

Do you really think that if you hurt a few or kill a few, that you can intimidate the whole people? In fact, you cannot beat all of the people or kill all of the people. For every Li Gongpu you kill, hundreds of millions of Li Gongpus will stand up! [Applause] In the future you will lose the support of hundreds of millions of people.

The reactionaries believe that they can reduce the number of people participating in the democratic movement and destroy its power through the terror of assassination. But let me tell you, our power is great, our power is enormous! [Applause] Look! All of these people today are our people and their power is our power. [Applause]

The power of the people will win and truth will live forever! [Applause] Throughout history, all who have opposed the people have been destroyed by the people! Didn't Hitler and Mussolini fall before the people? Chiang Kai-shek, you are so rabid, so reactionary, turn the pages of history, how many days do you think you have left? You're finished! It is over for you! [Enthusiastic applause]

Bright days are coming for us. Look, the light is before us. Just as Mr. Li said as he was dying: "Daybreak is coming!" Now is that darkest moment before dawn. We have the power to break through this darkness and attain the light! The coming of our light marks the final moment for the reactionaries! [Applause]

Mr. Li's blood was not shed in vain! Mr. Li gave his life and we shall demand a price in return. We have this confidence and we must have this confidence. . . . Reactionaries, you have seen one man fall but have you seen hundreds of millions stand up?

Justice can never be killed because truth lives forever! . . . [Applause]

To attain democracy and peace, we must pay a price. We are not afraid of making sacrifices. Each of us should be like Mr. Li. When we step through the door, we must be prepared never to return. [Long, enthusiastic applause]

18.2 GENERAL MARSHALL: THE MEDIATOR'S VIEW, 1947

After VJ (Victory over Japan) Day, the United States government was eager to bring about a coalition government uniting the Guomindang and the Chinese Communist party. General George Marshall, the wartime U.S. chief of staff, was sent to China by President Truman in mid-December 1945 to attempt to work out a cease-fire and the formation of a Political Consultative Conference (PCC) that might set in place the foundations for one national government and army. Initially, Marshall believed that both sides were receptive to the concept of a unity government; he was received

cordially by Chiang and Mao and steps were already underway in January 1946 to build the PCC.

In the end, however, the decades of political opposition, civil war, and deep feelings of mutual suspicion foreordained the failure of the Marshall Mission. Intractable opponents to a unity government worked against Marshall in both the Nationalist and Communist camps. By the spring of 1946 armed clashes had already broken out between the two parties. Marshall continued his attempts to forestall civil war during the summer of 1946 but by the end of that year he was obliged to acknowledge the futility of further American efforts to stave off war.

The statement below was released on January 7, 1947, just before Marshall's return to the United States. It reflected his conviction that efforts to unite the Nationalists and Communists were doomed by their intransigence and the lack of any moderate force in Chinese politics capable of acting as a buffer between them in a coalition government. When Marshall was, subsequently, appointed secretary of state, he adopted a wait-and-see policy for the United States that precluded an active search for solutions to the deepening crisis in China.

The greatest obstacle to peace [in China] has been the complete, almost overwhelming suspicion with which the Chinese Communist Party and the Guomindang regard each other.

On the one hand, the leaders of the Government are strongly opposed to a communistic form of government. On the other, the Communists frankly state that they are Marxists and intend to work toward establishing a communistic form of government in China, though first advancing through the medium of a democratic form of government of the American or British type.

The leaders of the Government are convinced in their minds that the Communist-expressed desire to participate in a government of the type endorsed by the Political Consultative Conference last January had for its purpose only destructive intention. The Communists felt, I believe, that the government was insincere in its apparent acceptance of the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new government and intended by coercion of military force and the active use of secret police to obliterate the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both parties of ignoring the effects of the fears and suspicions of the other party in estimating the reason for proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of various matters under negotiation. They each sought only to take counsel of their own fears. They botched, therefore, to that extent took a rather lopsided view of each situation and were susceptible to every evil suggestion or possibility. . . .

I think the most important factors involved in the recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the side of the National Government, which is in effec-

the Guomindang, there is a dominant group of reactionaries who have been opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I have made to influence the formation of a genuine coalition government. This has usually been under the cover of political or party action, but since the Party was the Government, this action, though subtle or indirect, has been devastating in its effect. They were quite frank in publicly stating their belief that cooperation by the Chinese Communist Party in the government was inconceivable and that only a policy of force could definitely settle the issue. This group includes military as well as political leaders.

On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though this view is vigorously opposed by many who believe that the Chinese Communist Party discipline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared to me that there is a definite liberal group among the Communist ideology in the immediate future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their end as, for instance, the destruction of communications in order to wreck the economy of China and produce a situation that would facilitate the overthrow or collapse of the Government, without any regard to the immediate suffering of the people involved. They completely distrust the leaders of the Guomindang and appear convinced that every Government proposal is designed to crush the Chinese Communist Party. I must say that the quite evidently inspired mob actions of last February and March, some within a few blocks of where I was then engaged in completing negotiations, gave the Communists good excuse for such suspicions.

However, a very harmful and immensely proactive phase of the Chinese Communist Party procedure has been in the character of its propaganda. I wish to state to the American people that in the deliberate misrepresentation and abuse of the action, policies and purposes of our Government this propaganda has been without regard for the truth, without any regard whatsoever for the facts, and has given plain evidence of a determined purpose to mislead the Chinese people and the world and to arouse a bitter hatred of Americans. It has been difficult to remain silent in the midst of such public abuse and wholesale disregard of facts, but a denial would merely lead to the necessity of daily denials, an intolerable course of action for an American official. In the interest of fairness, I must state that the Nationalist Government publicity agency has made numerous misrepresentations, though not of the vicious nature of the Communist propaganda. Incidentally, the Communist statements regarding the Anping incident¹ which resulted in the death of three Marines and the wounding of twelve others were almost pure fabrication, deliberately representing a carefully arranged ambush of a Marine convoy with supplies for the main-

1. A clash between U.S. Marines and Communist troops that occurred near Tianjin, on July 29, 1946.

tenance of Executive Headquarters and some UNRRA supplies, as a defence against a Marine assault. The investigation of this incident was a tortuous procedure of delays and maneuvers to disguise the true and privately admitted facts of the case.

Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been frustrated time and again by extremist elements of both sides. The agreements reached by The Political Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal and forward-looking charter which then offered China a basis for peace and reconstruction. However, irreconcilable groups within the Guomindang, interested in the preservation of their own feudal control of China, evidently had no real intention of implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I must here also deplore the dominating influence of the military. Their dominance accentuates the weakness of civil government in China. At the same time, in pondering the situation in China, one must have clearly in mind not the workings of small Communist groups or committees to which we are accustomed in America, but rather of millions of people and an army of more than a million men....

Between this dominant reactionary group in the Government and the irrec- oncilable Communists who, I must state, did not so appear last February, lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to be brought to the long-suffering and presently inarticulate mass of the people of China. The reactionaries in the Government have evidently counted on substantial American support regardless of their actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to compromise in the national interest are evidently counting on an economic collapse to bring about the fall of the Government, accelerated by extensive guerrilla action against the long lines of rail communications—regardless of the cost of suffering to the Chinese people.

The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the Government and in the minority parties, a splendid group of men, but who as yet lack the political power to exercise a controlling influence. Successful action on their part under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe, lead to unity through good government.

In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a democratic constitution which in all major respects is in accordance with the principles laid down by the all-party Political Consultative Conference of last January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the constitution that has been adopted seems to include every major point that they wanted.

Soon the Government in China will undergo major reorganization pending the coming into force of the constitution following elections to be completed before Christmas Day 1947. Now that the form for a democratic China has been laid down by the newly adopted constitution, practical measures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what extent the Government will give substance

to the form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to share in the responsibility of government.

The first step will be the reorganization of the State Council and the executive branch of Government to carry on administration pending the enforcement of the constitution. The manner in which this is done and the amount of representation accorded to liberals and to non-Guomindang members will be significant. It is also to be hoped that during this interim period the door will remain open for Communists or other groups to participate if they see fit to assume their share of responsibility for the future of China.

It has been stated officially and categorically that the period of political tutelage under the Guomindang is at an end. If the termination of one-party rule is to be a reality, the Guomindang should cease to receive financial support from the Government.

I have spoken very frankly because in no other way can I hope to bring the people of the United States to even a partial understanding of this complex problem. I have expressed all these views privately in the course of negotiations; they are well known, I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to present my estimate of the situation and its possibilities to the American people who have a deep interest in the development of conditions in the Far East promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.

18.3 CHIANG STEPS DOWN

Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to "retire" from office three times in his political career: in 1927, in 1931, and in 1949. In the first two cases, Chiang was forced by political opponents to retreat to his hometown of Fenghua in Zhejiang but was later able to defeat opponents and to place himself again at the helm of the Nationalist party.

In 1949, however, following the Manchurian campaign and the catastrophic defeat at Xuzhou in November 1948, Chiang's army was broken and many of his erstwhile generals sat in Communist prisons. In the meantime, civil society, afflicted by runaway inflation and chronic shortages, was clearly beyond Nanjing's control. Under these circumstances, Chiang was again obliged to give up the leadership of the Nationalist government. This time he abdicated control to his vice president Li Zongren. Li, a Guangxi warlord and ancient political enemy, had, ironically, been instrumental in pushing Chiang from office at the time of his first "retirement" in 1927. After abandoning the presidency to Li, Chiang continued to move troops and economic resources to Taiwan but deliberately left Li Zongren out of the planning process. By now, Guomindang control of the

mainland was utterly fragmented and many civil and military personnel loyal to Nanjing actively searched for means to depart China.

After the fall of the mainland, Li Zongren departed for exile in the United States but Chiang Kai-shek proved a more long-lived feature of the Chinese political scene. Having evacuated some two million troops to Taiwan and other offshore islands, Chiang again took office as the president of the Republic of China on Taiwan on March 1, 1950, and would serve in this capacity until his death in 1975. The two documents reproduced here reflect the complex political maneuvering that took place on the eve of the Nationalist defeat and the sense of enormous confusion in the GMD camp prior to the transition to Communist power.

PRESIDENT CHIANG'S STATEMENT ON RETIREMENT (JANUARY 21, 1949)

Since I issued my New Year message urging the restoration of peace, the entire nation, with one accord, has echoed its unreserved support. However, although more than two weeks have now elapsed, warfare has not yet drawn to a close and the ultimate aim of achieving peace has not been realized. Consequently an end to the people's suffering still is not in sight.

With the hope that the hostilities may be brought to an end and the people's suffering be relieved, I have decided to retire. As from Jan. 21, Vice-President Li Zongren will exercise the duties and powers of President in accordance with Article 49 of the Constitution which provides that "in the event the President, for any reason, is unable to perform his functions, his duties and powers shall be exercised by the Vice-President." I hope the entire nation, including both the military and civilian populations, as well as the various Government departments and agencies, will unreservedly, and with one heart, support Vice-President Li in order that a lasting peace may be achieved.

I have devoted my entire life to the work of the people's revolution, observing strictly the Three Principles of the People. From the fifteenth year of the Republic when we set out from Canton on the Northern Punitive Expedition to the time when national unity was achieved, I never for a moment failed to consider it my sacred duty to implement the principle of nationalism, give effect to the principle of democracy and improve the livelihood of the people.

At the same time, I have always realized that it is absolutely necessary to secure peace for the country before a sound foundation can be laid for the improvement of the nation's political and economic life. That is why for more than twenty years, while I was sometimes forced to resort to military measures in dealing with domestic affairs, I have always been prepared to make personal sacrifices and concessions. The only exception was the war of resistance against