dialectic
The term dialectic originates in the Greek expression for
the art of conversation (dialektik¬ tûcnh). So far as its
great variety of meanings have anything in common, it is
perhaps that dialectic is a method of seeking and sometimes
arriving at the truth by reasoning, but even this
general description, which to fit the variety of cases is so
vague as to be valueless, fails to do justice to the Hegelian
and Marxist notion of dialectic as a historical process.
However, among the more important meanings of the
term have been (1) the method of refutation by examining
logical consequences, (2) sophistical reasoning, (3)
the method of division or repeated logical analysis of
genera into species, (4) an investigation of the supremely
general abstract notions by some process of reasoning
leading up to them from particular cases or hypotheses,
(5) logical reasoning or debate using premises that are
merely probable or generally accepted, (6) formal logic,
(7) the criticism of the logic of illusion, showing the contradictions
into which reason falls in trying to go beyond
experience to deal with transcendental objects, and (8)
the logical development of thought or reality through
thesis and antithesis to a synthesis of these opposites.
Meaning (2) is notably still current, and the term is often
used in a pejorative sense.
In the following discussion the different kinds of
dialectic will be elucidated in their historical order.
socrates and his predecessors
Dialectic perhaps originated in the fifth century BCE,
since Zeno of Elea, the author of the famous paradoxes,
was recognized by Aristotle as its inventor (Diogenes
Laërtius, Lives VIII, 57). Aristotle presumably had Zeno’s
paradoxes in mind, as they are outstanding examples of
dialectic, in the sense of refutation of the hypotheses of
opponents by drawing unacceptable consequences from
those hypotheses. For example, it is unacceptable that
Achilles never overtakes the tortoise; therefore, the
hypothesis that leads to this conclusion must be rejected.
Insofar as this method relies on the law of formal logic
known as modus tollens (if p implies q, and q is false, then
p is false), Zeno was a pioneer of logic, but there is no evidence
that he could formulate the law itself; it was left to
Aristotle later to state explicitly the principles that underlie
this kind of dialectic, and thus to create the science of
formal logic.
Dialectic as the use of such indirect logical arguments
to defeat an opponent seems to have been used by
Zeno for serious philosophical purposes, but it later
became, in the hands of the Sophists, a mere instrument
for winning a dispute. For example, the Sophist Protagoras
claimed that he could “make the worse argument
appear the better”; such an aim belongs rather to rhetoric
than to logic or philosophy. This degenerate form of
dialectic was named “eristic” by Plato (for example, in
Sophist 231E) and others, from the word †riV (strife). Eristic
came to make deliberate use of invalid argumentation
and sophistical tricks, and these were ridiculed by Plato in
his dialogue Euthydemus, which takes its name from an
actual Sophist who appears in it as a user of eristic arguments.
Aristotle, too, thought the Sophists worth answering
in his book De Sophisticis Elenchis (Sophistical
refutations), although he sharply distinguished eristic
from dialectic, dialectic being for him a respectable activ-
ity.
If, however, the lost work of Protagoras did begin, as
several subsequent writers attest, with the claim that on
every subject two opposite statements (l’goi) could be
made, and if the book continued with a content of statement
and counterstatement, then Protagoras deserves to
be considered the ancestor of the medieval or of the
Hegelian dialectic rather than the father of eristic.
Socrates stands in contrast to the Sophists. Unlike
them, he professed to be seeking the truth. But he was not
above winning the argument, and what is called the
elenchus was a major element in dialectic as practiced by
him, if we are to accept as accurate the presentation of
him in Plato’s earlier dialogues. The Socratic elenchus was
perhaps a refined form of the Zenonian paradoxes, a prolonged
cross-examination that refutes the opponent’s
original thesis by getting him to draw from it, by means
of a series of questions and answers, a consequence that
contradicts it. This is a logically valid procedure, for it
corresponds to the logical law “if p implies not-p, then
not-p is true (that is, p is false).” Dialectic seems to have
been, for Socrates, literally the art of discussion, a search
for truth by question and answer; but the definition of a
concept is the sort of truth that was typically sought by
him, and he supplemented his elenchus with another
technique, later called epagoge (ùpagwgø) by Aristotle.
This consisted in leading the opponent on to a generalization
by getting him to accept the truth of a series of
propositions about particular cases. It may now be seen
why, in discussing dialectic, Aristotle says “there are two
innovations that may justly be ascribed to Socrates: epagogic
arguments and universal definition” (Metaphysics
M 4, 1078b). For Aristotle had a different conception of
dialectic, and since elenchus goes back to Zeno, the two
features he mentions are the only contributions made by
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Socrates to dialectic as Aristotle understood it. The
Socratic irony, or pretense not to know anything and not
to be conducting a refutation, was a personal feature of
Socrates’ dialectic and contributed nothing to later devel-
opments.
plato
In the middle dialogues of Plato there occurs a development
of the notion of dialectic beyond what we take to be
typical of the historical Socrates. Even though Socrates is
the protagonist, the views he is portrayed as putting forward
are presumably those of Plato. Dialectic is regarded
there as the supreme philosophical method, indeed the
highest of human arts: it is “the coping-stone, as it were,
placed above the sciences” (Republic 534E). In the Cratylus
Plato had described the dialectician as “the man who
knows how to ask and answer questions” (390C), and this
view of dialectic as question and answer is the Socratic
element that forms the single thread running through his
altering conceptions of the method. Furthermore, dialectic
always had the same subject matter: it sought the
unchanging essence of each thing. But the kind of reasoning
that Plato regarded as involved in dialectic seems
to change: In the middle dialogues it was some kind of
operation on hypotheses, whereas in the later ones (for
example, Phaedrus and Sophist) there is, instead, an
emphasis on division (diaàresiV) as a method. Division in
effect consists of a repeated analysis of genera into
species, of more general notions into less general ones, as
a way of arriving at a definition when no further division
is possible. This process is complemented by the opposite
process of synthesis or collection (sunagwgø).
Although Plato always spoke of dialectic in an
extremely favorable manner, his discussion of it in Republic
VI–VII marks a high point, as it is there made to be the
distinguishing feature in the education of the philosopher-kings
and is to be concerned eventually with the
supreme Form, that of the Good. It is to reach certainty
and overcome the need for hypotheses (Republic 511B).
But the elevation of the sentiments expressed is matched
by suitable vagueness as to the exact process involved, and
the interpretation of the few words that are at all precise
has been greatly disputed.
It may seem that if dialectic is a process of discussion,
then it cannot be of any use for private thought. For
Plato, however, there was no difference between the two:
“Thought and speech are the same thing, but the silently
occurring internal dialogue of the soul with itself has
been specially given the name of thought” (Sophist 263E;
see also Theaetetus 189E). However, Plato’s most important
pupil, Aristotle, was already taking a different view of
the nature of thought and hence assigning a merely secondary
role to dialectic: “Deception occurs to a greater
extent when we are investigating with others than by ourselves,
for an investigation with someone else is carried
on by means of words, but an investigation in one’s own
mind is carried on quite as much by means of the thing
itself” (De Sophisticis Elenchis 169a37). Dialectic was no
longer to be the method of science.
aristotle
The practice of dialectic was probably a major activity in
Plato’s Academy, to which Aristotle belonged from 367
BCE until Plato’s death in 347. Aristotle’s Topics was
apparently intended as an aid to this dialectical debate. It
is a handbook for finding arguments to establish or
demolish given positions, or theses, such as “Every pleasure
is good,” and while the particular theses used as
examples in the Topics are no doubt borrowed from the
debates in the Academy, the methods provided for dealing
with them are completely general, that is, applicable
to any thesis of the same form. The Topics is therefore the
first systematic account of dialectic, and Aristotle indeed
boasted that prior to his own treatment of the subject “it
did not exist at all” (De Sophisticis Elenchis 183b36), and
criticized the Sophists for giving teaching that was unsystematic
(©tecnoV). His own trend toward generality and
system had the effect that in the Topics Aristotle discovered
many basic principles of formal logic, including
some in the propositional calculus and in the logic of
relations, but he hardly reached an explicit formal statement
of them. A large part, at least, of this work was written
before his discovery of the (categorical) syllogism, a
type of argument for which he developed, in his Analytics,
an elaborate system—the earliest system of formal
logic—that superseded dialectic as a theory of demonstration.
But even if Aristotle’s formal logic developed as
an alternative to his dialectic, it may still have arisen out
of dialectic in some sense, since it has been argued that he
discovered the syllogism as a result of reflection on Plato’s
method of division.
The distinguishing feature of dialectic for Aristotle
was not so much the type of reasoning as the epistemological
status of the premises. Reasoning is dialectical if its
premises are opinions that are generally accepted by
everyone or by the majority or by philosophers; if the
premises merely seem probable, or if the reasoning is
incorrect, then it is “eristic.” Aristotelian dialectic is thus
quite respectable; it has even been called a “logic of probability,”
a name that could be misleading because dialec-
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tic does not in fact involve inductive reasoning. However,
dialectic is not good enough, Aristotle believed, to be a
method of acquiring knowledge proper, or science. For
that we require demonstration, which is valid reasoning
that starts out from true and self-evident premises. The
value of dialectic, according to Aristotle, is threefold: It is
useful for intellectual training, for discussions with others
based on their own premises, and for examining the
unprovable first principles of the sciences. “Dialectic,
being a process of criticism, contains the path to the principles
of all inquiries” (Topics 101b3).
stoics and medievals
Euclides of Megara (a contemporary of Plato) and his
successors in that town were logicians of note, and the
Megarian tradition in logic was continued by the Stoics.
The Stoic logic was known as dialectic, perhaps because
the initiators of their tradition had an interest in the
Zenonian paradoxes and related reasoning. Under the
headship of Chrysippus, who lived from 280 to 206 BCE,
the Stoic school reached its zenith, and it was still going
strong four centuries later. A saying is recorded from this
period, that “if the gods had dialectic, it would be the
dialectic of Chrysippus” (Diogenes Laërtius, Lives VII,
180). By “dialectic” the Stoics primarily meant formal
logic, in which they particularly developed forms of inference
belonging to what we now call the propositional calculus.
But they applied the term dialectic widely: for them
it also included the study of grammatical theory and the
consideration of meaning-relations and truth. This
widened scope, reflecting the special interests of the early
Stoics, remained typical of the school; it was accepted by
Cicero and perhaps overemphasized by Seneca, who
wrote that dialectic “fell into two parts, meanings and
words, that is, things said and expressions by which they
are said”—dialektikø in duas partes dividitur, in verba et
significationes, id est in res quae dicuntur et vocabula
quibus dicuntur (Epistulae Morales 89, 17).
In the Middle Ages “dialectic” continued to be the
ordinary name for logic: for example, the first medieval
logical treatise was the Dialectica of Alcuin. But the word
logica was also used; in fact, Abelard wrote a Dialectica
and more than one Logica. As the works of Plato and
Aristotle became known, the Scholastics took over various
conceptions of dialectic, and the medieval disputation,
by which university degree examinations were
conducted, can be regarded as a remote descendant or
revival of the debates in the Platonic Academy. The disputants
maintained theses and antitheses, arguing mainly
in syllogisms; the most significant difference from
ancient practice was that the class of unacceptable consequences
now included those propositions that were
inconsistent with divine revelation.
kant and his successors
In his Critique of Pure Reason (A61, B85) Immanuel Kant
asserted rather sweepingly that the actual employment of
dialectic among the ancients was always as “the logic of
illusion (Logik des Scheins).” He explained that he applied
the term to logic as a critique of dialectical illusion. He
titled the second division of his Transcendental Logic
“Transcendental Dialectic.”This new kind of dialectic was
concerned with exposing the illusion of transcendental
judgments, that is, judgments that profess to pass beyond
the limits of experience; but the illusion can never, he
thought, be dispelled entirely, as it is natural and
inevitable.
Although Kant, in his Transcendental Dialectic, had
set out the antinomies of pure reason as four sets of thesis
and antithesis, he did not call his resolution of the
antinomies a synthesis. It was his successor Johann Gottlieb
Fichte who, in his Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre
(Jena and Leipzig, 1794), first introduced
into German philosophy the famed triad of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis. In this he was followed by
Friedrich Schelling, but not in fact by G. W. F. Hegel.
Fichte did not believe that the antithesis could be
deduced from the thesis; nor, on his view did the synthesis
achieve anything more than uniting what both thesis
and antithesis had established.
hegel and his successors
Hegel is commonly supposed to have presented his doctrines
in the form of the triad or three-step (Dreischritt)
of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. This view appears to be
mistaken insofar as he did not actually use the terms; and
even though he evinced a fondness for triads, neither his
dialectic in general nor particular portions of his work
can be reduced simply to a triadic pattern of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis. The legend of this triad in Hegel
has been bolstered by some English translations that
introduce the word antithesis where it is not required.
However, there is indeed a Hegelian dialectic, involving
the passing over of thoughts or concepts into their
opposites and the achievement of a higher unity. But if it
is a process that arrives at a higher truth through contradictions,
it does not constitute a new conception of
dialectic. Hegel actually showed his awareness of the traditional
notion by paying tribute to “Plato’s Parmenides,
probably the greatest masterpiece of ancient dialectic.”
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And even the doctrine that dialectic is a world process—
not merely a process of thought but also found in history
and in the universe as a whole—was not wholly new, but
goes back to Heraclitus and the Neoplatonist Proclus.
Here again Hegel, with his interest in the history of philosophy,
was aware of his predecessors. What seems to be
genuinely new in Hegel’s view of dialectic is the conception
of a necessary movement. Dialectic was said to be
“the scientific application of the regularity found in the
nature of thought.” The “passing over into the opposite”
was seen as a natural consequence of the limited or finite
nature of a concept or thing. The contradictions in
thought, nature, and society, even though they are not
contradictions in formal logic but conceptual inadequacies,
were regarded by Hegel as leading, by a kind of
necessity, to a further phase of development.
Hegel has had an enormous influence not only on
willing disciples but even on thinkers nominally in revolt
against him, such as Søren Kierkegaard. One of the most
important offshoots of the Hegelian dialectic was the
Marxist dialectic, in which, of course, “matter” was substituted
for Hegel’s “spirit.”
See also Abelard, Peter; Aristotle; Chrysippus; Cicero,
Marcus Tullius; Dialectical Materialism; Diogenes
Laertius; Fichte, Johann Gottlieb; Greek Academy;
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich; Hegelianism; Heraclitus
of Ephesus; Infinity in Mathematics and Logic;
Kant, Immanuel; Kierkegaard, Søren Aabye; Marxist
Philosophy; Medieval Philosophy; Neoplatonism;
Plato; Proclus; Protagoras of Abdera; Schelling,
Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von; Socrates; Sophists; Stoicism;
Zeno of Elea.
Bibliog raphy
GENERAL DISCUSSIONS
For general discussions of dialectic, see Paul Foulquié, La
dialectique (Paris, 1949); Eduard von Hartmann, Über die
dialektische Methode (Berlin, 1868; 2nd ed. 1910); Karl Dürr,
“Die Entwicklung der Dialektik von Plato bis Hegel.”
Dialectica 1 (1947); and Jonas Cohn, Theorie der Dialektik
(Leipzig, 1923).
SOCRATES AND HIS PREDECESSORS
On Zeno, see H. D. P. Lee, Zeno of Elea (Cambridge, U.K.,
1936); G. E. L. Owen, “Zeno and the Mathematicians,” in PAS
58 (1957–1958): 199–222; and John Burnet, Early Greek
Philosophy (London, 1892; 4th ed., 1930). For the period
before Socrates as a whole, see Burnet’s From Thales to Plato
(London, 1914). For criticisms of the Sophists, see Plato,
Euthydemus, and Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis, translated
by W. A. Pickard-Cambridge in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. 1
(Oxford, 1928). On this whole phase of dialectic, see the
extremely reliable work of William and Martha Kneale, The
Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), Ch. 1.
PLATO
The most helpful book on Plato’s use of dialectic is Richard
Robinson, Plato’s Earlier Dialectic (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1941; 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1953), but the word earlier occurs in its title because it
contains no examination of the methods of division and
synthesis that appear in some of Plato’s later dialogues. For
the original descriptions of the Platonic dialectic, see the
Dialogues of Plato, passim (in any translation), but above all
the Republic, Books VI–VII, especially 510–540 in the
standard numbering. See also James Adam, The Republic of
Plato, Vol. II (Cambridge, U.K., 1902; reissued, 1963), pp.
168–179; Richard Lewis Nettleship, Lectures on the Republic
of Plato (London: Macmillan, 1901), pp. 277–289; Julius
Stenzel, Studien zur Entwicklung der Platonischen Dialektik
von Sokrates zu Aristoteles (Breslau, 1917; 2nd ed., 1931),
translated by D. J. Allan as Plato’s Method of Dialectic
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; reissued, New York: Russell
and Russell, 1964); Francis M. Cornford, “Mathematics and
Dialectic in the Republic VI–VII,” in Mind 41 (1932): 37–52,
173–190; R. S. Bluck, “¤poqûseiV in the Phaedo and the
Platonic Dialectic,” in Phronesis 2 (1) (1957): 21–31; D. W.
Hamlyn, “The Communion of Forms and the Development
of Plato’s Logic,” in Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1955):
289–302; Georges Rodier, “Les mathématiques et la
dialectique dans le système de Platon,” in Archiv für
Geschichte der Philosophie 15 (1902): 479–490, and his
“L’évolution de la dialectique de Platon,” in Année
philosophique (1905): 49–73; D. S. Mackay, “The Problem of
Individuality in Plato’s Dialectic,” in University of California
Publications in Philosophy 20 (1937): 131–154; and Juan A.
Nuño Montes, La dialéctica platónica (Caracas, 1962).
ARISTOTLE
For the original account, see Aristotle, Topica, translated by W.
A. Pickard-Cambridge in The Works of Aristotle, Vol. I
(Oxford, 1928). The most accessible scholarly discussion of
this phase is Ernst Kapp, Greek Foundations of Traditional
Logic (New York: Columbia Press, 1942). Important
treatments of the controversial issues involved are Friedrich
Solmsen, Die Entwicklung der Aristotelischen Logik und
Rhetorik (Berlin, 1929), his “The Discovery of the
Syllogism,” in Philosophical Review 50 (1941): 410–421, and
his “Aristotle’s Syllogism and Its Platonic Background,” in
Philosophical Review 60 (1951): 563–571; and Paul Wilpert,
“Aristoteles und die Dialektik,” in Kant-Studien 68 (1956):
247–284. There is also Livio Sichirollo, Giustificazioni della
dialettica in Aristotele (Urbino, 1963).
STOICS AND MEDIEVALS
For a discussion of Stoic use of dialectic, see Benson Mates,
Stoic Logic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953).
For a general account of the medieval phase and references
to particular works, see William and Martha Kneale, op. cit.,
Ch. 4. For the postmedieval rejection of dialectic, see Duane
H. Berquist, “Descartes and Dialectics,” in Laval théologique
et philosophique 20 (2) (1964): 176–204.
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KANT AND HIS SUCCESSORS
Kant and his successors are discussed in Graham H. Bird,
Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge and Paul,
1962); John E. Llewelyn, “Dialectical and Analytical
Opposites,” in Kant-Studien 55 (1964): 171–174; and
Richard Kroner, Von Kant bis Hegel, 2 vols. (Tübingen,
1921–1924).
HEGEL AND HIS SUCCESSORS
For general discussions of the Hegelian phase, see K. R.
Popper, “What Is Dialectic?,” in Mind 49 (1940): 403–426,
reprinted in Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations (London:
Routledge, 1963); Sidney Hook, “What Is Dialectic?,” in
Journal of Philosophy 26 (1929): 85–99, 113–123, his From
Hegel to Marx (London, 1936), and his “Dialectic in Social
and Historical Inquiry,” in Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939):
365–378; and Siegfried Marck, Die Dialektik in der
Philosophie der Gegenwart, 2 vols. (Tübingen, 1929–1931).
On dialectic in Hegel, see John M. E. McTaggart, Studies in
the Hegelian Dialectic (Cambridge, U.K., 1896); G. R. G.
Mure, An Introduction to Hegel (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1940); and above all, John N. Findlay, “Some Merits of
Hegelianism,” in PAS 56 (1955–1956): 1–24, and his Hegel: A
Re-examination (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), and a
valuable chapter by him on Hegel in A Critical History of
Western Philosophy, edited by D. J. O’Connor (London,
1964). See also Gustav E. Mueller, “The Hegel Legend of
Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis,” in Journal of the History of
Ideas 19 (1958): 411–414; Carl J. Friedrich, “The Power of
Negation: Hegel’s Dialectic and Totalitarian Ideology,” in A
Hegel Symposium, edited by D. C. Travis (Austin: University
of Texas, 1962), pp. 13–35; and Walter Kaufmann, Hegel
(New York, 1965). On Marx, see Harold B. Acton, The
Illusion of the Epoch: Marxism–Leninism as a Philosophical
Creed (London: Cohen and West, 1955).
Roland Hall (1967)
dialectical
materialism
Marxism-Leninism is the name given to the form of
Marxist theory that was accepted and taught by the Russian
and Chinese Communist parties and the Communist
parties associated with them. Marxism-Leninism is both
a view of the world as a whole and of human society and
its development. The view of human society is called historical
materialism, the name bestowed upon it by
Friedrich Engels. The view of the world as a whole is
called dialectical materialism, a title devised by G. V.
Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist, and first used by him in
an article published in 1891. Marxist-Leninists regard
dialectical materialism as the basis of their philosophy
and generally begin comprehensive expositions of that
philosophy with an account of it. One might say that
dialectical materialism constitutes the logic, ontology,
and epistemology of Marxism-Leninism, and historical
materialism its ethics, politics, and philosophy of history.
Sometimes, however, the term dialectical materialism is
used for the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism as a
whole. When dialectical materialism is thus conceived,
the natural sciences are the working-out of dialectical
materialism in the nonhuman sphere and historical
materialism its working-out in the sphere of human society.
But these slight differences do not affect the content
of the theory.
marx’s materialism
Approving references to materialism are prominent in
Karl Marx’s writings, especially in the early works. In The
Holy Family (1845), for instance, he argued that one
branch of eighteenth-century French materialism developed
into natural science and the other branch into
socialism and communism. Thus he regarded “the new
materialism,” as he called it, as a source of the social
movement that he believed was destined to revolutionize
human life. Materialism, as Marx understood it, was very
closely connected with social criticism and social development.
One aspect of materialism that Marx supported
was its rejection of idealist attempts to undermine and
belittle sense experience. He held that there is something
dishonest and irresponsible in philosophies which deny
that sense experience reveals the existence of an independent
material world; hence his view of knowledge was
realist, both on philosophical and moral grounds. In taking
this view he was much influenced by Ludwig Feuerbach.
Like Feuerbach, Marx rejected speculative
philosophy, or metaphysics, as we should call it today, on
the ground that the truth about the world and society can
only be discovered by the use of empirical scientific
methods. In a broad sense of the term, therefore, Marx
was a positivist, in that he denied the possibility of any
knowledge of the world that is not based on sense experience.
Hence, Marx’s view of the world was naturalistic
and opposed to any form of religion or supernaturalism.
Again under the influence of Feuerbach, Marx held that
belief in God, in an afterlife, and in heaven and hell cannot
be rationally justified, but may be explained (indeed,
explained away) in terms of the unfulfilled needs and
hopes of men whose lives are frustrated by an oppressive
social order. Marx held, too, that men are not immaterial
souls conjoined with material bodies. In his view, psychophysical
dualism is a relic of supernaturalism and
must be rejected with it. Marx did not systematically
develop this view as part of a philosophical argument but
took it as the basis of his view, expressed in The Holy
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