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C H A P T E R
 
Cognitive Linguistics
Vyvyan Evans
Abstract
Cognitive linguistics is a modern school of linguistic thought and practice concerned with investigating
the relationships among human language, the mind, and sociophysical (embodied) experience.
This chapter presents and evaluates its two primary, theoretical commitments—​the generalization
commitment and the cognitive commitment—​as well as the five theses arising from these that guide
cognitive linguistics research: the thesis of embodied cognition; the thesis of encyclopaedic semantics;
the symbolic thesis; the thesis that meaning is conceptualization; and the usage-​based thesis.The
chapter then surveys some of the most influential theoretical approaches within cognitive linguistics,
showing how they exemplify and realize the central theses of the cognitive linguistics enterprise.
Key Words:  cognitive linguistics, generalization commitment, cognitive commitment, conceptual
metaphor, blending, constructions, lexical semantics, meaning construction, conceptual structure, grammar
Introduction
Cognitive linguistics is a modern school of linguistic
thought and practice concerned with investigating
the relationships among human language,
the mind, and sociophysical (embodied) experience.
It originated in scholarship that emerged in the
1970s, conducted by a small number of researchers.
These include Charles Fillmore (e.g., 1975, 1978),
George Lakoff (e.g., 1977; Lakoff & Thompson,
1975), Ronald Langacker (e.g., 1978) and Leonard
Talmy (e.g., 1975, 1978). This research effort was
characterized by a rejection of the rationalist zeitgeist
in linguistics that held that language is innate
(Chomsky, 1965) and represents an encapsulated
module of mind (Chomsky, 1981; Fodor, 1983).
The early pioneers looked to new findings in cognitive
psychology that were then emerging in order
to develop an empiricist approach to linguistics. In
so doing, they were attempting to reconnect the
study of language with the nature the human mind.
As they then saw it, contemporary approaches to
the study of language in the Anglo-​American tradition,
most notably the generative approach to grammar
and the Montague approach to semantics had
left the discipline of linguistics bankrupt. The study
of natural language semantics had been lost amid
a highly formal and arcane procedure for identifying
truth conditions, and the study of grammar had
been reduced to an increasingly abstract architecture
that assumed underlying transformations for
converting kernel sentences into various surface
realizations. By the mid-​1970s, theoretical linguistics,
especially for Lakoff and Langacker, had lost its
way, and a reboot was required.
The strategy adopted was to step back from
the complexity of language and look at how the
mind works. Findings from psychology had, by
the 1970s, provided a reasonably thorough understanding
of some of the key elements involved in
how the mind perceives the world. Figure-​ground
segregation, attentional mechanisms, and processes
of schema formation and framing were all
15
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by now reasonably well understood. And new
work on how humans categorize conducted by
psychologist Eleanor Rosch (e.g., 1975), who,
like Fillmore, Langacker, Lakoff, and Talmy, was
also based on the West Coast of the United States,
was in the process of leading to a paradigm shift
in the study of categorization and knowledge
representation.
What then made this approach a “cognitive”
linguistics was that it sought to view language as
an outcome of the mind. Hence, understanding
new findings relating to the mind could and would
inform the study of language.
Today, cognitive linguists have highly detailed
models for the nature and structure of language,
informed by psychological mechanisms and processes.
But, by viewing language as an integral part
of mind, cognitive linguists have been able to do
more than just study language. In addition, cognitive
linguistics has developed detailed models
of conceptual structure. If language is informed
by cognition, then language can be deployed as a
window on the mind—​so cognitive linguistics contends.
Cognitive linguists deploy language as a key
methodology for studying knowledge representation.
And this has led to cognitive linguists being
in the vanguard of the development of an embodied
perspective on language and thought—​embodiment
is today a core perspective shared, in one form
or other, by large number of cognitive scientists
(see Barsalou, 2009, for a recent review). Indeed,
in recent years, cognitive linguistic theories have
become sufficiently sophisticated and detailed to
begin making predictions that are testable using a
broad range of converging methods from the cognitive
and brain sciences.
Perhaps what is most distinctive about cognitive
linguistics is that it is not a single articulated
theoretical perspective, nor a methodological toolkit.
Rather, cognitive linguistics constitutes an
enterprise characterized by a number of core commitments
and guiding assumptions. It constitutes
a loose confederation of theoretical perspectives
united by these shared commitments and guiding
assumptions.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the next
section, I provide an overview of the two primary
commitments of cognitive linguistics, its axiomatic
base. In the subsequent section I consider the five
theses of cognitive linguistics:  its postulates. It is
subscription to these that give a particular theoretical
architecture or approach its distinctive cognitive
linguistic character. I then consider the phenomena
that cognitive linguists have investigated before
addressing some of the most important theoretical
and methodological approaches to these phenomena.
The chapter then concludes by considering
some of the outstanding issues, areas, and questions
in cognitive linguistics.
Primary Commitments
Cognitive linguistics is distinct from other
movements in linguistics, both formalist and functionalist,
in two respects. First, it takes seriously the
cognitive underpinnings of language, the so-​called
cognitive commitment (Lakoff, 1990). Cognitive
linguists attempt to describe and model language in
the light of convergent evidence from other cognitive
and brain sciences. Second, cognitive linguists
subscribe to a generalization commitment: a commitment
to describing the nature and principles
that constitute linguistic knowledge as an outcome
of general cognitive abilities (see Lakoff, 1990)—​
rather than viewing language as constituting, for
instance, a wholly distinct encapsulated module of
mind. In this section, I briefly elaborate on these
two commitments that lie at the heart of the cognitive
linguistics enterprise.
The Cognitive Commitment
The hallmark of cognitive linguistics is the cognitive
commitment (Lakoff, 1990). This represents
a commitment to providing a characterization of
language that accords with what is known about
the mind and brain from other disciplines. It is this
commitment that makes cognitive linguistics cognitive,
and thus it forms an approach that is fundamentally
interdisciplinary in nature.
The cognitive commitment holds that principles
of linguistic structure should reflect what is known
about human cognition from the other cognitive
and brain sciences, particularly psychology, artificial
intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, and philosophy.
Accordingly, proposed models of language and
linguistic organization should reflect what is known
about the human mind, rather than represent
purely aesthetic dictates such as the use of particular
kinds of formalisms or economy of representation
(Croft, 1998).
The cognitive commitment has a number of
concrete ramifications. First, linguistic theories cannot
include structures or processes that violate what
is known about human cognition. For example, if
sequential derivation of syntactic structures violates
time constraints provided by actual human language
processing, then it must be jettisoned. Second,
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models that employ established cognitive properties
to explain language phenomena are more parsimonious
than those that are built from a priori simplicity
metrics. For instance, given the amount of
progress cognitive scientists have made in the study
of categorization, a theory that employs the same
mechanisms that are implicated in categorization in
other cognitive domains in order to model linguistic
structure is simpler than one that hypothesizes
a separate system. Finally, the cognitive linguistic
researcher is charged with establishing convergent
evidence for the cognitive reality of components of
any model proposed—​whether or not this research
is conducted by the cognitive linguist (Gibbs, 2006).
The Generalization Commitment
The Generalization Commitment (Lakoff,
1990) ensures that cognitive linguists attempt to
identify general principles that apply to all aspects
of human language. This goal reflects the standard
commitment in science to seek the broadest generalizations
possible. In contrast, some approaches to
the study of language often separate what is sometimes
termed the “language faculty” into distinct
areas such as phonology (sound), semantics (word
and sentence meaning), pragmatics (meaning in
discourse context), morphology (word structure),
syntax (sentence structure), and so on. As a consequence,
there is often little basis for generalization
across these aspects of language or even for study of
their interrelations.
Although cognitive linguists acknowledge that
it may often be useful to treat areas such as syntax,
semantics, and phonology as being notionally
distinct, cognitive linguists do not start with the
assumption that the “subsystems” of language are
organized in significantly divergent ways. Hence,
the generalization commitment represents a commitment
to openly investigate how the various
aspects of linguistic knowledge emerge from a common
set of human cognitive abilities upon which
they draw, rather than assuming that they are produced
in an encapsulated module of the mind consisting
of distinct knowledge types or subsystems.
The generalization commitment has concrete
consequences for studies of language. First, cognitive
linguistic studies focus on what is common
among aspects of language, seeking to reuse successful
methods and explanations across these aspects.
For instance, just as word meaning displays prototype
effects—​there are better and worse examples of
referents of given words, related in particular ways
(see Lakoff, 1987)—​so various studies have applied
the same principles to the organization of morphology
(e.g., Taylor, 2003), syntax (e.g., Goldberg,
1995, 2006), and phonology (e.g., Nathan, 2008).
Theses of Cognitive Linguistics
In addition to the two primary commitments of
cognitive linguistics, the enterprise also features a
number of postulates or theses. These can be captured
as follows:
1. The thesis of embodied cognition
2. The thesis of encyclopaedic semantics
3. The symbolic thesis
4. The thesis that meaning is conceptualization
5. The usage-​based thesis
The Thesis of Embodied Cognition
The thesis of embodied cognition is made of two
related parts. The first part holds that the nature
of reality is not objectively given but is instead a
function of our species-​specific and individual
embodiment—​this is the subthesis of embodied
experience (see Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson,
1980, 1999; Tyler & Evans, 2003). Second, our
mental representation of reality is grounded in our
embodied mental states:  mental states captured
from our embodied experience—​this is the subthesis
of grounded cognition (see Barsalou, 2009; Evans,
2009; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).
The subthesis of embodied experience maintains
that, due to the nature of our bodies, including our
neuroanatomical architecture, we have a species-​
specific view of the world. In other words, our construal
of “reality” is mediated, in large measure, by
the nature of our embodiment. One example of the
way in which embodiment affects the nature of experience
is in the realm of color. Whereas the human
visual system has three kinds of photoreceptors (i.e.,
color channels), other organisms often have a different
number (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991).
For instance, the visual systems of squirrels, rabbits,
and possibly cats make use of two color channels,
whereas other organisms, including goldfish and
pigeons, have four color channels. Having a different
range of color channels affects our experience of
color in terms of the range of colors accessible to us
along the color spectrum. Some organisms can see in
the infrared range, such as rattlesnakes, which hunt
prey at night and can visually detect the heat given
off by other organisms. Humans are unable to see in
this range. The nature of our visual apparatus—​one
aspect of our embodiment—​determines the nature
and range of our visual experience.
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A further consequence of this subthesis is that
as individual embodiment within a species varies,
so, too, will embodied experience across individual
members of the same species. There is now empirical
support for the position that humans have distinctive
embodied experience due to individual variables such
as handedness. That is, whether one is left-​or right-​
handed influences the way in which we experience
reality (Casasanto, 2009). In one experiment, for
instance, left-​handers were more likely to diagram a
preferred entity on their left and a dispreferred entity
on their right, whereas right-​handers placed preferred
entities to their right and dispreferred entities to their
left. This suggests that part of our conceptual representations
for Good and Bad may be influenced by
aspects of our individual embodiment.
The fact that our experience is embodied—​that
is, structured in part by the nature of the bodies
we have and by our neurological organization—​
has consequences for cognition—​the subthesis of
grounded cognition. In other words, the concepts
we have access to, and the nature of the “reality”
we think and talk about, are grounded in the
multimodal representations that emerge from our
embodied experience. More precisely, concepts constitute
reactivations of brain states that are recorded
during embodied experience. Such reactivations
are technically referred to as simulations. (I give an
example later relating to the word red that illustrates
this notion). These simulations are grounded in
multimodal brain states that arise from our action
and interaction with our sociophysical environment.
Such experiences include sensory-​motor
and proprioceptive experience, as well as states that
arise from our subjective experience of our internal
(bodily) environment, including our visceral sense,
as well as experiences relating to mental evaluations
and states and other subjective experiences, including
emotions and affect more generally and experiences
relating to temporal experience. From the
grounded cognition perspective, the human mind
bears the imprint of embodied experience. The
embodied experience and grounded cognition perspectives
together make up the thesis of embodied
cognition as current in cognitive linguistics.
The Thesis of Encyclopaedic Semantics
The thesis of encyclopaedic semantics is also
made up of two parts. First, it holds that semantic
representations in the linguistic system, what is
often referred to as semantic structure, relate to—​or
interface with—​representations in the conceptual
system. The precise details as to the nature of the
relationship can, and indeed do vary, however,
across specific cognitive linguistic theories. For
instance, Langacker (e.g., 1987) equates semantic
structure with conceptual structure, whereas Evans
(2009), maintains that semantic structure and conceptual
structure constitute two distinct representational
formats, with semantic structure facilitating
access to (some aspects of) conceptual structure.
The second part of the thesis posits the following.
The conceptual structure to which semantic
structure relates constitutes a vast network of structured
knowledge, a semantic potential (Evans, 2009)
that is hence encyclopedia-​like in nature and scope.
By way of illustration, consider the lexical item red.
The precise meaning arising from any given instance
of use of the lexical item red is a function of the range
of perceptual hues associated with our encyclopedic
set of mental representations for red, as constrained
by the utterance context in which red is embedded.
For instance, consider the following examples:
(1) The school teacher scrawled in red ink all
over the pupil’s exercise book.
(2) The red squirrel is almost extinct in the
British Isles.
In each of these examples, a distinct reactivation of
perceptual experience—​a simulation—​is prompted
for. In the example in (1) the perceptual simulation
relates to a vivid red, whereas in (2) the utterance
prompts for a brown/​dun hue of red. In other words,
the meaning of the lexical item red arises from an
interaction between linguistic and conceptual representations,
such that the most relevant conceptual
knowledge is activated upon each instance of
use. Examples such as those in (1) and (2) suggest
that word meaning does not arise by unpacking a
purely linguistic representation. Rather, it involves
access to and activation of multimodal brain states.
A simulation, then, is a reactivation of part of this
nonlinguistic semantic potential.
A consequence of this is that each individual
instance of word use potentially leads to a distinct
interpretation. For instance, fast means something
quite different in fast car, fast driver, fast girl, fast
food, and fast lane of the motorway. This follows
because any instance of use constitutes a distinct
usage-​event that may activate a different part of the
encyclopedic knowledge potential to which a lexical
item facilitates access.
The Symbolic Thesis
The symbolic thesis holds that the fundamental
unit of grammar is a form-​meaning pairing or
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Cognitive Linguistics 287
 
symbolic unit. The symbolic unit is variously termed
a “symbolic assembly” in Langacker’s cognitive
grammar or a “construction” in construction grammar
approaches (e.g., Goldberg’s cognitive construction
grammar; 1995, 2006). Symbolic units
run the full gamut from the fully lexical to the
wholly schematic. For instance, examples of symbolic
units include morphemes (for example, dis-​
as in distaste), whole words (for example, cat, run,
tomorrow), idiomatic expressions such as He kicked
the bucket, and sentence-​level constructions such as
the ditransitive (or double-​object) construction, as
exemplified by the expression:  John baked Sally a
cake (see Goldberg, 1995).
More precisely, the symbolic thesis holds that
the mental grammar consists of a form, a semantic
unit, and symbolic correspondence that relates
the two. This is captured in Figure 15.1. Hence,
the symbolic thesis holds that our mental grammar
comprises units that consist of pairings of form and
meaning.
One consequence of the symbolic thesis is that
the abstract rules posited in the generative grammar
tradition, for instance, are excluded from a
language user’s mental grammar. Langacker (1987)
for instance, posits a content requirement, a principle
that asserts that units of grammar must involve
actual content: units of semantic structure and phonological
form (even if phonologically schematic)
that are linked by a symbolic correspondence.
The adoption of the symbolic thesis has a number
of important consequences for a model of grammar.
Because the basic unit is the symbolic unit,
meaning achieves central status in cognitive linguistic
approaches to grammar. This follows because the
basic grammatical unit is a symbolic unit: form cannot
be studied independently of meaning.
The second consequence is that because there is
not a principled distinction between the study of
semantics and syntax—​the study of grammar is
the study of the full range of units that make up
a language, from the lexical to the grammatical.
Cognitive linguists posit a lexicon-​grammar continuum
(Croft, 2002; Langacker, 1987) to capture this
perspective. Whereas the grammar of a language
is made of symbolic units, symbolic units exhibit
qualitative differences in terms of their schematicity.
At one extreme are symbolic units that are highly
specified in terms of their lexical form and in terms
of the richness of their semantic content. Such symbolic
units, such as words, lie at the “lexical” end
of the lexicon-​grammar continuum. At the other
end lie highly schematic symbolic units, schematic
both in terms of phonological and semantic content.
An example of a symbolic unit of this kind
is the sentence-​level ditransitive construction studied
by Goldberg (e.g., 1995) and discussed in more
detail later. Lexically unfilled sentence-​level syntactic
templates such as the ditransitive construction
are held to have a schematic form and schematic
meaning conventionally associated with them as
exemplified in:
(3)
a. Form:    SUBJ VERB NP1 NP2
b. Meaning:  X CAUSES Y TO RECEIVE Z
Symbolic units of this sort lie at the “grammatical”
endpoint of the lexicon-​grammar continuum.
Whereas fully “lexical” and “grammatical” symbolic
units differ in qualitative terms, they are the same
Syntactic properties
Morphological properties
Phonological properties
Semantic properties
Pragmatic properties
Discourse-functional properties
Symbolic unit
Form
Symbolic
correspondence
Semantic
structure
Fig. 15.1 A symbolic unit.
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in principle, being symbolic in nature, in the sense
described. Moreover, examples such as these are
extreme exemplars. A range of symbolic units exist
in all languages, and these units occupy various and
less extreme points along the continuum.
A third consequence is that symbolic units can
be related to one another, both in terms of similarity
of form and semantic relatedness. One manifestation
of such relationships is in terms of relative
schematicity or specificity, such that one symbolic
unit can be a more (or less) specific instantiation
of another. Cognitive linguists model the relationships
between symbolic units in terms of a network,
arranged hierarchically and relating to levels of schematicity.
This is an issue I return to later when I discuss
the usage-​based thesis.
Finally, constituency structure—​and hence the
combinatorial nature of language—​is a function
of symbolic units becoming integrated or fused in
order to create larger grammatical units, with different
theorists proposing slightly different mechanisms
for how this arises. For instance, Langacker
(e.g., 1987) holds that constituency structure
emerges from what he terms conceptually dependent
(or relational) predications, such as verbs, encoding
a schematic slot, termed an elaboration site.
The elaboration site is filled by conceptually autonomous
(or nominal) predications, such as nouns. In
contrast, Goldberg (e.g., 1995), in her theory of
cognitive construction grammar, argues that integration
is due to a fusion process that takes place
between verb-​level slots—​that she terms participant
roles—​and sentence-​level argument roles, discussed
further later (see Evans, 2009, for further discussion
of these issues).
The Thesis That Meaning Is
Conceptualization
Language understanding involves the interaction
between semantic structure and conceptual structure
as mediated by various linguistic and conceptual
mechanisms and processes. In other words, linguistically
mediated meaning construction doesn’t simply
involve compositionality, in the Fregean sense,
whereby words encode meanings that are integrated
in monotonic fashion such that the meaning
of the whole arises from the sum of the parts
(see Evans, 2006, 2009, for discussion). Cognitive
linguists subscribe to the position that linguistically
mediated meaning involves conceptualization (i.e.,
higher order cognitive processing), some or much
of which is nonlinguistic in nature. Hence, the thesis
that meaning is conceptualization holds that the
way in which symbolic units are combined during
language understanding gives rise to a unit of meaning
that is nonlinguistic in nature—​the notion of a
simulation introduced earlier—​and relies, in part,
on nonlinguistic processes of integration.
There are two notable approaches to meaning
construction that have been developed within cognitive
linguistics. The first is concerned with the
sorts of nonlinguistic mechanisms central to meaning
construction that are fundamentally nonlinguistic
in nature. Meaning construction processes of
this kind have been referred to as backstage cognition
(Fauconnier [1985]/​1994, 1997). There are two
distinct, but closely related theories of backstage
cognition:  mental spaces theory, developed in two
monographs by Gilles Fauconnier ([1985]/​1994,
1997), and conceptual blending theory, developed by
Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). Mental
spaces theory is concerned with the nature and creation
of mental spaces, small packets of conceptual
structure built as we think and talk. Conceptual
blending theory is concerned with the integrative
mechanisms and networks that operate over collections
of mental spaces in order to produce emergent
aspects of meaning—​meaning that is in some
sense novel.
A more recent approach is LCCM theory (Evans,
2006, 2009, 2010, 2013), named after the two central
constructs in the theory: the lexical concept and
the cognitive model. LCCM theory is concerned
with the role of linguistic cues and linguistic processes
in meaning construction (lexical concepts)
and the way in which these lexical concepts facilitate
access to nonlinguistic knowledge (cognitive
models) in the process of language understanding.
Accordingly, because the emphasis is on the nature
and the role of linguistic prompts in meaning construction,
LCCM theory represents an attempt
to provide a front-​stage approach to the cognitive
mechanisms, and specifically the role of language,
in meaning construction.
The Usage-​Based Thesis
The usage-​based thesis holds that the mental
grammar of the language user is formed by the
abstraction of symbolic units from situated instances
of language use:  utterances—​specific usage-​events
involving symbolic units for purposes of signaling
local and contextually relevant communicative
intentions. An important consequence of adopting
the usage-​based thesis is that there is no principled
distinction between knowledge of language
and use of language (competence and performance,
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in generative grammar terms) because knowledge
emerges from use. From this perspective, knowledge
of language is knowledge of how language is used.
The symbolic units that come to be stored in the
mind of the language user emerge through processes
of abstraction and schematization (Langacker, 2000),
based on pattern recognition and intention reading
abilities (Tomasello, 1999, 2003). Symbolic units
thus constitute what might be thought of as mental
routines (Langacker, 1987) consisting, as we have
seen, of conventional pairings of form and meaning.
One of the consequences of the usage-​based
thesis is that symbolic units exhibit degrees of
entrenchment—​the degree to which a symbolic unit
is established as a cognitive routine in the mind of
the language user. If the language system is a function
of language use, then it follows that the relative
frequency with which particular words or other
kinds of symbolic units are encountered by the
speaker will affect the nature of the grammar. That
is, symbolic units that are more frequently encountered
become more entrenched. Accordingly, the
most entrenched symbolic units tend to shape
the language system in terms of patterns of use,
at the expense of less frequent and thus less well
entrenched words or constructions. Hence, the
mental grammar, although deriving from language
use, also influences language use.
A further consequence of the usage-​based thesis
is that by virtue of the mental grammar reflecting
symbolic units that exist in language use, and
employing cognitive abilities such as abstraction
in order to extract them from usage, the language
system exhibits redundancy. That is, redundancy
is to be expected in the mental grammar. As noted
earlier, symbolic units are modeled in terms of a
network. Redundancy between symbolic units is
captured in terms of a hierarchical arrangement
of schema-​instance relations holding between more
schematic and more specific symbolic units. By way
of illustration, Figure 15.2 captures the schema-​
instance relationships that hold between the more
abstract [P [NP]] symbolic unit and the more specific
instances of this abstract schema, such as [to
me]. The usage-​based thesis predicts that because [P
[NP]] is a feature of many (more specific) instances
of use, it becomes entrenched in long-​term memory
along with its more specific instantiations.
Moreover, the schema ([P [NP]]) and its instances
(e.g., [to me]), are stored in related fashion, as illustrated
in the figure.
Concerns of Cognitive Linguistics
The received view in language science has been
to separate the study of language into distinct
subdisciplines, for instance, phonology, morphology,
syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and so on. In
part, this has reflected the assumption, promulgated
by Chomsky (e.g., 1957), that these types
of linguistic knowledge can not only be studied,
in practice, as distinct knowledge types, but also
are governed by wholly distinct and incommensurable
principles.
For reasons discussed in the foregoing sections,
cognitive linguists tend not to separate the study
of language in such a compartmentalized way. In
the most general terms, theoretical approaches that
have emerged thus far in the cognitive linguistics
enterprise can be said to broadly focus, more or less,
on three general areas of enquiry:  (1)  conceptual
structure, (2)  linguistic semantics, and (3)  grammar.
I structure the discussion in this section around
these areas.
Conceptual Structure
The human conceptual system is not open to
direct investigation. Nevertheless, cognitive linguists
maintain that the properties of language allow us to
reconstruct the properties of the conceptual system
and to build a model of that system. The logic of
this claim is as follows. Because language structure
and organization reflect various known aspects of
cognitive structure, by studying language—​which is
observable—​we thereby gain insight into the nature
of the conceptual system. The subbranch of cognitive
linguistics that deploys language in order to
investigate conceptual structure is often referred to
as cognitive semantics.
[P [NP]]
[to me] [on the floor] [in the garage]
Fig. 15.2  Schema-​instance relationships.
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290	Evans
 
The Embodied Nature
of Conceptual Structure
Given the thesis of embodied cognition discussed
earlier, a key area of investigation within cognitive
semantics has been directed at investigating conceptual
metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999).
According to this approach, conceptual metaphors
give rise to systems of conventional conceptual mappings
held in long-​term memory. Consider the following
example:
(4) The number of shares has gone up.
According to Lakoff and Johnson, examples like
this are motivated by a highly productive conceptual
metaphor that is also evident in (5):
(5)
a. John got the highest score on the test.
b. Mortgage rates have fallen.
c. Inflation is on the way up.
This metaphor appears to relate the domains of
quantity and vertical elevation. In other words,
we understand greater quantity in terms of increased
height and decreased quantity in terms of lesser
height. Conceptual metaphor scholars like Lakoff
and Johnson argue that this conventional pattern of
conceptual mapping is directly grounded in ubiquitous
everyday experiences. For example, when we
pour a liquid into a glass, there is a simultaneous
increase in the height and quantity of the fluid. This
is a typical example of the correlation between height
and quantity. Similarly, if we put items onto a pile,
an increase in height correlates with an increase in
quantity. This experiential correlation between height
and quantity, which we experience from an early age,
has been claimed to motivate the conceptual metaphor
more is up, also known as quantity is vertical
elevation.
Grammatical Systems
One way of uncovering conceptual structure in
language is by investigating the way in which it is
encoded in the fabric of language: in grammar. In
his research, Talmy (2000) primarily focuses on the
nature of the conceptual content that gets encoded
by the grammatical system.
Talmy proposes that the grammatical structure
is arranged in terms of a limited number of large-​
scale schematic systems (Talmy, 2000). These allow
the grammar of a language to provide a foundational
level of schematic meaning, which is essential for
conveying richer meaning. For instance, take the
following:
(6) Those boys are painting my railings.
Here, the specifically grammatical elements—​the
so-​called function words—​are highlighted in bold.
These are elements that convey structural information
about a particular scene, rather than detailed
content, and which contrast with “content” words.
Now, if we remove the content words from the sentence,
namely, boy, paint, and railing, we end up
with something like the following sentence:
(7) Those somethings are somethinging my
somethings.
This represents, as close as we can approximate,
what a sentence might look like without content
words. But although the meaning provided by
this sentence is rather schematic—​we don’t know
what the “somethings” are, neither subject nor
object, nor what the subject is doing to the object,
the sentence does convey quite a lot. It tells us the
following:
(8) “More than one entity close to the speaker
is presently in the process of doing something to
more than one entity belonging to the speaker.”
If we exchange the content words for different ones,
we can end up with a description of an entirely different
situation, but the schematic meaning provided
by the function morphemes remains the same:
(9) Those workers are mending the roads.
Talmy’s point is that grammar allows relatively
stable information to be conveyed in an economical
way. Richer content words are draped across the
grammatical structure, thus facilitating communication.
Grammar, then, provides the basis for linguistic
meaning.
In his work, Talmy has primarily elucidated
four schematic systems, although he acknowledges
there are likely to be others. These are given in
Figure 15.3.
Schematic systems can be further divided into
schematic categories. By way of illustration, I elucidate
one schematic category from one schematic
system: the configurational system. This schematic
system structures the temporal and spatial properties,
as conveyed by language, associated with
an experiential complex, such as the division of a
given scene into parts and participants. Consider
the schematic category that Talmy identifies as
degree of extension. “Degree of extension” relates to
the degree to which matter (space) or action (time)
are extended. The schematic category “degree of
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extension” has three values:  a point, a bounded
extent, or an unbounded extent.
To make this clear, consider the examples in
(10)–​(12). These employ grammatical elements in
order to specify the degree of extension involved:
(10) Point  at + NP point-​of-​time
The train passed through at [noon].
(11) Bounded extent in + NPextent-​of-​time
She went through the training circuit in
[five minutes flat].
(12) Unbounded extent “keep—​ing” + “–​er
and –​er”
The plane kept going higher and higher.
As these examples illustrate, some grammatical
elements encode a particular degree of extension.
For instance, in (10) the preposition at, together
with an NP that encodes a temporal point, encodes
a point-​like degree of extension. The NP does not
achieve this meaning by itself: if we substitute a different
preposition for instance, a construction containing
the same NP noon can encode a bounded
extent (e.g., The train arrives between noon and
1 p.m.). The punctual nature of the temporal experience
in example (10) forms part of the grammatical
system and is conveyed in this example by closed-​
class forms. The nature of the punctual event, that
is, the passage of a train through a station rather
than, say, the flight of a flock of birds overhead,
relates to content drawn from the lexical system
(e.g., the selection of the form train versus birds).
In the example in (11), the preposition in,
together with an NP that encodes a bounded extent,
encodes a bounded degree of extension. In (12),
the grammatical elements keep –​ing + –​er and –​er
encode an unbounded degree of extension. This
closed-​class construction provides a grammatical
“skeleton” specialized for encoding a particular
value within the schematic category “degree of
extension.” The lexical system can add dramatically
different content meaning to this frame (e.g., keep
singing louder and louder; keep swimming faster and
faster; keep getting weaker and weaker), but the schematic
meaning contributed by the structuring system
remains constant—​in all these examples, time
has an unbounded degree of extension.
Conceptual Integration
The conceptual integration perspective is concerned
with the study of the “backstage” mechanisms
that facilitate meaning construction.
Although the processes involved are largely nonlinguistic
in nature and serve to integrate units of conceptual
structure in producing meaning, language
reveals these otherwise unseen operations that
facilitate meaning production behind the scenes
(Fauconnier, [1985]/​1994, 1997; Fauconnier &
Turner, 2002).
The conceptual integration perspective holds
that when we think and talk, humans assemble
what are referred to as mental spaces. These are
“packets” of conceptual material, assembled “on the
fly” for local purposes of language understanding
and conceptual processing. Moreover, material from
these mental spaces qua conceptual packets can be
selectively projected to form a hybrid mental space
drawn from a number of so-​called input mental
spaces. This hybrid mental space is referred to as a
blended space, also known as a blend.
To briefly illustrate the process of mental
space formation and blending, consider the following
joke:
(13) Q. What do you get if you cross a kangaroo
with an elephant?
A. Holes all over Australia!
Conceptual Structuring
‘grammatical’
System
Configurational
System
Perspectival
System
Attentional
System
Force-dynamic
System
Fig. 15.3  The schematic systems identified by Talmy.
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The conceptual integration perspective holds
that, in order to understand and hence “get” the
joke, we have to perform conceptual integration
across mental spaces and thus construct a blend.
Although we have complex bodies of knowledge
available to us concerning elephants and kangaroos,
including their size, means of locomotion,
and their geographical region of abode, all of which
gets diffusely activated by the question, the punch-​
line prompts us to selectively project only specific
aspects of our knowledge relating to elephants and
kangaroos in order to build a blended space. In
the blend, we integrate information relating to the
abode and manner of locomotion associated with
kangaroos with the size of elephants. The hybrid
organism we come up with, which exists only in the
blend, which is to say “in” our heads, has the size
of an elephant, lives in Australia, and gets about by
hopping. Such an organism would surely leave holes
all over Australia. The joke is possible only because
the operation of blending is a fundamental aspect
of how we think. Moreover, blending is revealed by
language use; linguistically mediated meaning construction
relies on it.
Categorization
Another way in which cognitive linguists have
investigated conceptual structure has been to investigate
categorization in language. In the 1970s, pioneering
research by cognitive psychologist Eleanor
Rosch and colleagues revealed that categorization is
not an all-​or-​nothing affair but that many categorization
judgments seemed to exhibit typicality effects. For
example, when we categorize birds, certain types of
bird (like robins or sparrows) are judged as “better”
examples of the category than others (like penguins).
George Lakoff (1987) explored some of the consequences
of the observations made by Rosch and
her colleagues for a theory of conceptual structure
as manifested in language. Lakoff observed that linguistic
categories appear to exhibit typicality effects
in the same way as natural object categories. For
instance, when we describe an eligible unmarried
man as a bachelor, such an example is a much better
exemplar of the category than, say, the Pope or
Tarzan.
Lakoff argued that what this reveals is that conceptual
structure consists of what he termed idealized
cognitive models (ICMs). An ICM is a highly abstract
frame that accounts for certain kinds of typicality
effects in categorization. For instance, the linguistic
category of “bachelor,” as reflected in language use, is
understood, Lakoff argued, with respect to a relatively
schematic ICM of marriage. The marriage ICM
includes the knowledge that bachelors are unmarried
adult males and therefore can marry. However, our
ICM relating to Catholicism stipulates that the Pope
cannot marry. It is because of this mismatch between
the marriage ICM—​with respect to which bachelor
is understood—​and the Catholicism ICM—​with
respect to which the Pope is understood—​that this
particular typicality effect arises.
Linguistic Semantics
Cognitive linguistic approaches to linguistic
semantics have focused on the nature of lexical
representation and, more recently, compositional
semantics—​the linguistic mechanisms whereby
semantic structure interfaces with conceptual structure
in the construction of meaning. I address representative
topics of enquiry here.
The Encyclopedic Nature
of Word Meaning
Research into the encyclopedic nature of meaning
has mainly focused on the way semantic structure
is organized relative to conceptual knowledge
structures. One proposal concerning the organization
of word meaning is based on the notion of a
frame against which word meanings are understood.
This idea has been developed in linguistics by
Charles Fillmore (1975, 1978, 1982, 1985). Frames
are detailed knowledge structures or schemas emerging
from everyday experiences. According to this
perspective, knowledge of word meaning is, in part,
knowledge of the individual frames with which a
word is associated. A  theory of frame semantics
therefore reveals the rich network of meaning that
makes up our knowledge of words.
By way of illustration, consider the verbs rob and
steal. On first inspection, it might appear that these
verbs both relate to a theft frame, which includes
the following roles: thief, target (the person or a
place that is robbed), and goods (to be) stolen.
However, there is an important difference between
the two verbs: whereas rob profiles thief and target,
steal profiles thief and goods. The examples
in (14) are from Goldberg (1995, p. 45):
(14)
a. [Jesse] robbed [the rich] (of their money)
<thief target goods>
b. [Jesse] stole [money] (from the rich)
<thief target goods>
In other words, whereas both verbs can occur in
sentences with all three participants, each verb has
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different requirements concerning which two participants
it requires. This is illustrated by the following
examples (although it’s worth observing that
(15a) is acceptable in some British English dialects);
note that an asterisk preceding a sentence is the convention
used in linguistics to denote a sentence as
being ungrammatical:
(15)
a. *Jesse robbed the money
b. *Jesse stole the rich
A related approach is the notion of profile-​base
organization, developed by Langacker (e.g., 1987).
Langacker argues that a linguistic unit’s profile is the
part of its semantic structure upon which that word
focuses attention: this part is explicitly mentioned.
The aspect of semantic structure that is not in focus
but is necessary in order to understand the profile is
called the base. For instance, the lexical item hunter
profiles a particular participant in an activity in
which an animal is pursued with a view to its being
killed. The meaning of hunter is only understood
in the context of this activity. The hunting process
is therefore the base against which the participant
hunter is profiled.
Polysemy
It is widely acknowledged in linguistics that
words typically have more than one meaning conventionally
associated with them (see Evans, 2009;
Tyler & Evans, 2003, for discussion). When the
meanings are related, this is termed polysemy. By
way of illustration, consider these examples for over,
adapted from Tyler and Evans (2003):
(16)
a. The bee is over the flower.
b. The cat jumped over the wall.
c. The ball landed over the wall.
d. I prefer tea over coffee.
e. The movie is over.
f. The government handed over power.
Moreover, polysemy appears to be the norm rather
than the exception in language. Lakoff (1987) proposed
that lexical units like words should be treated
as conceptual categories, organized with respect to
an ICM. According to this point of view, polysemy
arises because distinct senses of a word such as over
are linked to a central sense, with each sense being
related to one another in a network structured with
respect to and radiating out from the central sense
or ICM. In this, word senses form a semantic network
that can be conceptualized as a radial category.
For instance, for many native speakers, the use of
over in (16a) is most typical, whereas other senses
become increasingly more abstract, as in later examples,
such as (16f). This finding has been verified
empirically (Tyler, 2012).
Compositional Semantics
A recent approach to linguistic semantics (Evans,
2006, 2009, 2010, 2013) attempts to account for
variation in word meanings across contexts of use,
such as polysemy, but also a wider range of linguistic
semantic phenomena including metaphor and
metonymy. This approach posits a distinction in the
nature of the semantic representations that populate
the linguistic and conceptual systems. The semantic
representational format of the linguistic system is
modeled in terms of the theoretical construct of the
lexical concept, whereas the semantic representational
format of the conceptual system is modeled in terms
of the construct of the cognitive model—​notions that
give the theory its name: the theory of lexical concepts
and cognitive models (or LCCM theory for short).
In LCCM theory, a cognitive model is a composite
multimodal knowledge structure grounded
in the range of experience types processed by the
brain, including sensory-​motor experience, proprioception,
and subjective experience. In contrast,
a lexical concept—​the semantic pole of a symbolic
unit—​consists of a bundle of different types of schematic
knowledge encoded in a format that can be
directly represented in the time-​pressured auditory-​
manual medium that is manifested by the world’s
spoken and signed natural languages.
A key aim of LCCM theory is to provide a programmatic
account of the compositional mechanisms
that allow language to activate nonlinguistic
(conceptual) knowledge in the construction of linguistically
mediated meaning. In essence, LCCM
theory treats semantic variation in word meaning
as a function of interaction between linguistic and
conceptual content. The distinctive semantic contribution
of a particular word in any given context
of use results from the differential activation of the
encyclopedic multimodal knowledge structures to
which words facilitate access.
Grammar
In this section, I examine the way language has
been modeled by cognitive linguists. In particular,
I  show that, in slightly different ways, cognitive
approaches to grammar reveal how linguistic structure
and organization reflects and interacts with
aspects of cognition.
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Cognitive Grammar
In this section, I briefly consider the way in which
cognitive linguistics views language structure and
organization as an outcome of generalized conceptual
mechanisms. In so doing, I draw on the seminal work
of Langacker (1987, 1991a, 1991b, 1999, 2008), as
exemplified in his theory of cognitive grammar.
In his work, Langacker has developed a model
of language that treats linguistic structure and
organization as reflecting general cognitive organizational
principles. In particular, mechanisms relating
to cognitive aspects of attention are claimed to
underpin the organization of linguistic structure.
Langacker defines attention as being “intrinsically
associated with the intensity or energy level of cognitive
processes, which translates experientially into
greater prominence or salience” (Langacker, 1987,
p. 115). I briefly consider a theoretical construct,
posited in cognitive grammar, which is held to be
central to attention in general and that also shows
up in linguistic organization. This is the notion of
trajector-​landmark organization.
This theoretical construct is motivated by an
attentional phenomenon concerning the relative
prominence assigned to entities involved in a
relationship of some sort. For instance, in events
involving energy transfer, what Langacker refers to
as an action chain (e.g., John started the ball rolling),
one participant typically transfers energy to another
entity, thereby affecting it. As such, the affecting
participant is more salient.
Langacker maintains that the assignment of relative
prominence to entities at the perceptual and
cognitive levels is also a fundamental design feature
of language. Indeed, he claims that it shows up
at the level of the word, phrase, and clause and is
therefore fundamental for constituency and hence
the ability of symbolic units to be combined with
one another in order to form larger units. To illustrate
this idea, consider the distinction between the
following two utterances:
(17) John ate all the pizza.
(18) All the pizza was eaten by John.
These utterances relate to an action chain in which
some activity, namely eating, is performed by John
on the pizza so that there is no pizza left. Yet each
utterance assigns differential relative prominence to
the participants in this action chain, namely John
and pizza. In English, and in language in general,
the first participant slot in an utterance, commonly
referred to as the subject position, is reserved for participants
that are most prominent. The participant
in a profiled relationship that receives greatest prominence,
what Langacker terms focal prominence, is
referred to as the trajector (tr). The participant that
receives lesser prominence, referred to as secondary
prominence, is termed the landmark (lm). The
distinction, then, in the utterances above is that in
(17) John corresponds to the tr and pizza to the lm,
whereas in (18) pizza corresponds to the tr and John
to the lm. This distinction is captured by Figure
15.4. The distinction between tr and lm approximates
the more traditional distinction between subject
and object. The advantage is that it provides a
conceptual basis for the distinction.
The diagrams in Figure 15.4 reveal the following.
Although the transfer of energy is still the same across
the two utterances, as indicated by the direction of the
arrows, the participants are assigned differential prominence
across the two utterances. Put another way, the
active and passive constructions, as exemplified by the
two utterances, in fact encode a distinction in terms
of the focal prominence associated with the two participants
involved in the relationship being conveyed.
This distinction, which is central to the way language
encodes the relationship between agents and patients,
in fact reflects a more general cognitive mechanism: in
distinguishing between the relative prominence paid
and assigned to participants in an action chain.
Construction Grammar
I now turn to the way in which cognitive linguistics
views language organization as reflecting
embodied experience. I  do so by considering the
TR LM
JOHN PIZZA
John ate all the pizza
LM TR
JOHN PIZZA
All the pizza was eaten by John
Fig. 15.4  The distinction between tr-​lm alignment across
agent-​patient reversal.
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Cognitive Linguistics 295
 
theory of cognitive construction grammar developed
in the work of Adele Goldberg (e.g., 1995,
2006). In her work, Goldberg has studied sentence-​
level symbolic units, what she refers to as constructions.
In keeping with the symbolic thesis, Goldberg
claims that sentences are themselves motivated by
sentence-​level symbolic units consisting of a schematic
meaning and a schematic form. For instance,
consider the following example:
(19) John gave Mary the flowers.
Goldberg argues that a sentence such as (19) is
motivated by the ditransitive construction. This
is essentially a symbolic unit that has the schematic
meaning: x causes y to receive z and the
form:  Subj Verb NP1 NP2. As with many other
symbolic units associated with the grammatical system
(in the sense of Talmy), the distransitive construction
is phonetically implicit. That is, its form
consists of a syntactic template that is not lexically
filled, but which stipulates the nature and range of
the lexical constituents that can be fused with it
(see Goldberg, 1995, for discussion and evidence
for positing sentence-​level constructions; see also
Goldberg, 2006; Evans, 2009).
A crucial question for Goldberg concerns what
motivates the semantics and the form of such
sentence-​level constructions. That is, what motivates
such constructions to emerge in the first place? In
keeping with the thesis of embodied cognition, she
posits what she terms the scene encoding hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, sentence-​level constructions
emerge from humanly relevant scenes that are
highly recurrent and salient in nature. For instance,
on many occasions each day, we experience acts of
transfer. Such acts involve three participants: the agent
who effects the transfer, the recipient of the act of the
transfer, and the entity transferred. In addition, such
acts involve a means of transfer. Goldberg holds that
the sentence-​level construction is motivated by the
human need to communicate about this highly salient
scene. Indeed, the semantics and the form associated
with this construction are uniquely tailored to
encoding such humanly relevant scenes. In this way,
grammatical organization, Goldberg suggests, reflects
fundamental aspects of human embodied experience.
The construction grammar perspective has
also been applied cross-​linguistically in the work
of William Croft (e.g., 2002). Indeed, based on
a wide range of typologically diverse languages,
Croft argues that construction grammar provides
the most appropriate means of modeling languages
from a typological perspective.
Language Learning
In addition to focusing on the nature and structure
of language and the way in which it reflects
embodied cognition cognitive linguists have also
explored how language is learned and acquired.
Langacker (2000, 2008) proposes that the units
that make up an individual’s mental grammar are
derived from language use. This takes place by schematization.
Schematization is the process whereby
structure emerges as the result of the generalization
of patterns across instances of language use.
For example, a speaker acquiring English will, as
the result of frequent exposure, discover recurring
words, phrases, and sentences in the utterances he
hears, together with the range of meanings associated
with those units. Schematization, then, results
in representations that are much less detailed than
the actual utterances that give rise to them, giving
rise to schemas. These are achieved by setting aside
points of difference between actual structures, leaving
just the points they have in common.
For instance, consider three sentences involving
the preposition in:
(20)
a. The puppy is in the box.
b. The flower is in the vase.
c. There is a crack in the vase.
In each sentence the “in” relationship is slightly dif-
ferent: whereas a puppy is fully enclosed by the box,
the flower is only partially enclosed—​in fact, only
part of the flower’s stem is in fact “in” the vase. And,
in the final example, the crack is not “in” the vase,
but “on” the exterior of the vase—​albeit enclosed
by the vase’s exterior. These distinct meanings arise
from context. Yet, common to each is the rather
abstract notion of enclosure; it is this commonality
that establishes the schema for in. Moreover, the
schema for in specifies very little about the nature
of the entity that is enclosed, nor much about the
entity that does the enclosing. Langacker argues
that the units of our mental grammar are nothing
more than schemas.
In sum, schematization, a fundamental cognitive
process, produces schemas based on utterances
that children are exposed to during interaction with
adults, older siblings, and so on. These schemas consist
of words, idioms, morphemes, or even types of
sentence-​level constructions that exhibit their own
patterns of syntax. In this way, Langacker makes two
claims: general cognitive processes are fundamental to
grammar, and the emergence of grammar as a system
of linguistic knowledge is grounded in language use.
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A consequence of Langacker’s usage-​based
account is that the frequency with which a particular
expression is heard has consequences for
the resulting mental grammar that the child constructs.
And this fits with the recent findings in
developmental psycholinguistics (see Tomasello,
2003, for a review). Indeed, Langacker argues that
how frequently an expression occurs in a child’s
input determines how well entrenched the expression
comes to be in the child’s developing mental
grammar.
Bybee (2006) has conducted a significant
amount of research on the nature of frequency
and repetition in language use. She identifies two
main types of frequency effect that are relevant for
language learning. The first of these concerns the
frequency with which specific instances of language
are employed: token frequency. For instance,
the semantically related nouns falsehood and lie are
differentially frequent. Whereas lie is much more
commonly used, falsehood is much more restricted
in use. This gives rise to differential entrenchment
of the mental representations of these forms. This is
illustrated in the diagrams in Figure 15.5. Because
greater frequency has been found to lead to earlier
and more robust acquisition, this suggests that more
frequent instances of given expressions result in
their being more strongly entrenched in the mental
grammar. This difference between the two expressions
is captured by the bolding in the diagrams.
The expression lie appears in bold, signaling greater
entrenchment; falsehood doesn’t.
The second type of frequency relates not to
specific items of language, but to schemas that are
formed via the process of schematization described
earlier: type frequency. That is, language users form
schemas for types of patterns, rather than schemas
for tokens of language use. And the degree to
which the two sorts of schemas are entrenched in
the mind is a function of how frequently they crop
up in language use. For instance, the words lapped,
stored, wiped, signed, and typed are all instances
of the past tense schema [verbed]. The past tense
forms flew and blew are instances of the past tense
schema [XXew]. Because there tend to be fewer
utterances involving the distinct lexical items blew
and flew (because there are fewer distinct lexical
items of this type relative to past tense forms of the
–​ed type), then it is predicted that the [XXew] type
schema will be less entrenched in the grammar than
the [verbed] type schema. This is diagrammed in
Figure 15.6.
Cognitive linguists contend that not only are
abstract schemas stored as part of the mental grammar;
so too are individual instances of use. And this
is a consequence of frequency effects. So, whereas a
specific expression such as girls is predictable from
the word girl plus the plural schema [noun-​s],
because of the high frequency of the plural form
girls, this word is likely to be highly entrenched.
Hence, girls is stored in our mental grammar along
with the singular form girl, as well as the plural
schema [noun-​s]. This, however, contrasts with a
plural noun like portcullises, which is unlikely to be
stored because this expression has low frequency.
Instead, this form would be constructed by combination
of the plural schema and the singular form
portcullis.
According to Bybee (2010), a further consequence
of frequency and repetition in language
lie
lie lie lie lie lie
falsehood
falsehood falsehood
Low frequency
High frequency
Fig. 15.5  Token frequency effects.
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Cognitive Linguistics 297
 
input is that language is learned as chunks. Bybee
explains this as follows:
Chunking is the process behind the formation and
use of formulaic or prefabricated sequences of words
such as take a break, break a habit, pick and choose
and it is also the primary mechanism leading to the
formation of constructions and constituent structure.
(Bybee, 2010, p. 34)
Longitudinal studies by developmental psycholinguists
suggests that language is constructed bottom-​
up, rather than being guided by, for instance, a
top-​down universal grammar. Tomasello (2003) has
persuasively argued that language is learned in an
item-​based, rather than a rule-​based way, with generalizations
in terms of syntax being extracted from
item-​based constructions. The processes proposed
by Langacker, Bybee, and others would provide
the mechanisms by which this process occurs. In
short, an important factor in language acquisition
is the frequency with which expressions or “chunks”
occur in a child’s input. These chunks are learned,
initially, as entire units due to their repetition in
language use. And later, schemas are abstracted,
which are also, ultimately, an artifact of frequency
and repetition.
Finally, cognitive linguists (e.g., Evans, 2009;
Goldberg, 1995; Langacker, 2000; Lakoff, 1987;
Tyler & Evans, 2003) argue that linguistic units—​
constructions—​are organized in an individual’s
mind as a network, with more abstract schemas
being related to more specific instances of language.
As a result of the process of entrenchment, schemas
result that have different levels of schematicity. This
means that some schemas are instances of other,
more abstract, schemas. In this way, each of us carries
around with us in our head a grammar that has
considerable internal hierarchical organization.
Conclusion
Cognitive linguistics is a contemporary approach
to meaning, linguistic organization, language learning
and change, and conceptual structure. It s also
one of the fastest growing and influential perspectives
on the nature of language, the mind, and their
relationship with sociophysical (embodied) experience
in the interdisciplinary project of cognitive science.
What provides the enterprise with coherence
is its set of primary commitments and central theses.
Influential theories within the enterprise have
afforded practicing cognitive linguists the analytical
and methodological tools with which to investigate
the phenomena they address. What makes cognitive
linguistics distinctive in the contemporary study of
language and mind is its overarching concern with
investigating the relationships among human language,
the mind, and sociophysical experience. In
so doing, cognitive linguistics takes a clearly defined
and determinedly embodied perspective on human
cognition. And, in this, cognitive linguists have
developed a number of influential theories within
the interdisciplinary project of cognitive science
that self-​consciously strive for (and measure themselves
against) the requirement to be psychologically
plausible.
In terms of methods, cognitive linguistics has
now well-​established criteria and analytic frameworks
for the analysis of linguistic and nonlinguistic
phenomena. There is an excellent collection
detailing empirical methods in cognitive linguistics
VERB-ed
lapped stored wiped signed typed
XXew
flew blew
Low frequency
High frequency
Fig. 15.6  Type frequency effects.
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298	Evans
 
(Gonzalez-​Marquez, Mittelberg, Coulson, &
Spivey, 2006), as well as informed views on methods
in general in the literature, for example, with respect
to lexical semantics (e.g., Sandra, 1998; Sandra &
Rice, 1995). Since its inception in the mid to late
1970s, cognitive linguistics has matured in terms of
theories, methods, and scope. It is now firmly established
as a fundamental and impressively broad field
of enquiry within linguistics and cognitive science.
Future Directions
As it has developed, cognitive linguistics has
inevitably had to grapple with theoretical and methodological
problems. Some of the most notable of
these remain unresolved. One, for instance, relates
to the nature of concepts. For instance, what is the
difference, if any, between linguistic versus conceptual
meaning? Some cognitive linguists have,
at times, appeared to suggest that linguistic meaning
is to be equated with conceptual meaning (e.g.,
Langacker, 1987, 2008). Yet, findings in cognitive
linguistics—​for instance, the distinction between
the closed-​class and open-​class systems in cognitive
representation, as persuasively argued for by Talmy
(2000)—​would seem to suggest a more clear-​cut
distinction. Evans (2009, 2013) has argued, more
recently, for a principled separation between linguistic
versus nonlinguistic concepts. Such a separation
would seem to be supported by linguistic,
behavioral, and neuroscientific findings. Yet some
prominent psychologists (e.g., Barsalou et  al.,
2008) appear to have underestimated the complexity
of linguistic concepts, denying that language has
conceptual import independent of the conceptual
system. Others have gone the other way, arguing,
along the lines of Evans, for a principled separation
between the two knowledge types (see also Taylor &
Zwaan, 2009; Zwaan, 2004). The issue of the relative
semantic contribution of linguistic knowledge
versus conceptual knowledge to meaning construction
is a complex one and at present remains unresolved.
Clearly, communicative meaning relies on
language as well as nonlinguistic knowledge. As of
yet, however, the relative contribution, and the way
the two systems interface, is still not fully resolved.
Another outstanding issue relates to the domain
of time. A  common assumption within cognitive
linguistics holds that abstract patterns in thought
and language derive from the projection of structure
across domains—​the notion of conceptual
metaphor (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999).
However, it is not clear, in the domain of time,
for instance, that time is created by virtue of the
projection of spatial content, as is claimed by Lakoff
and Johnson (1999). Some researchers (Evans,
2004, 2009, 2013; Langacker, 1987; Moore, 2006)
have argued that time is as basic a domain as space.
Moreover, recent interest in reference strategies in
the domain of time cast doubt on a straightforward
projection of space to time (e.g., Galton, 2011;
Moore, 2011).
In addition, two issues have come to the fore in
recent work in cognitive linguistics. These are areas
that have not been prominent in earlier research,
and both bear special mention. The first is language
evolution (Croft, 2000; Sinha, 2009; Tomasello,
1999). Recent cognitively oriented accounts have
applied core insights from cognitive linguistics to
the nature of language change and its evolution.
The second is the so-​called social turn, whereby a
cognitive sociolinguistics has begun to be developed
(Harder, 2009).
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