

1. primární informace

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Evil Genius? How Dishonesty Can Lead to Greater Creativity

Abstract

We propose that dishonest and creative behavior have something in common: They both involve breaking rules. Because of this shared feature, creativity may lead to dishonesty (as shown in prior work), and dishonesty may lead to creativity (the hypothesis we tested in this research). In five experiments, participants had the opportunity to behave dishonestly by overreporting their performance on various tasks. They then completed one or more tasks designed to measure creativity. Those who cheated were subsequently more creative than noncheaters, even when we accounted for individual differences in their creative ability (Experiment 1). Using random assignment, we confirmed that acting dishonestly leads to greater creativity in subsequent tasks (Experiments 2 and 3). The link between dishonesty and creativity is explained by a heightened feeling of being unconstrained by rules, as indicated by both mediation (Experiment 4) and moderation (Experiment 5).

Researchers across disciplines have become increasingly interested in understanding why even people who care about morality predictably cross ethical boundaries. This heightened interest in unethical behavior, defined as acts that violate widely held moral rules or norms of appropriate conduct ([Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006](#)), is easily understood. Unethical behavior creates trillions of dollars in financial losses every year and is becoming increasingly commonplace ([PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011](#)).

One form of unethical behavior, dishonesty, seems especially pervasive ([Bazerman & Gino, 2012](#)). Like other forms of unethical behavior, dishonesty involves breaking a rule—the social principle that people should tell the truth. Much of the scholarly attention devoted to understanding why individuals behave unethically has therefore focused on the factors that lead people to break rules.

Although rule breaking carries a negative connotation in the domain of ethics, it carries a positive connotation in another well-researched domain: creativity. To be creative, it is often said, one must “think outside the box” and use divergent thinking ([Guilford, 1967](#); [Runco, 2010](#); [Simonton, 1999](#)). Divergent thinking requires that people break some (but not all) rules within a domain to construct associations between previously unassociated cognitive elements ([Bailin, 1987](#); [Guilford, 1950](#)). The resulting unusual mental associations serve as the basis for novel ideas ([Langley & Jones, 1988](#); [Sternberg, 1988](#)). The creative process therefore involves rule breaking, as one must break rules to take advantage of existing opportunities or to create new ones ([Brenkert, 2009](#)). Thus, scholars have asserted that organizations may foster creativity by hiring people slow to learn the organizational code ([Sutton, 2001, 2002](#)) and by encouraging people to break from accepted practices ([Winslow & Solomon, 1993](#)) or to break rules ([Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 2008](#); [Kelley & Littman, 2001](#)).

Given that both dishonesty and creativity involve rule breaking, the individuals most likely to behave dishonestly and the individuals most likely to be creative may be one and the same. Indeed, highly creative people are more likely than less creative people to bend rules or break laws ([Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2003](#); [Sternberg & Lubart, 1995](#); [Sulloway, 1996](#)). Popular tales are replete with images of “evil geniuses,” such as Rotwang in *Metropolis* and “Lex” Luthor in *Superman*, who are both creative and nefarious in their attempts to ruin humanity. Similarly, news articles have applied the “evil genius” moniker to Bernard Madoff, who made \$20 billion disappear using a creative Ponzi scheme.

The causal relationship between creativity and unethical behavior may take two possible forms. The creative process may trigger dishonesty; alternatively, acting unethically may enhance creativity. Research has demonstrated that enhancing the motivation to think outside the box can drive people toward more dishonest decisions ([Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013](#); [Gino & Ariely, 2012](#)). But could acting dishonestly enhance creativity in subsequent tasks?

In five experiments, we obtained the first empirical evidence that behaving dishonestly can spur creativity and examined the psychological mechanism explaining this link. We suggest that after behaving dishonestly, people feel less constrained by rules, and are thus more likely to act creatively by constructing associations between previously unassociated cognitive elements.

General Discussion

There is little doubt that dishonesty creates costs for society. It is less clear whether it produces any positive consequences. This research identified one such positive consequence, demonstrating that people may become more creative after behaving dishonestly because acting dishonestly leaves them feeling less constrained by rules.

By identifying potential consequences of acting dishonestly, these findings complement existing research on behavioral ethics and moral psychology, which has focused primarily on identifying the antecedents to unethical behavior ([Bazerman & Gino, 2012](#)). These findings also advance understanding of creative behavior by showing that feeling unconstrained by rules enhances creative sparks. More speculatively, our research raises the possibility that one of the reasons why dishonesty is so widespread in today’s society is that by acting dishonestly, people become more creative, which allows them to come up with more creative justifications for their immoral behavior and therefore makes them more likely to behave dishonestly ([Gino & Ariely, 2012](#)), which may make them more creative, and so on.

In sum, this research shows that the sentiment expressed in the common saying “rules are meant to be broken” is at the root of both creative performance and dishonest behavior. It also provides new evidence that dishonesty may therefore lead people to become more creative in their subsequent endeavors.

2. Původní informace x citovaná informace

-Citováno ([Winslow & Solomon, 1993](#)): Thus, scholars have asserted that organizations may foster creativity by hiring people slow to learn the organizational code ([Sutton, 2001, 2002](#)) and **by encouraging people to break from accepted practices** ([Winslow & Solomon, 1993](#)) or to break rules ([Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 2008](#); [Kelley & Littman, 2001](#)).

-Původně: “In their role as architects and pioneers, entrepreneurs **aid others to jump the hurdle of a paradigm shift** and introduce innovative products and services for the betterment of the economy and the well being of society.”

-Citováno ([Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 2008](#)): Thus, scholars have asserted that organizations may foster creativity by hiring people slow to learn the organizational code ([Sutton, 2001, 2002](#)) and by encouraging people to break from accepted practices ([Winslow & Solomon, 1993](#)) or to break rules ([Baucus, Norton, Baucus, & Human, 2008](#); [Kelley & Littman, 2001](#)).

-Původně: “We identify four categories of behavior proffered as a mens for fostering creativity that raise serious ethical issues: (1) **breaking rules and standard operating procedures**;...”

-Citováno ([Guilford, 1967](#); [Runco, 2010](#); [Simonton, 1999](#)): To be creative, it is often said, one must “think outside the box” and use divergent thinking.

-Původně: ([Runco, 2010](#)) “Divergent thinking is often tied to the potential for creative thought. It is, however, often misunderstood. It is not a kind of creativity but merely a cognitive process that sometimes leads to creative ideas.”

3. Srovnání s původním zdrojem informací

V první citaci autorů Winslawa a Solomona, mi připadají výrazy v možném překladu “prolomit přijaté postupy” a “přeskočit překážku paradigmatu a změnit jej” významově odlišné, v původním textu bylo paradiigma označeno za překážku, což možná vyzní lehce jinak, emočně zabarveněji.

Ve druhém srovnání citací byl text autorů v původním znění “prolomit pravidla a standartní operační postupy” zredukován na “prolomit pravidla”, což už není tak přesné a popisné. V tomto případě byl návrat k původnímu zdroji cenný, jelikož z něj byl zřetelnější kontext myšlenky, autoři mají vytvořenou typologii o čtyřech kategorích, které spolu souvisí a navazují.

Třetí zmíněná citace z textu Runca o divergentním myšlení mi připadá již lehce zavádějící. Je zde podán fakt, že k tomu, aby byl člověk kreativní, musí používat divergentní myšlení. Autor přitom v původním textu tvrdí, že divergentní myšlení je pouze složkou kognitivního procesu a že někdy může vést ke kreativním myšlenkám.

4. Popularizační článek

Evil Genius? How Dishonesty Can Lead to Greater Creativity

Dvojice autorů F. Gino a S. S. Wiltermuth se ve své studii zabývá vztahem mezi nepoctivostí ve smyslu nedodržování pravidel a mírou kreativity. Již z předchozího výzkumu vyplývá, že mají podobné rysy, jde o jisté porušení, překročení pravidel k vytvoření prostoru pro kreativitu, nové nápady a možnosti řešení, které jsou nad rámec zaběhnutých postupů práce a zvyklostí. Kreativita může vést k takovéto nepoctivosti. Studie však ověruje, zda je možná i opačná kauzalita, tedy: Může nepoctivost vést k větší kreativitě?

Proběhlo 5 experimentů, v nichž participanti měli možnost chovat se nečestně v zájmu jejich lepších výkonů v zadaných úkolech, za které byli finančně odměňováni. Poté se na základě dalších testů měřila míra jejich kreativity. Ti, kteří podváděli, byli následně kreativnější než ti čestní. Při vyhodnocování měření byl brán ohled na jejich tvůrčí schopnosti a individuální rozdíly, které byly zjištěny při prvním experimentu "Podvodníci jsou kreativní" (153 participantů, průměrný věk 30 let, SD=7; metody: Duncker candle problem, 2-min filler task, problem-solving task, Remote Association Task RAT). Téměř 59% účastníků podvádělo při úkolu řešení problémů a výsledky prokázaly, že ti, co podváděli, dosahovali vyššího skóru kreativity.

Ve druhém experimentu "Skutek podvádění zvyšuje kreativitu" (101 studentů, průměrný věk 21 let, SD=7; počítačová, matematická a logická hra, při níž byli účastníci manipulováni k podvádění). Poté byla opět změřena míra kreativity testem RAT. Výsledky opět potvrdily, že nepoctivý akt účastníka zvýšil v následujícím úkolu jeho kreativitu. Ve třetím experimentu "Porušení pravidel s a bez etických důsledků" (129 účastníků, prům. věk 28, SD=8) se potvrdil předpoklad, že porušování pravidel i přes vědomí etického důsledku povede k ještě vyšší kreativitě než porušení pravidel bez etických důsledků.

Čtvrtý experiment „Pocit nesvázanosti pravidly“ (178 participantů, prům. věk 29, SD=8) byl proveden metodou coin-toss task, kdy je podvádění i čestné chování kognitivně přibližně stejně náročné. Tím byla ošetřena možnost, že emoce částečně vysvětlují efekt nečestnosti a kreativity. Pátý experiment „Dokázání mediace prostřednictvím moderace“ (208 účastníků, prům. věk 22, SD=3; die-throwing game, Memory game, metoda moderace) dokázal, že porušování pravidel podporuje kreativní chování jen v případech, kdy je toto podvádění transparentní.

Souvislost mezi nepočitostí a kreativitou byla vysvětlena zvýšeným pocitem nespoutanosti pravidly. Tento pocit lidé získají porušením pravidel a následný nedostatek zábran pak způsobí jejich kreativnější chování.

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