Section Two
EDUCATION AND AESTHETIC KNOWING

CHAPTER II

What Knowledge Is of Most Worth in the Arts?

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The Spencerian View

The title of this chapter asks the central curriculum question as it applies to the arts. It is intended to start my attempt to deal with this question on an ironic note.

Herbert Spencer wrote his famous essay "What Knowledge Is of Most Worth?" (first published in 1859 and then in 1860 as the first chapter of *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*)[1] as a critique of the prevailing values of liberal arts study, which focused on the great artistic and intellectual achievements of Western culture. He effectively achieved his aim of starting a revolution in how education should be conceived. On the basis of his application of Darwin's theory of evolution to education, Spencer argued that the values then current needed to be reversed, so that the arts and humanities were no longer to be regarded as the finest fruits of civilization but should be relegated to leisure-time pursuits. "*As they occupy the leisure part of life, so should they occupy the leisure part of education.*"[2] What should occupy the primary position? That which is of most functional value in ministering to self-preservation directly and indirectly, followed by those activities related to child-rearing, followed still further behind by concerns for maintaining proper social and political relations, and finally, in the basement, "those miscellaneous activities which make up the leisure part of life, devoted to the gratification of tastes and feelings."[3] And what, specifically, best ministers to self-preservation and therefore should be regarded as of the highest value?

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What knowledge is of most worth?—the uniform reply is—Science. This is the verdict on all the counts. For direct self-preservation, or the maintenance of life and health, the all-important knowledge is—Science. For that indirect self-preservation which we call gaining a livelihood, the knowledge of greatest value is—Science. For the due discharge of parental functions, the proper guidance is to be found only in—Science. For that interpretation of national life, past and present, without which the citizen cannot rightly regulate his conduct, the indispensable key is—Science. Alike for the most perfect production and highest enjoyment of art in all its forms, the needful preparation is still—Science. And for the purposes of discipline—intellectual, moral, religious—the most efficient study is, once more—Science. The question which at first seemed so perplexed, has become, in the course of our inquiry, comparatively simple.[4]

The shift from an older notion of liberal education conceived as appropriate for a small elite to a functional, utilitarian view of education as necessary when the masses are to be schooled reflected historical changes occurring not only in intellectual paradigms but in social-political life as well. When education was conceived as being for all rather than for a privileged few, it could no longer afford the luxuries of the leisured class—"the gratification of tastes and feelings." Science, representing those subjects dealing with the hard realities of survival and success, would have to become basic. The cultivation of intrinsically qualitative and therefore nonutilitarian dimensions of individual experience would have to be given up (at least, of course, for the masses) in exchange for social and political democracy.

Spencer's view of what is real and what is valuable, historically determined as it was, has had continuing influence because it is persuasive at a certain level of analysis, and the Spencerian argument continues to be made to this day. So it is remarkable that in the face of its strong influence over the past century of education in Western culture, a counterargument continues to be offered and is by some people passionately advanced (and to some degree heeded). That argument is that the primary reality and value of human life remains its inherent quality as immediately experienced. "Science"—the utilitarian dimension of life and education—is, in this view, valuable not only or even primarily for its functionality (necessary as this is) but as a mode of understanding by which humans know and therefore incorporate into experience an important dimension of their reality. Yet there are other domains of knowing which constitute the multidimensional reality of human experience, including, out of the basement, the persistent and often insistent domain of the arts.

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2. *Justifying the Arts*

In the United States, the major burden of justifying the arts in education in the face of the dominant Spencerian value system has fallen to the professional fields devoted to the arts in education—music education and visual arts education primarily and in recent years also the slowly growing fields of dance education and theater education. Of course, an active community of professional philosophers and aestheticians has produced a wide-ranging literature on all aspects of art and its role in culture. That literature remains a significant dimension of Western intellectual life. And a fair number of these professional intellectuals have offered ideas and guidelines for education in the arts, ranging from broad general principles to moderately detailed prescriptions for how the arts should be taught in schools. Yet despite such ongoing work at the level of professional scholarship the arts education professions tended, until about three decades ago, to go their own ways little influenced by that literature, to fight their own battles for survival and recognition, and to manufacture their own justifications for why they should be included in schooling (if only in the basement). And they did so with little if any cross-fertilization among art fields, each of which tended to be a self-contained unit not only operationally but intellectually as well. That situation continues to the present.

It will be instructive to look briefly at the ways the professional art education fields went about the task of justifying their existence in a period of history dominated by utilitarian values because the question of what knowledge is of most worth, while having the most practical consequences for curriculum building, is essentially a philosophical question. A good school curriculum is likely to be conceived as one that is in consonance with a dominant belief and value system. What philosophical stances have been devised not only to justify the presence of the arts in education but also to answer the practical question of what about them is most worth knowing?

A good many attempts have been made to answer that question because it is itself rather complex and can be approached in a variety of ways.[5] I focus here on three influential arguments.

1. THE CLAIM FOR FUNCTIONALITY

The first argument adopted a Spencerian value structure. What is most valuable is that which best functions to secure the most important needs for humans—self-preservation, productive work, parenting, and so forth. While science (broadly conceived) may fulfill such functions most effectively, anything else contributing in some way to fulfilling them might be perceived as also useful to some degree and worthy, therefore, of being included in schooling.

A host of functional claims have been made for the arts in education over the century and a half that they have been included as part of school programs. The specifics of such claims have reflected the general value system that good education is utilitarian in the broad sense, but they have also focused on particular values that crop up from time to time. If "discipline" is a matter of great concern at a particular time (as it seems to be in fifteen- to twenty-year cycles), then it must be shown that involving students in art activities provides them with it, and instruction in art should therefore emphasize its demands for regularized, concentrated accomplishment of tasks. If social skills are highly valued at particular times, the contribution of art study to developing such skills can be pointed out. Programs then shift to an emphasis on socially interactive aspects of art involvement. If "the basics" are being touted as primary, the arts need to be shown to contribute to better learning of them. Instruction accordingly emphasizes the conceptual, numerical, symbol-system dimensions of arts study. Needs for security, moral development, self-esteem, self-expression, mental growth, emotional catharsis, knowledge of history and cultural mores, identification with a particular culture, ability to solve problems, leisure-time activities, and on and on, can all be met by art instruction catering to them. The more of such functions the arts can be shown to serve, and the more pertinent they can be shown to be to favored values, the more important they might become as an integral part of education.

Given the general acceptance of functionality as a major value basis for education as a whole, a certain degree of effectiveness has been achieved by utilitarian approaches in justifying the arts in education and building programs based on them. But a good many problems have also arisen on both sides of the justification-application coin. A deep scratch on the surface of the argument is hardly necessary to uncover the disconcerting fact that no such functional claim can establish the arts as necessary to achieve it. In all cases the value can be realized by a great many other and often far more direct means. In addition, it is hard to establish persuasively that the study of any art actually does contribute to the value in question, except as a result of instructional style rather than any inherent characteristic of art itself.

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Therefore, instructional style in any other subject would contribute to the value as effectively.

While the arts can then be conceived as more or less useful as one means to foster important values, they cannot themselves be conceived as important or valuable in any essential sense, nor as requiring instruction endemic to their own nature. The many attempts to secure a place for the arts in education based on the argument for functionality have left them both poorly justified and without a valid curriculum basis, however much they may have won the day in this or that particular advocacy skirmish.

2. THE CLAIM FOR TALENT DEVELOPMENT

The second way an attempt has been made to secure a place for the arts in American schools has also had a utilitarian cast but in a different sense from the first. This has been the argument that a society to be and remain viable requires a system for identifying and fostering the varieties of competencies needed to fulfill all its specialized roles. In our society the need for professional artists is generally recognized as both legitimate and important. It is also recognized that individuals who are blessed with what seems like a mysterious talent for creating art deserve to have their talent noticed and developed, to have their personal potentials fulfilled, and to be enabled to contribute as professionals to the communal artistic life. As our major institution for enculturation, the public school would seem to be the logical place to provide opportunities for nurturing artistic talent. Supplementary experiences can then be offered outside the school, but to rely entirely on nonschool arts involvements would be to deprive all children of an equal opportunity to have their talent incubated.

When conceived in this way, art instruction logically consists of apprenticeship training in that its purpose is to develop artistic talent. This might seem to be at odds with the claims that art study is instrumental to procuring a variety of other values. In fact, statements of purpose for school arts programs often propose both rationales with little if any awareness that they may be contradictory in their implications for how the arts should be studied. Usually, if thought about at all, the dichotomy is glossed over; after all, if students are learning how to be artists perhaps those other values will also be achieved. What is not brought to consciousness (and not mentioned by art teachers or other advocates for education in the arts) is that many people in our culture do not hold an image of artists as paragons

of social virtue. The behavior of artists is often regarded as divergent if not deviant, a degree of leeway being tolerated for them (especially when they happen to be successful). Generally, however, it may be assumed that most parents do not expect that school art instruction will make their children either social deviants or professional artists. They are likely to view such instruction as generally beneficial for a variety of ancillary reasons, and as a way to develop their children's artistic creative talent to some modest degree. Some few children, of course, will take hold in an art and give promise of a professional career.

When Spencer said that the best preparation to both enjoy and produce art is "science," he meant that the essentials of the arts curriculum are (a) training in the techniques, craft, and processes required to be a functioning artist, and (b) a supportive knowledge about what science has to say about human behavior, human biology, human physiology, and so forth, as they are related to producing art.[6] Given his influence, given the high value many people place on creativity and the widely shared belief that the arts are the paradigm of creativity, and given the variety of other individual and social values ascribed to the activity of creating art, the model of education in art as training to be an artist has been dominant in American schools. This model accounts for the most common historical answer to the question of what is most worth knowing about the arts—knowing how to create them.

3. THE CLAIMS OF AESTHETIC EDUCATION

The third argument has been more philosophically as well as experientially grounded than the previous two.

Some three decades ago a shift in thinking about education in the arts began to take place in both music and visual arts education. An extensive literature detailing the changes in both theory and practice of music and visual art education during the 1960s and afterward testifies to the magnitude of what occurred.[7] Under the influence of the curriculum reform movement, several educational thinkers began to argue that the qualities of experience mediated by the arts, the meanings they make available through their various modes of representation, and the ways those qualities and meanings are generated and shared, are peculiar to the arts. Thus the aesthetic dimension of human experience is seen as a distinctive cognitive domain requiring to be understood and valued on its own terms and taught in ways relevant to those terms. In addition, creating art,

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although valuable and necessary as one aspect of experiencing and knowing aesthetically, is not sufficient to gain the breadth and depth and variety of meanings available from the arts. To be literate in the aesthetic domain requires a broad-ranging array of responses to the arts. Such responses depend on refined capacities and dispositions (a) to perceive, discriminate, feel, and evaluate works of art; (b) to understand them as objects and events with distinctive cognitive characteristics; (c) to be aware of the historical, social, cultural, political, and religious contexts in which they reside; and (d) to be cognizant of the many issues and controversies surrounding them. Education in the arts, if it is to influence the development of such learnings, would have to be essentially different from an instrumentality for achieving a variety of aesthetically ancillary values or from professional training to be an artist. Both may be included and provided for, but the broader goal or aim of education in the arts would have to be the development of aesthetic literacy in a sense neither of the previous rationales was able to define. And the question of what is most worth knowing about the arts would have to be addressed by including for consideration a far more comprehensive selection of subject matters than had previously been identified.

The striking movement in the school arts fields over the past three decades toward an image of arts education as focused on the aesthetic nature of the arts, and as responsible for cultivating aesthetic sensitivity/awareness/literacy as its primary mission, soon began to be known by the term "aesthetic education." (The *Journal of Aesthetic Education* began publishing in 1966.) For some this was a confusing phrase in that it seemed to signify an interest in teaching conceptual material from or about the branch of philosophy called aesthetics, which lies outside the training of most arts teachers. But as curricula claiming to be instances of aesthetic education appeared and more books and articles on it were published, the term became ubiquitous and a general sense of its nature became more pervasive. This is not to say that the meaning of the term "aesthetic education" is entirely clear to its theoreticians or to arts teachers in the schools.[8] It is also not to say that its applications in school arts programs have been consistent or unanimous. Many teachers continue to follow models of arts education based on a variety of assumptions including that its purpose is to assist in the promotion of extra-aesthetic values or to train incipient artists (neither of which purposes is necessarily ruled out by many conceptions of aesthetic education). And, of course, some

theoreticians simply did not and do not find this point of view attractive.

Several characteristics associated with the term "aesthetic education" became extremely influential in the school arts education fields over the past thirty or so years. Recent important influences have reinforced the belief that education in the arts requires tuition in a broad range of disciplines relevant to the cultivation of the characteristic mode of cognition the arts represent.[9]

3. The Arts as Cognitive

What knowledge, then, is of most worth in the arts according to the general point of view often called aesthetic education? Another important intellectual movement in recent years bears on how this question might be answered. This is the growing recognition that traditional conceptions of cognition, equating it with verbal and symbolic conceptualization, are inadequate to describe or explain the varieties of modes in which human knowing occurs and by which human knowing may be represented. We can trace to Plato the history of the idea that cognition, to be considered authentic, must be as abstract—that is, free from the vagaries and errors of the senses and the intuitions—as it is possible for rationality to make it. The most dependable, most genuine knowledge therefore is achieved through a movement away from the concrete toward the abstract. "Basic" subjects are those fulfilling the assumption that cognition is essentially a function of abstract thinking achieved through higher and higher levels of verbal and symbolic conceptualization.

In education, the equation of cognition with rational conceptualization is most dramatically apparent in the influential *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*,[10] in which the "Cognitive Domain" consists of progressively higher levels of conceptual functioning, ranging from knowledge (of specifics; of ways and means of dealing with specifics; of the universals and abstractions in a field), to intellectual abilities and skills (comprehension; application; analysis) to synthesis, and finally to evaluation. The "Affective Domain" (construed in the Taxonomy to include primarily attitudes and values) and the "Psychomotor Domain" are not, ipso facto, cognitive. The assumption, then, that cognition exists only when the mind is processing conceptual materials in the ways the "Cognitive Domain" handbook outlines them is so widespread that few recognize that this is but one way to

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conceive of cognition. It has, in short, become a dominant myth of our times.

That myth has begun to unravel. Ironically, a major tear in its fabric occurred with the dramatic rise during the 1950s of skepticism about the epistemological foundation of the basic sciences. As D. C. Phillips summarizes it,[11] John Dewey had much earlier raised the issue of whether the warranted knowledge claims of science were more authentic than other types. But the middle of the century brought together several lines of thought inimical to the previous belief system. Popper argued that scientific knowledge claims cannot be proved or fully justified but only refuted. The credibility of logical positivism, which provided a foundation for the traditional scientific epistemology, was eroded. Thomas Kuhn explained how contextual factors determine what qualifies as scientific truth. Lakatos, Feyerabend, and others severely criticized the notion of scientific objectivity. All these constitute a significant literature that questions the myth of rationalistic scientific truth. As W. H. Newton-Smith suggested,

> The scientific community sees itself as the very paradigm of institutionalized rationality. It is taken to be in possession of something, the scientific method, which generates a "logic of justification." . . . For Feyerabend, Kuhn, and others, not only does scientific practice not live up to the image the community projects, it could not do so. For that image, it is said, embodies untenable assumptions concerning the objectivity of truth, the role of evidence, and the invariance of meanings.[12]

The atmosphere created by challenges to the concept that truth is unitary and peculiar to "objective science" has led to a more relativistic stance toward what can be known, how knowing is generated, and what are appropriate representations for what is known. A striking example is found in the "Editor's Preface" to the Eighty-fourth NSSE Yearbook, *Learning and Teaching the Ways of Knowing*: "The roads to knowledge are many. Knowledge is not defined by any single system of thought, but is diverse."[13] The contributors to this volume described numerous modes of cognition: aesthetic, scientific, interpersonal, intuitive, narrative and paradigmatic, formal, practical, and spiritual. Is it possible that a conception of knowing different from the prevailing one is being born?

The notion of aesthetic cognition as one among several bona fide cognitive modes holds great promise, and one is led to ask once more the persistent, contentious, puzzling question, "What is aesthetic cognition?" Stretching back at least to Plato, the history of the issue

of aesthetic cognition has been a tortuous one. I have no intention of tracing that history here.[14] I will, however, offer some selective reflections about it in light of possible educational implications. I will concentrate on one dimension of aesthetic cognition, often called "knowing of" or "knowing within." A second dimension, frequently termed "knowing how" (about which I will remark only briefly), is intimately related to "knowing of." The two together, I shall argue, constitute the nature of cognition in the aesthetic domain. Supplementary to these ways of knowing are two further dimensions of cognition relevant to improving the quality of knowing of and knowing how—"knowing about" or "knowing that," and what I will term "knowing why." These must also be treated briefly. I will then offer some suggestions about effective curricula in aesthetic education based on these four dimensions of cognition.

KNOWING OF OR WITHIN: THE ROLE OF FORM

"Knowing of" or "knowing within" consists of a particular combination of involvements of the self with particular qualities of an encountered object or event. Any object or event may be encountered in an aesthetic way; my discussion will emphasize encounters with works of art.[15] A work of art in some cultural settings is generally conceived to be a product while in others it is more widely construed to be a process. Both meanings are included in my explanation.

One necessary (but not sufficient) aspect of aesthetic involvements is the directionality of attention or discrimination required. To perceive an object or event in the aesthetic mode, one's focus must include, to some degree, attention to its intrinsically interesting qualities. This kind of focus requires an awareness of such qualities as being not entirely "about" something for which they act as signs, but as yielding a set of meanings contained *within* the qualities.

The term most often used to refer to the "within-ness" of intrinsically related events (colors, sounds, actions, and so forth) is "form." The form of a work of art is in this sense its sum total of interrelated events. The qualities that constitute the interrelationships may be described at several levels. One may speak of repetitions, contrasts, variations, developments, tensions, resolutions, unities, disjunctions, expectations, deviations, uncertainties, symmetries, distortions, energies, and so forth. Such terms call attention to the dynamic nature of aesthetic form—the sense it gives that forces are at work (across the broadest range from tremendous activation to stillness and quietude)—and to their effects on us when we internalize

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them. "Repetition" is an identifiable, objective quality of an object or event, while "expectation" is an internal, qualitative state of a person. But since expectation (of sounds, of actions, of movements, and so forth) is generated by conditions within the work, we tend to ascribe it to the perceptual qualities we are noticing as well as to its effects on us. Careful distinctions between the two can indeed be made, as in phenomenological analysis: in common language the distinctions are often conflated because cause and effect are so closely tied to each other in experiences of art.

At another level of description of the intrinsic qualities to which one attends when one is attending aesthetically, one may enumerate the characteristic means by which each art achieves the interrelations constituting its forms. In music, for example, relations among pitches heard successively are called "melody," while relations of pitches heard simultaneously are called "harmony." In poetry, relations are established by the use of rhyme, meter, alliteration, imagery, and so forth. Each art has a comparable list of elements by which it establishes its forms. At this level of description of the qualities one has an experience "of" when perceiving aesthetically, the terms include the relational dynamics they capture and display but refer to the means by which they are so captured and displayed.

Some works of art or types of art present to the percipient nothing more than formed qualities (a Mozart symphony, a late Mondrian painting, a Merce Cunningham dance, a John Coltrane improvisation). In such cases our perception can be of form as such—of sets of relations which have meaning when meaning is conceived as a function of purposeful structure. The purpose of the structure of a work of art is to embody, through the use of perceptual qualities, implications, connotations, intentions, suggestions, possibilities. When we perceive such relationships they function as meaningful with no need for meaning in its more limited and more common sense as requiring conventional denotative signs or symbols. The fullness of meaning in an aesthetic structure is often referred to as its significance or import or expressiveness. Precisely because such meanings are not literal, or are not limited to the literal, aesthetic cognition is *sui generis*.

For example, when a theme from the exposition section of the first movement of a Mozart symphony is treated in a variety of ways in the subsequent section, we recognize that it is being "developed": that is its meaningful effect. Upon hearing it in the recapitulation section we encounter it in light of its revealed potentials as Mozart chose to develop them. Its "meaning" has changed from its initial statement,

and we find this change—this "hearing as" or "knowing as"—to be meaningful. The theme is "heard as" imbued with the structural associations that were at first only implicit but were then made explicit. It is now "known as" it has been revealed—as richer with implications than it would first have seemed. We do this analogously with the Coltrane improvisation as he develops musical ideas, with the Mondrian painting as the shapes, colors, and lines structurally define balances, imbalances, implications of bounded with unbounded spaces, and tensions of ambiguities against resolutions of symmetries, and with the Cunningham dance as it unfolds through more and less determinate events.

It is important to recognize that the perceptible structure presented by these and all other works of art includes every interaction among every detail, and that hierarchical patterns of interactions emerge out of particular interactions. In a highly successful work of art *nothing* exists unrelated to and unessential to its total structure of interconnecting events at different levels of complexity and inclusiveness. That is why the perceptual processing of a work of art is not likely to occur once and for all with any one, particular interaction with it. Important works of art, no matter their style, type, genre, are those with the maximum richness and integration of interrelationships possible within that style, type, genre. Perception of such works requires an ongoing program of engagements in which the potential meanings in a work—its sum total of meaningful interactions—are revealed more fully to and experienced more subtly by the percipient. The active contribution to the process by the percipient is also an essential factor in aesthetic engagements. A competent percipient does not simply recognize structured events but also determines what will be perceived, in what degrees, and at what levels of discriminative precision. Aesthetic experiencing requires a reconstruction by the imagination of the percipient of the imagined interplay of occurrences built into the form by the artist.

I will discuss later the kinds of knowing that assist us in performing these cognitive operations with form. The point here is that the scope, detail, perspicacity, and ingenuity of one's perceptual structuring of formal qualities are essential determinants of what one knows within an aesthetic interaction. Such knowing, I suggest, is an essential component of aesthetic cognition, and is an essential component of aesthetic intelligence construed as a capacity to gain such cognition. Such knowing is amenable to improvement through learning.

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KNOWING OF OR WITHIN: THE ROLE OF CONTENT AND FUNCTION

In addition to form-making qualities such as those discussed above, most works of art contain some manner and degree of reference to people, things, ideas, issues, places, and events. Whether called figurative or representational or programmatic, they are often said to contain "content" or "subject" in addition to "form."

According to one view in aesthetics, called "formalism," such material is entirely or at least largely irrelevant to the kind of knowing appropriate to works of art. One must ignore or bypass content because the only aesthetically valid way to perceive a work is to perceive its form-causing qualities devoid of referential associations. As Roger Fry, an archetypal formalist, put it:

> No one who has a real understanding of the art of painting attaches any importance to what we call the subject of a picture—what is represented . . . all depends on *how* it is presented, *nothing* on what. Rembrandt expressed his profoundest feelings just as well when he painted a carcass hanging up in a butcher's shop as when he painted the Crucifixion or his mistress.[16]

An opposite view focuses on content as the essential ingredient of knowing in an aesthetic interaction. Often called "referentialism," this position argues that form is merely a way to point up or enhance the associations a work of art presents, and the goodness or effectiveness of a work is a function of the desirability of its explicit message and how well (clearly, powerfully) a work transmits that message. Socialist Realism is a clear, if extreme, referentialist doctrine.

Content, I suggest, is an important ingredient in the knowing of art because content is an important determinant of the form of the work in which it is contained. That is, when one interacts aesthetically with a work of art, the form of the work as perceived is the determining factor of the knowing one gains from it, but the knowing now includes the role of content as one ingredient of the form.

In a crucifixion scene, for example, the shape of the cross is seen not as an abstract set of two lines intersecting at right angles but as a cross, its intersecting lines being a function of the object we recognize. But in a painting, unlike an actual event (except when the event is being perceived aesthetically), the size of the cross, its placement in the composition, its width, color, texture, and relation to other shapes in the painting are all essential aspects of the form of the painting and of our aesthetic perception of the painting. If any change is made in any

of them the aesthetic meaning is changed concomitantly.[17] We see the intersecting lines as an object, but as an object which is part of a "composition"—a form "composed" to be meaningful as form. We judge the painting good or mediocre or bad, not on the basis that it contains a cross, as thousands of others equally do, but on the basis of how the cross has been incorporated as an element of meaningful structure. A great painting of a crucifixion is considered great—that is, to yield meaning of a profound, enduring nature—not because it has an object called a cross in it but because the object, while recognized to be one, has been "trans-formed" by its contributing role within the larger structure of interrelationships of which it is a part. The cross as an object is "seen as" or "known as" aesthetically meaningful in light of its structural associations within the complex of visual events with which it interacts. Art transcends content through form.

But in addition to the recognition of the cross as a particular object, it is also recognized, if one has been so acculturated, as an object with particular symbolic significance. Because of its association with an important religious event (and for other reasons of interest to archetypal psychologists) the cross is an object so saturated with symbolic meanings as to resist being seen neutrally. The values and affects we attach to it, whatever they may be, are inevitably called into play when we recognize the object in the work of art, adding their impact to our experience of the work. Such impact is also transformed by structure, while at the same time contributing to the impact of the structure.

This holds for all the other layers of associations, values, attitudes, beliefs, symbolic meanings in the crucifixion scene, including the body of Christ, his crown of thorns, the spear piercing his side, the grieving figures at the foot of the cross, and so forth. Each contributes to the total aesthetic cognition available from the painting as meaningful ingredients which have been metamorphosed, that is, changed in and by form to have meanings generally called aesthetic. A different painting containing identical content—even by the same painter—will yield different aesthetic meanings by virtue of differences in its form. That is why every crucifixion painting is unique in aesthetic meaning despite identical or similar contents. It is such meanings that painters—all artists—pursue. As Francis Sparshott explains in his discussion of programmatic music:

> Perhaps we should say that (as in painting) the most approved uses of the [extramusical] devices are those in which what is recognized and relished as

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referential is at the same time experienced as musical—that is, in which we feel that what we hear would be formally justified even if nothing were being referred to. . . . The characteristic musical delight in all such devices, for composers as much as for audiences, lies in the way *music is being made of them:* the exact way in which, having been what they were, they have now become completely music.[18]

The principle raised by this example applies to all the arts (given the necessary adaptations each would require), and to all manners and types and levels of content in the arts.[19] Aesthetic cognition, then, requires knowing about content, given the contributory role content plays, but also, and most importantly, requires the ability to go beyond such knowing to the knowing of or within yielded by meaningful structure. I will discuss later the kinds of learnings that would be useful in order to help students gain the aesthetic knowings available from art, including the knowings about content which contribute to them.

Another factor implicated in aesthetic perception is the variety of uses to which works of art are often put and the various functions they are expected to perform. It is a convention of modern Western culture that works of art, usually as products but also often as processes, are often regarded primarily or solely as a source of the kind of experience called aesthetic (one aspect of which I am here attempting to clarify). Symphonies being performed in concert halls; jazz improvisations listened to in clubs; paintings displayed in museums, galleries, homes; theater productions and dances and movies performed for audiences, and so forth, are understood as being occasions for aesthetic experiencing (however many other motives people may have for engaging in them). But throughout Western history and in many other world cultures, art has been associated with other activities.

For an example let us return to the crucifixion painting. Displayed in a cathedral the painting clearly serves a function emphasizing its content, calling the attention of worshippers to the religious meanings depicted in that important event. In this case the form of the painting—its intrinsically meaningful structure of interrelated visual events—is contributory rather than focal, reversing the relationship between form and content as it obtains in aesthetic experiencing. Because that relationship is usually a matter of *degree* of focus, rather than an exclusive focus on form or content devoid of influence from the other, it may be envisioned as occurring on a continuum. At one far extreme, a devout worshipper, glancing briefly at the painting in

the cathedral to which she has come to pray, is reminded of the event depicted by the painting and thinks of and is affected by its religious significance, the form of the painting being minimally influential in or perhaps entirely absent from the experience. The painting has in this case served a largely religious function. At the other extreme, a museum curator of Renaissance art, on closely examining the painting displayed in a museum she is visiting, is struck by the power of the artist's use of color as an aspect of structure in relation to other such paintings by this and other Renaissance artists. The religious content is likely to be minimally influential if not entirely absent in her experience, which would seem to be entirely or largely of intrinsic formal relations. And, of course, every possible degree of balance between focus on function and form exists along the continuum.

Just as content is likely to influence form to at least some degree, function is also likely to play a role in how form is perceived. And while I am suggesting the principle that aesthetic meaning requires going beyond content and function to that which form adds to them, I am unable to stipulate the degree to which that must occur in order for an experience to qualify as aesthetic. Nor am I suggesting that there is some optimal balance, or that an experience is "aesthetically better" if it is 100 percent of form, as formalists would say. It is possible that different works, with different contents (or none) and different functions (including entirely aesthetic ones), can be experienced across a broad range of foci on various aspects of perceptual processing and be understood to be aesthetic in experience when form plays a significant role. Aesthetic cognition requires involvement in form to some degree, and with meanings from content and function as they have been modified by form.[20]

Aesthetic education, I would propose, is the systematic attempt to influence the degree to which students can incorporate aesthetic meanings in their experience of works of art and other phenomena.

3. KNOWING OF OR WITHIN: THE ROLE OF FEELING

A second necessary aspect of aesthetic engagements has to do with the role of affect or feeling in the knowing of or knowing within yielded by such engagements. The treatment of aesthetic reaction here must be selective, especially given the vast and venerable literature on it. That literature has existed as long as the concept of art has existed[21] because it seems to be an essential characteristic of art that we care about it in a way involving ourselves as creatures who feel. So from the writings of Plato to the latest issues of the various scholarly

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journals devoted to the arts, the relation of the arts to feeling remains an ongoing point of contention. It is a particularly recalcitrant one because of the difficulties entailed in conceptualizing about awarenesses that are essentially internal, unobservable, unquantifiable, and ineffable. The point I want to focus on here has to do with ineffability.

Feelings, or affects, as I use the terms, are experiences at the level of internal awarenesses of subjectivities.[22] Although we are aware that we are undergoing subjective events we are not able to express or describe them in words (they are ineffable) for a variety of reasons. First, words, by their nature (I am referring here to words as discursive symbols in common language) are unsuitable to express the dynamically evanescent and fleeting character of feelings. Further, feelings are complex amalgams of a variety of felt qualities undergone simultaneously, and the mixtures of qualities are also transitory in that they shift among their combinations and interrelations from moment to moment. Language syntax is not constituted to represent this kaleidoscopic quality of feeling. And feelings are in constant motion in their intensity, each change of degree of intensity changing the nature and quality of what is being experienced. In depth as well there is a constant movement, as feelings are experienced as more or less significant or portentous from moment to moment. All such characteristics of feeling and their sum account for the gap between the richness and density of our inner subjective reality of felt awareness and the limited capacity of ordinary language to mediate or represent it.[23]

What language *can* do is represent those broad classes of feeling clusters which share sufficient common characteristics to constitute inclusive feeling categories. Words such as *love, joy, fear, anger, sadness, happiness* name "the emotions." These are broad, classificatory concepts each of which subsumes the infinite numbers, qualities, gradations, and combinations of what is actually experienced as "feeling" or "affect." The emotion category symbols (the names of emotions) bear the same relation to feelings as experienced as names of diseases bear to the actualities of what is experienced by someone undergoing them. Experience is "of" or "within" feeling. Words are "about" feeling.

With Dewey, Susanne K. Langer, and many others, I agree that the structures or forms of works of art are the most apt, cogent representations of the reality of human experience as being subjective—as being feelingful. The qualities constituting the meaningful, purposive interrelationships of aesthetic form are able to capture the

inherent dynamics of feeling (not "emotion") with a level of precision, fidelity, complexity, and subtlety unavailable in any other mode of mentation. In experiences of meaningful form the "knowing of," then, includes, as an inseparable aspect, an internalized awareness of expressiveness—that is, feeling constituting an essential component of what is being experienced and known. Interrelations among qualities are not just noticed. They are felt, and do not reach the fullness of meaning of which they are capable unless and until they are felt. But because of the widespread confusion of *feeling* as I am using the term with *emotion* as that term is ordinarily used, and because of the association of art with emotion that we have inherited from nineteenth century Romanticism, it is important to reiterate that art is not "emotional." The distinction is essential. Emotions are classificatory concepts while experiences of feeling are undergone subjectivities, no one of which, as such, is classifiable conceptually.

This distinction is particularly pertinent in cases when the expressive gestalt of a work of art seems to be aptly categorized by an emotion term. Many works of art are simply not amenable to such categorization: no emotion term applies comfortably to a Brahms symphony or to a Cézanne still life or to a Balanchine dance. But one can so categorize them if one chooses. Little disagreement would arise if one characterized the second movement of the Beethoven Third Symphony ("Marcia funebre") as sad, or if one called the entire symphony, as Beethoven did, "heroic" (Eroica). It would seem as easy and obvious to call Picasso's *Guernica* "anguished," and Hemingway's *The Old Man and the Sea* "tragic."

I suggest that emotions serve the same purpose in works of art as content does, and in fact may be conceived as another type of content. Just as the symbolic meanings of the crucifix influence its aesthetic meanings, the emotion "sadness" in the "Marcia funebre" influences the ineffable feeling caused by the form of that movement.

This is not to say that the aesthetic meanings of these works are limited to or equatable with or in any way contained within or to be understood as essentially *caused* by the object (the cross) or the emotion (sadness). Aesthetic cognition transcends any content—including emotional content—through form. The "Marcia funebre" is, as Beethoven designates it, also "Adagio assai," and this "quite slow" is where aesthetic feeling as "knowing of" begins to exist. It exists as well in the contour of the first theme and its minor modality, in the contrasting contour of the subsequent theme of the trio (in major), in the tone colors of oboe against strings as contrasted with

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violins against the other strings, in the ritards at ends of sections, in the recurring dotted-note figure and its suggestions and implications in other rhythmic motives and on and on with all the infinite, subtle, expressive, and meaningful details that constitute the purposive structure of this movement. Further, a different *performance* of the movement will inevitably alter its aesthetic meanings, because the slightest change in, say, how the dotted-note figure beginning the first theme is articulated, will change significantly what is perceived and felt.

To explore within all the meanings of form as perceptually and subjectively processed, including the general quality of sadness as one dimension influencing that which is perceived and undergone, is to gain the aesthetic cognitions available from this music. It is not enough to hear the music "as sad," which is like seeing the object in the painting "as a cross." The "knowing as" required in aesthetic engagements must transcend, through form, the designations, including objects and emotions, which may be present in particular works. When commentators on art dwell on the emotions art designates (and argue endlessly about how art manages to designate emotions),[24] they are fixated at the not yet expressive level of how art functions aesthetically. The notorious difficulties in explaining how perceived qualities can be identified as emotions arise, I suggest, from the inherent differences between form as expressive and language as denotative. Emotions exist at the level of concepts; feelings exist at the level of experiences which by their very nature are ineffable. Attending *in the direction of* meaningful, expressive form allows one to be influenced by but to *pass through* designations of whatever sort, including designated emotion categories, and reach their aesthetic conclusions in cognitions form has substantiated. In such conclusions emotion terms give way to qualitative subjective states ineffable in essence.

Aesthetic education, I propose, is the systematic attempt to influence the degree to which students can incorporate yet transcend any kind or type of content (including emotional content) employed by works of art as one aspect of their ineffable meanings, and thus approach closer to meanings perceptually and affectively experienced as qualities of purposeful structure. Mikel Dufrenne described feeling as a "capacity of receptivity, a sensibility to a certain world, and an aptitude for perceiving that world."[25] I would argue that this capacity, sensibility, and aptitude are amenable to improvement by effective education, which focuses on the distinctive cognitions art exists to

provide and the distinctive way art provides them, through perceptual/affective processing of formed qualities and contents.

Feeling as proactive. Such processing engages feeling as more than reactive to perceived interrelations in formed events. Feeling also serves a proactive role in aesthetic involvements, a role not given sufficient attention in the literature. For if it is an act of cognition to feel, through absorbed perception, the implied subjectivities an artist has imagined within a perceptual structure, it is cognitive as well to employ attentive feeling as a major means for discovering those implied subjectivities. Feeling, here, is not just the effect of a cause (the work's structure including its content as an aspect of its structure) but is the cause of experienced effects.

The proactive role of feeling as an inherent dimension of cognition in aesthetic involvements is likely to be multidimensional. Feeling is probably implicated in processes of making discriminations among events, classifying event-clusters, abstracting parts from wholes, integrating levels of hierarchical interrelations, comprehending relations, anticipating incipient events, synthesizing wholes out of parts and forming gestalts at higher levels, and so forth.[26] The point is that opportunities to employ feeling in these cognitive operations, and the experience of the expansion of the self such engagements afford, are at the core of the value of the arts and of aesthetic education. The central function of education in the arts is to help all students develop their capacities to gain such cognition, which is likely to be what is of most worth from the arts.

4. KNOWING HOW

People who bring meaningful forms into existence are generally called artists and anyone so engaged is, at the time of engagement, being an artist. Given that art cannot exist without people being artists, and given that what artists essentially produce are works (whether construed as products or processes) which are a source of aesthetic meanings, an understanding of the nature of artistry as a cognitive endeavor would seem to be important for any viable concept of aesthetic education. Other chapters in this volume deal with this matter; so I will limit my remarks here to a few concerning the knowings entailed in knowing how to create art.

I suggest that to be an artist is to know of or within through the act of causing such knowing to come into being as a work, whether as a product or a process. In this discussion I follow common practice in using the terms "artistic knowing" or "artistic cognition" or "artistic

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experience" to refer to interactions with art while creating it. The terms "aesthetic knowing" or "aesthetic cognition" or "aesthetic experience" refer to those interactions occurring when experiencing a work that someone else has created.[27] Other terms generally used to make this distinction are "expression/impression" or "production/appreciation." What does one need to know how to do in order to cause the coming into being of meanings as a product of formed interrelations among qualities and contents?

First, one needs to know how to imagine such interrelations. "Imagine" implies the ability to form a mental image of potential or actual relations among some sets of qualities. That image requires two interdependent ingredients—having "in mind" the materials out of which the relations are to be made (sounds, shapes, movements of the body, people acting, verbal images, etc.) and having "in mind" the feeling of the ensuing relation. Relations do not exist as abstract: they are brought into existence by some interplay of one thing with another, and the relation is imaged as how one thing interacts with another, the "interaction" being the "feeling." Artists, then, know how to imagine relationships among qualities of the materials they have "in mind," and how to imagine the affect of those related qualities.

But for artists, "in mind" is not in the ideal mind Plato envisioned. It is a mind in which the body and its actions, the feeling of the body in action, and the critical, discerning response to the images and feelings caused by the involvement of the body in action are all essential dimensions of knowing. In dance, the "body in action" can be taken literally, as it can be in any other artistic involvement in which skillful use of the body is an essential aspect of engagement with material being formed (playing an instrument, singing, painting, sculpting, acting, shaping clay). But even in less obviously physical artistic acts (writing a poem, composing, designing a building) the inward "embodiment" or "sensuosity" of the experience of the relations being formed is an essential ingredient in what is known and how it is known—the knowing Dufrenne terms "presence."[28]

Inasmuch as artists think in terms of meaningful relations among qualities, including how any content may be cast in terms of such relations, the effectiveness of such thinking depends in large part on how well the artist can envision potential relations, and respond opportunely to discovered relations, in the materials out of which the work is being formed. At base, after any considerations of content influence, of functionality or practicality, of any other related factors

impinging on the creative act, artists think directly in terms of materials being organized so as to be meaningful. The ability to think this way is tied intimately to the grasp, control, and mastery of the materials *in terms of which* the artist is thinking. The quality of artistic thinking depends on the richness of an artist's "vocabulary" of available gestures in the materials being formed, control over the subtleties and complexities of the form the material is taking, and ability to take the material in whatever direction the unfolding meaning requires. The term denoting such artistic mastery of material is "craftsmanship."

Craftsmanship includes skill but transcends it: craft is the ability to think in terms of meaningful material—material which has taken on and is taking on meaning as a function of its created structure. To know how to create art is to know how to think in this mode. This accounts for the centrality of developing craftsmanship in any attempt to teach people how to be artists; one's ability to "think art" is tied directly to one's ability to control the material within which one is thinking. To the degree that aesthetic education is concerned with helping students become artists and understand how artists think, it must engage them in the development of their craftsmanship with one set or several sets of materials the arts generally employ.

Two other "knowings how" to be an artist should be mentioned; knowing how to be sensitive and knowing how to be authentic.

Since the exercise of artistic imagination requires thinking in terms of and through control over the materials in which thinking is taking place, the sensitivity of an artist to the possibilities of meaning emerging from this thinking is a crucial factor in what the artistic result will be. Sensitivity is the level of discernment of rightness or convincingness or meaningfulness of each decision an artist makes as a purposive structure unfolds. Each decision has its consequences in what the form is becoming and what it cannot therefore become. A sensitive artist is guided to decisions leading in fruitful directions—directions productive of the meaningful gestalt being brought into life. Sensitivity to such meaning, perceptually and affectively and sensuously, is, I suggest, cognitive—a way of knowing the significance coming into being in the creative act as one is causing that significance to occur. Imagination, craft, and sensitivity are interdependent dimensions of knowing in artistic creation; each contributes its essential character yet each is dependent on the others for its existence.

Finally, all this must take place in a context of devotion to the inner integrity of the form coming into being, a form which is

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uniquely meaningful and which therefore makes its demands on the artist bringing it into existence. Knowing how to submit oneself to the requirements of the emerging form as they become apparent through one's sensitivity to what is occurring is knowing how to be an artist authentically. Authenticity, here, is the capacity to serve the needs of artistic meanings in their demands to be created honestly, that is, to be realized not only by the needs of the artist but also by the needs of the form to be whole and meaningful and genuine. In the maelstrom of complex decision making constituting the artistically creative act, it is so easy to make false moves—to do what is convenient or adventitious or unchallenging to one's imagination and sensitivity and craftsmanship, forcing or allowing the result to be less than it has demanded one to make it be. Knowing how to be authentic is, in artistic creation, knowing how to be artistically moral. Artists who act "in the service of their art" are, in this sense, acting morally, and this moral posture in turn pervades the quality of the imagination, sensitivity, and craftsmanship they exercise as they create.

Artistic knowing, or "artistry," is the sum of these four knowings how. Such knowing is a component of cognition dependent on but additional to knowing of or within and is amenable to improvement through learning. Such learning requires the exercise of this cognition through engagements of the four dimensions of knowing how in the actual creation of meaningful forms. One can, of course, "know about" these dimensions just by reading about them. But that is not artistic cognition, just as "knowing about" the qualities of aesthetic experiencing does not constitute aesthetic knowing. Yet conceptualizing about the ingredients of aesthetic experience and creation can be a powerful aid in developing people's capacities to know of and to know how. This leads to the final two knowings aesthetic education should impart.

5. KNOWING ABOUT OR THAT

Knowing of or within and knowing how are ends of aesthetic education. Knowing about or knowing that (and knowing why, discussed next) are means. This distinction between ends and means is crucial. It is a common error to think that people are aesthetically educated to the degree they have a great deal of conceptual knowledge about art, so that education *about* art in the sense of verbal learnings about art replaces the education *in* art I am insisting must take place in order for education to influence the cognitions available from art. A major and well-deserved anxiety in the arts education community

about the Getty Discipline-based Art Education project is that verbal knowing might be emphasized over aesthetic/artistic knowing, thereby undermining the very reason for the existence of education in the arts.[29]

By "knowing about" or "knowing that" I refer to the conceptual understandings most germane to the enhancement of one's ability to know of or know how. These understandings about art exist at several levels but all focus on the actual interaction of a person with a work. Since this interaction requires perceptual, affective, and sensuous discernment, knowings about what to discern and how to discern are implicated directly in what can be discerned and at what levels of complexity discernment can take place. Aesthetic education consists, in important part, of bringing students' conceptual attention to that which can be known aesthetically and artistically in works of art.

The activity of calling attention to various aspects and levels of meaningful forms may be called "analysis." As I use this term it applies to widening concentric rings of examination, description, and integration of aesthetic and artistic materials and processes.

Closest to the work itself is the scrutiny of the components of its form, in as much detail as is possible for the age and experience of particular students. Such scrutiny, when supportive of the inward knowing of the form of a work as immediately experienced, can clarify what is presented in a completed work and what is becoming in a work being created. As a means toward heightened awareness, such analysis is essential. But it fulfills its role in heightening both aesthetic cognition and artistic cognition when the knowings *about* form become submerged in consciousness within the knowings *of* form. That is, *thinking about* meaningful details of form must lead to *thinking with* what has been brought to conceptual awareness in order for the experience to yield the kinds of cognition available from engagements with art, which are always "knowings within" and, additionally, "knowings how." I cannot here discuss the ways to teach art to best insure that thinking about what is going on in a work will become transformed into the thinking with or within which constitutes cognition in art. Such matters fall into the domain of method. I want to make the general point here, applicable to the rest of this section, that all knowings about or knowings that (and knowings why), at any level of generality, must become, through processes of internalization, integrated within aesthetic and artistic cognition as I have tried to explain them, operating as tacit or subsidiary elements of such cognition.[30]

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Connected with and widening out from analysis of significant formal details at increasingly higher hierarchichal levels of complexity are all the matters relating to the role of content in particular works. Given the important influences of content on form, those influences must be clarified as to how content impinges on what a particular form could be and the corresponding impact of content on what an experience of a particular work might include.

Expanding further, analysis will include the particularities of historical and cultural contexts surrounding this or that work or body of work, influencing or determining its artistic choices and aesthetic contents. For example, to experience more deeply what is available to know from a particular performance of jazz, one needs to understand what was happening in jazz at the time of, say, John Coltrane's performance of "One Down, One Up." One needs to understand where Coltrane was in his own development as an artist and where that was to lead, and how jazz was reflecting in this work in particular and in Coltrane's style as a whole a changing sense of musical possibilities rhythmically and harmonically and tonally.

An aesthetically astute experience of "One Down, One Up" is a cognitive achievement, just as it is a cognitive achievement to create it. Aesthetic education is obligated to influence positively the capacities of mind that make possible both aesthetic cognition and artistic cognition.

6. KNOWING WHY

What I have termed "knowing why" adds a broader dimension to knowledge about the contexts in which particular aesthetic and artistic processes occur. This dimension has to do with general understandings about art as a cultural-psychological phenomenon. Here one conceptualizes matters such as these: why art exists; why all cultures have developed arts in some ways like and in some ways different from arts of all other cultures; why standards for judging art might be both general and also dependent on particularities of this and that art, style, genre; why the experience of art and why creating art seem to be so important for people; why different groups of people have different beliefs about art, what it is good for, and how it should be used; why philosophers of art have debated for centuries every conceivable issue related to art, its nature, its value; why some people think education in the arts is essential for all; why some students choose to engage themselves in special efforts to develop creative capacities in an art.

While the experience of a specific work is determined in large part by its specificities of form and content as they are structured by a percipient who brings to it particular habituations, capacities, and knowledge, the beliefs and understandings that person possesses about what art is all about in the first place will color all that happens in the interaction. Art, after all, is a human construct. Its meaning is a function of what one believes it to mean as one's culture has led one to adopt and adapt such beliefs. Aesthetic education, as a culture's mechanism for sharing an important cultural value, must include examinations of that value in its many complex dimensions. Knowing why provides a value structure—a logically consistent system of examined beliefs—within which the other knowings can be experienced as meaningful.

4. *General and Special Curricula in the Arts*

Given the preceding discussions (about knowing within, knowing how, knowing about, and knowing why), a curriculum in the arts would be the playing out of their implications in the myriad details to be attended to in building a coherent program of instruction. In the context of this chapter only one issue relating to curriculum development can be addressed—the issue of general learnings essential for all students and special learnings for particular students who choose them.

By general education in the arts I mean programs of instruction required of all students in schools, or electives providing the same learnings. By special education in the arts I mean arts electives that concentrate on a particular aspect or related set of aspects of the general arts curriculum and that are conceived to be appropriate only for those students interested in developing particular competencies or understandings.

General education in the arts should be as comprehensive and as extensive as possible. The four basic dimensions of cognition should all be included and should stress the development of each student's capacities to know of and know how. The contexts for such learnings can be single art classes as have traditionally been available or (as I would prefer) comprehensive arts classes in which interdisciplinary learning episodes would be used as (occasional) unifiers for the learnings about particular arts. These classes should concentrate on the unique ways each art functions cognitively, and also call attention at

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strategic points to the general characteristics of cognition all the arts share.[31]

Whatever the context, learnings related to knowing of or within will provide the unifying core. The experience of many works (from one art if a single art is being taught or from several arts if a comprehensive context exists), repesenting various historical periods, regions of the world, styles, genres, types, including folk, popular, "classical," ethnic, and so forth, will be the central activity, supported by the knowings about or that and knowings why essential to make aesthetic sense of them. In my view, emphasis should be placed on works of high quality (works demonstrating high levels of imagination, craftsmanship, sensitivity, authenticity) within each type or genre. Comparisons of the relative value of differing types of art should be avoided. Works of lesser quality can be used to heighten the sense that higher and lower levels of aesthetic value exist in particular examples of art.

Knowing how—creating art—serves both as an end and as a means in general education. As an end it engages all students in the mode of cognition called upon to be an artist—a way of thinking and knowing unavailable except by being (or acting as) an artist. All students need to share this cognition for the sake of knowing what it uniquely allows one to know.

In addition, attempts to create art by using qualities one is experiencing in already created works (for example, attempting to paint distorted figures as related to distorted figures one is perceiving in a painting) can illuminate powerfully the meaningful form(s) created by an artist who chose to use distortion as one element. So it is important that creating art be included in general education both as artistically meaningful in and of itself and as adding an educative dimension to aesthetic meaning.

The balances among experiencing and creating works, and of how much and what levels of conceptual learnings about and learnings why will be included, will largely be determined by developmental factors such as those discussed in other chapters in this book. The mix for second graders will be different from the mix for eleventh graders, especially because as students get older their abilities to know of, about, and why will far outstrip in depth and breadth their ability to know how (even if they have chosen to elect special study in creating art). But given that age-related and individual capacity-related factors will be an important influence on the balances among the modes of cognition, the principle for general education in the arts remains to aim for as inclusive a program of studies as is possible.

The special learnings segment of the arts curriculum is, on the other hand, essentially selective and intensive. From the several dimensions of aesthetic and artistic cognition, particular ones are chosen as foci for study. The selective nature of such study allows it to be intensive, with more thorough study of one or a few aspects of art than is possible in the general education segment. What is lost in breadth is gained in depth, but the necessary restrictions on how much and what can be studied in depth makes such study appropriate as electives for particularly interested individuals or groups.

The most popular selection from among the various knowings in art has been and is likely to continue to be knowing how. In special programs devoted to creating art, learnings how will appropriately dominate instruction. Experiences of already created works serve here primarily as a means for heightening growth in the understanding of creating, rather than as an end as they do in the general program. Similarly, knowings about and knowings why are selectively focused toward those relating to and helpful for developing creative abilities. A much more restricted range of styles or types of art will be studied than those encountered in the general program—a chorus, after all, deals with choral music, a ceramics class with shaped clay, a play production with acting and staging, and so on, and each of these with only those instances capable of being handled within the constraints of the students' creative skills and the time available.

All these factors make artistic creation appropriately an elective when conceived as the primary mode of interaction with and study of art. (Most students do not choose to devote the time and energy necessary to achieve even modest levels of success in creating art). Approaches to general education in an art that consist entirely of creating are misconceived and unfortunate. They narrow unconscionably the range of knowings that general education in the arts should provide and give the impression that arts education consists of a limited set of learnings related to one particular mode of engagement and that the study of art is a special endeavor for only those students especially interested or talented.

Other appropriate special art program electives might emphasize aspects other than creating—a high school course devoted entirely to the plays of Samuel Beckett, or to how to be a music critic, or to the arts of Africa, or to issues of avant-garde art, or to the role of technology in the arts. Such foci could be included as specific *parts* of general education, as, for example, units in a required or elective

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course on "All About the Arts." What separates special from general education is the difference in *degree* of extensivity, general education aiming toward one end of the whole-part continuum, special education toward the other.

Education in the arts, I suggest, required of and available to all students in schools as part of general education, and available to all those who choose to study particular aspects of art, exists to serve the needs of all to share the cognitions available only from art. Some few students will go on to become professional artists or professionals in other aspects of the arts, and such students need a broad general education in the arts as the foundation for their special study and special vocation. The rest, for whom the arts can provide a singular dimension of cognition in their lives, deserve to be helped to learn what is most worth knowing in the arts—the ways to share the vividness, clarity, significance, and depth of experience the arts provide.

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Notes

1. Herbert Spencer, *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical* (New York: D. Appleton, 1896). My discussion of Spencer's influence on education draws on Herbert M. Kliebard, "The Liberal Arts Curriculum and Its Enemies: The Effort to Redefine General Education," in *Cultural Literacy and the Idea of General Education*, ed. Ian Westbury and Alan C. Purves, Eighty-seventh Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part II (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

2. Spencer, *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*, p. 75. Emphasis his.

3. Ibid., p. 32.

4. Ibid., pp. 93-94.

5. A helpful overview of aesthetic and psychological orientations influential on concepts of art and the teaching of art is given by Arthur D. Efland, "Conceptions of Teaching in the Arts," in *The Teaching Process and Arts and Aesthetics*, ed. Gerard L. Knieter and Jane Stallings (St. Louis: CEMREL, 1979).

6. Spencer, *Education: Intellectual, Moral, and Physical*, pp. 75-81.

7. For treatments of the changes that took place in music education, see Michael L. Mark, *Contemporary Music Education* (New York: Schirmer, 1986). For a concise summary of changes in visual art education, see two articles in the *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 21, no. 1 (Summer 1987): Ralph A. Smith, "The Changing Image of Art Education: Theoretical Antecedents of Discipline-based Art Education," pp. 3-34, and Arthur D. Efland, "Curriculum Antecedents of Discipline-based Art Education," pp. 57-94. Both give useful bibliographies.

8. For a discussion of various assumptions about aesthetic education, see Harry S. Broudy, "Some Reactions to a Concept of Aesthetic Education," in *Arts and Aesthetics: An Agenda for the Future*, ed. Stanley S. Madeja (St. Louis: CEMREL, 1977), and

Bennett Reimer, "Essential and Nonessential Characteristics of Aesthetic Education," *Journal of Aesthetic Education* 25, no. 3 (1991): 193-214.

9. "Discipline-based Art Education" is a concept supported by the Getty Center for Education in the Arts, an operating entity of the J. Paul Getty Trust. It is an important attempt to expand traditional curricula in the direction of greater comprehensiveness of learnings. For an overview, see Ralph A. Smith, ed., *Discipline-based Art Education: Origins, Meaning, and Development* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), originally published as the Summer 1987 issue of the *Journal of Aesthetic Education*.

10. Benjamin S. Bloom et al., eds., *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook I: Cognitive Domain* (New York: David McKay, 1956); David R. Krathwohl, Benjamin S. Bloom, and Bertram B. Masia, eds., *Taxonomy of Educational Objectives, Handbook II: Affective Domain* (New York: David McKay, 1964); Anita J. Harrow, *A Taxonomy of the Psychomotor Domain* (New York: David McKay, 1972).

11. D. C. Phillips, "On What Scientists Know, and How They Know It," in *Learning and Teaching the Ways of Knowing*, ed. Elliot W. Eisner, Eighty-fourth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), pp. 38-39.

12. Ibid., p. 39.

13. Elliot Eisner, "Editor's Preface," in *Learning and Teaching the Ways of Knowing*, ed. Eisner, p. xi.

14. For an overview of concepts of aesthetic cognition until the early 1960s, see the index listings under "Knowledge and art" and "Truth and art" in Monroe C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics from Classical Greece to the Present* (New York: Macmillan, 1966). For discussions of concepts of aesthetic cognition held by a variety of important contemporary thinkers, see Ralph A. Smith, *The Sense of Art: A Study in Aesthetic Education* (New York: Routledge, 1989).

15. The distinctions between art and other phenomena are important (and complex) but cannot be explored here. It should be mentioned that works of art are generally conceived to be human creations in which their aesthetic meaning is their major or sole reason for being. Anything else—a mathematical formula, a sunset—when regarded for aesthetic meaning is being regarded "as if" it were art, that is, for meaning as a function of its perceived significant structure rather than as a function of its mathematical proof or its indication of the pollution content of the air. Aesthetic education should clarify this distinction and sensitize students to aesthetic meanings in works of art. Yet it should not neglect other things not conceived primarily to exist for aesthetic meaning but able to offer it as one aspect of their nature.

For an influential discussion of the role of social tradition and authority in determining what counts as art, see Arthur Danto, "The Artistic Enfranchisement of Real Objects: The Artworld," in *Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology*, 2d ed., ed. George Dickie, Richard Sclafani, and Ronald Roblin (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1989). In this same volume see also George Dickie, "The New Institutional Theory of Art" for another view of the role of institutional sanctions in defining art.

16. Roger Fry, *The Artist and Psycho-Analysis* (London: Hogarth Press, 1924), p. 308.

17. Several characteristics or "symptoms" of art described by Nelson Goodman, *Languages of Art* (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1969), pp. 252-255, are included in my description—"syntactic density," "semantic density," "relative repleteness," "multiple and complex reference." The characteristic of "exemplification" also figures in my view when construed as responses to aesthetic events reaching to a "knowing as."

18. Francis Sparshott, "Aesthetics of Music: Limits and Grounds," in *What Is Music?*, ed. Philip Alperson (New York: Haven, n.d.), pp. 66-67.

Skenováno pro studijní účely