**Experimentální filosofie svobodné vůle**

**Prezentace:** <http://prezi.com/qwzeotxddw3d/?utm_campaign=share&utm_medium=copy&rc=ex0share>

**Literatura (pro zájemce o doplnění informací):**

**Apriorní přístup ke svobodné vůli a morální zodpovědnosti:**

* FISCHER, J. M., et al. (2007). *Four Views on Free Will*. Malden (MA): Blackwell Publishing, 2007.
* FRANKFURT, H. G. (1969). Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility. *The Journal of Philosophy*. 1969, vol. 66, no. 23, s. 829–839 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2023833>.
* LYCAN, W. G. (2003). Free Will and the Burden of Proof. In O'HEAR, A. (Ed). *Minds and Persons*. Cambridge (UK): CUP, 2003, s. 107–122 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné také z WWW: <http://people.nnu.edu/ktimpe/research/China/Lycan.pdf>.

**X-phi:**

* FELTZ, A. & COKELY, E. T. (2009). Do Judgments about Freedom and Responsibility Depend on WhoYou Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions about Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. *Consciousness and Cognition*. 2009, vol. 18, no. 1, s. 342–350 [cit. 2013-0504]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2008.08.001>.
* MANDELBAUM, E. & RIPLEY, D. (2012). Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis. *The Review of Philosophy and Psychology*. 2012, vol. 3, no. 3, s. 351–368 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13164-012-0106-3>.
* NAHMIAS, E. (2006). Folk Fears about Freedom and Responsibility: Determinism vs. Reductionism. *Journal of Cognition and Culture*. 2006, vol. 6, no. 1-2, s. 215–237 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853706776931295>.
* NAHMIAS, E., et al. (2005). Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about Free Will and Moral Responsibility. *Philosophical Psychology*. 2005, vol. 18, no. 5, s. 561–584 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515080500264180>.
* NICHOLS, S. & KNOBE, J. (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. *Noûs*. 2007, vol. 41, no. 4, s. 663–685 [cit. 2013‑05‑04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00666.x>.
* SOMMERS, T. (forthcoming). Free Will and Experimental Philosophy: An Intervention [online]. (forthcoming), In CLAUSEN, J. & LEVY, N. (Eds.). *Springer* *Handbook of Neuroethics.* forthcoming [cit. 2014-08-31]. Dostupné také z WWW: <https://www.academia.edu/2127600/Free_Will_and_Experimental_Philosophy_An_Intervention>.
* WEIGEL, C. (2011). Distance, Anger, Freedom: An Account of the Role of Abstraction in Compatibilist and Incompatibilist Intuitions. *Philosophical Psychology*. 2011, vol. 24, no. 6, s. 803–823 [cit. 2013-05-04]. Dostupné z WWW: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2011.562640>.