

***Sociology and Anthropology in Twentieth-Century China:  
Between Universalism and Indigenism***

Edited by Arif Dirlik, with Guannan Li and Hsiao-pei Yen

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*About the Series*

## The Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in Twentieth-Century China

John Makeham, Series Editor

The series is the principal outcome of three annual workshops held in Canberra, Beijing and Hong Kong between 2007 and 2009 on the topic of “the Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in Twentieth-Century China.” Our aim in these workshops was to construct a historically informed multidisciplinary framework to examine the complex processes by which traditional Chinese knowledge systems and indigenous grammars of knowledge construction interacted with Western paradigms to shape the formation and development of modern academic disciplines in China. The modern disciplines were formed as intellectuals sought new roles for themselves in the context of dramatic political change. New institutions—above all academic (schools, universities) and media (newspapers, book publishing)—provided the social basis for much work on specialized disciplines from the late Qing through the Republican period. The mutual interaction of traditional Chinese and modern Western knowledge paradigms and institutional practices shaped the formation and development of modern academic disciplines in China.

Modern scholarship remains largely silent about how different domains of traditional knowledge practice responded to common challenges and the consequences of this for subsequent disciplinary developments. To what extent were new knowledge systems viewed as tools in the recovery of tradition rather than its abandonment? What were the thematics, conversations, controversies, and dominant modes of argument across these domains as they responded to the new challenges? To what extent and under what conditions did practitioners of traditional forms of learning concede authority to Western knowledge paradigms?

*Chapter 1*

***Zhongguohua: Worlding China***

**The Case of Sociology and Anthropology in 20th-Century China**

Arif Dirlik

Sociology and anthropology, along with the other social sciences, were foreign imports in the organization of knowledge in China. While some Chinese scholars trace social thought in China as far back as the late Zhou Dynasty (roughly 11th–3rd centuries BCE), this is quite misleading as the “social” as a category was very much a product of the encounter with Euro/America, and what “social” thought there had been earlier was indistinguishable from the cultural, the political, and even the religious. The new disciplines would also have a checkered career, entangled as they were in the vagaries of revolution.

Introduced into Chinese thinking beginning in the late 19th century, teaching and research in these new fields were initially dominated by scholars from North America and came into their own as disciplines in the 1920s and 1930s. As in Europe, the social sciences in 20th century China developed along conflicting trajectories, motivated by needs of order and governance, on the one hand, and reform and revolution, on the other, both shaped by the problems thrown up by a modernizing society. Their development was further complicated in the Chinese case by their foreign origins, which has made the question of “nationalization” into a central question in both their evaluation as disciplines and the tasks expected of them. The infant disciplines suffered a serious setback following the victory of the Communist Party in 1949 with the establishment of a state-sponsored Marxism, which for three decades suppressed not only the so-called bourgeois social sciences but also Marxist social sciences that did not conform to the demands of official Marxism. The disciplines were revived following the “reform and opening” after 1978 and have grown rapidly over the last three decades.

This introduction briefly sketches the establishment of sociology and anthropology as disciplines, the concerns that guided the work of Chinese sociologists and anthropologists as the disciplines came into their own as professional undertakings, and ongoing debates over the nationalization of the disciplines. It covers the period before 1949, with brief mention of subsequent developments. More detailed analysis of these questions is offered in the essays in the volume which focus on different aspects of these disciplinary projects. My main goal here is to provide a broad historical context for the discussions offered by the contributors to the volume, some of whom continue to play important parts in shaping the present-day trajectories of these disciplines in the People's Republic of China and Taiwan.<sup>1</sup>

## Sociology and Anthropology: Origins and Domestication<sup>2</sup>

### *Sociology*

The social sciences were entangled in questions of politics from their very origins. The first translations of works of sociology and anthropology into Chinese were undertaken not with disciplinary concerns in mind but due to late Qing (1644–1911) efforts to understand the sources of strength of the Euro/American powers that threatened the dynasty's survival. According to his student Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), the celebrated Confucian reformer Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927) included a section on sociology in his curriculum in the private academy that he had established in Guangzhou as early as the early 1890s, most probably based on materials made available in missionary publications. The first major work of sociology to appear in Chinese (in 1904) was Herbert Spencer's *The Study of Sociology*. It was one of a series of translations from English undertaken by the reform-minded intellectual, Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), who was one of the first Qing intellectuals sent abroad to study naval matters as part of the government's self-strengthening reforms. His translations—which included Adam Smith's *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, John Stuart Mill's *On Liberty*, and Thomas Huxley's *Evolution and Ethics*—had considerable influence on early twentieth-century Chinese thought, especially in the spread of Social Darwinian ideas among intellectuals already preoccupied with the question of China's survival in a world of national competition. Yan Fu himself “prescribed sociology as an antidote to political radicalism....

With his idea of sociology intertwined with elitism and political gradualism, [he] set the tone for later Chinese sociology, particularly of the Anglo-American variety.”<sup>3</sup>

In his translation of Spencer, Yan Fu had used the term *qunxue* 群學 (“collectivities” or “masses”) to render sociology into Chinese (this was also the term used by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao). The term *shehui-xue* 社會學, which would eventually come to stand for sociology, was first used in translations of works on sociology from Japanese, first by Han Tanshou 韓曇首 in 1898 and subsequently by the distinguished radical intellectual Zhang Taiyan 章太炎 (1868–1936) in a 1902 translation of *Sociology* (*Shakaigaku* 社會學) by the Japanese author Kishimoto Nobuta 岸本能武太.<sup>4</sup> The term had a long lineage in Chinese thought, where it had meant something along the lines of “gathering of *she* (or communities).” The Japanese neologism, *shakai* (*shehui*), brought with it a new understanding of the term which would take hold of Chinese thinking as social and political developments drove late Qing intellectuals to reconceive *shehui* as society, in the Euromodern sense of a structured or organic entity with its own internal logic and dynamics.

“American missionary sociology,” as Wong Siu-lun has described it, was to play a central part in the formation of sociology as a discipline.<sup>5</sup> The very first department of sociology in China was established in 1915 at Huijiang University in Shanghai, an undertaking of American Methodist Episcopalians. With the exception of Xiamen University, founded by an overseas Chinese entrepreneur from Singapore, which established a Department of History and Sociology in 1922, until the mid-1920s practically all departments of sociology were in private American missionary institutions, nourished by support from universities in the US. Scholars from the US were prominent in both teaching and research in sociology. A Japan-educated professor at Beijing University, Kang Baozhong 康寶忠 (1884–1919), offered courses in sociology beginning in 1916, but otherwise the teaching of sociology was limited in these early years to professors from the US teaching in missionary institutions.

Not surprisingly, the activities of these scholars in either teaching or research were guided by the practical missionary interests that had brought them to China in the first place: altruistic goals of reforming China which were often indistinguishable from the more fundamental aim of spreading the Gospel, both of which required a close understanding of Chinese society. Exemplary among them was John Stewart Burgess (1883–1949), graduate of Oberlin, Princeton, and Columbia, who

was to found the sociology department at Yanjing University and make it into one of the leading departments in the country. Burgess was also a pioneer of the social survey method, which in the hands of American sociologists produced the first major analyses of social problems; a major concern that that they would pass on to their Chinese students.

The significance of missionary institutions in shaping sociology in China went beyond the mere presence of these institutions. They also provided the intellectual and ideological context for the nourishing of the first generation of Chinese sociologists, who would come of professional age in the late 1920s and 1930s and establish sociology firmly as a discipline. Not all Chinese sociologists were trained in American institutions. Important figures in Chinese sociology such as Tao Menghe 陶孟和 (1888–1960) and Fei Xiaotong 費孝通 (1910–2005), not to speak of Marxist sociologists, received some or all of their training in England or Europe. Textbooks translated from Japanese also provided Chinese students with their first introduction to sociology. But as sociology was established as an academic discipline from the late twenties, US-trained students played a leading and dominant part in organization and research. Prominent among the first generation of US-trained sociologists who received their schooling in the late 1910s and early 1920s were Sun Benwen 孫本文 (1891–1979), widely recognized as the dean of sociological studies in the 1930s (Beijing University, Illinois, New York University, Columbia); Pan Guangdan 潘光旦 (1899–1967), the biological determinist (Tsinghua, Columbia); Wu Wenzao 吳文藻 (1901–1985), outstanding in community studies (Tsinghua, Columbia); Chen Da 陳達 (1892–1976), foremost scholar of Chinese overseas, labor issues, and population (Tsinghua, Columbia); Wu Zelin 吳澤霖 (1898–1990), sociologist and ethnologist (Tsinghua, Wisconsin, Ohio); Wu Jingchao 吳景超 (1901–1968), economic and urban sociologist (Minnesota, Chicago); Huang Wenshan 黃文山 (1895–1982), founder of the field of “culturology” (Beijing University, Columbia); and Lei Jieqiong 雷洁琼 (1905–1993), sociologist of women and the family (University of Southern California).

Upon their return to China, these individuals played important parts in the establishment and staffing of the departments of sociology that proliferated from the mid-twenties. Fudan University in Shanghai established a department of sociology in 1925, followed by Guanghua, Daxia, and Tsinghua Universities (1926), Central and Jinan Universities (1927), Northeast University (1928), Labor University in Shanghai (1929), and Zhongshan University in Guangzhou (1931). By 1930, there were sixteen

departments of sociology—eleven independent departments, two each jointly with history and politics, and one combined with anthropology. Other universities offered courses on sociology through various institutional arrangements. After several abortive efforts, in 1928 Chinese sociologists in Shanghai established the first professional organization, The Southeast Association of Sociology, which was combined with a similar association in Beijing in 1930 to form the first national association, “The Chinese Society of Sociology” (Zhongguo shehuixue hui 中國社會學會). The executive committee included the most prominent sociologists of the day: Sun Benwen, who played a major part in the organization and served as director; Xu Shilian 許仕廉 (1896–?), Wu Jingchao, Wu Zelin, Chen Da, Tao Menghe, You Jiade 游嘉德, and Qian Zhenya 錢振亞. The Association made its own the journal *Sociology* (*Shehuixue* 社會學) that had been inaugurated by the Southeast Association, with Sun Benwen as its chief editor. In the meantime, the Yanjing Department of Sociology had established in 1927 its own publication, *Sociological World* (*Shehuixue jie* 社會學界), which would last for eleven years. Together, the Association and these journals announced the coming of age of professional sociology in China.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, between 1930 and 1940 there was a hiatus in the development of sociology in Chinese universities which, according to Sun Benwen, was due to the “misunderstanding” of sociology, presumably on the part both of the general public and the Guomindang government in power after 1927.<sup>7</sup> The “misunderstanding” he referred to was the confusion of sociology and socialism, which may have made sociology suspect in the eyes of the authorities. The development of sociology did not regain its momentum until the war years, when the Guomindang government, with its newly established “social affairs department,” began to show serious interest in social work and welfare. By 1947, twenty-two universities had departments of sociology—nineteen of them independent departments—with 144 working sociologists (including anthropologists), only ten of them foreigners.<sup>8</sup>

The confusion of socialism and sociology may have been due to the preoccupation of professional sociologists with social problems, community studies, and rural research, but it was as old as the history of sociology in China. Reformers and revolutionaries of the late Qing had observed a close connection in contemporary European political discourses between social problems, the study of sociology, and socialism (often confused—as in the case of Sun Yat-sen 孫中山 (1866–1925), for

instance—with the institution of social policies to resolve social problems). By the late 1920s, the “confusion” was due primarily to the influence on Chinese social thinking of Marxism and, to a lesser extent (as in the case of the anarchist-inspired Labor University), anarchism.

This hiatus in institutional growth did not mean that sociology (or anthropology) stagnated. Rather, the ongoing transformation of departments during the “Nanjing Decade” with the addition of new research groups, new courses, and research projects gives the impression of ongoing experimentation with the best ways to accommodate faculty interests. Institutional innovations were accompanied by proliferating signs of intellectual vitality and professional maturation. These years witnessed extensive research activities organized by Chinese sociologists themselves, not to mention the training of a new generation of social scientists. Intellectual debates born of the conflicting affiliations of Chinese social scientists with various schools in the social sciences clarified significant theoretical and methodological questions concerning different approaches to social analysis, the relationship between the various social sciences, and their domestication within the Chinese context. Below I will say more on these debates, which were enlivened by the visits to China of distinguished sociologists and anthropologists such as Robert Park (1864–1944) from the United States and Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) from England. Finally, a great deal of social science literature was introduced both through translation and through the significant scholarly output of Chinese scholars.

Sociological work in the two decades before 1949 was guided as much by the training sociologists had received abroad as it was dictated by the circumstances of Chinese society. In his survey of Chinese sociology, Zheng Hangsheng identifies four schools in Chinese sociology: Rural Reconstruction (*xiangcun jianshe* 鄉村建設), Comprehensive or Syncretic (*zonghe* 綜合), Community (*shequ* 社區), and Marxist. Rural reconstruction, while it influenced the work of sociologists, was led by non-sociologist activist intellectuals such as the Confucian-inspired philosopher Liang Shuming 梁漱溟 (1893–1988) and YMCA-related James Yen 晏陽初 (Yan Yangchu; 1893–1990), both of whom engaged in rural experiments with village reform and local governance, with particular emphasis on education. Their examples stimulated numerous efforts at rural reconstruction in the 1930s that involved sociologists such as Chen Xujing 陳序經 (1903–1967), Li Jinghan 李景漢 (1894–1986), Wu Jingchao, Xu Shilian, Yang Kaidao 楊開道 (1899–1981), and many others, who received their

practical training in sociology in the course of these efforts. While these sociologists did not necessarily agree with Yen’s Christianity or Liang’s Confucianism, they brought their own sociological interests to the practical goal of reforming rural China.

The Syncretic school was the “orthodox” counterpart to Marxist sociology. It insisted on bringing together various aspects of society in sociological study and integrating sociology with other disciplines. Its foremost representative was Sun Benwen, who had studied with Robert Park at the University of Chicago, as well as William F. Ogburn (1886–1959) and Franklin H. Giddings (1855–1931) at Columbia. What distinguished the Syncretic school from the equally comprehensive claims of Marxism was its emphasis on culture and social psychology in the shaping of society. Sun Benwen placed a great deal of emphasis on social problems, but the Syncretic school in general was longer on theory than on practical research. Sun himself would exert enormous influence on sociological thinking not only through his organizational activities and his impressive output of texts and theoretical work. He was a foremost voice in the call for the sinicization of sociology (see below) by the production of sociological work by Chinese social scientists based on Chinese realities.

The third school was the school of community studies which was responsible for much of the research in these years on rural and urban China. Its leading figure was Wu Wenzao, who had studied with Franz Boas (1858–1942) and Ruth Benedict (1887–1948) in Columbia. Upon his return to China, he assumed a position in the Yanjing University Department of Sociology and quickly made it into a vanguard in social surveys. Most prominent among the talents he nurtured were Fei Xiaotong, Lin Yaohua 林耀華 (1910–2000), Li Anzhai 李安宅 (1900–1985), and Zhang Zhiyi 張之毅 (1919–1987), who all authored extensive and seminal works on social life and values, village and town structures, industrial life, the family, fertility, etc. Theoretically, members of this school were distinguished by their emphasis on anthropological work. The most famous of them all, Fei Xiaotong, had studied with Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) in the London School of Economics. Li Anzhai had been a student of Alfred Kroeber (1876–1960) in the University of California-Berkeley, while Lin Yaohua was a graduate of the Department of Anthropology at Harvard.

Finally, Marxism. Following the establishment of the Communist Party of China in 1921 and the influx of Marxism into Chinese thinking,

Marxists played an important part in the teaching and diffusion of sociology. Communist Party leaders in general—such as Li Dazhao 李大釗 (1889–1927) and Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893–1976)—were interested in social issues and social research. Not all, however, explicitly addressed issues of sociology and the social sciences. Among those who did were Qu Qiubai 瞿秋白 (1899–1935), who had had some brief experience in the Soviet Union, served for a while as head of the Sociology Department in the left-dominated Shanghai University, and authored several books on sociology; Li Da 李達 (1890–1966), who was educated in Japan, was a prolific theorist, and taught in a number of universities, including Beijing University and Zhongshan University; and Xu Deheng 許德珩 (1890–1990), who was educated in France and Germany, translated Émile Durkheim into Chinese, and wrote several works of his own. Critical of the Comte'an sociology of order, Marxist authors brought into Chinese sociology issues in the materialist conception of history, with particular emphasis on class, labor, and women. Possibly most important in terms of social investigation was Chen Hansheng 陳翰笙 (1897–2004), who was educated in Germany and invited by Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 (1868–1940) to head the Institute of Social Sciences of the newly founded Academia Sinica in 1928. His rural surveys across the breadth of the country in the 1930s were important in informing Communist approaches to land revolution.

Marxism was especially influential in the promotion of historical sociology. Marxist debates over the nature of Chinese society and its historical development played a major part in turning attention to the writing of social history and in nurturing an interdisciplinarity that cut across political boundaries as well. Marxism was important not just for Communist intellectuals, but also for Guomindang intellectuals such as Tao Xisheng 陶希聖 (1899–1988), whose institute at Beijing University was a major source of studies on Chinese economic and social history. Needless to say, while professional sociologists such as Sun Benwen were critical of Marxist sociology for its political agenda, the sociology that they practiced was infused with concerns and premises that were the contribution of the materialist conception of history to European sociology at its very origins.

Not all Chinese sociologists are easily classified into these categories. An example is Chen Da, who had studied with Giddings and Ogburn in Columbia (Giddings was his Ph.D. advisor, Ogburn his classmate from Reed College in Oregon) but brought to their stress on culture and social

psychology materialist orientations of his own. While in the US, Chen Da authored a study of Chinese Overseas, with emphasis on their laboring conditions. He followed this interest up in the 1930s in his studies of Overseas Chinese communities (*qiaoxiang* 僑鄉) in China. He was also recognized as a foremost sociologist of labor and population. His work with the Institute of Pacific Relations (founded by the Rockefeller Foundation) also gave him a leftist slant on the problems of China (which did not prevent him from getting into trouble during the Hundred Flowers Movement in 1957 for his advocacy of resurrecting sociology, which by then had been taken out of university curricula).<sup>9</sup>

Lei Jieqiong, the lone woman to receive significant attention in some surveys of sociology, is a similar case. Lei studied sociology at the University of Southern California, achieved the highest honors for her scholarship, and upon her return to China, acquired a post at Yanjing University, which she held from 1931 to 1937. Subsequently, she served in numerous prestigious university positions and was active in democratic circles. Lei's primary interest was in issues of women and the family. But she also produced critiques of women under Fascism and brought a historical materialist perspective on gender, with particular interest in the relationship between women's conditions and the unfolding women's movement in China.<sup>10</sup>

Marxists such as Qu Qiubai and Li Da would probably have had little difficulty agreeing with a statement Sun Benwen made in the conclusion to his *Principles of Sociology* (*Shehuixue yuanli* 社會學原理) that “sociology is a science, socialism is a kind of advocacy; the two should not be confounded.”<sup>11</sup> Marxists believed that a fundamental goal of sociology was to serve as a guide to social transformation. On the other hand, they also believed that sociology of the kind practiced by “bourgeois” sociologists was no less political in its service to capitalism. Whether or not sociology in China served capitalism is a moot point. What is less doubtful is that already in the 1930s professional sociologists were closely associated with the Guomindang government and shared in its goals of social reform and engineering.<sup>12</sup> Professional sociology in the 1930s, moreover, bore upon it the imprint of its missionary origins, as well as the social reformism that Chinese sociologists internalized in their education in the United States. The particular circumstances of Chinese society reinforced the practical goals that drove Chinese sociology from its beginnings. It is interesting, moreover, that a sociologist such as Sun Benwen, writing of sociology's mission to resolve social problems, could stipulate that “the

interest of the country and nation should be at the core of the solution,” as if subjecting sociology to national goals was politically innocent.<sup>13</sup>

### *Anthropology*

The first anthropology departments in China were not established until the late 1940s, just before the victory of the Communist Party in 1949. In 1947, Jinan University, Zhejiang University, and Tsinghua University established anthropology departments, followed the following year by Zhongshan University.

The time lag in the establishment of anthropology departments is neither surprising nor significant. Anthropology was a relatively new discipline. Few universities in the US and Europe had anthropology departments until after World War II. In many cases, moreover, anthropology was part of sociology departments. It is more than likely that a Chinese student who studied anthropology in the US would have been enrolled in a sociology department.<sup>14</sup> This situation was replicated in Chinese universities. Scholars with degrees in anthropology, such as Wu Wenzao, Huang Wenshan, or Fei Xiaotong, found disciplinary homes in departments of sociology. Courses in anthropology, too, were more often than not offered through those very same departments. On the other hand, given the significance of rural reconstruction and community studies in guiding research, sociologists themselves were drawn to ethnographic methods, which further blurred the distinction between the two disciplines. The founding of departments of anthropology in the late 1940s signaled not the beginnings of anthropology as a discipline but rather the separation of anthropology from sociology, which merely established the autonomous disciplinary identity of the two fields—not necessarily to the advantage of either except in an institutional sense.

An additional dimension in the case of China was a difference in the scope of research. One Chinese scholar in the forties (Cen Jiawu 岑家梧, 1912–1966), writing with reference to ethnology (*minzuxue* 民族學), observed that ethnographic work in China faced problems quite different than those in Europe and North America. Being a product of colonialism, ethnography in the case of the latter two was devoted to the discovery and delineation of differences in cultural identity. Chinese society, too, was constituted of different nationalities, and cultural difference was an important issue, but being part of the same polity, China, these nationalities were also united by cultural commonalities that were the products of

a long history of interactions. Discovering this commonality in difference was a major challenge that distinguished Chinese ethnography.<sup>15</sup> The distinction Cen drew between ethnographies in the two contexts may provide us with insights into another reason for the blurring of boundaries between sociology and anthropology in the Chinese context. In Europe, and subsequently in North America, the division between sociology and anthropology also marked a distinction between objects of study; the one was devoted to the study of contemporary industrial societies, by definition Euro/American (and white), the other to the study of pre-Euromodern, especially colored and “primitive,” ones. Cen no doubt exaggerated the commonalities between the nationalities in China (especially Han and others), as well as the differences in attitude between Chinese scholars and the Euro/American anthropologists who had trained them. In the discussions over ethnology and sociology in the 1930s, influential anthropologists such as Wu Wenzao, Huang Wenshan, and even Cai Yuanpei argued, very much in the vein of colonial social science, that sociology had as its domain contemporary civilized societies whereas ethnology (and, by implication, anthropology) applied to primitive peoples and the past. In China, this corresponded to the distinction between the Han and minority nationalities.<sup>16</sup> Whether or not the commonalities between the nationalities in China outweighed their differences, as Cen claimed, however, it is nevertheless quite the case that the inside/outside distinction that marked the division of labor between sociology and anthropology in Euro/America was much less applicable to social research in China where both were contained within the same political, if not necessarily the same economic, social, or cultural, space. The objects of study may not have been identical, but they did overlap, and there were good reasons for disciplinary crossings from the one over to the other.

If we think of anthropology in terms of its constituent fields of biology, archeology, linguistics, and ethnology or culture (the “four-fields” of US anthropology), anthropological work and concerns, too, go back to the early twentieth century and were entangled in issues of nationalism even more inextricably than in the case of sociology. China’s multi-nationality, a challenge to nationalists, may account for the prominence of ethnology in particular. On the other hand, archeological discoveries from the late nineteenth century were to raise questions about Chinese origins which also stimulated early advances in archeology. No



less important was the discovery in nationalist politics of the “people,” further endowing with political significance culture at the ground level.

Beijing University had established a Department of Archeology by 1922. The following year, an association was created for the study of folklore. In 1927, Zhongshan University established a Department of History and Philology, which was followed by a similar department at the Academia Sinica when it was founded in 1928.

One foreign figure, in addition to American “missionary” sociologists, was to play an important part in the development of these various aspects of anthropological work. This was Sergei M. Shirokogoroff (1887–1939), a Russian ethnologist of China and Central Asia, who spent most of his life teaching and researching in China. His numerous books, many of which were translated into Chinese, were widely influential. So was his teaching. Shirokogoroff taught a variety of subjects, first at Zhongshan University and subsequently at the Institute of History and Philology at the Academia Sinica. In 1929, he moved to Tsinghua University, where he helped establish the Department of Sociology. Under his influence, anthropology was added to the title of the department (if only briefly), and courses on anthropology to the departmental curriculum. Among the students who came under his strong influence was Fei Xiaotong.<sup>17</sup>

The development of ethnology in China would be given a powerful impetus by Cai Yuanpei, former Chancellor of Beijing University, Minister of Education under the Guomindang, and head of the Academia Sinica when it was established in 1928 by the new Guomindang government. Cai was educated in Germany, where he had come under the influence of evolutionary ethnology and esthetics, both of which may have had something to do with his intellectual attraction to anarchism. While chancellor at Beijing University, he had promoted the study of archeology and anthropology. An article he wrote in late 1926, “On Ethnology” (*Shuo minzuxue*), followed by his establishment of the Institute of History and Philology and the section on anthropology of the Institute of Social Sciences at the Academia Sinica, have given him something of a status of the founder of ethnology in China. While Cai’s essay was relatively brief, it was significant in its clarification of differences between ethnology and ethnography, as well as between anthropology and ethnology. The essay referred to the importance of historical work in grasping the formation of nationality, but it gave equal stress to on-the-ground investigation.<sup>18</sup> With his interest in esthetics, Cai was also inclined to admit into the scope of ethnology all societies, a position which, as I have noted above, would be

challenged by social scientists in the 1930s who advocated restriction of ethnology to the study of “primitive” societies.

Ethnology would advance rapidly in the 1930s, although here it is necessary to make note of some confusion. Much as historians of sociology such as Zheng Hangsheng assimilate anthropology and ethnology to sociology, historians of ethnology such as Wang Jianmin return the favor, including within ethnology all work with ethnographic implications. This is due not to confusion on the part of historians, but rather to the absence of a clear distinction between the fields in the composition of departments and research institutions, in research projects, and in method and theory.

There were, nevertheless, significant signs of autonomous development. The Chinese Society of Ethnology (*Zhongguo minzuxue hui* 中國民族學會) was established in Nanjing in late 1934. While there were sociologists among the founders (the ubiquitous Sun Benwen), the society’s agenda was clearly directed at ethnological work: “to research Chinese nationalit(ies) and their cultures.”<sup>19</sup> While the journal planned did not materialize due to financial reasons, a collection of research work (*Minzuxue yanjiu jikan* 民族學研究集刊) was published in 1936 through the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Institute in Shanghai. By 1948, six such collections would be published. Publications connected with the Society included *Monumenta Serica*, published by the Catholic Furen University (the society seemed to have strong German connections, as some of its meetings were also held in the German/Austrian/Swiss Alumni Society in Nanjing). At the first annual meeting in December 1935, the guest speaker was Radcliffe-Brown, who gave a lecture on “Recent Developments in Social Anthropology.”

The society served to bring some coherence to ethnological work. It developed quickly with branches in a number of locations around China. In his history of ethnology in China, Wang Jianmin suggests that, in general, ethnologists (which would include sociologists) in North China, under the influence of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski, were inclined to functionalism, while those in South China were more historical in approach.<sup>20</sup> He further divides ethnological practice into three regional groupings in terms of research interests. Prominent scholars in eastern China included Sun Benwen, Huang Wenshan, Wei Huilin 衛惠林 (1901–), Wu Zelin, Wu Dingliang 吳定良 (1893–1969), etc., who were grouped around Academia Sinica, Central University (later Nanjing University),

Jinling University in Nanjing (then the national capital), and Daxia, Hujiang, and Jinan universities, as well as the Sun Yat-sen Cultural Institute. Eastern China scholars were mostly interested in the collection of historical materials with emphasis on national culture, folk literature, and language.

In the South, Zhongshan University in Guangzhou and Xiamen University in Amoy served as the central institutions, with prominent ethnologists and historians such as Luo Xianglin 羅香林 (1905–1978), Chen Xujing, Yang Chengzhi 楊成志 (1902–1991), Lin Huixiang 林惠祥 (1901–1958), etc. They, too, were historical in approach, with particular interest in archeology, language, and physical anthropology. They also conducted research among minority nationalities in Southwest China.

Northern ethnologists, perhaps the most influential of all, were grouped around Yanjing, Beijing, Tsinghua, and Furen universities, as well as the archeology department of the Institute of History and Philology of the Academia Sinica, with Yanjing University playing a leading role. They were the best connected to scholars abroad. Among them were China's most famous social scientists, including Wu Wenzao, Pan Guangdan, Li Anzhai, Fei Xiaotong, Lin Yaohua, etc. Dominated by functionalists, as noted above, this group of scholars was most interested in research in contemporary society.

With the Japanese invasion after 1937, many Chinese scholars followed the Guomindang government to Western China. Tragic as it was, the invasion proved to be a boon for ethnologists as they found themselves in areas of China populated by national minorities. From 1937 to 1945, ethnologists conducted extensive research among minority nationalities, which also had the result of equating ethnology firmly with the study of such groups. One institutional product of the move to the West was the establishment in 1941 of the Western Frontier Research Institution, headed by Li Anzhai, which also published its own newsletter on frontier anthropology. A graduate of Yanjing University, Li had gone to the US to study with Alfred Kroeber and Robert Lowie (1883–1957) at UC-Berkeley and subsequently with Edward Sapir (1884–1939) at Yale University. One of the few Chinese scholars to have worked with indigenous people (the Zuni) abroad, Li would emerge over the years as a pioneer of Tibetology in China. The work done by Li and his wife/collaborator, Yu Shiyu 于式玉 (1904–1969), would also form the basis for the Communist Party's Tibet policy in later years.<sup>21</sup>

Following World War II, research in ethnology and anthropology, along with sociology, proliferated. This development was to be cut short with the victory of the Communist Party, and the educational reorganization of 1952, which abolished departments of sociology and anthropology and placed restrictions even on Marxist work. Ethnology would survive because of its political importance, as the management of minority nationalities was, and has been, a major concern of the government. But ethnology, too, would be brought within much narrower theoretical boundaries with the establishment of Stalinist orthodoxy.

The social sciences have been resurrected since 1978, and they are presently more integrated with Euro/American social sciences than ever before, not just within the PRC but with the many scholars of Chinese origin living and working abroad. These contemporary developments are too broad in scope and complexity to be included in this introduction. Some aspects will be taken up in the essays below. Here I will take up only one: the politics of sociology and anthropology as expressed in the question of “making the social sciences Chinese” (*shehui kexuede Zhongguohua* 社會科學的中國化), which first appeared in the 1930s, but has acquired even greater urgency at a time of cultural and educational globalization. Now, as then, the question divides social scientists. Its persistence, however, allows glimpses into the relationship between the social sciences and nationalist anxieties that are as old as the histories of these disciplines.

### Indigenizing Sociology and Anthropology: The Politics of the Social Sciences

Calls for the indigenization of the social sciences are as old as the introduction of modern Euro/American social science in China in the late 1920s. These calls have been driven by concerns that have changed over time, as have the contexts to which they are responses. While there has been a remarkable consistency over the years in the formal definition of indigenization or, alternatively, of “making the social sciences Chinese” (*Zhongguohua* 中國化), these terms are by no means transparent in their implications. “Indigenization” (*bentuhua* 本土化) and *Zhongguohua* are used interchangeably in the literature on the social sciences. Their translation into a conventional idea of “sinicization” has further burdened the terms with culturalist readings that are the legacies of imperial Chinese historiography. Such readings are quite misleading unless we understand

“sinicization” in materialist and concretely historical cultural terms, which may also be the most accurate way of understanding them with reference to the imperial past as well.

In his detailed two-volume study of the history of Chinese sociology before 1949, Yang Yabin notes that “how to integrate sociological theory with the realities of Chinese society, and make sociology Chinese, was a central task of sociology in the 1930s and 1940s.”<sup>22</sup> This commonplace description of the process of making sociology Chinese—or, for that matter, of indigenizing it—will be recognized readily as an academic version of “making Marxism Chinese,” referring to the ideological appropriation of Marxism for the Chinese Communist Party in the early 1940s that was to be hailed thereafter as the greatest achievement and outstanding characteristic of Mao Zedong Thought. The first calls for “making sociology Chinese” in the 1930s preceded Mao’s pronouncements of the 1940s, and were products, as was Mao’s own ideological work, of giving a national face to modernity that was a general concern of the 1930s, especially in the second half of the decade. Still, it is arguable that Mao’s appropriation of Marxism provides a paradigm—not least in its ideological tensions—for grasping the nativization of all theoretical imports from abroad. There would be a slight shift in terminology following the “opening and reform” of the late seventies under the Deng Xiaoping leadership that succeeded revolutionary Maoism. But the problems of modernity made Chinese continues to bear tensions and contradictions that have refused to disappear with the change in course in Chinese politics—or the academic disciplines.

The ambiguities built into the Chinese appropriation of Marxism are also visible in the uses of the paradigm with reference to the social sciences. It has not always been clear if making Marxism Chinese simply meant attentiveness to the realities of Chinese society without further implications for theory, as Mao’s own usage sometimes suggested; a need to revise theory itself in accordance with native social and cultural demands to produce a “Chinese” theory; or an ongoing dialectic between Marxism as universal theory and particular Chinese understandings of it. I have suggested elsewhere that the difficulties presented by making Marxism Chinese may account for Mao’s preoccupation with contradictions and the primacy he gave to practice in addressing questions that did not lend themselves to resolution at the level of theory.<sup>23</sup> These ambiguities are also important to understanding the conflicting interpretations of Marxism over the years in accordance with changing political goals.

Recognition of such contradictions may also be necessary to grasp difficulties that attend efforts to nativize the social sciences. While integrating social theory with the realities of Chinese society has remained the goal of making the social sciences Chinese, what this may entail remains problematic to this day. It has also assumed different dimensions at different times.

Historians of the social sciences have applied the paradigm to the social sciences from their origins in the twentieth century. It seems, however, that it was only in the 1940s, following the Maoist interpretation of Marxism, that social scientists began to rephrase concerns with domesticating the social sciences in terms of this new paradigm. The question of how to reconcile the demands of imported theory with the empirical evidence of Chinese society was a problem for Marxist social scientists from the late 1920s, as they sought in social analysis solutions to the difficulties of socialist revolution in a society that theoretically was lacking in the preconditions for such a revolution. Political loyalties precluded the questioning of the claims of Marxist theory to universal validity. The result was the tailoring of evidence to fit the demands of theory, which merely produced fruitless conflicts between competing universalisms. While Marxist debates over the nature of Chinese society and its past produced the first social histories of China, they failed to reconcile the contradiction between history and theory, which in the end would be resolved not theoretically but by political fiat.<sup>24</sup>

For liberal social scientists, the question of the indigenization of sociology appeared first in the 1930s and 1940s, coinciding with the professionalization of the social sciences as the first generation of social scientists returned from abroad (mostly the United States) to lead newly established departments in Chinese universities. Their primary concern was the domestication of the new social sciences by providing them with a Chinese content. This involved research into Chinese society to explore how issues in the social sciences appeared within China’s particular circumstances, as well as the production of Chinese materials for research and teaching that would replace the foreign texts, drawn from research in Europe and North America, that initially had provided the material for the social sciences, taught for the most part by foreign scholars. In its sixth annual meeting in January 1937, the Chinese Sociological Association (*Zhongguo shehuixue she* 中國社會學社) called for the “establishment of a Chinese sociology” (*Zhongguo shehuixue zhi jianshe* 中國社會學之建設) through a program of community studies. Such studies were already

under way in the 1930s; as a major concern of contemporary sociology in the United States, community studies had been part of the education of this generation of sociologists. This meeting attached them to the development of “Chinese” sociology. Based on the concrete realities of everyday life, community studies were deemed to be the ideal vehicle for grounding sociology in Chinese soil.

What this implied for sociological theory is not very clear as may be gleaned from the writings of contemporary sociologists such as Sun Benwen, whose views on the domestication of sociology are often cited by historians. In his own work as well as in more programmatic writings, Sun was a foremost exponent of bringing Chinese materials into sociological work and teaching. This entailed compilation of material on Chinese social theory and ideals, detailed research in urban and rural China, and the production of texts and reference works with Chinese content. While Sun endowed sociology with an important political and cultural function in serving national needs, he was careful to distinguish socialism and sociology and to reject the former for its “subjectivity.” Sun’s distinction may be read as an effort by a professional sociologist to rescue sociology from its subjection to politics. The function he assigned to sociology in serving national needs was hardly free of politics, however, and subjectivity was also at work in bringing into sociology Chinese social ideals. How these ideals were to be articulated to sociology as a “science” remained an open question in his work, as well as the works of other contemporaries.<sup>25</sup>

These questions, and to a large extent the disciplines they concerned, were sidelined for several decades after 1949. When the question of the social sciences re-emerged in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was social scientists from Taiwan, Hong Kong and the United States who played the leading role, even though the “re-opening” of China provided the immediate context. Initiated by intellectuals in Taiwan around 1980, this new round in efforts to make sociology Chinese brought together sociologists from Hong Kong, Singapore, The People’s Republic of China and the United States. Rather than establish a “Chinese” sociology, the participants sought for the most part to bring a Chinese voice into sociological theory.<sup>26</sup>

The circumstances under which the discussions were conducted were vastly different than those of the 1930s and 1940s. By the late 1970s, sociology and anthropology in the United States and Europe had undergone

significant transformations. The critique of the complicity of professional sociology and anthropology in colonial and neo-colonial ventures was informed by a new interest in post-Stalinist Marxism, that issued in a turn to political economy in new theoretical departures represented most importantly by world-system analysis and dependency theory (itself a product of Latin American social scientists), as well as attention to questions of social oppression that included, in addition to class relations, issues of gender, race, ethnicity, and indigenous peoples.

At the same time, important changes had taken place in the immediate circumstances of Chinese sociologists. The discussions coincided with increased attention globally to the success of East Asian societies in the global capitalist economy. This was reflected in the appearance of the Asia Pacific idea, as well as a recognition that these societies might be empowered by social dynamics and cultural characteristics that gave them an edge even over the earlier centers of capital. The result was a renewed interest among Chinese and non-Chinese analysts alike in social practices ranging from kinship to *guanxi* networks, and in the values that informed them. Confucianism turned almost overnight from an explanation of Chinese backwardness to the source of Chinese success. At the same time, however, the existence of multiple Chinese societies in Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the People’s Republic of China, not to speak of Overseas Chinese around the world, presented new challenges to making sociology “Chinese,” as these societies had developed along different trajectories for the past three decades, if not longer. Rather than revolutionary politics, these debates were now driven by a new identity politics that also complicated efforts to indigenize the social sciences. The relationship between history, culture, and theory assumed even greater complexity. The sociologists involved themselves hailed from a multiplicity of locations and participated in theoretical discussions not only in the periphery, as the Taiwan sociologist Xiao Xinhuang described sociology in Taiwan, but also at the center. Moreover, they also differed in the demands of their immediate context. This was especially the case with sociologists in Taiwan who already faced pressures from the democratization of Taiwanese society and the emergence of political and social movements in the cause of Taiwanization. They were intensely aware as professionals of the universal demands of theory, and equally sensitive to the problems of encompassing diverse social and cultural realities in one grand theory.<sup>27</sup>

According to Lin Nan, whose essay led the volume of US sociologists' contributions to the discussion, the "sinicization of sociology" was intended "to blend (*rongna* 容納) Chinese social and cultural characteristics and national character into sociology."<sup>28</sup> It was different from the creation of a "Chinese sociology," with scholarly and professional goals, or the application of sociology to Chinese society. The level of sinicization was to be determined "by the extent to which sociology acquired Chinese social and cultural characteristics and a Chinese national character." But "sinicization was an undertaking that transcended regional and national boundaries; social and cultural characteristics and national character entailed structures, relations between the group and individual, and different layers in society, which could all be blended into theory and method."<sup>29</sup> As examples of Chinese social and cultural characteristics that sinicization might entail, Lin specified family and kinship relations, centralized power which affected relations of hierarchy at all levels, the value systems and practices that bolstered the system, the consequences for society of a unified script, factors involved in China's development in an East Asian context that might offer different views on development than, say, those found in world-system analysis. Bringing forth new kinds of evidence in these areas, and the reformulation on that basis of theory, might, according to Lin, effect a theoretical revolution that could perhaps resolve the "paradigm crisis" in sociology. Following Thomas Kuhn, he suggested that this required a community of scholars working to this end, which was an opportunity for Chinese scholars.

While Lin's discussion stressed structural factors, other contributors to the volume, especially those working in specific areas such as social psychology, alienation, women's sociology, etc. placed greater emphasis on everyday values that needed to be brought into the process of "sinicization." Taiwanese sociologists in particular, according to Xiao, who conducted surveys among them, thought it was necessary to bring into consideration Chinese ethical values, as well as the concepts in which those values were imbedded: the "transmission of the Dao" (*daotong* 道統), humaneness (*ren* 仁), Heaven (*tian* 天), propriety (*li* 禮), *yinyang* 陰陽, etc.<sup>30</sup>

In either case, however, whether dealing with structures or cultural values, scholars involved in the discussion for the most part agreed that the goal of "sinicization" was not to divide Chinese sociology from the world but to enrich sociology world-wide. According to Xiao's survey, scholars in Taiwan were divided almost evenly on the question of whether

or not it was desirable to create a national sociology.<sup>31</sup> Hong Kong and Singapore sociologists for the most part were not interested at all in the question of "sinicization." US scholars, on the other hand, viewed "sinicization" as a form of "indigenization" (*bentuhua*), which was little more than a means in the long run to "globalization" (*quanqiuhua* 全球化). The most adamant about "sinicization" were scholars from the People's Republic, who displayed a chauvinistic (*shawenzhuyi* 沙文主義) attitude even toward their Chinese compatriots in their affirmation of Chinese characteristics.<sup>32</sup>

Again, "sinicization" covered a broad ground: from the transformation of Chinese society through theory, to the outright rejection of national differences in theory (which perceived difference only as a matter of the circumstances to which theory was applied), to the opportunistic uses of theory for national ends (*yang wei zhong yong* 洋為中用, making the foreign serve the Chinese) at the hand of mainland scholars, who saw no further cultural significance in theory, to the conviction especially of US sociologists that theoretical formulations to emerge from "sinicization" would produce a paradigm revolution in sociology. With the possible exception of mainland scholars, "sinicization" meant to Chinese sociologists not the capturing of sociology in a Chinese national space, but bringing into sociology Chinese voices, sentiments, and the social and cultural characteristics of Chinese society in order to create a more cosmopolitan and globalized sociology; to use a word that has become popular since then, a multicultural and multiculturalist sociology. They were anti-Eurocentric—they knew that sociology bore upon it the stamp of its origins in nineteenth-century industrial Europe—but their specific focus was on the contemporary hegemony of US sociology, which provoked national claims on sociology in Europe as well. Even in the case of PRC sociologists with their "chauvinism," we need to recall that the national characteristics they claimed also included as a formative moment the legacy of the "sinicization of Marxism." There were other Chinese sociologists, referred to by Xiao, who may have perceived a possible contradiction between "sinicization" and the universal claims of sociology, but this was largely muted—especially for US sociologists, who referred to themselves as border sociologists, who were outsiders as such to the workings of sociology in the PRC and Taiwan, and whose identification was primarily with their professional bases in the US.

The contradictions presented by "sinicization," ironically, arose more from a conflict between concretely Chinese and broadly universalist

theory, but rather from the problems Chinese societies presented to the project of “indigenization.” The differences in historical context between this discussion and those of the 1930s and 1940s are nowhere more evident than in the meaning of “Chineseness.” The different implications of indigenization (in addition to *Zhongguohua*, *quyuhua* 區域化, or regionalization, and *difanghua* 地方化, or localization, all of which are encountered in the discussions) could hardly be contained in one conception of a Chinese nation or culture shared by all the participants.<sup>33</sup> Strangely enough, a general treatment of the problems of “sinicization,” such as that offered by Lin Nan, did not even refer to the question, possibly because his self-image as an “outsider” made him reluctant to take up an issue of great sensitivity. It was brought up by Xiao Xinhua, who referred in his concluding essay to “four Chinas,” differences among which needed to be respected.<sup>34</sup> The question came up also in Xiao’s portrayal of sociology in Taiwan, an essay on national minorities in China addressing issues of assimilation, and in the paper on women’s sociology, referred to above, where the author suggested that differences between the PRC, Hong Kong, and Taiwan provided an opportunity for comparing women’s status in Chinese societies with different economic systems.<sup>35</sup> The only one to meet it head on was a discussion of alienation by Ma Liqin. What he had to say is worth quoting at some length:

In determining the objectives of research, we must use a definition of “China” that is open-minded and broad. What is the “China” in the term *Zhongguohua*? The China here needs to be taken as China in a broad sense, including Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and all the societies of Chinese overseas. This broad understanding of China has great significance for research into alienation. First, [the idea of] China must take as its main assumption Chinese, and Chinese cultural life; so that wherever there are Chinese and Chinese culture, there is Chinese society, and wherever there is Chinese society, there is China. This way, we are not limited by politics and its territorialities ... Secondly, giving priority to Chinese society over the state in defining China, we have [an idea of China] that is richer in its dynamism, transformations, and variety.<sup>36</sup>

Ma concluded his essay by observing that to make China more dynamic and democratic, it might be better to help Chinese understand the workings of society, in other words to emphasize “the sociologization of China” (*Zhongguo shehuixuehua* 中國社會學化).<sup>37</sup> This could be read, at a political level, as a call for the recognition of equal status in “Chineseness” to a variety of Chinese societies. Its conceptual and methodological

implications were equally significant, as indigenization now implied indigenization in different locations of Chinese. To the juxtaposition between a Euro/American sociology with its universalist claims and Chinese particularities was now added still another layer that juxtaposed a Chinese universalism versus the particularities of different Chinese societies. In the case of Taiwan, this would turn within the decade to the substitution of Taiwanization for sinicization.<sup>38</sup>

This discussion, too was inconclusive where issues of theory are concerned. The participants were much more explicit about bringing Chinese voices into theory, but without challenging the possibility of a universal theory. If there is any conclusion to be drawn with respect to theory, it is that theory could achieve greater universality by incorporating different voices.<sup>39</sup> Ultimately, the issue was to bring Chinese differences into theory to enrich theory, rather than to create a separate Chinese theory that would lead to fragmentation and preclude the possibility of theory except at the most limited local level.

Efforts to make social science Chinese continue to be a major preoccupation of Chinese social scientists. Since the 1990s, these have taken another turn due to the circumstances of the social sciences in China and abroad. Changes in China are marked by greater openness and pluralism. Interestingly, much the same may be said for the social sciences in Europe and North America, where questioning the global hegemony of Eurocentric social science has acquired the status of new fashion.<sup>40</sup> Most interesting, however, may be the global situation. As global modernity has led to conflicting claims on modernity, modernity’s ways of knowing have come under increased questioning. The present witnesses ethnic, national, and civilizational, as well as class and gender, claims on knowledge. On occasion, challenges to epistemological hegemony extend beyond the social to the natural sciences.<sup>41</sup> Epistemological universalism, ironically, has become a casualty of the globalization of modernity. The social sciences as they have developed over the last century and a half from their European origins are clearly at risk. It does not follow, however, that indigenizing the social sciences has become any easier.

In the case of China, the discussions have become more prolific and self-conscious than ever before. It is impossible here to discuss the many turns they have taken, nor am I qualified to do so. But the continuing difficulties may be illustrated by an analysis of the problem in a recent text on the history of Chinese sociology that is worth quoting at some

length because of the many issues it touches upon. Authored by a team under the leadership of the distinguished sociologist Zheng Hangsheng of People's University, the text was published in English as well as Chinese. This text introduces a further layer of difficulty into the discourse by equating "sociology with Chinese characteristics" (*you Zhongguo tese de shehuixue* 有中國特色的社會學) and "making sociology Chinese" (*shehuixue Zhongguohua* 社會學中國化), especially in the English version, which substitutes "sociology with Chinese characteristics" where "making sociology Chinese" is used—with quotation marks—in the Chinese text. I quote from the English version, which corresponds closely to the Chinese text, with slight amendments for stylistic reasons:

Essentially speaking, indigenization of Chinese sociology requires sociologists to describe and explain the social realities in China in a correct way and anticipate the prospect of social development in order to guide social development. The sign of indigenization is the development of sociological theories and methods with Chinese characteristics.... What is most important is to answer two questions.

What is our guiding ideology and what do Chinese characteristics mean? The answer to the first question is that Chinese sociology must stick to the guidance of Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, and Deng Xiaoping Theory, apprehending their standpoint, outlook, and methods in the observation of social life on the one hand, and having a good command of their theories about certain basic matters of Chinese society on the other. Any neglect of this will lead to the loss of our bearings in indigenizing sociology and to failure in solving the problem. What do Chinese characteristics mean then? It means that Chinese sociology must first have a foothold in Chinese social practice so as to investigate, study, and conclude. At the same time, Chinese sociology should engage in deep study of the history of Chinese social ideology to derive nourishment from the wealth of social ideological data and centuries old valuable tradition....

Indigenization is not anti-foreign ... it includes using foreign, particularly Western, sociology for reference, developing what is healthy and discarding what is not.<sup>42</sup>

The authors go on to stress that internationalization of Chinese sociology is of equal importance to indigenization. Internationalization includes,

First, Chinese sociology is one of the branches of world sociology, with the ability and position that are required in the dialogue with international sociological academia so that Chinese sociology can be recognized. Secondly,

Chinese sociologists should be able to expound Chinese society and construct the theory of Chinese sociology from the high plane of the world as well as the whole of humanity... In the 21st century, both indigenization and internationalization will speed up, which will be an inevitable consequence of world trends toward integration and of China's integration with the world.<sup>43</sup>

The explicitly political understanding of "indigenization" in this statement may not be to the liking of many social scientists in China who for the last three decades have made strenuous efforts to escape from politics in response to earlier political domination of intellectual life. The statement here clearly places indigenization within a socialist political program as defined by Deng Xiaoping. Were it to be updated to the present, it would presumably add "harmonious society" to its program as that now constitutes the national vision as defined by still a new generation of leadership.<sup>44</sup> If changing visions may create a predicament for social scientists, that is not a problem in and of itself; after all, changing social forces and their political demands have been responsible for transformations in social science practice, more often than not with beneficial results, and it would be silly to pretend that the needs of the state and of governance does not play a part in the social sciences elsewhere. The statement is an important reminder that politics remains an issue in the practice of the social sciences, as well as in the problematic of indigenization. Professionalization does not necessarily take politics out of their practice, as many Chinese social scientists seem to pretend these days, following their counterparts in the US and Europe. The question is not whether there is a relationship between politics and the social sciences, but what manner of relationship it is, and whether or not such a relationship allows room for professional autonomy. The statement above clearly does, which represents a radical change from the immediate past.

Most relevant here is what the statement may have to tell us about the indigenization of the social sciences, its temporal and spatial, historical and cultural dimensions. One of the most remarkable things (by no means uncommon in Chinese writings) is the status of Marxism as an integral part of the guiding ideology, already a fundamental part of a "Chineseness" to which the social sciences are to be indigenized.<sup>45</sup> The implication here is that "Chineseness" itself is a historical category, formed out of the accretion of characteristics of a variety of origins. For the same reason, indigenization means incorporation in a historically

changing cultural space with open boundaries, rather than capture in a bounded Chinese cultural space, as is often implied in culturalist uses of the term “sinicization”: China and Chineseness themselves are subject to change as they indigenize cultural elements from abroad. In this case, moreover, the statement does not stop at the importation of cultural elements, but mentions also going out into the world (using a term that has become quite popular in recent years, *zouxiang shijie* 走向世界). Hence the use of the metaphor of “dialogue” as part of a process that involves in equal measure both indigenization and internationalization.

This is not to accept uncritically the optimism that guides this statement, which ignores the power relationships involved in such exchanges; says little on how Marxist ideals (already included in the native legacy) might be reconciled to “centuries-old traditions” that they were intended to overthrow and transform; ignores divisions among Chinese social scientists who are by no means a homogeneous group culturally and professionally; is silent on internal inequalities, which are of special concern to anthropologists dealing with Han/minority issues;<sup>46</sup> and is quite “Euro/ Sinocentric in its obliviousness to knowledge systems other than those of China and the West, which is a problem of Chinese thought in general. The statement also ignores serious differences between “nationalization” (as in *Zhongguohua*) and indigenization (*bentuhua*), which, taken concretely, refers not just to the national level but also to layers of local levels, as well as internal differences of various kinds.

Nevertheless, at least at the level it takes up, the statement points to an important characteristic in the understanding of indigenization and nationalization in all the discussions mentioned above: that these terms have pointed to an insistence that the material and cultural realities of Chinese society be understood for what they are, as realities of their own rather than as poor copies of models imported from elsewhere. In all cases, there have also been demands for the recognition of Chinese voices, as well as an accounting for Chinese realities in any social science with universal claims (including Marxism). Zheng and his colleagues use the metaphor of “dialogue” in the interactions they envisage. Indigenization or nationalization of the social sciences since the 1930s have indeed been conceived above all as a “dialogic” relationship: not merely applying social science to China, or assimilating social science to an enclosed Chinese cultural space, but as an ongoing dialogue—maybe even a dialectic.

### ***Zhongguohua*: A Critical Appraisal**

A critical appraisal is necessary of two dimensions of the problematic of nationalization (*Zhongguohua*) and indigenization, and the questions they raise. The one pertains to theoretical questions, the other to the question of difference, which motivates the effort in the first place. While the themes have varied over the years, there is a remarkable persistence of the issues involved. This itself may suggest *prima facie* the difficulties involved in resolving the problems thrown up by nationalization/indigenization.

The first sense of *Zhongguohua*, which appeared most urgently in the 1930s and 1940s but is by no means restricted to that period, has been the necessity of bringing the social realities and problems of Chinese society into social science work. There could hardly be any question about the necessity of such effort, nor is there anything particularly “Chinese” or national about it, as it should be a prerequisite of any social science with pretensions to universalism. This does not mean that such demands are superfluous or trivial, because they point to a real problem that is a major cause of theoretical and methodological ferment in the social sciences in our day. There is hardly any question that social scientists have failed to live up to their professions of ideological and cultural openness more often than we might wish. It is arguable that not only the theoretical derivations but the very premises of the social sciences have been constituted by the hegemonic assumptions about the world of Euro/American-centered social scientists who have not hesitated to couch in universal terms parochial generalizations drawn from their own experience and ideals.<sup>47</sup> On the other hand, they have been able to sustain this hegemony because social scientists from other societies, products of imported systems of knowledge and mostly trained in Euro/American institutions, more often than not have internalized these very same assumptions. Marxist historians in China in the 1920s and 1930s did not hesitate to read Chinese society in terms of supposedly universal schema of development. The very social scientists who advocated Chinese content and voices in the social sciences nevertheless failed to question the social and cultural premises of those social sciences, their claims to scientific validity, or their promise of universal truth.

It remains unclear to this day whether the incorporation of “Chinese characteristics” into the social sciences is intended to enrich or to transform the disciplinary configurations and the theoretical structures of the



social sciences. The continued insistence on the importance of “Marxism with Chinese characteristics” as a guiding principle in the indigenization of sociology elides the question that Marxist sociology in China and elsewhere has been at odds with mainstream (formerly “bourgeois”) sociology, and is silent on the question of how a reconciliation is to be effected under contemporary circumstances, when basic Marxist concepts such as class have disappeared from sociological analysis almost everywhere, including China. Even when Chinese social scientists have voiced demands about bringing Chinese social and political ideals into the social sciences, they have failed more often than not to face the question of whether or not the social sciences as they have been constituted since the 19th century can survive reconstitution by the values of a pre-industrial society. What is not clear in either case is whether indigenization is to issue merely in a local version of a global sociology, or whether global sociology is to be transformed in the process. If it is the latter that is the goal, it seems to me that it is necessary for Chinese social scientists to cultivate a more global vision that transcends national concerns and to articulate Chinese concerns not just to Euro/American social sciences, but also to the concerns of other societies marginalized by modern Euro/American hegemony. The East/West or Chinese/Western binarisms that infuse discussions of the problem of indigenization obstruct such a global vision and in many ways perpetuate the Eurocentric biases of the social sciences. Such discussions seem to be guided more by considerations of power than by confrontation of basic problems in the so-called globalization of the social sciences.

This leads me to the second dimension of the problem, the question of difference, and the many layers of difference that call for attention. This question was raised most directly in the discussions of the 1980s, possibly because they are most readily evident from the peripheries not just of Euro/American but also of Chinese societies. But they are also quite pertinent to the controversies in our day.

What was most evident was the problematic nature of the whole idea of indigenization/nationalization. These clearly refer to different processes, and it is only a hegemonic subordination of the indigenous to the national that justifies their equation. “Indigenization” (*bentuhua*) is a term that refers to concrete grounding in place in both social and cultural terms, whereas “nationalization” (in this case “*Zhongguohua*”) refers to a more abstractly conceived space defined by the state, which contains within its commonalities many significant differences.<sup>48</sup> The concept of

*Zhongguo* is complicated further by the existence of a multiplicity of Chinese societies as well as of overseas Chinese populations. These societies may share certain characteristics, but they also differ significantly due to their historical trajectories.<sup>49</sup> Differences among these various Chinese societies also underline local differences within them (in the case of mainland China, not just differences between nationalities, but regional and local differences as well). Indigenization, properly speaking, should be distinguished from “*Zhongguohua*” because it refers to a different level of difference than the nation, which may be “local” vis-à-vis the global but is itself an abstraction vis-à-vis the concretely place-based. This also suggests that the relationship between indigenization/nationalization is a contradictory relationship, if only in the sense of “the unity of opposites.” So is the relationship of the national to a larger global space of Chineseness marked by many differences; the latter is a vague amalgam of social, cultural, and phenotypical characteristics, but possibly owes its existence more than anything to discursive constructions of Chineseness. If Chineseness is a historical construct, than making anything Chinese is an unstable idea and may depend above all on practices that differ from one location to another.

This is also indicated by the second difference I will take up here that pertains to the sociology of intellectuals and academic institutions. Chinese intellectuals, including professional academics, belong to a multiplicity of discursive communities and participate differently in professional activities. From the origins of professional social science in the 1920s to the present (except for the hiatus of the Cultural Revolution years), Chinese social scientists have also been parts of communities of social sciences that are international in scope. So have the institutions of social science, including universities. This situation was complicated with the appearance of different Chinese societies since the 1950s and has acquired further complexity with the large-scale migration of Chinese scholars abroad since the 1980s. If these scholars all believe in the necessity of “indigenizing” the social sciences, which is very doubtful, it is almost certain that they understand its desirability, processes, and outcomes differently. Differences between Chinese and Euro/American social science are not just differences between an inside and an outside, but differences that are increasingly internal to Chinese academia itself.

These internal differences are likely to become sharper as Chinese society becomes ever more deeply involved in global capitalism, and displaced onto another plane than the national. It is important for us to

remember that the social sciences are not just products of Euro/American social and cultural circumstances, but intellectual products of industrial capitalism and its subsequent unfolding. They derive their relevance at least in part from their function in capitalist society. Their increased relevance in contemporary China, too, must be seen in terms of the development of Chinese society. Whether we speak of the problems of Chinese society, its cultural characteristics, or tendencies in its professional work, it is less and less productive to draw sharp boundaries between Chinese society and the world at large. If this is indeed the case, as many Chinese scholars also suggest, then the question of indigenization may be a distraction from the more important political questions raised by structural transformations—regional, ethnic, or social—in Chinese society.

Making the social sciences Chinese has carried different meanings to different social scientists over the years: ranging from bringing Chinese voices into the social sciences to responding to the particularities of Chinese society within the social sciences, to the shaping of the social sciences by Chinese values. This last question, which may have the greatest significance for the theoretical structure and the ultimate goals of the social sciences, is itself quite complicated, as it refers to inherited values from the past as well as the values of contemporary Chinese societies that are a product at once of past legacies and modern struggles against internal and external injustices and inequalities. Whether Chinese social scientists look to the past, the present, or the future in the determination of Chinese values has significant consequences for the theory and practice of the social sciences.

Indeed, contemporary calls for the nationalization of the social sciences, which made sense in the 1930s and 1940s, presently seem unduly defensive and retrogressive. Present-day China is no longer an object of imperialist hegemony, but a major player on the global scene. As Chinese society becomes ever more deeply entangled in contemporary global capitalism, it also experiences the contradictions of capitalism not as an external force but as the very constituents of its social and political structure. Conversely, Chinese political and economic power, with all its contradictions, is global in its reach and effects. It is possible to fall back upon past legacies in the definition of Chinese values and identities against external hegemonies, which has been a driving force in arguments for a Chinese social science. It is important to remember, however, that these hegemonies appear differently as China itself becomes part of a

global structure of power. Under contemporary circumstances, indigenization or internationalization of the social sciences requires more than just an affirmation of a Chinese identity in the search for a Chinese voice or presence in the social sciences. It goes without saying that social scientists in China (and elsewhere) must be attentive to the particularities of their societies. But those particularities increasingly call for close attention to their global context and effects. Nationalizing the social sciences may soothe nationalistic anxieties, but unless China is to be viewed as a closed system, which is less feasible than ever before, efforts to make the social sciences Chinese make sense only if they are accompanied by simultaneous efforts at their globalization—not just with reference to “the West,” but with reference to societies globally. Any such effort needs to confront most urgently choices between compliance in the hegemonic legacies of the social sciences with their roots in the capitalist reorganization of society, albeit with “Chinese characteristics,” or drawing upon past legacies and the modern revolutionary experience in a global search for remaking the social sciences that is driven by commitment to social justice and democracy—at home and abroad.<sup>50</sup>

This search, too, is a legacy of the modern social sciences. While the particular dynamics of Chinese societies within an East Asian context played an important part in calls for indigenization, the phenomenon itself is not just Chinese or East Asian. The cultural commonality produced by the globalization of capital ironically has been accompanied by cultural fragmentation as populations around the world have seemingly discovered in cultural nationalism a means for the preservation and assertion of ethnic, national, or civilizational identities that are threatened by forces of economic and political globalization. The contradictory forces of hegemonic universalism and counter-hegemonic particularism are fundamental to the dynamics of what I have described elsewhere as global modernity, or modernity globalized. The cultural nationalist effort to revitalize traditions as markers of identity, moreover, are no longer simply defensive responses to a Euro-centered hegemonic universalism but are empowered by success in modernity—capitalist modernity—which finds expression in claims to “alternative modernities.” While global modernity represents a negation of an earlier period of Euro-centered modernity, however, it is still haunted by the cultural legacies of Eurocentrism, which continue to claim universal validity as integral constituents of the political economy of capitalism. The redistribution of power that marks global modernity plays out on a terrain that has been

shaped by capitalism, producing the contradictions that are crucial to grasping pervasive cultural fragmentation in the midst of economic and political globalization. This contradiction extends to epistemological questions as well, as our ways of knowing are very much entangled in the cultural contradictions of the age.<sup>51</sup>

The problem, therefore, is not just a Chinese problem but rather the relationship of the social sciences to political power more generally. The question has been raised once again in US anthropology in government efforts to deploy anthropology in the service of state policy, as in Afghanistan. What may be most crucial presently is greater attention to the legacy of the entanglement of the social sciences in political power, albeit with greater attentiveness to forms of knowledge, Chinese and otherwise, that have been marginalized and erased by a hegemonic social science.

## Notes

- 1 The historical account offered below has been culled from available secondary literature in English and Chinese. Especially pertinent are R. David Arkush, *Fei Xiaotong and Sociology in Revolutionary China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981); Chang Hao, *Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Intellectual Transition in China, 1890–1907* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971); Yung-chen Chiang, *Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China, 1919–1949* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: The Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989); Gregory Eliyu Guldin, *The Saga of Anthropology in China: From Malinowski to Moscow to Mao* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Nick Knight, *Li Da and Marxist Philosophy in China* (Oxford: Perseus Books, 1998); Nick Knight, *Marxist Philosophy in China: From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong, 1923–1945* (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Books, 2005); James R. Pusey, *China and Charles Darwin* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983); Benjamin I. Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1964); Y. C. Wang, *Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872–1949* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1966); Philip West, *Yenching University and Sino-Western Relations, 1910–1952* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976); Siu-lun Wong, *Sociology and Socialism in Contemporary China* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979); Zheng Hang-sheng (Hangsheng) 鄭杭生 et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology (Newly Compiled)* (Beijing: China Renmin University Press, 2003) (English version of *Zhongguo shehuixue shi xinbian* 中國社會學史新編 [Beijing: Higher Education Press, 2000]); Han Minghan 韓明謨, *Zhongguo shehuixue shi* 中國社會學史 [History of Chinese sociology] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Press, 1987); Wang Jianmin 王建民, *Zhongguo minzuxue shi* 中國民族學史 [*The History of Ethnology in China*], 2 vols. (Kunming: Yunnan Educational Press, 1997); Yang Yabin 楊雅彬, *Jindai Zhongguo shehuixue* 近代中國社會學 [Modern Chinese sociology], 2 vols. (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2001). The discussion below will not be footnoted unless direct reference is made to any one of these works.
- 2 In the discussion below, dates are provided where available for scholars involved in the development of sociology and anthropology in China.
- 3 Wong Siu-lun, *Sociology and Socialism*, p. 10.
- 4 Zheng Hang-sheng et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology*, p. 95.
- 5 Wong Siu-lun, *Sociology and Socialism*, p. 11.
- 6 Zheng Hang-sheng et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology*, pp. 125–130.
- 7 Ibid., p. 205; Han Minghan, *Zhongguo shehuixue shi*, p. 101.
- 8 Yang Yabin, *Jindai Zhongguo shehuixue*, Vol.2, p. 959.
- 9 Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 511–577 and pp. 742–774.

- 10 Ibid., pp. 816–853, for Lei Jieqiong.
- 11 Zheng Hangsheng et al., *Zhongguo shehuixue shi xin bian*, p. 130.
- 12 Yung-chen Chiang, Introduction to *Social Engineering and the Social Sciences in China*, pp. 1–22.
- 13 Zheng Hang-sheng et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology*, p. 197.
- 14 This was the case, for example, at Duke University, when this author joined the faculty in 1971. It was only in the mid-seventies that the Department of Anthropology was established as a separate department. The first anthropology department in the US was established by Franz Boas in Columbia University in 1896. A department was established in UC-Berkeley in 1901. The University of Chicago Department of Anthropology was not established until 1930, when anthropologists separated from the Department of Sociology.
- 15 Discussed in Wang Jianmin, *Zhongguo minzuxue shi*, Vol. 1, pp. 286–287.
- 16 Ibid., pp. 132–137. For a recent discussion of the relationship between sociology and ethnology, see, Wang Mingming, “The War Between Ethnology and Sociology and Its End: Notes and Remarks from a Chinese Anthropologist,” Paper presented at the conference, “Rethinking Ethnology: A Working Conference Sponsored by *The Journal of Material Culture*,” UCL (University College London), June 2009. I am grateful to Prof. Wang for sharing this paper with me.
- 17 Gregory Guldin, *The Saga of Anthropology in China*, pp. 44–45.
- 18 Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培, “Shuo minzuxue” 說民族學 [On ethnology], *Yiban* 一般 [In general] 1.12 (1926).
- 19 Wang Jianmin, *Zhongguo minzuxue shi*, Vol. 1, p. 186.
- 20 Ibid., pp. 139–144 and 162–166, for the discussion below.
- 21 Owen Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1951), pp. xxiv–xxv.
- 22 Yang Yabin, *Jindai Zhongguo shehuixue*, Vol. 2, p. 665.
- 23 Arif Dirlik, “Theory, History, Culture: Cultural Identity and the Politics of Theory in Twentieth Century China,” *Development and Society* 29.2 (December 2000), pp. 73–104.
- 24 For these debates, see Arif Dirlik, *Revolution and History: Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919–1937*.
- 25 For a discussion of Sun’s ideas, with a critique, see Zheng Hang-sheng et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology*, pp. 203–207.
- 26 According to the accounts of this “movement,” “sinicization” was already in the air in Taiwan in the late seventies, but things really got under way with a conference in 1980 organized by the Institute of Ethnology of the Academia Sinica, “Shehui yu xingwei kexuede Zhongguohua” 社會與行為科學中國化 [The sinicization of social and behavioral sciences]. It was followed up by a conference at the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1983, “Xiandaihua yu Zhongguo wenhua” 現代化與中國文化 [Modernization and Chinese culture], which included Chinese scholars from Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and

the People’s Republic. While the conference was broader in scope, “sinicization” apparently became a hot topic of discussion. The concern reached the United States the same year, when at the Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies in Tempe, Arizona, a round-table discussion was held on the subject of “Sinicization of Sociology: A Collective Portrait of Some American-Trained Chinese Sociologists.” The Institute of Ethnology Conference issued a volume, *Shehui ji xingwei kexue yanjiude Zhongguohua* 社會及行為科學研究的中國化 [Sinicization of research in social and behavioral sciences], edited by Yang Guoshu 楊國樞 and Wen Chongyi 文崇一 (Taipei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan minzuxue yanjiusuo, 1982). American sociologists published their own volume, *Shehuixue Zhongguohua* 社會學中國化 [Sinicization of sociology] (hereafter, *SHXZGH*), edited by Cai Yongmei 蔡勇美 and Xiao Xinhuang 蕭新煌 (Taipei: Juliu tushu gongsi, 1986). that offered Chinese-American sociologists’ take on the issues involved. Cai Yongmei’s introduction to the latter volume gives a personal account of these conferences and publications. For similar concerns for “indigenizing” sociology in Korea, see, Park Myoung-Kyu and Chang Kyung-Sup, “Sociology Between Western Theory and Korean Reality: Accommodation, Tension and a Search for Alternatives,” *International Sociology* 14.2 (June 1999), pp. 139–156.

- 27 Bringing a Chinese voice into scholarship has been a concern in recent years in many disciplines, most prominently in history. The concern in the latter case, however, has been almost exclusively with “historiographical traditions” of high culture. It follows civilizational divides, reminiscent of Orientalist mappings of the world. Orientalism may be a misnomer here or, conversely, be particularly pertinent, because Chinese historians do the same. See, for example, a report on a conference on the crisis of history, “Shixue wang nali zou?” 史學往哪裡走? [Whither history?], in *Jindai Zhongguo* 近代中國 (30 April 1989), pp. 1–14, in which the distinguished historian from Hong Kong, Du Weiyun 杜維運, was the keynote speaker. The speech is devoted exclusively to the accomplishments of historical high culture in China and how its ideals might be reconciled to “Western” historiography. This question has dominated historiographical discussions at conferences in which I have been a participant. It avoids, needless to say, the changes experienced by Chinese populations everywhere. Sociologists, on the other hand, like anthropologists, draw attention to everyday experience in their dealings with the confrontation between theory and culture—which incidentally may have something to say about the classification of disciplines into nomothetic and idiographic categories. The intrusion of disciplines into the discussion of the relationship between culture and history is also an indication of how much things have changed since the 1930s.
- 28 Lin Nan 林南, “Shehuixue Zhongguohua de xiayibu” 社會學中國化的下一步 [The Sinicization of sociology—the next step], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 29–44, on p. 32. This essay was delivered initially at the Tempe meeting.

- 29 Ibid., pp. 32–33.
- 30 Xiao Xinhua, “Shehuixue zai Taiwan” 社會學在台灣 [Sociology in Taiwan], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 271–310, on p. 307.
- 31 Ibid., p. 301.
- 32 Xiao Xinhua and Li Zhefu 李哲夫, “Toushi sanshi nianlai haixia liang’an shehuixuede fazhan” 透視卅年來海峽兩岸社會學的發展 [Looking at the development of sociology on two sides of the Straits in the last thirty years], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 311–328, esp. pp. 315–316.
- 33 In the course of the eighties, as attention turned to Taiwanization, *Zhongguohua* was downplayed, whereas *bentuhua* became more prominent in the thinking of Taiwan social scientists, with a specific focus on Taiwan. I am grateful to Chuang Ya-chung 莊雅仲 for pointing this out to me. Chuang was a graduate student in Taiwan in the late eighties.
- 34 Xiao Xinhua, “Fulu: Lü Mei Zhongguo shehuixue zhe tan shehuixue Zhongguohua” 附錄：旅美中國社會學者談社會學中國化 [Appendix: Chinese sociologists in the US discuss the Sinicization of sociology], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 329–345, on p. 339.
- 35 Xiao Xinhua, “Shehuixue zai Taiwan”; Guo Wenxiong 郭文雄, “Cong shehuixue Zhongguohua guandian kan Zhongguo shaoshu minzu zhengce yu yanjiu” 從社會學中國化觀點看中國少數民族政策與研究 [Viewing Chinese policy and research on minority nationalities from the standpoint of Sinicization], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 151–164; and Zhou Yanling 周顏玲, “Shehuixue Zhongguohua yu funu shehuixue” 社會學中國化與婦女社會學 [Sinicization of sociology and women’s sociology], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 105–134, on pp. 122–123.
- 36 Ma Liqin 馬立秦, “Lun shuli yanjiude Zhongguohua” 論疏離研究的中國化 [Sinicization of research in alienation], in *SHXZGH*, pp. 191–212, on p. 206.
- 37 Ibid., p. 209.
- 38 For discussions of Taiwanization, see John Makeham and A-Chin Hsiau, *Cultural, Ethnic, and Political Nationalism in Contemporary China* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005).
- 39 For an undertaking to this end, see Nan Lin, *Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
- 40 The most important challenge was the Gulbenkian Commission Report composed by Immanuel Wallerstein, *Open the Social Sciences* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1996). While the report stressed the Eurocentrism of the social sciences, it had little to say on challenges to them from outside of Europe. For an example of the latter, see the special issue on the globalization of sociology, *Canadian Journal of Sociology/Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie* 33.3 (2008).
- 41 Islamicization of sociology is discussed in Nilufer Gule, “Snapshots of Islamic Modernities,” *Daedalus* 129.1 (Winter 2000), pp. 91–117, esp. pp. 112–113. See also, Park Myoung-Kyu and Chang Kyung-sup, “Sociology between Western Theory and Korean Reality: Accommodation, Tension, and a Search for Alternatives,” *International Sociology* 14.2 (June 1999), pp. 139–156. Vandana Shiva, Ashis Nandy, and Vine Deloria, Jr. have written extensively on this topic. For representative titles, see Vandana Shiva, *Staying Alive: Women, Ecology and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1989), Ashis Nandy, “History’s Forgotten Doubles,” *History and Theory* 34.2 (1995), pp. 44–66; and Vine Deloria, Jr., *Red Earth, White Lies: Native Americans and the Myth of Scientific Fact* (Golden, CO: Fulcrum Publishing, 1997). For recent discussions of knowledge systems with reference to Pacific studies, see Robert Borofsky, ed., *Remembrance of Pacific Pasts: An Invitation to Remake History* (Honolulu: The University of Hawai‘i Press, 2000). For ethnomathematics, see, Elizabeth Greene, “Ethnomathematics: A Step Toward Peace?” *Dialogue* (Duke University) 15.9 (20 October 2000), pp. 4–5. For foundations, see Jacob Heilbrunn, “The News From Everywhere: Does Global Thinking Threaten Local Knowledge? The Social Science Research Council Debates the Future of Area Studies,” *Lingua Franca* (May/June 1996), pp. 49–56. Ashis Nandy and Vine Deloria, Jr. have been distinguished speakers at the Duke University Pivotal Ideas series in spring 2000 and spring 2001, respectively. For a discussion of these challenges in relation to modernity, see Arif Dirlik, “Reading Ashis Nandy: The Return of the Past or Modernity With a Vengeance,” in Arif Dirlik, *Postmodernity’s Histories: The Past as Legacy and Project* (Boulder, CO: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000), pp. 119–141.
- 42 Zheng Hang-sheng et al., *A History of Chinese Sociology*, pp. 446. In the Chinese text, the term used for indigenization in this context is *bentuhua*.
- 43 Ibid., p. 447.
- 44 Indeed, Zheng Hangsheng has undertaken this task in a later work, *Jiansuo daijia yu zengcu jinbu: shehuixue ji qi shengceng linian* 減縮代價與增促進步：社會學及其深層理念 [Cut the cost and speed up progress: Toward a layered reading of sociology] (Beijing: Beijing shifan daxue chubanshe, 2007). This work also includes detailed discussions of problems in sociology, including the transformation of theory by bringing into it legacies of the past, experiences of the present, and social ideals for the future.
- 45 Some histories of sociology in China, anxious to stress professional sociology, downplay the importance of Marxism in the origins of Chinese sociology. It is noteworthy that whether or not it is so named, Marxism also has been an integral part of the development of sociology in Europe and North America.
- 46 On this important question, which involves nations within nations, see Wang Mingming 王銘銘, “Xixue ‘Zhongguohua’ de lishi kunjing—yi renleixue wei zhongxinde sikao” 西學中國化的歷史困境——以人類學維中新的思考 [Challenges of “Sinicizing” Western learning—the perspective of anthropology], in Qiao Jian 喬健 et al. ed., *Ershiyi shiji de Zhongguo shehuixue yu renleixue* 二十一世紀的中國社會學與人類學 (Gaoxiong, Taiwan: Li Wen Cultural Publishing Co., 2001) and Wang Jianmin, “Xueke shijixing

- yu bentuxing: Cong Zhongguo minzuxueshi shuoqi” 學科世界性與本土性：從中國民族學史說起 [Cosmopolitanism and indigeneity in the disciplines: From the perspective of the history of ethnology in China], paper presented at the conference, “Formation and Development of Academic Disciplines in 20th-Century China: Second Workshop,” Central Nationalities University, Beijing, 29 October–1 November 2008. Cited with the author’s permission.
- 47 For a recent discussion, see, David Paul Haney, *The Americanization of Social Science: Intellectuals and Public Responsibility in the Postwar United States* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008). This very illuminating account of the emergence of an “American” version of social science nevertheless leaves unclear, perhaps intentionally, whether “Americanization” refers to the preoccupation with science, or the more recent concern with the public responsibility of the social sciences. See also below the reference to the work of Michael Burawoy.
- 48 For further discussion, see Arif Dirlik, “Globalization, Indigenism, and the Politics of Place,” *Ariel* 34.1 (January 2003) [actually published in 2005], pp. 15–29.
- 49 See Tan Chee-Beng, *Chinese Overseas: Comparative Cultural Issues* (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004).
- 50 The social sciences have been driven since their origins in the 19th century by conflicting impulses of order and radical change, which also imply different relationships to the state and to structures of power in society. The social sciences, moreover, are internally differentiated. The US sociologist Michael Burawoy in a recent presidential address to the American Sociological Association divides sociological practice into policy, public, professional, and critical work. The first two areas, Burawoy, notes, all along have been shaped by national circumstances. The discussion suffers from a fetishization of professional work, unfortunately, and says little about the interactions of these various practices and their impact on theoretical development and division. He also has little to say about sociological work in tricontinental societies that have been subjected to Euro/American domination, or about the implications for sociological work of different ways of knowing—disciplinary or cultural. The discussion is revealing nevertheless for pointing to the internal complexities of the social sciences and their entanglement in politics within and without the discipline, which should be a point of departure for any consideration of indigenization. See Michael Burawoy, “For Public Sociology,” *American Sociological Review* 70 (February 2005), pp. 4–28.
- 51 The necessity of “globalizing” the social sciences is increasingly recognized by social scientists in North America and Europe, although how to reconcile cultural difference with universal “scientific” goals remains a problem. For examples, see Immanuel Wallerstein, *Open the Social Sciences*; several articles by Michael Burawoy, including “Third-Wave Sociology and the End of Pure Science,” *The American Sociologist* (Fall/Winter 2005), pp. 152–165, “A

Sociology for the Second Great Transformation?” *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000), pp. 693–695, “What is to be Done?: Theses on the Degradation of Social Existence in a Globalizing World,” *Current Sociology* 56.3 (2008), pp. 351–359, and “Rejoinder: For a Subaltern Global Sociology?” *Current Sociology* 56.3 (2008), pp. 435–444; and Dimitri Della Faille and Neil McLaughlin, “Sociology’s Global Challenge,” in a special issue of *Canadian Journal of Sociology/ Cahiers Canadiens de Sociologie* 33.3 (2008), pp. 485–495. Anthropologists, closer to the people they study and less nomothetically inclined, have been discussing similar problems since the 1960s. See the seminal volume edited by Talal Asad, *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* (New York: Humanities Press, 1973).