

Japanese troops makes life and property safe and enables the Manchukuo Government to function.

EFFORTS TO AID CHINESE

We Japanese have striven to help the Chinese if only in our own selfish interest—and we could have accomplished much for them had our efforts not been opposed by Westerners. China could have been made relatively unified and orderly and peaceful today had our efforts not been opposed and thwarted; and not only the Chinese people, but those of Western countries would have profited....

15.7 POLITICS OF POWER: GENERAL VON FALKENHAUSEN'S ADVICE TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, 1936

Between 1934 and 1937, the Nanjing regime developed a close relationship to the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler. China, like Germany, was attempting to establish a state unified around a single party and a single leader, and the German model seemed an attractive paradigm to many of Chiang Kai-shek's followers and, quite probably, to the Generalissimo himself. Many adherents of the Guomindang, including Chiang's own son, were sent to Germany to receive military, police, and other sorts of training in this era. There were those who surely dreamed that China's "Revival Society" (*Fuxingshe*), a paramilitary group also known as the Blueshirts, would ultimately emerge as an elite political clique that would wield great power in the Guomindang.

Another symbol of the mutual interest and sympathy of Germans and Chinese in the 1930s was the arrival of numerous German advisors in China. Several Germans in sequence served as Jiang's chief foreign military advisers; Captain Walter Stennes trained Chiang Kai-shek's personal bodyguard; and Colonel-General Hans von Seeckt and General Alexander von Falkenhausen, both outstanding staff officers of the First World War, were the architects of the positional warfare tactics that led to the destruction of the Jiangxi Soviet in October 1934. Von Falkenhausen, as this top secret memorandum to Chiang Kai-shek indicates, also had fixed ideas in the political realm and was anxious to see Chiang emerge as a president with powers similar to those enjoyed by Mussolini and, of course, Hitler.

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... The history of all times has taught us that leaders are needed by states and nations in times of distress, when only the concerted application of *all* state and national power can provide the necessary control over their destiny. Absolute power made possible the great deeds of such historical figures, from Julius Caesar to Genghis Khan, such as Cromwell, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon I. Though history has examples of leadership shared by several persons, *one* person always was clearly in the leadership, and the others subordinate; such as recently Bismarck who, with the support of the King, found in Moltke and Roon the necessary complement to himself.

Limited power, however, or a division of power, but also the inadequacy of the leader, have almost invariably brought struggles for national existence to an unsuccessful end; from Hannibal to the Great War of 1914-18....

The recent period has everywhere shown tendencies to return to practical absolutism. For example in Italy and Germany, but also in Russia, all power is concentrated in one hand, while in some instances no constitutions even exist, and no control organ such as, legally, in Italy the King and in Germany Hindenburg until his death.

Therein lies the natural striving to have a personality at the head of the state endowed with ultimate responsibility, a person independent from elections, party politics, and public mood, and capable to provide a stability immune to the turnover of individual personalities. But this is the essence of monarchy.

[But] we must distinguish leaders [Führer] from dictators. Leaders are those who command the allegiance of the masses of the people and who provide for some check through occasional plebiscites. Dictators derive authority from material power, supported by a minority. Dictators can nevertheless be historically justifiable at a time when no consensus is possible among the people and the state is in need of firm guidance in order to survive.

Most dictators come to a violent end, unless they found a dynasty (Ming Dynasty)... For in every pure dictatorship there comes the moment when the dictator has become blind to the signs of the time, or is no longer in the position to heed them. What is missing is control through a healthy, objective opposition. For this reason, Bismarck once said, that in the absence of an opposition he would create one. The dictator who has no responsibility but to himself needs a source of control that is independent without interfering with his freedom of making the final decision in times of great emergency. *The opposition also, must be selfless and national-minded* in order to fulfill purpose in the state....

In applying the supreme power of command of the President care must be taken not to limit the instruments of power of the state to the traditional armed

forces on land, sea, and air, but to note that modern warfare requires the combined strength of the whole state and its people, down to the smallest detail.

As a precaution, the whole nation must be prepared for war; this is the only way to provide for its security in its entirety. This consideration must apply to every state measure concerning the economy, finances, and above all popular education and propaganda. Every powerful modern state today does this; they represent "nations in arms." Most states have laws regulating in every detail the "mobilization of the nation in case of war."

This fact leads naturally to the preeminent importance of military consideration in all government actions, and requires that the leading statesman possess unfettered powers in this so vital area for the state and nation. Generally speaking, this task no longer can be left to the individual government departments. Instead, it calls for firm consolidation and single-minded leadership. "War is the continuation of politics by other means." Policies must be coordinated with the realities of the state's power, its "potential de guerre." This means: the state's policies must be based on a just assessment of the power instruments available, and the instruments of power must be so ordered to suit the political situation.

Thus the ideal is a chief of state who is both statesman and commander in chief (e.g. Frederick the Great, Pilsudski, Mustapha-Kemal-Atatürk, et al.), and who *already in time of peace so organizes and staffs the national instruments of power* that the whole machine functions smoothly at all times.

At the same time we must remember that no single person in today's world has the energy to direct and lead everything. As division of labor becomes necessary, the unity of concept and the loyal cooperation of all must be secured above all.

Thus the whole organization of the state must be basically adapted to modern warfare in time of peace, for modern warfare requires that everything be prepared in peace time down to the smallest detail, so that it can automatically begin to function at the outbreak of hostilities. Three major areas are affected:

- a) All branches of the armed forces, on land, water, and in the air must be organically coordinated, also their missions.
- b) The whole task of preparing for national economic mobilization.
- c) The [need for an] unanimous attitude on the part of the true public, i.e., unanimous national support.

To subordinate the three areas—armed forces, economy, people—to the supreme leader is the ultimate end of all preparation for mobilization. They are closely related to one another. . . .

We [in China] have also tried centralization through the person of the Generalissimo and the creation of the National Military Commission. But since the

highest offices of the armed forces continue to exist unchanged, there is in practice a lack of clarity in the division of spheres of competence and responsibility. This gives rise to duplication of work, interferes with cooperation, leads to higher expenditures.

Thus to create a clear and unitary organization is important. It must assure in peace time the shaping and the coordination of all the direct and indirect elements that make up the state and the nation's defensive capacity, so that they work automatically in time of war. . . .