Grunfeld, Tom A. “Reassessing Tibet Policy.”  FPIF. Vol 5, No. 9. April  2000.


                                   Historical Background Handout

                              excerpt from “Reassessing Tibet Policy”

                                        Volume 5, Number 9
                                            April 2000

Written by A. Tom Grunfeld, Empire State College
Editors: Tom Barry (IRC) and Martha Honey (IPS)

Key Points
  * Tibet and China have been intertwined since the 7th century in one form or another.
  * The Dalai Lama, now almost 65 years old, feels the pressure of time in his hopes to preserve
Tibetan culture in his lifetime, making talks with Beijing and a compromise solution urgent.
  * U.S. policy works against a solution to this dilemma because of its unrealistic portrayal of
China.

The flight of the 17th Karmapa Lama from Tibet to India on the eve of the millenium catapulted
Tibet back into world headlines. This has created an opportunity for both China and the U.S. to
reassess their policies toward Tibet.

Tibet’s status has been intertwined with China since the 7th century through marriages, wars, and
treaties. Mongol conquests in the 13th century made Tibet part of a Mongol-ruled Chinese state, and
four centuries later the ethnic Manchu Q’ing dynasty further incorporated Tibet into China. In 1912
the 13th Dalai Lama unilaterally declared independence but two years later indicated his
willingness to sign a treaty granting Chinese “suzerainty” over both “Inner Tibet” and “Outer
Tibet,” establishing direct rule over the former and leaving the latter autonomous. When the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) reestablished strong central government in 1949, Tibet was regarded
as politically “integral” with China but in fact so autonomous that Beijing insisted on an
incorporation “treaty” to preempt any claims of independence. Yet the CCP refrained from stamping
out feudalism and theocratic rule. Twice in the 1950s, Mao Zedong assured the Dalai Lama that China
would make no further inroads against de facto Tibetan autonomy. This policy, however, applied only
to Outer Tibet, which was later renamed the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR). Other ethnic Tibetan
areas, known as Amdo and Kham (Inner Tibet), underwent political transformation.

This process of integration sparked rebellion, and minor insurrections in Kham/Sichuan turned into
open revolt by 1956. Support soon came from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which was
eager to destabilize the communist government. China’s suppression of a 1959 revolt forced the
Dalai Lama and 50-60,000 Tibetans into exile. Beijing then subjected the TAR to political and
social integration, ending Lhasa’s autonomous rule. During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards,
both Chinese and Tibetan, engaged in wholesale destruction of almost every religious building in
Tibet, paralleling antireligious campaigns throughout China. From exile, the Dalai Lama oversaw
refugee resettlement and guerrilla warfare—although he officially renounced all violence. CIA
support encouraged insurgent Tibetans to continue their war for independence, but the CIA was more
interested in harassing communist China than in promoting Tibetan independence. Following the 1971
visit to Beijing by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the U.S. cut off its support to the Tibetan
resistance. The Tibetan rebellion quickly dissipated; after 15 years, the Tibetans had been unable
to create a sustainable, freestanding military force.

By the late 1970s, China began relaxing its grip on Tibet. In 1978 the Panchen Lama was released
from detention, and he began championing the preservation of Tibetan culture. A new round of Dalai
Lama-Beijing contacts resulted in several Tibetan-exile delegations visiting Tibet. After these
talks faltered in the 1980s, the Dalai Lama decided to promote his cause internationally, believing
that increased foreign pressure generated by his “Tibet Lobby” would force Beijing to renew serious
negotiations. Rising international attention and continued unrest in Tibet sparked a policy debate
within China. The moderates argued for more freedom for Tibetan cultural practices and the return
of the Dalai Lama, while the hard-liners (many of them Tibetan governmental and party officials)
urged ending ties to the Dalai Lama and repressing all expressions of Tibetan nationalism.

After the Panchen Lama’s sudden death in January 1989, the Dalai Lama was invited for religious
funerary ceremonies in Beijing. Even though he was assured that there would be an opportunity for
direct high-level talks, the Dalai Lama declined the invitation after his advisers objected to the
continuing prohibition against his visiting Lhasa and pointed out that the international campaign
was giving his cause increasing prominence. The decision not to go to Beijing and renew direct
negotiations was probably the gravest error of his political life. He did, however, agree in 1992
with the Chinese leadership to recognize a 7-year-old boy from a nomad family as the reincarnation
of the Karmapa Lama, and there was the suggestion that the Dalai Lama could assist in searching for
the next Panchen Lama. But tensions escalated again in 1995 when the Dalai Lama (without first
consulting Beijing) announced that a boy had been selected as the 11th Panchen Lama. The designee
and his family were arrested, and Beijing enthroned its own candidate. Since then there has been no
progress in Chinese-Dalai Lama relations.

U.S. policy has done little to help resolve the Tibet issue. Washington’s policy ignores Tibet’s
complex history, is driven by domestic politics, and is inherently contradictory. While officially
recognizing Tibet as part of China, the U.S. Congress and White House unofficially encourage the
campaign for independence.


http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vol5/v5n09tibet.html