century" and the "clash of
civilizations" - as part of the trendiest vocabulary used in discussions
of contemporaryglobal affairs.
As is so often the case with the phrase of the moment, however, the
precise meaning of "GreaterChina" (usually renderedas dazhonghua in
Chinese) is not entirely clear. In essence, it refersto the rapidlyincreasing
interactionamong Chinese societies aroundthe world as the political and
administrativebarriersto their intercoursefall. But different analysts use
the term in different ways. Some refer primarily to the commercial ties
among ethnic Chinese, whereas others are more interested in cultural
interactions, and still others in the prospects for political reunification.
Some observers focus exclusively on Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and
mainlandChina,othersincorporateSingapore, and still others include the
overseas Chinese living in South-east Asia, America and Europe. To
some writers, "GreaterChina"is simply a way of summarizingthe new
linkages among the far-flunginternationalChinese community; to others,
it is a prescriptionof the institutions that should govern those ties.
Even more important,"GreaterChina"is a controversial concept. To
some observers, the formation of a GreaterChina is an inexorable and
irreversibleprocess - the resurrectionof a wide range of naturaleconomic
and cultural relationships that were long restricted by artificial
political obstacles. In contrast,other analysts stress the remainingbarriers
to economic interaction, cultural exchange and political integration
among Chinese societies, andinsist thatthe creationof GreaterChinawill
be a turbulentand ultimately unsuccessful undertaking.Moreover, where
some see the emergence of GreaterChina as an attractivepossibility both
economically and culturally,othersregardit as all too reminiscentof past
attempts to create empires by military force, and argue that both China
and the rest of the world would be better off without it.
This article is an attemptto explore the various meanings of the term
"GreaterChina,"as well as to capturesome of the controversy surrounding
it. It makes three basic arguments. First, the term "GreaterChina"
*This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference on "GreaterChina,"
convened by The China Quarterlyin Hong Kong on 4-5 January1993. I am gratefulto the
participantsin the conference for their valuable criticisms and suggestions. I also wish to
express my appreciationto Scott Kennedy, my researchassistantatthe Brookings Institution,
for his invaluable help in assembling material.
? The China Quarterly, 1993
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 661
subsumes three relatively distinct themes: economic integration, cultural
interaction and political reunification within the international Chinese
community. Each of these variants of Greater China has different
boundaries,has differentcapitalsor centres of activity, andtakes different
institutionalforms. Secondly, within each of these threethemes, thereare
many variations. Some authorssimply use different terms - whetherin
Chinese or in English - to express prettymuch the same ideas. In other
cases, however, different terms reflect significantly different meanings.
These variations, in turn, often reflect different assessments of the
boundaries of GreaterChina, and different evaluations of the feasibility
of institutionalizingit. Finally, GreaterChina is a problematicidea. Some
analysts question its feasibility, given the disintegrative forces that continue
to separatethe various elements of the global Chinese community.
Others question its desirability, either for China or for the rest of the
world. It is importantto understandthe reservations surroundingthe idea
of GreaterChina, as well as its rationale.
The Origins of "Greater China"
In the English language, the word "greater"is often used to suggest a
coherent economic and demographic region that spans administrative
borders. The term "GreaterLondon," for example, refers to the city and
its suburbs,even though those suburbsmay lie outside thejurisdiction of
the municipal government. Similarly, the term "Greater New York
Metropolitan Area" refers to the economic system that takes New York
City as its hub, but includes partsof at least three states. In these contexts,
the entity is regarded as the product of largely natural economic and
social forces, which render political boundaries obsolete or irrelevant.
In a political or strategic setting, however, the term "greater"often has
a much more pejorativeconnotation. Here, it refers to a state's expansion
of its political boundaries to include territories formerly outside its
control. Although occasionally justified in terms of uniting an ethnic
group divided by political frontiers, this is not usually a naturalprocess,
but may actually occur by force. The most common examples are the
"GreaterGermany"(Grossdeutschland) that Hitler intended to unite all
the "Germanicpeoples" of Europe as the core of an even larger German
Empire, and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, designed by
Japanto include most of East Asia. Otherimperialpowers have occasionally
employed the term in this way as well: the phrase "GreaterBritain"
was used briefly in the 1860s to refer to what was latercalled the British
Empire.'
Although the specific term "GreaterChina"is a fairly recentone, it has
quite a long pedigree. The concept can be traced to the traditional
distinction, made first by Chinese and then adopted by Western geogra-
1. Stephen Uhalley, Jr., "'Greater China': what's in a name?" paper presented to the
Regional Seminaron "GreaterChina,"sponsoredby the Centerfor Chinese Studies, University
of California at Berkeley, February 1993, p. 2.
662 The China Quarterly
phers, between "China Proper" (Zhongguo benbu) and what was variously
called "Outer China" or the "Chinese dependencies" (shudi or
fanshu). "China Proper"referred to those areas that were directly controlled
by the central administrativebureaucracy.For most of the Qing
Dynasty, it consisted of the 18 provinces primarily populated by Han
Chinese. In contrast, "Outer China" or the "dependencies" referred to
other areas, primarily peopled by ethnic minorities, that were under the
suzerainty of the Chinese state and whose subordinationwas ensured by
force if necessary. Duringthe Qing, these included Manchuria,Mongolia,
Chinese Turkestanand Tibet.2
Together, China Proper and Outer China were normally called the
"Chinese Empire,"but references to the combination of the two regions
as "GreaterChina" date at least to the 1930s. In 1934, George Cressey
used the term when calculating the geographic area of the country. Six
years later,Owen Lattimoreused it to describe the combinationof "China
within the GreatWall" (thatis, China Proper)and its six "frontierzones"
(which he described as "Manchukuo,"outer Mongolia, Inner Mongolia,
Chinese Turkestan, Tibet proper, and the "Tibet-Chinese frontier
provinces of Ch'inghai [Qinghai] and Hsik'ang [Xikang]").3
In the 1940s, the term "GreaterChina"also appearedon a numberof
United States government maps, with, depending on the map, two
different connotations: political and topographic. In some cases, it was
used to imply thatthe Republic of Chinaclaimed territoriesthathad once
been partof the Chinese Empire,but thatthe Nationalist government did
not presently control. A map published in 1944, for example, included
outer Mongolia, Manchuria, Tibet and Xinjiang as part of "Greater
China," even though not all of these territorieswere controlled by the
Chinese government of the time.4 In other cases, the phrase referredto
geographic featuresthatwere customarily associated with China, but that
spilled across internationalboundariesinto otherjurisdictions. Thus, one
map of the mountain ranges of "GreaterChina" showed the Himalayas,
the Tianshanmountainsandthe Shikote Akin range,even thoughthey lay
either partly or entirely outside the boundaries claimed by the Republic
of China.5
2. On the distinction between "ChinaProper"and the rest of the Chinese Empire, see
William Darby, Darby's Universal Gazetteer (Philadelphia:Bennett and Walton, 1827), p.
154; J. Calvin Smith, Harper's Statistical Gazetteer of the World(New York: Harperand
Brothers, 1855), p. 402; andLippincott's Gazetteer(Philadelphia:J.B. Lippincott, 1883), p.
464. The term "Outer China" is used, together with "China Proper," in China Proper,
Geographical Handbook Series, No. 530 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Departmentof the Navy,
Naval Intelligence Division, July 1944). On the related terms "outer territories" and
"dependencies,"see Edwin John Dingle (ed.), TheNew Atlas and Commercial Gazetteerof
China, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: The North-ChinaDaily News and Herald, 1918?).
3. George Babcock Cressey, China's Geographic Foundations: A Surveyof theLandand
Its People (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1934), p. 53; and Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian
Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographic Society, 1940).
4. U.S. Office of Strategic Services, "GreaterChina," 1944. See Uhalley, "What's in a
name?"
5. U.S. Departmentof the Interior,Bureauof Mines, ForeignMinerals Division, "Sketch
map of the principal mountain ranges in GreaterChina,"Map No. 170, June 1947.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 663
The more recent usage of the concept of GreaterChina first emerged
in Chinese-language sources in the late 1970s, largely to discuss the
expansion of economic ties between Hong Kong and mainlandChinathat
was resulting from the post-Mao reforms, and to highlight the prospects
that a similar growth might occur in the commercial relations between
Taiwan and the mainland. Perhapsthe first such reference can be found
in the June 1979 issue of a Taiwanesejournal, Changqiao (Long Bridge),
which advocatedthe creationof a "Chinese Common Market"thatwould
link Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, Singapore and the Chinese mainland.6
In Hong Kong, one of the first to use a similar concept was the
futurologistHuang Zhilian who, in 1980, devised the termsZhongguoren
gongtongti (Chinese community) andZhongguorenjingji jituan (Chinese
economic grouping) to refer to economic co-operation among Hong
Kong, Taiwan and the mainland.7
In English, the first contemporary use of the term "GreaterChina"
appearedabout five years later, in the mid to late 1980s. At first, a few
writers employed it to refer to the possibility of a politically reunified
China, as when The Economist mentioned that Taiwan might eventually
join a "greaterChina confederation."8 But it was more frequentlyused to
describe the expansion of commercial ties among the three main Chinese
economies. Business Week, in an article entitled "Asia's new firebreather,"referred
to "GreaterChina" as the prospective result of the
"three-wayeconomic integration"of Hong Kong, Taiwan and the mainland,
and as a more "comfortable"and "apolitical"path to reunification
than any formal political settlement.9 Around two years later, the Los
Angeles Times described GreaterChina as a "superpoweron a drawing
board," the result of the economic integration and possible political
reunification of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao and the mainland."
In the early 1990s, the concept of GreaterChina is becoming steadily
more commonplace. Chinese writerscontinue to devise variationson the
concept of an integratedChinese marketplace,and to a lesser degree to
propose formulas for the political reunificationof their country. At least
two majorinternationalconferences, attendedprimarilyby Chinese, have
been held specifically to discuss the concept of an integrated Chinese
economy, and many others have touched on the idea as partof a different
agenda." Several majorAmericanresearchinstitutionsand foreign affairs
organizations have popularized the term through their publications and
6. Cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1979, p. 24.
7. Huang Zhilian, Meiguo 203 nian: Dui "meiguotixi" de lishixue yu weilaixue defenxi
(America at 203 Years:An Analysis of the Historiography and Futurology of theAmerican
System) (Hong Kong: Zhongliu, 1980), pp. 915-929.
8. "Toorich to stay a lonely beacon," TheEconomist, 28 March 1987, p. 21. See also The
Financial Times, 9 December 1985, Section III, p. VII.
9. "Asia's new fire-breather,"Business Week, 10 October 1988, pp. 54-55.
10. " 'Greater China': superpower on a drawing board," Los Angeles Times, 12 June
1990, Section H, p. 1.
11. The firstconference was held in Hong Kong in January1992; the second in Stanford
in June 1993. See Uhalley, "What's in a name?" pp. 13-14.
664 The China Quarterly
conferences.12 Multinational corporations use the concept to describe
theirmarketingor investment strategiesin Asia, and several mutualfunds
have appropriatedthe termas well.'3 "GreaterChina"is rapidlybecoming
partof the standardlexicon of internationalaffairs, whose meanings and
implications deserve careful scrutiny.
A Transnational Chinese Economy
The most common theme in contemporary discussions of Greater
China is the integration of the world's various Chinese economies,
surmountingthe political boundariesthatonce divided and isolated them.
This first aspect of GreaterChina is reflectedin the enormous increase in
the tradebetween Hong Kong and mainlandChinaover the last 15 years,
and the more recent but equally rapid growth of trade between Taiwan
and mainland China since the mid-1980s. Hong Kong's trade with
mainland China, most of it entrep6ttransactions,grew from $5.7 billion
in 1980 to more than $80 billion in 1992. During the same period,
Taiwan's tradewith the mainlandincreased from around$300 million to
$7.4 billion. And, according to Taiwan's accounts, its trade with Hong
Kong, including some of its entrepOttrade,rose from $2 billion in 1980
to $17 billion in 1992. For each of the three Chinese economies, trade
with the other two has become an importantpartof its global economic
relations.
Investment has also been rising. It has been estimated that Taiwan has
now invested a cumulative total of $6.7 billion in mainland China and
another$2 billion in Hong Kong, thatmainlandChinahas invested a total
of $20 billion in Hong Kong (although none yet in Taiwan), and that
Hong Kong has invested $10 billion in mainlandChinaand a further$1.2
billion in Taiwan. If these figures are accurate,they suggest thatcross-investment
within these three parts of Greater China is in the order of
nearly $40 billion. The investment provided by overseas Chinese entrepreneursin
South-east Asia and North America would increase the
total still further.14
12. See, for example, Andrew Brick, "The emergence of Greater China: the diaspora
ascendent," Heritage Lectures, No. 411 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 9
September 1992); David Lamptonet al., TheEmergence of "GreaterChina": Implications
for the United States, Policy Series, No. 5 (New York:National Committee on U.S.-China
Relations, October 1992); Pamela Baldinger, "Thebirthof GreaterChina,"China Business
Review, May-June 1992, pp. 13-17; and Harry Harding, "The U.S. and GreaterChina,"
China Business Review, May-June 1992, pp. 18-22. The articles in China Business Review
were drawn from a conference on "American Economic Relations with Greater China,"
jointly organized in February1992 by the U.S.-China Business Council and the American
EnterpriseInstitute.
13. One of the firstfirmsto announcea "GreaterChina"marketingstrategy - regarding
Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China as a single consumer market - was the Swiss
watchmaker Rado. See Bangkok Post, 25 December 1989. Coca-Cola has also adopted a
similar strategy; see South China Morning Post, 29 October 1991. Of several closed-end
mutual funds making investments in Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainland China, the one
managed by Invesco Mim is called the "GreaterChina OpportunitiesFund,"while the one
managed by Baring Internationalis called the "GreaterChina Fund."
14. For furtherdetails on the level of economic interactionsamong the principalChinese
economies, see the article by Robert Ash and Y. Y. Kueh in this issue.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variationsand Reservations 665
The emergence of this transnationalChinese economy is most often
portrayedas the result of the economic complementarities that presently
exist among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the mainland. Mainland China has
an interest in gaining access to capital, technology and know-how from
Hong Kong and Taiwan, and especially to gain their co-operation in
penetrating markets in third countries. Conversely, manufacturers in
Hong Kong and Taiwan have an interest in finding alternativebases of
production, as higher wages, stronger currencies and environmental restrictions
make it increasingly expensive to produce goods at home. In
addition, Hong Kong and Taiwan - like other economies - are keen
to exploit the large and rapidly growing markets on the Chinese mainland,
especially at a time of recession and perceived protectionism in the
United States, Europe and Japan.
The realization of these economic complementarities,in turn,is facilitated
by the cultural ties among these Chinese societies. It is frequently
asserted that a common culture, a common language, family ties and
ancestral roots all make it somewhat easier for Chinese to do business
with one anotherthan to engage in commercial relations with foreigners.
In addition, prosperous Chinese entrepreneursoutside mainland China
may be more willing to absorb losses in their dealings in the People's
Republic out of a belief that they are assisting in the economic development
and modernization of their motherland.
Anothercrucial factorhas been the more accommodatingposturetaken
by the governments concerned. Both Beijing and Taipei adoptedpolicies
in the 1950s that were extremely inhospitable to the maintenance of
normal commercial relations among the three principalChinese economies.
The People's Republic chose a strategy of autarkic socialist
development which assigned a minimal role to foreign trade and which
virtually barredforeign investment, except for a brief period in which a
limited amountof Soviet investment was tolerated.Because of its hostile
political relationship with the mainland, Taipei banned virtually all
economic contacts across the Taiwan Strait. From this perspective,
mainland China's decision to welcome and promote foreign trade and
investment in the post-Mao era has been one critical stimulant for the
creation of this transnationalChinese economy. Another has been the
willingness of the Taiwan government to remove some of the barriersto
commercial relations with its rival on the mainland.
So far, this analysis makes the emergence of a transnationalChinese
economy appearto be a prime example of the "naturaleconomic territories"
- the economic systems spanning political boundaries - that
can develop when governments allow them.15 And, to a large degree, the
growing commercial interactions among Hong Kong, Taiwan and the
Chinese mainland do represent the construction - or, in many cases,
15. The term"naturaleconomic territories"has been popularizedby the Americanpolitical
scientist Robert Scalapino. See his TheLast Leninists: The Uncertain Future of Asia's
CommunistStates (Washington, D.C.: Centerfor Strategic andInternationalStudies, 1992),
p. 20.
666 The China Quarterly
the resurrection - of normaleconomic ties thathad been interruptedby
30 years of centralplanning in the People's Republic and by 35 years of
hostility between Beijing and Taipei. Hong Kong is resuming its original
role as the entrepOtfor southernChina, whereas Taiwan is developing a
naturalposition as a growth centre for Fujian and much of the Chinese
coast.
It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that more than natural
economic forces are at work. The governments of the principal Chinese
societies arenot simply removing past obstructionsandadoptinga neutral
posture towards economic relationships. Instead, they remain deeply
involved in promoting and guiding the commercial ties among their
economies. What is more, they are doing so for strikingly different
motives. From Beijing's perspective, economic interactionis viewed as a
way of facilitating the eventual political reunification of China. The
mainland Chinese government has therefore adopted a series of policies
to stimulate commercial relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan, most
notably the creationof special economic zones directly opposite them, for
political as well as for purely commercial reasons. Hong Kong, in turn,
regardseconomic ties with the mainlandas a way of cushioning its return
to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, in thatthey will give Beijing a large and
direct stake in preserving the territory'spolitical viability and economic
prosperity throughout the transition. On Taiwan, in contrast, economic
interaction with the mainland is seen in the short term as a lever for
extracting political concessions from Beijing, especially with regard to
renouncing the use of force against the island and allowing Taiwan a
larger voice in international affairs, and possibly a way of promoting
democratizationas well. Over the longer term, many on Taiwan regard
economic integration as a more feasible and more tolerable form of
national unity than formal political reunification.
The emergence of this new transnationalChinese economy has evoked
a multitudeof analytical concepts and prescriptiveformulas. A search of
both Chinese and English language materials has thus far identified no
fewer than41 variationson this particulartheme, ranging(in alphabetical
order) from the "Asian Chinese Common Market"throughthe "Chinese
Economic Community"and the "GreaterChina Economic Sphere"to the
"South-east China Free Trade Area." These formulas differ along two
principal dimensions: the scope of the territory regarded as being included,
and the degree of formal integrationbeing proposed.
Until quite recently, the varying definitions of the geographical extent
of the Greater Chinese economy could be portrayed as five concentric
circles, all centring on Hong Kong. These included: GreaterHong Kong
(Hong Kong, Macao and Guangdong)16; Greater South China (Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the south-easterncoast of the People's Repub-
16. Eugene Linn, "Hong Kong/Guangdong link: whither the South China NIC?" Amcham,Vol.
22, No. 10 (1990), pp. 12-15; Woo Kwong-ching, "Thechallenge of 'Hong Kong
plus'," 2nd ed. (Hong Kong: The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., November 1991); and Zhang
Jiangming, "Nuli cuijin yue-gang-ao-tai jingji hezuo zuoshang xin taijie" ("Workto enable
economic co-operation among Guangdong, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan to reach a new
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 667
lic, extending north perhaps as far as Shanghai)17; Greater Nanyang
(Hong Kong, Macao, South China, Taiwan, Singapore and overseas
Chinese entrepreneursin the rest of South-east Asia)'8; All China (Hong
Kong, Macao, Taiwan and the entire People's Republic)19; and Greater
China (Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, the People's Republic, Singapore
and overseas Chinese throughoutthe world).20 The emergence of these
variations reflects, to some degree, the changing realities of commercial
interaction within the transnationalChinese economy. At the beginning,
the economic ties between Hong Kong and Guangdong dominated the
process: Hong Kong accountedfor the bulk of China's foreign investment
and foreign trade, and the largest share of Hong Kong's trade and
investment relations were, in turn, with Guangdong. As a result, discussions
of "GreaterChina"understandablyfocused on the inner concentric
circles that lay closest to Hong Kong.
By the end of the 1980s, however, Taiwan had become a majortrading
partner and source of investment for mainland China, and investment
footnote continued
level"), Gang'ao jingji (The Economies of Hong Kong and Macao), No. 8 (1990), pp. 7-9,
citing a proposalby a Hong Kong entrepreneurfor a "PearlRiver Delta Economic Alliance."
17. Xiu Chunping, "Haixia liangan jingmao fazhan de dongyin, zhang'ai ji gaiyou de
quxiang" ("The impetus and obstacles to the development of economic relations across the
Taiwan Straitandthe trendit shouldtake"),Taiwanyanjiu (TaiwanResearch), No. 1 (March
1991), pp. 45-50; Ting Wai, "Theregional andinternationalimplications of the South China
Economic Zone," Issues and Studies, Vol. 28, No. 12 (1992), pp. 46-72; Jin Hongxun,
"Zhongguojingji de yitihua yu 'haixia liangan jingjiquan' shexiang" ("The integration of
China's economy and the idea of a 'Cross StraitEconomic Circle'," Taiwanyanjiu (Taiwan
Research), No. 3 (June 1991), pp. 44-51; Zhou Bajun,"Cong 'Zhongguorengongtongti' dao
'hua dongnan ziyou maoyiqu' " ("Froma 'Chinese Commonwealth' to a 'South-east China
FreeTradeArea',"Jingji daobao (Economic Reporter),6 November 1989, pp. 3-5; William
Yang, "Taiwan: a Chinese economic community is emerging," Business Taiwan, 4 May
1992; Sally Stewart et al., "The latest Asian newly industrialized economy emerges: the
South China economic community," Columbia Journal of WorldBusiness, Vol. 27, No. 2
(1992), pp. 30-37; and Zhong Yuanfan, "Jianliyu fazhan huananjingjiqu" ("Constructand
develop a South Chinaeconomic zone"), Gang'aojingji (TheEconomies of Hong Kong and
Macao), No. 4 (1993), pp. 3-6.
18. Li Huiwu, " 'Yatai shiji' yu 'fan nanzhongguo jingjiquan' de xingcheng" ("The
'Asia-Pacific Century' and the formation of a 'Pan-South China Economic Circle' "),
Gang'ao jingji (The Economies of Hong Kong and Macao), No. 10 (1991), pp. 21-23.
19. Zhou Zhihuan," 'Zhongguojingjiquan' chutan"("An initial exploration of the 'Chinese
Economic Circle' "), in Li Jiaquan and Guo Xiangzhi (eds.), Huigu yu
zhanwang - Lun haixia liangan guanxi (Review and Prospect - On Cross-StraitRelations)
(Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 1989), pp. 294-304; Fang Sheng,
"Guanyu'Zhongguojingjiquan' de sikao"("Reflections on a Chinese Economic Circle"),in
ibid. pp. 305-316; An-chia Wu, "Thepolitical implications of the 'Coordinationof Chinese
economic systems'," Issues and Studies, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1992), pp. 1-9; Charng Kao, "A
'GreaterChina Economic Sphere': reality and prospects,"Issues and Studies, Vol. 28, No.
11 (1992), pp. 49-64; and Huang Wentao, " 'Zhongguo jingji guanxiqun' de fazhan yu
'Zhongguo jingjiquan' de kunzhi" ("The development of the 'China Economic Relations
Grouping' and the obstacles to a 'China Economic Sphere',") Taiwan yanjiu (Taiwan Research),
No. 1 (March 1991), pp. 23-31.
20. Changqiao, June 1979, cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, 20 July 1979, p. 24;
Cheng Chu-yuan, "Dazhonghua gongtong shichang de gouxiang" ("The idea of a Greater
Chinese common market"), Zhongguo shibao (China Times), 9 June 1988, p. 2; David
Carnes, "Taiwan: Chinese prosperity sphere begins to take shape," Business Taiwan, 16
March 1992; and Brick, "Emergence of GreaterChina."
668 The China Quarterly
from both Hong Kong and Taiwan had spread from Guangdong up the
coast and into the interior. Even more recently, overseas Chinese entrepreneurs
in South-east Asia have shown a more visible interest in
conducting trade and investment with the People's Republic. In an
empirical sense, therefore, the boundaries of the transnationalChinese
economy have steadily expanded in all directions. As this occurred,
analysis began to incorporate the outermost of the concentric circles,
whose boundaries lay fartherfrom Hong Kong.21
But the analysis of the transnationalChinese economy is a prescriptive
exercise, as well as a descriptive one. One clear division among those
who address the concept has fallen between those who wish to include
Singapore and overseas Chinese in GreaterChina and those who do not.
The former often believe that expanding the geographic area of the
transnationalChinese economy will make it more dynamic, more efficient
and ultimately more powerful. Conversely, the latter often hold that
explicitly including overseas Chinese is highly risky, in that it will raise
fears in South-eastAsia thatChinahas hegemonic ambitionsin the region
and will produce suspicions that overseas Chinese are expected to be
more loyal to their motherlandthan to their place of residence.
The second dimension along which analyses of the transnational
Chinese economy vary involves the degree of formal economic integration
that is being envisaged. In fact, most discussions are extremely
vague on this point, referring ambiguously to an economic "circle,"
"sphere" or "zone" linking the various economies, without providing
much detail on the institutionalor legal structuresinvolved. To the extent
that these issues are addressed, however, there has been a growing
tendency to favour informal patterns of economic activity over formal
institutional arrangements.In other words, just as the geographical scope
of the transnationalChinese economy has been expanding, the prescriptions
for its organizationalstructurehave become steadily less ambitious.
Of course, some of the earliest discussions of the transnationalChinese
economy did imply a ratherhigh degree of formal economic integration.
Drawing on the theoretical literatureon economic integration,as well as
experience in Europeand elsewhere, some analysts proposed the creation
of a "free trade area" (ziyou maoyiqu) linking the various Chinese
economies, implying the elimination of tariff barriersto goods passing
among them. Others advocated the formation of a "common market"
(gongtong shichang), which would involve the establishment of a common
set of tariffs for all goods entering the region from abroad.And a
few, drawinga parallelwith the EuropeanEconomic Community,recommended
the organization of a Chinese Economic Community (jingji
gongtongti), which would entail not only free trade within the area and
common tariffs with non-members, but also the unrestrictedmobility of
21. Some analysts predict thatthe boundariesof the transnationalChinese economy will
continuously expand over time. See, for example, Fu Dongcheng, "Xianggang,taiwan, dalu
jingji tonghe de qianjing" ("The prospects for economic unification among Hong Kong,
Taiwan andthe mainland"),Zhongguo shibao zhoukan(China TimesWeekly),5-11 January
1992, pp. 15-22.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variationsand Reservations 669
the factors of production(especially capital andlabour),the co-ordination
of monetary and fiscal policies, and the creation of common social
welfare mechanisms.22
Over time, however, analyses have become considerably more modest
institutionally.23Instead of envisaging a high level of economic integration,
governed by formal intergovernmentalinstitutions, many observers
now advocate a more informal process of "consultation"or "co-ordination,"
in which governments will attempt to facilitate commercial
relations ratherthan trying to negotiate formal tradingblocs or common
markets.24This trend appears to be occurring for several reasons. First,
there is a greater awareness of the barriersthat would exist even to the
creation of a free trade area, let alone a fully-fledged economic community.
Hong Kong's status as a free port makes it impossible to envisage
its inclusion in a Chinese free tradearea,unless the rest of GreaterChina
were also willing to eliminate tariffs on imported goods.25 The gaps
between the standardsof living, economic institutions and legal systems
on the Chinese mainlandandthose in Hong Kong and Taiwan also make
extensive economic integration highly problematic.26Moreover, Taiwan
and mainland China do not yet have official political relations, direct air
22. These distinctions are drawn in Zhou Bajun, "Cong 'Zhongguoren gongtongti' dao
'hua dongnan ziyou maoyiqu' " ("Froma 'Chinese Commonwealth' to a 'South-east China
Free TradeArea' "). See also Cheng Chu-yuan, "Dazhonghuagongtong shichang de gouxiang"
("The idea of a Greater Chinese common market"); Gao Xijun [Charng Kao],
"Zhongguorenruhe mianduijingji bilei? Jianli 'yazhou huarengongtong shichang' de tantao"
("How should Chinese confront economic blocs? On the construction of an 'Asian
Chinese Common Market'"), Yuanjian(Distant View), 15 October 1988, pp. 101-105; and
Yu Yuanzhou, "Lun jianli 'Zhonghua jingji gongtongti' " ("On constructing a 'Chinese
Economic Community' "), Gang'ao jingji (The Economies of Hong Kong and Macao), No.
2 (1993), pp. 14-16.
23. This is evident in the work of Cheng Chu-yuan, one of the leading analysts of a
transnationalChinese economy. Comparehis recent "Da Zhonghuajingjiquan de xingcheng
yu qianjing"("Theformationandprospectsof the GreaterChinaEconomic Circle"),Zhongguo
shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), 6-12 June 1993, pp. 34-37, with his earlier
"Dazhonghuagongtong shichang de gouxiang" ("The concept of a GreaterChinese Common
Market").
24. See, for example, Li Shuiwang and Liu Yingxian, "Canjia 'Zhonghuajingji xiezuo
xitong' yantaohuiyouguan"("Concernsafterparticipatingin a symposium on a 'system for
co-ordinating the Chinese economies' "), Taisheng (Voice of Taiwan), April 1992, pp. 17-
19; and Liu Yingxian and Luo Xiangxi, "Cong liangan jingmao guanxi fazhan kan
'Zhonghua jingji xiezuo xitong' de jianlai ji kunnan" ("Viewing the construction and
difficulties of a 'system for co-ordinating the Chinese economies' from the development of
cross-Straiteconomic andtraderelations"),Taiwanyanjiu (TaiwanResearch), No. 2 (1992),
pp. 36-44.
25. This point was first made by Yun-wing Sung, in "Non-institutionaleconomic integration
via culturalaffinity:the case of mainlandChina, Taiwan, and Hong Kong" (Shatin:
Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992).
26. See, for example, Xu Donghai, "'Dazhongguo jingji gongtongti' shexiang yu
pinggu" ("Theidea andcritiqueof the 'GreaterChinaEconomic Community' "), Gongdang
wenti yanjiu (Research on CommunistParty Issues), Vol. 16, No. 1 (January 1990), pp.
73-78; Yen Tzung-ta, "Taiwan investment in mainland China and its impact on Taiwan's
industries,"Issues and Studies, Vol. 27, No. 5 (May 1991), pp. 10-42; Gao Chang, "Haixia
liangan jingji zhenghe kexingxing fenxi" ("An analysis of the feasibility of cross-Strait
economic integration"),Taiwanjingji yanjiuyuekan (TaiwanEconomic Research Monthly),
Vol. 14, No. 6 (June 1991), pp. 67-74; and An-chia Wu, "Political implications."
670 The China Quarterly
or sea links, or a trade or investment agreement. This makes discussion
of a high level of economic integration seem most premature.
Questions of feasibility aside, analysts both in China and abroadhave
also expressed reservations about the desirability of forming a highly
institutionalized transnational Chinese economy. In Taiwan, and to a
more limited degree even in Hong Kong, there is the fear that economic
integration with the mainland would lead to a "hollowing out" of local
industry.27This would be particularlytrue, according to one analysis, if
Taiwanese and Hong Kong entrepreneursshifted their entire production
processes and research and development effort to the mainland, not just
the simpler assembly operations.28 Paradoxically, some mainland
economists have expressed parallel concerns: that the complete removal
of barriersto tradeand investment relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan
would confrontmainlandmanufacturerswith unbeatablecompetition, and
thus would exacerbatethe problems of bankruptcyand unemployment in
the state sector in the People's Republic.29In each society, in otherwords,
analysts are viewing the process of full economic integrationwith some
apprehension,worryingthattheirown economy will gain the least benefit
and suffer the greatest dislocation.
The creation of a formal Chinese economic community would also
raise the same issues as the organization of any internationaleconomic
bloc: the fear of those outside that they will be disadvantaged,and even
the apprehensionof those inside that their other economic linkages will
be attenuated.Thus, several analysts in Chinahave warnedthattalk of an
institutionalized transnational Chinese economy could alienate other
countries in Asia, especially members of ASEAN, who would be excluded
from it. Similarly, observers in the United States have speculated
thatthe economic integrationof Hong Kong, Taiwan and mainlandChina
would divert more trade and investment from third countries than it
would generate. Some analysts in Japanare apprehensivethat the formation
of a Chinese economic community would produce an "export
machine"with which the rest of the developing world could not compete,
and whose output the developed nations could not absorb. Conversely,
observers in Taiwan (and, interestingly, in mainlandChina as well) have
27. Huang Ruiqi, "Lianganjingmao jiaoliu dui guonei chanye fazhan zhi yingxiang"
("Theeffect of cross-Straiteconomic andtradeinterchangeon the development of domestic
industry"),Taiwanjingji yanjiuyuekan,Vol. 14, No. 6 (June 1991), pp. 43-46. For a similar
concern about Hong Kong, expressed by the chairmanof a Hong Kong Chinese industrialists'
association, see Liang Qinrong, " 'Qian dian hou chang' moshi yu Xiang Gang jingji
fazhan luxiang," ("The 'store in front, factory in back' model andthe pathfor Hong Kong's
economic development"),Jingji daobao (Economic Reporter),No. 2 (1993), pp. 49-50. For
a more sanguine view, writtenby a mainlandscholar, see ZhangGuanhua,"Taiwan'chanye
kongdonghua' wenti zhi tantao" ("An inquiry into the 'industrial hollowing-out' of Taiwan"),
Taiwan yanjiu (Taiwan Research), No. 4 (1992), pp. 33, 34-39.
28. Liu Ruitu, "Poxi guonei shengchang waiyi dalu" ("An analysis of the movement of
domestic industry to the mainland"), Taiwanjingji yanjiu yuekan (Taiwan Economic Research
Monthly), Vol. 14, No. 6 (June 1991), pp. 32-37.
29. Pei Wuwei, "Dui 'Zhongguo jingjiquan' de jingji fenxi" ("An economic analysis of
the 'Chinese Economic Circle' "), Yatai jingji - Zhongguo de duiwai kaifang (AsiaPacific
Economies - China's Opening to the Outside World), No. 2 (1993), pp. 54-59.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variationsand Reservations 671
cautioned that the creation of a transnationalChinese economy might
somehow cut off or attenuate their existing economic relations with
Japan, the United States and the rest of the world.
Increasingly, therefore, discussions of the transnationalChinese economy
are featuring the significantly different concept of a network of
overlapping and interlocking economic territories,some large and some
small, ratherthan a single unified economic bloc. According to one early
version, presented by the Hong Kong scholar Huang Zhilian, these
economic territoriesmight include GreaterSouth Chinacentringon Hong
Kong and Taiwan, a Yangzi Circle focused on Shanghai, a Bohai Circle
linking TianjinandDalian to South Korea,anda South-west ChinaCircle
connecting Sichuan and Yunnan to South-east Asia.30To this list others
would add the Tumen River region, linking north-east China, Russia,
Japanand the two Koreas; and a North-west Circle, connecting western
China to Russia and the bordering CentralAsian republics.
This conception differs from earlier discussions of "GreaterChina"in
several ways. First, it is more multi-nodal, in that these emerging
economic circles and networks are no longer seen as centringexclusively
on Hong Kong, as earlier versions tended to be. It is still acknowledged,
of course, that Hong Kong will continue to provide much of the capital
investment for the entire Asia-Pacific region, and to serve as an entrepot
for much of its trade.But a numberof other key cities are also depicted
as centres of economic growth, with Taipei, Shanghai, Tianjin, Dalian
and Chongqing occupying a much more prominentplace thanthey did in
earlier versions. Whatever its economic logic, this approach has more
political appealthana concept thatassigns the centralpartsolely to Hong
Kong.
Secondly, unlike the earlierversions of "GreaterChina,"most of these
smaller economic circles are not solely Chinese. Although some (such as
Huang Zhilian's GreaterSouth China) still link territoriesexclusively or
largely settled by Chinese, and others (such as the South-west China
Economic Circle) involve connections with overseas Chinese entrepreneurs,there
are those (such as the Bohai Circle and the North-west
Circle) which foresee interaction with economies where ethnic Chinese
do not play a dominant role. Thus, Japan, Russia, India and North
America are centrally involved, whereas they were virtually excluded
from the first portraitsof GreaterChina.
And thirdly, the discussion of these transnational economic circles
envisages a relatively low degree of formal institutionalization.Although
governments will be involved in breakingdown the administrativebarriers
to trade and investment, and in building the physical infrastructure
that can promote commercial transactions, there is as yet little talk of
30. Huang Zhilian, " 'Xi Taipingyang diqu chanye xiezuo xitong' chubu gouxiang"
("Initialconception of a 'western Pacific regional industrialco-ordination system' ") Jingji
daobao (Economic Reporter), 18 July 1988, pp. 14-15. See also his Xianggang zouxiang
ershiyi shiji: "Huaxia tixi" yu "taipingyangshidai" de tansuo (Hong Kong Moves Toward
the 21st Century:An Exploration of the "CathaysianSystem"and the "PacificEra") (Hong
Kong: Chinese Press Publishing, 1989).
672 The China Quarterly
forming these regions into formal free trade areas or common customs
territories. Instead, there is more emphasis on building infrastructure,
exchanging information and harmonizing regulatorypolicies.
In short,the new vision of the transnationalChinese economy involves
a set of smallereconomic circles, integrallyconnected to largereconomic
regions, such as the emerging Asia-Pacific economic community, rather
than focused primarily on internal interaction. It also emphasizes relatively
spontaneous commercial activity, rather than the negotiation of
formal trading arrangements.To its advocates, it therefore promises the
best of both worlds: the benefits of new commercial opportunities that
cross internationalborders, without the economic or cultural exclusivity
- or the political ambition - associated with earlier conceptions
of a "GreaterChina."
A Global Chinese culture
The second core concept subsumed under the heading of "Greater
China"involves the increasing culturalinteraction of people of Chinese
descent, again across internationalboundaries.Like economic integration,
this trendcan be capturedin a few simple statistics. People from Taiwan
now visit mainland China around one million times every year. The
volume of visits between Hong Kong and the People's Republic is
several times higher. The flow of mail across the Taiwan Strait has now
reached 24 million pieces per year, andtelephone calls from the mainland
to Taiwan amountto 40,000 per day. The popularcultureof Hong Kong
and Taiwan has a growing audience on the mainland, and exchanges of
artists, performers and writers between Taiwan and the mainland are
steadily increasing.
The growth of these kinds of exchanges representsthe reintegrationof
the transnationalChinese society that had been created by the centuriesold
diasporafrom the heartlandof Chinato other partsof the world. The
flow of Chinese overseas began in the Ming Dynasty with the resettlement
of Chinese merchantsto South-eastAsian tradingports.It continued
with the emigration of thousandsof Ming sympathizersto Taiwan in the
17th century; with the flow of emigrant labour around the world in the
19th and early 20th centuries; with the flow of political refugees from
Communism to Hong Kong, Taiwan, South-eastAsia and NorthAmerica
in the mid-20th century; and with the continuing stream of students and
scholars to the West over the last hundredyears.
The political division of China in 1949 profoundly disrupted the
normalcontacts within this global Chinese society, just as it preventedthe
exercise of normalcommercial contacts. The People's Republic generally
viewed overseas Chinese as being contaminated with bourgeois values;
the Nationalist government on Taiwan cut off all cultural and humanitarian
exchange with the mainland. Although both Taiwan and the
mainland maintainedties with Hong Kong and with groups of sympathetic
Chinese abroad, the level of interaction within the international
Chinese community was far lower than it would normally have been.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 673
With the fall of these political barriers,culturalexchange could rapidly
resume, reflecting the naturaldesire for interactionamong those enjoying
a common culture. Families divided since 1949 longed for reunion.
Overseas Chinese wanted the opportunity to visit their native places,
historical sites or scenic spots on the mainland. Artists and performers
wished to exchange their work; intellectuals and scientists were eager to
sharetheirviews on topics of common concern. OrdinaryChinese wanted
to enjoy the stimulation of films, songs and literatureproduced in their
own language but in a different social setting. Moreover, the global
revolution in transport and communication has greatly facilitated the
resurrectionof these kinds of cultural exchange. Jet travel has made it
easier and less expensive for Chinese around the world to visit one
another.Telephones and fax machines have promoted regularcommunication
among friends and families. Audio tapes, video cassettes and
satellite broadcasting have all encouraged the exchange of popular cul-
ture.
To this degree, the recreation of a global Chinese culture has been a
naturalprocess: the productof a common ancestry, facilitated by modem
communications. But, as with commercial ties, many of the governments
involved have not been neutralor disinterestedobservers. The leaders of
mainland China have viewed cultural and humanitarianexchanges, like
economic relations, as a way of promoting the reunification of the
country.The rediscovery of a common culturalidentity, they believe, will
produce a desire for political reintegration.The Nationalist government
has favoured cultural ties across the Taiwan Strait for a related but
slightly differentreason:not so much to create a demandfor reunification
as to forestall the demand for independence. Moreover, many in Taipei
believe thatcross-Straitcontacts, by graphicallyrevealing the differences
in living conditions between the two sides, will bolster the legitimacy of
the Kuomintang while underminingthat of the Communists.
Thus far, the reintegrationof the global Chinese community has been
the least extensively discussed of the three core versions of Greater
China.31It is here, more than in economics or politics, that both description
and prescription are lagging well behind reality. Nevertheless, a
number of distinct variations on the common theme of renewed cultural
contact are already evident in the few writings on the subject.
Perhapsthe dominant tendency in the analysis is an emphasis on high
culture. Most writings on the subject focus on the growing interaction
among Chinese intellectuals aroundthe world, which they portrayas the
continuation and renewal of a 150-year search for a modem Chinese
culture. Tu Wei-ming, perhapsthe most articulateadvocate of this view,
has portrayed the process as one by which Chinese intellectuals can
overcome their "sense of impotence, frustration, and humiliation" and
31. There has, however, been at least one multilateral conference on the subject. The
meeting, called "Prospectsfor CulturalChina: Concept and Reality," was co-sponsored by
the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the Taibei Hong Kong-Macao Association, and the
China Times, and was held in Hong Kong in March 1993. See Zhongguo shibao (China
Times), 21 March 1993, p. 22.
674 The China Quarterly
find identity "not only as Chinese but as thinking and reflective Chinese
in an increasingly alienating and dehumanizing world."32
Tu's vision of what he calls a global "CulturalChina" raises several
profound and interrelatedquestions. First, who should be included in it?
Not surprisingly,Tu includes all those of Chinese descent, whetherliving
in predominantlyChinese societies (such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore
and the mainland), or as minorities in Chinese communities
overseas. More controversially, he also includes those non-Chinese with
a personal or professional interest in China: "individuals,such as scholars,
teachers,journalists, industrialists,traders,entrepreneursand writers,
who try to understandChina intellectually and bring their conceptions of
China to their own linguistic communities."Tu thus defines the membership
of a global Chinese culture culturally, rather than ethnically: it
consists of all of those, from whateverethnic background,who participate
in the "internationaldiscourse of culturalChina"and who therebyjoin in
the creation of a modem Chinese identity.33
The second crucial question raised by Tu's concept concerns the
capital of his CulturalChina. Traditionally,the Chinese state has sought
to ensure thatthe culturalandpolitical capitalsof the nationwere one and
the same, so as to ensure that the prevailing intellectual climate would
conform with political orthodoxy. Thus, the leaders of the People's
Republic today would presumably wish to see Beijing, and possibly
Shanghai, serve as the centres for modem elite Chinese culture. Conversely,
political dissidents, dissatisfied with the statusquo, wish thereto
be several centres of culturallife thatremain autonomous of the political
capital. For them, the intellectual capitals should not be restricted to
Beijing or Shanghai but should also include Taipei, Hong Kong and
Singapore, and, equally important,the overseas dissident communities in
Cambridge,PrincetonandParis.Tu Wei-ming inclines towardthe second
position. The subtitle of his article - "The peripheryas the center" implies
his major theme: that the "peripherywill come to set the ...
cultural agenda for the center."34Or, as he puts it elsewhere, "a
significantly weakened centermay turnout to be a blessing in disguise for
the emergence of a truly functioning Chinese civilization-state.''35
And this, in turn, leads to the third and ultimately most critical
question: the content of the modem Chinese identity that will be produced
by the "internationaldiscourse of Cultural China." In essence,
different centres are associated with different themes, particularlyin the
crucial area of political culture. Many intellectuals, let alone political
leaders, in Beijing, Shanghai and Singapore are advocating a modernized
version of traditionalChinese political culture, drawing heavily on Confucian
concepts of politics to create a political system thatis technocratic,
hierarchical and orderly. In contrast to this neo-authoritarianvision, the
32. Tu Wei-ming, "CulturalChina: the peripheryas center,"Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 2
(1991), p. 2.
33. Ibid. pp. 12-13.
34. Ibid. p. 12.
35. Ibid. p. 15.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 675
prevailing view among Chinese intellectuals in Hong Kong, Taipei and
overseas is for a much more democratic version of modem Chinese
culture, with the organizationaland ideological pluralism associated with
liberal democracies in the West. The outcome of this debate will not only
have a profound effect on the structureof the various Chinese polities,
but also, as will be noted later, have significant implications for the
political evolution of the rest of the world.
Alongside this there is also a phenomenon that is much more populist
in character: a transnational popular Chinese culture, shaped not by
modem literati but by commercial artists, musicians and writers. Although
this is rapidly becoming a reality, it has not yet become a
prominent part of discussions of a global Chinese culture. Still,
harbingersof this concept are apparentin the view of a group of Taiwan
and Hong Kong television executives that direct satellite broadcastingof
Chinese-language programming will soon create a "Chinese television
global village,"36and in the opinion of at least one mainland Chinese
scholar that there is emerging a Chinese "civilizational community"
(shengming gongtongti) characterized by a "pan-Chinese culture" (fan
Zhonghuaxing wenhua).
This populist version of a global Chinese cultureraises the same issues
of participants,capitals and content thathave been generatedby the more
elitist variants. One such question concerns the role of ethnic minorities
in forging Chinese popular culture. Chinese officials have long insisted
that the Manchus, Tibetans, Mongols and Hui are not only citizens in the
Chinese state,but have been assimilatedinto a common Chinese culture."37
Increasingly, however, many Chinese writersand artiststake the opposite
position: thatnationalminoritiesnot only absorbChinese culture,but also
provide values, meanings and artistic vocabularies that can enrich it.38
Relatedly, one can imagine controversy over the degree to which overseas
Chinese areregardedas consumers of Chinese popularculture,or as
creators of it. As a result, there will be intense rivalry to serve as the
geographic centres of popular Chinese culture. At first, it seemed clear
thatHong Kong andTaiwan would play such a role, at least in music and
film. Theirproductswere more professionally produced,more technically
sophisticatedandunconstrainedby the orthodox styles and subjects of the
cultural bureaucracy on mainland China. More recently, however, the
cultural centres of mainland China have made a strong resurgence. This
is not only because of the easing of the political restrictionsimposed after
the Tiananmen crisis of 1989, but also because many believe that
problems and trends in mainland society can only be reflected by their
own artists and writers. Thus, Guangzhou, Shanghai and Beijing (in
music), and Beijing and Xi'an (in film) are challenging the near-
36. Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly),26 April-2 May 1992, pp. 40-53.
37. David Yen-ho Wu, "The construction of Chinese and Non-Chinese identities,"
Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 2 (1991), p. 162.
38. See, for example, Leo Ou-fan Lee, "Onthe margins of the Chinese discourse: some
personal thoughts on the cultural meaning of the periphery,"Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 2
(1991), pp. 207-224.
676 The China Quarterly
monopoly in successful popular culture once held by Taipei and Hong
Kong.
The content of popular Chinese culture is also a matter of dispute.
Most observers agree thatthatproducedoutside the mainlandis primarily
individualistic, materialistic or even hedonistic in character.It is highly
likely that the official overseers of culture in Beijing will therefore seek
to encourage, as a counterweight, a more orthodox popular.culture that
embodies collective values, patriotism and asceticism. It is conceivable
that the battle between these two versions of Chinese popular culture
could be as intense as the struggle among Chinese elites between the
proponents of democracy and the advocates of neo-authoritarianism.
And yet, sceptics argue that the emergence of global Chinese culture
must overcome two set of dauntingobstacles. First, political barriersstill
play a restrictive role in cultural matters,just as they do in economics.
Although Communist leaders are much less intolerant of unorthodox
popular culture than they were in the Maoist era, there are still periodic
complaints against "spiritualpollution"from abroad,and there are informal
limits on the number and type of films and television programmes
from Hong Kong and Taiwan that can be exhibited on the mainland.39If
anything,the barrierson Taiwan are even higher:there arerestrictionson
the content of mainlandpublications thatcan be sold on Taiwan, bans on
the public exhibition of mainland films and television programmes, and
even regulationsconcerning the amountof time thatmainlandperformers
can appear on the screen in co-produced movies. Political mistrust
continues to hamper intellectual exchanges in the social sciences and
contemporaryhumanities. Some worry that these barrierswill not only
impede cultural interaction, but also ensure that cultural products intended
for a transnational audience (such as broadcast on the
Chinese-language channel of StarTelevision) remainbland and non-con-
troversial.
Otheranalysts have suggested thatthe main obstacle to the creation of
a global Chinese culture will not be the barriers imposed by central
governments, but rather the competing attractionof local sub-cultures.
And, indeed, the democratization of political life on Taiwan and the
decay of political controls on the mainland are producing a noticeable
resurgence of local identity. In Taiwan, in Guangdong, in Shanghai and
in other parts of mainland China, there is a renewed interest in local
history, folk religion and culture,and a rise in the use of local dialect. By
extension, there is presumably less interest in national history, in high
national culture and in the use of guoyu or putonghua.
In reply it can be said that these trends are not unprecedented,nor do
they negate the possibility of the emergence of a global Chinese culture,
at both the elite and popular levels. As Myron Cohen has written, "that
differentiation and integration may occur concurrently, especially in
complex societies, should hardlycome as a surprise.... The generationor
39. As one informant put it, historical dramas are encouraged, whereas programmes
showing daily social life in Taiwan and Hong Kong are not.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 677
preservation of [local] differences was the flip side of the creation of
[national] uniformities in late traditional Chinese culture." There was
always a tension between the national orthodox culture (which the state
sought to promulgate,but never expected commoners to masterfully) and
local sub-cultures (some aspects of which were tolerated by the state,
while others were suppressed).40Thus one should not regardthe question
of culturalidentity as a zero-sum situation,in which one form of identity
can exist only at the expense of another.The creationof a global Chinese
culture, in other words, can exist at precisely the same time as the
renaissance of local sub-cultures.
A similar debate concerns the likelihood thatlarge numbersof Chinese
overseas will become part of a global Chinese culture. Some argue that,
compared to the past, more overseas Chinese are seeing themselves as
permanentemigrants,ratherthantemporarysojourners,and are abandoning
their Chinese citizenship in favour of foreign nationality. Generation
by generation, they will therefore assimilate into their adoptive cultures,
intermarrywith people of different backgrounds,lose their knowledge of
Chinese language and culture, and even abandonmuch interest in China.
Outside East Asia, their ethnicity may prevent their full absorption into
their new societies. Even so, they may define thatethnicity in other ways
than Chinese, in the way that many younger Americans of Chinese
descent see themselves as Asian-Americans, rather than specifically as
Chinese-Americans.
In response, defenders of the concept of a global Chinese cultureagain
argue that cultural identity is not an either-or affair. Wang Gungwu, the
leading scholar of overseas Chinese, has insisted that working and
studying abroad does not necessarily eradicate a sense of Chineseness,
but ratherhelps to define it andeven to strengthenit.4' He emphasizes the
ongoing significance of ethnicity, noting that "most [overseas Chinese]
live in countries where denial [of their Chineseness] would be useless."42
He also predicts that the globalization of the world economy and the
improvements in communication and transporttechnology will make it
both convenient and imperative for overseas Chinese to maintainat least
a partial identity as members of a global Chinese culture.
A Reunified Chinese State
The final theme associated with the term "Greater China" is the
reunificationof the Chinese state after a period of division. Of the three
core concepts underdiscussion here, this is the one with the deepest roots
in Chinese history. In traditional times, the boundaries of the Chinese
empire were never static. The size of the empire shrankwhen the vitality
of the central government declined: peripheralterritories,parts of Outer
40. Myron L. Cohen, "Being Chinese: the peripheralization of traditional identity,"
Daedalus, Vol 120, No. 2 (1991), pp. 113-134, at p. 121.
41. Wang Gungwu, "Among non-Chinese," Daedalus, Vol. 120, No. 2 (1991), p. 136.
42. Ibid. p. 154.
678 The China Quarterly
China, became autonomous or fully independent. In periods of severe
decay, China Proper might itself be divided, falling victim to foreign
invasion, or disintegratinginto a numberof rival Chinese states. But the
subsequent phase in the dynastic cycle was that, in time, the empire
would reconstitute itself. A strong political force would reunify the
provinces of China Proper, re-establishing a powerful central government.
It would then use a combination of economic blandishments and
military force to reassert China's suzerainty over Outer China. The
boundaries of the resulting empire might not be precisely the same as
before, but the process was similar, and became an important part of
Chinese political culture.As JohnFairbankwrote of the situationin 1949,
"thehistory of past dynastic foundings predisposedthe Chinese people to
expect and welcome the returnof central power."43
The last years of the Qing Dynasty provide an excellent example of the
process of territorialdisintegrationduring a period of political decay. As
the empire weakened, it was stripped of land. Some of these lost
territories were part of China Proper, beginning with the Portuguese
occupation of Macao in 1557, and continuing with the other colonies,
concessions and leased areas (such as Hong Kong, Guangzhouwan,
Qingdao and Dalian) seized by the Western powers along the Chinese
coast in the 19th century.But foreign powers also seized more peripheral
regions: Russia took eastern Siberia; Japan seized the Ryukyus, Taiwan
and Korea;France colonized Indo-China.With the collapse of the Qing,
the process of disintegration went even further:Outer Mongolia, Tibet
and Turkestan all became independent of China, at least de facto, in
1911-12; and Manchuria,as Manchukuo,became a separate state under
Japanese influence in 1932.
Although the defeat of Japan in the Second World War returned
Taiwan and Manchuriato China, the Chinese civil war produced further
division of the country, when the Communistsseized control of mainland
China and the Nationalists retreatedto Taiwan. Thus by 1949, what had
been a single empire under the Qing had been divided into five separate
entities: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China on
Taiwan, the Mongolian People's Republic, Hong Kong and Macao.
Since then, both the Nationalist and Communist governments have
been committed to the reunification of China. But what should be the
boundariesof a reunifiedChinese state? In the 1950s, a few high school
textbooks published on Taiwan carriedmaps suggesting that Nationalist
China would seize all of Siberia and much of Soviet Central Asia after
the defeat of the Soviet Union and CommunistChina in a world war, but
there is no evidence that the Kuomintangever took such grandiose plans
very seriously.44Instead,the Nationalistgovernmenthas takenthe consistent
position that China should include all of China Proper,plus Taiwan,
43. John K. Fairbank,"TheReunificationof China,"in Roderick MacFarquharandJohn
K. Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, Vol. 14 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 22.
44. See Uhalley, "What's in a name?"
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variationsand Reservations 679
the South China Sea, Tibet, Xinjiang and Manchuria. Until recently,
Mongolia has also been a partof the Kuomintang'sconception of Greater
China, but in the past few years Taipei has shown a growing willingness
to acknowledge Mongolia to be a separate,independent nation.
The perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is even more
pertinentto an analysis of the prospects of a reunifiedChina. In fact, over
time the CCP has taken quite differentviews of its territorialclaims. One
issue has concerned Taiwan. At its Second Congress in 1922, the Party
called for the unification of China, but did not mention Taiwan as partof
the territory to be included within its borders.45 In an interview with
Edgar Snow in 1936, Mao Zedong made the same point more explicitly.
Likening Taiwan to Korea, Mao said that both territoriesshould become
independent states following the defeat of Japan, rather than being
reattachedto China.46However, the CCP's policy towardthe island soon
changed. Once the Nationalists had relocated to Taiwan, the CCP called
for the reunificationof Taiwan with the rest of China - a position it has
held consistently ever since.
The CCP's views on the statusof outerMongolia have also variedover
the years. Before 1949, CCP documents portrayedMongolia, Tibet and
Xinjiang as having the same status: as minority areas not part of China
Proper, which would formally be given the right of secession and
independence, but which would "automatically"(in Mao's word) become
partof a federal Chinese state after the Communists' seizure of power.47
After 1949, however, presumablyunder pressurefrom the Soviet Union,
Beijing recognized the independence of the Mongolian People's Republic.
And yet Mao and other senior Chinese leaders have periodically
hinted thatthey still considered outerMongolia to be partof China, as do
some younger people in mainland China today.
The last boundary question concerns the fate of other territories,
historically subject to Chinese suzerainty, that fell under the control of
foreign powers duringandafterthe 18thcentury.Chinese maps published
in the early 1950s depicted these territoriesin extensive detail, suggesting
thatthe Communistgovernment still held some claim to them. Moreover,
at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Beijing denounced the
treaties with Tsarist Russia that had demarcated the two countries'
border, and implied that it still laid some claim to large portions of
Siberia. Since the early 1970s, however, the CCP has consistently
pledged to accept most existing internationalborders, with some limited
modifications. Its sole remaining claims are to Hong Kong, Macao and
the islands in the South China Sea.
Boundaries aside, how should a reunified China be governed? Al-
45. "Manifesto of the Second National Congress of the CCP" (July 1922), in Conrad
Brandtet al. (eds.), A DocumentaryHistory of Chinese Communism(New York:Atheneum,
1966), pp. 63-65.
46. Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1961), p. 96.
47. "Manifestoof the Second National Congress"; "Constitutionof the Soviet Republic"
(November 1931), in Brandt,A Documentary History, p. 223; and Snow, Red Star Over
China, p. 96n.
680 The China Quarterly
though most discussions of a transnationalChinese economy and of a
global Chinese culture are of fairly recent vintage, formulas for reunifying
China under a single government have a much longer history. These
formulas - Communist and Nationalist - can be grouped into four
broadcategories: "one country,one system";"onecountry,two systems";
"one country, two governments"; and "one country, many govern-
ments.''48
Until quite recently, both the CCP and the Kuomintangproposed that
the reunification of China be accomplished under a single government,
and with a common socio-economic system. Not surprisingly,each party
believed that the government that it controlled should serve as China's
central political authority;equally predictably,each party advocated that
all of Chinese society be organized according to its own ideological
model. Thus, for most of the period from 1949 to 1979, the CCP called
for the "liberation"of Taiwan, the creationof a socialist economic system
on the island and the formation of a provincial government on Taiwan
thatwould be subordinateto the centralgovernmentin Beijing. In parallel
fashion, the Kuomintang's formula for reunificationinvolved the democratizationof
the mainland's political system, the reform of the mainland
economy accordingto marketprinciples, and then the reabsorptionof the
mainlandprovinces underthe Nationalist Constitutionof 1946. The CCP,
in short, envisaged the unification of China under the principles of
Marxism-Leninism, the Kuomintangunder the sanmin zhuyi.
In the early 1980s, however, the CCP significantlymodified its formula
for reunification,changing from a policy of "one country,one system" to
one of "one country,two systems." It announcedthat, afterreunification,
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan would become special administrative
regions of the People's Republic. As such, they would be able to preserve
their own social andeconomic systems, maintaina more democraticform
of government than in the rest of China, and enjoy a high degree of
autonomy in their internal affairs. In addition, Taiwan was offered the
right to maintainits own armed forces. Nevertheless, underthis formula
all these entities were seen as local jurisdictions underthe sovereignty of
the central Chinese government.
In response to this Communist initiative, scholars and policy analysts
on Taiwan developed a significantly different formula:not "one country,
two systems," but "one country, two governments."49 Under this approach,
Taiwan would not only maintain its own economic, social and
political system, but would enjoy equal status with the mainland in
internationalaffairs. Thirdcountries could have diplomaticrelations with
both Taiwan and the mainland, and both Chinese governments would be
represented in the United Nations and other internationalagencies. The
48. For anotherclassification and summaryof the competing formulas for reunification,
see Wen-hui Tsai, "Convergence and divergence between mainlandChina and Taiwan: the
future of unification,"Issues and Studies, Vol. 27, No. 12 (December 1991), pp. 1-28.
49. This formulais also summarizedas "one country, two regions" or "one country,two
entities."
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 681
principle of "one Chinese nation" would be maintained, but in practice
that nation would be divided into co-equal political systems.50
To some of its proponents, this formula applies only to a transitional
period, during which the remaining gaps between the conditions on
Taiwan and those on the mainlandmake full reunificationimpossible. As
one leading analyst on Taiwan has put it, the concept of "one country,
two governments" "does not preclude reunification ..., [but] only provides
the room for simultaneous recognition of both political systems
within the divided states in the transitional period before the eventual
reunification."51To others, however, this formula may representnot an
interim solution, but a final one. Many analysts on Taiwan believe that
the island's culture, economic system, political institutions and standard
of living are now significantly different from those on the mainland, and
that the gap between them may never be closed. No formula for reunification
under a single central government, in their perspective, could
guarantee sufficient autonomy for Taiwan to be acceptable to the Taiwanese
people. Thus, they believe that, whatever lip service must be
given to the concept of "one China,"the reality can only be two distinct
societies under two separategovernments.
Recently, a fourth set of formulas has begun to emerge on both sides
of the Taiwan Strait, adopting a federalist approach to China's reunification.Under
many of these formulas, the presentPeople's Republic
of China would devolve much of its existing political authority to its
provinces, while creating a federal national government to facilitate
reunificationwith Taiwan and Hong Kong. Such an approachcan therefore
be summarized as "one country, many governments." Although
federalism has deep roots in the history of contemporary China,52 its
revival in recent years has been most closely associated with the mainland
scholar Yan Jiaqi, the former director of the Institute of Political
Science of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, now living in exile
abroad.Yan has proposed the creationof a federal governmentto govern
the present territoryof the People's Republic, and then an even looser
50. Some mainland officials and policy analysts appearwilling to explore this proposal.
See, for example, the reportby Tang Shubei of the mainland's Association for Relations
Across the Taiwan Strait that the two sides might "commonly share international status"
(gongtong fenxiang guoji diwei), in Zhongguo shibao, 20 June 1993, pp. 72-75. The most
recent official statement of Beijing's policy toward Taiwan, however, shows no such
flexibility. See "TheTaiwan question and the reunificationof China,"a white paper issued
by the Taiwan Affairs Office and the InformationOffice of the State Council, relayed by
Xinhua News Agency, 31 August 1993, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily
Report: China, 1 September 1993, pp. 43-51.
51. Yung Wei, " 'Multi-system nations' revisited: interactionbetween academic conceptualization
and political reality," paper presented to the 15th World Congress of the
InternationalPolitical Science Association, Buenos Aires, July 1991.
52. See, for example, JeanChesneaux, "Thefederalist movement in China, 1920-23," in
Jack Gray (ed.), Modern China's Searchfor a Political Form (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1969), pp. 96-137; and PrasenjitDuara, "Provincialnarrativesof the nation:centralism
and federalism in Republican China," in Harumi Befu (ed.), Cultural Nationalism in
East Asia, Research Papers and Policy Studies No. 39 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian
Studies, University of California, 1993), pp. 9-35.
682 The China Quarterly
confederal structureto incorporateTaiwan, Macao and Hong Kong.53As
Yan points out, there was a time when the CCP itself endorsed a federal
system for China. The Party's Second National Congress in 1922 formally
proposed the creation of a "ChineseFederal Republic,"and Mao's
interview with Edgar Snow made a favourable reference to the concept.
And yet, once the Communist Partygained control over the mainlandin
1949, it promptly renounced its federalist heritage. Indeed, even though
the Communist Party modelled many aspects of its new governing
structureafter Soviet practice, it specifically rejected the idea of copying
the nominally federal structureof the Soviet Union.
Today, Chinese scholars and officials normally reject federalism as
incompatible with the official formula of "one country, two systems."54
Recently, however, there have been signs that the concept may be
receiving a more favourable hearing. Deng Xiaoping himself has reportedly
said that, if it is more acceptable to Taiwan, federalism may be the
most effective strategy for the reunification of China.55And interviews
with Chinese scholars in the summer of 1993 have suggested much
greater openness to the concept than in the past.
And yet, many still have qualms about the desirability of a single
reunifiedChina, even undera federal formula.The most obvious reservations
are held by people in the territoriesthat might be incorporatedin
such an entity. Although the fate of both Hong Kong and Macao has now
been determined by internationalnegotiations, a majority of people in
Hong Kong, and probablya sizeable portion of the population of Macao
as well, would have preferred to remain separate from the People's
Republic. Around 10 or 15 per cent of the people of Taiwan arein favour
of a formal declarationof independence from the mainland, and a much
larger number supportthe indefinite continuation of the status quo. And
certainly the overwhelming majority of those in outer Mongolia wish to
remain outside a reunified Chinese state.
Many of China's neighbours, too, are apprehensiveabout the strategic
consequences of Chinese reunification. It has already become commonplace
in discussions of regional and global matters to aggregate the
resources available to the three major Chinese societies to estimate the
power of a reunified China. Together, we are told, the foreign exchange
53. Yan Jiaqi, Lianbang Zhongguo gouxiang (The Concept of a Federal China) (Hong
Kong: Ming Bao, 1992). For more on federalism, see JiangJingkuan,"Zhongguotongyi zui
lixiang de tujing" ('"Themost ideal path for Chinese reunification: implement a federal
republicansystem"), Zhongbao yuekan (Central Monthly), April 1984, pp. 8-10; and Chen
Guozhen, "Minzu zijue zhi shi hai shi shenlou?" ("Is ethnic national self-determination
a mirage?"), Zhongguo shibao zhoukan (China Times Weekly), 2-8 September 1989,
pp. 13-15.
54. See, for example, Zhongguo tongxunshe (ChinaNews Agency), 26 February1992, in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: China, 2 March 1992, pp. 37-38.
55. Deng reportedly said that Beijing should give "careful consideration" to the
"possibility of post-reunificationconstitutional changes," including the formation of a "socalled
'federation' or 'confederation.' "Jing bao, No. 184 (5 November 1992), pp. 63-64,
in Foreign Broadcast InformationService Daily Report: China, 6 November 1992, p. 55.
Yang Shangkunis reportedto have made a similar remark.See China Post, 5 May 1993, in
Foreign Broadcast InformationService Daily Report: China, 12 May 1993, pp. 66-67.
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 683
holdings of Taiwan and the mainland dwarf those of any other country;
the global trade volumes of Hong Kong, Taiwan and the People's
Republic rival those of Japan;andthe armiesof Taiwan andthe mainland
would be the largest military force in Asia. Today, such calculations are
not that meaningful, since they assume that these resources would be at
the disposal of a single political will that does not exist. Were China to
be reunified under a powerful central government, however, such an
aggregation of resources would indeed have occurred, producing an
internationalactor far more powerful than mainland China is today.
Finally, some mainland Chinese - albeit a minority - also question
the desirability of a politically reunifiedChina. They not only admit
the social, economic andpolitical disparitiesbetween mainlandChinaand
Taiwan, but also acknowledge that the differences between the two are
not likely to be eliminated in the foreseeable future. In addition, some
interpret their country's history as showing that the Chinese nation is
more likely to be culturally vibrant and humanely governed if it has
several competing centres of political power, not just one.56
Conclusion
There has been a plethora of terms to describe the system of interactions
among mainlandChina, Hong Kong, Taiwan andpeople of Chinese
descent aroundthe world. The South China Economic Circle, the Greater
China Free Trade Area, the Chinese Economic Community, the China
Productivity Triangle, the Chinese Economic Circle, the Chinese Federation,
the Chinese Commonwealth, the South China NIC, the Chinese
Prosperity Sphere, CulturalChina, the Cross-StraitEconomic Circle and
the Chinese Civilizational Community arebut a fraction of the terms that
have been used by analysts and observers of the subject. Of these terms,
however, it is "GreaterChina"that is becoming, at least in English, the
most commonly employed.
Many people object to the use of the term "GreaterChina."Although
it was originally intended in an benign economic sense, as an simile to
GreaterLondon or GreaterTokyo, in some quartersit evokes much more
aggressive analogies, such as the GreaterEast Asia Co-ProsperitySphere
or Greater Germany. But despite these objections, the term is likely to
survive. Not only does it have a simplicity and familiarity that its rivals
lack, but its very vagueness is one of its greatest virtues. In contrast to
more specific terms, the phrase "GreaterChina" does not imply any
definite geographic boundaries, is not limited to any specific set of
interactions, and does not refer to any definite structuresor institutions.
It accuratelycapturesboth the broadscope and the uncertainoutcomes of
the phenomenon in question.
It has been suggested that "GreaterChina" in fact subsumes three
56. See, for example, Ge Jianxiong, Putianzhixia: Tongyifenlie yu Zhongguo zhengzhi
(All Under Heaven: Unity, Division, and Chinese Politics) (Jilin: Jilin Educational Press,
1989).
684 The China Quarterly
distinct, although related, concepts. Economically, Greater China involves
the expanding commercial interactions among mainland China,
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Culturally, it refers to the restoration of personal,
scientific, intellectual and artistic contacts among people of
Chinese descent aroundthe world. Politically, it refers to the possibility
of the re-establishment of a single Chinese state, reuniting a political
entity that was disintegratedby more than a century of foreign pressure
and civil war. To a degree, the three themes are interrelated:a common
cultural identity provides a catalyst for economic ties, and economic
interdependence may lay the foundation for political unification. In
theory, therefore, the three aspects of GreaterChina could merge into a
single integratedentity.
At present,however, they arenot perfectly correlated.Each of the three
faces of Greater China has different boundaries and different centres.
Economic GreaterChina, at this point at least, is largely limited to the
coastal regions of mainlandChina, togetherwith Hong Kong, Macao and
Taiwan. Hong Kong is clearly its capital, although Taipei and Shanghai
areboth rising in importance.CulturalGreaterChinaincludes all those of
Chinese descent, wherever in the world, who choose to become engaged
in what Tu Wei-ming terms the "discourse" on what it means to be
Chinese. It has several centres of influence: Hong Kong and Taipei are
the most importantfor popular culture; whereas elite cultural activities
are centred in places as diverse as Beijing, Singapore, Princeton and
Paris.Political GreaterChina,if it fully emerges, would include mainland
China, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. Its centre would be Beijing,
althoughthe degree of centralpower wielded in the capital remainsto be
seen.
Moreover, there appearsin all three Chinese societies to be a growing
acknowledgement of the barriersto the creation of GreaterChina, especially
one with a highly institutionalizedform. There areindeed powerful
integrativeforces in play: a naturaleconomic complementarityamong the
three economies, the common culturaland ethnic backgroundamong the
world's Chinese communities, the family ties linking various segments of
the Chinese diaspora,and the age-old sense thata powerful China should
be a unified China. But against these are working significant disintegrative
factors, including differences in level of economic development, in
political and economic system and in cultural identity. Moreover, some
fear the consequences of closer integration:the dislocations of economic
life, the erosion of cultural identity and the loss of political autonomy.
Thus, there is no unanimity among Chinese about the desirability of a
GreaterChina. Instead, different groups of Chinese approachthese three
sets of concepts with distinctly different degrees of enthusiasm. In
mainland China, there is interest in extensive cultural and economic
interaction among the People's Republic, Taiwan and Hong Kong, but
largely as a way of securing political reunification. On Taiwan, there is
also an interest in promoting cultural and economic ties with the mainland,
but these are widely regarded as an alternative to political
reunification,ratherthan as a means of achieving it. In Hong Kong, the
The Concept of "GreaterChina":Themes, Variations and Reservations 685
greatest interest is in the development of economic and culturalties with
South China, largely as a method for cushioning the transferof political
sovereignty to Beijing that will occur in 1997.
As a result, the emergence of GreaterChina remains an indeterminate
process, the final dimensions of which are not yet clear. But the trendsin
the discussion may give a preliminaryclue to what lies ahead. Increasingly,
analysis is focusing on less formal and institutionalized
mechanisms of economic and political integration. Federalism is emerging
as the dominant formula for political unification, and the "economic
circle" is replacing "common markets"and "free trade areas" for economic
interaction.
In addition, discussions of the economic and cultural interactions
among ethnic Chinese are becoming much less exclusive in tone. The
most recent analysis of economic trends foresees the development of
several differenteconomic regions, each of which would link segments of
the transnationalChinese economy to economic systems where ethnic
Chinese do not play the dominant role. Similarly, discussion of cultural
mattersis increasingly acknowledging that Chinese living outside mainland
China will probably develop and maintain a multi-layered cultural
identity, viewing themselves both as Chinese and Taiwanese, or as
Chinese and American, ratherthan as Chinese alone.
The rest of the world has viewed the prospect of a GreaterChina with
both fascination and considerable alarm. Some see it in benign terms, as
a dynamic common market which provides growing opportunities for
trade and investment. More frequently, however, there has been concern
that the combination of economic and military resources available to a
GreaterChina will pose a significantthreatto the commercial vitality and
the strategicstability of the rest of the world. There is also the worry that
the process of cultural integration will produce a neo-Confucianism
whose authoritariantendencies will pose an ideological challenge to the
West.57
The trendsoutlined above, however, suggest that some of the alarmist
interpretationsof Greater China have been severely overdrawn, largely
because they focus only on the integrative forces at work and overlook
the centrifugal tendencies. It is unlikely that a single central government
will be able to gain firm control of the economic and military resources
of the mainland, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Without such a centralized
political will, GreaterChina will not evolve into a strategic superpower
of the magnitude many envisage. Similarly, it seems improbablethat the
various Chinese economies will form a closed economic bloc, buying
primarily from themselves while seeking to export to others. And the
cultural interaction within the global Chinese community is marked by
sharp debate between proponents of democracy and advocates of state
57. See Samuel P. Huntington,"Theclash of civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.
3 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49.
686 The China Quarterly
control, rather than by consensus on the desirability of authoritarian
solutions. The international implications of greater cultural, economic
and political interactions among ethnic Chinese will doubtless be
significant, but they may not be either as great or as dire as some have
suggested.