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HOW WE GOT OUT OF ANALYSIS, AND HOW TO GET BACK IN AGAIN

1980. Joseph Kerman, Professor of Music at a state university in California, and a leading voice in musicology, publishes 'How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out'.¹ This is only two years after the formation of the Society for Music Theory. Just when theorists and analysts in America succeed in constituting themselves into a separate society, just when they win the opportunity to focus on what they deem important and what they think they are good at, and just when they think they have finally escaped the hegemonic rule of the American Musicological Society, they find themselves under attack.

1985. Kerman has another go at analysis. This time critique is extended to other areas of musicology (the early music movement, ethnomusicology and traditions of performing practices, among others).² We are urged to look beyond formalism and positivism, and to embrace criticism, especially *his* brand of criticism. Interpretations, not facts, are in short supply, we are told.

1990s. The New Musicology joins the fray, furthering the critique of formalism, and issuing a series of manifestos about how not to study and write about music.³ Its spirited but sometimes reckless writing proves intimidating to music theorists and practitioners of old musicology. Some go into hiding, hoping and praying that the lure of cultural studies and postmodernism will prove short lived. While in hiding, however, they are not idle.

End of 1990s. The storms seem to calm a little. We all realise that it is not about shouting or pointing accusing fingers but about getting down to work, moving beyond programmatic assertion to active praxis. Some drop out of the race altogether. Those who went into hiding emerge with piles of work ready to be published. Very little of this work responds to any of the central challenges of the new musicology. (This does not please the musicologists.) But it is good, solid work in an older but no less valid tradition of scholarship.

2004. A new stability is in evidence; it is somewhat precarious, however. The *Sturm und Drang* of the 1990s and the undisguised bid for power have left a sharply delineated pluralism. New musicologists are not exactly thrilled with

the state of pluralism, for that means that some of the practices they criticised so vigorously in the 1990s can continue to exist – ethically speaking.

Meanwhile, the original target of Kerman's critique has developed a distinct profile. This New American Music Theory represents, in part, an intensification of older practices. The Schenkerian faction continues to produce analyses, sometimes in a revisionist spirit, always with appropriate reverence for the master.⁴ Previously under-populated areas of research – such as the study of rhythm, cognition, non-Western and non-canonical repertoires – are now sites of vigorous and suggestive work.⁵ The history of music theory, which in the old days facilitated dialogue between musicologists and theorists, receives a boost from a number of publications, notably Ian Bent's edited volumes of music analysis in the nineteenth century, and the monumental *Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, edited by Thomas Christensen.⁶ Hermeneutically inflected work, semiotic applications, close readings of compositions of early music, and a renewed interest in *Formenlehre* give new life to old practices.⁷ Most dramatic of all, perhaps, an aggressive new formalism emerges under the banner of transformational or neo-Riemannian theory, inspired by Kerman's one-time colleague, David Lewin. In the hands of a small but dedicated group of younger scholars, some of them boasting degrees in mathematics, the hard end of the discipline of music theory comes to life in a way that makes the 1960s and 1970s look tame.⁸ Moreover, the pursuit of neo-Riemannian theory proves to be collaborative in the best sense. The community of scholars sports a relatively democratic rather than hierarchic profile, like the very networks they worship. These and other formalist ventures are alive and very well, and have as good a chance of survival as any other musicological practice.

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How did Kerman misfire? Let us recall his argument. Looking back some 200 years, he identified a number of culprits: firstly, Forkel, for seeking to separate the life from the music of Bach, and for thinking of the musical organism as in some sense autonomous; then Hanslick, for saying that music was nothing but its sounding forms; then the founding fathers Schenker and Tovey, who did not themselves shun the aesthetic issue as such but somehow made possible its avoidance by later analysts; then latter-day analysts, notably Allen Forte, the most prominent music theorist in 1980 – a 'distinguished analyst', Kerman called him – whose rigorous exclusion of evaluative and critical commentary in a monograph on Beethoven's Op. 109 shocked Kerman the humanist.⁹ After situating the problem of analysis historically, Kerman argued that analysis was no more than ideology; he then closed by offering his own musico-poetic analysis of the second song from Schumann's *Dichterliebe* as a better alternative to Schenker's.

With the benefit of twenty-five years of hindsight, it is easy to point out flaws in the argument, among them Kerman's partisan portrayal of the field of music theory, his less than nuanced explication of Schenker's analytical technique, and his failure to recognise analysts' declared objectives. The claim that analysis is ideology now rings hollow in part because it overlooks its own ideological biases and risks becoming mere tautology.¹⁰ The alternatives to Schenker's analysis that Kerman offered were false alternatives. Schenker was perfectly capable of producing musico-poetic analyses if he so desired (look at his analysis of Schubert's 'Ihr Bild', for example¹¹), but on this occasion his aim was to illustrate an aspect of divided form via interruption. Hanslick's ostensible formalism now appears to have been exaggerated in twentieth-century accounts that ignore his broader argument, and thus miss the structural tension in his by now iconic claim that music is nothing more than 'forms moved in sounding'.¹² And regarding the question of autonomy, the point – surely – is not whether a work is autonomous (or relatively autonomous) but *when* in the analytical process it is appropriate to set it up as such for particular heuristic purposes.¹³ Finally, Kerman missed the entire pedagogical value of analysis, a value which, in the United States at least, accrues from the teaching of undergraduate music theory, and is in that sense tied to the acquisition of basic musical literacy, a task that is normally entrusted to theorists, not to historians or musicologists.¹⁴

The catchy title of his 1980 article notwithstanding, however, Kerman did *not* want us to get out of analysis, only 'out from under'.¹⁵ He wanted to see analysis done via the mediation of history, aesthetics and, above all, criticism. He wanted to see less of formalism, less empiricism and less positivism. At the same time Kerman was profoundly ambivalent about analysis, and this, it seems to me, is the point that needs emphasising. According to him, 'analysis, taken on its own terms, is one of the most deeply satisfying of all known critical systems'.¹⁶ He recognised its power, observed some very clever people doing it, and knew, therefore, that there had to be something to it. Indeed, as editor of the journal *19th-Century Music* he supported the activity by publishing highly technical articles by Allen Forte and David Lewin, among others.¹⁷ But instead of thematising ambivalence strongly and positively, he turned the guns on the Yale and Princeton of the 1960s and 1970s.

Analysis is a much more complex activity than certain institutional representations of it allow, and it is part of my aim in this article to go back to the beginning, so to speak, and restate some of the most basic aspects of the practice. In order to do this, we need to disentangle analysis from theory,¹⁸ not so as to deny that analyses are always already based on some theory or other, but to emphasise the rhetorical advantages of adopting a strategic and temporary blindness to the theoretical scaffolding on which a given analytical proceeding is based. Although analysis is sometimes regarded as a branch of

musicology, its affinities and structural parallels with performance and composition are, to my mind, even more pertinent, and provide the most powerful justification for its continued cultivation.

What is Analysis?

‘Musical analysis’, writes Ian Bent, is ‘that part of the study of music which takes as its starting-point the music itself rather than external factors.’¹⁹ Some may insist on a minimal definition of ‘music’, while others will wonder how firm is the line between ‘external’ and (presumably) ‘internal’ factors. But if we overlook these pertinent concerns, we can draw attention to what is most attractive about Bent’s definition, namely, the word ‘starting-point’. I stress this because it seems to me that the case against analysis has been made in part by people who failed to recognise that analysis is ideally permanently open, that it is dynamic and on-going, and that it is subject only to provisional closure. In an ideal world, analysis would go on always and forever.²⁰

Of the many ways in which analysis has been held to be beneficial, two in particular seem to me to be of special interest. The first is the claim that analysis aids perception; the second is Adorno’s insistence that only analysis can lead us to the truth content of a work. The former is widely acknowledged; the latter is not, but I believe it to be implicit in the thinking of many analysts.

Firstly, analysis as an aid to perception: analysis sharpens the listener’s ear, enhances perception and, in the best of cases, deepens appreciation. Detailed and intensive scrutiny of a work brings one into close contact with the musical material, leaving the analyst permanently transformed by the experience. No subsequent hearing of the work can fail to reflect this new, heightened awareness of its elements.

Something like this must have been at the back of Walter Riezler’s mind when he wrote, in his Beethoven biography of 1938 that

What the ‘analysis’ of music can do for us, and what makes it valuable – even indispensable – is this, and this only: it can sharpen the ear of the unperceptive listener in such a way as to enable him to appreciate the music’s organic growth; and it can therefore teach him to hear better, and so to intensify his impressions of what he hears, and not to substitute for an adventure of the living spirit a process of conscious thought . . . But the only way to accomplish this task is to confine the analysis strictly to the musical facts, and to try and explain by reference to the inner laws of music.²¹

As Beethoven’s biographer, Riezler certainly knew many facts – what Bent called ‘external factors’. But his approach to analysis is not based on a holistic model in which facts culled from biography, sociology, history and style are brought together in a mutually reinforcing process of inquiry. It is based, rather, on a deliberate narrowing of scope: confine the analysis to the strictly

musical facts and produce explanations that are governed by ‘the inner laws of music’. According to him, analysis teaches the unperceptive listener to hear better (the perceptive listener does not need analysis); it sharpens his ear, and makes him appreciate music’s organic growth. There is even an element of adventure involved here, one that opens up a spiritual dimension in our quest for meaning through analysis.

There is, however, no final state to hearing, only the latest state. Which is why Milton Babbitt, in a dispute with George Perle over certain ‘introductory observations’ he had made about Schoenberg’s Violin Concerto, insisted that it is not what you hear but what you can *learn to hear* that matters.²² Babbitt and others are aware of the negative testimony that enemies of analysis can produce, claiming, for example, that they failed to hear a certain derivation or motivic parallelism. But what about those who missed that relationship on first hearing, but taught themselves to hear it after thirteen hearings? And what if an analysis produces a set of relationships, only a subset of which is (meant to be) hearable? To say with Riezler, then, that analysis enables us to hear better is to say something in the way of an invitation or exhortation, not to place a binding requirement on the work of analysis.

Secondly, analysis and truth content: the activity of analysis, in bringing us face to face with the musical elements, with the detail and particularity of a work, with its inside – this explication draws us close to understanding what Adorno, following Benjamin, called the composition’s truth content, its *Wahrheitsgehalt*.²³ Talk of truth in our times leaves some people uneasy because of the fear – an irrational one – that the truth I claim is nothing but my truth; yours may be different, and so I may be attempting to impose mine on you, and that is a bad thing. Adorno, however, intended nothing straightforward by the idea of truth content, and while some might insist that there be a specifiable set of conditions for truth if the concept is to have minimum utility, there is a sense in which the essential gesture of hinting at or inviting a particular journey of discovery, is just as valuable, if not more valuable than settling the score with a series of closed truth-statements. Here is what Adorno wrote about analysis and truth content:

Analysis is no mere stopgap, but is an essential element of art itself. . . . Analysis has to do with the surplus [*das Mehr*] in art: it is concerned with that abundance which unfolds itself only by means of analysis. It aims at that which . . . is the truly [‘musical’] in [music], and the truly [musical] in [music] is that which defies translation . . . [T]he ultimate ‘surplus’ over and beyond the factual level is the truth content, and naturally it is only critique that can discover the truth content. No analysis is of any value if it does not terminate in the truth content of the work, and this, for its part, is mediated through the work’s technical structure.²⁴

Unpacking ‘truth content’ could benefit from a brief recall of Adorno’s view of music analysis. According to him, performers and analysts are united in

investigating the 'inner relationships of the work'. The performer's task is an investigation of 'what is essentially contained within the composition'. Getting at structure, or more specifically, immanent structure, is an essential part of the analyst's task, for the analyst is concerned above all with 'structural hearing'. The analyst's cues come not from outside but from within the work, for in order 'to be able to enter [the composition's] structure analytically', she or he must let it 'assert itself'. This in turn demands systematic investigation. The analyst must not run away from asking *why* a particular relationship, event or process occurs; nor must she or he be distracted by investigations into compositional process, investigations that only tell us what has been 'put into' the work. The analyst must not be distracted by questions of intentionality, as when sceptics wonder whether the composer was conscious of relationships unearthed by the analyst. Analysis is not mere description, nor is it bound by a consideration of wholes or of totality; it could just as legitimately concern itself with parts or fragments. And each analysis must produce a result unique to the work; it must bring out the problem, or – as we would say today, perhaps – the unique problematic of each work. It is within this broad context and against this heterogeneous background that any discussion of a work's truth content should proceed.

Adorno's pursuit of truth content may seem mystifying to some Anglo-American analysts, who are generally impatient with discourses that do not specify things in quantities or with empirical precision or with the aid of explicit taxonomies. And yet, it is not easy to dismiss the idea that an analysis falls short if it does not get at the 'truth content', the surplus in a composition – given the obvious fact that the compositions that analysts from Schenker to Lewin have lavished attention upon are, for the most part, canonical masterworks whose secrets are not exhausted by a metric reduction or a voice-leading graph or even a stunning live performance. Analysis must finally respond to this element of a work, Adorno implies, without simplifying, and certainly without distorting through crass or premature specification of the nature of the truth content.

It might also be helpful to know what the truth content is not. According to Adorno, the challenges and rewards of exploring the truth content of a composition are at their most productive in the study of masterpieces. Composers such as Bach, Beethoven, Mahler and especially Webern, who set things in motion, who make possible other possibilities, and who are thus, in a historical sense, origins or fountainheads, may be described, in Foucault's words, as *founders of discursivity*. They are 'not just [composers] of their own works. They have produced something else: the possibilities and the rules for the formation of other [musical texts].'²⁵ Foucault's founders of discursivity are, in the first instance, critics and philosophers, Marx and Freud, not artists. Thus Rameau and Schenker, for example, would be founders of discursivity.

In a deeper sense, however, founders of discursivity are those composers whose work proves profoundly enabling.

What, finally, is the truth content of a composition? It is not a summary of the piece, be it verbal, diagrammatic or symbolic. It is not, therefore, a background structure like the Schenkerian *Ursatz* that makes possible a series of contrapuntal happenings. Although the *Ursatz*, or a formal scheme, or a concise verbal summary may in a sense harbour conventional truths – the plural is crucial – such truths are not identical with Adorno's truth content, which must be understood not as a concrete presence that can be beheld but as a constantly receding target, an object that becomes more elusive the closer one gets to it. Reassuring is the fact that the journey itself, the act of probing, necessarily generates content. But not all such content is admissible as part of a composition's truth content.

Adorno insists that the truth content be mediated by a composition's technical structure, and this suggests that an analysis that displays minimal engagement with a work's technical structure not as an end but as a means to an end cannot possibly hope to reveal its 'truth content'. In other words, we are not finished with formalism, despite the ritual and by now ineffectual denunciation of so-called 'formalism' by certain musicologists. Mediation allows passage from one state to another, facilitates translation, and encourages a self-awareness in the performance of an analysis. But the truth content is only mediated by the technical structure; the technical structure's objects, its products, do not constitute the truth content even if they participate in its articulation. So, a distinctive feature – such as the appearance of brass instruments at a given moment in the work – cannot be coterminus with the truth content although it may facilitate its discovery. Nor is the truth content a particular phrase, climax or cadence, although noting these may provide access to such truth.

Metaphors of ascension to an elusive 'truth content' enshrine a strategic process of deferral. Internalising this strategy – which also entails resisting the easy temptations of attaining closure – is a prerequisite for adequate analysis. The truth content is not necessarily a literal, empirical truth but rather a dynamic, motivating truth designed partly to anchor listening in specific socio-cultural and historical moments even while – and this is the paradox of it – releasing the analyst from the dubious responsibility of having to establish the authenticity of the analysis. All of this boils down to an attitude, an ethical attitude, perhaps.²⁶

Adorno's view of analysis is considerably more complicated and contradictory than I have indicated here, but the emphasis on mediation by technical structure brings us to the central claim of this article, namely, that analysis is most productively understood and practiced as a mode of performance and as a mode of composition.

Analysis as Performance

Many of us take for granted the fact that even the most routine preparation of a composition for performance demands prior analytical reflection, generally of an informal sort. The claim that analysis aids performance is therefore not controversial. This is not to say that a pianist preparing Chopin's Op. 28 Preludes for performance is obliged to make a metric reduction of each of them, or that basses singing the *St Matthew Passion* should undertake a Roman numeral analysis of each chorale, or that the string players of Webern's Op. 28 string quartet must know which note in which row form they are playing at a particular moment. It is only to assert that some awareness of these ways of analysing may inform the playing or singing, even if the enabling insights are not gathered into a separate and explicitly conceptual order.²⁷

More interesting are certain inexact parallels between analysis and performance as separate activities. Four claims flowing from this proposition are as follows: firstly, analytical knowledge is not necessarily cumulative; secondly, analytical knowledge resists or escapes verbal summary; thirdly, analysis is a hands-on activity; and fourthly, analysis may be if not primarily then at least equally an oral rather than a written genre.

Firstly, analytical knowledge, whatever it is, is not necessarily cumulative, just as performance knowledge is not necessarily cumulative. By this I mean that analysis, like performance, entails a fresh engagement, a re-enactment, not an aggregation of facts about previous enactments, even if these provide hints for a current proceeding. Just as performing musicians continue to record the 'Appassionata' Sonata, or the *Rite of Spring*, or *Bolero*, so analysts return again and again to their favourite pieces: the C major Prelude that opens Book 1 of the *Well-Tempered Clavier*, the theme of Mozart's A major Sonata K. 331, the Prelude to *Tristan and Isolde*, and the fourth of Webern's pieces for String Quartet Op. 5. This point is missed by those who expect analysis to yield certain epistemological secrets, secrets that in turn index new, positivistic knowledge. The aim of the 50th analysis of the 'Appassionata' is not to add incrementally to the previous 49 (although it can do that); it is rather to provide the analyst with an opportunity to make the 'Appassionata' his or her own. Just as we do not ask of the 50th recording of the 'Eroica' what new knowledge it adds to the previous 49, so we should not expect of an analysis that it add to some existing body of positive knowledge. Of course, different analysts notice different things, and different methods of analysis illuminate different aspects of a composition, so it is possible to show that one analysis exceeds a previous one from a specific point of view. And no doubt some analysts are motivated by a desire to demonstrate the poverty of a previous analysis, or the greater explanatory scope of their own theory. But I believe that the more fundamental motivation lies in the desire to inhabit temporarily a certain sonic world – and

to enjoy the sensuous pleasure of so doing. Only in response to certain institutional imperatives in the modern academy/economy does the motivation for analysis become primarily positivistic in nature.

Are we on the verge of anti-intellectualism here, or simply anti-positivism? Perhaps both. If we free the analyst of the responsibility of coming up with new knowledge, do we not then deliver him or her up to a self-indulgent, haphazard undertaking in the manner of Roland Barthes's *jouissance*? One can, of course, analyse a performance and specify its technical means, just as one can show that an analysis subtends certain technical means. But laying bare such means is a trivial, post-analytical exercise. In the analytical moment, we push through the labyrinth of technical structure towards Adorno's truth content. We push forward in a compositional mode, playing with elements, rearranging them to see what might have been, and entering into rigorous speculation about music as intentional discourse. We look vigilantly for relations, connections, and ways of relating and connecting. This is hands-on, parasitic inquiry of the first order. It guarantees nothing save the pleasure – or edification, if you want to get pious about it – of doing. The value of analysis should not rest on the accumulation of analytic discourses. On the contrary, analysis depends crucially on a regular reinvention of the wheel. Analysis is at its most vital when it denies history and precedent.

A second feature of analysis follows from this stance: beyond its most superficial manifestations, analytical knowledge resists verbal summary. When you place provisional closure on an analysis, hand it in as an assignment, or submit it to a theory or musicology journal, you may be asked to summarise your analysis, highlight its main points, provide a synopsis or an abstract. What a strange requirement! What a profound diminishing of the nature of the 'knowledge' produced! Is not the written analysis itself already a diminution of the analytical experience? Imagine – and I mean this only trivially – asking a violinist who has just returned backstage after a riveting performance of, say, the Sibelius Violin Concerto, to summarise the performance in words? What words could possibly convey the dimensions of such an act?

Depending on the kind of metalanguage employed, summaries or synopses of analyses do not always make inspiring narratives. If the narrative seems interesting, chances are that it is less of a summary than a speculative projection that is not organically linked to the analysis. A good analysis leads you back to the composition; you re-enter that world, reconsider its making, and resume the process of exploration. The outcome may be silent speech or inner speaking, not sound. The process is circular – unavoidably circular. To conclude, for example, that what an analysis shows is that a particular composition is saturated with Z-related hexachords, or that the first movement of the 'Waldstein' composes out a 3-line – this is to trivialise the whole rich experience by bowing to the pressures of verbal representation. There are, of

course, analyses whose purpose is to exemplify an existing theory; such analyses are different from the exploratory kind discussed here.

(Incidentally, it has always seemed striking to me that in the journal *19th-Century Music*, close reading of a composition – which presumably forms a critical and valuable portion of an analytical article – is frequently placed in smaller font. When the close reading is over, the font size is brought back up. The reader is therefore unwittingly encouraged to skip the technical details. Yet, it is those very technical details, the manner in which they are produced and assembled, and the kinds of connections they encourage or overlook that should lead us towards a work's truth content. How telling, then, that the editors of that journal (including Kerman) chose to place a health warning over the consumption of technical details!)²⁸

Thirdly, analysis is emphatically a hands-on activity. (In one sense, all disciplines are hands-on, but many have summarisable results that analysis lacks.) The hands-on nature of analysis stems from the fact that the knowledge it produces is not necessarily objective or replicable, like an archival report, but subjective, an invitation to a way of perceiving. If, on the basis of meticulous archival research, you succeed in establishing a new death date for say, Antoine Busnoys, then you report your finding so that it can be taken on board as the new fact, and is transmitted as such within the scholarly community. But the comparable facts of analysis do not work in quite this way, unless they are overly general or trivial, or disclose aspects of pre-compositional planning. There is always a surplus to be contended with because the materiality of the proceeding is its own reward.²⁹

Advocating hands-on activity in a capitalist, material economy is fraught with difficulty. At a time when university and government administrators, citing budgetary constraints, insist that professional activities have specifiable outcomes, portraying analysis as a never-ending quest with sensuous as well as intellectual benefits will seem strange, mystifying or even irresponsible. True, some mode of evaluating students and teachers is unavoidable, given the relative scarcity of resources and the fact of competition. But if we consider the disincentives to imaginative indulgence placed on us by such bureaucratic hurdles, then we should properly be working towards undermining them.

Fourthly, it may be that analysis is ideally an oral genre, and that, within the complex dynamics of orality, it achieves a depth that is not available within the written tradition. In this sense, too, analysis and performance are very much alike. Effective verification of analytical claims in the classroom demands regular recourse to the sounds being analysed, if not in actuality then imaginatively. Testing such claims, advancing alternative paths through a given composition, or pursuing a hypothesis about the secret of structure of a particular work often requires an on-going shuttling back and forth between actual sounds and the supplementary texts that ostensibly explain them. The balance

is negotiated differently by different analysts. Some can be quite detached, non-sensuous and entirely intellectual; others monkey around constantly, enjoying the sound of the music and retreating from the intellectual endeavour; some even allow themselves to be so distracted by the musical sonority that they suspend thought entirely and surrender to feeling. The point, however, is that the oral/aural home of music analysis has an effect on the kind of knowledge produced.

Jean-Jacques Nattiez once considered this possibility but gave the edge to the institutional accumulation of written knowledge:

Could music analysis be an oral genre, or even an oral tradition? It must face the following problem: no analysis is truly rigorous unless written down (Granger), an epistemological elaboration of the adage '*Verba volant, scripta manent*', since the *record* of the analysis enables it to be checked: once it is written down, it is possible to review, criticise and go beyond an analysis. Even with a very elaborate oral analysis, the listener has the physical problem of being unable to retain everything. If the teacher manages to give the impression of having penetrated the work deeply, the listener will be left with a positive 'aura', but a cumulative advancement of knowledge cannot be developed on the basis of impressions.³⁰

Arnold Whittall, on the other hand, contends that 'in a class, communication between teacher and students on the basis of their musical understanding [is] fundamentally aural; any other approach [is] always secondary'.³¹ The challenge for analysts, then, is to find imaginative ways of reconciling the conflicting imperatives between behaviour in class and behaviour after class, so to speak, between doing (which is never free of reflection, however geared to the moment it might be) and reflection, which responds ultimately to a different imperative – that of capital accumulation.

Analysis as Composition

Analysis, like composition, is a form of making, of doing, of constructing. Mysterious yet plain, composition subtends an infinite variety of sound ideals, creative practices and ethical motivation. Yet no tradition of musical composition has managed to escape the dimension of doing. And just as composition is a hands-on activity, so is analysis. Some have gone so far as to claim a near-compositional status for the analyst's representations. Schenker, for example, in a remarkable statement in *Free Composition*, claimed that

The musical examples which accompany this volume are not merely practical aids; they have the same power and conviction as the visual aspect of the printed composition itself (the foreground). That is, the graphic representation is part of the actual composition, not merely an educational means.³²

This verges on heresy. How can an analyst's graph have the same status as the actual composition? Are not voice-leading graphs 'mere' repositories of information about a composition?³³ Yes, but if you consider that the making of such graphs sometimes encourages the discretionary inscription of motifs and themes, which in turn betrays an incipient artistic impulse – however tentative – then it is obvious that we are not talking simply about data but about performed data. Moreover, graphs function as supplements to the work, not optional supplements but strong, necessary supplements, potential replacements. What Schenker meant, then, may be that the graph should always and ideally lead you back to the music; once you have encountered it, it becomes 'part of the actual composition'. Once you have encountered it, your perception of the composition is permanently transformed.

Most important, however, is the extent to which analysis is always already composition. If music is a form of language, then we might expect analysts to speak that language. To speak music as a language requires that one be in a position to make statements in music using the appropriate idiolect. An analyst who is detached from the nature of the musical language and lacks recreative ability within it may well promote views of musical structure that are at variance with the conventions upon which the repertoire in question was composed in the first place. This is not to imply that only those methods developed at or near the time of composition have any validity at all; it is only a claim that the ability to speak music as a mother tongue should be a requirement for proper and insightful analysis.³⁴

A primitive manifestation of this tendency to 'speak music' may be observed in the composing of prototypes for more complex surfaces. Alertness to what might have been has proved to be an important tool in music analysis. When skilfully constructed, fictions can serve a powerful explanatory function. Knowing when to deploy them calls for imagination and judgement. And the ability to construct a plausible fiction calls for elementary compositional skill. There was a time when such composing was central to the work of analysts. This was in the 1960s, in the era of composer-theorists, not the non-composing theorists who now dominate the field. For example, an author submitting an analytical study to the journal *Perspectives of New Music* was encouraged to offer his or her own recomposition of the composition analysed. This was a way of wringing a contemporary relevance out of the analytical exercise. The analyst translated the language of the older – or simply different – work into his or her own language, and then proceeded to make new, artistic statements. You could not be an analyst if you lacked compositional skill.³⁵

Alertness to what might have been, itself enabled by a native and spontaneous compositional instinct, has proved to be an asset in some areas of analytical research, notably the understanding of chromaticism and musical phraseology, and – specifically – for outing the hidden in Hans Keller's

functional analysis.³⁶ Limitations of space forbid discussion of all three forms of hypothesising, but a comment on chromaticism may not be inappropriate.

An enduring view locates the origins of chromatic elements in diatonic prototypes, mixture and in tonicisation. Understanding chromatic music in this view means understanding it in terms of other constructs, duly supplied by the analyst to make life easier. There is, in other words, no separate chromatic system, only a derivative one built on diatonic premises. The analyst's task, therefore, is to invent grammatically plausible prototypes to explain deviant, chromatic passages.³⁷

Understanding chromaticism as derivative, as borne of diatonicism, is not universally accepted: some theories insist on the autonomy of chromatic elements and hence on the viability of originary chromaticism.³⁸ But putting aside the disagreements about origins, what I wish to point out here is the impulse to fabricate prototypes as aids to understanding. Of course, the challenge of recomposition can range from simple, two-bar progressions to entire movements. Nonetheless, even having to supply a prototype that meets certain basic syntactical constraints points to one of the points of intersection between analysis and composition. Here it is not so much that analysis is like composition but that analysing entails composing.

Recomposition is not an innocent practice, however, for it can be used to lie. The fictional texts that are put in place to facilitate understanding of a complex passage are exactly that: fictions, imaginary constructions designed to persuade, titillate, amuse, entertain, lead in a certain musical direction or mislead. So we need an ethical attitude towards constructing these fictions. On the other hand, because fictions are the ultimate facilitators of truth-telling, because they are sites for unconstrained imagining, fictional musical-conceptual constructs are precisely what we need in order to enter the most productive speculations in and about music. Imaginatively composed explanatory props provide access to a work's truth content.

When analysis is realigned with composition, we restore to it a measure of improvisation, liberate it from the requirement of making propositional statements, and reconfigure its epistemological requirements to privilege play. In short, the link with composition encourages more thinking in music about music.

Conclusion

In this article I have tried to restore a vision of music analysis that stresses its affinities with performance and composition without denying its autonomy. This vision differs from the critical-aesthetic programme set out two-and-a-half decades ago by Joseph Kerman.

I have argued that analysis is like performance and also like composition. Performance, an in-time rendition based on a variable period of preparation,

stakes a claim to presentness, to the here and now as ultimate site for entering certain speculations in and about music. It gives pleasure to the performer and edifies the listener. Although it makes epistemological points indirectly, its aim is not to explain or teach as such; it is rather to overwhelm, entertain, amuse, challenge, move, enable indeed to explore the entire range of emotions, if not in actuality then very definitely in simulated form, at a second level of articulation, so to speak. And composition as the art of making, of putting together, shares with analysis the speaking of music as a language.

To stress these connections is not to collapse the distinct activities into one another; it is rather to seek to relieve analysts of the burden of having to order knowledge according to institutional paradigms that are insensitive to the peculiar materiality of music. *Pace* Kerman, then, the issue is not how to get out of analysis, for logically speaking it is impossible to do so. The issue, rather, is finding the most creative *musical* ways of remaining in, with or under analysis.

NOTES

An earlier version of this article was given as a paper under the title 'Analysis as Performance' at Miami University, Oxford, OH, in 1999. The present version was given to the Faculty of Music at Cambridge University on 28 January 2004 as one of four 2003–4 Donald Wort Lectures. It was also read to the Princeton Theory Group in June 2004. On each occasion, I received helpful comments – negative and otherwise – for which I am grateful.

1. Joseph Kerman, 'How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out', *Critical Inquiry*, 7 (1980), pp. 311–31; published as 'The State of Academic Music Criticism', in Kingsley Price (ed.), *On Criticizing Music: Five Philosophical Perspectives* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), pp. 38–54; reprinted in Kerman, *Write All These Down: Essays on Music* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 12–32, from which quotations in this article are taken.
2. Kerman, *Musicology* (London: Fontana, 1985); also published as *Contemplating Music: Challenges to Musicology* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985). Widely reviewed and frequently cited, *Contemplating Music* was a key text in debates about the nature and purposes of musicology from the mid-1980s onwards. Ruth Solie says that it memorably 'stir[red] up trouble' (in a review of Kevin Korsyn, *Decentering Music: a Critique of Contemporary Musical Research, Music and Letters*, 85/iii (2004), p. 418).
3. Those who are still in the dark as to what the new musicology is or does may wish to consult Lawrence Kramer, 'Musicology and Meaning', *Musical Times*, 144 [1883] (2003), pp. 6–12). He describes the new musicology as a 'research programme developed largely in the English-speaking world during the 1990s'. It seeks 'to combine aesthetic insight into music with a fuller understanding of its

cultural, social, historical and political dimensions than was customary for most of the twentieth century'. It is committed, moreover, to 'a principled resistance to over-idealising music'. Kramer names himself among five leading practitioners, the others being Philip Brett, Susan McClary, Rose Subotnik and Richard Leppert. Although he acknowledges the existence of 'numerous others on both sides of the Atlantic', the refusal to name influential figures such as Carolyn Abbate and Gary Tomlinson in this particular breath suggests that there may be more at stake here than merely providing an objective guide to a new style of enquiry. For more on the new musicology's desires, see Robert Fink, 'Elvis Everywhere: Musicology and Popular Music Studies at the Twilight of the Canon', *American Music*, 16/ii (1998), pp. 135–79. Peter Williams questions some of their practices in 'Peripheral Visions?', *Musical Times*, 145 [1886] (2004), pp. 51–67. Also of interest is the staged confrontation between Andrew Dell'Antonio and Stefano Castelvechi on the relative merits and demerits of the new musicology. See their 'statements' and 'closing remarks' in David Greer (ed.) with Ian Rumbold and Jonathan King, *Musicology and Sister Disciplines: Past, Present, Future. Proceedings of the 16th International Congress of the International Musicological Society, London, 1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 179–84, 185–90, 226–7 and 228–9.

4. On Schenker today, see William Rothstein's no-nonsense review of recent Schenkerian studies ('Articles on Schenker and Schenkerian Theory in *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*', *Journal of Music Theory*, 45/i (2001), pp. 204–26). Rothstein's tone serves as a reminder that criteria of correctness continue to matter in certain corners of Schenkerian research. See also Brian Hyer's vigorous response to a few paragraphs in Rothstein's review ('A Reply to William Rothstein', *Journal of Music Theory*, 46/i–ii (2002), pp. 347–63). Hyer broadens the intellectual basis of the debate and in the process highlights the differing commitments of insiders and outsiders, pedagogues and intellectuals. For a current and comprehensive bibliography, see David Carson Berry, *A Topical Guide to Schenkerian Literature: an Annotated Bibliography with Indices* (New York: Pendragon, 2004).
5. Two influential but methodologically divergent approaches to rhythmic and metric understanding are Christopher Hasty, *Meter as Rhythm* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) (which might be read profitably in conjunction with Arnold Whittall's review in *Journal of Music Theory*, 43/ii (1999), pp. 359–71) and Harald Krebs, *Fantasy Pieces: Metrical Dissonance in the Music of Robert Schumann* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). See also Justin London, *Hearing in Time: Psychological Aspects of Musical Meter* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). A sampling of cognitively oriented research might include David Huron, 'Tone and Voice: a Derivation of the Rules of Voice-Leading from Perceptual Principles', *Music Perception*, 19/i (2001), pp. 1–64; Fred Lerdahl, *Tonal Pitch Space* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); David Temperley, *The Cognition of Basic Musical Structures* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001); and Lawrence Zbikowski, *Conceptualizing Music: Cognitive Structure, Theory and Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For analytical studies of non-Western music, see Michael Tenzer, *Gamelan gong kebyar: the Art of Twentieth-*

- Century Balinese Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Willie Anku, 'Circles and Time', *Music Theory Online*, 6 (2000), www.smt.ucsb.edu/mto/issues/mto.00.6.1/mto.00.6.1.anku.html; Robert Morris, 'Variation and Process in South Indian Music: Some *Kritis* and their *Sangatis*', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 23/i (2001), pp. 74–89; and Martin Scherzinger, 'Negotiating the Music-Theory/African-Music Nexus: a Political Critique of Ethnomusicological Anti-Formalism and a Strategic Analysis of the Harmonic Patterning of the Shona Mbira Song *Nyamaropa*', *Perspectives of New Music*, 39 (2001), pp. 5–118. Analytical studies of rock may be found in Betsy Marvin and Richard Hermann (eds), *Concert Music, Rock, and Jazz Since 1945: Essays and Analytical Studies* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1995).
6. Ian Bent (ed.), *Music Analysis in the Nineteenth Century*. Vol. 1: *Fugue, Form and Style*; Vol. 2: *Hermeneutic Approaches* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Thomas Christensen (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Western Music Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
 7. For a striking hermeneutic exercise, see Brian Hyer, 'Second Immediacies in the *Eroica*', in Ian Bent (ed.), *Music Theory in the Age of Romanticism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 77–104. Recent contributions to the field of semiotics include Robert Hatten, *Musical Meaning in Beethoven: Markedness, Correlation, and Interpretation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Eero Tarasti, *A Theory of Musical Semiotics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Robert Samuels, *Mahler's Sixth Symphony: a Study in Semiotics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Raymond Monelle, *The Sense of Music: Semiotic Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Naomi Cumming, *The Sonic Self: Musical Subjectivity and Signification* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000). An exemplary collection of analyses of early music is Mark Everist (ed.), *Models of Musical Analysis: Music Before 1600* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). See also Cristle Collins Judd (ed.), *Tonal Structures in Early Music* (New York: Garland, 1998). Regarding the tradition of *Formenlehre*, see William Caplin's path-breaking *Classical Form: a Theory of Formal Functions for the Instrumental Music of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). Of comparable interest is the 'sonata theory' being developed by James Hepokoski and Warren Darcy, an instalment of which is 'The Medial Caesura and its Role in the Eighteenth-Century Sonata Exposition', *Music Theory Spectrum*, 19/ii (1997), pp. 115–54. Less taxonomically driven but musically more satisfying is Robert P. Morgan's emerging theory of form, which lays great store by notions of circularity: see, among other publications, 'Coda as Culmination: the First Movement of the "Eroica" Symphony', in Christopher Hatch and David W. Bernstein (eds), *Music Theory and the Exploration of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 357–76; 'Circular Form in the *Tristan* Prelude', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 53/i (2000), pp. 69–103; and 'The Concept of Unity and Musical Analysis', *Music Analysis*, 22/i–ii (2003), pp. 7–50, in particular the analysis of the first movement of Beethoven Op. 132. Scott Burnham provides a cogent guide to 'the analysis of large-scale tonal form' in 'Form', in Christensen (ed.), *Cambridge History of Western Music Theory*, pp. 880–906.

8. The *Journal of Music Theory* devoted an entire issue to the subject of Neo-Riemannian theory: see, in particular, Richard Cohn, 'An Introduction to Neo-Riemannian Theory: a Survey and a Historical Perspective', *Journal of Music Theory*, 42/ii (1998), pp. 167–80. Although only a few years old, that issue is already in need of a sizeable supplement in order to take into account important new writings by Dmitri Tymoczko, Ian Quinn, Joseph Straus, Edward Gollin, Richard Cohn and others.
9. In Kerman's words, Forte 'wrote an entire small book, *The Compositional Matrix* (1961), from which all affective or valuational terms (such as "nice" or "good") are meticulously excluded' ('How We Got into Analysis', p. 14).
10. See Terry Eagleton, *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).
11. Heinrich Schenker, '*Ihr Bild* (August 1828): Song by Franz Schubert to a Lyric by Heinrich Heine', trans. Robert Pascall, *Music Analysis*, 19/i (2000), pp. 3–9. An earlier translation by William Pastille appeared in *Sonus*, 6/ii (1986), pp. 31–7. A newer translation by Robert Snarrenberg may be found in *Der Tonwille: Pamphlets in Witness of the Immutable Laws of Music, Offered to a New Generation of Youth by Heinrich Schenker*, Vol. 1: Issues 1–5 (1921–3), ed. William Drabkin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 41–3).
12. Carl Dahlhaus, *Esthetics of Music*, trans. William Austin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 52. Originally published in 1854 as *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* (Leipzig: Barth), Hanslick's treatise has come to be associated in the English-speaking world with formalist aesthetics. Yet, as Dahlhaus's brief commentary makes clear, its message may not be as straightforward as has been imagined. *Vom Musikalisch-Schönen* is excerpted by and translated in Bojan Bujic (ed.), *Music in European Thought, 1851–1912* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 11–39. For a complete translation, see Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful: a Contribution Towards the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986).
13. I am echoing an argument made by Leo Treitler in 'Postmodern Signs in Musical Studies', *Journal of Musicology*, 13/i (1995), p. 12.
14. Patrick McCreless addresses music theorists' pedagogical burden in an insightful account of the state of the field. See his 'Rethinking Contemporary Music Theory', in Anahid Kassabian, David Schwarz and Lawrence Siegel (eds), *Keeping Score: Music, Disciplinarity, Culture* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1997), pp. 13–53.
15. Kerman, 'How We Got into Analysis', p. 30.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
17. See, for example, Allen Forte, 'Liszt's Experimental Idiom and Music of the Early Twentieth Century', *19th-Century Music*, 10/iii (1987), pp. 209–28 and David Lewin, 'On Harmony and Meter in Brahms's Opus 76 No. 8', *19th-Century Music*, 4 (1981), pp. 261–5.
18. The best articulation of theory and analysis as separate domains of enquiry

- remains David Lewin, 'Behind the Beyond: a Response to Edward T. Cone', *Perspectives of New Music*, 7 (1968–9), pp. 59–69.
19. Ian Bent, 'Analysis', in Stanley Sadie (ed.), *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1980), p. 341.
 20. A tiny but telling reordering of sentences in the revised article gives pride of place to the sentence that includes 'starting-point'. This enhances the view that the essential character of analysis is open and dynamic. See Ian Bent and Anthony Pople, 'Analysis', in Stanley Sadie and John Tyrell (eds), *The New Grove Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, 2nd rev. edn, Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 2001), p. 256.
 21. Walter Riezler, *Beethoven*, trans. G.D.H. Pidcock (New York: Vienna House, 1938), p. 20.
 22. 'I cannot assume responsibility for what is "heard"', wrote Babbitt, 'but only for what can be learned to be "heard"'. Otherwise, I should be at the mercy of the inadequate training, knowledge, intellectual capacity and dubious veracity of any listener offered as a counterexample'' See his 'Reply to George Perle', in *The Collected Essays of Milton Babbitt*, ed. Stephen Peles with Stephen Dembski, Andrew Mead and Joseph N. Straus (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 142.
 23. T. W. Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', trans. Max Paddison, *Music Analysis*, 1/ii (1982), p. 176. For another celebration of implicit truths accruing from hands-on analytical doing, see Pieter van den Toorn, *Music, Politics and the Academy* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).
 24. Adorno, 'On the Problem of Musical Analysis', p. 177.
 25. Michel Foucault, 'What is an Author?', in *Textual Strategies: Perspectives in Post-Structuralist Criticism*, ed. Josué V. Harari (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1979), p. 154.
 26. The ethics of music analysis (as distinct from theory or criticism) is a subject awaiting proper discovery and comprehensive discussion by Anglo-American music theorists. Fruitful pointers may be found in the analytical writings of David Lewin. See, for example, 'Some Instances of Parallel Voice-Leading in Debussy', *19th-Century Music*, 11/i (1987), pp. 59–72, which pursues the truth content of Debussy's 'Canope' in an authentically Adornian spirit without Adorno's evasion of technical exegesis. See also Nicholas Cook, 'Schenker's Theory of Music as Ethics', *Journal of Musicology*, 7 (1989), pp. 415–39 and Leslie D. Blasius, 'Nietzsche, Riemann, Wagner: When Music Lies', in Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (eds), *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 93–107.
 27. See Dunsby, *Performing Music: Shared Concerns* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) for a stimulating discussion of various kinds of conceptual baggage that one may or may not bring to the moment of performance. Also of interest is John Rink (ed.), *Musical Performance: a Guide to Understanding* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

28. In Forte, 'Liszt's Experimental Idiom', almost all the analyses are featured in reduced font. Similarly, in R. Larry Todd, 'Of Sea Gulls and Counterpoint: the Early Versions of Mendelssohn's Hebrides Overture', *19th-Century Music*, 2/iii (1997), pp. 197–213, the close reading is in smaller font. Most dramatic of all is the choreographing of Richard Taruskin, 'Chez Pétrouchka: Harmony and Tonality chez Stravinsky', *19th-Century Music*, 10/iii (1987), pp. 265–86. The section of close reading beginning on p. 276 with the statement, 'The C of the opening section is not a conventionally established tonic', is typeset in a smaller sized font. Four pages later, when the close reading is over, the original font size is restored as the author assures us that 'Whether or not one accepts all the details of this analysis, the essential point seems clear enough.' This play of fonts confers an almost parenthetical status on passages of close reading and inverts the priorities that might be adopted in consuming written analyses.
29. The distinction between making (*poiesis*) and doing (*praxis*), theory and practice, and knowledge and action is discussed both historically and systematically by John Dewey in *The Quest for Certainty: a Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (New York: Minton, Balch and Co., 1929). Dewey traces some 'historic grounds for the elevation of knowledge above making and doing', explains that an element of uncertainty is inherent in practical activity, and concludes that 'the quest for complete certainty can be fulfilled in pure knowing alone. Such is the verdict of our most enduring philosophic tradition'. Such, too, is the verdict of a musicology that demands positive results and is impatient with analysis as a practical, 'purposeless' activity. In a recent radical critique of hermeneutic and formalist analytic discourses, Carolyn Abbate echoes Dewey when she extols the virtues of performance and associated pleasures as ends rather than means (Abbate, 'Music – Drastic or Gnostic?', *Critical Inquiry*, 30/iii (2004), pp. 505–36).
30. Jean-Jacques Nattiez, 'Varèse's "Density 21.5": a Study in Semiological Analysis', trans. Anna Barry, *Music Analysis*, 1/iii (1982), p. 244.
31. Reported in Jonathan Cross, 'Colloquium: Can Analysis Be Taught?', *Music Analysis*, 4/i–ii (1985), p. 191. A comprehensive study of the interfaces between orality, aurality, notation and words in the production of music analyses is long overdue. Important leads may be found in the writings of philosophically aware music theorists such as Benjamin Boretz and Hans Keller, and these could in turn be refreshed by notions of supplementarity central to Derrida's *Of Grammatology*, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
32. Schenker, *Free Composition*, trans. Ernst Oster (New York: Longmann, 1979), p. xxiii.
33. See Agawu, 'Schenkerian Notation in Theory and Practice', *Music Analysis*, 8/iii (1989), pp. 275–301, for comment on styles of analytic graphing.
34. Carolyn Abbate explores Nietzsche's Wagnerian claim that some of the trappings of opera lead away from – rather than towards – the music itself, producing 'people who do not speak music as their mother tongue' (*Unsung Voices: Opera*

and Musical Narrative in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 15–16).

35. For two out of several examples of compositions provoked by analysis, see Christopher Wintle, 'An Early Version of Derivation: Webern's Op. 11/3', *Perspectives of New Music*, 13/ii (Spring-Summer, 1975), pp. 166–77, which ends with the author's 'recomposition' of Webern's cello-piano piece; and John Rogers, 'Pitch-Class Sets in Fourteen Measures of Mozart's Jupiter Symphony', *Perspectives of New Music*, 9/ii–10/i (1971), pp. 209–31, which offers 'the concluding bars of [Rogers's own] Trio for flute, cello, and piano in conclusion'. Writers on rhythm sometimes normalise phrases in order to make analytical points. A good example is William Rothstein, 'Rhythmic Displacement and Rhythmic Normalization', in Allen Cadwallader (ed.), *Trends in Schenkerian Research* (New York: Schirmer, 1990), pp. 78–113. The practice is widespread, however.
36. Hans Keller's brand of functional analysis requires that the analyst intervene compositionally. Not surprisingly, it has gone virtually unnoticed in the American academy, where theory and composition are no longer as close as they once were. For an introduction to Keller's thought, see Christopher Wintle (ed.), 'Hans Keller (1919–1985): a Memorial Symposium', *Music Analysis*, 5/ii–iii (1986).
37. Matthew Brown guides us to Schenker's view of chromaticism in 'The Diatonic and the Chromatic in Schenker's Theory of Harmonic Relations', *Journal of Music Theory*, 30/i (1986), pp. 1–31.
38. Originary chromaticism dispenses entirely with diatonic motivation and incorporates non-diatonic elements into the set of primitives of tonal behaviour. Thus, when Robert Bailey (*Wagner, 'Tristan' Prelude* (New York: Norton, 1985)) collapses the universe of 24 major and minor keys into 12 modally interchangeable keys in order to account for nineteenth-century tonal practice, he posits a form of originary chromaticism. Similarly, approaches that hold the chromatic scale as inviolate, including those stemming from set theory, implicitly deny prior diatonicism, and are therefore originary. Obviously, the consequences of adopting either approach differ fundamentally depending on whether the repertoire being analysed is tonal or non-tonal. If the Schenkerian approach is regarded as originary, non-originary approaches might include James Baker, 'Chromaticism in Classical Music', in Hatch and Bernstein (eds), *Music Theory and the Exploration of the Past*, pp. 233–308; Daniel Harrison, *Harmonic Function in Chromatic Music* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Richard L. Cohn, 'Maximally Smooth Cycles, Hexatonic Systems, and the Analysis of Late Romantic Triadic Progressions', *Music Analysis*, 15/i (1996), pp. 9–40.