Pictures and Photographs
Author(s): H. Gene Blocker
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Winter, 1977), pp. 155-
162
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H. GENE BLOCKER
Pictures and Photographs
THERE IS NO established tradition or discipline
of film aesthetics, as there is for theater
or painting. But opinions are beginning to
coalesce along the lines of several important
contemporary debates out of which an aesthetics
of the film may soon emerge. The
most important of these concerns the question
of film realism. Spokesmen for cinematic
realism include some of the best
known figures in film criticism: Panofsky,
Bazin, Kracauer,and more recently, Stanley
Cavell.
According to these writers, the most striking
feature of film, and that which differentiates
it most dramatically from other art
forms, is its complete realism, the neutral
objectivity of the film representation of reality.
Other arts attempt to represent reality
accurately, but they are limited by the necessity
of an indirect representation of the
world through the intermediary of a subjective
point of view and an artistic medium
which transform the object and thereby distort
its true, objective character. In other
art forms, then, we never get the object itself,
but only the object as perceived by the
artist and as it emerges through the artistic
medium of word, line, texture, color, etc.
Film, on the other hand, according to this
view, presents us with the object itself. As
Panofsky says,
The processes of all the earlier representational
arts start from an idealistic conception of the
world. These arts start from an idea to be projected
into matter and not with objects in the
physical world. The cinema . ... , on the other
H. GENE BLOCKER is professor of philosophy at
Ohio University.
hand, organizes material things and persons into
a composition that receives its style, not so much
by an interpretation in the artist's mind, but by
the actual manipulation of physical objects. The
medium of the movies is reality as such.l
Bazin says of still photographs that "in
spite of any objections the critical spirit
may offer, we are forced to accept as real
the existence of the object reproduced, actually
re-presented."2 According to Bazin,
what we see in a photograph is a piece of
reality which took place in the past, hence
"re-presented,"and which is and is understood
to be part of the larger context of the
actual world as it was at that point in time.
And finally, the most widely discussed filn
theorist today, Kracauer, says that "film . . .
is uniquely equipped to record and reveal
physical reality and, hence, gravitates toward
it; ... it must always be kept in mind
that the most creative film maker is much
less independent of nature in the raw than
the painter or poet; that his creativity manifests
itself in letting nature in and penetrating
it." 3
Cavell takes as his point of departure his
basic agreement with Panofsky and Bazin
that the medium of the movies is physical
reality itself. This, then, is one side of the
contemporary debate, stressing the objectivity
of film and playing down subjective
interference. The other side is represented
by Rudolf Arnheim and, more recently,
Lincoln Johnson,4 who argue that film is
like the other arts in conveying a sense of
reality only indirectly through the interference
of subjective point of view and artistic
medium. This largely philosophical debate
BLOCKER
is given a certain urgency by the intense
controversy going on in film circles today, as
between Kracauer enthusiasts and Jordan
Belson. In what follows I will argue that the
Arnheim-Johnson side of the debate is more
nearly correct than the Cavell-PanofskyBazin
side. Several years ago I argued that
Goodman erred in exaggerating the role of
conventional rules in artistic representation;
here I find Cavell erring in the opposite
direction, underestimating the role of cinematic
convention.
I will begin by briefly sketching Cavell's
position in The World Viewed. He agrees
with Panofsky's claim that the medium of
film is physical reality, proof of which includes
the fact that in remembering films we
remember the objects depicted therein. Of
course, as he points out, we are not literally
presented with physical objects, but only
with photographs of physical objects. Still,
Cavell argues,when we analyze carefully the
relation of photo to physical object we cannot
find any intermediary, such as "sense
data"or "likeness,"through which the photo
presents the object. This, Cavell argues, is
how film differs from painting. A painting
of a dog presents us with a likeness of a dog,
rather than the dog itself, while "a photograph
does not present us with 'likenesses'of
things; it presents us, we want to say, with
the things themselves." 5
Borrowing a line from Wittgenstein's and
Austin's analysis of emotion as embodied
in, rather than associated with, emotional
expression, Cavell argues that whatever middleman
we try to place between the photo
and the physical object will fail because the
connection between them is too close there
is no gap between them large enough
to fit any intermediary, such as "sight" or
"sense data." In the case of sound, on the
other hand, we do have a possible intermediary.
We say, for example, that we hear the
"sound" of a train. So a recording would
present the sound of a train, rather than the
train itself. But the analogy won't work,
Cavell says,in the case of vision. I don't see
a sight of an object; I see the object. Therefore,
it makes no more sense to say that in
looking at a photograph I see a sight of an
object. Where we do speak of "sights" in
ordinary English, sights are physical objects,
though very large ones, like the Grand Canyon.
"Objects don't make sights, or have
sights. I feel like saying: Objects are too
close to their sights to give them up for reproducing;
in order to reproduce the sights
. .. you have to reproduce them." 6 Those
familiar with Cavell's doctoral dissertation
(Harvard, 1961)will recall his analysis there
of the similar argument of Wittgenstein concerning
symptoms and criteria of emotion in
The Blue and Brown Books which Austin
later employed in distinguishing anger from
signs of anger in "Other Minds." Even
Bazin's suggestion of the photo as a "mold"
is not direct enough, for this analogy implies
"clear procedures for getting rid of their
originals, whereas in a photograph, the original
is still as present as it ever was." 7 Anything
standing in the way of or being substituted
for the object, simply will not do.
Photographs escape subjectivity, then,
and the reason they do is that they are made
mechanically, or as Cavell says, "automatically."
It is this, Cavell argues, which frees
us at long last from subjectivity in the artistic
representation of the world.
So far as photography satisfied a wish, it satisfied
a wish not confined to painters, but the
human wish, intensifying in the West since the
Reformation, to escape subjectivity and metaphysical
isolation-a wish for the power to reach the
world.s
By "automatism" Cavell means that the
photographic image is not "hand-made,"9
but mechanically produced through the
causal interaction of light and the physical
properties of the object, along with the
physico-chemical properties of the camera
and the film. The reason a photograph is a
photograph of Ian Smith rather than John
Vorsteris that Smith rather than Vorsterwas
part of a causal chain which produced the
photograph. The light waves which entered
the lens and chemically interacted with the
film were light waves reflected off of Smith
and not Vorster. Later I will refer to this as
the causal criterion of "is a photograph of."
As Cavell puts it, "Photography overcame
subjectivity in a way undreamed of by painting,
... by automatism, by removing the human
agent from the taskof reproduction." 10
156
Pictures and Photographs
Again, Cavell does not mean that a photo
of a dog is a dog. He means that when we
describe what it is a photo of, the best we
can come up with is the name for the object
itself. The photo differs from what it is of
in two ways: in our absence from it (traditionally
known as aesthetic "distance") and
in the absence of the "existence" of the object
in the photograph. Concerning the first
point, Cavell writes,
One could . .. say that photography was never in
competition with painting. What happened was
that at some point the quest for visual reality ...
split apart. To maintain conviction in our connection
with reality, to maintain our presentness,
painting accepts the recession of the world.
Photography maintains the presentness of the
world by accepting our absence from it. The
reality in a photograph is present to me while
I am not present to it; and a world ... to which
I am . . . not present . . . is a world past."
A painting is subjectively biased, and so we
are present to the painting to the extent that
these biases are our own. A photograph is
objectively realistic though we are not ourselves
present before the object at the moment
the picture was taken. Indeed, these
objects may have radically altered or even
ceased to exist.
The second point, concerning "existence,"
is closely related. "That the projected world
does not exist (now) is its only difference
from reality. (There is no feature, or set of
features, in which it differs. Existence is not
a predicate.)" 12
Again, those familiar with
Cavell's dissertation will recognize the language.
In talking about Wittgensteinian criteria
of emotion, Cavell argued earlier that
even where the person was acting or faking,
we would have no other way to describe his
behavior than in terms of the emotion in
question. The only difference between genuine
and faked emotion, he argued, is one of
existence. In meaning, or essence they are
identical. So, in the case of a photograph.
When asked to say what it is a photo of, we
cannot do better than, "Ian Smith." And the
only difference between this Smith and the
one now conferring with colleagues in Salisbury
is that only the latter "exists." By these
two criteria Cavell comes very close to Plato's
famous analogy of art to a mirror image.
157
The fact that we know it's a mirror image
distances us from the object represented
which is just like its mirror image except
that it alone exists beyond the mirror.
A kind of proof for this which Cavell
offers is that the representational content of
a painting, but not a photograph, ends at
the edges of its frame and goes no deeper
than the background actually-shown. The
painted scene is not perceived as part of a
larger world, while a photograph is always
seen as a piece of a larger reality lifted out
of context.
You can always ask, pointing to an object in a
photograph-a building, say-what lies behind
it, totally obscured by it. This only accidentally
makes sense when asked of an object in a painting.
You can always ask, of an area photographed,
what lies adjacent to that area, beyond
the frame. This generally makes no sense asked
of a painting.'3
The great power of photography, and
more so of cinema, is therefore that it allows
the objects in the world to speak for themselves,
rather than be manipulated by the
artist in the artistic medium to say what the
artist wants them to say. It is a possibility
of the cinematic medium, Cavell says,"to let
the world happen, to let its parts draw attention
to themselves according to their natural
weight." 14
Looking firstat Cavell's arguments, before
proceeding to a more general diagnosis of
this realist posture, Cavell seems to me to
fail to draw the distinction he wants between
painting and photography. Many of the
considerations he raises turn on the fact,
which I fully accept, that we describe
the content of photographs in our ordinary
physical object language. But this is not
due, as Cavell supposes, to anything peculiar
to photographs, but to the general economy
of a natural language in describing all representational
content - whether in paintings,
stories, movies, or photographs. By a kind of
linguistic Occam's Razor, we don't invent a
new language for every occasion but extend
the object language we have to new situations,
in a way which is usually so widely
accepted as to avoid misunderstanding. But
this holds for our description of all representational
arts. The story of Hansel and
BLOCKER
Gretel is about a boy and his sister; Picasso's
Weeping Woman is about a weeping woman,
etc.
So Cavell's argument that photos are
unique in being immediately of objects,
rather than sights, likenesses or sense data is
off the track. Picasso'spainting is not of the
sight of a weeping woman, but simply of a
weeping woman. This provides a better explanation
for the fact Cavell alludes to that
we remember films in terms of the objects
depicted. We tend to remember things generally
as we are able to describe them (we
remember very little, for example, of our
lives before we learned to talk). So we describe
all the representational arts, whether
presently before us or in recollection, in the
ordinary object language because that is all
most of us have. But we do the same with
paintings and stories. "Surely you remember
Night Cafe, a bartender standing near
a pool table in the center of a cafe, with
small groups of customers slumped over
tables along the sides." "You know, the
Hemingway story about an old fisherman
who finally lands the big one he has dreamed
about only to be eaten by sharks,etc."
Photographs most certainly do not escape
subjectivity. Less so do movies. We cannot
look at Civil War photographs or 1930s
Hollywood movies without being struck
with the overwhelming sense of period style.
The same is becoming true of the backlighting
and the stop-action cliches of the 1960s
(The Knack, for example, or early Beatles'
films, such as Hard Day's Night). Indeed,
it is precisely to capture this photographic
style which has inspired many of the "New"
or "Photo Realist" painters, such as Goings,
Mahaffey, and Estes. Bert Stern's Marilyn
Monroe, 1968,is an interesting example of a
photograph which captures a photographic
style popular in the 1950s. And many of our
popular movies of the mid-seventies capitalize
and exploit the period style of earlier
movies.
Through the selection of subject, angle,
amount, and direction of light, background,
sharpnessof focus, and light-dark contrast in
all these ways the photographer represents
the object from a subjective point of view,
expressive of feeling and mood. The photographic
subject can indeed be made to say
whatever the photographer wants it to say.
Nilsson's Scissors, for example, is organic,
which the real pair of scissorswas not. Not to
mention the case most damaging to Cavell's
objectivist thesis, that of radically nonrepresentational
art photography in which it is
impossible even to identify the real object,
as in Minor White's Birdlime and Surf and
the recent films of Jordan Belson, who says
of his work,
My camera is an inner camera which doesn't do
very well when it points out at external reality.
I'm trying to focus on something, bring it back
alive from the uncharted areas of the inner
image, inner space.15
At the extreme end of nonrepresentational
cinema are experimental films, like George
Semsel's Film Infinity, in which the image
has been punched, scratched, or painted on
film which was never placed in a camera.
Nor is there any difference I can see between
painting and photography concerning
the presumed world beyond the edges
and behind the presented object. In Raphael's
painting of the Holy Family in The
Alba Madonna, there is a clear presumption
that the pastoral scene continues beyond the
edges of the painting, that what we see is
part of a broader landscape of the same kind.
Just asclearly the painting excludes a stretch
of the Chicago "El" rising a few feet off to
the left of young John the Baptist. Picasso's
Weeping Woman is similarly understood to
be in a room. This is precisely why the background
is presented as it is; enough is indicated
to suggest the broader setting not
shown but clearly represented and highly
important for the representational and expressive
meaning of the work - a feeling of
calm and repose in the Raphael and a sense
of privacy and withdrawal in the Picasso.
Anything in the Picasso painting which suggested
that the scene takes place in a grouptherapy
session would spoil its effect (but,
like the Holy Family under the "El," might
create another effect, one perhaps of irony).
What I think Cavell is really getting at is
that some photographs do invite us to explore
objects in much the same way we visually
explore real objects, discovering for our-
158
Pictures and Photographs
selves their peculiar thingness. But this is a
style of photography which happens to have
been popular a few years ago, not the abandonment
of artistic style. It is an artistic
rejection of one convention of photography
(the "arty"photography of the '40s and '50s,
e.g., Nilsson) and an endorsement of another
conception of photography (the New Realism).
It is therefore an artistic statement
about thinghood, not a subjective withdrawal
to let the things speak for themselves.
This kind of statement can also be made
in paintings (Diirer, Chuck Close, Richard
McLean, Alan Turner, Noel Mahaffey,Richard
Estes, Ralph Goings) and in stories
(Butor, Robbe-Grillet). There are degrees
of realism and abstraction in all the representational
arts. Some photographs are almost
totally abstract (White's Birdlime and
Surf, and Kevin Kampman's Old Man's
Cave and Belson's Samadhi), while some
paintings are obsessively devoted to object
detail and texture (the "Photo Realist"
painters). And all points are represented
along this continuum (Nakahara, Nilsson,
Callahn, and Stern). It may be that photography
and cinema have a greater affinity for
thingly interest than painting or fiction (and
it may be for this reason, as Glynis Lee
points out,16 that Robbe-Grillet has turned
almost exclusively to film as an artistic medium).
But this in no way detracts from
the fact that this is an artistic, subjective,
anthropomorphic statement about objects,
stating, for example, as Sartredid in Nausea,
that objects exist independently of us, unheeding,
uncaring, and indifferent to us,
and carryingwith it obvious emotional overtones
of our loneliness, defiance, or indifference.
Ironically, even to say, as RobbeGrillet
does, "they just are!" is a powerful
human comment on nonhuman reality and
its relation to us.
Like Cavell, I have been going to the
movies for a long time and I too find them
visually convincing. But, unlike Cavell, I
attribute this to my own complete cultural
immersion in cinematic conventions, not to
the absence of these conventions.
More generally, I think Cavell, Bazin,
Panofsky, and Kracauer exaggerate the
transparent objectivity of photography and
159
cinema, and the reason they do is that they
fail to recognize an important ambiguity in
"is a photograph of." To be a photograph,
I will argue, requires two things. By stressing
only one of these the realist account is
therefore exaggerated and inadequate. The
two requirements are that the photograph
must 1) be a picture of X, and 2) be causally
related to X. Cavell, et al. emphasize the
second, and by ignoring the first fail to give
a complete analysis.
By "is a picture of" I mean "is a representation
of." Of course, this is itself a
notoriously difficult notion to define. But I
hope we have some rough sense of it, at least,
and whatever more precisely we mean or
ought to mean by it, I want to say that the
full meaning of "is a photograph of" must
include it. To take a stab at defining what I
mean by representation, let me specify at
least some of the necessary conditions, after
which we can argue whether these are the
right ones, enough of them, and what exactly
they mean. A pictorial representation is a
two dimensional image intended as a visual
correlate of an object (as evidenced, for example,
by its identification in the language
used to describe the object), an intention
which is likely to be understood and accepted
by others (i.e., be visually convincing)
because it conforms to the pictorial conventions
of that group, conventions which, unlike
linguistic conventions, translate at least
one visual correlate of the object onto a two
dimensional plane. The naive view that it
is also a likeness of, or resembles the object
I take to be a shorthand and confused version
of the acceptability part of the above
definition, and indicates the speaker'swholehearted
immersion in the conventions of
that society and the successof the representation
in conforming to those conventions.
A photograph is not just a picture, but it
is a picture. It is a special sort of picture because
of the causal criterion on which Cavell
and others lay so much stress. Not only are
photographs causally produced, but we
know they are, and this knowledge enters
into our approach to and perception of
photographs. This means, among other
things (which Cavell interestingly does not
mention), that we agree that there are many
BLOCKER
details in a photograph not intended by the
photographer, but unavoidably, necessarily
there because of the object. This is why
photographs can be used as evidence in a
court of law. An amateur film buff shoots
some footage of the U.S. President's motorcade
in Dallas over ten yearsago and experts
are still studying the film for evidence of
multiple assassins, etc. from details of the
film the cameraman had no notion of whatever.
In Grant Woods's painting, American
Gothic, on the other hand, the loose strand
of the woman's hair is significant because it
is presumed to be intentional, and this too
has to do with our knowledge of how
paintings are made. That strand of hair
had to be hand-painted, so we presume that
there is a reason for it, especially as it conflicts
with the general mood of moral rigidity
in the rest of the picture.
So I accept the causal criterion. Where I
disagree with Cavell is that I think "is a
photograph of" ambiguously includes the
representational criterion as well. That is,
normally, or better, in the paradigm case,
a photograph is and is seen to be causally
related to the object it is a photo of, and it
is also accepted as a picture of that object.
But these two criteria needn't go together,
and when either one is present without the
other we find ourselves in a quandary
whether to say it is a photograph of X
or not.
Is a photograph taken one inch from Ian
Smith's forehead a "photograph of Ian
Smith?" The causal requirement is met but
not the representational requirement. Or
we can think of examples in which the reverse
holds, photographs which represent
(are considered pictures of) what they were
not caused by. A newspaper photograph of
"Zimbabwe freedom fighters" turns out to
have been taken in Angola two yearsearlier.
If we don't know this we assume the picture
is of Rhodesian guerrillas because it appears
in a New York Times article about the
Rhodesian insurgency. Our quandary over
the first example, and our willingness to
accept the second, indicates that "is a photograph
of" includes both representational
and causal requirements. When one or
other is absent, we feel somewhat inclined
to say it is a photograph of X because of
the criterion which is present, but we also
feel somewhat inclined to say it is not because
of the other criterion which is absent.
Of course, if we know the true facts in the
second case we will rescind our claim that
it is a photograph of Rhodesian guerrillas.
But the fact that we firstaccepted it as such
shows that the causal history of a photograph
is ordinarily presumed knowledge
garnered largely from the representational
content of the photograph itself and the
context in which it is placed (title, surrounding
text, news background, etc.). One
of the best known photographs of the Vietnam
war (by Phillip Harrington) of a GI
emerging from a tank with a peace sign on
his helmet was actually taken in West Germany.
But this in no way prevented it from
counting as a picture of a GI in Vietnam,
and, in the absence of this bit of causal history,
this did not prevent it from counting as
a photograph of a GI in Vietnam.
Notice that while it is true that in describing
photographs we use an object language,
we tend to use common nouns of
general types of things more often than
proper nouns of particular people and
places. It is a photograph of an old man
sunning himself, a girl and her boyfriend,
a soldier, or a mother and her child. In
choosing the right descriptive label we look
to the representational content. In a photo
study of mother and child, it may turn out
that the causal woman (the model) is not
the mother of the child at all, or that "the
child" is only a doll. Imagine a photograph
of a lone pine tree against a background
of snow-covered fields as a photograph of
the Battle of the Bulge (Christmas Eve,
1944). It represents a placid natural scene;
it is causally quite different. Or, a photograph
of a lake surrounded by boulders and
trees as a picture of New York City (i.e.,
causally of Central Park). Because the representational
content of a photograph is
usually of a general nature (i.e., a photo of
"a nurse" rather than "Jane Smith"), and
thus, as Aristotle would say, the kind of
thing which happens or might happen, the
160
Pictures and Photographs
photograph represents the photographer's
idea of the object. Thus, the difference
between a photograph of X and X itself is
not "existence," but, if we must use this
Latinizing dichotomy, "essence."
Even if we accept the causal criterion as
primary, we still have to choose among
many causally correct candidates the most
appropriate label, and this will obviously
depend on its representational appropriateness.
Which is the best description in our
earlier example, "Ian Smith," "Smith's
face," "Smith's forehead," "a person's forehead,"
"a person's face," "human skin," or
what? If the last seems better, why does it?
Because that is what the photograph is a
picture of; it is the best description of what
it represents. On the other hand, a photo
causally of Smith's face does count as a
photo of Smith because our representational
conventions dictate that a person's identity
is largely determined by his face.
Notice to what a large extent photographs
follow pictorial conventions. First,
even to be seen as a photo of an object one
has to know a great deal about pictorial
conventions. There are, of course, peoples
in the world today who do not initially see
photos as photos of objects. In "Languages
of Art" 17 I explored these conventions in
some detail; for now I would like to simply
mention the main convention, which is to
look through the picture plane as though
one were looking through a pane of glass at
an object some distance behind the picture
plane.
There is also an important group of
"gestalt" or compositional conventions
which apply equally to painting and to
photographic representation, all of which
must be learned and are not perceived universally,
cross-culturally. These include
1) "figure-ground," the convention that a
picture is a picture of only one thing (or
event) to be picked out against a background
of other visually identifiable objects
(for example, it is a picture of a girl, although
there is also a recognizable tree,
house and moving car in the background),
2) the object or event depicted is the one
which dominates the picture plane in size,
161
centrality or objective importance, 3) that
the displayed background is typical of the
surrounding background not shown (thus
the photograph causally of Central Park is
representationally of a wooded wilderness),
and 4) "closure," the identity of the object
is determined as that which is most likely
from contextual clues shown in the picture.
A photograph of a young person carrying
books along a tree-lined walk will tend to
be seen as representing a student even
though it might have been a delivery person
bringing an order of books up the
lawn of a large suburban home. An interesting
exception to these conventions are
photographs of scenic beauty. This is a
separate genre with its own conventions,
deriving historically from the eighteenthcentury
interest in the "picturesque." It was
not always obvious that a picture of fields
and water and trees, without people, was
of any interest.
Cinematic illusion depends in many cases
on getting the desired representational content
without the causal correlate (usually to
save money). So a photo of a man dressed
in jeans and a Stetson on a horse surrounded
by rocks and sagebrush is a picture
of a cowboy out West, though causally the
man is in fact a second-rateactor on his first
horse in an indoor movie set. A woman
holding a child will be understood as the
child's mother; a man and woman alone
together in the moonlight will be read as
lovers; an older woman wearing a scarfover
her head and holding a hoe becomes the
representation of a worker, and so on,
though causally counter to fact in each case.
All of these have been so thoroughly exploited
in Hollywood for decades they are
now cliches. Even abstract, "fantasy" films
are often causally of quite different objects.
So, for example, the abstract swirl of color
and shape at the very beginning of the
movie version of West Side Story is causally
of trees in a city park.18
This is why a photograph taken of a 1974
Lion's Club meeting in Columbus, Ohio
will be more readily accepted as a photo of
the 1977 Dental Convention in Chicago's
Palmer House than a photo actually taken
BLOCKER
there during the convention of one of the
hotel's large potted plants, a film of which
could conceivably be used as part of a lowbudget
Tarzan movie. The photo of the
potted plant is not just a bad photograph
of the Dental Convention; it isn't one at all,
the reason being that while it meets the
causal criterion it fails to meet the representational
criterion. Of course, one might
object that I am being unfair, that if the
causal object were really part of the Dental
Convention it would be a photo of the
convention. But how do we know what to
choose among all the things going on at the
convention as being the best causal object?
Simply, I suggest, what we judge to be the
most representative. Individual photos of
each participant won't do, nor will a photo
of a small group having lunch in the hotel's
cafe (not by itself); it must be something
which we already feel looks like a convention
- groups of well-dressed people with
name-tags milling about a large hall, etc.
In short, representational photographs cannot
avoid what Panofsky called an "idealistic
conception of the world."
1 Erwin Panofsky, "Style and Medium in the
Moving Pictures," in Film (Daniel Talbot, ed.) New
York, 1959, p. 31.
2
Andre Bazin, What is Cinema? (Hugh Gray,
trans.) Berkeley, 1967, pp. 13-14.
:'Siegfried Kracauer, Theory of Film. New York,
1960, p. 40.
4Lincoln Johnson, Film. New York, 1974.
5Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed. New York,
1971, p. 17.
Ibid., p. 20.
Ibid.
8 Ibid., p. 21.
9Ibid., p. 20.
0Ibid., p. 23.
n Ibid.
12Ibid.
3 Ibid.
14Ibid., p. 25.
15Jordan Belson, "The Film Art of Jordan
Belson" (interview with Larry Sturhahn), Filmmakers
Newsletter, May 1975, p. 23.
16Glynis Lee, Robbe-Grillet and the French New
Novel. M.A. thesis, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio,
1975.
17The British Journal of Aesthetics, v. 14, no. 2,
Spring 1974.
18 Linwood Dunn, in a talk given at the Athens
International Film Festival, Athens, Ohio, 1975.
162